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II. At War and At Peace

The Civil War

Until very recently, politics in Nepal was essentially a triangular affair involving political parties represented in Parliament, Maoist forces, and the monarchy, which traditionally has had close connections to the army. In 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) declared a “people’s war” against the “ruling classes,” which included the monarchy and the political parties. During the first years of the armed conflict, the ill-equipped and poorly trained Nepal Police bore the brunt of responsibility for fighting the CPN-M. As a key target of the CPN-M, hundreds of police officers lost their lives. A total of 1,271 out of 1,971 police posts across the country stopped functioning after they were destroyed during attacks by the CPN-M, or after police personnel were withdrawn for security reasons.¹

On November 23, 2001, the Maoists withdrew from peace talks and attacked police and army posts in 42 districts, reportedly killing at least 30 army and 50 police personnel.²The authorities responded on November 26 by declaring a nationwide state of emergency and deploying the Royal Nepal Army (RNA, now Nepal Army, NA).³  The government imposed a state of emergency and introduced the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance (TADO), granting wide powers to the security forces to arrest people involved in “terrorist” activities. The CPN-M was declared a “terrorist organization” under the Ordinance.⁴

The NA’s involvement did little to quell the insurgency, but it did make the civil war increasingly lethal for civilians. According to the Nepali human rights group, Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), some 13,256 Nepalis were killed in the conflict.⁵ Over 8,000 mostly civilian deaths were recorded after November 2001, when the army was deployed. Since the army was not able to maintain positions outside of their barracks, they made regular “sweeps” into areas of Maoist activity, often in response to Maoist attacks, targeting civilians as in most cases the People’s Liberation Army (PLA, armed wing of the CPN-M) had left the area by the time the army arrived. The NA’s behavior demonstrates that, rather than winning “hearts and minds,” its tactics had the effect of terrorizing the local population.

In November 2003, the government put the police and the paramilitary Armed Police Force (APF) under the unified command of the army.⁶ Human rights violations escalated dramatically after this. In both 2003 and 2004 Nepal took on the ignominious distinction of having the highest yearly number of new cases of “disappearances” reported to the United Nations (UN) Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) in the world.⁷ In total, 1,619 “disappearances” (1,234 attributed to the security forces, 331 to the CPN-M and 54 unidentified) were reported to the NHRC.⁸ Maoist forces were also responsible for killings, abductions, torture, extortion, and the use of children for military purposes.⁹

On February 1, 2005, King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and with the army’s backing assumed all executive authority, citing the inability of the civilian government to resolve the conflict. He ordered the detention of thousands of political activists, journalists, and human rights monitors, and imposed severe restrictions on civil liberties.

Amid a further rapid deterioration of the human rights situation, the international community finally acted on longstanding calls from national and international non-governmental organizations to set up a human rights monitoring mission by the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Under considerable pressure from members of the UN Commission on Human Rights, in April 2005 the government of Nepal signed a Memorandum of Understanding with OHCHR to set up a large field office. This brought about more effective human rights monitoring and reporting in the country. The Maoist leadership allowed OHCHR to travel freely and investigate alleged abuses, and at least in some cases took action in response to concerns raised by the monitors.¹⁰ Complaints of “disappearances” by the NA plummeted, though cooperation from the army remained problematic. For instance, the NA consistently denied the OHCHR full access to its records of courts of inquiry and courts martial.¹¹

After the King assumed power in February 2005, the political parties represented in parliament that had established a Seven-Party Alliance (SPA)¹² initiated a dialogue with the CPN-M with the help of India. The CPN-M’s unilateral decision to begin a four-month ceasefire from September 3, 2005, was not joined by the royal government. On November 22, 2005, the SPA and the Maoists adopted a 12-point “Letter of Understanding,” which included a call for the election of a constituent assembly, and committed the Maoists to multi-party democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. The agreement, strongly criticized by the royal government, was welcomed by the UN Secretary-General.

Following the end of its unilateral ceasefire in January 2006, the CPN-M stepped up its military activities. It called for a blockade of Kathmandu and all district headquarters nationwide from March 14 and announced an indefinite country-wide strike from April 2. Shortly after talks between representatives of the SPA in New Delhi in March, the Maoists decided to join the political parties in a combined show of strength. Opposing bans and curfew orders, tens of thousands of people took part in street protests across the country that escalated from April 6. On April 24, the King announced the reinstatement of the House of Representatives. A government under Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, leader of the Nepali Congress Party, was formed. It started negotiations with the CPN-M on a full-fledged peace agreement.¹³

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

After difficult negotiations, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Nepal’s government and the CPN-M was signed on November 21, 2006. The CPA consolidated a series of commitments to human rights made in previous agreements and included many of Nepal’s international obligations to respect, promote, and ensure human rights. In its preamble, the CPA commits all signatories “to create an atmosphere where the Nepali people can enjoy their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and…to ensuring that such rights are not violated under any circumstances in the future.”¹⁴ These include ending discrimination, arbitrary detention, torture, killings, and “disappearances.”

The CPA separately mandates OHCHR and the NHRC to monitor the implementation of the human rights provisions of the CPA. Both sides also agreed to make public within 60 days of signing of the agreement the whereabouts of those “disappeared” or killed during the conflict and to set up a high-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  

A United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN) with a limited political mandate and characterized as “a focused mission of limited duration” was established in Nepal in early 2007.¹⁵ UNMIN’s mandate is confined to “monitoring arms and armed personnel” of both sides, providing technical support for the planning, preparation, and conduct of elections, and assisting in the monitoring of ceasefire arrangements. 

The signing of the CPA raised hopes that the human rights situation would continue to improve, as it had in the aftermath of the ceasefire. In the course of 2007, however, the limited abililty of state institutions, including law enforcement agencies, to protect the lives and security of the population became increasingly apparent, especially in the Terai region, where members of the Madheshi community launched a sometimes violent protest movement demanding an end to discrimination.

Demonstrations in the Terai at times turned violent. Between January and October 2007, OHCHR recorded more than 130 killings of civilians, almost all in the central and eastern districts of the Terai. These include killings by members of Madheshi armed opposition groups as well as killings as a result of excessive use of force by Nepal Police and APF during demonstrations.

Elsewhere, mainly in the hill and mountain regions of Nepal, since 2007, members of the Young Communist League (YCL), the youth wing of the CPN-M, took on a public security role. In doing so, they were responsible for various abuses including extortion, threats and intimidation, physical assault, ill-treatment sometimes amounting to torture, forced labor, disruption of rallies and meetings, and destruction of property.¹⁶ 

The peace process was seriously undermined by a failure of the governing parties to implement many of the peace accord provisions and to respond adequately to the grievances of marginalized groups. 

Amid the continuing power and influence of the NA, security sector reform also has been neglected by the political parties. In September 2007, when the Maoists withdrew from government and elections to a constituent assembly had to be postponed, one of their published 22 preconditions for participation in the elections was security sector reform. Yet neither the CPN-M nor any other party have advocated for the establishment of effective oversight mechanisms or accountability processes.  In August 2008, the three main political parties in the new government announced in a joint document, the Common Minimum Program, that they would appoint a high-level commission to develop a national security policy.

On December 23, 2007, the seven main political parties, including the Maoists, signed a 23-point pact, agreeing to declare Nepal a republic at the first session of the Constituent Assembly, due to be constituted after elections on April 10, 2008. The parties also reiterated their commitment to establish a commission of inquiry on disappearances and a TRC.  

The elections were won by the CPN-M with 37 percent of the votes. The Nepali Congress (with 18 percent) and Communist Party of Nepal -UML (with 17 percent) suffered heavy defeats in an apparent demonstration of the people of Nepal’s desire for fundamental change. After protracted negotiations, the CPN-M, CPN-UML, and the Madeshi Janadhikar Forum formed a government in late August 2008. Earlier, Dr Ram Bharan Yadav, a member of the Nepali Congress party and member of the Madeshi community, was appointed the country’s first president. Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda, the CPN-M leader, was elected prime minister. Both appointments occurred as a result of elections in the Constituent Assembly, as the political parties could not reach a consensus. In a joint document, the Common Minimum Program, announced on August 21, 2008, the three governing parties affirmed their commitment to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances.