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THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMACY REVIVED
After 1989, when a coup deposed the elected government and imposed a military-Islamist junta on Sudan, the Sudanese government became internationally ostracized for its gross human rights abuses. The U.S. was legislatively mandated to vote against the Sudanese government in international lending institutions, and did so. The U.S. under the administration of Pres. Bill Clinton (1993-2001) developed a policy of isolation of the hard-line Sudanese government and worked diplomatically with U.S. regional allies (also referred to as the “Front Line States,” Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda) to bring pressure to bear on the Sudanese government. In late 1997 the U.S. also imposed economic sanctions prohibiting U.S. entities from doing business with the Sudanese government.
When the “Front Line States” isolation strategy failed because the key regional actors became sucked into their own wars (Uganda in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Ethiopia against each other), nothing replaced it.
The conservative religious lobby in the U.S., which began in the 1990s to develop greater concern with religious persecution in other countries, put Sudan at or close to the top of its priority list, describing the situation there as “genocide.” It attracted grassroots attention with campaigns to collect money to free slaves (described as “Christians” enslaved by Arabs or Muslims) in Sudan. It pressured the U.S. government to maintain a harder line on Sudan, including increased sanctions and “nonlethal” support for the rebel SPLM/A, despite its bad human rights record.
Sudan attracted the concern of high-level officials in the administration of Pres. George W. Bush starting in early 2001, including the president himself. On September 6, 2001, in the White House Rose Garden, President Bush announced the appointment of his special envoy for peace in Sudan, former U.S. Sen. John Danforth. He initiated a process to establish whether either side—the Sudanese government or the SPLM/A—was interested in peace.
The forward momentum on Sudan was accelerated when U.S. foreign policy after September 11, 2001, became concentrated on a war on the terrorists who attacked the U.S., believed to be part of an international conspiracy headed by Osama bin Laden. The U.S. called on all countries to cooperate. Sudan, which had hosted Osama bin Laden between 1990 and 1996, quickly announced that it would cooperate with the U.S.
The U.S. did not limit its interest in Sudan to the sole issue of terrorism. Senator Danforth vigorously pursued his mandate, setting up four tests for the two Sudanese parties to pass to demonstrate their commitment to peace. In May 2002 he found that their interest was sufficient to warrant serious U.S. engagement in a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Further talks resulted in a July 2002 agreement at Machakos, Kenya, between the warring parties addressing the key issues of self-determination and the relationship between the state and religion, and a ceasefire agreement was reached in October 2002 in the context of the on-going peace negotiations. As of the writing of this report, the negotiations have not produced a final peace agreement.
Clinton Administration Policy on Sudan
The Clinton administration policy on Sudan evolved into a hardline policy of attempting to isolate that country as a “pariah state.” Sudan had been one of the few countries in the world to side with Iraq after that country invaded Kuwait in 1990. In 1992, several Sudanese employees of U.S. AID working in Juba were summarily executed by the army following an SPLA incursion into that southern capital city. In 1993, the U.S. State Department designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism whereby additional sanctions were imposed on U.S. relations with Sudan.1475
In June 1995 there was an attempted assassination of Pres. Hosni Mubarak of Egypt while he was in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to attend an OAU conference. Three Egyptians, apparently part of the assassination team in Sudan, fled back to Sudan immediately after the attempt with the help of the Sudanese embassy in Addis. Sudan’s know-nothing response to Ethiopia’s extradition request for the three lead the U.S. to try to impose Security Council sanctions on Sudan for its failure to honor the extradition order. Minor diplomatic and air travel sanctions went into effect.1476 They were not lifted until September 2001: the extradition order was never honored.
The U.S. Congress also passed a military assistance bill providing funds to help the three “Front Line States” fight their own rebels—which rebels were supported by Khartoum. It was widely assumed that this money was intended to pass through to the SPLM/A, which each of these countries had a history of supporting. The SPLM/A, however, complained bitterly that it saw none of it at all.1477
In February 1996, the U.S., for security reasons, withdrew its American staff from its embassy in Khartoum, although the embassy was never closed. In April 1996, President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism Act, which restricted U.S. commerce with nations designated as sponsors of terrorism by the State Department. The U.S. Treasury Department granted the Occidental Petroleum company a secret waiver from restrictions on investment in Sudan in August 1996. The Sudanese government, however, claimed it excluded the company from consideration as an investor because of uncertainly about diplomatic relations with the U.S., in November 1996. The whole story was not known publicly in the U.S. until January 1997.1478
U.S. Bombs Khartoum, August 1998
In June 1998, the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were simultaneously attacked by suicide bombers in trucks, killing hundreds, mostly Kenyans and Tanzanians. The U.S. attributed the attacks to the Islamist militant group Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden from bases in Afghanistan.
On August 20, 1998, the U.S. struck Khartoum with two cruise missiles, destroying its target, the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant, which the U.S. suspected of involvement with the alleged embassy bombers and chemical weapons. One person was killed and eleven workers injured in the nighttime attack.
The Sudanese government strongly protested the attack and called on the U.N. Security Council to investigate the plant and determine if chemical weapons had been there, but the U.S. defeated efforts to put the matter on the Security Council agenda. The U.S. further refused to disclose evidence which would be sufficient to justify—to the international community—its belief that the factory or its owners were involved in the embassy bombings, chemical weapons, or terrorism, claiming that this would compromise U.S. security methods and personnel.1479
The Al Shifa bombing therefore became a setback to U.S. diplomatic efforts to lead its allies and world opinion with regard to Sudan, particularly to lead them to isolate Khartoum as a means of pressuring the Sudanese government. In addition, the U.S. regional allies, the “Front Line States” of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda—who had long been assisting the SPLA militarily for their own reasons—lost interest in Sudan as they became mired in other wars. Eritrea and Ethiopia fought each other in a bloody crossborder war from 1998-2000, and Uganda in 1998 ventured into Congo, where its fought on the side of rebel groups in northeast Congo, agreeing only in 2002 to withdraw. The Ugandan forces also participated—with strong-arm tactics—in exploiting and trading in Congo’s abundant and valuable mineral wealth, according to a report by a U.N. panel of experts.1480 To show its disapproval, the U.S. held up part of the U.S. military package (wrongly but popularly believed to be destined for the SPLM/A) designated for the Ugandan military. Since that withdrawal from Congo, it appears that U.S. military assistance to Uganda has been recommenced.1481
U.S at the U.N.
The U.S., as noted, was opposed to the Canadian effort to put Sudan and the East African regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) talks on the agenda for the U.N. Security Council to consider in 2000, when Canada had the presidency of the Security Council and could set the agenda. The U.S. did not want to open up discussion of its August 1998 bombing of the Khartoum pharmaceutical plant. Ultimately, the only action involving Sudan and the Security Council for 2000 was a vote at the General Assembly in September 2000 against seating Sudan on the Security Council. The U.S. used all its diplomatic muscle to achieve this unprecedented result.1482
After September 11, 2001, and Sudanese cooperation on terrorism, however, the U.S. did not oppose the motion to lift the minor Security Council sanctions on Sudan imposed in 1996 related to the Sudanese failure to extradite to Ethiopia suspects in the Mubarak assassination attempt.1483
U.S. Congress Gets in on the Act
In 1998 Congress overwhelmingly passed the International Religious Freedom Bill. The bill resulted in the creation of a new office in the State Department to monitor and issue yearly reports on the state of international religious freedom, and in the establishment of a U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom (U.S. CIRF) as a watchdog over that office.
The U.S. CIRF was to suggest countries that the U.S. might consider taking action against on account of their violations of religious freedom. Most of the commissioners initially appointed to the U.S. CIRF by President Clinton were conservative rather than liberal in outlook, reflecting the outlook of the bill’s sponsors.1484
In September 1999 the State Department designated Sudan as a “country of particular concern” under the legislation although it did not impose any sanctions on Sudan additional to the broad ones in effect. Meanwhile, Sudan was and remains one of the top priorities of the U.S. CIRF. Its first hearing was on Sudan, on February 15, 2000.1485 In its first, May 2000, report the U.S. CIRF found “that the government of Sudan is the world's most violent abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief.”1486
In June 1999, in its first specific reference to Sudan in years, the U.S. Congress adopted a “sense of the Congress” resolution condemning the Sudanese government for a wide range of human rights abuses.1487 Later in 1999, Congress passed an appropriations bill containing provision for food aid to the rebel SPLA, at the discretion of the U.S. president.1488 Several U.S.-based NGOs operating in Sudan, as well as Human Rights Watch, lobbied against the U.S. giving food aid to the SPLA, citing SPLA abuses, concern about NGO staff safety, and the need to preserve NGO neutrality.1489 The SPLA denounced these NGOs.1490 On February 10, 2000, President Clinton wrote a letter to the U.S. Congress as required by the legislation, informing that “at this time” he would not exercise his discretion to allow U.S. food aid to the SPLA.1491
There were only a handful of Congressmen interested in Sudan in the mid-1990s: Congressmen Donald Payne (D-NJ), Tony Hall (D-OH), and Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA) stood out in their efforts to rouse Congress to the plight of the Sudanese. In 1999, a few more members of the U.S. Congress began to devote time and interest to Sudan, in response to pressure from U.S. conservatives and religious groups who believed that the Muslims of Sudan were persecuting the minority Christians of Sudan in a “genocidal war” and were enslaving southern Christians in the course of the war.1492 One was newly-elected Congressman Tom Tancredo (R-CO), in whose district schoolteacher Barbara Vogel was already raising money for slave “redemptions.” Another was freshman Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), who was one of the most outspoken senators on Sudan.
An important supporter of peace in Sudan was Senator Bill Frist (R-TN), who had gone to southern Sudan with World Vision in his capacity as a medical doctor during the 1998 famine. He was appointed Senate Majority Leader in 2002 and took another trip in his medical capacity to southern Sudan in 2003, discomforting U.S. officials concerned about his safety in the south despite the ceasefire.1493 He was said to lead Senate opinion on Sudan.
A lobbying group that focused on Congress, and was frustrated by the U.S. State Department, was the Boston-based American Anti-Slavery Group (AASG), a group created in 1995. It began its work on Sudan that year by focusing attention on why U.S. African-American Congressmen and other leaders did not take a position on “black African slavery” in Sudan.1494
Its work grew as the phenomenon of slave “redemption” of “Christian” southern Sudanese slaves from “Arab Muslim” raiders/masters grew. A few Christian NGOs— not including those who had relief and medical operations on the ground in Sudan—had started to buy back slaves in Sudan as a means of freeing them. In lightning trips conducted under great secrecy to northern Bahr El Ghazal in Sudan, the “slaves” were presented to first-time visitors to Africa (who spoke no Arabic or local languages) by an “Arab” “go-between” who had allegedly gathered them from their owners in western Sudan and walked them south into SPLA territory.1495
The Sudanese churches recognized the problem of slavery but did not endorse these buy-backs.1496 Many operational NGOs took a similar position.1497 A scandal regarding the misuse of the redemption funds and bogus “slaves” surfaced, in which even some Christians who had formerly participated in the “redemptions” renounced the practice.1498
The redemption campaign in its simplicity proved emotionally appealing. Steady campaigning on the slavery issue at the grass roots, fund-raising through appeals to “buy-back” slaves, and spreading the word to African-American churches had an effect, as did the removal by illness of the Black Muslims’ Louis Farrakhan from the debate. Farrakhan, who commanded a following among African-Americans in the U.S., had visited Sudan and was a defender of the Islamic government of Sudan even after meeting with southern Sudanese who appealed to him as Africans to condemn the Sudanese government’s persecution of them.
The U.S. African American community was split on the Sudan issue until Farrakhan faded out on the issue in the late 1990s. U.S. Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ), who had been a vocal supporter of military aid to the SPLA long before Sudan became an issue of religious rights, was key in the effort to bring the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) along in a coalition with the white religious conservatives on Sudan.
There was thus ongoing constituent pressure on Congress to “do something” on Sudan. But Sudan was already subjected to a stringent sanctions regime, with only one visible hole, that of gum Arabic; Sudan was the source of more than 90 percent of this product, used to suspend particles in soda pop cans, in the world.1499
This conservative religious/Black Caucus coalition, and another including operational NGOs responsible for programs regularly caring for hundreds of thousands of southern Sudanese in need, more established churches, and human rights groups (such as those groups opposing food aid to the SPLA), were both seeking ways to rachet up U.S. pressure on Sudan. At the same time, the Europeans and other U.S. allies were going in exactly the opposite direction, that of normalizing their relations with Sudan, greased by the participation of their companies in the growing oil business in Sudan and despite the efforts of European NGOs operational in Sudan.
Campaign Against Oil Investment
Pressure to Sell Off Talisman Shares
U.S. pressure groups of many persuations were concerned that, although U.S. companies were already barred from doing business in Sudan, non-U.S. oil companies were undercutting the economic boycott. These included Talisman, a company based in neighboring Canada, where Canadian activists had been mounting a campaign to force the Canadian government to rein in Talisman. U.S. activists kept up continuous and unforgiving pressure on Talisman. But it had not been enough.
Canadian NGOs had campaigned against Talisman and its predecessor Arakis since at least 1995, urging them to pull out of Sudan on account of the gross human rights abuses committed by the Sudanese government. They also pressured Talisman shareholders to sell off their Talisman shares in protest, targeting large, institutional Canadian shareholders. Probably as a result of this pressure, Vancouver’s Citizens Bank of Canada sold off its undisclosed Talisman holdings.1500
The faculty and students of the University of Toronto and York University, Ontario, lobbied to rid their pension and endowments funds of Talisman stock as well.1501 The head of the Ontario Teachers Federation, Barbara Sargent, announced that the federation would lobby its pension fund board to divest its Canadian $184 million worth of Talisman stock if it could corroborate evidence of violations in Sudan where Talisman operates. The teachers welcomed the Canadian government’s human rights fact-finding mission to Sudan in 1999.1502 Their Ontario pension fund board, in contrast, said that it had no plan to sell its 4.5 million Talisman shares (3.2 percent of Talisman’s publicly traded shares). It said it bought Talisman shares because it buys positions in all stocks included in the Toronto Stock Exchange’s index of 300 leading stocks.1503 As of December 2000, the Ontario teachers’ pension fund held a diminished number of Talisman shares, 3.8 million, or 2.7 percent of Talisman’s outstanding stock. In 2002 it still held a substantial block of Talisman stock, despite the unions’ displeasure.1504
U.S. groups joined the campaign because Talisman’s shareholders included a large roster of U.S.-based pension funds and institutional investors. Smith College Professor of English Eric Reeves ran a prolific one-man email campaign for human rights in Sudan, focusing on the oil industry and divestment of Talisman shares, then the capital market sanctions amendment. Activists sent letters to mutual fund companies and pension funds that held Talisman shares, urging them to sell off their Talisman holdings.1505 AASG said the funds included Fidelity Investments, Vanguard Group, State Street, the State of New Jersey Division of Investment, the California Public Employees Retirement Plan (CALpers), the New York State Common Retirement Fund, and the State of Wisconsin Investment Board.1506 Other groups were targeted for divestment as well, including Capital Management Group, the Teacher Retirement System of Texas,1507 and TIAA-CREF, the world’s largest private pension fund. As of May 1, 2001, more than ten major institutional shareholders had divested more than 3 million Talisman Energy shares, with a value of more than U.S. $ 100 million.1508
The activists lobbied the manager of New York City’s U.S. $ 90 billion pension fund, Alan Hevesi, who was reported in October 1999 to have hopes of convincing Talisman to threaten a withdrawal from Sudan as a means of pushing Sudan to end slavery and the civil war. CEO Buckee replied that he welcomed discussions with the funds but believed Talisman was doing more for the Sudanese people by keeping cordial relations with the Sudanese government and asking questions about government policies.1509 The Council of the City of New York, urged by Alan Hevesi, held a hearing to examine the city’s involvement with corporations doing business in Sudan.1510 New York City finally sold all its Talisman shares in the fall of 2000 and did not publicly dispute the characterization of the sale as a divestment.1511
Several large investors targeted by the campaign decided to sell out after taking months of hammering. In December 1999, TIAA-CREF said that it had sold its 260,000 Talisman shares on the grounds that the time was right to sell and move on.1512 Activists applauded the sale and expressed skepticism about the financial explanation for it.1513
The Teacher Retirement System of Texas and CALpers sold off their Talisman shares after being lobbied by Sudan activists.1514 The New Jersey Pension Fund sold its 780,000 shares of Talisman in early 2000, though it claimed that the sale was a business move, not a moral statement.1515 The Vanguard Group also sold off all its shares in mid-2000 after coming under divestment pressure.1516 Smith College issued a preemptive divestment statement, pledging that it would not acquire any shares of Talisman while Talisman remained a part of GNPOC.1517
Manning and Napier Advisors sold off its 1 million shares but also denied this was a divestment, although its public comments made it clear that the company knew about the divestment campaign.1518
In a response to the divestment campaign, Talisman announced that it would be buying back up to $ 300 million worth of its own shares in 2000, in an effort to keep the per share price up.1519 On February 28, 2001, Talisman renewed its offer to buy back up to 5 percent of its outstanding common stock for the year starting March 5, 2001.1520
Although the stringent prohibitions on Americans doing business with Sudan remained in place under a Clinton administration executive order, the Khartoum government was hopeful that from January 2001 it would receive better treatment under the administration of George W. Bush. President El Bashir went so far as to invite “U.S. oil companies to participate in oil exploration and production.”1521 President Bush nevertheless renewed the stringent sanctions in November 2001, and again in November 2002.
The Campaign for Capital Market Sanctions
A novel human rights strategy emerged, which appeared to be the brainchild of Roger W. Robinson, Jr., chairman of the William J. Casey Institute, a conservative think-tank. Robinson was previously in President Reagan’s National Security Council.1522 The strategy was capital market sanctions: the idea that foreign companies—in the oil business in Sudan—should not be allowed to raise money in U.S. capital markets. The reasoning was that Sudan had been designated by the State Department as a terrorist-sponsoring gross human rights abuser, U.S. companies were subject to stiff sanctions barring them from doing business with Sudan, and, because the Sudanese government claimed the subsoil rights, anyone in the oil exploration, development, or production business in Sudan would therefore be engaged in business with the government.
The impact of U.S. economic sanctions on Sudan were defeated by foreign companies which benefited from access to U.S. capital markets as they dodged U.S. sanctions. The efforts to convince the U.S. president, the Treasury Department, and the Securities and Exchange Commission to bar these foreign companies from U.S. capital markets were ultimately unsuccessful in this first test case, but in the process the campaigners brought enormous pressure on the oil companies and financial community, and not least of all on the Sudanese government.
More than 200 U.S. religious and civic leaders signed a petition to U.S. President Bill Clinton in December 1999, urging that he take a visible, personal stance on the “genocide” in Sudan and specifically that he construe or amend the executive order imposing sanctions on Sudan to bar the CNPC from access to U.S. capital markets as long as it continued to be a 40 percent partner in GNPOC.1523 The president declined to impose capital market sanctions on CNPC or anyone, as did his successor President Bush.
The Department of the Treasury, in response to inquiries from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, responded on September 8, 1999 and April 13, 2000 that the comprehensive sanctions program against the government of Sudan did not apply to Talisman as a Canadian corporation trading on the N.Y. Stock Exchange. The sanctions would, however, prohibit U.S. persons from contracting to underwrite or purchase shares in a new public offering by Talisman—if the proceeds were for use to support a project in Sudan.1524 Although this would prevent Talisman or any other foreign company from raising money in the U.S. for a Sudan project, it would not deter Talisman from raising money in the U.S. for its other projects. Talisman argued that its Sudan project comprised only 10 percent of its assets.
In mid-May, 2001, the SEC the responded in a manner more favorable to the activists. It said, in answer to a letter from Rep. Frank Wolf, that it would require greater disclosure from foreign firms in their mandatory filings pertaining to shares listed and traded in U.S. capital markets.1525 The SEC held, “The fact that a foreign company is doing material business with a country, government, or entity on [U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control]’s sanctions list is, in the SEC staff’s view, substantially likely to be significant to a reasonable investor’s decision about whether to invest in that company.”1526
Many hailed this as a “victory” for human rights groups.1527 Rep. Frank Wolf’s charges that PetroChina and Talisman may have failed to disclose material information in reports filed with the SEC was referred to the SEC’s division of enforcement.
Failing to provoke executive agencies into decisive action, however, the campaigners sought U.S. legislation to prohibit foreign companies engaged in the oil business in Sudan from listing or trading their shares on any U.S. stock exchange.1528 In June 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Sudan Peace Act together with a last-minute amendment offered by Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-AL) regarding capital market sanctions.1529 The Bush administration indicated that it opposed capital market sanctions, but President Bush did not overtly threaten to veto the bill.1530 The State Department said the administration “supports generally” the aims of the pending Sudan Peace Act, but “some of its amendments” could infringe on the prerogatives of the SEC.1531 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan opposed the proposed capital market sanctions.1532 International response to the U.S. barring companies working in Sudan from the U.S. capital markets was predictably negative as well.1533 The Senate bill that passed did not contain the capital market sanctions provision,1534 despite lobbying efforts.
A Talisman spokesman said that his lawyers believed the legislation applied to companies actually operating in Sudan and not parent corporations like Talisman. Talisman owns a Dutch subsidiary, Talisman (Greater Nile) B.V., which owned 25 percent of GNPOC, which operates the oilfields.1535 The oil company press release maintained that its presence in Sudan was positive and Talisman remained “a strong advocate for human rights.”1536
Later in the month of June 2001, however, Talisman CEO Jim Buckee said that if it were a choice between loosing its access to the NYSE and holding on to its Sudan project, Talisman would choose the stock exchange.1537 The Sudanese government hastened to add that if Talisman pulled out of Sudan, there were other “reputable companies” that would take over.1538
While the capital market sanctioners were still pressuring the Senate to support the Sudan Peace Act and its capital market amendment, the September 11 attack on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon intervened. At the request of the U.S. president, this and other contentious legislation was postponed.
The capital market sanctions issue was shortly revived by activists, outraged that an outgoing Republican Senator, Phil Graham of Texas, imposed a hold on Senate consideration of the capital market sanctions. Then the National Foreign Trade Council, representing more than 500 U.S. companies, weighed in with what were the underlying concerns of the financial and manufacturing communities. It considered that Sudan was the “stalking horse for China,” and vowed to continue lobbying against the Sudan Peace Act.1539
Avoiding raising more dust on the capital market sanctions issue, however, Talisman in January 2002 issued shares through the Toronto Stock Exchange rather than the NYSE.1540
Talisman Sued by Displaced under the Alien Tort Claims Act in New York
Although Talisman had a temporary reprieve when the Sudan Peace Act seemed to be relegated to the back burner, Talisman’s troubles were not at an end. On November 8, 2001, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and individuals displaced from the oilfields brought a class action lawsuit in U.S. federal district court for the Southern District of New York against Talisman and the Sudanese government. 1541
The amended complaint alleged that “Defendants have collaborated in a joint strategy to deploy military forces in a brutal ethnic cleansing campaign against a civilian population based on their ethnicity and/or religion for the purpose of enhancing Defendants’ ability to explore and extract oil from areas of southern Sudan by creating a cordon sanitaire surrounding the oil concessions located there.”1542 Talisman’s motion to dismiss was denied and the suit is pending as of the writing of this report. 1543
U.S. Aid to Sudanese Rebel Groups
The most controversial position of the U.S. CIRF and the conservative religious lobby on Sudan, for those not in the financial community, was that the U.S. should provide assistance to the rebel SPLA. The U.S. CIRF recommendation of aid to the SPLA, made in 2000, was objected to by one of the commissioners, Dr. Laila Al-Marayati.1544 In its 2001 report the U.S. CIRF scaled back the recommendation (in line with congressional changes) to recommend support for the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), to which it referred as “the political opposition in Sudan.” This description is misleading. The NDA comprises military as well as political opposition. The SPLA is by far its largest member.1545
Initially the aid was sought in the form of an amendment to the appropriations bill for the fiscal year 2000, which began October 1, 1999. The amendment, sponsored in the Senate by first-term U.S. Sen. Sam Brownback and in the House by Reps. Donald Payne, Frank Wolf, Tom Tancredo, and others, would at the discretion of the president supply food aid to the SPLA.
The move to give food aid to the SPLA was met by the resistance of most of the American operational NGOs involved in relief activities in northern and southern Sudan. These American organizations were concerned that the U.S. supplying food aid to rebels would become merged—in the mind of the Khartoum government—with their own food-supplying activities to needy civilians, and they might become military targets. They wanted the appearance of neutrality in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to be preserved, not compromised. President Clinton ultimately decided not to supply food aid to the SPLA.1546
Another U.S. $10 million dollars for the NDA—for “nonlethal nonfood” assistance—was inserted into the next appropriations bill, for fiscal year 2001 (October 2000-September 2001). No executive action was taken on that, however, until after the U.S. presidential elections were held in November 2000. Apparently the outgoing Clinton administration through the State Department sent out requests for bids for a U.S. $ 3 million project designed to provide training in negotiations and office support for the NDA, for “building its capacity to participate in the peace process.”1547 The U.S. CIRF supported this project. 1548
News of the contract, on which only DynCorp1549 of Reston, Virginia, bid, was not publicly disseminated until a story appeared in the Washington Post on May 25, 2001, about this U.S. $ 3 million contract for an avowed opposition group.1550 The new secretary of state, Colin Powell, hastened to explain that this contract would not extend the conflict and would boost the NDA’s capacity to negotiate politically;1551 a State Department officer said that it did not include vehicles or communications equipment,1552 two of several dual-use objects mentioned in the Congressional report language.1553
The reasons for supporting the NDA with U.S. $ 3 million were confusing. The training was for capacity-building so that the NDA could participate in the peace process. Northern politicians, who are the principal group of civilians in the NDA, are already skilled political negotiators, dating from their participation in multiparty politics in Sudan before the military coup of 1989 which lead to the banning of all political parties and to their exile. It seems that the training was intended for SPLM/A negotiators, whose negotiating skills are less developed.
Another puzzling aspect of the U.S. $ 3 million was that it was intended to improve NDA capacity for participation in peace negotiations—when the NDA is not a party to the IGAD peace negotiations, the only peace process that the U.S. wholeheartedly backs.
It appears that the U.S. completely ignored one aspect of the U.S. CIRF recommendations, however: their qualification that “aid should not be given to any opposition group unless it is making substantial and verifiable efforts to adhere to international human rights norms.”1554
DynCorp began to administer the contract in 2002, and its official admitted that it was providing a Washington, D.C., office for the NDA and paying its staff, all pursuant to State Department approval.1555 One staff member of the NDA office was the person who had long been the SPLA representative in Washington. DynCorp maintained that the contract was for only $ 2.8 million and that it was also refurbishing and supporting an NDA office in Asmara, Eritrea. DynCorp insisted that its work did not involve any military aid at all, and that it had retained a U.S. human rights professor especially to work on its Sudan project.1556
Meanwhile, much of the Economic Support Fund funding for fiscal year 2001 (U.S. $ 10 million) and for fiscal year 2002 (October 1, 2001-September 30, 2002, another $ 10 million) was going not to the NDA as permitted in the authorizing language, but to support the high-level peace effort conducted by Senator Danforth, under the “not withstanding any other provision of law” clause of the legislation. Some of the funds were going to pay for transport and lodging and per diems for the SPLM/A delegates to the talks, however.
U.S. Special Envoy for Humanitarian Assistance to Sudan: May 2001
The new administration, which took office in January 2001, early on expressed its interest in resolving the Sudan conflict and bringing an end to the suffering of its peoples. On March 6, 2001, the new Secretary of State, Colin Powell, testified at a House International Relations Committee hearing, “There is perhaps no greater tragedy on the face of the Earth today than the tragedy that is unfolding in the Sudan.”1557
While Colin Powell was determined to cut back substantially on the proliferation of special envoys and return diplomacy to the State Department, Sudan was an exception. The term of appointment had lapsed for former U.S. Representative Harry Johnston, President Clinton’s special envoy for humanitarian affairs, peace, and human rights to Sudan. Recognizing, however, the serious nature of the permanent humanitarian emergency in Sudan, President George W. Bush appointed his U.S. AID director, Andrew Natsios, as special envoy for humanitarian assistance to Sudan in May 2001, announcing:
Andrew Natsios was no stranger to Sudan. He had served in U.S. AID before, and was later director of the American nongovernmental relief agency World Vision. He had visited World Vision’s projects in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan. (which had been substantially discontinued in March 2000 because of the Memorandum of Understanding dispute with the SPLM/A). Roger Winter, who had just been named as one of the top executives at U.S. AID, quickly became a key member of the Sudan team inside AID.
The AID team, led by Natsios, visited Sudan, north and south, in July 2001 and Natsios promised, and delivered, emergency relief to the government side for the drought and displaced persons in Darfur—uprooted as a result of SPLA capture of a town in western Bahr El Ghazal.1559 This was the first delivery of emergency relief supplies by the U.S. government to the Sudanese government side of the conflict in many years. The AID team expanded as did the AID budget for Sudan, and its members became involved in the Danforth initiative and the IGAD peace process. It played a major role in successfully negotiating with the Sudanese government for humanitarian access to the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, and most of southern Sudan, which was achieved after much effort.
U.S. Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan: September 2001
President George W. Bush appointed former Sen. John Danforth as his special envoy for peace in Sudan on September 6, 2001. Announcing the appointment in the Rose Garden of the White House, President Bush said:
Danforth’s mission was to report to the president as to whether the two main parties to Sudan's nineteen-year civil war—the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A—were ready for peace negotiations. If he found that they were, then the U.S. would undertake an intensive diplomatic effort to assist in the negotiating process. If they were not serious about peace, then the U.S. would not substantially set up its engagement in Sudan. Senator Danforth and his team of U.S. State Department and U.S. AID officials and others especially appointed to serve on this task force, including Amb. (Ret.) Robert Oakley, visited Sudan and the region in waves from October 2001 to January 2002; several higher-level officials went more than once.
Senator Danforth approached his mission by proposing four tests that the two main parties to the conflict—the Sudanese government and the rebel SPLM/A—must meet in order to satisfy the U.S. that they were committed to the search for peace: (1) The signing of a ceasefire agreement in the Nuba Mountains, allowing humanitarian access, to be monitored by a team of fifteen to twenty-five international personnel; (2) An agreement by both sides not to attack or target civilians or civilian objects in the war in the south, also to be monitored, by a verification mission of fifteen international professional staff; (3) The appointment of a commission consisting of eminent persons from many countries which would investigate and make recommendations for practical solutions to the problem of slavery in Sudan; and (4) respect for “zones of tranquility” in the conflict areas, enabling medical humanitarian agencies to carry out polio immunizations and campaigns against bovine rinderpest and guinea worm.1561
U.S. Policy in Sudan, 2002
The forward momentum on Sudan was accelerated when overall U.S. foreign policy after September 11, 2001, became focused on the response to the terrorists who attacked the U.S., believed to be part of an international conspiracy headed by Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda movement. The U.S. called on all countries to cooperate. The Sudanese government and individual Islamists in the Sudanese government had hosted and done considerable business with Osama bin Laden when he lived and invested in Sudan between 1990 and 1996. The Sudanese government asked him to leave in 1996 (he moved to Afghanistan), as part of a campaign since 1993 to remove itself from the U.S. list of countries supporting terrorism. Sudan remained eager to improve its poor relations with the U.S. government, and perhaps feared a repeat of the cruise missile bombings of Khartoum (August 1998). After September 11 the Sudanese government immediately and publicly announced its cooperation with the U.S. on terrorism.
Senator Danforth’s work as special envoy and the imposition of the four tests, initially received with skepticism, produced some positive results for the promotion of human rights and the prospects for peace in Sudan. There was early agreement on a slavery/abduction investigation to be conducted by an international commission of eminent persons. The Nuba Mountains ceasefire agreement was signed by both parties January 19, 2002, in Switzerland. Progress was also made on negotiating “zones of tranquility” access for three medical programs.
The agreement to cease attacking civilians and civilian structures, as it was expanded, was the most difficult to negotiate. A February 20,2002, attack by government helicopters on an emergency food delivery location in the village of Bieh, not far from the Ryer/Thar Jath drilling site in the Lundin Block 5A area, resulted in a death toll of at least seventeen [later confirmed to be twenty-four] civilians.
This was the straw that broke the camel’s back. The U.S. State Department demanded “an explanation of how one part of the government can negotiate with the United States an agreement to end attacks against civilians while another part of the government is deliberately targeting civilians.”1562 It suspended all negotiations with Sudan on the war until the explanation was forthcoming.1563 The Sudanese government protested the U.S. suspension of peace talks and denied that it deliberately targeted civilians. According to Senator Danforth, the government had accepted an international mechanism to verify protection of civilians (part of the agreement not to attack civilians) just one week before the Bieh bombing. “This is part of a pattern of repeated attacks. It is also part of a pattern whereby the government says one thing and does another,”1564 he noted.
The Sudanese government finally signed the “no attacks on civilians or civilian objects” agreement proposed by Danforth, on March 10, 2002. The SPLA signed on March 25.1565 Oil remained central to the parties’ concern about this “no-targeting civilians” agreement. The Sudanese government sought language stating that oil installations were “civilian objects” and the SPLA sought the reverse language. The agreement was silent on this point, leaving it to the monitors to decide on a case-by-case basis, should there be any other attacks on oil installations.
Senator John Danforth’s report to President Bush was made public on May 10, 2002. It summarized the state of compliance by the parties with the four agreements and concluded that the parties had shown sufficient commitment to finding a negotiated end to the war that the U.S. should continue its engagement. The report concluded that there were massive human rights abuses being committed in Sudan, and that its judicial system was completely unable to provide any redress.
Senator Danforth also put forth his opinion that “the fair allocation of oil resources could be the key to working out broader political issues if it were possible to find a monetary formula for sharing oil revenue between the central government and the people of the south” in whose territory the oil is found. He urged the U.S. government to dedicate resources and staff to “develop our best thinking on how the distribution of oil revenues might further the cause of peace in Sudan.”1566
The peace talks, hosted by Kenya under the auspices of IGAD, the East African and Horn intergovernmental authority, proceeded with noticeable momentum in June and July 2002. These talks under IGAD had intermittently engaged the parties’ attention since 1994 when the government and the SPLM/A reached an initial breakthrough in the signing of a Declaration of Principles (DOP).1567
Under the Clinton administration the U.S., Norway, Canada, and several other countries formed an IGAD Partners’ Forum group (IPF) designed to provide stepped-updiplomatic and financial support to the IGAD peace process.1568 In 2002 the international actors coordinated their pressure on Sudan, lead by an informal “Troika” composed of the U.S., the U.K., and Norway, with the Kenyan government playing a leading role and providing the chief mediator.
This team succeeded in achieving the signature of the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A on a ground-breaking agreement on July 20, 2002, addressing the key DOP issues on self-determination and the relationship between the state and religion. The agreement was that a self-determination referendum would be conducted to determine southern choice (between unity or independence)—six and a half years after the signing of the final peace agreement. As to religion, shari’a was confirmed as the religion and source of laws in the northern two-thirds of the country, and the south was free to be a secular or other state as it desired during the interim six and a half year period, when a southern regional government would have substantial autonomy within a unified Sudan.
The mediators also managed to reconvene and push forward the second round of talks in October 2002, although the government had walked out of the talks in September on the grounds that the SPLA had captured the government garrison town of Torit, in Eastern Equatoria. As of the writing of this report, the parties have come to verbal agreement on security (military) arrangements but other items remain. An agreement on sharing the oil and other revenue has not been concluded, however, although the parties are said to have agreed on a formula and most details save for the exact percentage each will receive under that formula. The World Bank provided technical expertise to the parties.
The U.S. and its diplomatic allies have shown unprecedented willingness to bring enormous pressure to bear on the parties. Short of full international engagement in the Sudan peace process, however, the parties would likely continue to fight indefinitely. Congressional attention to Sudan also continued, responding to the peace process. In October 2002, the original Sudan Peace Act providing for capital market sanctions on companies doing business in Sudan was jettisoned and a compromise reached between key legislators on the sanctions. The bill was refashioned to put pressure on the Sudanese government to continue participating in the peace process (at the time, it had walked out of the talks). If within six months of the enactment of the bill (i.e., April 21, 2003) the president certified that the Sudanese government (1) was acting in “bad faith,” or (2) had “unreasonably interfered with humanitarian assistance efforts,” then four sanctions would be enacted, including taking “all necessary and appropriate steps” to ensure that the Sudanese government could not use oil revenues for the purchase of military equipment.1569 If the SPLM/A was in bad faith and negotiations failed, then the sanctions would not apply to the Sudanese government. This bill was signed into law by President Bush on October 21, 2002.1570
The bill also provided that the rebels would receive one hundred million dollars, regardless of the Sudanese government’s compliance, over a three-year period. The ability or willingness of the U.S. government to provide these funds, if the peace talks collapse, may be called into question in the aftermath of the U.S. military engagement in Iraq.
1475 See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Devastation, p. 60.
1476 See Human Rights Watch, Behind the Red Line.
1477 “Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact, Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan,” p. 47.
1478 “U.S. Eased Law on Terrorism To Aid Oil Firm,” Washington Post, January 23, 1997.
1479 Tom Raum, “CIA: 1998 Sudan Bombing Not Mistake,” AP, October 19, 1999; Milt Bearden, “U.S. Should Admit Its Mistake in Sudan Bombing,” Wall Street Journal (New York), May 20, 1999.
1480 United Nations, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2002/1146, October 2002, http://www.monuc.org/downloads/N0262179.pdf (accessed August 21, 2003). “The Uganda People’s Defence Forces and their associated rebel militias have been used as the de facto enforcement arm of the network [in northeastern Congo], ensuring the network’s pre-eminent commercial position through intimidation, and the threat and use of force. UPDF or militias associated with individual UPDF officers have established physical control over areas containing commercially viable natural resources – coltan, diamonds, timber and gold.” Ibid., p. 20.
1481 U.S. State Department official, briefing, Washington, D.C., August 27, 2003.
1482 U.S. State Department official, meeting held by outgoing special envoy Harry Johnston, Washington, D.C., November 2000.
1483 “UN End Sanctions Against Sudan,” AP, New York, September 29, 2001.
1484 Two U.S. CIRF commissioners were familiar faces from the Reagan era: Elliott Abrams, former assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, who was found to have lied to the U.S. Congress during the Iran-Contra hearings about his solicitation of funds from the Sultan of Brunei for the benefit of the Nicaraguan contras, and Nina Shea, who had been a vocal Nicaraguan contra supporter while at the Puebla Institute. She had since written a book about persecuted Christians worldwide. Both were among the first commissioners on the U.S. CIRF. Elliott Abrams resigned from the U.S. CIRF in 2001 to take a high-level position at the National Security Council in the Bush administration, reportedly acting as liaison between the NSC and the White House on Sudan matters.
1485 One month later a commission member criticized the State Department’s first report on religious human rights in Sudan as inadequate because it was “unclear—even about the basic fact that religious persecution is at the core of the conflict.” Testimony of Nina Shea before the House International Relations Committee et al., March 8, 2000. http://uscirf.gov/briefings/shea_030800.php3?scale=800 (accessed July 17, 2001).
1486 http://uscirf.gov/reports/01May00/policy_Sudan.php3 (accessed June 15, 2001).
1487 U.S. House of Representatives, “Condemning the National Islamic Front (NIF) government for its genocidal war in southern Sudan, support for terrorism, and continued human rights violations, and for other purposes,” Concurrent Resolution, H. Con. Res. 75, 106th Cong., 1st sess, June 16, 1999.
1488 Section 592(b) of the Fiscal Year 2000 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act.
1489 Karen DeYoung, “Aid Groups Challenge U.S. Policy on Sudan,” International Herald Tribune, January 6, 2000; Stephen Mbogo, “Stakeholders Lobby against New U.S. Strategy on Food Aid,” All Africa News Agency, Nairobi, January 31, 2000. WFP also expressed concern that the U.S. plan would represent a threat to OLS and “disrupt an existing non-partisan aid programme.” “WFP Worried about US Food Aid Project for Southern Sudanese Rebels,” AFP, Geneva, November 30, 1999. See Human Rights Watch press release, “Food Aid to Sudanese Rebels Opposed,” New York, December 13, 1999.
1490 Nhial Deng Nhial, SPLM/A press release, “Statement on the MOU between the SRRA and the NGOs,” Nairobi, March 1, 2000.
1491 William J. Clinton, Text of a Letter from the President to the Chairman of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, February 10, 2000. p. 2.
1492 Testimony, Charles Jacobs, American Anti-Slavery Group, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., September 28, 2000.
1493 “Senate majority leader went on his own for medical missions to Sudan, Kenya,” AP, Washington, D.C., September 3, 2003.
1494 Bill Sammon, “Christians, Jews say African slavery being ignored; U.S. black activists deny Farrakhan factor,” Washington Times, February 27, 1998 (quoting Charles Jacobs, American Anti-Slavery Group, “Jesse Jackson’s office told me he wouldn’t touch it because it could be perceived as an anti-Arab campaign.” Ibid.) “Black African” is not a term that southern Sudanese use to describe themselves, at least not before the AASG and others used it.
1495 Linda Slobodian, “The Slave Trail,” http://www.canoe.ca/SlaveTrain/ (accessed March 26, 1998); see Christian Solidaritry International, “Slavery In Sudan: Evidence to Congressional Sub-Committee Hearings, March 1996,” testimony of Baroness Cox, Washington, D.C., March 13, 1996; Caroline Cox and John Eibner, “Christian Solidarity International: Visit to Sudan, May 31-June 5, 1995,” preliminary draft, Oxford, U.K., June 1995.
1496 A joint statement the SCC and the NSCC issued in Geneva in July 1999 said, “The issue of slavery should be looked at in the context of the crisis in Sudan; When the crises in Sudan are brought to an end, slavery will also come to an end; Partners should support the efforts of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to end slavery in Sudan; With all the good intentions in slave redemption, it does not end slavery.”
1497 Human Rights Watch, “Background Paper on Slavery and Slavery Redemption in the Sudan,” March 1999, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudan1.htm, and “Slavery and Slave Redemption in Sudan,” March 2002, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudanupdate.htm; and Human Rights Watch, Children of Sudan: Slaves, Street Children, Child Soldiers (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Sudan.htm (all accessed May 22, 2002); AntiSlavery International (London), www.antislavery.org/ (accessed May 22, 2002);
1499 The U.S. had exempted gum arabic from its own sanctions on trade with Sudan. An editorial in the Washington Post chastised the U.S. for “Soda Pop Diplomacy,” specifically: “it does seem fair to ask whether a nation that can't accept the pulp settling on the bottom of the can of soda pop is totally, utterly—and credibly—committed to the fight against global terrorism.” “Soda Pop Diplomacy,” editorial, Washington Post, November 8, 1997.
1500 Steve Chase and Guy Dixon, “Silence is golden, PR experts tell Talisman,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), Calgary and Toronto, November 20, 1999.
1501 Nicola Luksic, “University of Toronto holds millions in controversial Talisman Energy,” University of Toronto Varsity newspaper, December 9, 1999; Angela Pacienza, “York Money Immersed in Controversy: Faculty Urges University to Sell Talisman Stocks Linked to Civil War,” York University Excalibur, December 1, 1999; Nancy Kuyumcu, “Stock Controversy Continues,” York University Excalibur, January 19, 2000; Reka Szekely, “Sudan War Grips York Student,” York University Excalibur, March 22, 2000.
1502 Steven Chase, “Ontario teachers target Talisman,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), Calgary, November 18, 1999.
1503 Paul Waldie, “Teachers urged to dump Talisman,” National Post (Toronto), November 18, 1999.
1504 Gary Kenny, KAIROS, email to Human Rights Watch, June 21, 2002. The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board website states, regarding corporate social responsibility, that “non-financial considerations cannot take precedence over risk and return considerations in the management of the pension fund. . . .” The pension plan proxy voting guidelines then state that the pension plan encourages companies to develop policies to address social policy issues including environmental impact and impact on the communities of its operations which policies Talisman had not adopted with regard to Sudan. Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board, Corporate Governance Policies and Voting Proxy Guidelines, http://www.otpp.com/web/website.nsf/web/CorporateGovern/$FILE/ProxyVoting.pdf (accessed June 24, 2002).
1505 See, e.g., Com. John Busby, National Commander, The Salvation Army; Charles W. Colson, founder, Prison Fellowship Ministries; Nina Shea, director, Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom House; Rabbi Irving Greenberg, President, Jewish Life Network et al., letter to James Burton, Chief Executive Officer, California Public Employees Retirement System, January 24, 2000.
1506 Leslie Miller, “Group calls for stock boycott to prevent slavery,” AP, Boston, July 28, 1999. AASG press release, “New Jersey divests from ‘slave stock,’” Boston, January 27, 2000, http://www.anti-slavery.org/pages/updates/njdivest.html (accessed Aug. 27, 2003).
1507 The Teacher Retirement System of Texas was established by the Texas state legislature. http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/TT/met1.html.(accessed August 21, 2003).
1508 These numbers include only those Talisman shareholders who liquidated 100 percent of their position after being targeted, and have publicly acknowledged the liquidation. The numbers thus understate the extent of the divestment campaign as a whole. Eric Reeves, email to Human Rights Watch, May 18, 2001.
1509 Steven Chase, “Talisman urged to threaten Sudan,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), Calgary, October 13, 1999.
1510 Ian Fisher, “Oil Flowing in Sudan, Raising the Stakes in Its Civil War,” New York Times, Khartoum, October 17, 1999.
1511 Business section, New York Post, September 16, 2000.
1512 Charles Frank, “U.S. teacher fund sells Talisman shares,” Calgary Herald, December 10, 1999.
1513 “Activists Applaud TIAA-CREF’s Talisman Share Sale,” Dow Jones Energy Service (New York), Washington, December 8, 1999.
1514 Paul Waldie, “[Ontario] Teachers urged to dump Talisman,” National Post (Toronto), November 18, 1999; “Anti-Slavery Group Hails Texas Teachers for Divesting from ‘Slave Stock,’” PRNewswire, November 1, 1999; Jane Lampman, “Battle against oppression abroad turns to Wall Street,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston), March 3, 2000.
1515 “New Jersey’s Pension Funds Unload Stock in Canadian Oil Company,” Star-Ledger/KRTBN (Newark), January 27, 2000.
1516 Eric Reeves, email to Human Rights Watch, June 7, 2001 (quoting letter from Vanguard CEO to individuals who had been pressuring for divestment, first half of 2000).
1517 Eric Reeves, Smith College press release, February 26, 2000.
1518 “Silence is golden, PR experts tell Talisman,” November 20, 1999.
1519 Paul Waldie and Charlie Tillis, “Talisman to embark on share buyback; Buckee admits Sudanese operations have hurt stock price,” National Post (Toronto), December 15, 1999. Talisman bought back a total of 4,278,300 common shares for a total Canadian $ 210.2 million (U.S. $ 142.5 million) (Canadian $ 49.13 or U.S. $33.31 per share) in February 2000 at the time of their repurchasing bid. Talisman also bought back, before year’s end, 730,800 common shares for Canadian $ 40.8 million (U.S. $ 27.7 million). The grand total for 2000 was 5,009,100 shares repurchased for Canadian. $ 251 million. Talisman 2000 Annual Report, p. 33.
1520 Talisman press release, “Talisman Energy Inc. Normal Course Issuer Bid,” Calgary, March 6, 2001.
1521 “Sudan’s Bashir seeks better ties with U.S.,” Reuters, Cairo, January 10, 2001.
1522 Edward Alden, “US And Canada: SEC Chief Inherits Disclosure Bombshell: Capital Markets
Watchdog's Expanded Role May Cause Sea Change In The Way Foreign Companies List In US,” Financial Times (London) Washington, May 11, 2001.
1523 Among the signatories were Bishop Robert Morgan, the President of the Council of Bishops of the United Methodist Church; Clifton Kirkpatrick, the Stated Clerk of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.; the Rt. Rev. Stephen Jecko and four other bishops of the Episcopal Church (but not its conference of bishops); Peggy Noonan, Chuck Colson, Michael Horowitz, at Hudson Institute; Freedom House Chairman Bette Bao Lord; former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury William Simon; and former U.S. National Security Advisor William P. Clark. Letter to President William Jefferson Clinton, Washington, D.C., December 9, 1999.
1524 R. Richard Newcomb, director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, letter to Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Washington, D.C., April 13, 2000.
1525 See above, “China’s First Initial Public Offering on the N.Y. Stock Exchange Backfires;” Letter and attachments from Laura S. Unger, acting chairman, SEC, to the Honorable Frank P. Wolf, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., May 8, 2001, http://www.security-policy.org/papers/2001/LSEC-Wolf.pdf (accessed June 7, 2001).
1526 Ibid, p. 3.
1527 See Jane Lampman, “Human rights groups gain ‘disclosure’ victory on Wall Street,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston), May 17, 2001; Edward Alden and John Labate, “The Americas: SEC plans to tighten rules on embargoes,” Financial Times (London), May 11, 2001; Barrie McKenna, “SEC policy change to put Talisman under tighter scrutiny,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), Washington, D.C., May 15, 2001; Jim Wolf, “U.S. SEC to examine foreign firms’ deals with foes,” Reuters, Washington, D.C., May 14, 2001.
1528 Eric Reeves, “Capital market sanctions,” email to Human Rights Watch, March 26, 2001.
1529 The Sudan Peace Act, which sought to draw policy and appropriations on Sudan together into one bill, was first offered in 1999 and again in 2000. In June 2001 it passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 422 to 2, and was sent to the Senate. The capital market sanctions amendment was dropped and the bill passed the Senate and was signed into law by Pres. George W. Bush on October 21, 2002.
1530 Steven Mufson, “House Bill on Sudan Troubles Bush,” Washington Post, August 15, 2001.
1531 “State Department Has Reservations about Sudan Act,” Reuters, Washington, D.C., June 14, 2001.
1532 Campion Walsh, “Bush Admin, Greenspan Oppose Tighter Sudan Sanctions,” Dow Jones (New York), Washington, July 25, 2001.
1533 E.g., “Malaysia slams US ‘bullying’ tactics against firms in Sudan,” AFP, Kuala Lumpur, June 16, 2001.
1534 Claudia Cattaneo, “US human rights legislation lessens pressure on Talisman,” Financial Post (Toronto), June 14, 2001.
1535 Marc Lacey, “The House Votes Strongly in Favor of Putting Pressure on Sudan,” New York Times, June 14, 2001.
1536 Talisman press release, “Talisman Energy Comments On Proposed US Legislation,” Calgary, June 13, 2001.
1537 James Stevenson, “Talisman says Sudan oil holdings not worth being banned in the U.S.,” Canadian Press, Calgary, June 18, 2001
1538 “Talisman can be replaced by other ‘reputable’ oil companies, says Sudan,” Canadian Press, Calgary, June 26, 2001; Jeffrey Jones, “Sudan puts brave face on potential Talisman exit,” Reuters, Calgary, June 26, 2001; Kamarul Yunus, “Petronas may benefit if Talisman pulls out from Sudan,” News Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), July 16, 2001.
1539 Paul Basken, “U.S. Lawmarkers Seeking Sudan Sanctions Encounter China Obstacle,” Bloomberg, Washington, January 17, 2002.
1540 Talisman press release, “Talisman announces successful $ 325 million medium term note issue,” Calgary, January 22, 2002. The press release specifically said that these securities have not been and will not be registered in the U.S.
1541 Presbyterian Church of Sudan vs. Talisman Energy Inc., Civ. Action No. 01CV9882 (AGS), S.D.N.Y., second amended complaint dated August 15, 2003, http://www.bergermontague.com/pdfs/SecondAmendedClassActionComplaint.pdf (accessed August 21, 2003).
1543 Presbyterian Church of Sudan vs. Talisman Energy Inc., Civ. Action No. 01CV9882 (AGS, S.D.N.Y., opinion on motion to dismiss dated March 19, 2003, http://www.bergermontague.com/pdfs/talisman.pdf.pdf (accessed September 24, 2003).
1544 “Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom,” Washington, D.C., May 1, 2001, p. 133 (concurrence with qualifications to recommendations 3 and 5 regarding Sudan).
1545 The NDA is the umbrella opposition group of which the SPLA is by far the largest military force. Since the withdrawal of the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is the biggest political party in the NDA.
1546 William J. Clinton, Letter from the President to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, February 10, 2000.
1547 The U.S. $ 3 million funding, separate from the U.S. $ 10 million inserted into the 2001 appropriations bill, was initially approved during the Clinton administration. “Determination: Assistance to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA),” signed by Secretary of State Madeliene Albright, November 15, 2000.
1548 “Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom,” Washington, D.C., May 1, 2001, p. 130.
1549 Coincidentally, an article appeared about DynCorp’s work in Bosnia, where 161 of 1,832 U.N. police officers were from the United States, all selected and trained by DynCorp under an exclusive U.S. $ 15 million annual contract with the State Department: “American officials acknowledge serious problems in selecting and training American police officers to serve in Bosnia.” Colum Lynch, “UN Police in Bosnia: Who's Watching?” Washington Post U.N., New York, May 29, 2001. DynCorp is the leading U.S. government contractor for anti-drug work in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Nora Boustany and Alan Sipress, “U.S. Slates $3 Million for Sudanese Opposition,” Washington Post, May 25, 2001.
1550 “U.S. Slates $3 Million for Sudanese Opposition,” May 25, 2001.
1551 “Sudan slams US for supporting opposition,” AFP, Khartoum, May 28, 2001 (quoting Colin Powell).
1552 Jeff Millington, director, East Africa, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., June 11, 2001.
1553 The language from the report accompanying the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY 2001 was: “Provided further, That up to $10,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading may be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to provide assistance to the
1554 “Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom,” Washington, D.C., May 1, 2001, p. 130 (footnote omitted). The concurring U.S. CIRF commissioner noted that due to the degree of documented human rights abuses by the SPLA, “actual compliance with international norms (not simply “efforts”) must be significant and sustained before any aid would be considered. At this time, no such improvements have been verified by either the U.S. government or credible non-governmental human rights organizations in the region.” Ibid., p. 133. The U.S. government is not bound by these recommendations.
1555 DynCorp official, Human Rights Watch interview, Washington, D.C., May 7, 2002.
1557 Pauline Jelinek, “Sudan's 18-year civil war ‘a priority,’ Powell says,” AP, Washington, D.C., March 9, 2001.
1558 Remarks by the President to the American Jewish Committee, National Building Museum, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010504.html (accessed June 24, 2002).
1559 The government at the time was showcasing several thousand needy displaced persons who fled north to Darfur when the SPLA captured Raga in western Bahr El Ghazal. It continued to ignore the much larger number of persons it had caused to be displaced from the oilfields of Western Upper Nile/Unity State, and to actively forbid humanitarian access to them.
1560 “President Appoints Danforth as Special Envoy to the Sudan.” Remarks by the President and Senator John Danforth on Danforth's Appointment as Special Envoy to the Sudan, The Rose Garden, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010906-3.html (accessed June 24, 2002).
1561 See Human Rights Watch backgrounder on the Danforth initiative, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/danforth-bck0515.htm
1562 Richard Boucher, Press Statement, “Aerial Attacks on Feeding Site in Sudan,” U.S. Department of State, February 21, 2002, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8205.htm (accessed June 20, 2002).
1563 “U.S. suspends talks with Sudan,” February 21, 2002.
1564 John C. Danforth, “Hope for peace? Gunship rockets blow up government promises,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, commentary column, February 24, 2002.
1565 The language of the agreement was broadened from a prohibition on aerial bombardment of civilians to include all forms of attacks on civilians and civilian objects when it became clear that Khartoum would read the “no aerial bombardment” provision to permit it to conduct ground attacks on civilians. In addition, the government sought to include SPLA attacks in the agreement.
1566 Indeed, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) graphically demonstrated to the parties in mid-2002, through expert oil industry advice in a Nairobi workshop attended by important representatives from both sides, how much more oil revenue could be expected in the event of peace. See http://www.csis.org/africa/index.htm (accessed October 30, 2002).
1567 The parties agreed to the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1994. In the DOP the parties affirmed the “rights of self-determination of the people of South Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum” and agreed that a “secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan.” Declaration of Principles, articles 2 and 4, signed by representatives of the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, Nairobi, May 20, 1994. The Sudanese government spent considerable effort backing away from it until the Machakos Protocol was signed in Machakos, Kenya, on July 20, 2002.
1568 The IGAD Partners Forum members in 2001 are listed in a footnote above under “Neglect of the Environment: Environmental Issues Regarding the Sudd and the Jonglei Canal.”
1569 The four sanctions are: 1) the U.S. will oppose any funding for Sudan from international financial institutions; 2) the U.S. will suspend diplomatic relations with Sudan; 3) the U.S. will take "all necessary and appropriate steps” to deny the Sudanese government access to oil revenues to ensure that it "neither directly nor indirectly utilizes any oil revenues for the purchase of military equipment;" and 4) the U.S. will seek a U.N. Security Council arms embargo against the Sudanese government. Sudan Peace Act, Public Law 107-245, 107th Congress, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin…07_cong_public_laws&docid+f:publ245.107 (accessed November 18, 2002).
1570 “Bush Signs and Commends Sudan Peace Act,” Statement by the President, October 21, 2002; U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on the Sudan Peace Act, October 15, 2002. Text of bill, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:5:./temp/~c1072cIX1F
(accessed August 21, 2003).