IV. INFORMAL STATE CENSORSHIP THROUGH TEMNIKI

On September 3, 2002, the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee for Freedom of Speech and Information, Mykola Tomenko, made public the existence of an unsigned instructional memorandum, alleged to have originated in the Presidential Administration, which contained detailed instructions for national television station managers concerning the portrayal of political events during news broadcasts. Tomenko had received the document from a top manager at a national television station. These secret directives, known as temniki, originally were sent to a few stations closely associated with the SDPU(u) in the autumn of 2001, in the pre-campaign period prior to the 2002 parliamentary elections. Editors, journalists, and media analysts reported that by August 2002 distribution of temniki had expanded to all stations, and compliance with the instructions was more vigorously enforced through phone calls and intimidation on the part of members of the Presidential Administration.

Production editors and journalists normally encounter temnik instructions and other external directives as delivered to them by top station editors. They reported having seen the clearly identifiable documents in the hands of their supervisors. However, only the most senior station managers and editors-in-chief receive temniki; they are expected to determine an editorial policy in accordance with temniki guidelines and take necessary measures to ensure that they are fulfilled. Journalists from some stations reported that top editors openly discuss with production editors and newsmakers the existence of guidelines and the pressure they feel to guarantee compliance. Editors and journalists fear that failure to comply could result in potentially devastating inspections or withdrawals for the station, or demotion, salary cuts, or job loss for individuals.

Journalists reported that temniki have transformed the news-making process on national television. While Human Rights Watch could not confirm that temniki guided the presentation of all material appearing on news broadcasts, our research did confirm the existence of several clear trends in news programming across all television stations that are consistent with temnik guidelines. Both temniki available to Human Rights Watch and journalists' statements confirmed that temnik instructions direct television editors and journalists to cover events in ways that portray President Kuchma and the SDPU(u) favorably and that minimize or eliminate negative or controversial information about pro-presidential figures. In addition, the guidelines instruct newsmakers to present negative or misleading information about opposition politicians and parties, or ignore them altogether. The dominance of these trends in programming suggests that television editors and journalists have been induced to tailor their news broadcasts to the narrow framework established by the temnik guidelines. This editorial agenda is not simply attributable to the particular interests of individual station owners, managers, or editors, but rather is imposed by the government and expressed through subtle but effective coercion. Despite government denials of authorship or the existence of temniki, the instructions they carry clearly promote reporting biased in favor of Kuchma and the SDPU(u).

Temniki History
A few newspapers and the two television channels most closely controlled by the SDPU(u) were the first to receive guidelines outlining news broadcasts in late 2001 during the lead-up to the March 2002 parliamentary elections. According to editors and journalists interviewed by Human Rights Watch, these stations' leaders responded by formulating editorial policy and supervising subordinates according to the instructions presented in the temniki guidelines. According to a major news figure working for one of these stations, the instructions from station leadership in this period, "were ...concentrated and clear, so that no one could say, `I don't understand how the news should be presented.'"⁶⁸ Newsmakers soon became accustomed to editors' frequent instructions on political reporting that seemed to them to "depend[] on the mood of the president."⁶⁹ Although journalists were expected to comply with these instructions, a number of them told Human Rights Watch that they nevertheless felt free to include certain information prohibited by the instructions and produce balanced political news without facing negative repercussions.

Political pressure expanded from SDPU(u)-controlled channels to other television stations in the summer of 2002, not long after the appointment of Viktor Medvedchuk as the head of the Presidential Administration and the creation of the Department for Information Policy within the Presidential Administration in mid-2002. As a major news figure from a leading television station told Human Rights Watch, "In this period, systematic censorship on all channels emerged."⁷⁰ Not only were temniki being sent to all national stations, but editors and journalists felt increased pressure to comply with the directives' instructions. An editor from one station confirmed that after returning from a vacation in the summer 2002, he "immediately felt a sharp difference" in the pressure to edit news in accordance with the outside directives.⁷¹

In this period top station managers and editors also received more frequent phone calls from figures within the Presidential Administration insisting on compliance and threatening repercussions for stations and individuals who disobeyed the instructions. As a result, leading editors no longer simply established editorial limits but also exercised stricter oversight of the news content and pressured journalists to produce one-sided news, threatening them with negative consequences for non-compliance. Vadim V., an editor from a leading station, reported that by autumn 2002 temniki were no longer used exclusively by the station leadership to determine editorial policy, but also occasionally appeared in the newsroom, where journalists and production editors worked to determine broadcast materials.⁷² Journalists noted that the expanded influence of temniki and increased outside pressure coincided with opposition parties' preparation for nationwide anti-Kuchma demonstrations and efforts by leading politicians to lay the preliminary groundwork in advance of the 2004 presidential elections.⁷³

Temniki Authorship
According to editors and journalists, temniki typically arrive via fax or email on blank paper rather than on official letterhead and have no signatures or official stamps that could allow their origins or author(s) to be traced. Journalists speculate that individuals within the Presidential Administration write the temniki, under the tutelage of public relations specialists, and in some cases in cooperation with station managers or top editors. The anonymous nature of the temniki makes their existence easy to deny by both those responsible for their production and those within the executive responsible for media policy. The Head of the Presidential Administration's Department for Information Policy, Serhii Vasiliev, announced, "We have not said... what issues the media is allowed to examine."⁷⁴ An official at the State Committee for Information Policy, Television, and Radio Broadcasting, the executive body responsible for regulating the media and guaranteeing freedom of expression, told Human Rights Watch, "There is no state policy that condones censorship."⁷⁵ He also denied the existence of the temniki.

Ukrainian authorities attribute perceived censorship in the media to the undue influence of owners and managers or foreign governments, but not the state. They further seek to shift the blame by accusing journalists or politicians who have openly discussed censorship or temniki of engaging in negative publicity, or political or financial opportunism. In a September 13, 2002 press conference, President Kuchma stated that Ukraine's negative image in terms of freedom of speech was considerably exaggerated for political purposes.⁷⁶ In early October, Viktor Medvedchuk claimed that the first politician to publicly confirm the existence of temniki, opposition politician Mykola Tomenko, is himself the author of the temniki.⁷⁷ In response to the Verkhovna Rada's hearings on censorship on December 5, 2002, Serhii Vasiliev stated that the journalists who spoke out against political censorship are all, "representatives and directors of mass media, which are funded by foreign grant makers... Thus, it is necessary to approach the leaders of those countries, which finance these projects, with requests to end censorship immediately."⁷⁸

Temniki Format
The standard temnik is an eight- to ten-page Russian language document sent weekly to television stations and some newspapers with detailed instructions related to the week's political events. Additional temniki with further instructions elaborating on specific political developments may also be distributed. Of the instructional documents available to Human Rights Watch, those issued in 2001 were titled "Temnik," whereas those issued in 2002 were titled "Press release" or "Additional commentary," but informally all are known as temniki.

Each temnik presents explicit and detailed instructions about which political topics should be covered, how this news should be interpreted, and in which order material should be presented during broadcasts. The tone of the guidelines is straightforward and civil. The standard temnik format consists of several subheadings, which include Theme of the week, Fundamental themes of the week, Ongoing themes, Controversy, Additional themes, and Potential themes. The Additional themes section includes information on topics that should be covered or ignored on specific days of the week. Under each of these subheadings, a particular theme is listed and then followed by one of three phrases-Interpretation, commentary, or the abbreviation FIU (for internal use)-after which explicit instructions are set forth for how each theme included under a subheading should be interpreted.

For the topics acceptable for broadcast, the interpretation, commentary, and FIU section of the temnik includes additional guidelines often requesting that certain aspects of events be highlighted or downplayed, to ensure the emergence of a pro-Kuchma and pro-SDPU(u) perspective. Sometimes these sections state that additional information will follow or that a certain theme will be further clarified. Temniki from 2001 occasionally gave the names of the people responsible for supplying this additional information. Additional information comes in separate temniki and may also come through other means, such as phone calls. Instructions may also include directives specific to certain types of media (newspapers or television stations) or specific media outlets. Instructions also may direct readers' attention to attachments of additional texts or press releases that sometimes accompany temniki.

Temniki Themes
The temniki include instructions for newsmakers to portray President Kuchma favorably and avoid discussion of events that question his credibility. If a potentially controversial news item is deemed acceptable for inclusion in news broadcasts, the directives typically include instructions to avoid implicating the president. The activities of the SDPU(u) also figure prominently in the temniki. Many of the directives also address news topics related to freedom of expression. Temnik instructions often place a "request to ignore" under topics related to the opposition or call for a distortion in the presentation of the opposition to emphasize controversy, conflicts, and corruption.

Portrayal of Kuchma
Some temnik "requests" regarding coverage of Kuchma appear unrelated to specific political controversy, but instead depict events with the aim of promoting the president's standing at a time when his domestic and international reputation had been damaged by scandals. A temnik titled "Additional commentary on events of week 36," issued for the first week of September 2002, includes under the Fundamental themes of the week section the topic: "President L. Kuchma's participation in the Global summit on sustainable development in Johannesburg (RSA)."⁷⁹ The instructions request that news broadcasts emphasize Kuchma's interactions with powerful European leaders and downplay his contact with African government authorities. "For presentation of the two sides of the meetings-a request to accent the President's discussions with representatives of the European political elite. A request to portray meetings with leaders of African states in an international economic context based on additional agreement."⁸⁰

Some temniki seek to clarify Kuchma's position on controversial issues and others explicitly aim to shield the president from criticism. A temnik titled "Press release" and dated September 13 was issued shortly after Kuchma delivered his televised Independence Day public address. The speech drew negative public reaction, as many concluded that Kuchma intended to change the constitution in order to seek a third term or create conditions for transferring the presidency to his chosen successor.⁸¹ The document opens with the request "to cover the day's events in the following order on all this evening's news bulletins," and lists as the second point, "President Leonid Kuchma took part in an Internet Conference" with the commentary:

During the Internet Conference, President made several important announcements. Their basic theses:
-L. Kuchma will step down as president in 2004;
-L. Kuchma is convinced that Ukraine does not need a dictatorship anymore than any other country;
-L. Kuchma considers that his government is ready for dialogue with the public, but society is not ready for this. `Open government is a two-way street.'⁸²

Similarly, "Additional commentary for events of week 36" states in the Additional themes section for September 3 that, "A `round table' discussion of political reforms in Ukraine begins at 15:00. FIU: Request to exclude from broadcasts any theses placing under doubt the seriousness of the president's initiatives."⁸³ Ironically, it was at the September 3 roundtable discussion on political reform that Mykola Tomenko first revealed the existence of temniki and used the temnik, "Additional commentary for events of week 36," as evidence.

"Additional commentary for events of week 36" contained directives to eliminate information about other cases in which Kuchma had been implicated in possible wrongdoing. In late July 2002, eighty-three people had been killed and more than one hundred people injured when a military aircraft crashed into a crowd of spectators at an air show at the Skniliv airfield in Lviv. Kuchma and military officials came under attack for safety failures that may have contributed to the accident.⁸⁴ In relation to this, the final point of the Additional themes for September 3 states, "Forty days have passed since the airplane accident at the Skniliv airfield. FIU: A request to ignore the attempts of political parties to turn the fortieth-day [anniversary] of the tragedy into a political show."⁸⁵

While Human Rights Watch is not aware of any temnik instructions on initial coverage of the criminal investigation of Kuchma announced in October 2002, the response by television news programs when the story broke followed a clear pattern, indicating external pressure. In what one journalist described as a "day of shame for Ukrainian television" on October 15, channels either ignored or reported only in midnight broadcasts on the decision of a Kyiv appellate court judge to open a criminal case against President Kuchma on charges of corruption and abuse of power. In response to this important event, on its prime time evening news program, Studio 1+1 "simply was silent. Not a single word. Zero reaction."⁸⁶ The station broadcast some information on a late night show starting just before midnight. Similarly, both STB and Novyy Kanal included the opening of the criminal case against the president as a news item only in late night programming; it received no mention on the main evening newscasts. The state channel UT-1 did not comment on the initiation of the case in its main evening news broadcast at 9:00 p.m. When UT-1 did describe the event in its late night news program, the text focused on the unfairness of the case. On Inter's prime time news program, the topic appeared eighth in the news order, well after other material, including the arrival of the Estonian president in Odessa. ICTV proved to be the only station that covered the criminal case in its standard evening news program, but as the fifth item of news. ⁸⁷ In contrast, the case received attention in major international newspapers, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Berliner Zeitung, as well as Polish and Russian press.

Freedom of Expression
Controversial issues related to freedom of expression are also a topic of concern for temnik authors. For example, the temnik "Additional commentary for events of week 36" included reference to a press conference to be held by the publishing house Taki Spravi, which had recently come under the scrutiny of the tax authorities after the publication of a controversial biography of Yulia Tymoshenko.⁸⁸ The press conference's stated theme was: "The tax police began concrete actions directed towards the illegal seizure of `Taki Spravi' property. They should answer for their violations of the law."<sup>89</sup> Temnik instructions requested that news broadcasts ignore this press conference. Two other Additional theme items related to freedom of expression also included "request to ignore" instructions. These were points 13 and 19, which read, respectively: "At 10.00 a ceremony will begin for the opening of the Arpad Gense Ukrainian-Hungarian Institute for Informational Technology," and "The commission for journalistic ethics and the non-governmental organization `Charter-4' are resuming their trip through Ukraine. On September 2-3 representatives of the commission will visit Lviv."⁹⁰

Some events related to freedom of speech are deemed appropriate for coverage, albeit with a particular interpretation. "Temnik 11" from December 2001 noted that local and international organizations were planning an Internet conference for December 10 entitled "Media and Elections." The interpretation of this event lists specific questions for journalists to ask participants, including a question for Yulia Mostovaia, the editor of Zerkalo nedeli, a publication known for its independent stance. The temnik requested specifically that journalists should ask Mostovaia, "[Articles]... that function as political advertising have appeared in your newspaper. Will you continue to support this practice? If yes, then go ahead and say, which party will your newspaper support during the elections?"⁹¹

"Temnik 10" and "Temnik 11" addressed other media issues. The Controversy section of both documents includes a topic entitled "Negative discussion of the SDPU(u) in the mass media. The basic accusation is monopolization of the media." The interpretation was not elaborated in either temnik, but was to "be distributed additionally" with a contact person specified.⁹² Point 21 of "Temnik 10" under Additional themes described parliamentary activities for December 5 and attempted to portray debate on the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting as simple political infighting:

The Verkhovna Rada committee of freedom of speech and information is holding a conference at which they will examine amendments to the current legislation on television and radio, which aim to increase the inspectorate functions of the NCTR. The relationship of parliament to the report of the National Council of Ukraine for television and radio broadcasting (NCTR) may be biased by the proximity of the elections, announced chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on freedom of speech and information [and top SDPU(u) official] Aleksandr Zinchenko. In his words, the committee is analyzing `the exceptional professional activities of the NCTR, and the [parliamentary] hall divides according to political tastes, passionately, without analysis of the essence of the questions.'⁹³

Activities of the SDPU(u)
Temnik instructions also concentrate on activities of the SDPU(u) and its leader Viktor Medvedchuk. "Temniki" 10, 11, and 12 covering the final three weeks of December each contained instructions related to various national events that presented opportunities for the SDPU(u) to receive positive coverage. These temniki also conveyed instructions for describing events related to the dismissal of Viktor Medvedchuk from the post of deputy chairman of the Verkhovna Rada.

The Fundamental themes of the week for "Temnik 10" included first "the activities of the SDPU(u)" and the theme: "presentation of the revitalized SDPU(u) [web]site." The temnik made clear that this event was to be interpreted as follows:

The SDPU(u) is using the internet not only as a means for information (here it is obvious that Our Newspaper+ is better at this), but as a means of communication in the system: Leader [and] party members, party [and] supporters, press group [and] journalists, public archive [and] analysts. The SDPU(u) invites even the harshest statements into debates on its forums. In the near future personal sites of leaders and a forum for questions about social democracy will be added. On December 5, a press conference with A. Zinchenko is planned (press release attached).⁹⁴

Other domestic events also presented opportunities for the SDPU(u) and its members to receive positive news coverage. For December 4, 2001 the Additional themes of "Temnik 10" noted:

The national academy of science of Ukraine together with the Fund for intellectual cooperation `Ukraine XXI' is holding a presentation of the first two volumes of the five-volume publication, "History of Ukrainian Culture.... Interpretation: Present [this theme] fully, show a picture. SDPU(u) member [...] cares about culture.⁹⁵

Similarly, in "Temnik 11," the Additional themes for December 10 described another opportunity for SDPU(u) activities to be highlighted. Point sixteen reads:

[International] Human Rights Day. On December 10, 1948 the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal declaration on human rights. It has been celebrated throughout the world since 1950. Interpretation: Connect this to the Law on Languages. In this way, the SDPU(u) defends human rights.⁹⁶

In the Controversy section of "Temnik 10," point 10 recognizes, "the appearance [in parliament] of projects, analogous to SDPU(u) projects." This event was to be interpreted to suggest that:

The projects begun by the SDPU(u) find support from other parties. There it is-leadership. Of ideas. The return of the possibility of a social-democratic majority in the future parliament. They have joined our initiatives. What may this stand for but that Medvedchuk will become not only the Leader of the SDPU(u)...⁹⁷

For December 6, "Temnik 10" offers instructions regarding the relevance of international diplomatic events to the SDPU(u)'s political projects. Point 22 suggests that if Ukrainians chose to elect the social democrats in the March elections, the country would have the unique potential to achieve political and social conditions approaching those found in one of Europe's most economically and politically powerful countries, Germany:

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder will visit [Ukraine]. The fourth round of high-level Ukrainian-German talks will take place.... Interpretation: Schroeder is the head of a country in which the social democrats and greens created a [coalition] government. Try to imagine what kind of Ukrainian government might exist if it was created by the social democrats and the greens.⁹⁸

The December temniki also included detailed instructions for covering events related to the dismissal of SDPU(u) leader Medvedchuk from his post as vice chairman of the Verkhovna Rada.⁹⁹ "Temnik 10" begins its Fundamental themes of the week with: "[The SDPU(u)] collected signatures for the VR's [Verkhovna Rada] passage of the `law on languages.'"<sup>100</sup> The `interpretation' suggested that any attempt to oust Medvedchuk should be linked to his position on the language law. It stated:

Fundamental interpretation is based on the text of [then-Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information and prominent SDPU(u) politician] Zinchenko's presentation in the VR (text in attachment). It is necessary to present the issue such that the SDPU(u) members are the main initiators. There were many versions [of the law], but [the version proposed by] Medvedchuk prevailed, [and] the signatures were collected. Accentuate all seven languages (Hungarian, Romanian) in a list not starting with Russian. If the law will be passed, then the so-called "Russian Block" may self-destruct and the communists will lose not less than 5% percent of the total number of voters. As a result [of these political losses], a collection of signatures for the dismissal of Medvedchuk began.¹⁰¹

The Theme of the Week of "Temnik 11" also addresses "The collection of signatures for the dismissal of Viktor Medvedchuk," and offers a detailed interpretation:

We are concerned that the right and the left are collecting signatures. It is necessary to protect Medvedchuk-to remember his promotion to the post of first vice speaker, how many important laws the Rada has passed in this time, etc. Connect all positive aspects of the parliament during the session conducted by Medvedchuk to him personally....¹⁰²

After Medvedchuk's dismissal on December 13, 2001, "Temnik 12" addressed the topic and its repercussions in one-and-half pages of Interpretation. The Theme of the week was "The Dismissal of V. Medvedchuk from the post of first vice speaker of the VR." Additional commentary follows: "Numerous parties and individual politicians evaluated this event as `a strong PR step for the SDPU(u).' There are suggestions that for the party, new perspectives for strengthening the effectiveness of its pre-election campaign are opening." The interpretation of these events instructed newsmakers to emphasize that:

... unless Medvedchuk himself had not forced the vote, then it is possible to say with great certainty that the dismissal would not have occurred ...What took place on December 13 was an impulsive gesture by a proud man, `You don't trust me? Then vote.' ... In the end they have gotten themselves an unmanageable and ineffective parliament for the next three months ...¹⁰³

The text that follows interpreted the political context that precipitated the dismissal:

Nationalists and the Communists joined forces for the vote [on the dismissal] in order to deliver a blow to the center. This is a very worrying symptom ... This alliance can become a destructive force, the actions of which will lead to unpredictable consequences.¹⁰⁴

Specific instructions are included for media outside of the capital:

Separate line for regional media- a source within the PA [Presidential Administration] revealed that the dismissal of Medvedchuk was constructed by Bankova [the central Kyiv street where the Presidential Administration is located] in order to replace Kinakh with Medvedchuk in the post of premier ... That is why Kinakh is so scared. Medvedchuk is now considering [the offer], but judging from everything, he will doubtfully agree. It is not advantageous for him; his hands will be tied. For regional media-the line `develop courage, vote for Medvedchuk.'¹⁰⁵

And the final interpretation discusses other ways in which to present Medvedchuk:

For all media: Widely discuss `Who is Medvedchuk?' Use the information line about his dismissal in order to show him not only as a politician, but as a Personality. Offer a portrait, appraisals of Medvedchuk by people close to him. Begin to accent the changes in Medvedchuk's demeanor. He appears with out a tie, playing golf, he's changed the color of his suit, frequently smiles, jokes. The man is changing.¹⁰⁶

Portrayal of Opposition Politicians
Temniki instructions also offer detailed information for covering the activities of opposition figures and parties, in particular the most popular politician in Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko and vocal opposition politician, Yulia Tymoshenko.¹⁰⁷ The events related to the September 16 opposition protest, described above, also received significant attention in the temniki. Journalists confirmed that editors pressured them to comply with the instructions.

Journalists told Human Rights Watch that top management consistently requested that they "change the context" in which Viktor Yushchenko appears and that Yushchenko and his "Our Ukraine" bloc are to be portrayed as mired in internecine conflict or in disagreement with other members of the opposition.¹⁰⁸ The temniki call for precisely such coverage. In its discussion of the forthcoming 2002 parliamentary elections, "Temnik 10," listed an item called "Yushchenko's Activities," which addressed the removal of some members from the "Our Ukraine" party. It proposed an interpretation that "... `ethnic cleansing' is taking place. ... Altogether, incomprehensible things are happening with their party list. ... A big scandal is in the works for the party conference."¹⁰⁹

"Temnik 11" addresses similar themes. "The activities of Yushchenko and `Our Ukraine'" are included under the Fundamental themes of the week section, with a long interpretation that states "it is important to show that Yushchenko's supporters, who want to get into parliament on the party list, won't make it" due to complications in bloc and party quotas.¹¹⁰ In addition, the conferences of three parties that participate in the Our Ukraine bloc were scheduled for the same day. The interpretation of these developments suggests:

[O]bviously, this reflects a split in the bloc. They didn't agree. It will not be possible to achieve effective PR with conferences being held on the same day...¹¹¹

One correspondent also noted that news broadcasts on his station also focused on Yushchenko's conflicts not only within his own party, but with members of other opposition parties. "If Yushchenko is shown, he is in conflict with another side: `[Socialist Party leader Oleksandr] Moroz criticized Yushchenko.'"¹¹²

In "Additional commentary for events of week 36," the subheading titled Themes for presentation in Sunday television programs lists "The reaction of society and politicians to President L. Kuchma's address to the Ukrainian people on August 24, 2002." Here, the instructions portray Our Ukraine as struggling to communicate a coherent message and Yushchenko as rethinking his presidential aspirations. The For internal use directive provides detailed instructions for newspapers and television stations:

A request for newspaper materials . . . to demonstrate the contradictory position of `Our Ukraine' in relation to L. Kuchma's television address [on August 24, Ukrainian Independence Day]. On the one hand, `OU' says that its bloc has considered a transformation to a parliamentary-presidential republic to be necessary, and on the other hand notices that `now is not the time' for a change of political systems; society and politicins [sic] aren't ready. On the one hand, `UO' is against the interference of the PA [Presidential Administration] in the structuring of parliament, and on the other hand, requests the president's cooperation in forming a majority around `OU.' Which of the pronouncements of V. Yushchenko are we to believe? These unbalanced and contradictory reactions of V.Yu. may provide evidence that he is nervous and recognizes the possibility that his hopes for the presidential seat are lost.¹¹³

Along similar lines, journalists reported receiving instructions never to show photos or videos of certain members of the opposition and to show other opposition figures only on occasion, as when speaking on non-political issues. A news editor at station "F" described this very simple equation: "No information on a person means that, for the television audience, that person does not exist."¹¹⁴ Journalists consistently stated that among topics they were expected to ignore, prominent opposition politician Yulia Tymoshenko ranked first. One journalist told Human Rights Watch that the top editors of his station told him in advance of the autumn 2002 protests: "We need to eliminate [images of] Tymoshenko."¹¹⁵ A prominent newsmaker from another station stated, "With respect to Tymoshenko, the editors say, quite clearly: No."¹¹⁶ Yet a third journalist stated, "The strictest taboo applies to Tymoshenko."¹¹⁷ While it is unclear whether journalists cited such instructions as a result of particular temniki or as a result of other forms of external pressure, temniki consistently call for biased reporting on Tymoshenko. In "Temnik 11," the Additional themes for December 10 addressed the fact that "The leader of the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc will hold a press conference `New rules, new conditions for political games,'" with the interpretation, "REQUEST TO IGNORE."¹¹⁸

In its instructions for December 17, "Temnik 12" similarly directs journalists to ignore the following entry on Tymoshenko: "The Kiev Pecherski district court is examining Yu. Tymoshenko's case appealing the grounds used as the basis of her dismissal from the post of vice-premier."¹¹⁹ However, other aspects of the controversy surrounding Tymoshenko and the criminal cases against her and her associates remained an acceptable topic for coverage. In "Temnik 11," for December 12, the Additional themes noted that a California court was holding hearings on money laundering charges against former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko.

Interpretation: Connect this to Tymoshenko, [Socialist Party of Ukraine leader Oleksandr] Moroz. The `Master' and his `family.' Post the prepared drawings of their relations (`genealogical tree') on the Internet, then circulate it in the official media. (Responsible- [ ]). Prepare a series of caricatures, `family order in laundering dirty money.'¹²⁰

Temniki also "requested" negative coverage of Tymoshenko's supporters. The September 13 "Press release" noted that:

The Head of the State Tax Administration has commented on the detention of an assistant to Rada Deputy Oleksandr Turchynov of the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc with a large sum of cash. Commentary: The event is relevant and timely. Videos of the detention will be distributed. Request to give [this topic] broad coverage.¹²¹

"Additional commentary on events of week 36" details other kinds of information about the opposition that are acceptable for publication and broadcast. In discussing Our Ukraine's organization of a conference, called the All-Ukrainian Forum of Democratic Forces, the temnik gives instructions to highlight the problems and probable failure of the forum irrespective of any reforms that its leader, Viktor Yushchenko, may attempt to institute.¹²²

Informational work on the so-called "Forum of Democratic Forces" will go according to the following logical sequence:

- The `Forum' is actually a gathering of selected representatives of [political] parties.
- Far from all the forces intending to participate in the event can be called `democratic' (for example the SNPU of O. Tiagnibok).¹²³
- Yushchenko should remove from the list of participants people who are far from democracy and determine the rules for participation in the `Forum.' Then more truly democratic forces will be prepared to participate.
- If V.Yu. does not do this, he risks utterly discrediting the `forum' in the eyes of society.
- If V.Yu. `cleanses' the list and brings order to its formulation, dozens and dozens of different parties and organizations are expected to send letters with demands to participate in the `forum's' organizational committee. As a result there will be a chance of a `watering down' and `disruption' of the `forum,' and the event risks becoming ridiculous.¹²⁴

This temnik also suggested other topics for coverage on the day of the Forum, which was to take place on September 15, the eve of the "Rise Up Ukraine" protest:

It would appear expedient to `revive' the scandal at the `Orliat' cemetery in Lviv [A Ukrainian-Polish disagreement over a Polish war memorial] in order to redirect the protest potential of the city's people in another direction. Cardinal Liubomir Guzar is available for interview. ¹²⁵

Activities of Opposition Parties
Temniki also include requests to ignore particular events related to opposition parties. "Temniki" 10, 11, and 12 of December 2001 all included information about pre-election party conferences, with most of them acceptable for coverage. However, "Temnik 10" listed a "Request to ignore" the "Party conference of [opposition youth party] Moloda Ukraina."¹²⁶

September 16 Demonstrations
Temniki and Human Rights Watch interviews demonstrated that coverage of the opposition parties' "Rise up Ukraine" movement and the anti-Kuchma protests scheduled for the anniversary of the death of Heorhii Gongadze on September 16 was closely regulated. The Ongoing themes section of "Additional commentary on events of week 36," distributed less than two weeks before the demonstrations, stated:

The opposition is preparing to carry out street demonstrations on September 16, 2002. FIU: This theme is only for print and Internet publications. Request to exclude [this topic] from television broadcasts.¹²⁷

More explicitly, in the Additional themes section of the same temnik, for September 2, 2002, point 18 states, "A press conference on the theme `Rise up Ukraine' begins at 11.00 FIU: Request to ignore."¹²⁸ Journalists confirmed that in the weeks prior to the Kyiv demonstrations, there was very little coverage of demonstrations that had already begun in some of the regions, or of any other of the opposition's activities.¹²⁹

Despite the fact that the demonstrations were held on the anniversary of the disappearance of murdered journalist Heorhii Gongadze, television stations offered no mention of him or his still unsolved case.¹³⁰ The last point of the September 13 "Press release," distributed in the final days before the demonstrations, included information requesting that stations ignore one important reference to Gongadze. This document requested that stations disregard a statement by Yurii Karamzin, a member of parliament, that he had "received information as to the whereabouts of Georgii Gongadze's head."¹³¹

As the protests drew closer, the temniki requested that channels provide coverage emphasizing negative aspects of the protests. In the September 13 "Press release," instructions requested that news programs discuss at length the Shevchenko District Court decision to ban the protests from the center of Kyiv. In addition, the document described as "important and timely" a statement adopted by the Presidium of the Ukrainian Trade Unions Federation (TUF) saying that support for the September 16 protests was "not expedient" and recommending that TUF chairman not take part "in this and other political actions."¹³²

Similarly, journalists reported that in the days prior to the demonstrations, all channels aired a series of speeches delivered by religious leaders and the regional governor dissuading people from participating in the protests. These highly public figures described the events as hooliganism and as disturbances to public order.¹³³ Television stations also ran regular reports by the Ministry of the Interior about hospitals stocking up on medical and emergency supplies.¹³⁴ The September 13 "Press release" also described as "important and timely," a speech by Presidential Administration Head Viktor Medvedchuk commenting on the planned demonstrations, and requested that the text of his speech be "quoted in full."¹³⁵ The document does not mention inclusion of statements of opposition leaders in response to these news events.

The anti-Kuchma protests coincided with what journalists described as a "peak in the waves of temniki."¹³⁶ They reported immense pressure from editors to comply very strictly with instructions that often demanded news broadcasters to include inaccurate information in their reporting. Thus, no station remained silent about the protests, but "neither were [journalists] able to display the whole truth."¹³⁷ Journalists interviewed by Human Rights Watch denied rumors that they had received pre-prepared tapes for broadcasts on September 16, but the limits on what could be reported were so strict that most stations ultimately reported almost exactly the same material. According to analysts, on this day, more than any other, it was "entirely clear that the channels are bounded by the constraints of censorship..."¹³⁸ Another noted:

[O]f course there was a feeling that there was some sort of a directing hand, if nothing else by the fact that the order of the news was exactly the same on all channels: first [President Kuchma's attendance of the Second European Economic Summit in] Salzburg, then information on the public demonstrations. The common direction was obvious, the common basic goal was obvious: to show these demonstrations as if they don't have meaning.¹³⁹

For the news broadcasts on the evening of September 16, journalists reported that editors expected them to report inaccurate information. Denis D., a prominent television journalist, told Human Rights Watch that he attended the demonstrations and calculated that some 50,000 people participated. However, in the evening news broadcast he was expected to "lie openly" and report only an "officially confirmed" statistic of 15,000 participants.¹⁴⁰ To further obscure the true number of participants, video footage gave no indication of the volume of people in the city square, showing only distinct faces or small groupings.¹⁴¹ In one ICTV broadcast, a correspondent appeared standing on the empty European Square and reported on the protests after the mass of demonstrators had since moved on to occupy the streets surrounding the Presidential Administration. The channel presented the events as if they had come to a quiet conclusion and failed to cover the real and ongoing story in another location. The effect of this editorial choice was to "give the demonstrations a much diminished quantity and less emotional incandescence on ICTV."¹⁴²

In the face of editorial restrictions, stations primarily used images that included the faces of elderly people and communist supporters, particularly those holding old Soviet placards or photographs of Stalin. Footage showing demonstrators focused on the red flags and banners of the communists and failed to include images of the white flags of the "Our Ukraine" opposition bloc, suggesting that the opposition was directed by and relevant only to those "who seek a return to a previous regime."¹⁴³ Journalists also stated that they were requested not to show images of Viktor Yushchenko, but concentrated on politicians from parties perceived as less mainstream or more radical, including the Communist Party and Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc.

Other images that were not included in broadcasts were those of young people and of anyone demanding the resignation of Kuchma, despite the fact that the demonstrations were organized around this principal theme. Instead, television broadcasts of participants and political leaders necessarily included only vague or neutral statements, or statements that, however obliquely, portrayed the state authorities in a positive light. One editor told Human Rights Watch, "We were instructed to ask people about the fact that police don't break up the protests. People would say, `Yes, it's good that the police don't break up the protests.' In this way, the police and the authorities look good in this situation."<sup>144</sup> Another editor said that the station leadership approved a small excerpt from a speech by Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz. The footage was completely devoid of context and merely captured Moroz stating, "Our goal is a better life for all people."<sup>145</sup> As one journalist put it, broadcasts on September 16 "presented the position of the opposition in such an opaque way that people still asked, `What do these people really want?'"¹⁴⁶

Coverage portrayed the crowds in the central square as primarily an obstacle to normal traffic flow, which prevented non-participants from going to work or stopped an ambulance from accessing sick demonstration participants. News broadcasts did not show what eyewitnesses described as "thousands of police officers just standing on the edges [of the demonstration] not managing the traffic problem, but asking drivers stuck in traffic if they wanted to file official complaints against the demonstrators."¹⁴⁷ Analysts described the control of information and the obstruction as "less about direct attempts to block the opposition and more about raising the degree of inconvenience."¹⁴⁸

The government's closure of all six national television stations, ostensibly for maintenance, for several hours on the morning of September 16 also remains unexplained. Some journalists and media analysts noted that the closures must have been linked to the demonstrations because all stations had never been off the air simultaneously for maintenance in the past. However, many hesitated to describe the closures as a purely censorial act to prevent viewers from seeing news about the protests. Technical reasons could have justified the simultaneous closures. According to one journalist, "since four of the six stations share the same transmitter, for maintenance on that transmitter, it makes sense to take all stations off the air at once."¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, none of the major television stations had a regularly scheduled news program during the morning hours that the stations were closed. However, one analyst believed that while it was plausible that all of the national stations were scheduled for regular maintenance on the morning of September 16, regional stations were not, and yet these stations were taken off the air as well.¹⁵⁰ The true reasons for the closures of the stations on the morning of September 16 remains unclear, yet most media analysts and journalists interviewed by Human Rights Watch doubt that the incident was purely coincidental.

⁶⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with Denis D., station "A," Kyiv, October 17, 2002. In order to protect the identity of journalists interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the names of all interviewees and the names of the television stations on which they work have been replaced with pseudonyms. In some cases the location of interviews has been omitted. Other details that could reveal journalists' identity have also been omitted.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Human Rights Watch interview with Vadim V., station "B," Kyiv, October 11, 2002.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ For details on some of President Kuchma's political actions regarded as anticipatory of the 2004 elections, see Taras Kuzio, "Can Glasnost Save President Kuchma and His Regime?" RFE/RL Newsline, August 30, 2002 [online], http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/08/300802.asp (retrieved December 18, 2002).

⁷⁴ Peter Byrne, "Media Feeling the Squeeze on Eve of Protests," Kiev Post, September 13, 2002 [online], http://www.kpnews.com/main/11785/ (retrieved October 15, 2002).

⁷⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with Anatolii Murakhovskyi, first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Information Policy, TV and Radio Broadcasting, Kyiv, October 15, 2002.

⁷⁶ European Institute for the Media, Ukrainian Media Bulletin, September 2002 [online], http://www.eim.org/ (retrieved November 15, 2002).

⁷⁷ Vakhtang Kipiani, "The Knight of Darkness and Temniki," Ukrainskaia pravda, October 8, 2002 [online],
http://www.pravda.com.ua/cgi-bin/print_ru.cgi (retrieved October 30, 2002).

⁷⁸ "Vasiliev: Censorship was thought up by journalists, in order to receive money," Korrespondent.net [online], http://www.korrespondent.net/display_print.php?arid=60892 (retrieved December 6, 2002).

⁷⁹ Anonymous, "Additional commentary on events of week 36: for internal use," p. 1. Capitalization in the original.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ The speech was made on August 24, 2002, the eleventh anniversary of Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union. In this speech he proposed the transformation of Ukraine from a presidential to a parliamentary-presidential republic. There was speculation that this proposal was made only in reaction to the opposition protests demanding greater democracy and possibly designed to create the conditions under which Kuchma might be able to serve a third term or for his chosen successor to be elected. Taras Kuzio, "Can Glasnost Save President Kuchma and His Regime?"

⁸² Anonymous, "Press release," September 13, 2002.

⁸³ Anonymous, "Additional commentary on events of week 36: for internal use," p. 4.

⁸⁴ Kathleen Knox, "Ukraine: Opposition Turns Up Heat On Kuchma Over Tragedies," RFE/RL August 2, 2002 [online], http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/08/02082002160340.asp (retrieved December 31, 2002) and "Ukraine Mourns World's Worst Air Show Tragedy," RFE/RL Newsline July 29, 2002 [online],
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/07/290702.asp (retrieved December 19, 2002).

⁸⁵ Anonymous, "Additional commentary on events of week 36," p. 4.

⁸⁶ Leonid Amchuk, "Day of Shame for Ukrainian Television," Ukrainskaia pravda, October 17, 2002 [online],
http://www.pravda.com.ua/ru/archive/?21017-4-new (retrieved October 29, 2002).

⁸⁷ Amchuk, "Day of Shame."

⁸⁸ See note 63 above.

⁸⁹ Anonymous, "Additional commentary on events of week 36," p. 3.

⁹⁰ Ibid. Charter 4 is a Ukrainian non-governmental organization founded by several prominent journalists that promotes journalistic integrity and conducts monitoring of the media.

⁹¹ Anonymous, "Temnik 11," December 9-15, 2001, p. 5.

⁹² Anonymous, "Temnik 10," December 2-8, 2001, p. 3. The name of the contact person has been omitted.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 6.

⁹⁴ Anonymous, "Temnik 10," pp. 1-2. Our Newspaper+ is the official SDPU(u) party newspaper.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 5. The name of the SDPU(o) official has been omitted.

⁹⁶ Anonymous, "Temnik 11," p. 5.

⁹⁷ Anonymous, "Temnik 10," pp. 3-4.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 6.

⁹⁹ On December 13, 2001, 234 members of the Verkhovna Rada voted to dismiss Medvedchuk. The factions that gathered the 150 signatures to place the motion of a dismissal included the Socialist and Communist Parties, as well as some centrist and some right-leaning parties. "Oligarchic Social Democrats Suffer Setback," RFE/RL, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine Report vol. 3, no. 48 (December 18, 2001) [online], http://www.rferl.org/pbureport/2001/12/48-181201.html (retrieved December 11, 2002).

¹⁰⁰ Anonymous, "Temnik 10," p. 1.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. During the pre-election period, the SDPU(u) worked to garner additional support from Russian language speaking parts of Ukraine. The SDPU(u)-sponsored law on languages would have defined the legal status of Russian as a `state' but not `official' language. Taras Kuzio, "Russia Gives Ukraine a Helping Hand in its Elections," RFE/RL Newsline vol. 6 no. 13, Part 2, January 22, 2002 [online], http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/01/220102.asp (retrieved December 23, 2002).

¹⁰² Anonymous, "Temnik 11," p. 1. "Temnik 11" also focuses on the importance of Medvedchuk's leadership with respect to Ukraine's international standing. For December 11, Additional theme thirty-five notes that: "The Monitoring Committee of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly is planning to examine the Ukraine's fulfillment of its Council of Europe obligations." The interpretation details Medvedchuk's role in this:
"On December 7, during a meeting with the Chair of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. Medvedchuk announced that Ukraine had passed the majority of laws and codices related to its Council of Europe obligations. That is, the majority of commitments have been made. The remaining open question is the final legislation regulating legal conflicts that have emerged in the voting on the passage of the `European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages.' Connect this to the necessity to regulate the status of the Russian language through laws! Quote this as the position of Medvedchuk when illustrating the work of the committee." "Temnik 11," pp. 5-7.

¹⁰³ Anonymous, "Temnik 12," December 16- 22, 2001, p. 1.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Anonymous, "Temnik 12," p. 2.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ According to an October 2002 poll conducted by the Ukrainian Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies, if presidential elections had been held in October, Yushchenko would have received 24 percent of the vote, well ahead of Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko (10 percent), Tymoshenko (6.3 percent) and Viktor Medvedchuk (5.9 percent). "Yuschenko holds lead in opinion polls," Interfax-Ukraine, November 2, 2002 [online],
http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/archive/?2112 (retrieved November 20, 2002).

¹⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with Valentin V., station "D," November 8, 2002.

¹⁰⁹ Anonymous, "Temnik 10," p. 2.

¹¹⁰ Anonymous, "Temnik 11," pp. 1-2.

¹¹¹ Ibid. Bold in original.

¹¹² Human Rights Watch interview with Pavlo P., station "F," Kyiv, October 19, 2002.

¹¹³ Anonymous, "Additional commentary on events of week 36," pp. 2-3. Translator's note: misspelling/typographical error "politicins" in the original. Yushchenko and Viktor Medvedchuk are considered to be the leading contenders in the 2004 presidential elections.

¹¹⁴ Human Rights Watch interview with Valerii V., station "F," Kyiv, October 11, 2002.

¹¹⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with Pavlo P., station "F," Kyiv, October 19, 2002.

¹¹⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Denis D., station "A," Kyiv, October 17, 2002.

¹¹⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with Valentin V., station "D," November 8, 2002.

¹¹⁸ Anonymous, "Temnik 11," p. 5. Point sixteen of this section noted the observance of International Human Rights Day on this same day, December 10.

¹¹⁹ Anonymous, "Temnik 12," p. 4.

¹²⁰ Anonymous, "Temnik 11," p. 8. Name of contact person withheld.

¹²¹ Anonymous, "Press release," September 13, 2002.

¹²² The forum was designed to address the continuing political crisis and threats to Ukrainian democracy. In an open letter to President Kuchma, Our Ukraine called on the authorities to participate in the forum "for the sake of the consolidation democratic forces, formation of a parliamentary majority and a coalition government." "Our Ukraine Calls on President to Show his Commitment to Democracy," Kyiv Post, September 6, 2002 [online], http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/11741/ (retrieved December 21, 2002).

¹²³ The Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine, headed by Oleksandr Tiagnibok, is a small right-wing party that espouses neo-Nazi views.

¹²⁴ Anonymous, "Additional commentary on events of week 36," p. 2. Translator's note: inconsistencies in capitalization of Forum/forum in the original.

¹²⁵ Anonymous, "Additional commentary on events of week 36," p. 2.

¹²⁶ Anonymous, "Temnik 10," p. 8.

¹²⁷ Anonymous, "Additional commentary on events of week 36," p. 4.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

¹²⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with Yurii Y., station "A," Kyiv, October 9, 2002.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Anonymous, "Press release," September 13, 2002.

¹³² Ibid. On the close relations between the SDPU(u) and the Ukrainian Trade Unions Federation, see "Trade Unions and Social Democrats are Allies," SDPU(u) website, February 13, 2002 [online], http://www.sdpuo.org.ua/eng/news/actual_article/3C6A3AF3 (retrieved February 19, 2003).

¹³³ Human Rights Watch interview with Yurii Y., station "A," Kyiv, October 9, 2002.

¹³⁴ Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine Returns to Soviet Era Tactics to Subdue Opposition."

¹³⁵ Anonymous, "Press release," September 13, 2002.

¹³⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Denis D., station "A," Kyiv, October 17, 2002, and Human Rights Watch interview with Vadim V., station "B," Kyiv, October 11, 2002.

¹³⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with Yurii Y., station "A," Kyiv, October 9, 2002.

¹³⁸ Natalia Ligacheva, "Television in the Conditions of a Police State," Telekritika [Television Criticism], September 17, 2002 [online], http://www.telekritika.kiev.ua/comments/ (retrieved November 7, 2002).

¹³⁹ Irena Bekeshkina, academic director, Fund for Democratic Initiatives, as quoted in Natalia Ligacheva, "Television in the conditions of a police state."

¹⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with Denis D., station "A," Kyiv, October 17, 2002.

¹⁴¹ Human Rights Watch interview with Yurii Y., station "A," Kyiv, October 9, 2002.

¹⁴² Natalia Ligacheva, "Television in the Conditions of a Police State."

¹⁴³ Human Rights Watch interview with Yurii Y., station "A," Kyiv, October 9, 2002.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Vadim V., station "B," Kyiv, October 11, 2002.

¹⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with Natalia Ligacheva, Editor-in-Chief, Telekritika website, Kyiv, October 10, 2002. Telekritika is a non-governmental, non-profit organization that provides independent, critical analysis of Ukrainian television news. Telekritika was created by Internews-Ukraine, a non-profit public organization that works to support the development of democracy through support of independent mass media.

¹⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with Natalia Ligacheva, Editor-in-Chief, Telekritika website, Kyiv, October 10, 2002.

¹⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with Yurii Y., station "A," Kyiv, October 9, 2002.

¹⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with Natalia Ligacheva, Editor-in-Chief, Telekritika, Kyiv, October 10, 2002.