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II. Recommendations

Recommendations for Current AMIS operations

Having completed a detailed examination of the technical capacities of the AMIS II-E, and in view of our extensive research on the situation in Darfur, Human Rights Watch makes the following recommendations for ways in which mission operations may be immediately improved to protect civilians and which are urgently needed whatever the mission’s future evolution might be. A second set of recommendations follows on the possible transfer of AMIS to a United Nations mandate.

To the African Union

• In view of escalating insecurity across Darfur, urgently put in place measures to immediately enhance the performance of AMIS II-E. To this end:

o Expedite the completion of AMIS II-E in its entirety, including the full deployment of all 6,171 military personnel, 1,560 civilian police and equipment;

o Proactively and aggressively interpret AMIS’s mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian operations;

o Clarify that AMIS rules of engagement apply to the tasks of protecting civilians and humanitarian operations under imminent threat, and ensure that the rules allow for use of deadly force in the execution of these tasks;

o Delegate more control over the use of deadly force to sector commanders, to increase effectiveness;

o Ensure that the rules of engagement are supported and implemented by sector commanders and understood by soldiers through practical training. To this end, ensure that troop contributing countries provide soldier rules of engagement cards in the appropriate language, and that these cards are disseminated;

o Deploy in each sector fully equipped quick reaction forces to respond immediately to imminent threats to civilians and humanitarian operations, with rules of engagement that provide for the use of deadly force;

o Provide civilian police with some arrest powers (particularly in areas where no Government of Sudan presence exists), facilities, equipment, and procedures to enable them to detail and document alleged perpetrators before turning them over to the Sudanese authorities; and

o Pressure the government of Sudan to desist from any action hindering the deployment and full operationalization of the Canadian-loaned armored personnel carriers, and other equipment and supplies.

• As recommended in the A.U., U.N., and E.U. March 2005 assessment of AMIS, ask donors to provide attack helicopters to enhance AMIS’s capacity to protect civilians.³
• Change the composition of the ceasefire monitoring teams and remove members of the parties to the conflict from the investigative body. They should retain the right to see and comment on the commission’s findings before they are published, but within a limited (e.g. one-week) period. If any party disagrees with the final report it should file a dissenting report.
• Due to Sudanese government obstruction of AMIS operations, ensure that Sudanese President Omar El Bashir is not elected to the presidency of the A.U. at the January 2006 African Union Summit.
• Pending a decision on transfer of the mission to a United Nations mandate:

o Start planning for additional troops above the AMIS II-E levels of 6,171, including staff checks with troop contributing countries and discussions with donors about securing logistical and financial resources to support an increased force posture;

o Urgently generate and deploy additional civilian police above the AMIS II-E levels of 1,560 to provide improved visibility and protection around camps for internally displaced persons and vulnerable villages; and

o Assess the impact of the current operational command and control structure via force and mission headquarters, which competes with a “national” linear command and control structure (in which troop contributing countries nominate a national commander to oversee sector commanders, who in turn oversee national battalion groups).

To the Government of Sudan

• Ensure that Sudanese military forces and police cooperate fully with African Union Mission in Sudan forces. Deploy only experienced units of the Sudanese government armed forces in Darfur.
• Immediately remove all obstacles to the deployment and operation of AMIS by:

o Expediting deployment and operationalization of the Canadian-loaned APCs, tactical air support and other equipment and services requested by AMIS;

o Expediting entry procedures for the A.U. and its partner personnel, and facilitating their full and unimpeded access throughout Darfur;

o Supporting A.U. requests for any additional AMIS troops and civilian police and for policing powers to AMIS police;

o Ensuring that all state security forces and government-backed forces cease committing violations of human rights and humanitarian law;

o Unconditionally ceasing to provide arms and logistical, financial, and other support to all militia groups, and disarm them; and

o Facilitating safe and unhindered access for humanitarian relief operations to all civilians in need of assistance throughout Darfur.

To the United Nations Security Council

• Urge member states to continue to provide the African Union Mission in Sudan with funding including with sufficient cash to enable AMIS to effectively protect civilians and humanitarian operations, and with all necessary communication, logistical and technical support. Promptly pass a resolution demanding that the Sudanese government fully cooperate with the A.U. and the continuing AMIS mission, and desist from placing any obstacles in the way of AMIS deployment and operations.

To partner Governments: the United States, the European Union and its member states, and the member states of the Arab League

• Ensure adequate allocation of funding for the completion of AMIS II-E deployment, infrastructure, and ongoing operations pending any change to the mission’s status. Fund the urgent enhancement of AMIS’s ground and aerial mobility. Insist that the government of Sudan promptly and fully remove obstacles to the deployment of AMIS and fully support and facilitate AMIS operations.
• Pending a decision on transfer of the mission to a United Nations mandate:

o Support planning for additional troops above the AMIS II-E levels, including pledging logistical and financial resources to support an increased force posture, and providing attack helicopters to enhance AMIS’s capacity to protect civilians; and

o Support an immediate and substantial expansion of the AMIS civilian police component through logistical and financial support and expertise.

Recommendations on a possible transfer to a U.N. mandate

To the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council

• Ensure that the U.N. Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council work closely to develop plans, building on the recommendations of the forthcoming A.U.-U.N. assessment mission report, to ensure sustainable and long-term protection in Darfur, through a likely transition to a U.N. mandated force.
• Ensure that any United Nations mission mandated for operations in Darfur preserves and strengthens the capacity to act robustly to protect civilians.
• Should AMIS be folded into the existing United Nations Mission in Sudan, ensure that any merger does not diminish the mandate, mission tasks, rules of engagement or equipment AMIS has or plans to acquire, unless these are rendered unnecessary by a durable peace agreement.
• Recognize that a mission in Darfur requires rapid reaction forces, APCs, helicopters and attack helicopters, and a more robust profile than the current U.N. Mission in Sudan is deploying. Define the terms of reference for operations in Darfur accordingly.
• Ensure close collaboration by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations with A.U. headquarters and AMIS personnel to ensure that the successive evaluations of AMIS operations are fully reflected in planning and implementation of a U.N. mission in Darfur.

To the Government of Sudan

• Should the African Union and the United Nations Security Council decide on the transfer of the African Union Mission in Sudan to a U.N. mandate, cooperate fully with the United Nations in the deployment and operations of forces under a U.N. mandate in Darfur, including accepting inclusion of forces from outside Africa as part of such a mission.

To the United Nations and African Union member governments

• Contribute personnel, equipment, funding and other resources to any mission under U.N. auspices that replaces the African Union Mission in Sudan.