In mid-1998, while the militia of Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep was burning Duar, Koch, Boaw, and Ler villages and looting relief organizations in the oilfields of Block 5A, Talisman, the largest independent Canadian oil and gas exploration and production company, investigated the adjacent GNPOC concession and decided to invest. The deal by which Talisman bought out Arakis was completed in October 1998.
To the Sudanese government, it must have seemed in 1999 that its luck was finally changing. The pipeline was completed on schedule and inaugurated in May 1999, with great fanfare. An oil refinery for local use of Sudan’s crude oil was completed near Khartoum, and inaugurated on the tenth anniversary of the NIF’s coming to power, June 30, 1999. The first export of crude oil from Sudan took place on August 30, 1999, almost the same day the IMF lifted its nine-year suspension of Sudan.
Then the world price of crude oil began to rise, and rise, until it more than doubled, as Talisman continued to locate and drill new wells in its concession, generating even more government revenue.
Yet there were still some discordant notes. The first incident of pipeline sabotage occurred two weeks after the first export of oil. More importantly, in early 1999 the dispute—between the Sudanese government and its ministry of defense, and Riek Machar and his ex-rebel SSDF—over who would guard the Block 5A oilfields being explored by Lundin came to a head. Riek Machar opposed any army presence, insisting that Block 5A was in territory he brought to the government in 1997 under the Khartoum Peace Agreement and that his forces would and could protect Lundin’s concession. He did not want a repeat of the situation in GNPOC areas, where his forces, military and political, were not allowed even a minor role, despite the peace agreement.
The government was also actively peeling away commanders from Riek Machar’s SSDF; by directly arming and funding them it cut away Riek Machar’s authority over them. The proliferation of ethnic locally-based militias, armed by the government to “protect” their areas from the SPLA, was not limited to Paulino Matiep’s forces. Various militias, including from the Dinka, Murle, Toposa, and Mandari, had been directly armed as well, most under illiterate commanders. Many were reactive to early SPLA human rights abuses of their civilian population although they also committed serious abuses.
Since the government of Sudan had already seen some southern militias redefect to the SPLM/A, most spectacularly the Dinka commander, Kerubino Kwanyin Bol in January 1998,369 it put greater faith in the army, reportedly dominated by northern officers, and non-southern militias, such as the Baggara muraheleen and the Popular Defence Force (PDF)—an Islamist force also called mujahedeen (holy warriors).
Although Arakis had been in Sudan since 1992, by mid-1998 it had relatively little to show for it. The Sudanese oil industry remained in rudimentary form, producing limited amounts for local consumption. The country still imported most of its petroleum needs. A government-controlled newspaper, Al Anbaa, said that Heglig oil wells produced 2.5 million barrels of oil in one year, from June 1997 to July 1998—only 6,849 barrels per day (b/d).370 Another oilfield near Heglig, Abu Jebra, came on stream in December 1992 and up until July 1998 produced 471,629 barrels of oil in total, an average of 173 b/d. After Talisman arrived, the 2000 production from the GNPOC concession soared to 200,000 b/d.371
In mid-1998, the British Columbia Securities Commission had reprimanded and fined the former chief executive officer of Arakis, James Terrence Alexander, and fined Arakis as well, for breaches of regulatory norms in 1995372 and the company was unable to raise the U.S. $ 250 million required for its share of the Sudan venture. It suffered from a poor cash flow, low per share prices, and the threat of a takeover by a rival, Lundin, which had acquired a 10.8 percent share of Arakis.373 On July 16, 1998, Arakis threw in the towel and announced that it planned to put itself up for sale.374
A month later, on August 17, 1998, Canada’s largest independent oil and gas producer, Talisman Energy Incorporated, announced that it would acquire Arakis and Arakis’ main asset, the Sudan project.375 One analyst suggested that among Talisman’s considerations may have been that it had no gas stations vulnerable to boycotts and therefore could “afford to go where better-known oil companies dare not invest because of the risk of bad publicity.” In addition, it faced no competition from U.S. companies due to the United States embargo on U.S. companies doing business with Sudan.376
Three days after the takeover announcement, on August 20, 1998, the U.S. government launched cruise missile attacks against locations in Khartoum, Sudan and Afghanistan.377 Persons at those locations were believed to have assisted or been associated with those who had bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998, killing several hundred people, mostly Kenyan and Tanzanian nationals. The U.S. cruise missle target in Sudan was the Al Shifa pharmaceutical factory, allegedly tied to chemical weapons production and to the embassy bombers. This attack killed one and injured eleven workers present.378
Talisman announced that it was reconsidering the Arakis acquisition because of the U.S. missile strikes,379 but by the end of the month it declared that it would go ahead with the acquisition, and advanced Arakis approximately U.S. $ 22 million for the company to continue its Sudan operations pending the closing of the sale.380 It made a second advance to Arakis of approximately U.S. $ 25 million on September 18, 1998.381
On October 8, 1998, Talisman announced the completion of the Arakis acquisition (purchase of all outstanding shares of Arakis Energy).382 The purchase price was reported to be Canadian $ 277 million (equivalent to U.S. $ 180 million) in Talisman stock, which was paid to all Arakis’ shareholders, including Lundin.383 Talisman thereby acquired Arakis’ 25 percent interest in GNPOC and Blocks 1, 2, and 4, covering 12.1 million acres, and in the incomplete pipeline and port, on which construction had just started in May 1998.384
Following Talisman’s cash infusions and with its technically advanced and hard-working staff, project construction proceeded on schedule, although Talisman was sharply criticized, particularly by Canadian churches and NGOs, because of the project’s human rights implications.385 Nevertheless, due to a jump in crude oil prices led by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Talisman saw its and the Sudanese government’s profits soar, as oil prices more than doubled from U.S. $ 14 per barrel in October 1998 to U.S. $ 33 in October 2000.386
Pipeline construction proceeded apace. The inauguration of the GNPOC pipeline from Blocks 1 and 2 to the Red Sea took place, with great fanfare, on May 31, 1999—the same month that government forces and militias attacked and violently drove thousands of civilians from their homes around oil concessions near Pariang (see below). President Bashir, ex-President Nimeiri (just granted amnesty), and Islamist ideologue and party founder Hassan al Turabi were on the podium for the pipeline inauguration, also attended by foreign dignitaries such as Iraqi Oil Minister Amir Muhammed Rasheed.387 An Iraqi newspaper reported that the minister was in Sudan for talks on boosting energy cooperation between Sudan and Iraq. It added that Iraqi engineers had participated in the construction of the Sudanese oil terminal on the Red Sea and had helped Sudan build an oil refinery prior to the 1990 U.N. sanctions on Iraq.388
Sudan’s Deputy Energy Minister John Dor said that he expected crude output to increase from 150,000 to 270,000 barrels a day within two years.389 President Bashir characterized the pipeline project as having successfully met the challenge of U.S. obstructions:
In July, an oil refinery at Al Shajarah, south of Khartoum, owned by the Sudanese company Concorp, was completed by the Chinese company CNPC.391 The first privately-owned oil refinery in Sudan, it cost U.S. $ 15 million and was projected to refine 10,000 barrels of crude oil per day from the government’s share of crude brought from the GNPOC oilfields via the GNPOC pipeline.392 The president of Sudan inaugurated the refinery on June 30, 1999, the tenth anniversary of the military-Islamist coup d’état, and he conferred the Order of Accomplishment on the general director of Concorp Petroleum Co., Mohamed Abdalla Jaral-Nabi, in recognition of his efforts to boost Sudanese oil production.393 Only a few months before, a Sudanese environmental organization criticized the construction of the refineryand warned that overspills and oil dumping into the Nile would contaminate the river.394
In a letter to the Khartoum daily Akhbar Al Youm published on June 26, 1999, Talisman CEO Jim Buckee predicted that “there will be enough production to meet Sudan’s needs for a long time and to export to meet the world’s hunger for energy.”395 Talisman later estimated that, over the life of the Heglig and Unity fields alone, the government of Sudan would earn approximately U.S. $ 3 billion to $ 5 billion, depending on the international price of oil.396
Before the oil project went on-line, Sudan’s economy had been in dire straits. In 1990, the IMF had issued a declaration of noncooperation against Sudan due to the government’s unpaid debt and debt service payments to the IMF. Sudan agreed to a schedule of payments to the IMF in 1997 and made progress in fiscal reforms that ultimately led the IMF to lift its declaration on August 27, 1999—just days before Sudan exported its first crude oil.397
While the people displaced from the oilfields struggled with on-going hostilities, disease, mud, rain, floods, mosquitoes, and lack of food in distant Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile, a ceremony to mark Sudan’s first export of crude oil took place at the newly-constructed oil supertanker port on the Red Sea on August 30, 1999. The notables assembled at Masra al Bashair watched as the first 600,000 barrels of crude oil flowed into an oil tanker.398 Its destination was Singapore, where the buyer, The Shell Transport and Trading Company planned to refine it.399 Representatives from thirty Western companies and delegates from Chad, the Central African Republic, and Saudi Arabia witnessed the event.
The government-run radio described the export as a victory for the Islamist government: “We have defeated all the foreign enemies wishing to stop the export of the oil. We must now defeat the internal enemy who may try to halt the full utilisation of the oil revenue.”400 The press quoted President Bashir, who described the exports as a reward from God for “Sudan’s faithfulness.”401
Once completed, the pipeline formed an obvious target for rebel attacks. Yet sabotage of the pipeline occurred not in the south of Sudan but in the north—perhaps because so little of the pipeline is located within the south. In the first incident, saboteurs attacked the pipeline in an uninhabited area fourteen kilometers east of Atbara (north of Khartoum), at midnight on September 19, 1999, just a few weeks after the first export of oil. In response, Sudan’s interior minister announced the deployment of more than 3,000 policemen along the pipeline. These “oil utilities police” would work in cooperation with the army and security forces already there to protect the oilfields, pipeline, and pumping stations.402 The Popular Defence Force, the Islamist militia under army jurisdiction, again called on all mujahedeen to join militia brigades heading for zones of military operations.403 There was confusion about which rebel force conducted the attack on the pipeline. Authorities said they found an emblem of the Umma Liberation Army (ULA) at the sabotage site.404 The ULA was the armed wing of the Umma Party—one of the two largest political parties in Sudan and at the time a member of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the coalition of opposition parties and armed movements headquartered in Asmara, Eritrea.
The NDA defended the attack, calling the pipeline a legitimate military target. It argued the sabotage did not constitute a terrorist but a military action because the NDA was in a state of war with the government.405 The SPLM also reiterated its position that the oil industry was a legitimate military objective.406
The government brought lawsuits for blowing up the pipeline against the NDA and Umma Party in exile.407 The government sought the extradition from Egypt of Sudanese opposition leaders who gave press interviews in Cairo (where they lived) about the sabotage. The Egyptian government ultimately reached a “gentleman’s agreement” with NDA leaders, and they left Egypt for Eritrea, thus rendering the issue of extradition moot.408
A month later, in early October 1999, two bomb blasts went off at a petroleum depot and service station in Kassala, a large town in eastern Sudan near the Eritrean border. Again, an emblem of the Umma Party reportedly was found at the explosion scene, but the Umma Party denied any involvement.409 On November 28, 1999, an import pipeline from Port Sudan to Khartoum was sabotaged in Erkweit, about 120 kilometers southwest of Port Sudan. This did not affect the export of oil.410 The government claimed that the attack was launched from “a neighboring state,” meaning but not saying Eritrea.411
The oil export pipeline was sabotaged again on January 16, 2000. A bomb explosion, about 150 kilometers (ninety miles) southwest of Port Sudan, left a ten-foot rupture in the pipe.412 The government blamed the Beja Congress,413 a political party of the marginalized Beja people of eastern Sudan who took up arms in the 1990s and joined the opposition NDA.
In the early morning hours of May 1, 2000, the oil export pipeline was blown up again, some fifty meters from the site of the January blast, far from Western Upper Nile.414 A representative of the Beja Congress admitted to Human Rights Watch that Beja forces had sabotaged that pumping station, known as Bramayo, thirty kilometers south of Sinkat. They had sabotaged it three times, he said, the last time in May 2000. In that attack, a small team of Beja Congress saboteurs came at night and laid explosives, according to their representative. They took two hours to set up the explosives and detonated them in the early morning, damaging the pumping station.415
According to the government, a camel chase took place the next day. Government soldiers and police chased Beja members across the Red Sea mountains, tracking the rebels’ camels’ hoofprints eighty kilometers from the scene of the blast. A brief gunbattle broke out and the government announced it had killed one and wounded and captured another of the suspects.416
The Beja Congress, however, said that its sabotage team, on camels, managed to get away but the government came after them with soldiers in a truck with a machinegun (“doshka”) mounted in the back (known as a “technical” 417). The Beja Congress, still on camelback, twice ambushed the government vehicle. One of its camels was injured in the exchange of fire and had to be put to death. The Beja succeeded in blowing up the technical in the second ambush, killing eleven soldiers. At that point the Beja left their three remaining camels near the truck and proceeded on foot into hiding. The Beja denied that the government had caught, killed, or injured any of the sabotage team. They lost only their camels, the spokesperson said. 418
No further sabotage of the pipeline occurred from May 2000 through the writing of this report.
At a strategic location near the oil areas, within Block 4 and near Block 1, the government army had an important base at Mayom, in Bul Nuer territory of Western Upper Nile/Unity State. South of Mayom, Paulino Matiep’s Bul Nuer government militia had its base in Mankien. In late 1998, divisions within Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s troops appeared, neither for the first nor the last time. His deputy commander, Philip Bapiny Machar, and about one thousand members of his government-sponsored militia, fled west into Bahr El Ghazal and joined the SPLM/A,419 the second major defection of southern government militias to the SPLM/A in 1998 (Cmdr. Kerubino Kwanyin Bol’s, in January, was the first).
Thousands of Bul Nuer civilians fled with their soldier relatives to Twic County, many living under trees and subsisting on wild foods and assistance from their kin. They did not bring their cattle because the animals could not cross the swamps.420 Suspicious that the remaining civilians would provide help to Philip Bapiny, “a son of the area,”421 Paulino Matiep responded by pushing more rural Nuer out of the villages around Mankien and Mayom, telling them to go into the garrison town of Mayom, supposedly as a safety measure.422
In early 1999, Nuer chiefs and other leaders (but apparently no Bul Nuer) tried several times to confer with Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep about bringing peace to the Nuer. According to one chief, they could not convince the government loyalist to meet with them.423 These chiefs were aligned with the Riek Machar forces.
Although it would neither rely on southerners as firm allies nor allow them to grow too powerful, after the Khartoum Peace Agreement the government also stepped up its direct ties with various Nuer commanders, winning several away from Riek Machar’s SSDF by separately arming and funding them. This sapped the strength of the SSDF; apparently the government feared a strong SSDF might challenge the government for control of the oilfields.
When the UDSF/SSDF delegation members who had attended the Wunlit conference returned to Khartoum, their names were noted and their movements monitored daily by Sudan’s security forces. The delegates began to fear that they would be targeted if the situation were to change. The government also blocked release of funds to the Southern States Coordinating Council, cutting off its officials and others who had been observers at Wunlit.424 Riek Machar’s southern rivals in Khartoum, some of whom joined the ruling National Congress Party (formerly the NIF) rather than Riek Machar’s UDSF, called for his replacement as head of the SSCC. They said he should not hold government office because he was not in the government’s National Congress party.425 When Riek Machar backed the Wunlit meeting, those same enemies, led by Lawrence Lual Lual,426 accused him of collusion with Garang.427 Riek Machar and the UDSF resisted these demands and Riek Machar retained his position.
In addition to its close relationship with Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep, the government separately funded the following Nuer militia leaders in Upper Nile: Cmdr. Gordon Kong Chuol (operating from Nasir, one of the three commanders who with Riek Machar had led the 1991 split from the SPLM/A); Cmdr. Gabriel Tanginya (Old Fangak, then Poum, Upper Nile); Cmdr. Simon Gatwich Dual (Motot-Akobo); and Cmdr. Garkoth Gatkuoth Hothnyang (Nasir).428 The SSDF claimed that Tanginya had about 2,000-3,000 forces, the others less. According to the SSDF chief of staff: “We gave [Tanginya] the command, but if he is in Khartoum, he meets only with the government, not us.”429
Riek Machar protested, to no avail, that this direct government support to his commanders constituted a violation of the Khartoum Peace Agreement. Gov. Taban Deng claimed that this was part of the government’s divide and rule strategy, which targeted illiterate commanders.430
By early 1999, Riek Machar’s tenuous pact with Khartoum was breaking down, 431 and the government had grown increasingly wary of its peace partner. The real crux of the disagreement concerned control of the oilfields in Block 5A. By early 1999, Talisman’s expertise and cash had made a tremendous difference and the pipeline project appeared to be on track. Upon completion of the pipeline from GNPOC’s wells to the Red Sea, it would only be a matter of a short link-up of some seventy-five to one hundred kilometers to pump the oil from a planned-for third party user, Lundin on Block 5A, to the main pipeline in Block 1.432
In February 1999, Sudan’s minister of defense met Riek Machar in Western Upper Nile/Unity State. The minister reportedly insisted that the government’s own forces must guard the petroleum, including the Lundin operations in Block 5A. Riek Machar disagreed, according to a witness, asserting that the SSDF had guarded Lundin since 1997,433 which was true according to Paul Wilson of Rappaport, security consultant for Lundin during that period.434
One of the SSDF officers explained:
According to this version, the government at one point acceded to Riek Machar’s insistence that his forces would be the ones to guard the Block 5A concession.
Riek Machar at this time told the Sudanese government of the upcoming 1999 Nuer-Dinka reconciliation conference at Wunlit in Bahr El Ghazal, and of his support for it. The government’s initial reaction was that there should be no meeting without the government’s presence. As always, the government opposed any civil society gatherings that were not in its control, even one to be held in rebel territory.436
One SSDF delegate returning from Wunlit in March 1999 observed the military build-up in Western Upper Nile/Unity State. The government had flown in new forces to the army bases in Heglig, Rubkona, and Bentiu, and he observed seven trucks carrying about 1,000 mujahedeen on the road from Heglig heading to Rubkona.437
Despite its encouragement of a proliferation of southern militias, the government increasingly relied, for protection of the oilfields, on the regular army, Islamist militias recruited in the cities and colleges, and non-southern militias incorporated into the army through the Popular Defence Force (PDF). These forces were increasingly brought to the oil concession areas of GNPOC and Lundin starting in 1999.
On March 11, 1999, after the Wunlit meeting, First Vice President Ali Osman Taha called upon all young men and women in eastern Sudan to join the mujahedeen of the recently formed “Manifest Victory” (Al Fatih al Mubin) Brigade. “With the start of the oil exportation,” he proclaimed, “we will score a decisive victory by liberating all positions and spreading peace and stability in all parts of Sudan.”438 On April 29, 1999, the second conference of the pro-government General Sudanese Union called on its branches nationwide to send mujahedeen to the battalion of “Petroleum Protectors.”439
On May 5, the Popular Defence Force’s coordination office announced the dispatch of the first batch of “Protectors of the Oil Brigade” (Liwa Hamma al Bitarol) to the oilfields. Sudanese TV announced that a major mobilization for the Brigade was underway in states throughout the country, with “scores of mujahedeen pouring into the assembly centers to join.”440 President Omar El Bashir appealed to young men to volunteer to defend their oil from foreigners, warning of “plots prepared by the U.S. and Israel to be executed by Uganda and other hirelings for preventing exportation of petroleum as of next June 30.”441
A few days before the inauguration of the pipeline, on May 27, Sudan’s official radio announced that the government was sending another batch of 2,500 volunteers, mostly youth and students, to protect the oil pipeline. The brigade was seen off by Defence Minister Lt. Gen. Abdul Rahman Sirul Khatim in Khartoum.442
The prize was growing: because of Talisman’s successful exploration, the proven reserves in GNPOC grew steadily: for the years ending December 31, 1998: 403.6 million barrels; 1999: 528 million barrels; 2000: 562.8 million barrels; and 2001: 725.2 million barrels.443 The government’s figures were even higher.444 An energy and mining ministry official told a youth conference that oil reserves explored in Heglig were expected to reach 1.2 billion barrels by the end of 1999.445
369 The government had tolerated Cmdr. Kerubino Kwanyin Bol’s previous unpredictability (holding relief staff hostage) because he conducted a scorched earth campaign against his own Dinka kin from the garrison town of Gogrial, Bahr El Ghazal. He committed so many abuses that relief officials considered him a particularly outstanding cause of hunger and instability in the area. See Human Rights Watch, Famine in Sudan, pp. 46-48; 130-34.
370 The oilfield in Adarail/AdarYal in Block 3 on the Ethiopian border east of Melut produced some 169,347 barrels. “Sudan Produced Three Mln Barrels of Oil—Paper,” Reuters, Khartoum, November 18, 1998. Block 3 is not covered in this report, but is covered in the report by Christian Aid, The scorched earth: Oil and war in Sudan (London: March 2001).
371 Talisman Energy, “Sudan: Results for 2000,” http://www.Talisman-energy.com/operating/sudan.html (accessed May 21, 2001).
372 BCSC, “In the Matter of the Securities Act (R.S.B.C.) 1996, c. 418, and In the Matter of Arakis Energy Corporation,” Agreed Statement of Facts and Undertaking, May 12, 1998.
373 See “Sudan Deal Signed by Arakis, Government, and Partners,” Platt’s Oilgram News (New York), March 4, 1997; Matthew Ingram, “Signs of Life on Planet Arakis,” The Globe and Mail(Toronto), June 23, 1998. Lundin also had agreed with the government of Ethiopia to acquire the exploration and production rights to the Gambela Block in that country, across the eastern border of Sudan, part of the Melut Basin. “Canada: Gambela Block Onshore Ethiopia,” Business Wire (Vancouver), November 14, 1991.
374 Starr Spencer, “Arakis, Unable to Raise Funds, Forced to Seek Sale,” Platt’s Oilgram News (New York), July 17, 1998.
375 Jim Buckee, Talisman Energy press release, “Talisman Agrees to Acquire Arakis,” Canada Stockwatch (Vancouver), Calgary, August 17, 1998.
376 Graham Bowley, “Talisman: Sudan Oil Project Takes Flak,” Financial Times (London), Toronto, November 19, 1999.
377 The targets in Afghanistan were said to be training camps of Al Qaeda, an Islamist armed group.
378 Letter, Human Rights Watch to U.S. President Bill Clinton, September 15, 1998.
379 Talisman’s CEO stated that the company was “actively seeking more information . . . [and would] let events unfold further before making decisions on future actions concerning the acquisition of Arakis.” Jim Buckee, Talisman Energy press release, “Talisman Seeks Further Information on Events in Sudan,” Canada Newswire, Calgary, August 21, 1998.
380 Jim Buckee, Talisman Energy press release, “Talisman Advances Funds to Arakis,” Canada Stockwatch (Vancouver), Calgary, August 31, 1998.
381 David Mann, Talisman Energy press release, “Talisman Advances Additional Funds to Arakis,” Canada Stockwatch (Vancouver), Calgary. September 18, 1998.
382 “Talisman Acquires Arakis Energy,” Canadian Corporate News, Calgary, October 8, 1998.
383 Chris Varcoe, “Talisman Sees Hope in Sudan; Calgary Firm Continues to Face Obstacles,” Calgary Herald, Ottawa Citizen, March 19, 1999.
384 Talisman Energy, “Background Paper,” pp. 2-3; Talisman Energy, “Company Highlights,” http://www.Talisman-energy.com/high.html (accessed July 17, 1999).
385 Inter-Church Coalition on Africa press release, “Canadian Corporate Involvement in Sudan: Action against Talisman Energy Inc. Needed Urgently, Canadian Agencies Tell Axworthy,” Toronto, November 18, 1998.
386 U.S. Department of Energy, “Select Crude Oil Spot Prices,” WTI at Cushing, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/crude1.htm (accessed November 27, 2000).
387 “Iraq’s Oil Minister to Visit Sudan Soon,” Reuters, Baghdad, June 26, 1999.
388 “Iraq Oil Min in Sudan to Boost Energy Cooperation—Report,” AP, Baghdad, June 30, 1999.
389 “Sudan to Start 150,000 B/D Oil Exports in June—Newspaper,” Dow Jones Newswires, Manama, Bahrain, May 30, 1999, quoting the Arabic language newspaper Al Hayat (London). That target of 270,000 b/d had not been met as of late 2002.
390 Susan Sevareid, “Sudan Inaugurates Oil Pipeline,” AP, Heglig, Sudan, May 31, 1999.
391 See “China Finishes Sudan Oil Projects,” AP, Beijing, July 14, 1999. During an earlier visit to the refinery, National Industry Minister Badr Eddin Suleiman affirmed the importance of the Sudanese private sector entry into various industrial investments. “National Industry Minister Inspects Concorp Oil Refinery,” Sudan News Agency (SUNA), Khartoum, June 22, 1999.
392 “Sudan’s First Private Sector Oil Refinery Inaugurated,” AFP, Khartoum, June 30, 1999.
393 “Al-Bashir Inaugurates Concorp Oil Refinery,” Omdurman Republic of Sudan Radio Network, Omdurman, in Arabic, June 30, 1999, as translated in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), Washington, D.C., June 30, 1999; “President Al-Bashir Inaugurates Concorp Oil Refinery,” SUNA, Khartoum, June 30, 1999.
394 See “Neglect of the Environment: Warnings about Environmental Impact of Oil Extraction,” below.
395 Letter, James Buckee, Talisman CEO, to Ahmed Al Youm, Akhbar Al Youm editor in chief, June 21, 1999, published by Akhbar Al Youm, Khartoum, June 26, 1999.
396 J.W. Buckee, “Talisman in Sudan,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), Calgary, October 21, 1999; Talisman Energy, “Sudan—The Greater Nile Oil Project, Background Paper,” December 1998, p. 6.
397 IMF, “IMF Lifts Declaration of Noncooperation from Sudan,” News Brief No. 99/52, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1999.
398 Nhial Bol, “Islamic Regime Begins to Export Oil,” IPS, Bashar, Sudan, August 30, 1999.
399 The Shell Transport and Trading Co. is the U.K. holding company of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of companies. “The Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies – Structure,” http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=royal-en&FC1=&FC2=&FC3=%2Froyal-en%2Fhtml%2Fiwgen%2Fabout_shell%2Fwho_we_are%2FStructure_of_Shell.html&FC4=&FC5= (accessed September 16, 2003).
400 Nhial Bol, “Islamic Regime Begins to Export Oil,” August 30, 1999.
401 “Sudan Begins Oil Exports,” U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) News Briefs (Nairobi), September 1, 1999.
402 Mohammed Ali Saeed, “Sudan to Request Extradition of Suspects in Pipeline Blast,” AFP, Khartoum, September 22, 1999.
403 “Program Summary: Omdurman Sudan TV,” Omdurman Sudan Television Network, Omdurman, in Arabic, September 23, 1999, as translated in FBIS, Washington, D.C., September 27, 1999.
404 “Sudan: Statement on Pipeline Explosion; Rebels Suspected,” Omdurman Sudan Television Network, Omdurman, in Arabic, September 20, 1999, as translated in FBIS, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1999.
405 Carol Pineau, “Sudan Pipeline Bombers Pledge to Strike Again,” AFP, Asmara, Eritrea, October 11, 1999.
406 Samson L. Kwaje, SPLM, “Flow of Oil Disrupted,” Nairobi, September 20 or 21, 1999.
407 Mohammed Ali Saeed, “Sudanese Government Suing Opposition Over Pipeline Blast,” AFP, Khartoum, September 21, 1999.
408 “Sudan Puts Arab League Agreement on Terrorism Control to Test,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Khartoum, September 29, 1999; “Egypt Deports Two Sudanese Rebel Leaders over Oil Pipeline Blast,” AFP, Cairo, October 9, 1999; “Sudan—Egypt Denounces Oil Pipeline Attack,” Omdurman Republic of Sudan Radio Network, Omdurman, in Arabic, September 24, 1999, as translated in FBIS, Washington, D.C., September 27, 1999; “Egypt Deports Two Sudanese Rebel Leaders over Oil Pipeline Blast,” AFP, Cairo, October 9, 1999; “Sudan Opposition Says Bomb Suspects Not Deported,” Reuters, Cairo, October 10, 1999; Carol Pineau, “Sudan Pipeline Bombers Pledge to Strike Again,” October 11, 1999; “File for the Extradition of the Accused from Eritrea Has Been Prepared,” SUNA, Khartoum, October 14, 1999.
409 Mohamed Ali Saeed, “Blasts in East Sudan, Military Buildup on Border with Eritrea,” AFP, Khartoum, October 6, 1999.
410 “Sabotage on Oil Pipeline in East Sudan,” AFP, Khartoum, November 28, 1999. The eight-inch-diameter pipeline had been built in 1974 to carry imported and refined oil products, mostly gasoline, to Khartoum. “Sudan Says Pipeline Attack Launched from Neighbouring State,” AFP, Khartoum, November 29, 1999.
412 “Sudan: Opposition Blamed for Oil Pipeline Explosion,” AFP, Khartoum, January 16, 2000, as translated in FBIS, Washington, D.C., January 19, 2000.
413 “Sudan Oil Pipeline Sabotage,” BBC Online News, Khartoum, January 16, 2000; “Sudan: Opposition Abroad Denies Involvement in Oil Attack,” AFP, Khartoum, January 17, 2000, as translated in FBIS, Washington, D.C., January 19, 2000; “Sudan: Oil Pipeline Resumes Operation after Blast,” AFP, Khartoum, January 19, 2000, as translated in FBIS, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2000.
414 Claudia Cattaneo, “Talisman’s Sudanese Pipeline Bombed: Third Incident of Sabotage on Controversial Project,” Financial Post (Toronto), Calgary, May 1, 2000; “Sudan Pipeline Blown Up,” Oil Daily (New York), May 2, 2000.
415Ali El Safi, Beja Congress spokesperson, Human Rights Watch interview, Kampala, Uganda, July 17, 2000.
416 “Camel-back Chase for Rebels Accused of Blowing Up Sudan Pipeline,” AFP, Khartoum, May 2, 2000; “Suspect in Sudan Pipeline Attack Arrested After Gun Battle,” AFP, Khartoum, May 6, 2000.
417 A “technical” is the name for a pickup truck with heavy machine guns or light antiaircraft artillery mounted in the bed of the truck, an improvised mobile weapon.
418Ali El Safi, interview, July 17, 2000.
419 See WFP, Sudan Bulletin No. 65, December 6-13, 1998, Nairobi, December 18, 1998.
420 The WFP learned in December 1998 that a large number of displaced Nuer moved from Unity state to the Twic Dinka in Bahr El Ghazal.WFP, Sudan Bulletin No. 66, Nairobi, December 20, 1998. The Twic County local authorities said 28,000 Nuer in Twic County were displaced from Western Upper Nile/Unity State. Ibid.
421 Bapiny and Paulino Matiep were both Bul Nuer, from the Gok section. Thomas Duoth, interview, July 22, 1999.
422 In January 1999, some 600 to 700 of Cmdr. Philip Bapiny’s troops backed by 150 SPLA troops attacked Mankien, but were expelled by Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces. After Cmdr. Peter Gatdet mutinied from Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep in September 1999, Cmdr. Philip Bapiny returned with his forces from Twic County to join fellow Bul Nuer Peter Gatdet. Thomas Duoth, interview, July 22, 1999.
423 Ler chief, interview, July 26, 1999.
424 SSDF officer, interview, August 3, 1999.
425 The 1999 Constitution lifted the ban on political parties for the first time since it was imposed by the coup government on June 30, 1989.
426 Cmdr. Lawrence Lual Lual, the Dinka leader of the SPLM/A-Bahr El Ghazal group (after Commander Kerubino defected to the SPLM/A in January 1998), announced in October 1998 that he had left the UDSF because Riek Machar had removed all Lual’s nominees from government posts. He claimed he had 1,500 forces, of whom 400 were cooperating with Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep. Alfred Taban, “Pro-government Ally Splits from Sudan Coalition,” Reuters, Khartoum, October 11, 1998.
427 A regional newsletter commented that Dr. Riek Machar had the backing of President Bashir and his southern opponents had the backing of Dr. Turabi. “Problems for Machar,” The Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris), March 27, 1999.
428 Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999. Garkoth Gatkuoth announced in January 1999 that he formed the SSDF-2 and left Riek Machar because “Machar has no respect for law and justice.” He claimed Riek Machar had attempted to assassinate him after he sent a letter saying he would fight independently. Cmdr. Garkoth Gatkuoth alleged that half of the SSDF in Juba had joined his faction; observers estimated that there were some 3,000 SSDF forces in Juba. Alfred Taban, “Sudan Militia Splits from Pro-government Coalition,” Reuters, Khartoum, January 21, 1999.
429 Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999.
430 “Paulino [Matiep] has been there in Unity State since 1987. On September 17, 1997, he defected from Riek [Machar]. Also in 1997 Gabriel Tanginya in Old Fangak defected. Gordon Kong defected in Nasir in 1999. The government of Sudan targets illiterate Nuer commanders. All the above are illiterate.” Taban Deng, interview, July 26, 1999.
431 See Human Rights Watch, Famine in Sudan, Appendix F, “Letter from Dr. Riek Machar to President Omar Hassan Ahmed El Bashir (undated but after July 4, 1998)”, pp. 201-05.
432 See Lundin Oil press release, “IPC Sudan Limited Spuds first Well in Sudan,” Stockholm, April 8, 1999.
433 SSDF officer, interview, August 3, 1999.
434 Paul Wilson, interview, May 16, 2001.
435 SSDF officer, interview, August 3, 1999. “You who are in the majority” refers to the SSDF and UDSF south of Bentiu..
436 Ibid.; Tito Biel, interview, August 19, 1999.
437 SSDF officer, interview, August 3, 1999.
438 “Sudan VP Vows to Take All Rebel-Held Areas by June 30,” AFP, Khartoum, March 11, 1999.
439 “Sudan: Youth Conference Decides to Send ‘Mujahidin’ to Defend Oil Installations,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Khartoum, April 29, 1999.
440 “Sudan: Government Forces Dispatched to Defend Oilfields,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Omdurman, May 5, 1999; “Government Dispatches Mujahadeen to Defend Oilfields,” IRIN, Nairobi, May 6, 1999.
441 “Beshir Warns of Foreign Plot to Block Sudanese Oil Exportation,” AFP, Khartoum, May 5, 1999; “Sudan: Government forces dispatched to defend oilfields,” Sudan TV, Omdurman, in Arabic, May 5, 1999, as translated BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, U.K., May 5, 1999; .
442 “Thousands of Sudanese Volunteers to Guard Oil Pipeline,” AP, Khartoum, May 27, 1999.
443 Based on Talisman Energy, 2001 Annual Report, p. 57.
444 By April 1999 reserves in Blocks 1 and 2 were estimated at 800 million barrels instead of the 450 million barrels estimated only one year before, according to Assistant Secretary of Energy and Mining Ali Ahmed Othman. The assistant secretary said that oil exploration in Sudan was just beginning. “Sudan Confirm Oil Reserves of 800 Million Barrels,” Panafrican News Agency (PANA), Khartoum, April 13, 1999.
445 “Sudanese Oil Reserves Surpass 1 Billion Barrels,” Xinhua (Beijing), Khartoum, May 3, 1999.