publications

Prison Reform

General Reforms

Beginning in April 2006, the Public Security Directorate (PSD) undertook a plan to reform Jordan’s prison administration. Following prison riots in March and April 2006, the PSD hired a US consulting firm, Kerik International group, headed by the former Police Commissioner for New York City, Bernard Kerik, to provide analysis, advice, and training for prison management. These reform efforts received renewed impetus following a critical report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, who had visited Jordanian detention sites in June 2006, finding “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment … amounting to torture in some instances [to be] widespread,”199 and “general impunity for torture and ill-treatment in Jordan.”200

King Abdullah called on the government to present a reform plan “according to the latest specifications consistent with international standards.201Upon being appointed director of the Public Security Directorate in December 2007, Maj.Gen. Mazin al-Qadi made it a priority of his tenure to “maintain the process of upgrading the performance of personnel working in the country’s correctional and rehabilitation centres and developing the[se] centres’ infrastructure, premises and services.”202

Overall, it appears that the reform program has emphasized physical improvements over procedural reform and accountability for abuses. The most tangible results have been the building of several new prisons, with al-Muwaqqar prison, southeast of Amman, opening in May 2007, and the closure in December 2006 of Jafr prison, a remote desert prison with a particularly bad reputation for torture.203 Furthermore, Jordan passed an amendment to Article 208 of the Penal Code criminalizing torture for the first time in October 2007, following Jordan’s ratification of the UN Convention against Torture on June 15, 2006.204 There have so far not been any prosecutions under this article.205 In November 2007, the PSD director circulated an advisory to all PSD members stressing that torture is a crime and that they must not have recourse to violence.206

Less tangible but potentially more important areas of reform have included a new system to classify prisoners, which separates convicted prisoners from detainees awaiting trial who must be presumed innocent; an interest in reducing the growing number of inmates by imposing punishments other than imprisonment; and improvements to prison services, including medical services, visitor and telephone services, and court transportation. In addition to criminalizing torture in the Penal Code, the PSD assigned police prosecutors to seven prisons to investigate potential abuses (see “Impunity,” “Complaints and Prosecutions”). The reform plans have also included a new training program for an augmented prison staff and directors on principles of the use of force and human rights, among other topics.

New Prisons

The PSD is in the process of building a string of new prisons to alleviate overcrowding and decrepit facilities in the existing prisons. The prison population stood at 7,665 on April 13, 2008, and around 55,000 inmates enter and exit the prison system each year.207 The plan to build new prisons is ambitious, aiming to add a large prison for convicted prisoners in northern Jordan, Umm Lu’lu’, by early 2009, in addition to two smaller detention centers in Zarqa and Marka, with capacity for 900 to 1000 inmates each over the coming two years. Umm Lu’lu’ and Marka would replace Juwaida prison, and Zarqa would replace Birain. In September, the government plans to finish construction of the super-maximum security prison Muwaqqar II (see below). In 2009, the PSD aims to open three more prisons in Karak/Tafila, Balqa’ and Irbid to replace existing prisons there.

Human Rights Watch’s visits to seven prisons showed that most prisons were at or above capacity, but that in general the building structures in most prisons appeared adequate, with the exception of Juwaida and parts of Qafqafa, and sanitary facilities. It is therefore surprising that by far the largest effort, financially and administratively, has been directed toward the construction of new prisons. PSD Director Mazin al-Qadi did not reveal the budget for these new prisons.208 Current expenses per prisoner per day excluding capital outlays run at around JOD20 (ca. US$30), an official said.209 Director of prison service, Sharif al-‘Umari, told Human Rights Watch that the design of the existing prisons, large rooms for 20- 60 prisoners facing a shared exercise courtyard, was inappropriate for modern prison operations.210

The Super-maximum security prison Muwaqqar II

In early 2006, King Abdullah hired the Kerik International group to reform the kingdom’s prisons.211 Among projects to train Jordanian prison staff and modernize its prisons, the Kerik Group also advised on the establishment and design of a super-maximum security prison (supermax). Such prisons are designed to isolate violent inmates from the general population. Jordan’s new supermax adjoins a brand-new regular prison a few kilometers east of the police training academy outside al-Muwaqqar. Still under construction, it is officially called Muwaqqar II. The head of the PSD, Maj.Gen. Mazin al-Qadi, told Human Rights Watch that he hopes to have construction completed in September 2008.212 Reports indicate that the government, at least in 2007, considered imprisoning Islamists charged with “national security” offenses there, among others.

Human Rights Watch visited the supermax on April 15, 2008, met with the supervising engineer, and inspected the facility. It has 240 cells divided among three wings, two stories tall and at 90 degree angles to one another. In between wings are high walls to prevent prisoners on the second floor from seeing, and communicating with, prisoners on the first floor of another wing. The cells are no bigger than two by three meters, containing a shower above a French toilet, a sink, and a cot. An outdoor veranda with metal bars at the back of the cell is big enough to stand up, but not to lie down. This is the exercise area. According to the supervising engineer, each prisoner will eat inside his cell and have no contact with fellow prisoners.213 Visiting cubicles, however, are included in the design.

The purpose of supermax prisons, which came into vogue in the US in the 1980s, was to isolate incorrigibly violent or dangerous inmates for whom the normal panoply of prison regulations stipulating the piecemeal withdrawal of privileges was insufficient. Human Rights Watch has documented the danger of these facilities in the US. In a report issued in 2000, we found that

Inmates have described life in a supermax as akin to living in a tomb. At best, prisoners' days are marked by idleness, tedium, and tension. But for many, the absence of normal social interaction, of reasonable mental stimulus, of exposure to the natural world, of almost everything that makes life human and bearable, is emotionally, physically, and psychologically destructive. Prisoners subjected to prolonged isolation may experience depression, despair, anxiety, rage, claustrophobia, hallucinations, problems with impulse control, and/or an impaired ability to think, concentrate, or remember. As one federal judge noted, prolonged supermax confinement "may press the outer bounds of what most humans can psychologically tolerate."

Some inmates subjected to supermax confinement develop clinical symptoms usually associated with psychosis or severe affective disorders. For mentally ill prisoners, supermax confinement can be a living horror: the social isolation and restricted activities can aggravate their illness and immeasurably increase their pain and suffering. Moreover, few supermax facilities offer mentally ill inmates the full range of mental health services and treatment that their psychiatric conditions require.214

Bernard Kerik in July 2007 told a U.S. television program that “we're building a supermaximum facility for Al-Qaeda types, for these radical Islamics so that they all go into one centralized center and they're held there under supermaximum security so that they done [sic] go into different institutions throughout the country and radicalize other people.”215 Officials did not invite broader discussion about the supermaximum prison and its appropriateness for Tanzimat inmates. In October 2007, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Interior Mukhaimer Abu Jammous expressed surprise in a meeting with Human Rights Watch that we had learned of the planned relocation of national security prisoners to the supermax.216 The designation of a supermax for prisoners who have committed certain types of crimes, rather than based on their violent or dangerous behavior inside the prison, regardless of their charge or conviction, defies the original purpose of such facilities.

A supermax is not appropriate for national security prisoners, so-called Islamist Tanzimat, who are already housed in separate facilities inside two Jordanian prisons. Prison authorities hold the Tanzimat prisoners in small group isolation, with three or four prisoners to a cell, where they exercise and eat alone. The desire by prison authorities to manage this population by imposing additional restrictions on their movement seems to go beyond legitimate security concerns of indoctrination and escape risks. Small group isolation has already caused psychological strain, which complete isolation in solitary confinement would likely heighten.

The authorities in 2007 withdrew privileges, such as seeing prisoners from other cells or praying together, citing the desire to apply the same regime on Tanzimat inmates as on ordinary inmates. In fact, other prisoners enjoyed more interaction with fellow prisoners. In August 2007, some of the Tanzimat complained that “we are exposed to the sun for just four hours, then we stay in small cells for 20 hours [which has led to] hypertension, shortsightedness, severe constipation, back pain, rheumatism and skin disease.”217 Human Rights Watch cannot verify the accuracy of these complaints, but has documented similar abuses of state security prisoners in small-group isolation in Turkey.218 The psychological effects of small group isolation have led a governmental group of prison experts to recommend certain minimum measures for inmates in such group isolation:

Prisoners who present a particularly high security risk should, within the confines of their special unit [be] able to mix freely with fellow prisoners in the unit; allowed to move without restriction within what is likely to be a relatively small physical space; [and be] granted a good deal of choice about activities … by way of compensation for their severe custodial situation.219

Jordanian corrections officials in April and again in August 2008 assured Human Rights Watch that Muwaqqar II was no longer intended for national security prisoners, but for violent prisoners, who would enter for an initial period of three months before being returned to the general population.220 Each case would require a special determination by a PSD committee, but repeat offenders could be transferred to the supermax for periods longer than three months. By August 2008, the PSD had not finished writing regulations for Muwaqqar II.221

Operating this prison would necessitate a change in the law. Article 38.d. of Jordan’s current prison law stipulates that a prisoner who violates prison regulations can be “put in solitary confinement for a period not exceeding seven days each time.”222 International law does not put an explicit limit on the time authorities may put a prisoner in solitary confinement, such as in a supermax, but requires regular and transparent reviews of confinement in isolation.223The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has argued that prolonged, consecutive solitary confinement can constitute ill-treatment.224

Classification

The prison law states that inmates should be separated according to gender, conviction status, type of crime, length of sentence and age.225 The government had not implemented this law until February 2008, when the prison service designated Qafqafa, Swaqa and Muwaqqar as prisons for convicted inmates, with the remainder for pre-trial and administrative detainees. The reason for using entire prisons, rather than wings within a prison, as pre-trial or post-conviction centers was the improved logistics of transporting prisoners from fewer locations to the courts, officials said.226 Juwaida prison, now largely a pre-trial detention center, will be only a few hundred meters from the planned new criminal court. Another reason was the increased efficiency of concentrating improved rehabilitation measures, such as work, training and study, in only a few centers for convicts. Within these centers, and within each wing, prisoners are now further segregated according to sub-categories of age, health, crime and general behavior, the director of the prison service said.227

The regulations accompanying the prison law require a “psychiatrist, a general doctor, and a social worker” to be part of the team classifying prisoners.228 Since psychiatrists visit prisons between twice a week and once every two weeks, it seems unlikely that this aspect of the law is being followed. Human Rights Watch did not encounter a prisoner who said a doctor or social researcher was present during his classification.

The prison service also blamed prisoners’ opposition to transfers to another prison under the new classification system for the riots that lead to a fire in which three prisoners died in Muwaqqar on April 14, 2008. Opposition to the classification system may have been a minor contributing factor.229

Health Services

Prison reform plans include providing better medical care for inmates at all of Jordan’s prisons. In July 2008, the prison service held three days of workshops with the Ministry of Health concerning the health care needs of prisoners. Current deficiencies, the director of the prison service said, lay in the lack of doctors, especially psychiatrists.230 In August 2008, Minister of Health Salah Mawajdeh told Human Rights Watch that his Ministry was eager to ease the caseloads of prison doctors.231 The director of the prison service said that improvements in health services depended on other agencies, too. Recently, the PSD concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Health to provide improved health care. Qafqafa and Birain have received new medical equipment. Nevertheless, there are still too few psychiatrists, according to the head of the prison service.232

The PSD also was studying the possibility of distributing condoms following the appearance of sexually transmitted diseases in Qafqafa prison earlier this year.233 Human Rights Watch received conflicting information from prison doctors regarding blood testing of inmates upon entry. In April 2008 the doctor of Birain prison said they did not conduct such blood tests, whereas the Muwaqqar prison doctor in August 2007 said he routinely took blood samples to check for sexually transmitted diseases. It was unclear whether prisoners consented to these tests.

Social Services

PSD director Mazin al-Qadi told Human Rights Watch that other planned improvements include issuing a prisoners’ magazine, lectures focusing on national and religious values, a theater, already in place in Swaqa, allowing prisoners access to university text books, and increasing the staff of Ministry of Social Affairs’ social workers, for example to run literacy and adult education programs.234 Sharif al-‘Umari, the director of prisons, clarified in July 2008 that plans for a prisons website, a magazine, visiting foreign music and theater groups, artisanal workshops for 150 inmates and a school at Muwaqqar were well advanced.235

The main role of social workers in prison currently appears to be reviewing applications for financial aid from families where the main breadwinner is in prison. One prison director told Human Rights Watch that “Social services are not working as they should, although they helped 30 families financially.”236

Overall, very few prisoners work in Jordanian prisons. In Muwaqqar, no prisoners worked, whereas in Salt (Balqa), around six prisoners out of 433 worked in the kitchen, or as teachers and barbers; in Juwaida 15 prisoners out of a population of 1140 worked, mostly in the kitchen. In Qafqafa, prisoners could work in a bakery and a patisserie. In Swaqa, there is a farm at which prisoners can work. Not more than 20 prisoners worked in each prison.

One idea of the reform program would be to create prisons with different security levels in which prisoners could work and even leave the facility.237 In late 2008, the PSD hoped to open a low security prison in Salhub, close to Amman, consisting of five villas.238 Al-‘Umari also said he planned to put in place an individualized system for prisoner assessments, determining the appropriate facility and wing, work and social opportunities, and eligibility for a reduction of sentences of seven and a half days per month of good behavior.239

Training

Another component of the reform program is new training for an augmented prison staff and administration. Sharif al-‘Umari told Human Rights Watch that the prison service had added 400 employees to its staff in 2008, helping to establish closer contact between guards and prisoners.240 The National Center for Human Rights (NCHR), in cooperation with the prison reform unit at the Royal Police Academy, has instituted a series of training programs: one for prison directors, who are now mostly law school graduates, and one for prison guard trainees, including officials from Preventive Security who are tasked with guarding national security suspects and providing a control function over regular guards. The training focuses on prisoner rights and the prohibition against torture.241 The Kerik Group also carried out training of trainer workshops with corrections officers, including on non-lethal use of force.242 At the same time the supervisor of the prisons unit at the NCHR told Human Rights Watch that they were preparing a new brochure about prisoners’ rights and duties, which each prisoner would receive upon entering a facility.243

The government has also focused on emphasizing limitations on the use of force and the prohibition against torture in its training manuals. In 2007, the PSD issued a Code of Police Honor, which in Article 1 stresses the “protection of human principles and rights that the heavenly laws and international agreements have guaranteed.”244 In 2008, it produced a “Working Guide for Directors of Correction and Rehabilitation Centers,” which combines Jordanian law and international norms into some practical recommendations, such as a prisoner’s rights to legal counsel, to consult hislegal file, or to practice his religion. In his foreword, PSD director Mazin al-Qadi emphasizes the importance “not to have recourse to force … and the importance of documenting” instances in which force was used.245 In a separate chapter on torture, the booklet obliges directors to hold weekly lectures on human rights, and emphasizes that as a deterrent to torture, directors should “make the employees understand … the negative consequences resulting [from torture] on the national level.”246

The PSD’s efforts to raise awareness about torture and abuse, by training, educational booklets, and high-level instructions admonishing officials to refrain from use of unnecessary force, are laudable. However, they appear to be relying almost exclusively on educational measures, and not on accountability, to combat torture. Alone, these measures are too weak to be effective, especially given the historic nonchalance with which law enforcement officials have treated Jordan’s prison laws, including the prohibition against torture, and the lack of accountability for acts of torture.

Accountability

The PSD’s Legal Affairs department since early 2008 has assigned police prosecutors to work inside the prisons (see “Impunity”). This is a significant step and shows the willingness of the government to provide the resources necessary to detect and prosecute torture. However, the absence of any prosecutions to date for torture despite this reform indicates that the police cannot credibly investigate itself.

International Assistance

The European Union has analyzed the needs of Jordan’s penitentiary system and in March 2008 began a €1 million program of assistance to last 18 months aimed at improving prison management, especially the flow of information about prisoners’ behavior and the training of prison staff.247 The Austrian Ministry of Justice as the lead counterpart to Jordan’s prison service began work on July 9, 2008.248

The United States currently does not fund assistance to the Jordanian penitentiary system, including the work carried out by the Kerik International group.249




199 UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak. Mission to Jordan,” A/HRC/4/33/Add.3, January 5, 2007. Jordan was the first Arab country to allow a visit by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture.

200 “UN Expert Visiting Jordan Finds ‘General Impunity For Torture And Ill-Treatment’,” UN News, New York, July 3, 2006.

201 Ghaith Tarawna, “King Orders ‘Immediate’ Closure of Jafr Prison and Its Conversion to a School and Training Center,” al-Ra’i, December 18, 2006.

202 “Qadi Pledges to Continue Upgrading PSD Performance,” Jordan Times, December 11, 2007.

203 Jafr prison had a long history of housing political dissidents and armed Palestinian opposition before closing in the 1970s. It only reopened in the late 1990s to alleviate overcrowding, but quickly earned criticism for its remote location in the southern desert and as a “punishment center,” before again closing, and reopening in 2005, before closing again in 2006. UN Special Rapporteur on Torture. U.N. Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak. Mission to Jordan,” A/HRC/4/33/Add.3, January 5, 2007. Guards from Jafr prison now serving in different Jordanian prisons are still especially feared today. Human Rights Watch interview with prisoners in Aqaba, August 27, 2007, and Swaqa, August 21, 2007.

204 The amended article took the Convention’s definition of torture into Jordanian law. The article prohibits “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Penal Code, art. 208.

205 Human Rights Watch interview with Mahir Shishani, director, Grievances and Human Rights Office, PSD, Amman, April 14, 2008.

206 Hilmi al-Asmar, “Legislation Criminalizes Torture in Jordan,” Amman News Center, January 2, 2008, http://www.amanjordan.org/a-news/wmview.php?ArtID=17594 (accessed June 9, 2008).

207 Human Rights Watch interview with Sharif al-‘Umari, director, prison service, Amman, April 13, 2008.

208 Human Rights Watch interview with Mazin al-Qadi, director, Public Security Directorate, Amman, April 13.

209 Human Rights Watch interview with prison official, Amman, October 24, 2007.

210 Human Rights Watch interview with Sharif al-‘Umari, director, prison service, Amman, July 31, 2008.

211 Kerik had spent a brief spell in Iraq as Minister of Interior under the U.S.-led occupation in 2003, and was then involved in the training academy for Iraqi police set up outside the Jordanian town of al-Muwaqqar.

212 Human Rights Watch interview with Maj.Gen. Mazin al-Qadi, director, Public Security Directorate, Amman, April 13, 2008.

213 Human Rights Watch interview with the supervising engineer from the PSD, Muwaqqar II, April 15, 2008.

214 Human Rights Watch, Out of Sight: Super-Maximum Security Confinement in the United States, vol. 12, no 1 (G), February 2000, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/supermax/Sprmx002.htm .

215 “Bernard Kerik Building Nuke Proof Complex in Jordan,” Transcript, Glenn Beck Program, July 03, 2007, http://archive.glennbeck.com/news/07032007a.shtml (accessed May 19, 2008). In June 2007, the magazine Best Life, in its profile of Kerik wrote, “Based on his undisputed success as commissioner of New York City’s prisons, Kerik has been entrusted to overhaul Jordan’s prison system and design a “supermax” facility to incarcerate hard-core Al-Qaeda detainees.” Joseph Braude, “Bernie Kerik Won’t Fold,” Best Life Magazine, http://www.bestlifeonline.com/cms/publish/finance/Bernie_Kerik_Wont_Fold.shtml (accessed May 19, 2008).

216 Human Rights Watch interview with Mukhaimer Abu Jammous, secretary-general, Ministry of Interior, Amman, October 25, 2007.

217 Human Rights Watch interview with prisoners Isma’il, Swaqa Tanzimat, August 22, 2007.

218 Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Small Group Isolation in Turkish Prisons: An Avoidable Disaster, vol.12, no. 8(D), May 2000, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/turkey/ .

219 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, “Report to the Swedish Government on the visit to Sweden carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 5 to 14 May 1991,” CPT/Inf (92) 4 [EN], March 12, 1992, http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/swe/1992-04-inf-eng.htm (accessed May 20, 2008).

220 According to the current prisons director, this plan was largely developed under the previous PSD director, Muhammad ‘Aitan. Human Rights Watch interview with Sharif al-‘Umari, director, prison service, Amman, July 31, 2008.

221 Human Rights Watch interviews with Khalid al-Majali, Prison Reform Unit in the Royal Police Academy, Muwaqqar II, April 15, 2008, and in Amman, July 31, 2008.

222 Prison Law, article 38.d.

223 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), Report to the Icelandic Government on the Visit to Iceland, conducted between 6 and 12 July 1993, Strasbourg, France, 28 June 1994, CPT/Inf (94) 8, p. 26, http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/isl/1994-08-inf-eng.htm#II.B.3 (accessed June 8, 2006).

224 The principle of proportionality calls for a balance to be struck between the requirement of the situation and the imposition of a solitary confinement-type regime, which can have very harmful consequences for the person concerned. Solitary confinement can in certain circumstances amount to inhuman and degrading treatment; in any event, all forms of solitary confinement should last for as short a time as possible. European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2nd General Report, CPT/Inf(92)3, p.20.

In 2003, Human Rights Watch examined the conditions of mentally ill prisoners in US prisons, including those placed in solitary confinement and concluded that

“Perhaps nowhere in corrections is the contradiction between the paradigm of security and that of mental health more apparent than in supermax settings. Whatever the correctional justification for such facilities, it is clear they were not designed with their mental health impact in mind. Indeed, mental health experts did not participate in the development of such regimes… Yet most independent psychiatric experts, and even correctional mental health staff, believe that prolonged confinement in conditions of social isolation, idleness, and reduced mental stimulation is psychologically destructive.” Human Rights Watch, Ill Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003) http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/index.htm .

The UN Committee against Torture, examining the record of the US came to similar conclusions in 2006, when it expressed its “concern[..] about the extremely harsh regime imposed on detainees in “supermaximum prisons, ” [which, if ] its purpose [was] retribution, … would constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 16). United Nations Committee Against Torture, “Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture. United States of America,” Thirty-sixth Session May 1-19, 2006, CAT/C/USA/CO/2, July 25, 2006 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/432/25/PDF/G0643225.pdf?OpenElement (accessed June 10, 2008).

225 Law of the Correction and Rehabilitation Centers Number 9 of 2004 (Prison Law), Official Gazette No. 4656, April 29, 2004, arts 10 and 11.

226 Human Rights Watch interview with Mazin al-Qadi, April 13, 2008.

227 Human Rights Watch interview with al-‘Umari, April 14, 2008.

228 Public Security Directorate, Correction and Rehabilitation Centers Administration, “Regulations of the Law of Correction and Rehabilitation Centers,” 2007, art.3.d.

229 Human Rights Watch interview with prison official, Muwaqqar, April 15, 2008. These claims are unconvincing, however, because our research has found that prison authorities routinely transfer prisoners to different prisons in Jordan, often as punishment. Our investigation also concluded that the underlying reason for the riots was inmates’ anger at torture by guards. See Appendix 3.

230 Human Rights Watch interview with Sharif al-‘Umari, director, prison services, Amman, July 2008.

231 Human Rights Watch interview with Salah Mawajdeh, minister of health, Amman, August 5, 2008.

232 Human Rights Watch interview with Sharif al-‘Umari, April 14 and July 31.

233 Human Rights Watch interview with Mazin al-Qadi.

234 Human Rights Watch interview with Mazin al-Qadi.

235 Human Rights Watch interview with Sharif al-‘Umari, July 31, 2008.

236 Human Rights Watch interview with Muhammad Muhaimid, director, Juwaida, October 22, 2007.

237 Human Rights Watch interview with Khalid al-Majali, prison reform unit, Royal Police Academy, October 24, 2007.

238 Human Rights Watch interview with ‘Umari, July 31, 2008.

239 Human Rights Watch interview with ‘Umari, July 31, 2008.

240 Human Rights Watch interview with ‘Umari, July 31, 2008. In October 2007, Abu Jammous of the Ministry of Interior had promised that some of the additional 12,000 PSD officers in 2008 would be assigned to the prison service. Human Rights Watch interview with Mukhaimer Abu Jammous, secretary-general, Ministry of Interior, Amman, October 25, 2007.

241 Human Rights interview with Nisreen Zureikat, supervisor of the prisons unit, National Center for Human Rights, Amman, April 9, 2008 and Human Rights Watch interview with Mazin al-Qadi.

242 Human Rights Watch interview with Frank Ciaccio, Vice President, Kerik Group, New York, September, 2007 and with Khalid al-Majali, prison reform unit, Royal Police Academy, Amman, October 24, 2007.

243 Human Rights Watch interview with Nisreen Zureikat, supervisor of the prisons unit, National Center for Human Rights, Amman, April 9, 2008.

244 Code of Police Honor, Public Security Directorate, 2007, art.1.

245 Sa’d al-Limun and Khalid al-Majali, “Working Guide for Directors of Correction and Rehabilitation Centers,” Public Security Directorate, 2008, p.iii.

246 Sa’d al-Limun and Khalid al-Majali, “Working Guide for Directors of Correction and Rehabilitation Centers,” Public Security Directorate, 2008, p.11.

247 Human Rights Watch interview with Joaquin de Tasso-Vilallonga, First Secretary, and with Alessandro Campo, judicial adviser, Delegation of the European Commission in Jordan, Amman, April 9, 2008; Delegation of the European Commission in Jordan, Twinning Project Fiche. Improving the Penitentiary System in Jordan, JO07/AA/JH08.

248 Human Rights Watch interview with Josef Schmoll, project leader of the Austrian Ministry of Justice, Amman, August 5, 2008.

249 See: United States Agency for International Development, 2007 Cash Transfer and Local Currency Program, http://jordan.usaid.gov/sectors.cfm?inSector=23 (accessed February 12, 2008), now defunct. Human Rights Watch interview with US Embassy and USAID staff, Amman, December 16, 2007.