OTHER

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Background

Located on the Israeli-Syrian border, the Golan has been an area of conflict ever since the establishment of Israel in 1948. During the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel occupied most of this area, displacing many of the occupants to Syria. Israel annexed the Golan in 1981. Today, most of the 16,000 Golanis hold Israeli identity cards instead of passports, and thus do not enjoy full citizen's rights. Around 15,000 Israelis have moved into settlements there. In the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan is being discussed.

Landmine Problem

In Israel, the Occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan there are numerous minefields, although the exact locations, numbers, and types of mines are not publicly known. The Israeli State Comptroller's Report indicates that for 350 minefields, there is clearly no longer a security need.⁶⁸ Some of these minefields originate from the period of the British Mandate. Some were laid by Jordan, Syria or Egypt prior to the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan. In addition, Israel planted landmines along borders, military areas, and settlements in the occupied areas, as well as electricity and water stations and pipelines.⁶⁹ These minefields continue to be a big obstacle to the civil use and development of the land and its resources. The situation is especially severe for the Golani people whose livelihood depends on growing crops and grazing cattle. Thus there are numerous requests for mine clearance from civil bodies like the Agricultural Ministry, the Israeli Land Administration and the Israeli water company, Makorot.⁷⁰

A major danger in the Golan is the fact that many minefields are not marked or fenced and are thus easily entered by mistake.⁷¹ There are several areas fenced off covering several kilometers of land, and there are also fenced off minefields near schools and even in the back yards of some Golani residents. However, in many instances, there are no warnings or protections for civilians at all.

For example, in Ein Al-Hamreh there are still several areas with mines that are not fenced off. It was here that an Israeli soldier was killed by a mine in 1990; in another incident two victims were injured and one killed. Furthermore, the area between Ein Al-Hamreh and Al-Mansurah (approximately one hundred square kilometers) is mined, but much of it is not marked; this is a known grazing area. Minefields also surround the village of Majdal Shams.

According to al-Haq, a Palestinian human rights organization with ECOSOC consultative status at the UN, the Israeli Army used to confiscate land for the purpose of planting mines, and offered compensations to the landowners far below the actual value.⁷² Israel justified this in the name of military needs. Some other areas are declared closed to civilians by military order, as they are mined or suspected of being mined, either by the Israeli army or by the Syrians before 1967.⁷³

Residents avoid some areas out of fear that they could contain mines. Landmines planted directly next to houses, schools, and streets impose restrictions on the freedom of movement. The situation is worsened by the fact that, since the Golan is a mountainous area, rain and natural earth movements cause mines to move from their original places and slide into areas that are believed to be safe, sometimes even into the back yards of houses.

In addition to agriculture, tourism is an important source of income for many Israeli settlers in the Golan, as the mountainous area is ideal for hiking and skiing. But tourism, too, is restricted as a result of mines. Some attractive areas are closed to civilians, while others are open but still dangerous due to the insufficient marking of existing minefields. Tourists hiking in the Golan are at risk of entering a minefield unintentionally.

Israeli mining near electrical stations, water stations, and water pipes poses dangers for the workers, and leads to difficulties in maintaining and extending these stations.

Protection of Civilians

Israel as a party to Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons has a duty to protect the civilian population from the effects of mines it has laid, including marking and monitoring known mined areas.⁷⁴

Al-Haq argues that Israel also has a legal obligation to provide protections for civilians in the Golan from landmines emplaced by other belligerents. The Fourth Geneva Convention provides for the protection of the civilian population, individually and collectively, who find themselves in the hands of a belligerent State or occupying Power of which they are not nationals "at any given moment and in any manner whatsoever" (Art. 4) and in "all cases of partial or total occupation" (Art 2).⁷⁵ While Israel has argued that these provisions are not applicable in the Golan because an Arab country was not sovereign, al-Haq disagrees, noting that the Fourth Geneva Convention was intended to protect the right of people who find themselves "in the hands of a Party to the conflict or occupying Power of which they are not nationals" (Art. 4), irrespective of the competing claims to sovereignty over the territory.⁷⁶ It does not exclusively refer to territory whose "legal sovereign" has been displaced by the occupant and the term "territory" in the Convention is not restricted to territory where the displaced government has the formal title as the "legitimate sovereign."

Mine and UXO Casualties

Al-Haq has done a survey of mine casualties in the Golan, but there has not been comprehensive research on mine victims within the Golan. The Israeli State Comptroller's Report covers mine incidents in Israel based on military data for the period of December 1997 to May 1998 and reports one incident in which a "member of the minority" was killed in southern Golan while entering a known minefield together with another person.⁷⁷

Four other incidents are included in the State Comptroller Report involving Israeli soldiers and employees of Makorot. Further information about mine victims that are not from the Arab Golani community (Israeli soldiers and civil employees, local Israeli civilians, tourists, and soldiers of the international peacekeeping forces in the Golan) is not known.

Al-Haq collected information about sixty-six Arab Golani landmine and UXO victims since the beginning of the Occupation in 1967, of whom sixteen died and fifty were injured.⁷⁸ It was not possible in all cases to find out what if the explosion was caused by a mine or by UXO. Al-Haq's data indicates that among the fifty people who survived, forty-three were under the age of eighteen. Eight of the sixteen fatally wounded were under the age of eighteen. One victim lost both eyes and both legs. One victim lost both eyes and both arms. One victim lost one eye, one leg and both hands. One victim lost one eye, one leg and one hand. Six victims lost at least an eye. Six victims lost at least one leg. Sixteen victims lost one hand. Eighteen people suffered from burns and fragments entering their body.⁷⁹

The last known human accident with mines occurred in November 1999, when teenagers brought a landmine they found outside their village to a local sports club, where it exploded and injured three of them slightly and one seriously in the foot.⁸⁰

Research has revealed that of the sixteen incidents in which Golanis were killed by mines or UXO, seven happened while the victims were grazing cattle, two on agricultural roads and one on agricultural land. The Israeli State Comptroller's Report mentions that evidence of agricultural activity were discovered in nineteen minefields in the Golan.⁸¹ This has occurred even though these areas have been officially declared closed for civilians.⁸²

In addition to civilian casualties, there are also frequent incidents of cattle being killed by mine blasts, thus resulting in serious economic loss. For example, Sheepherder Najeeb Tareeba estimates that since 1967 he has lost more than fifty cattle due to landmines. The most recent explosion killed one of his livestock in February 2000.⁸³

The survey indicated a high risk for Golani children, especially small children, who are more likely to suffer serious or even fatal injuries than adults. Four-year-old Amir Abu-Jabel was killed by a landmine in 1989 while playing in the yard of his house.⁸⁴ It appears that rain probably swept the mine to the area from a nearby minefield. Golani Arab children are at an even higher risk because they are traditionally responsible for grazing cattle and helping with the harvest.

Of particular interest to al-Haq was landmine victim Saleh Abu-Arrar. Saleh is a victim who discussed at length the trials of being a child landmine victim. With his strong passion for life, Saleh has overcome near blindness and the loss of his limbs to become a successful accountant in the Golan. Saleh went into great detail on how he was victimized and what he felt like immediately afterwards. He described to al-Haq field workers what it was like the morning after the accident as he lay in the hospital bed. He talked about waking up and asking his brother to scratch his right leg. His brother scratched his left. After requesting for his brother again to scratch his right leg, once again he scratched his left one. At that time Saleh's brother told him that he had lost his right leg. When Saleh arrived home from the hospital he remembers people from the community walking by him thinking that he could not hear them saying, "Saleh would have been better off dead than to have survived and be handicapped forever." Realizing he would never be "normal" Saleh stopped feeling sorry for himself and is now quite a success story for all landmine survivors.⁸⁵

Mine Awareness and Victim Assistance

Currently, there are no governmental or local programs to teach Golani citizens about the dangers of mines. Research in the Arab Golani community shows first aid for mine and UXO victims was delivered by the IDF in twenty-two cases and by civilians in the others, one of them being an Israeli settler.⁸⁶ If the victim lies in a minefield or an area suspected to contain more mines, the IDF has to bring a vehicle through to the victim. Al-Haq has documentation of one instance in which a second mine exploded under a military vehicle trying to reach a mine victim and killed an Israeli soldier.⁸⁷

The closest hospital to the Golan is in Safed, more than 100 kilometers from the Golani villages. In the Golan itself there is only a small emergency clinic. Thus the special medical help needed for serious mine injuries is not available quickly enough in the Golan to be of effective assistance. In the Golan there are no governmental or local rehabilitation facilities for mine victims.

At the time of the accidents many Golani families were either unaware of their rights or afraid to deal with Israeli authorities and institutions.⁸⁸ Thus many of them never tried to get any compensation or to make use of the facilities and benefits provided by the state of Israel to handicapped victims. Even if victims or their families tried to get compensation, Israel is generally unwilling to acknowledge any responsibility for mine accidents involving civilians and thus generally do not pay compensation.⁸⁹ In fact, nineteen mine victims who had to be treated in a hospital after a mine or UXO explosion were subsequently investigated by the police on the circumstances of the accident.⁹⁰

NORTHERN IRAQ (IRAQI KURDISTAN)

Key developments since March 1999: As of May 2000, the UN reports nearly 3.1 square kilometers of land cleared and returned to productive use, impacting forty-nine villages. The survey program has conducted a socio-economic impact survey of 95% of the villages in the three northern governorates. Supplies and funds valued at about $8 million were provided for mine action from April-October 1999. The UN in mid-2000 expressed concern about incidences of freshly laid mines being found in previously cleared minefields.

Mine Ban Treaty

The region of northern Iraq has been autonomous from Baghdad since the 1991 Gulf War. Northern Iraq is under the nominative political leadership of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), an entity comprised primarily by the two major Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). There is no formal diplomatic recognition of the KRG, the KDP, or PUK.

As regional, informally recognized entities, neither the KRG nor the major parties have signed the Mine Ban Treaty. However, the leadership in northern Iraq has maintained a long-standing opposition to the employment of landmines due to the debilitating effect they have had in the region. Leaders of both the KDP and PUK, in similarly worded letters to the UN Secretary General, have committed to ensuring that the principles and obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty are realized. The letter from Masoud Barzani, President of the KDP, was dated 3 October 1999 and the letter from Jalal Talabani, PUK General Secretary, was dated 26 January 2000.

Mr. Jalal Talabani, General Secretary of the PUK, told Landmine Monitor that the KRG, "were it to be allowed, would have no hesitation in ratifying the [Mine Ban] treaty unconditionally."⁹¹ He said the PUK has foresworn the use of landmines, but also notes that some mines remain in place "given our precarious situation, and our vulnerability to attack. We do not use them for offensive purposes, for we have none." Mr. Talabani stated that the PUK does not "in any way, shape, or form stockpile landmines."⁹² Dilshad Miran, the London representative of the KDP told Landmine Monitor last year, "We are totally against landmines in all their forms."⁹³

Recent Use

There is credible evidence that landmines were used in northern Iraq during past periods of factional fighting, but there is no evidence of recent use of antipersonnel mines by the KDP or PUK. However, it appears that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) continues to use antipersonnel mines in northern Iraq.

Since 1991 there has been sporadic fighting in the region that has involved the KDP, PUK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Iraqi military, and the Turkish military. The PKK maintains operational bases in northern Iraq from which it has in the past launched cross-border operations into Turkey, resulting in incursions by Turkish military forces.⁹⁴ KDP and Turkish forces are often allied in operations against the PKK.⁹⁵ This situation has generated frequent accusations of landmine use by the PKK. On 17 July 1999, the Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan radio claimed that the PKK emplaced landmines in July along roads in the Chaman border area. A local man was reported injured by one of these mines.⁹⁶ The Turkish General Staff reports that between 1994 and present nearly 15,000 landmines have been seized from PKK bases, primarily located in northern Iraq.⁹⁷

A United Nations report in June 2000 noted that the UN Office for Project Services "remains concerned about the incidences of freshly laid mines being found in previously cleared minefields."⁹⁸ The report does not identify the user of mines.

Landmine Problem

Northern Iraq remains one of the more heavily mined areas in the world. Huge numbers of mines were employed in the region by the Iraqi Army in 1980-88 during the Iran-Iraq War.⁹⁹ According to surveys conducted by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the British NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG), more than 470 square kilometers of land is mined in the region, affecting approximately 1,500 villages in the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleymaniyah. Mines have been placed in locations that affect roads, power lines, agricultural land, former Iraqi military barracks, and villages vacated and destroyed by Iraqi forces during the Anfal Campaigns of the late 1980s.¹⁰⁰

Landmines take their heaviest toll on rural people, farmers, herders, those gathering firewood, and children.¹⁰¹ Internally displaced Kurds are unable to return to villages destroyed during the Anfal Campaigns, thus hampering resettlement and reconstruction.

No Iraqi records of minefields are available to the Mine Action Program (MAP) in northern Iraq. MAP reports a total of more than 3,200 mined areas in the region,¹⁰² with the greatest concentration of mines along the Iran-Iraq border, specifically in the districts of Penjwin, Sharbazher and Qaladiza.¹⁰³ Other mined areas include former Iraqi military installations, destroyed villages, grazing/agricultural areas, and roads.¹⁰⁴ However, the primary impact of landmines in northern Iraq is upon villages currently inhabited, or those de-populated during Anfal.

Mine Action Coordination

The General Directorate for Mine Clearing, affiliated with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Cooperation of the KRG, is the primary local authority office charged with humanitarian mine action activities in northern Iraq. The KRG, KDP and PUK work closely with UN organizations and local and international NGOs. Current initiatives include exploring avenues of promoting capacity building within the KRG administration so that, with time, all responsibility for such programs can be handed over to KRG partners.

Since late August 1997 the United Nations Office for Project Services has managed and executed the Mine Action Program in northern Iraq under UN Security Council Resolution 986 Food for Oil Program. The MAP mission is to conduct landmine/UXO surveys, marking and clearance using manual, explosive detecting dog (EDD) and mechanical methods. The MAP also supports a network of medical facilities for treatment and rehabilitation of victims, and provides mine awareness training to UN staff in northern Iraq.¹⁰⁵

The MAP is one of the largest employers in northern Iraq. Staff includes 1,230 local and forty-eight expatriates. Through grants and other forms of cooperation with local partners, MAP supports the employment of an additional 666 local humanitarian staff. UNOPS estimates the impact of MAP upon the local economy is between $600,000 and $800,000 per month through salaries and local materiel procurement.¹⁰⁶

Mines Advisory Group has been operating continuously in northern Iraq since 1992, longer than any other international humanitarian mine action organization. MAG has conducted mine awareness, clearance, marking, survey, and explosive ordnance disposal operations.¹⁰⁷

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) began operating in northern Iraq in 1995 in Suleymaniyah Governorate. During 1999 NPA mine action capacity in northern Iraq was comprised of one explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team and two demining teams.¹⁰⁸

Numerous local NGOs are active in the mine action arena in northern Iraq. The table below provides an overview of these organizations¹⁰⁹:

Organization	Primary Mission	Began	Donors
Solidarity	Landmine Clearance	1996	Swedish International Development Agency, Kurdish expatriate community
Kurdish Mine Removal Society (KMRS)	Landmine Clearance	1991	Private donors inside northern Iraq and in Sweden
Kurdish Humanitarian Mine Clearance Organization (KHMCO)	Landmine Clearance, not yet operational	1999	Local authorities
Kurdish Life Support (KLA)	Victim Assistance, Survey	1991	KLA UK, European Community Humanitarian Organization (ECHO), SCR 986, UN HABITAT, UNICEF

Mine Action Funding

Primary funding for UNOPS mine action in northern Iraq is provided by the UN Oil for Food Program. Established by UNSC Resolution 986 as "a temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people," the Security Council has continued the program in 180-day periods. The program began in 1997, and Phase VI ended on 20 November 1999.¹¹⁰

As of 31 October 1999, supplies and funds for the mine clearance program valued at $18.5 million had arrived in the three northern governorates since the start of the program, of which $16 million had been utilized or distributed.¹¹¹ Approximately $8 million of those totals was provided and utilized in the period from April-October 1999.¹¹²

NPA received approximately $1 million in funding for programs in northern Iraq from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Affairs.¹¹³

Funding for Handicap International/Belgium (HI) victim assistance programs in northern Iraq comes primarily from UNOPS and UNICEF. In 1999 HI received $185,000 from UNOPS, as well as $53,000 from Belgium's Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale (General Directorate for the International Cooperation, DGCI) and $40,000 from the Netherlands' Stichting Vluchteling. A total of $529,000 has been requested for programs during 2000.

MAG, like many other NGOs, is unable to access funding under Resolution 986. MAG's sources of funding include SIDA, DFID, Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, Stichting Vluchteling, Anti-Landmijn Stichting, and SCIAF. In part due to the political situation, funding is increasingly unsure.

Surveys and Assessment

As of May 2000 UNOPS reports that an extensive database of mined areas has been developed for northern Iraq. The goal of this database is to facilitate more efficient planning, prioritization and allocation of resources. The survey program has trained local socio-economic impact surveyors, and has conducted a socio-economic impact survey of 95% of the villages in the three northern governorates. Results of the survey indicate more than 3,200 mined areas, covering approximately 491 square kilometers of land needed for resettlement or agricultural use, or the development of basic infrastructure including electricity, water and reconstruction. A database has been established to record information pertaining to mined areas and mine incidents. This database is available to local authorities, UN agencies, and NGOs. The UNOPS MAP has trained and deployed twenty-four landmine/UXO socio-economic impact survey teams, and eight Level Two Survey teams. ¹¹⁴

MAG set up and ran an in-country survey, community-based data gathering and database from 1992. This has become the DCU (Data Co-ordination Unit) which has records of over 3,700 minefield reconnaissance/surveys for over 750 of the most heavily mine- and UXO-contaminated areas. This information was opened to NPA when it arrived in 1996 and to UNOPS in 1997 which set up its own data recording system. MAG's data has been complemented as teams region-wide have completed surveys, demarcation and clearance programs. Since the early days, MAG has been operating survey and demarcation teams to help identify suspect areas and make available more land for farming through `area reduction.' Between 1992 and 1996, MAG conducted what was probably the largest minefield marking program in the world: MAG has so far demarcated 1,150 minefields covering some 110 million square metres.¹¹⁵

Mine Clearance

The UNOPS MAP in northern Iraq conducts the Level Two (Technical) Survey, area reduction, marking, and clearance. The MAP has identified twenty-five types of landmines in the region, with Valmarra 69 bounding and VS 50 antipersonnel mines the most common.¹¹⁶

Primary contractors supporting MAP are European Landmine Solutions (ELS) and Mechem. ELS operations in northern Iraq began in January 1998. ELS is working to develop and expand indigenous capacity for long term mine clearance. By early 1999 ELS had recruited, trained and deployed survey and demining teams, together with section and team leaders and medical support staff, and had integrated explosive detection dogs into the operations. The company now manages a program with over 800 local and 18 international staff members.¹¹⁷

Mechem, a South African demining firm, is providing explosive detecting dog support to the MAP. Mechem began operations in 1998 with six dogs, and currently employs twenty-four dogs and twelve handlers. The primary duties of Mechem include support to Level Two survey teams and quality assurance of areas cleared by ELS. Mechem is also training local dog/handler teams. The first locally-trained teams are expected to become operational in August 2000.¹¹⁸

MAP mine clearance teams are currently working in twenty-five minefields, having returned twenty-four to productive use. Selection of minefields to be cleared is done in close cooperation with local authorities and other humanitarian sectors to ensure proper prioritization. Priorities for clearance are: land needed for resettlement; settled land producing high numbers of victims; agricultural land; areas necessary for basic needs, such as water and fuel; land needed for reconstruction and infrastructure development.¹¹⁹

As of May 2000 the MAP reports 3,088,215 square meters of land cleared and returned to productive use. A total of 1,905,973 square meters of land have been technically surveyed and prepared for follow-on clearance operations. MAP reports that 2,367 landmines and 5,137 pieces of UXO were destroyed. Forty-nine villages with a combined population of approximately 2,600 have been positively impacted by these clearance efforts.¹²⁰

The MAP has trained 596 local deminers who are currently working in fifteen clearance teams. Twenty explosive detecting dogs and handler counterparts have been trained, with forty additional teams expected to complete training by August 2000.¹²¹

MAG has been conducting mine clearance operations since early 1993. MAG currently employs over 600 local staff and has built capacity to such a degree that expatriate supervision is now at a very limited level. MAG operates 17 Mine Action Teams across the region. These Mine Action Teams are multi-skilled and highly mobile and flexible, they can be split into sub-teams where necessary to work small urgent tasks, or built together to conduct larger clearance work. In 1999, 18 minefields were cleared; 1,191,081 square meters were declared safe; nearly 5,000 mines were destroyed. Since 1992, MAG has declared safe over 4 million square meters of land from mines and UXO.¹²²

NPA reports that during 1999 a total 552 antipersonnel mines and 65 UXO were removed and destroyed by manual demining effort. 171,845 sq.meters of land including that of area reduction (73,318) cleared. Seven priority minefields were cleared and handed over to the local population in the target area. As part of explosive ordnance disposal efforts, 20,211 UXO, 216 antipersonnel mines, and two antitank mines were removed and destroyed. 2,753,796 square meters of land cleared through battle area clearance. The work covered 45 villages in the area.¹²³

Regarding PUK capabilities to enact mine action themselves, Mr. Talabani stated, "We simply do not have the capacity, in terms of manpower or expertise, to undertake this ourselves." But he noted that the PUK assists the UN organizations and international mine action NGOs in planning and implementing programs. Mr. Talabani also decried the inability to import state-of-the-art mine clearance technology and machinery. He said, "The fact that the international community fails to act to counter the restrictions upon our access to effective and safe mine-clearing technology is an international shame."¹²⁴

Mine Awareness Education

Most known mined areas in the region are marked either by signs or by strips of wire placed along the mine-affected area.¹²⁵ The UNOPS MAP provides mine awareness training for UN staff in northern Iraq.

MAG is the primary provider of mine awareness training to the population of northern Iraq. MAG pioneered and continues in northern Iraq the `Child to Child' approach as applied to mine awareness, involving children passing on mine awareness messages to their peers. MAG also operates 8 Education/Teacher Training Teams which are achieving the integration of mine awareness into the Education Departments' school curriculum. 2,500 primary school teachers have so far been trained to pass on the message. School instructors and supervisors have also been trained. MAG also runs five Religious Representative Teams which work with the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs and over 500 local Mullahs to bring mine risk education to those adult male populations at risk from mines. A further Farsi-speaking team runs mine awareness around Hajihomoran where Kurdish refugees continue to repatriate from Iran - their children have never been to their homelands and are specially at risk.¹²⁶

MAG has worked with UNICEF and local officials to produce a mine awareness book for schools to help children identify landmines and teach them how to avoid them.¹²⁷ During 1999, MAG mine awareness teams provided training and visits as shown below:¹²⁸

Victim Assistance

According to data provided by the UNOPS MAP socio-economic survey, a total of 9,289 victims have been injured or killed by landmines in northern Iraq since 1980. MAP provides assistance to established prosthetics centers and victim workshops, and assists in the establishment of new assistance facilities. Through twelve first aid posts, MAP supports regional trauma centers that are the first stop for landmine victims following injury.¹²⁹

According to PUK General Secretary Talabani, "The local hospitals have developed capabilities and expertise to deal with the problem, but I emphasize that this remains limited, relative to the scale and urgency of the problem we face in the region."¹³⁰ Limited ability to import necessary medical equipment and medicines, as well as lack of access by Kurdish doctors to international medical developments, are great obstacles to development of indigenous victim assistance capacity.

HI is providing orthopedic support to war victims in Suleymaniyah and Halabja. The purpose of the program is to enhance and expand the quality and coverage of existing ortho-prosthetic and physiotherapeutic services for disabled people. HI has been active in Suleymaniyah since 1991 in response to the large number of amputees identified there, primarily victims of numerous landmine incidents along the Iranian border. Because of ongoing conflict, and lack of access to prosthetic centers in Baghdad, these victims did not have access to proper care.¹³¹

HI has identified the need for wider rehabilitation services, and development of orthotics production and advocacy/social rehabilitation of the disabled are current priorities. The Ministry of Public Health in Suleymaniyah, the Rozh Society for Disabled People and the Handicapped Union (local NGOs) are favored partners for development of holistic approaches to rehabilitation of the disabled in the regions.¹³²

The first HI orthopedic workshop was the Vincent Orthopedic Workshop located in Suleymaniyah in facilities provided by the local health department. Opened in 1991, this workshop produces below-knee and above-knee prostheses, as well as some ortho-prostheses. It also produces crutches, walking aids and orthotics. Since 1991, more than 3,900 prostheses and 900 orthotics have been delivered, and more than 4,000 devices have been repaired or inspected. More than 2,000 pairs of crutches have been produced and delivered.¹³³

The second workshop supported by HI is the Halabja Prosthetic Limb Center located in the town of Halabja near the Iranian border. The workshop produces below-knee and above-knee permanent prostheses, as well as some orthotics. Since re-opening in March 1998, with funding assistance from UNOIP, more than 350 disabled persons have received long-term care through orthopedic activities at this workshop. This funding also supported renovation of the facility, purchase of equipment and training for staff.¹³⁴

PALESTINE

Key developments since March 1999: The Palestinian Authority expressed its desire to join the Mine Ban Treaty. No humanitarian mine clearance was undertaken, or planned. There continue to be civilian casualities. Defense of Children International/Palestine Section launched a mine awareness campaign.

Mine Ban Policy

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has not developed into a sovereign state. The PA does not have the international legal status to sign or ratify international treaties, including the Mine Ban Treaty. The PA was one of twelve observer delegations to the First Meeting of State Parties to the treaty in Mozambique in May 1999. In a statement to the plenary, the PA representative expressed its desire "to put an end to the danger of antipersonnel mines," and asked states "to help make the Middle East free of mines."¹³⁵ In April 2000, the PA stated its strong support for and desire to join the Mine Ban Treaty.¹³⁶

According to one source, the issue of mines and unexploded ordnance in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) "has not been addressed in any of the agreements negotiated between Israel and the PNA."¹³⁷ This apparent lack of discussion would seemingly indicate that the issue is not a priority for either the Palestinian Authority or the Israeli government. Colonel Nizar Ammar, Head of Planning and Studies in the Palestinian General Security said, "Authority officials have not given enough attention to this issue."¹³⁸ Palestinian Legislative Council member Hatem Abdel Qader said, "To be silent only because we are afraid that the negotiations will fail or will not take U.S. to where we want to go is unacceptable on the part of the Palestinian leadership."¹³⁹

Landmine Monitor has been unable to obtain information on possible use, stockpiling, trade or production of antipersonnel mines by Palestinian armed forces.

The Landmine Problem

After decades of war and on-going military occupation, Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories have been left with thousands of antipersonnel mines, antitank mines, and unexploded ordnance (UXO) on their lands. Until now, international attention and awareness regarding the problem of landmines and UXOs in the OPT has been minimal to non-existent.

The number of landmines planted in the OPT is not known. There are no precise and comprehensive statistics available from any source. According to Israeli and Palestinian military experts, the majority of the landmines planted in the OPT are U.S., British, or Israeli-made mines. Most of these were laid by British, Jordanian, and Israeli forces.

After 1967, the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted in the emplacement of more minefields along the new borders and around dozens of military bases and training areas. In 1997 and 1998 Defence for Children International/Palestine Section (DCI/PS) carried out a survey, identifying 334 mine and UXO incidents.¹⁴⁰ DCI/PS reports that the West Bank areas that experience the most frequent landmine and UXO explosion incidents are Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya and Nablus. Most of the explosions occur in the rural areas of "Zone C" (62.1%), then in "Zone B" (20.5%), and then in "Zone A" (17.4%). In Zones B and C, the majority of the explosions occur in the border areas and near Israeli military training bases, and also in areas adjacent to Israeli settlements. 40% of the explosions resulted from landmines, 39% were UXO explosions, and in 21% of the cases the explosive device was not identified.

Israel has officially declared the locations of sixteen minefields. These declared minefields are located as follows: Jenin District (five minefields), Tulkarem District (one minefield), Qalqilya District (two minefields), Bethlehem District (three minefields), Ramallah and Jerusalem Districts (three minefields), Hebron District (two minefields).¹⁴¹ However, Palestinian military experts believe that there are a large number of other undisclosed minefields located in the first defense lines between Jordan and the West Bank, in the second defense lines in the Jordan Valley and in other strategic areas leading to the central areas of the West Bank.

Israel has acknowledged that some of the minefields in the occupied territories have no strategic value from a military point of view.¹⁴² According to Major Fathi Saeed, of the Operational Section of the Palestinian National Security Forces, Jenin Area, "Most of the minefields in the West Bank are located in the depth of the West Bank, where no one is threatening Israel's security."¹⁴³

Survey and Assessment

The PA has yet to initiate preparations for demining Palestinian areas. No detailed assessment or survey has been made to determine the extent of the mine and UXO problem in Palestine. Even the National Security Forces have no clear idea about the scope of the problem in the OPT. They do not have maps or records of minefields. They obtain their information from the Israeli side.

Mine Clearance

No mine clearance has been done by the PA in the OPT. In Zones B and C, the PA does not have the authority to clear mines. In Zone A, where the PA does have jurisdiction, they have failed to do so due to a variety of reasons, namely, lack of financial and technical means, equipment and trained personnel. Indeed, the ability of the PA to clear landmines and UXO is limited. Major Saeed said, "As Palestinian National Forces we have the human resources to do the clearance, but these resources need training, and we are in need of technical resources." ¹⁴⁴

The Israeli government has undertaken only limited mine clearance in the OPT. Israel has declared that it has cleared two minefields since its occupation of the West Bank: Alnabi- Elias and Yaabad. However, a mine explosion in the Yaabad field killed a Palestinian on 15 July 1996. Israel replied to an inquiry from the Yaabad Municipality by stating that "the minefield is very old. It has existed since the Jordanian period. We detected and removed the mines that we discovered. We cannot guarantee its emptiness because the detecting instruments cannot discover the mines if they are old. A heavy bulldozer crossed the minefield and exploded the mines. We hope you will notify us if anything is discovered." ¹⁴⁵

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has stated, "The IDF takes every measure required, including the issuing of orders, putting up fences and signs in the areas, and providing information to local residents in order to prevent the recurrence of these [mine and UXO] incidents."¹⁴⁶ The statement also said that such measures "are implemented in the Judea and Samaria region, and that the fire practice areas in Judea and Samaria are marked and bordered according to standing army regulations."¹⁴⁷

According to DCI/PS, twelve minefields are not properly marked or fenced. Other fences are in need of repair, and signs (often in Hebrew and English only, not Arabic) in need of replacement.

Mine Awareness

Defense of Children International/Palestine Section in 1999 launched a mine awareness campaign, particularly in areas close to minefields and military training bases. DCI/PS has secured support for its mine awareness education programs from a variety of international organizations, including Norwegian People's Aid, R_dda Barner and Handicap International. It intends to launch a pilot program in the Jenin area of the northern West Bank, a region which is highly affected by mines and UXO.

DCI/PS conducted two sessions to train volunteers from the local community as mine educators. The first was held in the Jenin area, and included 27 volunteer participants. The second was located in the Tobas area, where 20 volunteers participated. After completing the training sessions, the volunteers conducted numerous lectures and workshops to raise the awareness of the problem of landmines and UXO within their communities.

A coordination committee (Mine Action Committee) representing organizations that participated in the project was created to plan, follow-up, and evaluate the activities. This committee is comprised of representatives from DCI/PS, National Security Forces, Palestinian Red Crescent and the YMCA. In addition, as a part of the awareness campaign a collection of printed materials was issued, including a poster indicating the dangers of landmines and UXOs.

On the local level, the PA (specifically the Palestinian National Security Forces and the Ministry of Education) has cooperated with the DCI/PS mine awareness program. The PA's participation has been instrumental in developing the educational programs necessary to inform the Palestinian community about the dangers of landmines and UXOs.

Landmine Casualties

According to the 1998 study carried out by DCI/PS, every year, dozens of casualties occur as a result of mines and UXO. The documented cases indicate that approximately 34% of the victims are Palestinian children.¹⁴⁸ Not only do children often consider the mines and UXO to be curious objects, but many incidents occur in areas used for grazing flocks, work often undertaken by children.

It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of Palestinian victims, as there has been no concerted effort to document casualties. According to Fadi Abu Sido, Head of Armament Prohibition and Regional Security in the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, "Injuries and casualties have been happening since 1967, while work on this issue did not start before 1994, that is after the advent of the Palestinian Authority."¹⁴⁹

DCI/PS believes that since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967, there have been more than 2,500 landmine and UXO victims. Some of the findings of the DCI/PS survey, based upon a random sample of 334 incidents that have occurred since 1967 are that of the total 464 casualties: 144 were killed (31%) and 320 were injured (69%); 34% were children under eighteen years of age; 46% were from families who work in agriculture; 93% are males from low-income families with minimal education. DCI/PS found that 18% of the victims have taken legal actions against the Israeli government in order to receive compensation for their loss. According to one account, there have been several instances following a mine/UXO accident of the IDF interrogating or harassing either the survivor or family members.¹⁵⁰

Survivor Assistance

No special rehabilitation assistance is provided to landmine victims in the OPT, but there are numerous rehabilitation centers to deal with the disabled from all aspects, including medical, psychological, and vocational. Still, most survivors receive their medical treatment in Israeli hospitals, either because the Israeli hospitals have strong experience in dealing with these injuries or because Palestinians were transferred to Israeli hospitals to have their treatment before the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.

There are two major health care providers for landmine victims in the OPT, the government hospitals and the private hospitals. These two types of hospitals are spread all over the Palestinian territories, with at least one hospital in every Palestinian governorate. Still, the situation for Palestinian survivors is very bad. For instance, a year after the explosion wounding 16-year-old Burhan Shkeir, he had not received any help or financial support. His father explained: "In order for the (Palestinian) Ministry of Health to agree to treat him for free, it has to get a paper from the Ministry of Social Affairs. And for the latter to complete all its legal procedures, we need a lot of time and patience."¹⁵¹

According to the Director of the General Union of Palestinian Disabled, "No special disability laws are available to landmine victims."¹⁵² But during the last year, the General Union of Disabled Palestinians, Rights Representative and Advocacy Body in coordination with the Central National Committee of Rehabilitation, and the Rehabilitation Institutions Coordinating Body in Palestine, succeeded in passing a special law, "People with Disabilities Rights Law," in the Palestinian Legislative Council. This law, which was Law Number 4 for the year, was published in the official newspaper and entered into force on 10 October 1999. Currently, there is no national body representing the disabled, but there are attempts to formulate the National Council for Disability, which would represent the disabled, NGOs and the government.

WESTERN SAHARA

Key developments since March 1999: The major mine awareness program run by Norwegian People's Aid ended in May 2000. There are no humanitarian mine clearance programs underway. There were reportedly forty-two mine accidents from November 1999 to March 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front (Frente Polisario, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro). The Polisario's Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic is not universally recognized and has no official representation in the UN. Therefore it was unable to sign the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Polisario representatives have stated on a number of occasions, including in March and April 2000, that the Saharawi government would sign and ratify the treaty, if eligible to do so.¹⁵³ At the same time, officials continue to speak of a possible need for the weapon. According to Mr. Dah Bendir, who is responsible for Polisario Mine Engineering, "Due to the actual situation of uncertainty, we cannot make a commitment to destroying all the mines we have, because we may go back to war tomorrow morning. But it's our will to do so when the conflict is finally resolved."¹⁵⁴

The non-governmental Saharawi Campaign to Ban Mines (SCABAM) was established in early 2000.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

The Polisario is not known to produce or export mines. It has imported mines from Algeria and perhaps other nations. It has also acquired mines by lifting them from the Moroccan defensive walls. Polisario acknowledges having a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but will not disclose the number and types of mines.¹⁵⁵ Polisario is not known to have used antipersonnel mines in 1999 or 2000.

Landmine Problem¹⁵⁶

Western Sahara is heavily mine-affected. After years of colonial and post-colonial conflict, mines and UXO litter the landscape. Moroccan and Polisario forces fought intermittently from 1975 to 1991, when a cease-fire went into effect and a UN peacekeeping force, MINURSO, was deployed to the region. The cease-fire resulted in a territory that is divided between the Polisario and Morocco by defensive walls, known as berms (earthen walls of about three meters in height). Both sides have fortified these walls with mines

Estimates of the number of mines in Western Sahara range from 200,000 to 10,000,000.¹⁵⁷ Thirty-five different types of AP mines and twenty-one different types of AT mines from twelve states have been confirmed by MINURSO to exist in the territory.¹⁵⁸

The most mine-affected area in Western Sahara is thought to extend up to ten kilometers to the east of the berms. The location of UXO, which are distributed throughout the entire territory, is unknown. The desert conditions of sand, wind and occasional heavy rain make mine shifting a constant phenomenon.

Survey and Mine Clearance

Some clearance has been conducted by militaries from both sides, though it only totals a small percentage of the problem. A Swedish Demining Unit operated for several months in 1998. Polisario and MINURSO have cooperated in identifying and marking danger areas along MINURSO patrol routes. A UN report on the Western Sahara in January 1999 recommended a pilot demining project, but there does not appear to have been any follow-up on this.¹⁵⁹ The Global Landmine Survey sent an exploratory mission to the Western Sahara to look at the feasibility of a Level One Survey, but no further action has occurred.¹⁶⁰

The Polisario liaison with MINURSO told Landmine Monitor about an agreement reached between Polisario and the UN "related to the destruction of mines in the area and since then we have been destroying all types of mines and UXO that we have found in our region."¹⁶¹ According to Fadli Mohamed Ahmed, a Saharawi officer who represented the Polisario in an international landmines conference held in October 1999 in Catalunya, Spain, the Polisario have cooperated with the UN by presenting maps of minefields and suspected areas.¹⁶²

The most recent report of the UN Secretary General states that "during the period 13 May 2000 to 3 July 2000, 278 mines and unexploded ordnance were marked and 124 destroyed on the Moroccan side while 488 were marked and 177 destroyed on the Frente Polisario side."¹⁶³ Between 6 December and 22 May 2000, both sides in cooperation with MINURSO conducted 28 disposal operations for UXO and ammunition.¹⁶⁴

Mine Awareness

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) conducted a mine awareness program from April 1998 until May 2000, educating about 90,000 Saharawi refugees. NPA had a mine awareness team in each of the main refugee camps (Smara, Aaiun, Auserd, and Dajla), as well as in a smaller camp based at a women's training school. It also conducted mine awareness through the media, such as radio programs.

Landmine Casualties

The Saharawi Campaign to Ban Mines believes that since November 1999, the number of mine accidents in Western Sahara has increased, noting that about forty-two accidents occurred between November 1999 and March 2000. SCABAM attributes this to the fact that the northern part of the country experienced heavy rainfall, leading to more movement throughout the region, and resulting in an increase in mine/UXO accidents.

Survivor Assistance

Mine victim access to emergency services, especially in remote areas, is limited to military medical facilities. In preparation for repatriation, the Saharawi government, supported by Spanish NGOs and aid committees for the Saharawi people, began the construction of two hospitals in Western Sahara. However, these hospitals lack staffing and basic equipment for medical assistance. All the seriously wounded patients have to be taken to the National Hospital located in Rabouni. Many mine accident victims do not receive assistance until two or three days after the accident occurs. Other victims die on their way to medical treatment, as in some cases the closest health facility can be up to forty hours away.

SCABAM has begun a survey of landmine survivors, and identified about 360 amputees living in the four main Saharawi refugee camps, near Tindouf, Algeria. The majority of these amputees lacked prosthetics, while others had been using the same prosthetic device for ten years or more. SCABAM is seeking funding for a mine victim support project to provide prosthetics to the amputees.

68 Conclusion from the Israeli State Comptroller's Report No. 50 A, for the Year 1999, "Mine Laying in the Israel Defense Forces," (Published in Hebrew and translated unofficially) Israel Government Printing Office, Jerusalem. Hereafter cited as "State Comptroller's Report, 1999."

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Documented during field visits by al-Haq, 1999-2000.

72 Documented by al-Haq fieldwork and May 1999 questionnaires.

73 State Comptroller's Report, 1999.

74 See CCW Protocol II (1980), Article 4, paragraph 2 (b) and Article 7, paragraphs 2 and 3.

75 Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, TIAS No. 3365, 75 UNTS 287. See Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 22 (J. Pictet Ed. 1958); G. Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation 281, 283 (1957); UK War Office, The Law of War on Land: Being Part III of the Manual of Military Law 140 (1958); and M. Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 216-17, 224- 27 (1959).

76 Roberts, "The Applicability of Human Rights During Military Occupation," 13 Rev. Int'l Study 39 (1987).

77 State Comptroller's Report, 1999.

78 Based on data from questionnaires collected by al-Haq, May 1999.

79 Data obtained from al-Haq fieldworker in the Golan Heights. Information is based on affidavits and questionnaires from May 1999.

80 Al-Haq Affidavit #3 2000, Amir Abu-Jabel's father.

81 State Comptroller's Report, 1999.

82 Ibid.

83 Al-Haq Affidavit #4, 15 February 2000, Najeeb Saleh Taraba.

84 Al-Haq Affidavit #3 2000, Amir Abu-Jabel's father.

85 Al-Haq Affidavit #1, 14 February 2000, Saleh Salman Youssef Abu-Arrar.

86 Al-Haq Questionnaire, May 1999.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Finding based on analysis of al-Haq Questionnaire, May 1999.

90 The results of these investigations are not known to al-Haq because most of the interviewees did not know the final outcome.

91 Interview with Mr. Jalal Talabani, General Secretary, PUK, 25 June 2000.

92 Ibid.

93 Landmine Monitor 1999 interview, 9 January 1999.

94 "Iraq condemns Turkish attack," BBC News, 6 December 1999.

95 "Turkey continues anti-Kurdish raid in N. Iraq," BBC News, 8 December 1997.

96 News Archive, Stratford-Iraq, 17 July 1999, http:// www.stratfor.com /meaf/news/an990717.htm.

97 "Almost All the Land Mines Used by the PKK Are Italian," Milan Il Giornale in Italian, 1 July 1999, p. 10.

98 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1281 (1999), S/2000/520, 1 June 2000, p. 13. The report addresses distribution of humanitarian supplies throughout Iraq.

99 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, p. 97.

100 Norwegian People's Aid, "Mine Action Proposal 2000," p. 7.

101 Ibid.

102 UNOPS, "Executive Summary, UNOPS Mine Action Program in Northern Iraq," June 2000.

103 Norwegian People's Aid, "Mine Action Proposal 2000," p. 7.

104 UNOPS, "Executive Summary, UNOPS Mine Action Program in Northern Iraq," June 2000.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 Mines Advisory Group, "Activities Summary, 1st January 1993 - 31st January 2000."

108 Norwegian People's Aid, "Mine Action Proposal 2000," p. 4

109 Correspondence from Mr. Sayed Aqa, Field Director, Survey Action Center, February 2000.

110 United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, "Oil for Food - The Basic Facts," June 2000.

111 United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, "180 Day Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council (Phase VI)," paragraph 107.

112 Ibid. Also, UN Office of the Iraq Programme, "180 Day Report requested by SCR 1210 (S/1999/573) (Phase V)," paragraph 104.

113 Correspondence from Norwegian People's Aid, June 2000.

114 UNOPS, "Executive Summary, UNOPS Mine Action Program in Northern Iraq," June 2000.

115 Information provided via email by Tim Carstairs, Communications Director, MAG, 27 July 2000.

116 Ibid.

117 European Landmine Solutions, http://www.landmine-solutions.com/operations.htm.

118 Correspondence from Mr. Sayed Aqa, Field Director, Survey Action Center, February 2000.

119 UNOPS, "Executive Summary, UNOPS Mine Action Program in Northern Iraq," June 2000.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Information provided via email by Tim Carstairs, Communications Director, MAG, 27 July 2000.

123 Norwegian People's Aid, "Mine Action Proposal 2000," p. 7 with additional information provided by NPA via email on 31July 2000.

124 Interview with Mr. Jalal Talabani, General Secretary, PUK, 25 June 2000.

125 Gilles Paris, "The Sanctuary Of Iraqi Kurdistan," Le Monde, 19 December 1998.

126 Information provided via email by Tim Carstairs, Communications Director, MAG, 27 July 2000.

127 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, p. 97.

128 Mines Advisory Group, "Activities Summary, 1st January 1993-31st January 2000."

129 UNOPS, "Executive Summary, UNOPS Mine Action Program in Northern Iraq," June 2000.

130 Interview with Mr. Jalal Talabani, General Secretary, PUK, 25 June 2000.

131 Correspondence from Handicap International, Belgium, June 2000.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid.

135 Statement of the Palestinian observing delegation to the FMSP, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

136 Letter from the Office of the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Gaza, 27 April 2000.

137 Fihmi Shahin, "Yesterday's War Harvests More Victim's Today," Haquq al-Nas (People's Rights magazine), LAW, the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, August 1999, No. 30, p. 13.

138 Hadeel Wahdan, "Landmines, the Hidden Terror," The Palestine Report, 22 September 1999.

139 Ibid.

140 Defense of Children International/Palestine Section, Report on the Field Study on the Victims of Landmines and Remnants of the Israeli Army in the West Bank during the period from June 1967 to February 1998: The First Report (Jerusalem: DCI/PS, 1998), p.7. Hereinafter, DCI/PS Report 1967-1998.

141 DCI/PS, The Problem of Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance and Munitions Remnants in the Palestinian Territories: A Seminar Report, 25-26 March 1998 (DCI/PS: 1998), p. 14. Herafter cited as `DCI/PS Seminar.'

142 Conclusion from the Israeli State Comptroller's Report No. 50 A, for the Year 1999, "Mine Laying in the Israel Defense Forces," (Published in Hebrew and translated unofficially) Israel government printing office, Jerusalem.

143 Interview with Major Fathi Saeed, National Security Forces-Operational Section, Jenin, 19 October 1999.

144 Ibid.

145 Letter from the IDF to the Yaabad municipality, 29 July 1996.

146 B"Tselem, Incidents of Death and Injury Resulting from Exploding Munition Remnants (Jerusalem: B'Tselem, July 1995), p. 13.

147 Ibid., p. 13. Note: "Judea and Samaria" are the terms the Israeli government uses to refer to the West Bank.

148 DCI/PS Report 1967-1998, p. 7.

149 Hadeel Wahdan, "Landmines, the Hidden Terror," The Palestine Report, 22 September 1999.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.

152 Interview with Ziad `Amr, Ramallah, 3 January 2000.

153 Statement by Sinniya Ahmed at the NGO-sponsored "Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban" conference, Geneva, 24-25 March 2000; interview with Mr. Mohamed Haddad, liaison between Polisario and MINURSO, Rabouni, Algeria, 10 April 2000.

154 Interview with Polisario Mine Engineer Mr. Dah Bendir, Rabouni,Algeria, 9 April 2000.

155 Ibid.

156 For a more detailed description of the landmine problem, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 921-924.

157 U.S. Department of State, "Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis," 1998, p. A-2.

158 MINURSO, "Western Sahara: Updated Mine Situation," February 1998. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 922, for details.

159 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara," 28 January 1999.

160 Global Landmine Survey, information sheet, undated.

161 Interview with Mr. Mohamed Haddad, liaison between Polisario and MINURSO, Rabouni, Algeria, 10 April 2000.

162 Interview with Polisario officer Fadli Mohamed, Rabouni, Algeria, 28 April 2000.

163 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara," S/2000/683, 12 July 2000, pp. 3-4.

164 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara," S/2000/461, 22 May 2000, p. 3; "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara," S/2000/131, 17 February 2000, p. 3.