Looking Forward: Government Inaction and the Risk of Further ViolenceIn spite of serious blunders and abuses, since August the Joint Task Force has succeeded in restoring a fragile peace to the streets of Port Harcourt. That achievement already stands threatened, howevera limited wave of violence and kidnappings broke across Port Harcourt in the first three months of 2008, including the kidnapping of three young children.129 Many local residents told Human Rights Watch that they were terrified of what will happen when JTF forces withdraw their presence on the streets.130 As one local resident put it, the JTF has restored sanity within the area. Before we were living with fear [Now] we are sleeping freely with our two eyes closed.131 But few had faith in the ability or willingness of the police and state government officials to prevent the gangs from returning to the streets. Even fewer had confidence the government would address the root causes of the violence. Since at least 2003 (as discussed above in the Background chapter), high-ranking state and local government officials in Rivers State have been directly implicated in arming the very gangs the JTF is now tasked with combating. Rivers State police have consistently turned a blind eye not only to the criminal and politically motivated violence, but also to the political sponsorship of gang violencea problem that has continued to the present. Ultimately, no effort to combat gang violence in Rivers State can succeed unless it holds to account the politicians behind those committing the crimes. The Rivers State GovernmentCelestine Omehia became governor through the brazenly rigged April 2007 polls. He remained in office for only five months before Nigerias Supreme Court overturned his election in October 2007. While in power the Omehia administration did nothing to check rising violence in the state or to sever the links between government officials and criminal gangs that were established by his predecessor as governor, Peter Odili.132 Human Rights Watch interviewed Okey Wali, then-attorney general under the Omehia government. Among its major tasks, the attorney generals office is responsible for pursuing criminal prosecutions against gang members in Rivers State. In October 2007 Wali acknowledged that no such prosecutions were underway or even planned.133 Wali also claimed that he was powerless to build prosecutions against politicians who sponsored armed gangs unless the police presented him with all of the evidence needed to go to court. Asked why the state government had not urged the police to arrest Soboma George at any point after he escaped from prison in 2005, Wali responded, I do not know the facts of what happened before we came [into office]. He also claimed that, I do not have any records indicating that Soboma George was charged to courtdespite the fact that Soboma George was facing murder charges when he escaped from prison. Wali then added, This is not the time to cry over spilt milk.134 The Omehia administration included politicians with ties to cult gangs, sending a clear signal that those gangs and the politicians who sponsored them were an integral part of politics under its watch. Omehias secretary to the state government (SSG), Gabriel Pidomson, was one of the chief sponsors of gangs involved in the devastation of Pidomsons home community of Bodo.135 Pidomson had also been speaker of the Rivers State House of Assembly during the Odili government. As one resident of Bodo complained to Human Rights Watch, The first person to bring gun here was Pidomson. And yet they have made him state house of assembly and then SSG.136 The irony inherent in all of this was not lost on the victims of Rivers post-election violence. The man whose wife, a nurse, was shot dead by gang members while she walked home from work one afternoon in early August (see above, chapter The Human Rights Impact of Post-Election Gang Violence in Rivers State, subsection August: Chaos Takes Hold), complained bitterly,
Administration of Gov. Rotimi AmaechiCurrent Rivers Governor Rotimi Amaechi was put into office by Nigerias Supreme Court in October 2007. Amaechi had challenged the legality of the PDP primaries in Rivers State, arguing that he had won the contest and should have been on the ballot instead of Celestine Omehia as the partys gubernatorial candidate. The Supreme Court found in Amaechis favor and, rather than order a new election, simply installed him into office. There is ample reason for skepticism over the Amaechi administrations ability or willingness to address Rivers States chronic problems of corruption, poor governance, and violence. Amaechi served in the Rivers State House of Assembly during the Odili administration and in that capacity was implicated in an investigation by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in a corruption scandal involving the alleged theft of some ₦100 billion.143 This in fact was the primary reason advanced by PDP officials for keeping Amaechi off the ballot. One of Amaechis first acts as governor was to announce that he would not conduct any inquiry into allegations of corruption against the Odili administration effectively ruling out an essential component of any sufficient effort to tackle the root causes of violence in the state.144 Amaechis first months in office have nonetheless been marked by some positivealbeit limitedsigns. Amaechis government has indefinitely suspended, but not formally renounced, the Omehia governments disastrous plan to demolish 26 waterfront communities. That plan threatened to render tens of thousands of people homeless without adequate compensation and without any convincing rationale. Also, Governor Amaechi has for the first time appointed a credible civil society representative to Rivers States Electoral Commission, which will oversee the conduct of local government polls slated for March 29, 2008.145 But PDP primaries in preparations for those polls were held in February 2008 and local observers reported that they were marred by widespread irregularities as well as acts of thuggery and intimidation by powerful politicians.146 To its credit, the Electoral Commission ordered a rerun of many of the most flawed primary polls, but the rerun polls were reportedly marred by the same kinds of abuse. A report by local civil society groups lamented,
At this writing it remains to be seen whether the state government will address these problems. The Nigerian PoliceTwo days prior to Rivers States gubernatorial elections in April 2007, Human Rights Watch met with a local gang leader less than a block away from a police post in the Diobu area of Port Harcourt. Gesturing contemptuously at the officers standing around outside, he remarked, You see that small police station? They have no influence over us. Their hands are tied.148 While Rivers State government officials have actively nurtured the arming and growth of gangs in the state, the Nigerian police have made the proliferation of these groups possible by consistently failing to enforce the law. The police have made no significant effort to investigate, apprehend, or prosecute any prominent gang leader or any Rivers State government official involved in sponsoring gang violence. That failure, which has often left gangs free to prey upon communities throughout Rivers State, is a gross neglect of the central responsibilities of the police force. The police have also failed to deal with other manifestations of rampant criminality in Rivers State, including oil bunkering, kidnappings, and electoral fraud by Rivers politicians. Assistant Inspector General of Police Ogbonna Onovo confirmed to Human Rights Watch in October that the police had no plans to investigate former governor Peter Odili or any other Rivers politician for sponsorship of cult violence.149 Asked to justify this inaction Onovo responded, Ateke and Asari have never said, It was so-so who armed me.150 This would not excuse a failure to investigate even if it were true, but in fact Ateke Tom has repeatedly stated on the record that Odili employed him to help rig the 2003 elections by force. In April 2007, for example, Ateke told Human Rights Watch that in 2003, Any place Odili sent me, I conquered for him. I conquered everywhere.151 The police have also not made any attempt in recent years to arrest leading gang members. Soboma George and Ateke Tom, for example, have both moved about the state openly for much of the past four years, even though both were theoretically wanted by the police. Implausibly, the police claim that prior to the August JTF assault on his home they had been searching for Soboma George and other gang leaders for several years but were unable to locate any of them. Rivers State Commissioner of Police Felix Ogbaudu told Human Rights Watch in October 2007, We [didnt] know where they are. These are clever people.152 As already noted, Soboma George, an escaped prisoner who faces charges of murder, had openly maintained a home in Marine Base, and some residents of Port Harcourt complained that Soboma was regularly seen playing soccer in public places and questioned why the police could not have arrested him there.153 The Federal GovernmentThe Rivers State government and the Nigerian police bear most of the direct responsibility for creating the conditions that have allowed violence to grow unchecked in Rivers State. But the irresponsibility and misconduct of both of those institutions is only possible because the federal government has done nothing to insist on adherence to, and enforcement of, the law. Rivers violence has its roots in politics, and the PDP at the national level has benefited from the successful efforts of Rivers politicians to violently rig elections. President Umaru YarAdua came into office pledging dramatic action to halt violence in the Niger Delta, but these promises have not resulted in any concrete action to date.154 Because Nigerias police are under federal control, the federal government has the responsibility to ensure adequate oversight and guidance of police activities in Rivers State. However, there is no evidence that the federal government has exerted any pressure on the police to conduct investigations into the criminal links between violent gangs and the states politicians. Under both the Obasanjo and YarAdua federal governments, the national anti-corruption body, the EFCC, systematically failed to pursue criminal charges against influential members of the ruling party, including former governor Odili. In March 2008 Odili secured a controversial court injunction barring the EFCC from investigating or arresting him for any corruption-related offense; that ruling is being challenged in court. The EFCCs arrest of powerful former Delta State Governor James Ibori on corruption charges in December 2007 seemed to signal a sharp and important departure from the trend toward leaving the most powerful politicians untouched. But weeks after Iboris arrest the YarAdua government eviscerated the EFCCs credibility by sacking its executive chairman in apparent retaliation for its pursuit of high-profile politicians. Because of the motives that appeared to lie behind it, this move has largely destroyed the credibility of federal anti-corruption efforts. This will likely further embolden politicians in Rivers State and elsewhere who have used corruption as a mechanism to fund violence and subvert the democratic process. In September 2007 President YarAdua announced that he would order an investigation into the links between Rivers State government officials and cult gangs.155 However, the federal government has since made no mention of that promised investigation. 129 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with activists and journalists (names withheld), Port Harcourt, March 2008. 130 Human Rights Watch interviews with residents (names withheld), Rivers State, September and October 2007. 131 Human Rights Watch interview with a resident (name withheld), Diobu, Port Harcourt, October 5, 2007. 132 See above, chapter Background, section Politics and Violence in Rivers State. 133 Human Rights Watch interview with Okey Wali, then Rivers State attorney general, Port Harcourt, October 10, 2007. 134 Ibid. 135 See text box below, Sponsorship of Cult Violence in Bodo. 136 Human Rights Watch interview with a resident (name withheld), Bodo, September 30, 2007. 137 Human Rights Watch interview with the widower of a shooting victim (names withheld), Port Harcourt, September 29, 2007. 138 Pidomson is alleged at one point to have held the rank of national executioner in the Vikings Eastern Division, which encompasses Nigerias South East and South South geopolitical zones. Human Rights Watch interviews with cult members and activists (names withheld), Port Harcourt, September and October 2007. 139 For a detailed account of inter-cult violence in Bodo and its links to local politics, see Patrick Naagbanton, The Bodo War of Attrition: A Briefing Paper on the Bodo, Ogoni Crisis, www.cehrd.org/files/The_Bodo_war_of_Attrition2.doc (accessed December 12, 2007). 140 Human Rights Watch interviews with local residents (names withheld), Bodo, September 30, 2007. See also Naagbanton, The Bodo War of Attrition. 141 Human Rights Watch interview with local Deebam cultist (name withheld), Bodo, September 30, 2007. 142 Human Rights Watch interviews with local residents (names withheld), Bodo, September 30, 2007. 143 The EFCC interim report into the matter is available at http://saharareporters.com/www/news/detail/?prevpage=0&startpage=10063&x=2&id=219 (accessed December 12, 2007). 144 See Ime Akpan, I Wont Probe OdiliOmehia, Leadership (Abuja), November 3, 2007. 145 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Port Harcourt-based civil society activists (names withheld), October 2007. 146 Draft civil society report on Rivers 2008 local government primaries (forthcoming), on file with Human Rights Watch. 147 Ibid. 148 Human Rights Watch interview a local gang leader (name withheld), Diobu, Port Harcourt, April 12, 2007. 149 Human Rights Watch interview with Ogonna Onovo, assistant inspector general of police, Abuja, October 17, 2007. 150 Ibid. 151 Human Rights Watch interview with Ateke Tom, Rivers State, April 13, 2007. See also Human Rights Watch, Criminal Politics, pp. 80-81. 152 Human Rights Watch interview with Felix Ogbaudu, Port Harcourt, October 8, 2007. 153 Human Rights Watch interviews with residents (names withheld), Port Harcourt, October 6, 2007. 154 See below, Conclusion. 155 See, for example, Saidu Usman Sarki, ViolenceYarAdua to Probe Rivers Officials, Leadership, September 19, 2007. |