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The Human Rights Impact of the Joint Task Force Intervention in Rivers State

The Joint Task Force is a combined force of police, military, and State Security Service (SSS) personnel tasked with addressing security issues in the Niger Delta region. It is headquartered at Bori Camp, an army facility within Port Harcourt.

On August 12, the day after the destruction of the NNPC filling station in downtown Port Harcourt, the federal government ordered the JTF to deploy soldiers into the streets across Port Harcourt in an effort to halt the gang violence ravaging the city. Their deployment brought about a sudden lull in fighting as gang members went into hiding or left the city.87 The uneasy standoff that ensued lasted only briefly, as JTF forces took the offensive just one day later.

The initial wave of JTF operations in August 2007 largely forced cult gangs underground or out of Port Harcourt, while later JTF operations occurred within several neighboring riverine communities. These operations included a high-profile but ultimately fruitless January 2008 raid on Ateke Tom’s hometown of Okrika, a riverine community immediately south of Port Harcourt. The overall conduct of JTF forces has demonstrated a degree of restraint that has not been evident in past Niger Delta operations.  However, specific operations resulted in numerous human rights abuses, including looting, arbitrary arrest, and extrajudicial killings. At the same time, the JTF has failed to apprehend any key cult leader, and many Port Harcourt residents fear that violence could return to crisis-level proportions when the JTF eventually withdraws its soldiers from the streets.

JTF Operations Following the August Crisis

The Assault on Marine Base

On the morning of August 12, JTF forces stormed the Marine Base neighborhood of Port Harcourt. Marine Base is a waterfront community not far from Government House and up until then had been a stronghold of Soboma George’s Outlaws gang. Soboma maintained a home in Marine Base, and local residents said he frequently passed the night there.88 

JTF forces engaged in sporadic gunfights with locally based gang members in Marine Base throughout the day on August 12.89 Many Marine Base residents told Human Rights Watch that they locked themselves inside their homes from the first sounds of gunfire in the morning until the shooting subsided late that afternoon.90 Many spent most of the day lying underneath beds or tables for fear of catching a stray bullet. As a result, few residents witnessed any of the fighting directly. “We went inside when we heard the guns,” one local shopkeeper told Human Rights Watch. “We only heard the sounds…it was a mini-war, those boys against the military.”91 

One resident witnessed much of the fighting from the second-story windows of a building that overlooks Marine Base and confirmed that shooting continued throughout the day.92 According to several eyewitnesses and media reports, the military made use of an attack helicopter that on at least one occasion during the afternoon was seen hovering above the neighborhood firing rounds into the streets below it.93 By late afternoon JTF forces had routed local gang members—most of whom fled into the nearby creeks—and established control over the area.

When the fighting ended late in the afternoon residents emerged from their homes to confront a scene of widespread destruction. Many residents pointed out to Human Rights Watch interior and exterior walls of their homes, which were pockmarked with bullet holes from August 12.94 The Marine Base residence of Soboma George was partially gutted by fire and subsequently occupied by soldiers.

Remarkably, given the scale of the fighting, no local residents appeared to have been killed or wounded during the JTF attack.95  Some residents told Human Rights Watch that in the evening they saw the bodies of several young men lying in the streets whom they believed were gang members involved in the fight.96

The JTF’s Failed Attack on Soboma George

On August 16 the JTF staged an attack on a small guest house along Reclamation Road just west of Port Harcourt’s old commercial center where they believed George was passing the afternoon.97 JTF forces attacked the guest house, employing a helicopter for surveillance in support of military personnel attacking from the street. The apparent aim of the attack was to kill rather than to apprehend Soboma George, as JTF forces issued no warning, riddled the building with gunfire, and then set it ablaze.98

Military spokespersons quickly announced that they believed Soboma George had been killed in the attack, but it was soon revealed that he had managed to escape unharmed. This was surprising, not only because of the violence of the assault but also because of the surrounding terrain, which should have made escape extremely difficult.99 JTF forces pulled four charred, unidentified bodies from the smoldering wreckage of the guest house they had destroyed.100 Those dead were never identified. Soboma has since been in contact with the press and his survival was later acknowledged by JTF and government officials.

JTF Efforts to Maintain Order in Port Harcourt

One day following the failed attack on Soboma George, the Rivers State government imposed an indefinite statewide curfew from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. JTF forces have also maintained a significant presence on the streets of Port Harcourt through checkpoints and patrols. This was broadly welcomed by residents of Port Harcourt, who longed for a return to normalcy.101 On August 18 then-Governor Celestine Omehia announced that soldiers would remain on the streets of the state capital for six months; this has since been extended indefinitely.102

Military checkpoints have become less numerous and less strict over time, but armed soldiers and police remain a common sight on the streets of Port Harcourt.103 The curfew was eventually pushed back to a 9 p.m. start, and was rescinded altogether by the state government on New Year’s Eve 2007. Security has not been restored completely, however. The very night the curfew was lifted, armed men linked to Ateke Tom attacked Port Harcourt’s best-known hotel, reportedly killing some 13 people.104 Gangs have also continued to carry out kidnappings through the beginning of 2008.105

Human Rights Abuses Committed by JTF Forces in Port Harcourt

JTF forces killed several residents of Port Harcourt in circumstances that do not appear to have offered any justification for the use of lethal force. Military personnel have also looted homes and arbitrarily detained people without charge—in some cases for the apparent purpose of extorting money in return for their release. In several cases JTF personnel beat people whom they had arbitrarily detained in the course of anti-gang operations that failed to detain any actual gang members.

In the opinion of the roughly 85 local activists, journalists, and ordinary residents of Port Harcourt interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the conduct of JTF forces has improved substantially over time since their initial deployment in August 2007.106 Indeed most of the abuses reported to Human Rights Watch took place in the first weeks of the JTF’s deployment. This appears to be partly because JTF commanders insisted on improved conduct and partly a consequence of the fact that JTF checkpoints became less numerous and strict after that initial period. As described below, many reported JTF abuses involved people passing through such checkpoints.

 

One military spokesperson acknowledged to Human Rights Watch that, “At first there were complaints of public molestation by soldiers,” but said that “we were directed to stop this, and it has stopped.”107 Beyond that spokesperson’s claims that “one or two” soldiers were disciplined for committing abuses against civilians, there have been no reported cases of any JTF personnel being investigated or held to account in any way for serious human rights abuses.108

Unlawful Killings and Beatings

During the first weeks of the JTF intervention in Port Harcourt, military personnel set up checkpoints throughout the city to control the population’s movement. Individuals passing through these checkpoints were usually required to raise their hands above their heads while passing through the area and were sometimes searched by soldiers. In a handful of cases, soldiers reportedly beat or even killed civilians attempting to negotiate these checkpoints.

In one August incident, soldiers reportedly shot and killed a man when he lowered his arms at a checkpoint to answer an incoming call on his mobile phone. Witnesses said that no warning was offered before the soldiers opened fire.109 In another August incident described to Human Rights Watch by an eyewitness, a man refused to raise his arms in the air while passing through a JTF checkpoint. Soldiers reportedly set upon and badly beat him in reprisal for his defiance, then stripped him naked on the street and forced him to submerge himself in an open gutter filled with refuse and dirty water.110

Several other cases reported to Human Rights Watch involved the use of lethal force by soldiers without evident justification.  In one incident witnessed in mid-August 2007 by a prominent local human rights activist, soldiers reportedly emerged from a military vehicle at a traffic-choked intersection, dragged two young men from a car just in front of their own, and shot both of them dead in the street. The eyewitness told Human Rights Watch that he could not discern any justifiable reason for the killing. “The thing happened in split seconds,” he said. “They came down and dragged these boys from their car and opened fire. They died there. I don’t know why. [Maybe] they were chasing them from somewhere.”111

In one case, JTF forces detained a gang member who was wounded during a firefight; he later died in custody. A JTF statement claimed that the detainee died while the military were transporting him to Okrika—a community without any adequate medical facilities—for “medical treatment.” The man had been arrested less than a kilometer from Port Harcourt’s largest hospital.

In general, there has not been adequate explanation of the circumstances under which individuals killed by JTF forces died. As one Port Harcourt-based journalist put it, “Whenever they [the JTF] kill someone they say he is a cultist. There is no way to know whether he really is or not.”112 A JTF spokesperson interviewed by Human Rights Watch declined to provide even a rough estimate of the number of gang members killed by JTF personnel since August.113

Arbitrary Detention and Extortion

JTF officials acknowledge that especially during operations in August, the JTF detained several hundred people on suspicion of cult activity.114 However, they have never revealed the total number of those arrested.115 In many cases, arrests were arbitrary and in some instances appear to have been made for the primary purpose of extorting cash bribes from those held. JTF officials conceded to Human Rights Watch that they have no legal authority to retain anyone in their custody, and since September official policy has been to require all detainees to be quickly turned over to police or SSS custody.116

Human Rights Watch interviewed several people who were detained and held by the JTF at Bori Camp without any apparent legal justification. Some said that they were released only after being forced to bribe JTF members for their freedom.117 One such case documented by Human Rights Watch involved two young men whom JTF forces detained in late August because they were employees of a car dealership where suspected cult members had gone to purchase cars. The two young men told Human Rights Watch that they were detained at Bori Camp, sharing a cell with several young men who had been arrested for violating curfew. The two men said that they were not questioned at all and were released without charge after 11 days in detention—but only after friends and family scraped together a cash bribe of ₦360,000 demanded by JTF personnel at Bori Camp.118

On September 1, JTF forces raided the town of Bodo in Rivers’ Ogoni region with the stated intention of apprehending cult members and restoring law and order to the town. As discussed above (see text box: “A Gang Leader Denounces his Former Sponsor”), Bodo has long been plagued by bloody contests for supremacy between two cult gangs in the employ of rival local politicians.119 JTF forces failed to apprehend any local cult members—cult members told Human Rights Watch they were tipped off beforehand and left prior to the raid.

Failing to find any of the people they intended to arrest, JTF personnel committed abuses against ordinary residents. Soldiers arbitrarily detained 13 people; according to local residents and to cult members interviewed by Human Rights Watch, none of these 13 people was involved in cult activity or violence. As one frustrated resident said to Human Rights Watch, “Those they said they were looking for, they couldn’t get any of them. So they were just harassing innocent people [and] even picked some innocent people and took them away.” Among those detained was the elder sister of one suspected cult member, who told Human Rights Watch that she was publicly whipped by a JTF soldier, made to lie face down in the dirt, and then arrested. She was detained at the SSS facility in Port Harcourt for two weeks before being released without charge.120 All of the other 12 detainees were set free without charge within two weeks of their arrest.

During the same operation JTF personnel also shot up and burned the residences of several alleged Deebam members. Human Rights Watch interviewed residents who said that soldiers had also entered their homes and ransacked them looking for cash, stealing whatever they found.121

Many of the residents who complained to Human Rights Watch about the raid said that they would have been supportive of a JTF operation if it had successfully targeted local cult members.122 As one man whose neighbor’s home was looted by JTF personnel put it:

Myself, I even want them to come and search the houses. If they are coming and it is genuine, there is nothing bad with that. But the issue is whether or not they start harassing innocent people. The things they d[id] when they came is different from what they tell us—they start harassing innocent people and destroying their properties. That is not supposed to be their aim.123

On the night of January 17, 2008, police carried out a raid in the violence-plagued Diobu neighborhood of Port Harcourt and arrested more than 200 people. The police officers involved appear to have had no clear idea whom they were seeking to arrest; civil society leaders and press accounts indicated that police arrested men and boys largely at random. None was charged with any criminal offense, but some of those arrested said they were forced to pay bribes to the police to secure their release from jail.124

The JTF in Ogbogoro

The story of the JTF’s intervention in Ogbogoro provides a clear illustration of how effective the JTF’s presence has been in restoring security to many communities that had been plagued by violence. At the same time, Ogbogoro’s example highlights the impossibility of ending the rampant criminality absent a political commitment on the part of all levels of government to tackle the underlying causes of the area’s problems.

On September 7 (as described in “Gang Terror in Ogbogoro,” above), Deebam cult members in Ogbogoro attacked a community meeting and murdered two prominent traditional rulers. The meeting had been called to endorse a decision to invite the JTF to come to Ogbogoro and confront the cultists.

JTF forces responded quickly but after cult members had already fled the town. The JTF has maintained a presence in Ogbogoro ever since, a development residents have eagerly welcomed. Local youth leaders say they have actively cooperated with the JTF in trying to locate and apprehend cultists in the surrounding areas and assisted in a late September JTF operation that resulted in the successful rescue of a British hostage from a nearby community in Etche Local Government Area.125

In spite of the reprisal they suffered for earlier efforts to combat local cult activity, community and youth leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they were proud of the stand they had taken. One local leader told Human Rights Watch that, “Other Niger Delta communities should be proactively involved and not just sit back and accept these problems. They should learn from our example.”126

The JTF presence has brought a tenuous peace to Ogbogoro. The primary concern expressed by many residents is that violence will return when the JTF removes its forces from Ogbogoro’s streets.127 None of the local leaders of Deebam cult has been apprehended, although community leaders say they have provided their names to the JTF and police. Several community leaders say they have received notes or phone text messages conveying threats of violence and death to be carried out when the JTF leaves and cultists are able to reenter the community.

All of the Ogbogoro residents interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they wanted to see the JTF remain in the community until the threat of further violence could be eliminated. One traditional ruler said, “We don’t want the military to leave us so soon. We don’t want you to hear that this community has been destabilized again…We want a substantial military presence here until the principal perpetrators of these crimes are caught.”128




87 Human Rights Watch interviews with residents, cult members, and JTF personnel (names withheld), Port Harcourt, September and October 2007. See also Jimitota Onoyume, “Army Ends Gun Battles in Port Harcourt,” Vanguard, August 13, 2007.

88 Human Rights Watch interviews with local residents (names withheld), Marine Base, Port Harcourt, October 6, 2007. For more on this see below, “The Nigerian Police.”

89 Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses (names withheld) and with Maj. Sagir Musa, Port Harcourt, September and October 2007.

90 Human Rights Watch interviews with local residents (names withheld), Marine Base, Port Harcourt, October 6, 2007.

91 Human Rights Watch interview with a shopkeeper (name withheld), Marine Base, Port Harcourt, October 6, 2007.

92 Human Rights Watch interview with a local resident (name withheld), Port Harcourt, October 3, 2007.

93 Human Rights Watch interviews with witnesses and Marine Base residents (names withheld), Port Harcourt, October 2007.

94 Human Rights Watch interviews with local residents (names withheld), Marine Base, Port Harcourt, October 6, 2007.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with JTF Spokesperson Maj. Sagir Musa, August 18, 2007.

98 Human Rights Watch interviews with gang members, activists, and residents (names withheld), Port Harcourt, October 2007.

99 The guest house was located next to a road that ran down a narrow peninsula of reclaimed land between water and mangrove swamps. The adjacent waterways are relatively broad and the entire area is devoid of readily apparent cover.

100 Human Rights Watch interviews with civil society activists (names withheld), Port Harcourt, September 2007.

101 Human Rights Watch interviews with residents (names withheld), Port Harcourt, October 2007.

102 See “Nigeria Soldiers to Remain in Port Harcourt for Six Months—Governor,” Dow Jones Commodities Service, August 19, 2007.

103 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with activists and local residents (names withheld), Port Harcourt, February 2008.

104 “Fighting Rocks Nigeria Oil City,” BBC News Online, January 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7167294.stm (accessed January 5, 2008).

105 See, for example, George Onah, “Gunmen kidnap Agip manager,” Vanguard, February 21, 2008; Ahamefula Ogbu, “Gunmen kidnap lawmaker’s brother,” This Day, February 1, 2008; Chris Agunweze, “Kidnappers of Lulu Briggs’ wife demand N.5bn ransom,” Daily Sun (Lagos), February 8, 2008.

106 Human Rights Watch interviews (names withheld), Rivers State, September and October 2007.

107 Human Rights Watch interview with Maj. Sagir Musa, Port Harcourt, October 6, 2007.

108 Ibid.

109 Human Rights Watch interviews with human rights advocates (names withheld), Port Harcourt, September 2007.

110 Human Rights Watch interview with a local human rights activist (name withheld), Port Harcourt, September 30, 2007.

111 Human Rights Watch interview a local human rights activist (name withheld), Port Harcourt, September 28, 2007.

112 Human Rights Watch interview with a local journalist (name withheld), Port Harcourt, October 6, 2007.

113 Human Rights Watch interview with Maj. Sagir Musa, Port Harcourt, October 7, 2007.

114 Ibid; Human Rights Watch interview with Rivers State Commissioner of Police Felix Ogbaudu, Port Harcourt, October 8, 2007.

115 Human Rights Watch interview with Maj. Sagir Musa, Port Harcourt, October 7, 2007.

116 Ibid.

117 Human Rights Watch interviews with former detainees (names withheld), Port Harcourt and Bodo, September and October 2007.

118 Human Rights Watch interview with two former detainees (names withheld), Port Harcourt, October 6, 2007.

119 See below, chapter “Looking Forward,” section “The Rivers State Government.”

120 Human Rights Watch interviews with local residents and cult members (names withheld), Bodo, September 30, 2007.

121 Human Rights Watch interviews with local residents (names withheld), Bodo, September 30, 2007.

122 Ibid.

123 Human Rights Watch interview with a local resident (name withheld), Bodo, September 30, 2007.

124 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with civil society activists, January and February 2008; see also “Police corruption blamed for wave of arrests,” IRIN, January 28, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=76458 (accessed February 21, 2008).

125 Human Rights Watch interview with NDPVF members (names withheld), Ogbogoro, October 10, 2007. The hostage, David Ward, was freed in a JTF operation in early October 2007. Human Rights Watch interview with Maj. Sagir Musa, Port Harcourt, October 7, 2007.

126 Human Rights Watch interview with a local NDPVF leader (name withheld), Ogbogoro, October 10, 2007. The NDPVF has itself been involved with election rigging, robbery, and other violent crimes. In Ogbogoro, however, NDPVF members have largely played a constructive role in trying to combat violence in their community.

127 Human Rights Watch interviews with local residents (names withheld), Ogbogoro, October 10, 2007

128 Human Rights Watch interview with a traditional leader (name withheld), Ogbogoro, October 10, 2007.