III. CONDUCT OF THE GROUND WAR

The hostilities in Iraq in March and April 2003 were the largest engagement of ground forces since the Gulf War in 1991.  The U.S.-led Coalition deployed about 350,000 ground forces,[150] while the Iraqis fought with an estimated 350,000 ground forces in the regular army and Republican Guard[151] and between 18,000 and 40,000 paramilitary fedayeen.[152]  Human Rights Watch documented a number of cases that constituted serious violations of IHL by Iraqi armed forces.  Despite taking extensive precautions to protect civilians, U.S. and U.K. ground forces were found to have caused significant numbers of civilian casualties with the widespread use of cluster munitions, particularly in populated areas.  Moreover, in some instances of direct combat, problems with training on as well as dissemination and clarity of the U.S. ground forces' rules of engagement may have, in some instances, contributed to loss of civilian life.

Synopsis of the Ground War

On March 20, 2003, at approximately 6:15 p.m. local time, artillery from the U.S. Army's Third Infantry Division fired upon targets inside Iraq, followed shortly thereafter by artillery from the U.S. Marine Corps' First Marine Division.  By nightfall, mechanized infantry and armored forces from the Third Infantry Division, First Marine Division, and the British Army's First Armoured Division had crossed the Iraq-Kuwait border.  The U.S. Marines and British forces headed toward Umm Qasr, al-Fao Peninsula, and Basra, while the Third Infantry Division took a more westerly route to the Euphrates River Valley and, ultimately, to Baghdad.[153]

           

Coalition forces seized Umm Qasr by March 21, though skirmishes continued outside the city.  British forces and elements of the First Marine Division encircled Basra on March 22.  While British forces settled in to probe Basra's defenses and cut off the city, the First Marine Division pushed northwest along the Euphrates River toward al-Nasiriyya.  Task Force Tarawa, the Marines' lead element, encountered Iraqi forces on the outskirts of al-Nasiriyya just before dawn on March 23, 2003.[154]  A pitched battle between U.S. Marines and Iraqi forces ensued in and around the city for several days.  Some of the bloodiest fighting of the war occurred along a stretch of highway in al-Nasiriyya that became known as "Ambush Alley."  Having pushed through al-Nasiriyya by March 31, Marine units conducted raids on Ba`th party headquarters in the town of al-Shatra.[155]  The First Marine Division then moved toward the city of al-Kut on the Tigris River.  By April 2, U.S. forces were positioned to assault Baghdad from the southeast.

           

Meanwhile, advance elements of the Third Infantry Division pushed as far as one hundred miles (160 kilometers) inside Iraq by the evening of March 21.[156]  On March 22, the division's Second Brigade engaged enemy forces in al-Samawa, southeast of al-Najaf, while its Third Brigade seized a key bridge across the Euphrates River just northwest of al-Nasiriyya.  It also captured al-Talil airbase, southwest of that city and next to the ruins of the ancient city of Ur.[157]  The First Brigade moved the farthest of the three units, reaching a wide, flat desert plain known as the "Sea of al-Najaf" on the outskirts of the city of al-Najaf.  By March 23, the Third Infantry Division had advanced nearly two-thirds of the distance from the Kuwait border to Baghdad.[158]  In their rapid advance northward, elements of the division avoided fighting in the cities of al-Nasiriyya, al-Samawa, and al-Najaf, leaving behind pockets of resistance.  By the time the Third Infantry Division was just north of al-Najaf, its lines of supply and communication extended more than 300 miles (482 kilometers) to the Kuwaiti border and were vulnerable to attack from the regular and irregular Iraqi units that the Americans had passed en route.  Hampered by fierce sandstorms beginning on March 25 and stiff resistance from irregular forces around al-Samawa and al-Najaf, U.S. forces halted their advance to consolidate supply lines and eliminate Iraqi forces.

           

During this pause, U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army tactical aircraft continued to attack Republican Guard divisions south of Baghdad.  Between April 1 and 2, the First Marine Division began to progress up Highway 7 toward al-Kut.[159]  Nearly simultaneously, the U.S. Army began to push through the Karbala' Gap.[160]  U.S. forces advanced toward Baghdad from the southeast and the southwest in a coordinated movement, while elements of the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions stayed behind to pacify al-Najaf and Karbala' after major fighting there.  The First Brigade of the Third Infantry Division began the battle for the Saddam International Airport on April 4 while the Second Brigade assumed a blocking position to the south of the city; the First Marine Division approached to within ten miles (sixteen kilometers) of Baghdad from the southeast and spread over an arc to the east of the city.[161]

           

On April 5, the Second Brigade of the Third Infantry Division made the first U.S. foray into downtown Baghdad with a column of sixty armored vehicles.  After a three-hour movement through the city, it withdrew to its staging area to the south of Baghdad.[162]  On April 7, the brigade made another thrust, this time through the governmental district to the Republican Palace complex, and stayed overnight in Baghdad.  These operations on April 5 and 7 were nicknamed "Thunder Run."  On April 7, Basra fell to British forces.[163]  On April 9, Baghdad fell to U.S. forces.[164]

Iraqi Conduct in the Ground War

Iraqi forces violated international humanitarian law during the ground war, directly causing or contributing to civilian casualties.  In particular, Human Rights Watch documented instances of abuse of the red cross and red crescent emblems; violations of the prohibitions on the use of civilian shields, use of antipersonnel landmines, and location of military objects in protected places, such as hospitals, mosques, and cultural property sites; and a failure to take precautions in preparing for urban combat.  Witnesses also reported large numbers of Iraqi soldiers wearing civilian clothes, a practice that eroded the distinction between combatant and civilian and put the latter at risk.  It must be noted that Human Rights Watch was unable to interview members of the Iraqi armed forces in order to get their response to accusations of violations of IHL. 

Use of Human Shields

According to Human Rights Watch interviewees and U.S. and U.K. media reports, Iraqi armed forces endangered civilians by using them to shield combatants from the enemy.  Iraqi prisoners of war said they received orders to "use any means necessary" during their battle with the Marines including "putting women and children in the street."[165]  Human Rights Watch gathered testimonies that are consistent with such allegations.  Yusif Sahib Jawad, a 29-year-old taxi driver, witnessed fedayeen fighters hiding between houses on al-Madina Street where much of the fighting in al-Najaf took place.  "Most of the fedayeen and Ba`thists distributed and hid between houses because they thought the Americans wouldn't shoot civilians.  They used civilians as shields," he said.[166]  In one case, he saw Ba`th militia members spot a U.S. helicopter in the sky and then pull their car next to a car carrying a civilian family.  The helicopter fired and seven civilians died in their vehicle, Jawad said.[167]  The press reported that helicopter pilots often encountered these kinds of situations.[168]

 

Coalition forces interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported other cases of the use of human shields that they had witnessed.  In al-Najaf, Colonel David Perkins, commanding officer of the Second Brigade, Third Infantry Division, saw a fedayeen drive behind a home in a four-by-four vehicle with its lights off.  "He went into the building, came out with two women, one was holding a child.  So everyone held their fire, and luckily the women were able to break loose," Perkins said.  After his hostages fled, the fedayeen jumped back in his vehicle and started shooting; the U.S. troops then killed him.[169]  Perkins witnessed another case as his unit was trying to take a bridge across the Euphrates.  Iraqi forces lined up civilians in front of their vehicles so they could advance safely.  "It would cease all fire," Perkins said.[170]  A sergeant in Perkins' brigade said that during the battle of Baghdad, fedayeen would use civilians to shield themselves while running across the street.[171]

Members of other service branches reported similar situations.  Major Michael Samarov, a battalion executive officer, encountered civilian shields as his Marines entered Baghdad on April 8.  "There were busloads of people driven to our position on Highway 6.  When [the Iraqi military advance] wouldn't work, they threw families in the vehicles.  It was a very challenging situation.  We made every attempt to minimize casualties, but it was extraordinarily difficult," he said.[172]  In al-Shatra, a Marine corporal said a caravan of three buses drove toward his unit.  Fedayeen had put women and children in the first two to allow the third carrying fedayeen to advance on the Marines safely.[173] British troops also reported shielding from the southern part of the country.  During fighting east of Basra, Colonel Gil Baldwin, commanding officer of the Queen's Dragoon Guards, said he saw Iraqi forces "herd" women and children out of their homes and fire rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) over their heads.[174]  Human Rights Watch could not corroborate these specific incidents with non-military sources; however, the detail and repetition of the reports suggests a pattern.

The U.S. and U.K. press also reported incidents of Iraqi forces using civilians, including children, as human shields.  In one of many accounts, Sergeant David Baird, a tank commander of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, said fedayeen "were crossing the road to try and outflank us on the left and, as they crossed, four or five of them grabbed kids by the scruff of their necks and dragged them across with them. . . . The children were only five to eight years old."  After the fedayeen crossed, they let the children run back to their mothers.[175]

International humanitarian law prohibits the use of civilians as shields.  Parties to a conflict are expressly prohibited from directing the movement of civilians to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.[176]  In the cases described above, Iraqi soldiers used civilian bystanders to do both of the prohibited activities: to protect themselves and to advance on their enemy. 

Abuse of Red Cross and Red Crescent Emblems

Iraqi armed forces violated international humanitarian law by abusing the red cross and red crescent emblems.  These emblems may only be used to identify and protect medical personnel, buildings, and equipment in times of armed conflict and to identify national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

The night of March 23, during the battle for al-Najaf, fedayeen came to the Hay al-Hussain Ambulance Center.  The ambulances there and in other parts of Iraq were white with red crescent emblems on the front hood and rear door and sometimes on the side door.  The fedayeen told the center's staff that they knew of injured people who needed help and climbed in an ambulance with their guns.  "They got in . . . and then took part in the battle.  They used [the ambulance] as a cover to reach the field of battle," said Rashid Majid Hamid, 42, a paramedic, who witnessed two such cases.[177]  At 11:00 p.m. five days later, an intelligence official commandeered an ambulance from the same center and posed as an ambulance driver to scout the road twenty kilometers (12.4 miles) southeast of al-Najaf.  Paramedic Falah Muhsin, 52, said he was afraid to go along but "had no choice."[178]  While these examples involved taking local ambulances, in other cases, the fedayeen took ambulances from a more central source.  "Because they have so much power, they take them from the Ministry of Health," Muhsin said.[179]  A doctor at al-Najaf Teaching Hospital said he saw fedayeen driving in cars with red crescent flags.[180]  Coalition troops confirmed they had come under attack from ambulances.  Major Samarov said the Marines took fire from ambulances one or two nights.[181]  In another instance of abuse of the red crescent emblem, the Iraqi Intelligence Service occupied the Red Crescent Maternity Hospital in Baghdad.[182] 

An international aid worker also told Human Rights Watch that Iraqi forces disguised a Ba`th party militia building in Basra, with no connection to the ICRC, by affixing an ICRC emblem to it before the war started.[183]  Such buildings served as rallying points for the local militia.  They were used to store small arms, ammunition, rockets, grenades, and other ordnance, and during a crisis, the militia would go to there to receive orders.

These actions violate the prohibition on abuse of the emblem.  International humanitarian law has long prohibited making improper use of the "distinctive emblem" of the red cross or red crescent.[184]  Attacking the enemy under cover of the red crescent constitutes an abuse of the emblem.  Using the ICRC emblem to protect military objects is equally unlawful.

Use of Antipersonnel Landmines

Iraqi forces violated the prohibition on the use of indiscriminate weapons by laying antipersonnel landmines in several parts of the country.  British Royal Marines advancing toward Basra encountered freshly sown antipersonnel minefields as well as newly laid antivehicle mines that slowed their progress.[185]  "The U.N. withdrew three or four days before the war.  Then the Iraqis rushed to put mines along the border," said Dr. Akram al-Shuwali, director of Umm Qasr General Hospital.[186]  Mines caused several of the civilian casualties his hospital received during the war.[187]  Further north, Iraqi forces used landmines against advancing U.S. troops.  Landmines newly planted prior to the Coalition attack were reported on the road between Basra and Baghdad.[188]  The Iraqis reportedly deployed landmines along access routes to their positions around al-Nasiriyya.[189]  U.S. troops entering al-Najaf in the last days of March encountered mines on roads and bridges into the city.[190]  The Third Infantry Division was also "held up in a minefield" near Karbala'.[191]  According to a U.S. State Department demining expert, most mines found were a twenty-year-old design, largely imported from Italy.[192]

Although the heaviest fighting took place in south and central Iraq, Iraqi forces also used mines north of Baghdad.  In March 2003, reports emerged of Iraqi forces laying mines around the northern city of Kirkuk.[193]  It was confirmed after the Iraqi forces withdrew that they had laid antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines in dense minefields along and between main roads near Kirkuk and around abandoned military posts.[194]  Demining teams from the Mines Advisory Group operating in Kirkuk found Valmara 69 antipersonnel bounding fragmentation mines and PMN antipersonnel blast mines placed across nearly all routes and around strategic points.[195]  Mines were also encountered on the roads between Erbil and the cities of Kirkuk, Gwer, Mosul, and Makhmur.[196] 

Iraqis used landmines not only along their borders and the route of advancing enemy troops but also around civilian infrastructure.  "One month ago, the power lines were down and we could only get to the building through a minefield," said Lieutenant Colonel John Shanahan, commanding officer of a British explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit in Basra.[197]  British troops near the southern al-Rumaila oilfields found mines and booby-traps left by Iraqi forces.[198]  As part of their widespread mine-laying around villages in the Mosul-Kirkuk area, Iraqi forces reportedly mined water tanks in the town of Chamchamal after cutting off its water supply.[199]  Regardless of location, Iraqi mines continued to endanger civilians after the war.  In May, Human Rights Watch found abandoned Iraqi weapons caches that included antipersonnel mines and learned about both caches and minefields from clearance technicians in Basra, Karbala', al-Hilla, and Baghdad.[200]

Human Rights Watch believes that the use of antipersonnel landmines is prohibited by customary international law because they are inherently indiscriminate weapons.[201]  International humanitarian law prohibits "a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective."[202]  Antipersonnel landmines fall into that category.  They cannot distinguish between combatants, legitimate military objectives, and civilians who inadvertently activate them.  Thus, even though Iraq is not among the 141 parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty that prohibits use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines,[203] Human Rights Watch considers any use of such mines by Iraq a violation of IHL.

Location of Military Objectives in Protected Places

In addition to protecting civilians, international humanitarian law gives special protection to certain facilities, including hospitals, places of worship, and cultural property.  Iraqi armed forces used these protected places to advance their military goals.  The fedayeen, for example, used al-Nasiriyya Surgical Hospital as the base of their local operations.[204]  As discussed above, the Mukhabarat occupied the Baghdad Red Crescent Maternity Hospital and threatened to kill Dr. al-Rikabi, the hospital director, if he challenged them.[205]  Such military use of civilian hospitals violates international humanitarian law.  Parties to an armed conflict are required to respect and protect civilian hospitals, which may in no circumstances be attacked.[206]  This protection ceases, however, if the medical establishments are used to commit "acts harmful to the enemy."[207]  By using hospitals as military headquarters, Iraqi forces turned them into military objectives. 

Iraqi armed forces also sought to protect themselves by establishing positions in mosques.  In al-Najaf, they occupied the Imam `Ali Mosque, the most holy religious site in Iraq.  Wasfi Tahir, a 26-year-old merchant, said he saw Iraqi fedayeen and Ba`th militia fighting from this mosque in the middle of the city.  He said the fedayeen fired at U.S. troops, but the Americans did not return fire.[208]  The press reported that about 150 members of the Ba`th party and Fedayeen Saddam had taken positions in the mosque.[209]  In Baghdad, fedayeen from Syria moved into the Abu Hanifa mosque, one of the holiest Sunni shrines in Iraq. At 4:00 a.m. on April 9, a firefight broke out between U.S. forces and fedayeen inside the mosque.  According to a fedayeen combatant, the battle lasted until around noon, killing ten civilians and causing significant damage to the mosque's well-known clock tower.[210] 

International humanitarian law prohibits the use of "places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples . . . in support of the military effort."[211]  The Imam `Ali and Abu Hanifa mosques are not only places of worship, but also mosques with special religious and historical significance to Shi`a and Sunni Muslims, respectively.  Iraqi forces' use of these mosques for military actions is clearly illegal.

Fedayeen from Syria occupied the Abu Hanifa mosque in Baghdad, and on April 9, a firefight broke out between U.S. forces and fedayeen inside the mosque.  Damage to the mosque's clock tower is visible in this photo.  © 2003 Bonnie Docherty / Human Rights Watch

Iraqi forces also endangered cultural property by establishing military positions around historical landmarks.  Agargouf is a fifteenth-century B.C. ziggurat.  Ghanan Fadhil, an archaeologist at the site, said the Iraqi military had placed rocket launchers around the site and anti-aircraft guns on top of the mud-brick temple.  They also occupied the museum restaurant, only a couple hundred yards from the ziggurat.  The Coalition attacked these forces with both air- and ground-launched cluster munitions.  "They didn't hit the ziggurat but the site was so close there were many cracks in newer unsettled places," Fadhil said.[212]  When Human Rights Watch visited Agargouf in May, it found an SA-3 surface-to-air missile site across the road, a restaurant that had been trashed, and bullet shell casings on top of the monument.  This kind of collocation violates the prohibition on use of "historic monuments . . . which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples . . . in support of the military effort."[213]

Lack of Precautions in Preparing for Urban Combat

Iraqi forces regularly located military equipment in heavily populated areas.  Human Rights Watch saw military vehicles or anti-aircraft positions in schools and residential neighborhoods in every city it visited.  In at least some cases, the placement of this military hardware suggested that Iraqi armed forces failed to take the necessary precautions to spare civilians from the dangers of urban warfare.

From Baghdad to Basra, Human Rights Watch documented dozens of examples of such lack of precautions.  Iraqi forces established positions in civilian areas in the weeks before the war.  They brought military vehicles and weapons into Nadir, a crowded slum in al-Hilla, a week or so before the conflict began and several weeks before the battle there.[214]  In a village on the road between al-Hilla and Baghdad, Human Rights Watch saw three tanks wedged into three narrow alleyways.  Such placement would not have been the result of ordinary maneuvers during battle.  At al-Najah Intermediary School for Girls, located in a Karbala' residential area, Iraqi troops had dug fighting positions with anti-aircraft guns in the schoolyard.[215]  Human Rights Watch found dug-in mortar positions and anti-aircraft cannons between homes in Hay al-Zaitun in Basra.  Such placements appear to have been intentional, not merely the result of falling back into urban areas during fighting.

Iraqi forces also placed large caches of weapons and ammunition in civilian neighborhoods.  For example, residents said troops established caches in Hay al-Khadra, a neighborhood of Baghdad, the week before the war started.[216]  Several munition stores seemed to pre-date the war.  Human Rights Watch visited a huge storage facility near al-Maqal Airfield in Basra that was only a half-kilometer (.3 miles) from a civilian neighborhood.  The quantity and nature of the munitions stored at this facility were such that if it had been attacked, the civilian neighborhood would have suffered extensive damage.  These caches and the dangers they have posed to civilians are addressed in the last chapter of this report.

Iraqi forces placed this anti-aircraft gun in the yard of al-Najah Intermediary School for Girls, located in a Karbala' residential area.  It was one of dozens of examples of Iraqi placement of military hardware in civilian neighborhoods.  © 2003 Bonnie Docherty / Human Rights Watch

Some Iraqi civilians interviewed by Human Rights Watch interpreted the location of military hardware in neighborhoods as an intentional attempt by the Iraqi armed forces to use civilians to protect military objectives.  "They put anti-aircraft guns in civilian parts to have a safe place.  They thought the Americans would not hit them because it was between civilians," said Dr. Muhammad Hassan al-`Ubaidi of al-Najaf Teaching Hospital. 

Coalition troops made similar allegations.  Asked if he thought Iraqis sometimes used the location of military hardware to shield themselves, Colonel Lyle Cayce, staff judge advocate for the Third Infantry Division, "I don't think there is any question.  Look at the entire pattern across the battlefield.  Why put airplanes next to mosques?  You can't fly from there."[217]  Colonel Baldwin had the same impression after his experiences in southern Iraq.  "It must have become clear infrastructure areas were avoided [by Coalition forces].  It wouldn't take the brains of an archbishop to figure it out," he said.[218]  Baldwin described seeing a rocket launcher hidden in a village near Basra.  "It could easily have been dug in in the desert," he said, noting there was "no tactical value" to its placement in the village.[219]

Asked about the causes of civilian casualties in Baghdad, Dr. `Ali al-Aharkhi, chief of neurosurgery at the Adnan Khiralla Hospital, said, "The real problem was weapons put by our government in between civilian areas.  If you put tanks near houses, they will definitely be attacked.  There was a tank in front of my house.  [The military forces] refused to move it."[220]

Human Rights Watch also found examples of Iraqi troops failing to take any steps to protect the population, including the implementation of evacuation plans.  Four residents in Nadir, for example, said no precautions had been taken to ensure their safety.[221]  Residents of Hay al-Khadra'a in Baghdad provided similar testimony.[222]  "There were . . . vehicles, armor, and weapons (anti-aircraft and rocket launchers) in the streets, highway, and homes. . . . The Iraqi forces did not make any attempt to evacuate us.  They did nothing else to protect us and other civilians from the battle," said Munkith Fathi `Abd al-Razzaq.[223]  On the contrary, it appears the Iraqi troops hoped the presence of civilians would deter enemy attacks.

The location of military objectives in civilian areas raises concerns under international humanitarian law.  While IHL does not prohibit fighting in urban areas, it does require parties to an armed conflict to take precautions to protect civilians from the dangers of military operations.[224]  If properly implemented these precautions should provide civilians some protection in situations of urban warfare.  With regard to precautions taken against the effects of attacks, IHL requires parties to an armed conflict, "to the maximum extent feasible," to "avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas."[225]  They should also "endeavor to remove the civilian population . . . from the vicinity of military objectives."[226]

While military targets such as combatants and military hardware and vehicles may end up in civilian areas during combat, it appears based on Human Rights Watch's observations that the Iraqi armed forces intentionally located military objectives in civilian areas well ahead of any combat operations.  Human Rights Watch believes this practice, coupled with the failure to remove the civilian population from areas exposed to the dangers of fighting, amounts to a failure to take the precautions required by IHL against the effects of attacks.

Combatants in Civilian Clothes

Iraqi civilians around the country reported seeing Iraqi troops out of uniform.  Dr. `Abd al-Sayyid, director of al-Nasiriyya General Hospital, blamed many of the civilian deaths in the battle of al-Nasiriyya on the practice.  "Fedayeen were among the civilian homes. . . . [T]he problem was with the Iraqi troops and fedayeen dressed as civilians," he said.[227]  Yusif Sahib Jawad, the taxi driver who lived along the main battle route in al-Najaf, said he saw Ba`thist and fedayeen combatants wearing civilian clothes.[228]  Qassim Abu Ahmad, 35, witnessed the battle in al-Yarmuk neighborhood of Baghdad.  He reported that all of the fedayeen he saw in the street or on rooftops were dressed like civilians.[229]  When asked how they knew these combatants were not civilians bearing arms, Iraqis generally replied that "everyone in the neighborhood knows" who is a civilian and who belongs to the army, Ba`th party militia, or fedayeen.[230]

Almost every member of the Coalition interviewed by Human Rights Watch commented on this practice.  "By March 24 [the fourth day of the war], we were already seeing a large number of irregulars out of uniform.  It was clearly a combination of systematic and conscious," said Colonel Baldwin, whose troops advanced up al-Fao Peninsula to Basra.[231]  Major Samarov said the Marines encountered uniformed troops in the south, near Safwan, al-Zubayr, and Basra.  "After that I'd be hard-pressed to think of any enemy not in civilian clothes," he said.[232]  Other reports of Iraqi combatants fighting in civilian clothes came from Marines caught in an ambush along the route from al-Nasiriyya to al-Kut and the soldiers in the Second Brigade, Third Infantry Division, who fought in al-Najaf.[233]  The Iraqis often combined such conduct with use of civilian vehicles, particularly orange-and-white taxis.  On April 7, for example, Special Republican Guard forces launched a counterattack on Second Brigade forces entering Baghdad while firing from civilian vehicles and wearing civilian clothes.[234]

Such actions tend to erode the distinction between combatants and civilians and put the latter at risk.  They do not, however, relieve the opposing side of its obligation to distinguish at all times between combatants and civilians and to target only combatants.[235]  In case of doubt, a person must be considered a civilian.[236]

Conclusion and Recommendations

Iraqi forces committed a number of violations of international humanitarian law, which may have led to significant civilian casualties.  These violations included use of human shields, abuse of the red cross and red crescent emblems, use of antipersonnel landmines, placement of military objects in protected places (such as mosques, hospitals, and cultural property sites), and failure to take adequate precautions to protect civilians from the dangers resulting from military operations.  The Iraq military's practice of wearing civilian clothes tended to erode the distinction between combatants and civilians and put the latter at risk.

To prevent future IHL violations by Iraqi armed forces, Human Rights Watch recommends that the new Iraqi army be adequately trained in international humanitarian law and human rights law. 

 

Coalition Conduct in the Ground War

The Coalition took many precautions to spare civilians from the effects of the ground war, including vetting cluster munition strikes and giving guidance to troops involved in direct combat.  The use by U.S. and U.K. ground forces of cluster munitions, especially in or near populated areas, however, was one of the major causes of civilian casualties in the war.  Moreover, in some instances of direct combat, problems with training on as well as dissemination and clarity of the rules of engagement may have contributed to loss of civilian life.

Ground-Launched Cluster Munitions

The U.S. and U.K. use of ground-launched cluster munitions represented one of the major threats to civilians during the war.  Unlike Coalition air forces, American and British ground forces used cluster munitions extensively in populated areas.  Human Rights Watch found evidence of ground-launched submunitions (known as grenades) in residential neighborhoods across the country, including in Basra, al-Hilla, Karbala', al-Najaf, and Baghdad.  A military list of duds reported after the war shows that the use of these weapons was widespread along the battle route to Baghdad, including in and around other populated areas.[237]  While these strikes were directed at Iraqi military targets, the weapons' inaccuracy, broad footprints, and large numbers of submunitions caused hundreds of civilian casualties.

Use of Cluster Munitions

Coalition use of ground-launched cluster munitions far outstripped the use of air-dropped models.  CENTCOM reported in October that it used a total of 10,782 cluster munitions,[238] which could contain between 1.7 and 2 million submunitions.[239] 

An Iraqi woman holds a U.S. submunition dud she found on her home in Nadir, a neighborhood of al-Hilla.  The explosive had come out of the ground-launched DPICM shell so she was in no danger.  Thirty-eight civilians were killed and 156 were injured in Nadir during and after the U.S. attack on March 31, 2003.  © 2003 Marc Garlasco / Human Rights Watch

Although it did not break them down by type, field research and U.S. Air Force numbers suggest that the vast majority were ground-launched.  Human Rights Watch found evidence of at least four types of artillery-, rocket-, and missile-delivered submunitions.  The Third Infantry and 101st Airborne divisions and the 214th Field Artillery Brigade reported using 1,014 MLRS rockets, 330 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles, and 121 artillery shells with Sense and Destroy Armor Munitions (SADARMs), which carry at least 928,000 submunitions of varying types.[240]  They also used 17,423 artillery rounds, an unknown number of which carried submunitions.[241]  The United Kingdom, more forthcoming about its weapons choice, reported it used 2,100 ground-launched cluster munitions.[242]  Its L20A1 artillery projectile contains forty-nine grenades, for a total of 102,900 submunitions, more than ten times the number of cluster bomblets the Royal Air Force dropped. 

While information from CENTCOM and individual ground units has trickled in, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have not released final numbers of cluster munitions they launched.  Human Rights Watch called for more transparency on cluster use in an April 29 press release.[243]  Five months after the war, a senior CENTCOM official said the information was still unavailable.  "The process is continuing.  Units on the battlefield are still on the battlefield, and I can't swear to the precision of record keeping.  The guidance from CENTCOM and the Army and Marine Corps is to recreate to the best degree possible where munitions were used so we can provide back to the U.N. . . . a best guess of where they are [to facilitate clearance of duds]," the official said.[244]  CENTCOM's release in October of a figure for total cluster munitions implies it has completed its counting process.  Nevertheless, a complete breakdown by service branch and type of munition has yet to be made public.

U.S. and U.K. forces used these weapons to respond to or prevent incoming fire from Iraqi forces.  U.S. ground forces deployed cluster munitions primarily as a counter-battery tool, i.e. to destroy enemy mortars and artillery and to kill the troops operating them.  While six rounds of high explosive artillery, a unitary weapon that sends fragments fifty yards (forty-six meters) in every direction, was the "normal response" to incoming mortar fire, MLRS cluster munitions were used for longer-range targets.[245]  Ground-launched clusters were also used for suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions.[246]  These missions sought to clear a safe path for Apache helicopters by attacking "man portable air defense," such as an Iraqi soldier with a shoulder-launched missile.  They blanketed the path of a helicopter with submunitions, targeting places where such defense might have existed even if there was no observation to confirm it.[247]  British ground forces used cluster munitions for their anti-armor and area effects.  "If there's a twenty-tank convoy, if you use a precision-guided munition, you get one at a time.  If you use a cluster munition, you get twenty in one hit," said Colonel Baldwin.  For non-armored targets, the British fired high explosive artillery rounds.[248] 

The majority of the U.S. submunitions used were Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICMs).  Smaller than the air-dropped BLU-97, each DPICM grenade is 2.25 inches (5.5 centimeters) tall and 1.5 inch (3.5 centimeter) in diameter.  Sometimes likened to a battery, it is a cylinder, usually gray, that has one hollow end and, at the other, a white ribbon that arms and stabilizes it during flight.  It consists of a scored, steel fragmentation case with an armor-piercing shaped charge inside.  The DPICM can be launched by artillery or rocket.  A 155mm artillery projectile contains either eighty-eight or seventy-two M42 and M46 DPICMs, depending on the model.[249]  The MLRS has twelve rockets, each with 644 M77 DPICMs.  In Iraq, the standard volley of six rockets would release 3,864 submunitions over an area with a .6-mile (one-kilometer) radius.[250]  Both delivery systems leave shockingly large quantities of duds; the artillery projectiles have a dud rate of 14 percent, the MLRS a dud rate of 16 percent, about triple the Air Force estimate for BLU-97 bomblets.[251]

U.S. ground forces also used missile- and helicopter-launched submunitions.  The ATACMS consists of a thirteen-foot-long (four-meter-long) missile fired from a modified MLRS.  It contains 950 or 300 M74 softball-sized submunitions, each of which dispenses 195 fragments that target thin-skinned vehicles and personnel.[252]  The reported dud rate is 2 percent.[253]  The Hydra M261 rocket is launched from Apache or Cobra helicopters and contains nine submunitions with clover-leafed parachutes.[254]  These M73 grenades have a reported 4 percent dud rate.[255] 

For the first time in combat, the United States used the SADARM, a guided artillery-launched submunition.[256]  Each 155mm shell contains two submunitions that use wave and infrared sensors to detect armored vehicles.  If they find a target, they fire a penetrating slug that pierces armor.  If they do not, they are designed to self-destruct.[257]  Although further research will need be done to determine the weapon's humanitarian effects, a Third Infantry Division presentation on lessons learned in Iraq described the SADARM as a "winner," saying it was accurate and "very effective" against tanks and other armor.[258] 

British ground forces used the L20A1 artillery projectile.  It contains forty-nine M85 submunitions, which the United Kingdom used for the first time in combat in Iraq.  These Israeli-designed grenades resemble the DPICM in shape, color, and purpose.  They also have a self-destruct mechanism, however, that is designed to reduce the dud rate to 2 percent.[259]

Civilian Harm

Ground-launched cluster strikes caused hundreds of civilian casualties across Iraq.  Human Rights Watch documented cases in most of the major cities, including al-Hilla, al-Najaf, Karbala', Baghdad, and Basra.  Doctors at local hospitals provided statistics that supported individual testimony of deaths and injuries.  The majority of these casualties resulted from the heavy use of cluster munitions in populated areas where soldiers and civilians commingled.  The targeting of residential neighborhoods with these area effect weapons represented one of the leading causes of civilian casualties in the war.

Al-Hilla endured the most suffering from the use of ground-launched cluster munitions.  Dr. Sa`ad al-Falluji, director and chief surgeon of al-Hilla General Teaching Hospital, said 90 percent of the injuries his hospital treated during the war were from submunitions.[260] In the neighborhood of Nadir, a slum on the south side of the city, every household Human Rights Watch visited suffered personal injury or property damage during a March 31 cluster attack.  On the day of the strike, the hospital treatedMap 14 109 injured civilians from that neighborhood, including thirty children.[261]  According to local elders, the attack killed thirty-eight civilians and injured 156.[262]  During a visit on May 19, Human Rights Watch found dozens of mud brick homes with pockmarked walls and holes in the roof from shrapnel.  Male residents pointed to wounds on their legs and pulled up their shirts to reveal chest and abdominal wounds.  In the house of Falaya Fadl Nasir, for example, the strike injured three people, his two children, Mahdi, 18, and Marwa, 10, as well as Imam Hassan `Abdullah.  One grenade pierced the roof of his home, causing a fire inside.[263]  Hamid Turki Hamid, 36, a dresser in the hospital, said his son and a friend were in the street when the attack began.  After bringing in his son, he returned to gather his neighbor's child.  "That's when the bomb exploded, when I was injured," Hamid said.[264] 

Cluster munitions caused civilian casualties in other neighborhoods in and around al-Hilla.  On March 31 at about 2:00 p.m., the U.S. Army launched DPICMs on al-Maimira, a village of about 500 people south of al-Hilla.  The strike killed three civilians-Amir Ahmad, 9, Jawad Ruman, 27, and Khalid `Abbas, 32-and injured thirty-eight.  A villager said there was no battle in the area and speculated that the strike was aimed at guns on the main road and across the river or civilian lorries mistaken for a military convoy.[265]  During an attack on al-Mahawil at 1:00 p.m. around April 3, cluster grenades killed four civilians and injured five, most of whom had to have limbs amputated.  One woman, who was nine months pregnant, had an amputation and an injury to her womb; the baby had shrapnel in it but survived.[266]

Dr. Sa`ad al-Falluji inspects the X-ray of a patient with shrapnel still lodged in his leg in al-Maimira, outside al-Hilla.  Three civilians were killed and thirty-eight injured during a U.S. ground-launched cluster strike on the village. © 2003 Marc Garlasco / Human Rights Watch

The harm to civilians caused by ground-launched submunitions in al-Hilla exemplified a pattern seen around the country.  In al-Najaf, cluster grenades killed about thirty-six civilians on the night of March 28 alone.[267]  "The day of the bombing was a horrible day.  There were not enough places to keep the dead people.  Many of the dead people were in the lobbies of the hospital. . . . Later families came and took them.  The government buried unknown people in the cemeteries," said Dr. Safa' al-`Umaidi, director of al-Najaf Teaching Hospital.[268]  The nearby al-Najaf General Hospital treated fewer patients during the war, but the director said most of the injuries he saw came from cluster munitions.[269]  A cluster strike that landed in Hay al-Karama at 1:00 a.m. on March 27 caused many civilian casualties.  Hatim Jawad, a 52-year-old merchant, for example, suffered shrapnel wounds as well as severe damage to his home.[270]  Another man approached Human Rights Watch crying and clutching a piece of bone he said was part of his late sister's skull.[271]

The villages around al-Najaf also suffered casualties from ground cluster strikes.  At sunset on March 28, cluster grenades landed on the farm of Jassim `Abdul-Ridha, 31, in al-Hifa, southeast of al-Najaf.  Two months later, his 10-year-old son, Nussair, who had been tending sheep during the strike, was still in the hospital recovering from skin grafts, fractures, and bone loss in his ankle.  His other son, Muhammad Jassim, 7, had been injured at the same time but had returned home.  Two neighbor children were hurt in this strike: Jassim Muhammad, 6, suffered paralysis and received additional shrapnel wounds in his abdomen and upper leg; his brother Ja`far Muhammad, 3, suffered head injuries that led to apparent brain damage.[272]  At a different farm west of al-Najaf, three brothers were sitting in their garden when a strike occurred around March 22.[273]  Salim Hashim, 26, lost his left hand and suffered injuries to his chest, leg, right thigh, shoulder, and face; he remained in the hospital on May 24.  Hamid Hashim, 23, received shrapnel injuries to his head and eye, and Hani Hashim, 20, was injured in his hand.[274] 

U.S. ground forces also made extensive use of cluster munitions in and around Baghdad.  At 2:00 a.m. on the night of April 4 to 5, DPICMs rained down on an apartment complex next to a Palestinian refugee camp in northeast Baghdad.[275]  The submunitions killed at least one civilian, Radwan Muhammad, and injured about eighteen others.[276]  "When they started bombing the area, I was standing with four persons.  All were injured.  The explosion hit my eyes and I couldn't see because of the big light," said Ahmad Yahir Ahmad Salama al-Hadidi, 45.[277]  He still has shrapnel in his body and has difficulty breathing because of burn damage to his lungs.[278]  Residents speculated that the strike targeted Syrian fedayeen outside their homes or an anti-aircraft position at a nearby intersection.  This strike was one of many in the capital area.[279]  A list of submunition duds from the U.S. military, which provides an indication of where strikes occurred, includes 166 sites within a twenty-kilometer (12.4-mile) radius of Baghdad.[280]

U.K. forces caused dozens of civilian casualties when they used ground-launched cluster munitions in and around Basra.  A trio of neighborhoods in the southern part of the city was particularly hard hit.  At noon on March 23, a cluster strike hit Hay al-Muhandissin al-Kubra (the engineers' district) while `Abbas Kadhim, 13, was throwing out the garbage.  He had acute injuries to his bowel and liver, and a fragment that could not be removed lodged near his heart.  On May 4, he was still in Basra's al-Jumhuriyya Hospital.[281]  Three hours later, submunitions blanketed the neighborhood of al-Mishraq al-Jadid about two-and-a-half kilometers (one-and-a-half miles) northeast.  Iyad Jassim Ibrahim, a 26-year-old carpenter, was sleeping in the front room of his home when shrapnel injuries caused him to lose consciousness.  He later died in surgery.  Ten relatives who were sleeping elsewhere in the house suffered shrapnel injuries.[282]  Across the street, the cluster strike injured three children.  Ahmad `Aidan Malih Hoshon, 12, and his sister Fatima, 4, both had serious abdominal injuries; their cousin Muhammad, 13, had injuries to his feet.[283]  Hay al-Zaitun, just east of al-Mishraq al-Jadid, suffered casualties from cluster munitions that landed there on the evening of March 25.  Jamal Kamil Sabir, a 25-year-old laborer, lost his leg to a submunition blast while crossing a bridge near his home with his family.  He spent eleven days in the hospital.  His nephew, Jabal Kamil, 22, took shrapnel in his knee.  Jamal's pregnant wife, Zainab Nasir `Abbas, still had shrapnel in her left leg in May because doctors were afraid to remove it during her pregnancy.[284]  A neighbor, Zaitun Zaki Abu Iyad, 40, was killed when cluster grenades landed on her home.[285] 

Jamal Kamil Sabir lost his right leg during a U.K. cluster munition strike on his home in Hay al-Zaitun in Basra on March 25, 2003.  © 2003 Reuben E. Brigety, II / Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch also found evidence of ground-launched submunitions in other areas of Basra.  In al-Tannuma neighborhood, on the eastern bank of Shatt al-`Arab, U.K. artillery targeted Iraqi tanks hidden in a date grove in the middle of civilian homes.  The cluster grenades blanketed a much larger area.  When the strike occurred on March 30 at 4:45 a.m., nine members of Tha'ir Zaidan's family were injured.  Shrapnel lodged in the head of his young son, Hassan.[286]  On the opposite side of the city, cluster munitions targeted Iraqi troops in al-Hadi neighborhood.  The strike killed Sa`ad Sha`ban, 40, and Bassam Ghali, 35.[287]

 

It appears that most if not all of the strikes described above were directed at legitimate military targets.  Human Rights Watch saw tanks and artillery positions located in neighborhoods, and witnesses described the presence of Iraqi forces.  Nevertheless, the United States and United Kingdom made poor weapons choices when they used cluster munitions in populated areas.  Such strikes almost always caused civilian casualties, in the case of al-Hilla numbering more than one hundred, because the weapons blanketed areas occupied by soldier and civilian alike with deadly submunitions that could not distinguish between the two.

Targeting and Technology

Both the U.S. and U.K. militaries took precautions to limit civilian casualties by establishing a process for vetting ground-launched cluster strikes.  As shown above, however, such attacks were one of the major causes of civilian casualties during the war.  The precautions failed for two reasons.  First, the technology available to Coalition ground forces, in terms of range, accuracy, and reliability of cluster munitions, fell far behind that of the U.S. Air Force.  Second, despite the vetting process, ground troops consistently used these area effect weapons in residential neighborhoods, virtually guaranteeing loss of civilian life.  Coalition militaries should reevaluate and reform their use of ground-delivered cluster munitions before employing them in any future conflict.

U.S. forces screened ground cluster strikes through a computer and human vetting system.  The Third Infantry Division's artillery batteries were programmed with a no-strike list of 12,700 sites that could not be fired upon without manual override.  The list included civilian buildings such as schools, mosques, hospitals, and historic sites.[288]  Map 9 Officers of the Second Brigade said they strove to keep strikes at least 500 meters (547 yards) away from such targets although sometimes they cut the buffer zone to 300 meters (328 yards).[289]  In general, they also required visual confirmation of a target before firing, but in the case of counter-battery fire, they considered radar acquisition sufficient.[290]  The latter detects incoming fire and determines its location, but it cannot determine if civilians occupy an area. 

The Third Infantry Division established another layer of review by sending lawyers to the field to review proposed strikes, a relatively recent addition to the vetting process.[291]  "Ten years ago, JAGs [judge advocate general attorneys] weren't running around [the battlefield]," said Captain Chet Gregg, Second Brigade's legal advisor.[292]  The division assigned sixteen lawyers to divisional headquarters and each brigade.[293]  Lead lawyer Colonel Cayce, who served at the tactical headquarters, reviewed 512 missions, and brigade JAGs approved additional attacks, which were often counter-battery strikes.  Although less controversial strikes, such as those on forces in the desert, were not reviewed, Cayce said, "I would feel pretty confident a lawyer was involved in strikes in populated areas."[294]  Commanders had the final say, but lawyers provided advice about whether a strike was legal under IHL.  Cayce said his commander never overruled his advice not to attack and sometimes rejected targets he said were legal.[295] 

While the review process involved a careful weighing of military necessity and potential harm to civilians, limited information and the subjectivity of such an analysis meant it was "not a scientific formula."[296]  The first challenge was to determine the risk to their forces.  "The hard part is how many casualties we will take.  It's a gut level, fly by the seat of your pants.  There's no standard that says one U.S. life equals X civilian lives," Cayce said.[297]  Then lawyers had to evaluate the threat to civilians.  In the case of counter-battery fire, they had to make the judgment without knowing if civilians were present in the target area at the time of the strike; they relied instead on pre-war population figures.  Cayce acknowledged the danger of cluster strikes on populated areas and said that he tried to limit them to nighttime.  "I was hoping kids were hunkered down, hoping with artillery fire they were not out watching," he said.[298] 

British artillery units had a similar vetting process although it gave observers more responsibility than lawyers.  Its no-strike list included schools, mosques, and hospitals.  "We couldn't fire on [such a site] irrespective of who was in it.  Even if you called for fire, it couldn't happen.  They were no-fire zones," said Colonel Baldwin.[299]  Unlike the U.S. forces, the British required forward observation even in the case of counter-battery fire.  Either a human or the video of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), or drone, had to confirm visually that no civilians were present.  "At no time did we fire where we couldn't see," Baldwin said.[300]  Asked about the civilian injuries in al-Tannuma, he said, "I cannot completely rule out the fact somebody went against the ROE, but I'd be surprised if they did.  For every single artillery strike, we asked an observer if he saw civilians."[301] 

While the British required observers, they did not have lawyers in the field.  Military lawyers signed off on the rules of engagement before the conflict, but the interpretation was done at a divisional level, if there was time, or below that, if the conflict was happening too fast.  "If [the battle was] so fast and furious, interpretation went down to the forward observer.  We argue they are the best judge of if we should fire or not," Colonel Baldwin said.[302]  

The value of these vetting processes for cluster strikes was limited by the weapons and technology available to ground troops.  Officers of the Third Infantry Division complained that if they needed long-range rocket artillery, the MLRS with submunitions was the only option they had.  Therefore, they said, they often had to use cluster munitions for counter-battery fire when a unitary warhead would have sufficed.[303]  "We need to have the capability to hit a target [with something] more like a regular high explosive shell. . . . We are already testing longer-range cannon with a regular shell.  It would solve a lot of problems," Colonel Cayce said.[304]  A high explosive shell impacts an area with a fifty-yard (forty-six-meter) radius rather than the .6-mile (one-kilometer) radius of an MLRS volley.[305]  The U.S. Marines, however, did not have the MLRS, relying instead on artillery, air support, and possibly help from Army ATACMSs.[306]  These alternatives raise questions about the military necessity of the Army's MLRS cluster strikes. 

Ground-launched cluster munitions were also less accurate than the newer, air-dropped models.  "In defense of the ground guys, I have to say we have not come the distance in ability to be precise with [ground-launched] cluster munitions to the degree we have with the air. . . . The Army is working on coming the extra mile on precision-guided munitions," a senior CENTCOM official said.[307]  Colonel Cayce also called for more accurate long-range artillery.  He said the Army was developing a guided skeet, like that in the CBU-105, for the MLRS.[308]  The SADARM is guided, but it is artillery-launched and does not have a range equal to the MLRS.  In the Third Infantry Division's after action report, it recommended the development of "an MLRS suite of munitions that allow for greater employment on the battlefield," including in populated areas.[309]

Unlike the Americans, the British ground forces used exclusively new cluster technology in Iraq-the L20A1 artillery munition.  While this weapon's submunitions have a lower dud rate than the U.S. versions, it remains an area effect weapon that kills civilians when used in a populated area.  The new technology only lulled the British into taking less care when using it.[310]

The precautions to reduce civilian casualties did not prevent widespread use of cluster munitions in populated areas.  The no-strike lists included certain civilian structures but not residential neighborhoods.  Forward observers either ignored or failed to see civilians in populated areas.  U.S. military lawyers did not challenge the proposed strikes although they raise serious concerns under IHL's proportionality test. 

Training may also have been inadequate.  "The training paradigm for artillery is still evolving," a senior CENTCOM official said.  "The Army looks for mass of fire as opposed to precision because they don't know what's out there beyond the horizon.  As they press forward, they want to make sure they are reducing the threat to their forces, suppressing what's beyond the next horizon."[311]  An Army field manual acknowledges the dangerous side effects of cluster munitions and discusses ways to limit the collateral damage of strikes in urban areas, but it does not prohibit them or consider them indiscriminate.[312] 

The Coalition may have fired on legitimate military targets, especially when responding to incoming Iraqi fire, but the use of cluster munitions in populated areas almost always leads to civilian casualties.  For that weapon, neighborhoods still occupied by their residents should be put on a no-strike list, to be overridden only with excellent information and careful consideration.

Conclusion and Recommendations

As described in more depth in the previous chapter, cluster munition strikes raise concerns under international humanitarian law.  They must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis under the proportionality test, which balances military advantage and civilian impact.  Strikes in or near populated areas are usually problematic because when combatants and civilians commingle, civilian casualties are difficult to avoid.  Cluster munition strikes also have the potential to be indiscriminate because the weapons cannot be precisely targeted.  Cluster munitions are area weapons, useful in part for attacking dispersed or moving targets.  They cannot, however, be directed at specific soldiers or tanks, a limitation that is particularly troublesome in populated areas.

In choosing weapons, parties to an armed conflict must minimize civilian harm.  They must "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects."[313]  The weapons should be used sparingly, if at all, when it is foreseeable that they will cause at least incidental harm to civilians.  The availability of alternative weapons must be also considered. 

The use of cluster munitions in the ground war raises serious questions under these provisions of IHL.  The weapons themselves have inherent flaws that make strikes in populated areas prone to being indiscriminate.  Furthermore, while the Coalition took precautions by establishing vetting processes for individual strikes, the results show them to be inadequate.  Despite the care taken, ground-launched cluster strikes caused hundreds of civilian casualties.  As will be discussed below, the duds they left behind increased the number of deaths and injuries after the conflict. 

Human Rights Watch has previously called for a suspension of cluster munition use until the weapon's humanitarian effects have been fully addressed.[314]  If cluster munitions are used, Human Rights Watch recommends:

• Armed forces cease using ground-launched cluster munitions in or near populated areas.
• Coalition forces develop a new vetting process that successfully reduces the harm to civilians caused by cluster munitions.
• The U.S. military identify, and if necessary develop, a long-range alternative to the MLRS with submunitions.
• U.S. ground forces keep better records of the number, location, and type of cluster munitions used.  Such records are essential for clearance of duds and also facilitate analysis of and accountability for targeting decisions.

Antipersonnel Landmines

The United States refused to rule out use of antipersonnel mines in Iraq, saying on one occasion that American forces might use air-dropped mines to prevent access to suspected chemical weapons sites.[315]  By February 2003, the United States reportedly had stockpiled ninety thousand antipersonnel mines in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.[316]  There have been no confirmed reports, however, of antipersonnel mine use by the United States or other Coalition forces during the conflict.  The head of the Coalition Provisional Authority stated, "We have constructed no minefields, set no 'booby traps' anywhere in Iraq."[317]  U.S. forces used command-detonated Claymore directional fragmentation mines, which are permitted under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.[318]  Like Iraq, the United States is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, but most of its Coalition partners, including the United Kingdom and Australia, are.  Human Rights Watch believes any use of antipersonnel mines violates customary international law.

Rules of Engagement

Although the United States took precautions to protect civilians by issuing rules of engagement, problems with training on, dissemination of, and clarity of these rules may have, in some instances, contributed to loss of civilian life.

The U.S. military provided guidelines for its troops by distributing laminated rules of engagement cards to all its soldiers and Marines.  These ROE, issued by the CENTCOM's Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), tell troops to obey the laws of war and explain their legal obligations during combat.  The first provision states, "Positive identification (PID) is required prior to engagement.  PID is a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target.  If no PID, contact your next higher commander for decision."  Other paragraphs set out additional protections for civilians.  For example:

Do not target or strike any of the following except in self-defense to protect yourself, your unit, friendly forces, and designated persons or property under your control:

·Civilians

·Hospitals, mosques, national monuments, and any other historical and cultural sites.

Do not fire into civilian populated areas or buildings unless the enemy is using them for military purposes or if necessary for your self-defense.  Minimize collateral damage.[319]

The ROE card, reprinted in full as an appendix to this report, is consistent with international humanitarian law.  The armed forces develop general ROE for each armed conflict.  Individual operations within each conflict may also have their own specific set of rules of engagement, tailored to the particular circumstances of the battle.

Soldiers and Marines interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they tried to abide by these rules.  Colonel Perkins of the Third Infantry Division said when faced with fedayeen in civilian vehicles, his troops would use a spotter to let them know which cars were safe to target.  "We tried to delineate between civilian and military targets. . . . On the fifth and on the seventh [of April] when we attacked [Baghdad] the majority of what you can hear is, 'OK, can you see the white vehicle?  He just shot at our guys.  He's an enemy.  The blue guy behind him is friendly, don't engage him,'" Perkins said.[320] 

Training on the application of rules of engagement, however, may have been insufficient.  Elements of the Third Infantry Division practiced urban combat tactics "all the time" in Kuwait, but the training focused on teaching soldiers how to clear a room in close combat quarters, not how to engage an unconventional enemy whose forces may wear civilian clothes.[321]  A military conference about lessons learned from the war emphasized the need better to prepare troops for dealing with ROE.  Its list of lessons includes "Rules of Engagement (ROE) vignette training is critical in ensuring soldiers in contemporary operational environment (COE) adhere to laws of land warfare."[322] 

Post-conflict analysis by the Third Infantry Division indicates problems with dissemination of the rules of engagement.  According to the division's after action report, the final ROE, which included "new guidance on high collateral-damage targets," arrived after its troops had moved to Kuwait.  "Late receipt of ROE caused confusion on a number of issues that were not clearly written.  These matters were not resolved until hostilities began, meaning we could not train soldiers on the provision," the report said.[323] 

During the war, especially in the battles of Baghdad and al-Nasiriyya, contradictions in, lack of consistency in, and/or misapplication of rules of engagement may have led to civilian casualties.  In particular, verbal ROE apparently differed from the official written ROE, most notably with respect to the requirement for positive identification prior to engagement. 

From April 5 to 7, the Third Infantry Division pushed its way into Baghdad in an advance known as Thunder Run.  Contradictions in verbal and written rules of engagement may have led to civilian casualties.  Junior U.S. soldiers who participated in Thunder Run said that on April 7 the verbal ROE from their immediate superiors were to "assume that all targets were hostile" rather than to obtain positive identification.  They said that the verbal ROE were changed on April 9 to allow them to engage targets only when they were fired upon.

Colonel Perkins, who led Thunder Run, said that ROE guidance for his troops was: "Don't take anything for granted; assume that people have the capability to kill you, but don't assume that everyone is hostile."  He said hostile intent would be demonstrated if (1) a target fired at a soldier, (2) a target carried a weapon, or (3) a target was driving toward U.S. forces at a high rate of speed.[324]  Division lawyer Colonel Cayce explained that after Iraqi combatants began to appear in civilian clothes, soldiers were warned that any civilian could be a potential combatant, but they still needed positive identification.[325]  Asked about the discrepancy between his version and that of the enlisted men, Perkins suggested that some soldiers may have incorrectly interpreted the guidance they were given, but that such interpretations did not accurately reflect the commander's intent or explicit text of the ROE promulgated by CFLCC.  He said civilian protections in urban combat ultimately come down to the individual soldier making the right decision. "We just have to train on it," he said.[326]

In al-Nasiriyya, a change in or confusion about the rules of engagement may again have contributed to the civilian toll.  A Marine officer, who came in a second wave, said al-Nasiriyya was the only place along the road to Baghdad declared "hostile."  "In the combat zone, it meant anyone there was a bad guy," he said.  Another Marine, who was among the first in al-Nasiriyya, said the ROE there were positive identification.  During a daylong ambush further north near al-Shatra, however, the ROE were lifted and troops were told to "shoot anything that moves."

Conclusion and Recommendations

Contradictions between written and verbal rules of engagement have the potential to lead to civilian casualties and violations of international humanitarian law.  While U.S. rules of engagement on paper met international humanitarian law standards, in practice, soldiers and Marines reported conflicting interpretations of what they meant and how to apply them in practice, particularly in the fighting in Baghdad and al-Nasiriyya, where most civilian casualties occurred.  Further investigation would be required to determine if there were violations of IHL, but there is clearly a need for better guidance and training to reduce civilian casualties in future ground wars.  

Human Rights Watch recommends:

·The U.S. military ensure that there is no confusion between written and verbal rules of engagement and that ROE are distributed in a timely fashion.

·Armed forces devote better training to application of rules of engagement, especially in urban warfare and in circumstances where the enemy may be wearing civilian clothes.