Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Thai Policy toward Burmese Refugees: III. Expulsion to Burma

Migrants in Thailand lacking proper documentation are routinely rounded up by Thai police. After extracting bribes from them, police release some of the migrants on the spot or after holding them for a couple hours in a police station. Those who are sent to the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) in Bangkok face much more serious difficulties. For Burmese in Thailand, the only way out of the IDC is deportation to Burma (either formal or informal), or detention in the Special Detention Center (SDC), a facility from which it is much more difficult to gain release.

Informal Deportees Dropped at the Border

Thai authorities currently expel as many as 10,000 Burmese migrants a month in “informal deportations” to Burma.³⁶ The Burmese are often dropped off at an unofficial border crossing point on the Thai side of the border in Mae Sot. Many are able to turn right around and return to the place they have been staying in Thailand if they pay stiff bribes to Thai police. Others are loaded on boats and forced to cross the river to a border crossing point controlled by the Democratic Buddhist Karen Army (DKBA), one of the military factions that has signed a ceasefire agreement with the SPDC. It is possible for some of those deported across the river to also bribe their way back to Thailand. Others, however, may be at risk of persecution or other ill-treatment by DKBA soldiers or Burma’s military, the Tatmadaw. UNHCR officials have admitted that recognized Burmese refugees holding valid protection letters from UNHCR have been among those expelled in these “informal deportations.”

In theory, detainees at the IDC who are refugees or asylum seekers can identify themselves to UNHCR staff posted at the detention center. However some detainees are reluctant to identify themselves as refugees. Some fear that given the increasingly close relationship between the Burmese and Thai governments and their intelligence agencies, they may put themselves at risk by publicly asking to make an asylum claim directly in front of Thai authorities at the IDC, with dozens of other detainees from unknown factions and political groups looking on. Some detainees wager that rather than being identified as a political activist and possibly sent to the SDC, which is used exclusively for political cases, it may be safer to quietly go along with informal deportation to Mae Sot. This gets them out of the IDC, but they take a big risk, gambling that at Mae Sot they will not be shipped back to Burma but will be able to bribe their way safely back to Bangkok.³⁷

The Holding Center at Myawaddy

The SPDC now plays a greater role in the deportation process. A June 2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Burma and Thailand provides for 400 Burmese to be deported each month, directly into a SPDC holding center in Myawaddy, Burma. The Myawaddy holding center, established by the SPDC in 2002 to process returned migrant workers, is operated by the Directorate of the Defense Service Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense, specifically by Military Intelligence Unit 25. Other than ICRC, no international organizations regularly monitor conditions at the holding center, which is known to perform involuntary HIV/AIDS testing and political screening.³⁸ In addition to health examinations, deportees have reported that military intelligence and immigration officials question them about past and current political affiliations and their future plans.

This screening poses a great risk to asylum seekers perceived as having been involved in political activities in Thailand, or in Burma prior to flight. In one case in 2002, three Burmese political activists were arrested by Thai authorities while traveling by boat to Ranong, in southern Thailand. The activists were handed over directly to SPDC authorities, who arrested them and sent them to Kawthaung Prison. On September 17, 2002, the activists were removed from the prison. Their current whereabouts remain unknown.

Even deportees who are not asylum seekers or subject to political persecution face punishment under Burma’s strict anti-emigration policies. According to NGOs in Mae Sot, Burmese who have been able to return to Thailand after being deported report that officials at the SPDC holding center photograph all returned migrants and tell them if they pass through the center three times, they will be imprisoned. People also report that when they return to their villages they are forced to sign pledges that they will not try to leave Burma again, and are threatened with prison sentences and heavy fines. Under SPDC Regulation 367/120-(b) (1), illegal emigration carries a sentence of up to seven years’ imprisonment.

According to SPDC statistics, 9,554 undocumented Burmese workers were officially deported from Thailand directly to the SPDC holding center in Myawaddy in Burma between February 2002 and April 26, 2003.³⁹

Into the Hands of the SPDC

The 2003 MoU streamlines and structures the deportation process to Myawaddy. Although the Thai government has assured UNHCR that recognized refugees (“Persons of Concern,” or POCs) will be withdrawn from the list of people to be deported, Thai immigration officials make no effort to determine if any deportees are refugees or have reasonable fear of persecution in Burma. However Thai officials allow UNHCR staff at the IDC to inspect the lists of names of people to be deported and to identify and call out the names of Burmese who have registered with UNHCR. If those detainees identify themselves to UNHCR, they can avoid formal deportation. Detainees may also make an asylum claim with UNHCR staff at the IDC, whether registered with UNHCR or not. However, the only option then is for the refugee or asylum seeker to be placed into the pool of people to be “voluntarily” and “informally” expelled.

“We are monitoring the process closely,” a UNHCR official told Human Rights Watch. “We interview those slated for official deportation under the MoU in order to identify people who have valid protection reasons not to return. They are then removed from the official deportation process and transferred to the voluntary informal deportation system.” ⁴⁰

UNHCR staff in Bangkok attempt to alert UNHCR protection officers in Mae Sot, in cases where a recognized refugee or asylum seeker registered with UNHCR is among a particular group of people to be expelled, either officially or unofficially. If notified, UNHCR staff in Mae Sot then go to the IDC in Mae Sot, or even directly to the unofficial border crossing point on the banks of the river that marks the boundary. Sometimes the alerts from Bangkok come just in time, with UNHCR protection officers getting to recognized refugees as they are about to board the boats to cross the river. UNHCR pulls out about thirty asylum seekers or refugees a month from the informal deportations.⁴¹ UNHCR officials admit that some people undoubtedly slip through the cracks—but not many. “With the informal deportations, we frequently see some of them again,” a UNHCR official said. “Pulling people out of informal deportation can be fairly reliable—as long as we know about them.”⁴²

As for the safety net for people who are formally deported, UNHCR says that to date no Burmese who has been registered with UNHCR has been expelled directly to Myawaddy. Since the formal deportations began at the end of August 2003, UNHCR has been able to identify approximately twenty detainees at the IDC who wanted to make an asylum claim. Many of these were already registered with UNHCR or had previously been in refugee camps, while others were not.⁴³

UNHCR is not able to conduct private and confidential counseling with the detainees in the IDC.⁴⁴ “We go and see people in groups in the IDC,” a UNHCR official told Human Rights Watch. “We call out their names in the large cells and counsel them [there]. If someone wants to speak to us privately, we take them aside in the cells from the rest of the group.”⁴⁵ Those who want to get their names off the list for official deportation are supposed to identify themselves.

Now that UNHCR no longer conducts refugee status determination, it will be much more difficult to ensure protection of Burmese in detention with valid asylum claims, especially new asylum seekers who have not yet registered with UNHCR. In addition, those who are rescued from formal deportation face the threat of being arrested again after being “informally” deported to Mae Sot because the Thai government defines Burmese as illegal immigrants whether they have UNHCR protection documents or not. For many Burmese, it is an endless, costly, and frightening cycle: arrest, detention, deportation, payment of bribes, release, and re-arrest.

Profile: One of the Unlucky Ones—Former Child Soldier Deported to Burma

The DKBA were there on the other side of the border. They were searching for KNU soldiers. … My whole body was shaking with fear.

—Former child soldier, describing being deported in August 2003.^a

“S” is one of many refugees who knows that Burmese who are “informally deported” may face a dangerous and harrowing experience. A former child soldier with the KNU, S was terrified when he was forced to meet his former enemies—soldiers from the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)—upon being dropped off in Burma, on the other side of the river from Mae Sot.

For those who come to Thailand just to find a job, who have no security problems in Burma, it’s no problem. But for me, it was a problem. There are SPDC agents in Mae Sot and DKBA soldiers across the border. There were money and security problems for me—I had to borrow money to get back.

S had left his village in Burma when he was fourteen years old and joined the KNU, along with his younger brother. “We left because the government army mistreated us,” he said. “Forced labor, portering, taxes—plus they asked for food and shot our pigs and cows. They treated the women badly.”

S was schooled by the KNU, but spent the “summer holidays” on the front lines carrying a gun with the other soldiers. When he finished high school he joined the KNU army fulltime. In 1998 his captain sent him back to his village for his own safety after S was named in a personal conflict with members of an allied resistance faction. His family helped S hide near the village for a year, fearing that he would be arrested or killed by the SPDC. After SPDC troops interrogated and tortured people in his village to get information about the whereabouts of S and other KNU soldiers, he fled.

S walked for eight days—mostly at night—to the Thai border, which he crossed at the end of June 1999. He stayed in a Thai-Karen village where he had a relative, but soon had to leave because of the danger of arrest by Thai authorities or reprisals from KNU soldiers. “The KNU leaders were searching for soldiers who had deserted, to catch them and take them back, or punish them,” he said.

A friend helped him get to Bangkok. On July 23, 1999, he applied for an interview with UNHCR. The next morning he went to one of the refugee camps, where he stayed unofficially for almost a year. Finding it difficult to survive as an unregistered refugee in the camp, he returned to Bangkok, where he volunteered with a church. In November 2001, when UNHCR finally recognized S as a refugee, his situation did not get much better:

It is hard—there is no security, no protection. I only have the UNHCR paper. Police can arrest me at any time. Plus I can't find a job because the Thai employers want only people with work permits. It’s difficult to make it on 2,000 baht (U.S. $50) a month.^b

S, who married a Karen refugee in June 2003, was detained several times in Bangkok by Thai police, who shook him down for bribes after demanding to see his papers. On August 5, 2003, both S and his wife were arrested by Thai police when they were returning from UNHCR. They were sent to a police station, and then on to the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) in Bangkok. S identified himself as a refugee to UNHCR staff at the IDC and asked for help.

They said they couldn’t help—I should go to Mae Sot [and be “informally” deported]. I said I wouldn’t go to Mae Sot. The U.N. staff said it was my decision. I hadn’t made any decision when two days later my wife and I were sent to Mae Sot.

Upon arrival in Mae Sot with sixty other deportees, Thai military intelligence officers processed them at an immigration detention center. The group was then driven to the river marking the border, where they were sent across to the Burma side by boat. There, S faced his worst enemy: soldiers from the DKBA, the renegade faction of the KNU, who were searching for KNU soldiers:

When I saw the DKBA soldiers I threw all my documents in the water. My whole body was shaking with fear. The DKBA soldier asked me my name. They asked in Burmese, not Karen. I felt unconscious with fear and couldn’t answer. One of the soldiers hit me from behind and said, “Did you hear the question?” I gave them a false name.

My biggest fear was to say I was KNU. The DKBA knows that KNU refugees say bad things about DKBA. It’s a big problem. If you can’t answer, they ask again. Then they hit you, and ask again. After that, they put you in prison, and ask again. Then they kill you. Killing is the last question for you.

After telling their names to the soldiers, the group of deportees were able to circle back around to the bank of the river. They got into the very same boat that had taken them to the Burmese side, and returned to Thailand—at a cost of 500 baht (U.S.$12.50) per person.

As soon as S and his wife arrived back in Mae Sot, they were arrested—again. “The police said they were going to send us back across the very same day,” he said. “If we paid 2,000 baht (U.S.$50) each, they said they would release us.”

S paid the bribe, and made his way to a friend’s house in Mae Sot, where he and his wife hid for a month. Then they arranged for an agent to take the couple by foot to Tak, avoiding police checkpoints along the way, and then continued by bus to Bangkok. That set the couple back another 10,000 baht (U.S.$250), a sum they are still struggling to repay.

^a Human Rights Watch interview with former KNU child soldier, Bangkok, November 12, 2003. He was recognized as a refugee by UNHCR in 2001.

^b Recognized Burmese urban refugees (POCs) generally receive monthly stipends of 2,000 baht (U.S.$50) per person.

Increasing Pressure on Migrants

In August 2003 the Thai cabinet passed a resolution prohibiting the renewal of permits for some 12,000 registered migrant workers��mostly Burmese—who fall into certain categories, such as those working in gas stations, hotels, restaurants, car repair shops, laundries, and beauty parlors. Along with the nationwide campaign to crack down on illegal migrants, many of those workers were arrested and deported after their work permits expired on September 25, 2003.⁴⁶ NGO workers in Mae Sot say that some industries, such as restaurants and hotels, appear to have been largely unaffected by the cabinet resolution, often because the business owners are well connected and can pay off the local authorities. In other cases, Burmese migrants have been clearly targeted for deportation, for example, Burmese known to be involved in activist organizations or those working at garment factories with labor disputes.

On December 17, 2003, for example, Thai security forces arrested and deported 269 Burmese garment workers who had gone on strike against Nasawas Apparel Company in Mae Sot. They were protesting the dismissal of twenty-five workers for demanding raises in pay.⁴⁷ On September 29, 2003, local labor and immigration officials in Mae Sot informed Dr. Cynthia Maung that Burmese staff at Mae Tao Clinic would not be able to renew their work permits, putting into limbo the legal status of the clinic, which is the main provider of healthcare services to asylum seekers and migrants on the Thai-Burma border.⁴⁸

Refugee relief workers on the border report that Burmese asylum seekers in Mae Sot have become much more desperate to obtain any sort of documentation from UNHCR since the August cabinet decree. The level of desperation sharply increased after UNHCR suspended RSD in January 2004.

In November 2003 the Thai National Security Council announced plans to establish three holding centers—two in the northern provinces of Tak and Chiang Rai and one in the southern province of Ranong—for illegal Burmese migrant workers who are not registered with the authorities. Undocumented migrant workers were given sixty days to register with the government or face arrest and deportation.⁴⁹

Legal aid lawyers in Thailand fear that the holding centers will serve to fast track the deportation of even more migrants directly into the hands of the SPDC, without access to lawyers, a court process, or independent screening for asylum claims. Large numbers of undocumented migrants can be “dumped” into the holding centers while awaiting official deportation, lawyers say.

“The problem is Thailand can’t afford to keep them in police stations—there’s no room,” said one Thai lawyer. ⁵⁰ “Right now with the official deportations of 400 a month, the processing takes time. If they want to deport more people, they’ll need these types of centers.”⁵¹

Official figures released by the Immigration Department in January 2004 put the number of Burmese nationals arrested as illegal migrants in Thailand during 2003 at 115,633 people, out of a the total of 189,486 migrant workers of all nationalities arrested during the year.