III. ALIR I COMBATANTS IN RWANDA
Plans for promoting peace in Central Africa suppose that Rwandan combatants hostile to the current government of Rwanda and based in the Congo will be disarmed and demobilized as stipulated in the Lusaka Accord of 1999. But information about the number and location of the combatants, as about their intentions, has been spotty and sometimes conflicting. Some of the confusion results from the lack of clear distinction between ALIR, which operates largely in North and South Kivu, and another force that operates largely in South Kivu and in Katanga. The armed group to the south includes units which work closely with the army of the Congolese government, the Forces Armées Congolaises and which may be linked with a group known as the Forces Démocratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR).3 A leader of the southern group, Maj-Gen. Augustin Bizimungu, commands operations for the Congolese army.4 In early September, the Congolese government and the FDLR cooperated in assembling and disarming some 3,000 combatants who were handed over to U.N. authorities.
In February 2001, Rwandan President Paul Kagame told an audience in Washington, D.C. that there might be "3,000, 5,000 or 10,000" combatants hostile to Rwanda based in the Congo. After ALIR began military activities inside Rwanda in May, Rwandan authorities began to speak of 35,000 to 40,000 combatants. In early August, Brigadier-General James Kabarebe, interim chief of staff of the army, was quoted as saying that a force of 13,000 ALIR combatants had been "neutralized," but that 40,000 others were left further south.5
At about the same time, the Rwandan Minister of Defense was quoted as saying that the previously cited figure of 40,000 was too low and that about 100,000 "Interahamwe" (see below) were massing in the Congolese province of Katanga to march on Rwanda."6 He may have been including civilian refugees in this surprisingly high number. As of early December, there had been small-scale fighting in the southwestern Rwanda but the predicted large-scale attack had not taken place.
ALIR combatants now in Rwandan custody told Human Rights Watch researchers that forces hostile to the Rwandan government number between 30,000 and 40,000, including three ALIR I brigades in North Kivu and another in South Kivu that together number between 15,000 and 20,000 as well as a force of some 17,000 further south in Katanga.7
The Congolese government told the military commission supervising implementation of the Lusaka Accord that only 5,000 Rwandan combatants were in the DRC. 8
Diplomats, academic experts, and other foreign observers generally estimate the total number of Rwandan combatants opposing the Rwandan government and based in the Congo as between 15,000 and 25,000.9
In July Lt. Col. Mubaraka Muganga said that some 4,000 combatants had crossed into Rwanda.10 Diplomats based in Kigali generally estimate a smaller number of 2,000 to 3,000. Judging from several clashes where hundreds of ALIR were involved and from reports by witnesses who have seen large numbers on the move, it seems likely that between 2,000 and 4,000 ALIR forces have arrived from the Congo since late May. On June 13, for example, one group crossed the road at Mukamira heading towards Karago and the Gishwati forest, another crossed at Genda, while a third group entered the region from the Virunga Forest.11 Another numerous group of ALIR combatants apparently headed south across the road at Gataraga, Mutobo (formerly Mukingo), just west of Ruhengeri town, before dawn on June 25. Witnesses who passed by later that morning reported that the grass looked like it had been trampled by a herd of elephants.12
A substantial number of those who have entered Rwanda have been taken captive or surrendered. On July 16 Rwanda Radio reported that there were some 1,320 "infiltrators" undergoing "re-education" at the Mudende "solidarity camp."13 The number of rebels in RPA custody continued to swell and in August the government opened a second solidarity camp for hundreds more in Nkumba, Ruhengeri. Some of these were members of ALIR who were captured or who surrendered in the Congo and then were repatriated to Rwanda by the RPA.14
The minister of defense stated on August 2 that the Rwandan government forces had killed some 1,800 combatants since May. Published tolls of deaths in individual encounters inside Rwanda during the ten week period fall far short of that number but the total announced by the minister may also include ALIR forces killed on the Congolese side of the border.
Estimating the numbers of ALIR forces, whether those who have crossed the border, those who have been captured, or those who have been killed in combat is complicated by the presence of civilians who sometimes accompanied them. According to witnesses of hostilities at Cyanzarwa (formerly Rwerere) on June 5 and 6, two different ALIR groups advanced through the area, one largely or exclusively made up of combatants, the other including a large number of civilian supporters, including a spiritual advisor and a prayer group composed of women.15 ALIR organized some of these supporters into a civilian auxiliary group called main d'oeuvre civile (MOC). When Human Rights Watch researchers visited some 400 ALIR captives at Camp Muhoza, one ALIR member estimated that sixty of that number were "civilian auxiliaries" and another sixty were child soldiers.16
As of mid-August military activity had been confined to the northwest, but witnesses had reported sighting armed strangers, apparently ALIR fighters, in parts of central and southwestern Rwanda, in the provinces of Gitarama, Kigali-rural, and Cyangugu. In early August, the Minister of Defense announced that Rwandan government troops had driven back an advance party of combatants headed for southwestern Rwanda, but this action apparently took place on the Congolese side of the frontier.17 In September, October, and November, there were further skirmishes in Gikongoro and Butare provinces in Rwanda as well as just across the border in Burundi and elsewhere in the Congolese province of South Kivu.
Composition and Organization of ALIR I
Rwandan rebels against the current government of Rwanda are often called "ex-FAR and Interahamwe," but this label is not accurate for most ALIR combatants. Data collected by Human Rights Watch researchers indicates that soldiers of the former Rwandan army (Forces Armeés Rwandaises, FAR) and members of the Interahamwe militia who participated in the 1994 genocide constitute only a minority of those now fighting the Rwandan government.18 High-ranking Rwandan authorities frequently equate all members of the armed opposition to perpetrators of genocide who intend to continue the campaign to exterminate Tutsi.19 But others in the field present a different assessment. One Rwandan military officer noted that many ALIR fighters are young people recruited since 1994. Speaking of those captured by the Rwandan government forces, he said, "We find in fact very few members of the real Interahamwe or FAR who were involved in the genocide."20 In addressing an audience in Ramba on June 30, Brig. Gen. James Kabarebe said that only the leaders of ALIR were ex-FAR or Interahamwe. The others, he said, were children or young men from the refugee camps, "rare" collaborators persuaded to join the force more recently, and Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese, all of whom have no apparent link with the genocide.21
The FAR and Interahamwe fled with more than a million refugees to the Congo after the RPA defeated the genocidal government in July 1994. During the first Congo war of 1996 to 1997, the Rwandan government army destroyed ex-FAR and militia bases in the Congo as well as the refugee camps. Hundreds of thousands of persons remained unaccounted for after these attacks; presumably many of them died and others fled into the bush or forest. The remnants of the FAR reorganized the force and recruited both among civilians scattered in the Congo and among persons resident in Rwanda, particularly in the northwestern part of the country. They led a rebellion in 1997 and 1998, which the Rwandan army suppressed ruthlessly, producing a new wave of refugees to the Congo. Some of those who fled as refugees subsequently joined ALIR as well.
Although ex-FAR form only a part of the ALIR forces, they hold most of the positions of command, particularly at the more senior levels. Some of the ALIR officers-like a number of those commanding the force further to the south22-certainly played important roles in the 1994 genocide. Col. Pierre Habimana, for example, captured by the Rwandan forces in mid-July, was reportedly a member of the Presidential Guard, a unit of the FAR heavily involved in slaughtering Tutsi in 1994. He denies that there was a genocide and rejects personal responsibility for his actions at that time, saying that he was only a "technician" "defending the government."23 Others, like General Paul Rwarakabije, the commander of ALIR, served in units less implicated in genocidal killing and reportedly have not been accused of wrongdoing. In the interests of both justice and effective policy-making, it is important to remember that not all FAR troops committed genocide.
ALIR replicated the command structure of the FAR. Training schools prepared candidates for positions of command. At one such school, the Ecole Supérieure Militaire, located in the forest in Masisi, candidates studied political education and social communication as well as more technical courses on military subjects. Several officers said they had studied international humanitarian law, one for fifty hours, another for one hundred hours. He said that one course was taught by a civilian who had worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross and another was taught by an instructor who had studied in Europe.24
Regional Context and the return to Rwanda
ALIR combatants interviewed by Human Rights Watch researchers generally acknowledged that the Congolese government had assisted them with airdrops of equipment and ammunition until late 2000. According to one witness, such deliveries occurred in August 1999 near Goma, in December 1999 near Ngere in Walikale, twice in April 2000 in Masisi, and again in October 2000 in Shabunda. At about the time of this last delivery, the witness said, President Laurent-Desiré Kabila sent two Congolese army officers, one of them a captain, to spend two months working as liaisons with ALIR I. According to some observers, Kabila organized a meeting in October 2000 to coordinate action among the various groups of Rwandan and Burundian combatants fighting against their home governments. At this meeting, the decision was made to shift the focus of the war to the eastern border area of the Congo. From this period on, there was improved communication among Rwandan and Burundian combatants, particularly between Rwandan groups and the Burundian Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, FDD). They used radio and some may have had satellite telephones.25 Although it is unclear what if any aid ALIR forces in North Kivu received from the Congolese government since Joseph Kabila took power, it seems likely that ALIR forces in South Kivu continued to receive arms shipments from the younger Kabila through mid-2001.26
ALIR combatants related a number of cases in previous years where they had fought against MaiMai, militia groups in the eastern Congo hostile to their presence as outsiders. But in the last year or two, they said, ALIR forces worked out alliances with the MaiMai against Rwandan government troops and those of the RCD, the rebel movement backed by Rwanda. One witness said ALIR forces did not exploit local mineral resources in the Congo because they recognized these as belonging to the MaiMai and did not want to clash with them over this question.27
Perhaps aware of the resupply of arms and the plans for an offensive in the east, the Rwandan army intensified its attacks on ALIR in their Congolese strongholds in Walikale and Rutchuru during the months of October and November 2000. In May 2001, the Rwandan government forces launched another massive search-and-destroy operation in eastern Congo with the intention of "cleaning up the Kivus."28
After the death of Laurent Kabila and the installation of his son, who showed a new willingness to implement the Lusaka Accords, the international community increased its pressure on the new president to end all support for Burundian and Rwandan rebel movements. This changed political situation, in combination with the relentless Rwandan army assaults, helped move the ALIR leadership to return to Rwanda. According to some ALIR combatants, the decision was more than just a reaction to these pressures and reflected as well the previously made commitment to go back to Rwanda. One witness said that ALIR had adopted the motto "Our country or death."29
Conduct of ALIR Combatants
According to several ALIR officers, they and their superiors ordered combatants to obey the rules of international humanitarian law. Two were sufficiently well-acquainted with this law to discuss specific provisions of it with Human Rights Watch researchers.
ALIR has a system of military justice, with each brigade having a prosecutor and a war council. One ALIR officer said that at least one brigade had also instituted a system of gacaca,30 calling on an advisory group of combatants, drawn from all ranks, who often imposed more lenient penalties than those stipulated by regulations. Thus crimes that might otherwise be sanctioned by the death penalty were punished by beating the guilty up to 300 strokes.31
ALIR officers said that the force also had a set of religiously-inspired "commandments" that proscribed killing civilians, assaulting women, theft, and the use of alcohol and drugs, among other practices. Apparently even legitimate marriage was forbidden for the duration of the conflict. Soldiers were supposed to follow these "commandments" along with other usual military regulations and the provisions of international humanitarian law.
Whether in observance of international humanitarian law or religious precept or whether for political reasons, ALIR commanders reportedly ordered combatants not to kill or otherwise injure civilians. Adults and children of the ALIR force interviewed separately by Human Rights Watch researchers claimed without exception that ALIR combatants had been directed not to harm civilians. Several witnesses gave details of when and where such an order had been delivered. Two said, for example, that Colonel Ndege (a nom de guerre) delivered the order to protect civilians at a May 6 meeting of officers in Masisi. Another said he had received such an order in writing.32 Junior officers said that they were responsible for passing this order on to their troops.33
As of mid-August, at least ten civilian killings by ALIR combatants were reported in northwestern Rwanda. In one instance, ALIR combatants supposedly returned the fire of a patrol that they crossed at night, killing two civilians. According to one witness, they apologized to the survivors when they learned that they had fired on civilians.34 In several other cases, ALIR combatants killed those whom they accused of alerting the Rwandan soldiers to their presence or those who refused to hand over goods which the combatants wanted to take.35 On July 8, several ALIR combatants robbed and shot two women, a mother and daughter, in what may have been the consequence of a long-standing local conflict. The women were not seriously wounded.36 On August 20, ALIR combatants reportedly shot and killed a park ranger when their paths crossed on Karisimbi volcano. The ranger was part of a routine patrol tracking gorillas.37
On June 29 the mayor of Ndiza district (formerly Nyabikenke and Rutobwe communes) was shot and a police commander accompanying him was killed. Several days later local authorities announced that two ALIR combatants, aged thirteen and twenty, had been captured and accused of the attack. According to the authorities, the two claimed that the shooting was an accident. They said that they had wanted to surrender but that the police officer fired and they had then fired back. If this account proves correct, it will be the only case thus far of ALIR attacks in the central province of Gitarama. Some local people noted the absence of other signs of ALIR presence in the immediate area and remarked that the shooting might have a connection to rivalries dating back to the election of local officials in March.38
There is no indication that any of the victims killed by ALIR combatants have been selected on an ethnic basis.
One witness said that men of his unit had killed civilians when they were raiding from a base in the forested national park of the Virunga volcanoes. When the group returned to the base and reported to the commanding officer, two men, Corporal Savimbi and Corporal Nirora were punished by being beaten with one hundred strokes each.39
ALIR combatants have reportedly been ordered not to rape women. As of mid-August, there had been one case of rape reported by ALIR combatants, that of a local official in the northern part of Ruhengeri province.40
Looting of Property
ALIR combatants have caused serious harm to residents of the northwest by looting, particularly food, clothing, and medicines. Several ALIR officers and combatants claimed that they had been ordered not to steal the personal property from the homes of civilians although they were permitted to forage for crops from the fields and for other materials as necessary to sustain themselves. If such was the order, combatants have violated it in numerous cases where they have stolen such goods as radios. ALIR combatants have not generally destroyed property, such as by burning down buildings, as rebels sometimes did in 1997 and 1998.
The pattern of looting was established by their first raid in late May in Buhoma district (formerly Nkuli and Nyamutera communes) when a company of seventy armed men emerged from the Virunga National Forest to steal from homes and shops. They abducted civilians, including two children aged twelve and fourteen, from Nyarutembe sector, to serve as guides and to transport the stolen goods but they reportedly released them the next day. The ALIR combatants clashed with Rwandan government soldiers about seven miles from where they had exited the forest, losing about half of their company in this first combat. 41
On June 17, ALIR raiders completely harvested four fields of potatoes in Kagano sector without the consent of the owner.42 According to one resident of Buhoma district, ALIR combatants visited his area every day in early July.
Last night, they looted Dusabimana Theoneste. They took his radio and 450 pounds of potatoes. Elsewhere they took 900 pounds of potatoes and six chickens. In Rusenge cell which borders the forest, they are always there. They don't even knock on the door. They come at 7 p.m. If you haven't finished cooking, they wait and eat with you and then go to another house.43
From the forested Virunga volcanoes, their initial base, some groups shifted south to the Gishwati forest, the other important wooded area in the northwest. They generally moved during the night and early morning, but sometimes dared to travel in broad daylight.44 Once established in Gishwati, the combatants raided homes, shops, and fields in the area. On the night of June 6-7, for example, they looted in Nyagisagara district (formerly Kibilira commune), which borders Gitarama.45
ALIR combatants also looted supplies from three health centers (Nyamutera, Shingiro, and Gasiza). At the Shingiro center, which also housed a special feeding center for malnourished children, the combatants took virtually everything, including a bed on which to transport a wounded fighter and the center's microscope. They took money, clothes, and bedding from the patients in the clinic and stole clothes and ate the food at the home of the director.46 Military and civilian authorities knew at 1 a.m., just before the May 25 attack on the Gasiza health center, that the group was heading for that area. But when the ALIR force attacked the center, the district office, and the commercial center simultaneously at 5 a.m., there were not enough soldiers available to protect the health center. Approximately one hour after the attack began, Rwandan government soldiers arrived on the scene with an armored personnel carrier and began firing. Two civilians were hospitalized after being injured by fire from the armored personnel carrier, including a woman whose foot was shattered.47
ALIR combatants attempted to raid a fourth center, that at Busengo, but were driven off by Rwandan government soldiers.48 According to a member of an advance ALIR unit known as the Commando for Research and Intensive Action (Compagnie de Recherche et Action en Profondeur), one of their objectives was to obtain supplies and equipment for treating the sick and injured who remained in the forest, whether in Rwanda and in the Congo. Another was to destroy military equipment and vehicles.49
Ideology and Objectives
Members of ALIR interviewed by Human Rights Watch researchers said the goal of the movement was to overthrow the current government of Rwanda, which they described as repressive and abusive of human rights. Press accounts report similar assertions from other ALIR combatants, including the captured chief of staff, Colonel Habimana.50 According to local authorities, ALIR tracts had been found saying that ALIR meant to free the country, to end dictatorship, and to eliminate injustice.51 Several of the combatants now in Rwandan custody remarked that they had expected to win support from the local population, but had found that residents of northwestern Rwanda shunned any renewal of the conflict.52
Some expressed their political objective in ethnic terms. Several ALIR members talked of ending "Tutsi" rule and "liberating the Hutu."53 As Habimana said, "We Hutu just want our power back."54 But others avoided any ethnic references. One officer said that ALIR leaders had realized that killing on an ethnic basis was totally unacceptable (faisait scandale) to the international community and thus resolved to end the practice.
Another ALIR combatant attributed the rejection of ethnic hatred to Christian ideas, which some claim influences the thinking of an important number of ALIR leaders and combatants. According to the Rwandan press, ALIR leaders gave the codename "The Lord's Oracle" (Oracle du Seigneur) to the recent military operation in Rwanda.55 Some of those taken captive wore rosaries or other religious insignia, often inscribed with a Bible and an AK-47 assault rifle and the words "Safe in God." Several children with such rosaries said they had received them from an ALIR spiritual advisor.56 A military identification card taken from a captured ALIR combatant bore a stamp with the images of a Bible and a gun and a dove. Around the perimeter of the stamp were the words "justice, belief in God (foi en Dieu), unity and peace."57An ALIR spiritual advisor told Human Rights Watch researchers that he-along with prayer groups, seers, and prophets-received spiritual messages which they communicated to military commanders after having separated them into those coming from God and those coming from the devil. He stated that ALIR combatants believe it is God's will for Hutu refugees in the Congo to go home to Rwanda at any cost, a statement confirmed by others in separate interviews.58 In a cache of ALIR documents recovered by the Rwandan forces, nearly half were prayers and religious songs.59 Some ALIR combatants call their force the Army of Jesus, Ingabo za Yezu in Kinyarwanda.
3 Some ALIR combatants told Human Rights Watch researchers that FDLR is the public voice of ALIR, Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 19, 2001. But a FDLR spokesman told Human Rights Watch in September 2001 that his organization had no link with ALIR. This report is drawn exclusively from information provided by combatants of the northern group and hence ALIR is used throughout to refer only to what is known as Division I of ALIR or ALIR I.
4 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, June 19, 2001.
5 Alex Duval Smith, "Rwanda Warns of Hutus Preparing Second Genocide," Independent, August 4, 2001.
6 United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), IRIN-CEA Update, 1,236, August 3, 2001.
7 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri June 19 and July 9, 2001.
8 Herve Bar, "Désarmement des groupes armés : une étape complexe du processus de paix," Agence France Presse, August 20, 2001.
9 Human Rights Watch interviews, Kigali, June 20-22, 2001; by telephone, August 13, 2001; Arnaud Zartman, "Congo Politicians Pick Delegates, " Associated Press, August 14, 2001.
10 Mungwarakarama J. Pierre, "Congratulations to the people of Ruhengeri for their role in protecting security," Ingabo, No. 74, July, 2001.
11 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, June 19, 2001.
12 Human Rights Watch interviews, by telephone, Ruhengeri, June 27 and 29, 2001.
13 Radio Rwanda, Evening News, July 16, 2001.
14 Voice of America, "Rwandan Army Thwarts Hutu Rebel Offensive from Congo," August 2, 2001; and Herve Bar, "Captured Hutu militiaman tells of orders to infiltrate Rwanda, " Agence France Presse, June 4, 2001.
15 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18 and Kigali, June 20, 2001.
16 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, June 19, 2001.
17 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18, 2001 ; Kigali, July 17, 2001 ; IRIN-CEA Update, 1,236 , Friday, August 3, 2001 ; Agence France Presse, "Au moins quatre civils tués en sept jours par des miliciens hutus rwandais, " July 12, 2001.
18 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18-19 and Kigali, June 22, 2001.
19 Smith, "Rwanda Warns of Hutus Preparing Second Genocide;" Karl Vick, "In Rwandan Village, a Turn Against Hutu Rebels, " The Washington Post, June 17, 2001.
20 Herve Bar, "Captured Hutu militiaman tells of orders to infiltrate Rwanda, " Agence France Presse, June 4, 2001
21 Herve Bar, "Winning with words : Rwanda battens down against cross-border foes, " Agence France Presse, June 30, 2001.
22 In addition to Major-General Bizimungu mentioned above, Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho, prefect of the city of Kigali during the genocide, is associated with the forces in the south. This force may have been responsible for distributing tracts at the battle of Pweto in 2000 which spoke of Tutsi as "snakes, " a term widely used during the 1994 genocide. Vick, "In Rwandan Village, a Turn Against Hutu Rebels. "
23 Smith, "Rwanda Warns of Hutus Preparing Second Genocide. "
24 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18-19 and July 9, 2001.
25 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18-19, 2001.
26 Human Rights Watch interview, Kigali, August 30, 2001.
27 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, June 19, 2001.
28 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18-19, 2001.
29 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, June 19, 2001.
30 Gacaca, a customary, community-based practice for resolving conflicts, is currently being transformed within the Rwandan civilian justice system into a hierarchy of popularly elected courts to try cases of genocide.
31 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, June 19, 2001.
32 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, July 9, 2001.
33 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18-19, 2001.
34 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18 and July 9, 2001.
35 Agence France Presse, "Au moins quatre civils tués en sept jours par des miliciens hutus rwandais, " July 12, 2001.
36 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18 and July 10-11, 2001.
37 IRIN-CEA Update 1250, August 23, 2001.
38 Human Rights Watch interviews, Kigali, July 2 and Ndiza, July 3, 2001.
39 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, June 19, 2001.
40 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, July 9, 2001.
41 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, May 23-24, 2001.
42 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, June 18, 2001.
43 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, July 10, 2001.
44 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, May 23-24, 2001.
45 Human Rights Watch interview, Gisenyi, June 7, 2001.
46 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, June 18, 2001.
47 Human Rights Watch interviews, Cyanzarwe, May 24, 2001.
48 Human Rights Watch interviews, July 9, 2001.
49 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18-19 and July 9, 2001.
50 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18-19, 2001 ; Radio Rwanda, Evening News, July 16, 2001 ; Vick, "In Rwandan Village, a Turn Against Hutu Rebels. "
51 Human Rights Watch interview, Gisenyi, May 23, 2001.
52 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, May 23, June 19, and July 9, 2001; Vick, "In Rwandan Village, a Turn Against Hutu Rebels; " and Mungwarakarama, "Congratulations to the people of Ruhengeri for their role in protecting security."
53 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ruhengeri, June 18-19, 2001.
54 Smith, "Rwanda Warns of Hutus Preparing Second Genocide. "
55 Cyrille Kanamugire, "La mission secrète du PDR-UBUYANJA et de son Président Bizimungu, " Kinyamateka, no. 1580, July 2001.
56 Human Rights Watch interviews, Gitagata, August 23, 2001 ; Reuters, "Captured Rwandan Hutu Rebel Officer Peter Habimana says his Congo-based force is strong enough to survive recent defeats, " July 15, 2001.
57 Human Rights Watch interview, Gisenyi, May 24, 2001.
58 Human Rights Watch interview, Ruhengeri, June 19, 2001; Smith, "Rwanda Warns of Hutus Preparing Second Genocide. "
59 Human Rights Watch interview, Kigali, June 22, 2001.