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<<previous | index | next>> II. New Thai Policies toward Burmese Refugees and MigrantsMajor policy shifts recently announced by the Thai government in regard to Burmese refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants will have important and often severe repercussions for hundreds of thousands of Burmese nationals living in Thailand, many of whom have fled from gross human rights violations, military conflict, and a concomitant lack of economic opportunity in Burma.2 Under intense pressure from the Thai government, on January 1, 2004, UNHCR suspended its screening of new asylum seekers (formally known as Refugee Status Determination, or RSD) from Burma, leaving tens of thousands of vulnerable people in a legal and practical limbo.3 Refugee assistance agencies and human rights groups in Bangkok and on the border were immediately flooded with calls and visits by Burmese asylum seekers asking where to turn for protection. No advance notice was given to Burmese refugees or refugee relief agencies prior to the abrupt suspension. NGOs in Bangkok received written notification from UNHCR on January 8.4
While UNHCR was granted approval as of February 1, 2004, to “register” new asylum seekers, those who register will only be referred to refugee camps and will not be given any definitive resolution of their status, as explained in a note circulated by UNHCR:
Broadening of Resettlement OpportunitiesIn January 2004, the United States entered into discussions with the Thai government and UNHCR about expanding resettlement opportunities for Burmese refugees in Thailand. While many details have yet to be worked out, it appears that the United States has committed to resettling 4,000 UNHCR-recognized Burmese refugees and asylum seekers now living in Bangkok and other urban areas in Thailand. These include 2,000 individuals recognized by UNHCR under its mandate as refugees (called “Persons of Concern,” or POCs in Thailand) and 2,000 asylum seekers who had cases pending with UNHCR as of December 31, 2003.6 This resettlement initiative is largely a welcome development, although there are several issues of concern. The first is the fact that it focuseson the 4,000 Burmese “urban refugees” who were registered with UNHCR as of December 31, 2003. The fate of urban refugees who are not yet registered with UNHCR, as well as asylum seekers who arrive from Burma in the future, is far less clear.7 While U.S. government officials say that additional urban refugees can be considered for resettlement once they register with UNHCR, the position of the Thai government—which wants to avoid a “magnet effect”—is much less certain. The Thai government and UNHCR have also yet to work out the process for determining the asylum claims of new applicants. “Obviously there are people who have not yet been registered who will have a strong claim to refugee status based on a legitimate fear of persecution,” a senior U.S. official told Human Rights Watch. “Some mechanism will have to be found to address their circumstances.” 8 In addition, at this point the resettlement does not include the 142,000 Burmese living in nine refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border, although U.S. government officials do not rule out that possibility later. “We are focused on the urban caseload initially but that doesn’t mean we won’t be looking at the camps along the border at a later date,” the U.S. official told Human Rights Watch.”9 Also not included for consideration for resettlement or even asylum at this time are members of groups such as the Shan, who have largely been barred by the Thai government from lawful residence in the refugee camps, as well as hundreds, if not thousands,of people with valid claims to asylum within the estimated one million Burmese migrants working in Thailand. Suspension of New Refugee AdmissionsWith UNHCR suspending one of its core protection functions in Thailand—Refugee Status Determination (RSD)—there is now no impartial and effective system in place to screen and admit newly arriving asylum seekers from Burma, as well Burmese already in Thailand who did not meet the unpublicized December 31, 2003, deadline to register with UNHCR.
By failing to insist that an admissions system be in place for new asylum seekers from Burma prior to or as part of the resettlement agreement, both the United States and UNHCR could end up enabling Thailand to effectively cap the flow of asylum seekers from Burma.10 As a UNHCR official told Human Rights Watch: “If UNHCR can’t continue its own RSD and the government doesn’t create an admission mechanism for the camps, there will be no formal admissions procedure for Burmese asylum seekers in Thailand. With no mechanism to distinguish between refugees and ‘illegal migrants’, it would be more possible for Burmese who are in need of international protection to be deported.”11 If screening of new Burmese asylum applications starts up again, the Thai government will likely take over this important task. Because Thailand narrowly restricts those to whom it provides protection and assistance to “people fleeing fighting,” the government is likely to start rejecting Burmese exiles and asylum seekers fleeing persecution for their pro-democracy activities in Burma. Those who are rejected will be classified as illegal immigrants and face the risk of being deported back to Burma. Meanwhile, Thai authorities have launched a fresh campaign to round up and deport thousands of Burmese migrant workers back to Burma. Undoubtedly, asylum seekers and refugees—many of whom are forced to support themselves by working as migrant laborers in Thailand—are caught up in these sweeps and face human rights abuses upon return. By sending people fleeing persecution back to a country where their lives or liberty would be threatened, Thailand is violating one of the fundamental principles of international law, the principle of non-refoulement. The “Urban” RefugeesUp until the end of 2003, the Thai government had been pushing forward a plan to forcibly relocate all of the Burmese urban refugees to the border camps. This proposal was designed in part to accommodate concerns by Rangoon about Burmese refugees openly conducting pro-democracy activities in Bangkok and some of the border towns, such as Mae Sot and Mae Hong Son. Confining all refugees from Burma to camps along the border has been presented as a “harmonization” process, in which all Burmese refugees would be sheltered together and treated the same. At the same time the policy removes from public view Burmese refugees in Thailand who are openly campaigning for democracy and reform in Burma. The resettlement offer by the United States could postpone or even obviate the plan to relocate the 4,000 registered urban refugees to the camps, say U.S. officials, although the Thai government has not offered a specific guarantee on that point. “We hope that the relocation will be held in abeyance while we do [resettlement] interviews,” a U.S. official told Human Rights Watch. “Our strong preference, rather than locating interview teams in the boondocks, would be to process the refugees where they are now.”12
As to the fate of the Burmese refugees in the border camps, UNHCR officials have said they support resettlement options to be considered for these groups. “Resettlement is an important protection response to protracted refugee situations—some people have been in the camps for twelve years, where they face a range of serious protection and social problems,” a UNHCR official said.13 In addition, UNHCR is updating its contingency plan for UNHCR-monitored “voluntary repatriation” of Burmese refugees. UNHCR officials say they have received “positive signals” from Rangoon that UNHCR may be able to establish a presence on the Burmese side of the border, which would enable monitoring of returnees.14 Other indications that Burma has “opened up,” UNHCR officials say, is the fact that several international organizations are now working in Karen State and a ceasefire has been negotiated between Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the KNU. UNHCR officials stress, however, that it is still too early to launch a voluntary repatriation program because the necessary factors are not in place to ensure that the process fully complies with UNHCR’s standards.15 A UNHCR official told Human Rights Watch in February:
Crackdown on Burmese MigrantsMany of the estimated one million Burmese migrant workers in Thailand fled their homeland for a mixture of political and economic reasons and could face serious reprisals from the Burmese authorities if expelled from Thailand. Despite this fact, the Thai government regularly deports thousands of Burmese each month.17 The Thai government uses two different means of deportation, both of which bring the very real threat of violating the principle of non-refoulement. Under the first method, launched in May 2003, authorities expel as many as 10,000 Burmese people each month in “informal deportations” to Burma through an unofficial border point at Mae Sot, on the grounds that they are illegal migrant workers. While many are able to bribe their way back to Thailand, others have faced persecution or other ill-treatment by Burmese government soldiers or intelligence officials, or by some of the ethnic-based armed groups operating along the border. Even more worrisome is the second method of deportation: “formal deportations” authorized under an agreement between the Thai government and the SPDC. Since August 2003, Thailand has been deporting 400 “illegal” Burmese nationals a month directly into a holding center in Burma operated by Burmese military intelligence. The names of those to be deported from the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) in Bangkok are shared with Rangoon. UNHCR also has access to the lists so that UNHCR staff posted at the IDC can check whether any recognized refugees or asylum seekers are slated for deportation. Detainees who are refugees or asylum seekers, or those who want to make a fresh asylum claim on the spot, can choose to have their names removed from the deportation list sent to the SPDC. Ironically, the detainee’s only option then is to elect to be “informally deported” through Mae Sot. While UNHCR staff in Mae Sot subsequently try to prevent the informal deportations of asylum seekers and recognized refugees to Burma, this is not always possible. It is not clear what happens to the 400 people deported each month from the IDC directly into the hands of the SPDC. No official mechanisms are in place for impartial NGOs or any other entity to systematically follow up to ensure that the deportees are not mistreated upon return or that adequate provision has been made for their economic and social reintegration.18 The SPDC and its predecessors have a long and well-documented history of mistreating returning Burmese, particularly members of ethnic minority groups with whom the government has been engaged in protracted armed conflicts.19 In November 2003, the Thai government stepped up the pressure when it announced that undocumented migrant workers had sixty days to register with the government or face arrest and deportation.20 That same month the Thai National Security Council revealed plans to establish three holding centers for Burmese migrant workers who are not registered with the authorities.21 Compounding the problem, strict new labor regulations introduced in Thailand in 2003 may result in the deportation of even more individuals with genuine fears of persecution if returned. A bilateral agreement between Burma and Thailand in June 2003 aims to establish a labor import system requiring migrant workers in Thailand to have passports, visas, official contracts, and a limited term of stay.22 There is concern that the Thai government intends to use this “labor-order”23 policy arranged with the SPDC, as well as stricter enforcement of labor laws and visa regulations, to flush out and deport non-SPDC approved migrants and exiled political activists who are among the Burmese migrant workforce in Thailand.24 Those who fled Burma for both economic and political reasons will find it dangerous and difficult—if not impossible—to return to Burma to obtain the legal documentation required to work in Thailand.25 As part of this plan, starting in September 2004 the SPDC will begin to replace “illegal” workers from Burma with “legitimate” ones by exporting “legal labor” into Thailand.26 In this way, the military government in Rangoon stands to profit—politically and financially—by facilitating and controlling the flow of migrants to Thailand.27 Workers not approved by the SPDC, especially exiled political dissidents, are unlikely to receive authorization from either government to work in Thailand. Under this policy, they will be returned either directly to the SPDC, or simply deported across the border. Forging Friendship with RangoonSince Prime Minister Thaksin came to office in 2001, Thailand has steadily warmed its relations with the Burmese military government and advanced an increasingly harsh policy towards Burmese refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers. Thaksin’s stance has been out of step with many other countries that are pressuring the SPDC to hand over power to a democratically-elected civilian government. While other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members such as Malaysia and Indonesia spoke out against the May 30 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and emphasized the need for political change in Burma, Thailand has continually moved closer to Burma. Burmese refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants are now paying the price. In the past the Thai government took a fairly tolerant approach towards peaceful Burmese activist groups operating in Thailand. It is now adopting a more hardline stance. Thai authorities have begun to monitor, curtail, and shut down the activities of Burmese human rights defenders, opposition groups, and advocacy organizations. At the end of 2002, for example, Thai authorities closed Burmese opposition political offices in Sangklaburi and Mae Hong Son, near the Burma border. The government also introduced new visa regulations that make it much more difficult for Burmese activists to obtain visa extensions to remain in Thailand. In 2003, Thaksin was clearly displeased when Burmese protestors—including some recognized refugees—demonstrated in front of the Burmese embassy in Bangkok after the May 30 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi.28 Thai police arrested twenty-six Burmese demonstrators—including two children—after two separate rallies. As of February 2004, all but three of the protesters remained in custody at the Special Detention Center in Bangkok. After the first arrests at the end of June, Thaksin said: “The Burmese are entitled to stage protests against their government in camps we provide. They can say what they want. But it is not right that they come to Bangkok and protest. We do not like any situation that we cannot control.”29 It was only a few days later that the Thai government announced plans to move all of the urban Burmese refugees to the border camps. Organizations that provide services to Burmese refugees have also come under increased scrutiny. In October 2003, several refugee relief organizations in Bangkok temporarily suspended their services and many Burmese asylum seekers and refugees kept off the streets, fearing police raids of NGO offices and sweeps of Burmese urban activists and migrants in advance of the meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) nations in Bangkok. Human rights activists, both Burmese and Thai, have repeatedly been warned by police and intelligence officials not to speak out against the SPDC or the Thai government. Many newspapers have retreated from criticizing or even reporting on this subject for fear of official reprisals. These moves threaten the relatively open society that Thailand has gradually built since the end of military rule in 1992. History of Burmese Refugees in ThailandGross human rights abuses by Burma’s military government, now called the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as well as decades of internal armed conflict, have caused hundreds of thousands of Burmese to flee to Thailand since the mid-1980s. Thailand, which is not a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the “Refugee Convention”) or its 1969 Protocol, has responded to this flow of people in different ways at different times. Some officials in the military, which has primary responsibility for dealing with the inflow of refugees, have protected Burmese, for both humanitarian and political reasons. Others have sought to push them back. As with Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Lao refugees, there has also been a long history of violence, abuse, and exploitation against those fleeing armed conflict from neighboring countries. At its best, Thailand has pursued a humanitarian policy in which refugees fleeing conflict zones in Burma have been provided with temporary asylum in refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border. Others who make their way to Bangkok or Mae Sot have been able to make an asylum claim with UNHCR under its mandate. Those receiving protection in Thailand from Burma thus fall into two broad categories: approximately 142,000 refugees sheltered in ten border camps,30 and approximately 4,000 urban refugees and asylum seekers in Bangkok and other urban centers. The urban refugee population consists principally of ethnic Karen who do not feel safe at the border, as well as Burmese political exiles, dissidents, and students who fled the Burmese government’s violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in 1988 and subsequent repression.31 Though members of both groups are deserving of international protection, Thai policy toward each has differed. The refugee camp population consists primarily of ethnic minority Karen and Karenni who have fled to Thailand as a result of conflict between Burma’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, and armed opposition groups. The Thai government has permitted many of these people to stay in camps and receive basic humanitarian assistance delivered by private relief agencies. Thailand has historically restricted admission to the camps to “persons fleeing fighting.” Up until 2001, such a determination was made by governmental Provincial Admission Boards (PABs).32 However, since 2001, there has been no formal procedure for admission into the camps, with the result that as many as 30,000 refugees in the camps are not registered.33 In addition, Burmese fleeing human rights abuses such as forced labor, extrajudicial executions, rape, forced relocation, demolition of villages, destruction of food crops, and conscription of child soldiers––but not deemed to be fleeing fighting by the Thai authorities––are not allowed to enter Thailand and are often pushed back at the border. Of particular concern is the lack of protection available for ethnic groups from Burma such as the Shan, Akha, Lahu, Wa, Kachin, Mon, and Burman. Many of these ethnic minority people who seek refuge in Thailand must try to survive as migrant workers or enter the camps illegally. Among the most visible victims of these discriminatory policies are the more than 200,000 ethnic Shan refugees in the border region who do not have access to international protection or the camps.34 The number of Shan people arriving in Thailand increased dramatically in 1996 as the SPDC’s three-year forced relocation campaign affected thirteen townships in Shan State. Despite diligent attempts to crack down on new arrivals by both the Thai and SPDC authorities, the number of Shans fleeing to Thailand increased in April and May 2003 due to landlessness, forced recruitment for the SPDC Army, and new forced relocations of villages.35 2 In 1989 the English name of the country was changed from Burma to Myanmar by the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, now called the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC). English versions of place names were changed to Burmanized versions at the same time, e.g., Rangoon became Yangon. The National League for Democracy, which won elections in 1990 that were subsequently rejected by the military government, does not recognize these name changes, and ethnic groups that are not ethnic Burman regard them as part of an effort to Burmanize national culture. 3 Until January 1, 2004, individual Burmese asylum seekers could apply to UNHCR at its offices in Bangkok and Mae Sot to make a determination as to whether he or she was a refugee under UNHCR’s mandate. In making such an assessment UNHCR applied the criteria set out in article 1(A) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (the “Refugee Convention”), which defines a refugee as a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling, to avail himself of the protection of that country.” Burmese asylum seekers who were recognized as refugees by UNHCR were provided with a refugee certificate holding basic bio-data and the person’s photograph. It certified that the bearer was considered a refugee under the mandate of UNHCR and carried UNHCR’s address and phone numbers for Thai authorities or foreign embassies to contact should they need additional information about the refugee. Burmese asylum seekers who registered with UNHCR were provided with documentation providing similar basic information about the bearer, which stated that the person was under UNHCR’s protection while their asylum claim was being determined. 4 UNHCR sent an announcement to NGOs entitled “Suspension of refugee status determination processing for new applications from Myanmar asylum-seekers as of 1 January 2004.” The notice was dated January 6, 2004 but issued to NGOs in Bangkok on January 8. 5 “New UNHCR registration process for applications from Myanmar asylum-seekers as of 1 February 2004,” UNHCR Regional Office for Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, January 31, 2004. 6 UNHCR will have to approve the refugee status of the second group—the 2,000 asylum seekers who were in the system as of December 31, 2004—before their cases can be submitted to the U.S. for resettlement. 7 Refugee relief agencies in Thailand estimate that the actual number of Burmese urban refugees and asylum seekers is actually 8,000 to 10,000 people, of whom approximately 4,000 are registered with UNHCR. The larger number includes many people who have been rejected for asylum, intimidated from applying because of pressure from Burmese political and military factions, or fearful of being deported if they make an asylum claim. 8 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with senior U.S. official, February 2, 2004. 9 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with senior U.S. official, February 2, 2004. 10 On June 30, 2003, Thai Foreign Minister Surakiart raised the possibility of limiting the number of refugees, saying that the situation had changed “because there is reconciliation now inside Myanmar.” Earlier in the year General Winai Phattiyakhul, secretary-general of the Thai National Security Council, said, “From now on, Thailand would force refugees to go back to where they came from… Thailand would not welcome refugees from Burma and other neighboring countries anymore.” Thai Government to Hold Talks with UNHCR over Refugee Dispute, Agence-France Presse, June 30, 2003. Forum Asia, “Thai Army Raided Karen Village in Sangkhlaburi,” January 3, 2003. 11 Human Rights Watch email correspondence with UNHCR official in Thailand, February 5, 2004. 12 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with senior U.S. official, February 2, 2004. 13 Human Rights Watch email correspondence with UNHCR official in Thailand, February 5, 2004. 14 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with UNHCR official, January 30, 2004. 15 According to UNHCR’s Handbook for Emergencies, the necessary conditions for a voluntary repatriation must include safeguards as to the voluntary nature of the return; safeguards as to treatment upon return; and continued asylum for those who do not repatriate and remain refugees. Ensuring the voluntary nature of the return includes guaranteeing that the decision to repatriate is made freely; the refugees are making an informed decision based on an accurate country profile; and the decision is made expressly. UNHCR, Handbook for Emergencies, June 2000, and UNHCR, Handbook, Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection, 1996. 16 Human Rights Watch email correspondence with UNHCR official in Bangkok, February 11, 2004. [17] While deportations of migrants is not a new phenomenon in Thailand, the government launched a fresh campaign against illegal migrant workers after a high-level meeting in December 2002. The campaign was spurred in part by growing populist-nationalist sentiments that illegal migrant workers were taking Thai jobs and causing economic, security, and public health problems. It was decided that the police would work with the military at the border to stop illegal migrants from entering Thailand. The Foreign Ministry would work on deportations and the Labor Ministry would work to train Thai workers to replace illegal migrants caught in the crackdown, to prevent a labor shortage. 18 While the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has visited the holding center in Burma, as of January 2003 they had never been present on “deportation days.” 19 See “Burmese Refugees Forced Back,” Human Rights Watch press release, June 16, 2000; Human Rights Watch, “Unwanted and Unprotected: Burmese Refugees in Thailand,” A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 10, no. 6, September 1998; Human Rights Watch, “No Safety in Burma, No Sanctuary in Thailand,” A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 9, no. 6, July 1997. 20 “Illegal foreign workers in Thailand required to register within 60 days,” Xinhua, November 11, 2003. 21 “Illegal Workers: NSC to build 3 camps in border areas. Each to hold at least 5,000 immigrants,” Bangkok Post, November 11, 2003. 22 Sanitsuda Ekachai, “Why this abject toadying to Burma?” Bangkok Post, July 3, 2003. 23 Thai Prime Minister Thaksin used the phrase “labor-order” in July 2003 to refer to the campaign to regulate migrant workers, alluding to the government’s “social-order” crackdown against nighttime entertainment. “Labour Controls—Curbs loom for migrant workers,” The Nation, July 22, 2003. 24 Approximately 300,000 of the estimated one million Burmese migrants in Thailand have registered with the Thai government. “Thailand, Myanmar ink deal on curbing illegal workers,” Kyodo, June 24, 2003. 25 National Security Council Secretary-General Prakit Phachonpatchanuek has said that he believes that none of the Burmese migrant workers who have fled to Thailand would want to return to Burma to obtain a passport and other documentation required to work legally in Thailand. Penchan Charoensuthipan, “Analysis/Foreign Labor: Seeking Solutions that work,” Bangkok Post, September 17, 2003. 26 Penchan Charoensuthipan, “Analysis/Foreign Labor: Seeking Solutions that work,” Bangkok Post, September 17, 2003. 27 Amy Kazmin and Panvadee Uraisin, “Burmese workers find life brutal in Thailand,” Financial Times, August 4, 2003. 28 On June 26, 2003, police arrested eleven members of the Democratic Friends of Burma and charged them with illegal entry after they took part in a peaceful protest at the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok. On September 18, police arrested fifteen Burmese activists from several pro-democracy organizations, including two children, while attempting to protest in front of the Burmese Embassy. See Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Burmese Protesters Should be Released,” September 25, 2003. 29 “Gov’t Wants U.N. to alter label policy, Urges UNHCR to share information on registered exiles,” The Nation (Bangkok, Thailand), July 1, 2003. 30 These include approximately 112,000 registered refugees as well as 30,000 “unofficial” refugees residing in the camps. UNHCR and the Thai authorities have discussed the idea of registering all refugees living unofficially in the camps but the government is reportedly hesitant to do so out fear that it might act as a “pull factor” for more refugees to enter the camps illegally. Population figures are from the Population and Geographic Data Section, UNHCR, June 2003, and Burma Border Consortium, “Overview of the Situation of Burmese Refugees in Thailand,” November 6, 2003. 31 Not all urban refugees are political dissidents. Following a series of splits within the Karen National Union (KNU) and the 1994 defection of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) from the KNU, Karen refugees who feel unsafe in the camps or fear the insecurity caused by armed attacks on the refugee camps and the border region have made their way to Bangkok to seek protection. 32 The PABs determined who could reside in the camps. These boards had a high rejection rate of asylum seekers because they accepted only those persons who were considered to be “people fleeing fighting.” This ruled out eligibility according to the criteria set out in the Refugee Convention (see footnote 3, above) as well as some persons who may be considered refugees within the meaning of UNHCR’s extended mandate, which has not been precisely defined but at least includes persons who are fleeing not only conflict but events that have seriously disturbed the public order. According to UNHCR, in the past when PABs rejected people who UNHCR had recognized, UNHCR was able to successfully win appeals challenging the rejections. Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR official in Thailand, November 12, 2003. 33 Burma Border Consortium, “Overview of the Situation of Burmese Refugees in Thailand,” November 6, 2003. 34 Thailand has refused to recognize several ethnic groups from Burma as even “temporarily displaced” persons in part because of their perceived association with the production and trafficking of drugs in Shan state. These include not only the Shan, but Wa and Lahu as well. 35 “Refugees Not Job Seekers,” Independence Weekly, Shan-EU, June 15-22, 2003; and “Charting the Exodus from Shan State: Patterns of Shan Refugee Flow into Northern Chiang Mai Province of Thailand (1997-2002),” Shan Human Rights Foundation, 2003.
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