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IX. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The discovery of the Charnier de Yopougon brought condemnation from members of the international community, and became the focal point of international concern about human rights, leading the United Nations secretary-general to take the unusual step of appointing an international commission of inquiry into the October violence. The violence during the December parliamentary elections, however, received little attention and few condemnations. There were more expressions of concern about the legitimacy of the electoral process than about the deeper, more worrying causes for and meaning of the violence, including the manipulation of concepts of ethnicity and citizenship to target perceived political opponents.

Following the flawed October elections, South African President Thabo Mbeki, and Gnassingbe Eyadema, the president of Togo and current head of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), called for new elections.135 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the United States were less direct but strongly criticized the elections. Former colonial power France recognized the new government and said it was up to the Côte d'Ivoire to decide whether to hold new elections.136

The decision to disqualify Ouattara from standing in the parliamentary elections was condemned by the U.N., OAU, the U.S., and the European Union, which all subsequently dropped plans to send election monitors as they had to the presidential contest two months earlier.

The United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan publically expressed shock at the October killings, calling the Charnier de Yopougon a "heinous crime."137 International calls for accountability for the Yopougon massacre and other serious abuses led the secretary-general to appoint a special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, in November, and then an international commission of inquiry, chaired by Ambassador Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago), in December. The secretary-general decided to appoint a commission following discussions with senior officials of the new Ivorian government. The other members of the commission were Franca Sciuto (Italy) and Mahamat Hassan Abakar (Chad), and the team comprised four human rights investigators, a police investigator, a political advisor, a legal advisor, a forensic specialist, and an anthropologist. The commission's mandate, accepted by President Gbagbo, was three-fold: 1) to establish the facts and circumstances relating to the events that followed the October 22 presidential elections, their origin and aftermath; 2) to determine the nature of the acts committed and attribute responsibilities; and 3) to recommend measures to address impunity and prevent the recurrence of similar events. The commission spent two months in the country.138

The report of the International Commission of Inquiry for Côte d'Ivoire was submitted to the secretary-general and the Ivorian government in late May 2001, and was made public in late July 2001.

The report concludes that serious and systematic human rights violations took place during the October and December events, which at times took on an ethnic dimension. It states that "since these tragic events, the Côte d'Ivoire has tried to improve its human rights situation, and it should continue on this path. But reconciliation will be difficult as long as people, Ivorians or not, do not feel safe from serious attacks against their individual rights, and as long as the forces charged with keeping order operation with impunity."139

In its recommendations, the report focuses on the fight against impunity; compensation for victims or their relatives; the fight against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; the security forces; technical assistance; and national reconciliation. On the question of impunity, the report states: "As the commission has underscored throughout its report, the fight against the longstanding culture of impunity within the security forces must constitute a top priority for the Ivorian authorities. Those persons believed to be responsible for human rights violations must be punished, regardless of their function or rank, on the basis of in depth and impartial investigations and fair trials." It goes on to call for investigations into cases of torture and ill-treatment within the gendarmerie camps and maintains that the measures taken so far by the Ivorian government to address the consequences of the events - for instance the charges brought against eight gendarmes - constitute encouraging first steps, but are not sufficient.140

The U.N. had sent monitors to the October presidential elections, despite the many concerns about the legitimacy of the process, including the exclusion of RDR candidate Alassane Ouattara and others from the process. Following the Ivorian Supreme Court's decision to disqualify Ouattara once again from participating in the December parliamentary elections, however, the secretary-general issued a statement expressing dismay and later canceled the participation of U.N. election monitors in the second poll.

France
The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire caused much political wrangling within the French government and between the French and their European partners. France's significant economic interests and historical closeness to the Côte d'Ivoire led to considerable debate over how much abuse of power by the Ivorian government should be tolerated. The French government accepted the new government while also publicly condemning the violence, but it often played an ambiguous role internationally.

Although French officials claim that they initiated the Article 96 consultations between the European Union and the Côte d'Ivoire (see below) which resulted in the temporary suspension of E.U. assistance, those directly involved at the European Commission state that the French were firmly opposed to the E.U. action.141 Indeed, the French resumed their bilateral civilian cooperation with the Côte d'Ivoire in January 2001 just as the E.U. decision to undertake Article 96 consultations was made. It seems clear that the French strongly supported the resumption of E.U. and other bilateral assistance to Côte d'Ivoire, even if that aid was not linked to progress on the human rights and justice front.

Gbagbo himself had been closely linked to the Socialist Party in France, and lived in France during his exile in the 1980s. Given France's current "cohabitation" government, with the Socialists holding the Prime Minister's office, and the Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) holding the presidency, relations between France and Gbagbo were potentially complicated. However, President Jacques Chirac met Gbagbo in January 2001 at the Franco-African summit in Cameroon, which resulted in a personal invitation from Chirac for Gbagbo to visit France. Gbagbo went to Paris in June 2001 and held extensive high-level meetings with French officials, including with President Chirac, Prime Minister Jospin, and the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, interior and cooperation, as well as the presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate.142 Behind the scenes, there was some competition between the Socialists and the Elysée (the French presidency) about influence on the new Ivorian president, but none of the French actors publicly highlighted concerns on the human rights and justice issues, or linked progress in these areas with French support. There was a general consensus on the need for France to support Gbagbo, end the country's international isolation, and help ensure that E.U. and other financial assistance would be restored.

Some French aid to Côte d'Ivoire was cut off in January 2000 in response to the December 1999 coup, notably the assistance of the technical advisors attached to the ministries and to the senior military command, although they remained in the country working at the French embassy. Other assistance deemed beneficial to the population continued, including aid for health and education, as did military training in regional schools. In January 2001, France resumed its full bilateral civilian cooperation, and in June, it resumed some military cooperation. Other forms of military cooperation, such as arms sales and transfers, spare parts for military aircraft, and visits to France by high-level Ivorian military officers, remain suspended.143

The United States
The United States publicly condemned the electoral irregularities and human rights violations associated with the Ivorian elections in both October and December, and called for the authorities to cease intimidation and violence directed at opposition supporters. On October 25, 2000, U.S. State Department Deputy Spokesman Philip T.Reeker referred to "gross violations of democratic process," and called on all parties "to refrain from violence and come up with an interim agreement that can respect the will of the Ivorian people and return to the rule of law and get Côte d'Ivoire back on the democratic path."144 On October 26, Reeker called the election "fundamentally flawed" and went on to say that "it is going to be very important for the voices of the disenfranchised Ivorians to be heard, and in that sense the holding of free, fair and inclusive elections will be needed to fully restore the Government of Côte d'Ivoire's legitimacy and bring democracy back to Côte d'Ivoire."145

The U.S. suspended approximately $1.2 million in electoral support in December when it determined that the elections could not be free and fair, based in part on the exclusion of numerous opposition candidates, although it did provide some assistance for the municipal elections in March, focusing on assistance to Ivorian NGOs for voter education and election monitoring.

After the discovery of the Charnier de Yopougon, U.S. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher called the reports of the massacre "appalling." He applauded the Ivorian government's agreement to allow an international investigation, and welcomed "the commitment of Mr. Gbagbo to find the perpetrators of the massacre and bring them to justice."146

Most U.S. assistance, except to support child survival and combat HIV-AIDS, has been suspended since the 1999 military coup, as mandated under section 508 of the Foreign Operations Act. U.S. assistance will remain suspended until the president certifies to Congress that a democratic government has taken office. Although there have been no official statements calling for new elections, the thrust of U.S. policy continues to be that it will monitor the situation and reevaluate as appropriate. U.S. officials maintain that they have repeatedly told the Ivorian government that those implicated in the violence must be brought to justice, and that any resumption of U.S. aid will be evaluated in the context of government progress toward national reconciliation and curbing human rights abuses.147

In its annual report on human rights conditions around the world during 2000, published in February 2001, the State Department criticized the government of Côte d'Ivoire for its persistent human rights abuses, including violations committed during the 2000 elections, and the lack of full, participatory elections. The report calls the Ivorian government's human rights record "poor," and notes that members of the security forces committed numerous human rights abuses, including hundreds of extrajudicial killings. The report states that the Gbagbo government has a "mixed record in controlling the security forces."148

The European Union (E.U.)
In December 1998 the European Union suspended aid to President Bédié's regime following a scandal involving the misappropriation of €27.5 million by several ministers. The December l999 coup ensured that any potential resumption of aid was postponed.

In January 2001, the E.U. decided to hold consultations with Côte d'Ivoire under Article 96 of the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement,149 the new human rights conditionality clause. The consultations, which were held on February 15, focused on a series of E.U. concerns about the electoral process and human rights violations. The E.U. presented to the government a list of areas that had to be addressed within three months for the resumption of non-humanitarian aid. They included:150

      1. Assure an open political system for all parties and guarantee that the municipal elections would be open to all parties;
      2. Make the committee for national reconciliation an active and efficient structure to address intercommunal problems, provide it with the necessary means to function, and ensure that its recommendations are followed by the government;
      3. Make transparency on the abuses committed during the transition, including under the military regime, a priority;
      4. Guarantee the neutrality of the armed forces and ensure that they respect human rights;
      5. Guarantee the independence and the neutrality of the justice system, especially in the nomination of local judges;
      6. Guarantee freedom of expression, especially of the press;
      7. Publicly condemn xenophobia and establish administrative procedures dealing with citizenship and residency, so as to improve the situation of foreigners resident in the Côte d'Ivoire;
      8. Restart the dialogue with all political parties.

During the subsequent three months, the E.U. maintained a dialogue with the Ivorian government, and determined that "a number of significant measures have been taken by the Ivorian authorities," such as holding of local elections open to all political parties, launching of a dialogue including all parties, starting a national debate about reconciliation, and opening legal proceedings relating to some major human rights violations. For these reasons, on June 25, 2001, the E.U.'s Council of Ministers decided to resume gradual cooperation with Côte d'Ivoire, to be further reviewed and presumably restored in January 2002. However, the E.U. listed several areas of ongoing concern that will require further monitoring, including national reconciliation, the appointment of judges for the high courts, investigations and legal proceedings concerning acts of violence during 2000, and public condemnation of expressions of xenophobia.151 E.U. officials made clear, however, that these areas of concern do not represent benchmarks per se, and the idea of gradual resumption of aid is also linked to the difficulties of restarting assistance quickly once it has been stopped.152

International Financial Institutions
On March 1, 2001, the World Bank froze all loans and credits to the Côte d'Ivoire, since its loans were overdue by six months. The Bank's programs to the Côte d'Ivoire were suspended in October 2000, when the arrears exceeded the 60-day limit. Accordingly, all disbursements were suspended and no new operations can move forward. The Bank will not resume assistance until the arrears are cleared.153 The Bank has been holding discussions with the Ivorian government on ways to reform the economy and fight corruption, but these have not included human rights criteria.

The International Monetary Fund's program with Côte d'Ivoire has been frozen since 1998 due to concerns over corruption and mismanagement by the Côte d'Ivoire government. On July 2, 2001, the government of the Côte d'Ivoire and the IMF signed an agreement for a staff-monitored program, which could lead to new loans in three to six months.154 The success of this program will have important implications for the renewal of other international assistance, including from the E.U.

African Commission
The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights sent a mission to Côte d'Ivoire on a "promotional visit" in March 2001, consisting of the chair of the Commission, Victor Dankwa, and commissioners Kamel Rezzag-Bara and Jainaba Johm. The mission met with government ministers and officials, civil society representatives and political parties. In an oral report to the 29th ordinary session of the commission in Tripoli, Libya, April 2001, the chair noted that serious violations had taken place in Côte d'Ivoire including rapes, extrajudicial executions, and ethnic intolerance. A written report was not made available of the mission's findings.155

135 Norimitsu Onishi, "Dictator Gone, Ivory Coast Splits into Ethnic and Political Violence," New York Times, October 27, 2000.

136 "Political Leaders Meet to Restore Calm in Ivory Coast," Associated Press, October 27, 2000.

137 "Ivory Coast: Secretary-General Shocked by Mass Grave Discovery," IRIN-West Africa, October 31, 2000.

138 Commision D'Enquéte Internationale pour la Côte D'Ivoire, "Côte D'Ivoire: Rapport de la Commission D'Enquéte Internationale pour la Côte D'Ivoire, Février-Mai 2001," July 19, 2001, Published by the Untied Nations, p. 2.

139 Ibid. p. 55-56.

140 Ibid. p. 57-63.

141 Human Rights Watch interviews in Brussels, June 25, 2001.

142 Stephen Smith, "La Côte d'Ivoire Cherche l'Aide de la France," Le Monde, June 19, 2001.

143 Human Rights Watch interview with Francis Blondet, Sous-Directeur, Afrique Occidentale, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, June 29, 2001.

144 "Press Briefing," U.S. Department of State, October 25, 2000. Briefer: Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman.

145 "Press Briefing," U.S. Department of State, October 26, 2000. Briefer: Philip T. Reeker.

146 "Press Briefing," U.S. Department of State, October 30, 2000. Briefer: Richard Boucher, Spokesman.

147 Human Rights Watch interview with Don Boy, Ivory Coast Desk Officer at U.S. Department of State, June 19, 2001.

148 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000. (Washington: February 2001).

149 The Cotonou Agreement, concluded in June 2000, replaced the previous Lomé Agreement and regulates trade and other relations between African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) developing countries and the E.U. Among other things, the Cotonou Agreement included stronger human rights criteria than its predecessor for the ACP countries to have preferential trade terms with the E.U.

150 "Côte d'Ivoire: La check list politique de l'UE!" La Lettre du Continent, March 1, 2001, p. 4.

151 European Union, General Affairs Council, Council meeting, Luxembourg, June 25, 2001, p.10-11.

152 Human Rights Watch interviews with E.U. officials in Brussels, June 25 and 26, 2001.

153 The World Bank Group, "World Bank Places Côte d'Ivoire in Non-Payment Status," News Release No: 2001/251/AFR, March 1, 2001.

154 "Ivory Coast, IMF to Sign Program Monday," Reuters, July 2, 2001.

155 Transcript of commission session taken by Rachel Murray, Queen's University Belfast, supplied to Human Rights Watch.

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