III. MEDIA BACKGROUNDUkrainians currently enjoy access to a wide variety of broadcast, print, and Internet news sources. According to the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, Ukraine has 791 registered television and radio stations.26 In addition, there are 3,925 print media sources, more than 500 Ukrainian Internet news sites, and thirty-five news agencies. Four percent of television and radio stations and 9 percent of print media outlets are state-owned. There are three state-run news agencies.27
Numerous governmental agencies exist to regulate information and the media. The bodies authorized to develop and implement information policy include the Rada Committee for the Freedom of Speech and Information and, within the executive, the State Committee for Information Policy, Television and Radio Broadcasting and the State Committee for Communication and Information. The National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting is responsible for broadcast licensing.31 In the months following revelations about the Gongadze murder and growing criticism of the authorities' relationship to the media, in April 2001 President Kuchma established the Information Policy Council, a presidential administration body designed to protect information and media rights and freedoms and to improve relations between media and the authorities. In July 2002, after the appointment of Viktor Medvedchuk, an additional department within the presidential administration, the Department of Information Policy, was created. Broadcast Media
In recent years, two of Ukraine's wealthiest individuals and prominent political figures have come to directly control or heavily influence all major Ukrainian television stations, except UT-1, which is state-owned. Viktor Pinchuk, son-in-law of President Kuchma and a Labor Party parliamentary deputy, maintains heavy investment in Novyy Kanal, STB, and ICTV, as well as the Dnipropetrovsk Channel 11.35 Pinchuk's other media holdings include Ukraine's largest daily newspaper, Fakty i komentarii [Facts and Comments], and the Ukrainian News news service.36 Novyy Kanal and STB both also receive significant Russian investment. SDPU(u) figure Oleksandr Zinchenko owns Inter, and SDPU(u) figures also own Studio 1+1.37 Head of the Presidential Administration Viktor Medvedchuk also maintains financial commitments and influence over these stations, as well as UT-1.38 An SDPU(u) leader, Hryhorii Surkis, owns TET, an important Kyiv local and regional station which reaches 12 percent of the nation.39 UT-1, owned by the National Television Company of Ukraine, is the only truly national television station, with coverage of more 98 percent of Ukrainian territory. The five other major stations broadcast over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and are thus considered `national': Studio 1+1 has 95 percent coverage; Inter has 62 percent coverage; and Novyy Kanal, STB, and ICTV each maintain about 25 percent coverage.40 The three stations with largest coverage, UT-1, Studio 1+1, and Inter, account for nearly 90 percent of television advertising profits, with the remaining 10 percent divided among the other 828 stations.41 According to AGB, a television audience data collection company, for July to September 2002, Studio 1+1 enjoyed 27 percent of the average market share, Inter 26.7 percent, Novyy Kanal 8.3 percent, ICTV 5.8 percent, STB 5 percent, and UT-1 4.6 percent.42 Regional stations enjoy a much smaller market share and largely broadcast programs relevant to local interests. Russian channels such as ORT, RTR, NTV, and TV-6 air via cable and satellite and some programs are retransmitted on Inter and other regional companies. Western Ukraine receives Polish, Czech, and Hungarian television programs.43 According to a November 2001 report by the National Broadcasting Council, feature films and soap operas dominate television programming. Both Novyy Kanal and ICTV dedicate more than 66 percent of broadcast time to this content, and Inter more than 50 percent. Films and soap operas are less frequent on UT-1, which offers more news and current affairs programs. About 20 percent of broadcasts on Studio 1+1, STB, and Inter are dedicated to news. On weekdays, Studio 1+1 offers between five and seven thirty-minute news programs a day at varying times, including a morning combined news-entertainment program, with the rest of programming largely dedicated to comedy shows, soap operas, films, and cartoons.44 STB's news program Windows airs four times daily and has additional business and crime news programs. Other typical programs include a comedy show, imported programs including Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous and Fantasy Island, as well as frequent feature films.45 Inter airs eight short news programs during morning and daytime hours, two evening news programs at 8:00 p.m. and 11:40 p.m., and varied entertainment programming, including the soap operas In The Name of Your Love and Isabella. Novyy Kanal also presents numerous serial dramas and feature films, as well as two five-minute morning news programs interspersed in its Waking Up morning show, one afternoon broadcast and two twenty-five minute evening broadcasts at 7:00 p.m. and 11:15 p.m.46 All stations offer fewer news programs and more feature films on weekends. Print Media
Ukrainian-language publications media comprise nearly 38 percent of registered print media, Russian-language publications, 22 percent, and bilingual publications, 20 percent. The daily circulation of Russian language press is about twenty-five million copies per day, compared to sixteen million copies of Ukrainian language press, concentrated largely in western Ukraine. Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea maintains numerous Crimean-Tatar language editions, although Russian-language print press dominates.50 Ukraine has experienced an Internet boom in recent years, and currently over 500 different media sources can be accessed online. Most of these news sources are independent and are not associated with political parties or other interest groups. More than half (55 percent) of Ukrainian websites are run by media outlets and news agencies, 23 percent belong to political parties, 14 percent host forums and news sites, and eight percent are personal pages.51 Ukraine has more than 320 online newspapers and journals, and most major print media have online versions.52 The most popular Internet media source is the virtual magazine Korrespondent.net.53 While the total number of users in Ukraine has also grown to more than two million, only 750,000 people regularly use the Internet, the majority of them being men (83 percent) between the ages of 20 and 29 (48.9 percent).54 Limits on Freedom of Expression
The weakness of the Ukrainian economy limits the ability of independent media outlets to thrive as profit-generating businesses that rely exclusively on advertising and sales revenue. Journalists face little opportunity for job mobility and steady income. Economic instability has forced the majority of media outlets and journalists to accept sponsorship from major industrial or political interests in exchange for financial security. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as international and domestic media monitoring groups have noted that the concentration of media ownership frequently limits objectivity in news reporting and that personal or group interests and opinions dominate most media sources. Regional media are most vulnerable to pressure by owners and very often reflect the interests of local business and political interests. Print and broadcast media with a national scope are frequently owned or controlled by individuals close to President Kuchma and therefore most often follow a pro-Kuchma line.59 Media outlets' weak financial positions also leave them vulnerable to political pressure. While the law guarantees equal entry into the market for all potential participants, state-run or pro-presidential media outlets receive favorable rates for newsprint, state-owned offices, and distribution and postal services.60 Endemic corruption and arcane tax and accounting regulations for businesses lead to falsification of financial records as a necessary tool for survival. As a consequence, most media owners face selective state harassment or closure "under the guise of perfectly legitimate law enforcement."61 In addition, the OSCE, international and domestic monitoring groups, and several analysts have noted the government's use of arbitrary and harassing tax, fire, and health inspections to paralyze and close independent media outlets.62 In one high-profile case, Taki Spravi [So It Goes], one of Ukraine's top three publishing firms, was subject to some thirty raids by the tax police between March and November 2002 after the publication of a biography of opposition leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, Unfulfilled Orders.63 Several prominent television and radio stations, including the Kyiv-based UTAR television station, Studio 1+1, and Radio Kontinent, all lost their broadcast licenses in recent years in controversial decisions by the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting (NCTRB).64 During the March 2002 election period there were numerous reports of direct action against media outlets. In January 2002, printers refused to publish the socialist newspaper Rubezh [The Border], prompting a hunger strike by the publication's journalists. In February and March 2002, Kyiv printing houses cancelled contracts to publish the opposition newspapers Slovo batkivshchyny [The Word of the Fatherland] and Vechernie vesti, forcing the owners to relocate their printing operation to western Ukraine.65 In September 2002, fake copies of Vechernie vesti were circulated, calling on Kyiv residents not to join the protests.66 One week before the elections, unidentified policemen stopped a truck carrying 107,000 copies of the Svoboda opposition newspaper and dropped them in a river. The police subsequently confiscated the reprinted edition at the publisher.67 26 Ukrainian National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting, "Analysis of Television and Radio Broadcasting in Ukraine," [online], http://www.nradatvr.kiev.ua/return3.htm (retrieved December 19, 2002). 27 Nathalia Gabor and Zoya Skoropadenko, "The Ukrainian Media Landscape," European Journalism Center, October 2002 [online], http://www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/ukraine.html (retrieved December 13, 2002), and Ukrainian National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting. 28 See "Limits on Freedom of Expression" below. 29 Reporters Without Borders, "Press Freedom Index," October 2002 [online], http://www.rsf.fr/article.php3?id_article=4118 (retrieved December 16, 2002). 30 Committee to Protect Journalists, "CPJ Names Ten Enemies of the Press on World Press Freedom Day," May 3, 2001 [online], http://www.cpj.org/enemies/enemies_01.html (retrieved November 19, 2002). 31 The National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting exists as one the most influential regulators in the domestic media market, given its authority to withdraw or grant broadcast licenses. The council consists of eight members: four presidential appointees and four parliamentary appointees. Both the president and the Rada have the authority to remove individuals. From December 1998 to June 2000 the council remained inactive due to political fighting between the executive and legislative branches. See Katya Gorchinksaya, "Media Licensing Agency to Resume Work," Kyiv Post, June 15, 2000 [online], http://www.thepost.kiev.ua/main/2872/ (retrieved October 24, 2002). 32 Ukrainian National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting. 33 Nathalia Gabor and Zoya Skoropadenko, "The Ukrainian Media Landscape." 34 The European Institute for the Media, Ukrainian Media Bulletin, January 2002 [online], http://www.eim.org/ (retrieved November 15, 2002). 35 The European Institute for the Media, Ukrainian Media Bulletin, January 2002. 36 In a ranking of the wealthiest people in Central and Eastern Europe, the Polish weekly news magazine Wprost [Directly] named Viktor Pinchuk the second wealthiest man in Ukraine, with a total net worth of U.S.$1.3 billion. Pinchuk controls the Interpipe Company and one of Ukraine's largest banks among other important industrial holdings. Peter Byrne and Vitaly Sych, "Three Ukrainians Among Region's Wealthiest," Kyiv Post, October 24, 2002 [online], http://www.kpnews.com/main/12104/ (retrieved October 24, 2002). 37 Nathalia Gabor and Zoya Skoropadenko, "The Ukrainian Media Landscape." 38 Wprost ranked Medvedchuk the third wealthiest person in Ukraine. In addition to large stakes in television and media companies, Medvedchuk controls several banks and the Dynamo-Kyiv soccer club. Byrn and Sych, "Three Ukrainians Among Region's Wealthiest." 39 Katya Gorchinskaya, "Business Elite Eye Media Property," Kyiv Post, June 16, 2000 [online], http://www/kpnews.com/diplaypr.php?arid=289 (retrieved October 24, 2002). 40 Nathalia Gabor and Zoya Skoropadenko, "The Ukrainian Media Landscape" and The European Institute for the Media, Ukrainian Media Bulletin, January 2002. 41 Nathalia Gabor and Zoya Skoropadenko, "The Ukrainian Media Landscape." 42 AGB, "Ukraine Data: Average Market Share in Prime Time," October 2002 [online], http://www.agb.com/public/countries/audiencedata/ukraine_1.htm (retrieved December 13, 2002). 43 Nathalia Gabor and Zoya Skoropadenko, "The Ukrainian Media Landscape." 44 Channel 1+1, "Television Programming" December 19-25, 2002, [online], http://www.1plus1.net/schedule/ (retrieved December 19, 2002). 45 Television channel STB, "Television Programming," December 16- 22, 2002 [online], http://www.stb.ua/tvcast/ (retrieved December 19, 2002). 46 Novii Kanal, "Television Programming," December 16- 22, 2002 [online], http://www.novy.tv/tv/ (retrieved December 19, 2002). 47 Nathalia Gabor and Zoya Skoropadenko, "The Ukrainian Media Landscape." 48 OSCE, "Ukraine: Parliamentary Elections 31 March 2002: Final Report." 49 Nathalia Gabor and Zoya Skoropadenko, "The Ukrainian Media Landscape." 50 Ibid. 51 Research company "Meta," as quoted in European Institute for the Media, Ukrainian Media Bulletin, November 2001 [online], http://www.eim.org/(retrieved November 15, 2002). 52 Yuri Onisimov, "Association for Progressive Communications European Internet Rights Project Country Report: Ukraine," 2001 [online], http://www.apc.org/english/rights/europe/c_rpt/ukraine.html (retrieved December 16, 2002). 53 Nathalia Gabor and Zoya Skoropadenko, "The Ukrainian Media Landscape." 54 Yuri Onisimov, "Association for Progressive Communications European Internet Rights Project Country Report: Ukraine." 55 Reporters Without Borders documented two murders, two jailings, eighteen attacks, and twenty-seven other incidences of pressure and intimidation against journalists in Ukraine during 2001. Reporters Without Borders, "Ukraine-Annual Report," 2001 [online], http://www.rsf.fr/article.php3?id_article=1785 (retrieved September 9, 2002). 56 According to the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, "High libel fees have become one of the means that lead the media into bankruptcy and foster a climate of self-censorship." OSCE Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, "Current Situation of Media in Ukraine," March 2000 [online],
57 Institute for Mass Information, "Mikola Tymenko: Independence of Ukrainian Media: Fight for Freedom," n.d. [online], http://en.imi.org.ua/articles/1035293440116/ (retrieved December 16, 2002). 58 Presidential Decree, "On Additional Steps to Ensure Transparency and Openness of the State Bodies' Activities," N.683/2002, August 1, 2002. The decree proposes a study and a report to examine the implementation of the Law of Ukraine "On Information" and other normative legal acts. Non-governmental organizations will be invited to participate in the research and report. 59 According to the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, "State-owned media exist on state subsidies and non governmental media are controlled by financial-political clans that-depending on their loyalty to the authorities-determine the policy of the publication. That is why all media in Ukraine...serve the interests of the authorities or political and financial circles supporting them, and not the interests of readers or viewers." OSCE, "Situation of the Media in Ukraine." For examples and analysis see European Institute for the Media, "Preliminary Report on Monitoring of Media Coverage during the Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine March 2002," April 1, 2002 [online], http://www.eim.org/Library.htm (retrieved December 16, 2002), (The European Institute for the Media (EIM) is a Dusseldorf- and Paris-based think tank examining developments in European media and communications. The institute publishes monthly bulletins on the Ukrainian media in addition to other monitoring reports); International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), "Media Sustainability Index-Ukraine," 2001 [online], http://www.irex.org/pubs/msi_2001/ (retrieved September 10, 2002), (IREX is a United States-based nonprofit organization specializing in higher education, independent media, Internet development, and civil society programs in the United States, Europe, Eurasia, the Near East, and Asia); and Kharkiv Group for Human Rights Protection, Freedom of Expression in Ukraine 2001 (Kharkiv: Kharkiv Group for Human Rights Protection, 2002). 60 OSCE, "Current Situation of Media in Ukraine," pp. 6-7, and IREX, "Media Sustainability Index-Ukraine." On equal entry see Law of Ukraine "On Information," Verkhovna Rada resolution no. 2658-12, October 2, 1992; Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting," Verkhovna Rada resolution no. 3760-12, December 21, 1993 (and amendments); Law of Ukraine "On Printed Mass Communication Media," Verkhovna Rada resolution no. 2783-12, November 16, 1992 (and amendments); and Law of Ukraine "On Information Agencies," Verkhovna Rada resolution no. 74a/95, February 28, 1995. 61 IREX, "Media Sustainability Index-Ukraine." 62 Ukrainian law allows for the operations of any organization to be suspended following a resolution by the Fire Safety Department, the Health and Anti-Epidemic Service or any other government structure. During a period of two and a half years, the newspaper Den was inspected more than thirty times by various state regulatory bodies. In 1999, the Health and Anti-Epidemic Service made claims against STB television, which were proven groundless. OSCE, "Current Situation of the Media in Ukraine," p. 10. In February 2002, the tax police searched the office of the Internet site, Obkom.net, seized documents and computers, and detained station employees. The State Tax Administration claimed that Obkom.net was connected to Koral Bank's money laundering schemes, had failed to pay its taxes, and was paying its employees illegally. The Chief Editor of Obkom.net believed the raid to be connected to its publication of articles critical of political figures, including the Head of the State Tax Administration, Mykola Azarov. European Institute for the Media, Ukrainian Media Bulletin, February 2002 [online], http://www.eim.org/ (retrieved November 15, 2002). See also IREX, "Media Sustainability Index-Ukraine." 63 According to the chief of the Smolensky District tax police, Volodymyr Furlet, his office was authorized to freeze Taki Spravi's bank accounts in June after the company failed to submit to authorized inspections. The tax police also accused the firm of being involved in money laundering, attempted to take court action that would force the sale of his business at auction, and later initiated a criminal case against the publishing house. Taki Spravi officials claim that, beginning in March 2002, they complied with numerous tax inspections, including inspections without warrants and armed inspections in which the firm's employees were threatened. Taki Spravi's director, Serhii Danyliv, claims that although he complied with the tax police's requests for documents, the authorities continued to conduct audits. Firm officials stated that the tax inspectors only requested documents related specifically to the book on Tymoshenko. Danyliv has initiated a counter suit against the tax inspectorate on the grounds that his business may be ruined as a result of the authorities' actions. He has also started proceedings before a U.S. court and the World Bank's International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Peter Byrne, "A Taxing Ordeal," June 27, 2002 Kyiv Post [online], http://www.kpnews.com/mail/11376 (December 19, 2002), Askold Krushelnycky, "Ukraine: Publisher Accuses Kuchma Government of Censorship, Harassment," RFE/RL Media Matters vol. 2, no. 47 (December 6, 2002) [online], http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/12/06122002190954.asp (retrieved December 10, 2002) and "Interview: President of `Taki Spravi': journalists understand that we are paid off old scores," Telekritika [online], http://www.telekritika.kiev.ua/interview_eng/?id=3552 (retrieved December 19, 2002). 64 The NCTRB determined that in 2001, some 70 percent of television and radio companies violated their licensing terms. European Institute for the Media, Ukrainian Media Bulletin, November 2001. Nevertheless, the council remains selective in its revocation of licenses, and many believe that the council's decisions lack objectivity and transparency. In April 2002, the NCTRB revoked the license of UTAR, one of the oldest independent Kyiv television stations. The popular station Studio 1+1 had its license revoked in February 2002, but continued to broadcast during the appeals process. In November the Supreme Economic Court dismissed the charges against Studio1+1 and declared the license valid. "The Court Battle for the Future of Ukrainian Television," RFE/RL Media Matters vol. 2, no. 33 (August 30, 2002) and "Supreme Economic Court Declared Valid Broadcasting License of 1+1 Studio," UNIAN, November 1, 2002 [online], http://www.unian.net/eng/news/print-27385.html (retrieved January 2, 2003). In December 2001, the NCTRB transferred the broadcasting rights of Radio Kontinent, which transmitted Deutsche Welle, the BBC, and Voice of America, to Onyks radio station, claiming that Onyks' bid for broadcasting frequencies "more fully reflects informational interests of Ukraine." Heorhii Gongadze had worked on Kontinent, a station known for its outspoken criticism of the government and Kuchma. "No more Deutche Welle, BBC for Ukrainians," Prima News Agency, January 9, 2002 [online], http://www.prima-news.ru/eng/news/news/2002/1/9/8816.html (retrieved October 24, 2002). 65 The European Institute for the Media, Ukrainian Media Bulletin, March 2002 [online], http://www.emi.org (retrieved November 15, 2002). 66 Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine Returns to Soviet Era Tactics to Subdue Opposition." 67 The European Institute for the Media, Ukrainian Media Bulletin, March 2002. |