Previous PageTable Of ContentsNext Page


 
Recent Reports 
 Support HRW 
About HRW
Site Map

Human Rights Watch - Home Page

IV. BACKGROUND

The Sierra Leonean Civil War
The Sierra Leonean armed conflict, which has devastated the country since 1991, pits the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)7 rebels against the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Kabbah, who was elected president in March 1996 in the country's first multi-party elections in almost three decades, was overthrown by a group of senior military officers of the Sierra Leonean army who formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in a coup in May 1997. The rule of the AFRC, which joined the forces of the Sierra Leonean army with the RUF after coming to power, was characterized by serious human rights violations, political repression, and a nearly complete breakdown of the rule of law. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a Nigerian-led peacekeeping force, ousted the AFRC/RUF from power in February 1998, reinstating Kabbah as president. Kabbah's government has virtually no national army and is supported by ECOMOG. 8 Local Civil Defense Forces (CDFs), the largest and most powerful of which is the Kamajors, also fight on behalf of the government.9 All parties to the conflict have committed atrocities against civilians-including children.10

In January 1999, RUF rebels launched an offensive against the capital Freetown, which was characterized by systematic human rights abuses against the civilian population. Since then, there have been signs of a possible negotiated resolution to the conflict in Sierra Leone. On May 18, 1999 the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF signed a cease-fire agreement, which came into effect on May 24, and talks between the two sides opened the following day. The talks were guided by a facilitation committee chaired by the foreign minister of Togo, with the participation of ECOWAS, the Organization of African Unity, and the U.N. secretary-general's special representative. On July 7, 1999, the parties reached a peace accord in Lome, Togo.11

At the time of publication of this report, it was too soon to predict whether the Lome Accord would truly bring sustainable peace to Sierra Leone. All parties to the conflict were reported to have breached the May 1999 cease-fire, and Human Rights Watch documented continued atrocities including murder and mutilation of civilians and recruitment of child soldiers in the weeks leading up to the peace accord. It should also be noted that refugees returned home prematurely after the 1996 Abidjan Accord and the 1997 Conakry Accord and were subsequently at great risk, and many were even forced to flee again, when these peace plans were not implemented and fighting continued or resumed.

The conflict has not appeared to be over fundamental political or ethnic differences, but rather as a struggle for control of the country's resources, not least its lucrative diamond mines. Shortly after the conflict began in 1991, RUF leader Fodoy Sankoh announced that the aim of the RUF was to overthrow the regime then in power, citing massive corruption, and to install a democratic plural political system. However, the RUF has failed to consistently or publicly articulate a political agenda other than a goal of ousting successive governments.

Sierra Leone has been largely ignored by much of the international community, with the exception of those attempting to exploit its rich diamond and mineral deposits. In this mix of exploitation and indifference, combined with a history of weak respect for the rule of law and democratic institutions, military leaders have repeatedly seized power and diverted revenue from the mines for their own benefit. In attempts during recent years to gain political and economic control, both government and rebel groups have sought to tip the balance of power by employing private security firms or mercenaries, often in exchange for lucrative contracts and mining concessions.

This war has been waged through attacks on the civilian population. While all sides have committed atrocities in violation of international humanitarian law throughout the conflict, the large scale and grotesque nature of the attacks on civilians committed by the RUF since February 1998 has particularly devastated already embattled communities. Survivors told Human Rights Watch that RUF soldiers would typically capture civilians, round them up from their hiding places in the forest or in villages, and commit atrocities against them-often including mutilation-in an effort to instill terror. In some cases, RUF soldiers have further terrorized their victims by forcing them to participate in their own mutilation, for example by asking captives to draw a slip of paper from a hat with the word "hand," "leg," "eyes," or "life" on it-representing what the rebel soldiers would take from them. In some cases, rebel soldiers have reportedly forced those they abducted-including children-to commit atrocities against their own family members.

Forces fighting on behalf of President Kabbah have also committed human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. CDFs including Kamajors have committed numerous abuses including arbitrary killings and torture, although on a smaller scale than those carried out by the RUF. During fighting in Freetown in January 1999, ECOMOG forces too committed numerous violations of humanitarian law including extrajudicial executions of prisoners and suspected rebels.

Human Rights Watch field investigations in 1998 and 1999 revealed that children have been the frequent targets of brutal, indiscriminate acts of violence by the RUF, including murder, mutilation, torture, beating, rape, and sexual slavery. Pregnant women and nursing mothers have also been targets of the RUF. The RUF has abducted thousands of children to serve as child soldiers, porters, and laborers. The CDFs, especially the Kamajors, have recruited thousands of children to become part of their forces for the same purposes. Despite promises by the government to demobilize all combatants under the age of eighteen, recent reports indicate that the CDFs continue to recruit children and to deploy them in combat. Both sides favor children in their ranks because they believe children are often easily indoctrinated, fearless, and have little sense of what is morally right or wrong. Many of the atrocities have been committed by child soldiers, some as young as seven years of age.

The fighting has caused the displacement of more than a million Sierra Leoneans. Most have become internally displaced, while nearly five hundred thousand have fled the country as refugees, predominantly to neighboring Guinea and Liberia. Despite progress made towards reaching peace in Sierra Leone, the conflict continued to cause massive displacement in 1999 as RUF rebels battled ECOMOG forces for control of the country.12

The Refugee Situation in Guinea
Many Sierra Leonean refugees suffer from extraordinary psychological trauma due to the intentionally cruel methods of inflicting harm used by the RUF rebels against them, their families, and their communities. They have been displaced from their homes and their communities, which can be traumatizing in itself. Many refugee children have been separated from their parents and, as is discussed below, are living with caregivers who may exploit them or fail to meet their needs. These children have a human right to adequate assistance and protection. Nevertheless, many refugee children remain vulnerable to human rights abuses in refugee camps in Guinea.

In many respects, Guinea has stood out as a generous host nation for many years. Guinea is currently host to the largest refugee population in Africa, with close to half a million refugees-up to 65 percent of whom are estimated to be children-who have fled strife in neighboring countries.13 More than 300,000 of these refugees come from Sierra Leone. Most have fled Sierra Leone since February 1998, when the RUF rebels embarked on a massive reign of terror after being ousted from power, and have settled in the Gueckedou area of south-eastern Guinea.

UNHCR administers more than sixty refugee camps for Sierra Leoneans in the Gueckedou area, encompassing the Gueckedou and Kissidugou prefectures. Many of the camps are located within a peninsula-like territory stretching into eastern Sierra Leone. A river running along the border forms a natural barrier between this area of Guinea and Sierra Leone, providing minimal protection to refugees from the RUF soldiers who have frequently operated in the border area. During the November to June dry season, the border provides even less protection. Some of the camps are less than one kilometer away from the border with Sierra Leone.

Refugees now outnumber Guinea nationals in the Gueckedou area.14 Most of the refugee camps are adjacent to or surround Guinean villages, and are named after those villages. The camps range in population from several thousand refugees to more than 20,000. The refugees have constructed mud huts, which they call "booths," and community buildings in the camps.

Many of the camps in the Gueckedou area were originally established in 1991 when refugees first began fleeing the Sierra Leonean conflict. Most of this first group of refugees had returned home to Sierra Leone before 1997, leaving the camps almost empty. During the mass influx from Sierra Leone in early 1998, many refugees settled directly in these existing camps, where some infrastructure was already in place. The camps in the Gueckedou area are currently in a "care and maintenance phase" (i.e. normal operations) following the initial "emergency phase" in the spring and summer of 1998.

Every camp has a camp chairman and a camp committee which, in a sense, can be considered local government structures. Local Guinean gendarmes are responsible for security within the camps but, with the exception of patrolling for suspected RUF rebels, do not maintain a significant presence in the camps. In addition, refugees have begun establishing community organizations in the camps. Perhaps most significantly, nearly every camp has established women's associations which have attempted to ensure that women's views are taken into account in the camps, including with respect to prevention of sexual violence and addressing the needs of those who were victims of sexual violence in Sierra Leone.

While Guinean citizens have historically peacefully coexisted with the Sierra Leonean refugee population, relations grew tense in some areas in 1999 because many Guineans were fearful that the Sierra Leonean conflict would extend onto Guinean territory, and apparently suspected that refugees had cooperated with rebel forces. In April 1999, Guinean private citizens reportedly attacked a refugee camp in Moola, in the Forecariah area, allegedly because they suspected that rebel forces had infiltrated the camp. Later the same month, after an armed attack on Yefoula, a village and refugee settlement in the Gueckedou area, international observers were fearful that clashes would erupt between the local citizens and refugees, but managed to avoid confrontation.

UNHCR administers the refugee camps in Guinea and provides assistance and protection for the refugees who live in them, with a budget of approximately U.S.$23 million for operations in 1999. Donor response to funding appeals for the Sierra Leonean emergency have been inadequate and fallen far short of requirements.15 Governments' failure to contribute to appeals for Sierra Leone may be symptomatic of the larger problem of "donor fatigue" with respect to refugee crises in Africa.

UNHCR operates with a relatively small staff in Gueckedou, none of whom have specific responsibility for refugee children, although they are supposed to address children's issues within their larger functions.16 UNHCR employs two protection officers and one community services officer in Gueckedou.17 In addition, UNHCR employs four field officers and three field assistants who are spread out in four zones with more than 300,000 refugees.18

Several programs in Guinea directly target refugee children. The programs are funded by UNHCR and governments and, in most cases, are administered by UNHCR's nongovernmental (NGO) implementing partners. Virtually every camp has a primary school administered by the International Rescue Committee (IRC). The German organization Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) operates a school canteen program, providing lunch for children in school in some camps. Enfants Refugies du Monde, a French NGO, runs a program allowing children the opportunity to play on a daily basis in three of the camps. In addition, UNHCR provided funding for IRC to begin a program for the protection of separated children (i.e. children not being cared for by their parents), focusing on family tracing and monitoring of care, in March 1999, as a supplement to existing programs by local NGOs in this regard. However, there is little in the way of secondary education, vocational training, or other programs designed for adolescents in the camps.

Protection of Refugee Children Globally
Children make up more than half of all refugees worldwide. Nevertheless, the international community has devoted very limited resources to address children's issues. Among international agencies, UNHCR is the leading actor with respect to refugee children. UNICEF, the primary U.N. agency responsible for children, plays a limited role in most refugee situations.19 With some exceptions, UNHCR has been responsible for refugee children while UNICEF has assumed responsibility for children who are internally displaced within their own countries. Several international NGOs, including IRC, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and members of the International Save the Children Alliance, have played a particularly active role in bringing the issue of refugee children to the forefront.

Until recently, no specific unit in UNHCR had responsibility for refugee children. As a result of two external evaluations, by the United States and United Kingdom, which found that UNHCR was failing to provide adequate assistance and protection for refugee children, UNHCR established the post of senior coordinator for refugee children within UNHCR's Division of Operational Support in 1992. The office of the senior coordinator has provided UNHCR staff with advice and support on children's issues and attempted to ensure that children's issues are not ignored. UNHCR also created a post of senior coordinator for refugee women in 1992 and has a position of senior education officer.20 However, all three of these posts were vacant as of July 1999.

In 1993, the Executive Committee of UNHCR adopted the UNHCR Policy on Refugee Children. This was followed by the adoption in 1994 of a detailed set of guidelines entitled Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care. In 1996, on the request of the U.N. secretary-general, Graça Machel submitted a report on the impact of armed conflict on children to the United Nations which, among other issues, focused international attention on the plight of refugee children.21 UNHCR participated in the preparation of this report. Since then, the Executive Committee has raised the issue of child protection several times.22 In addition, the High Commissioner requested all staff, including in field offices, to devote particular attention to adolescents, sexual exploitation of children, education, prevention/monitoring of military recruitment of children, and separated children.23

The office of the senior coordinator for refugee children has developed several new initiatives since the Machel study was completed. In coordination with international NGOs, it has begun to implement a training initiative on the rights of refugee children called Action for the Rights of the Child (ARC). It has established new posts of regional policy officers for children in West Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central Asia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. In West Africa, it has also established a Liberian Children's Initiative for refugees in Liberia which it hopes to extend to Guinea and elsewhere in West Africa through the Neighborhood Initiative, a new inter-agency program in cooperation with the office of the special representative of the secretary-general for children and armed conflict and others. These initiatives have been instrumental in drawing attention to the rights of refugee children and in beginning to implement UNHCR's policies and guidelines on refugee children.

Human Rights Watch believes that, in order to effectively carry out its mandate, the senior coordinator for refugee children should be given greater resources and authority to monitor and enforce compliance to ensure that UNHCR field and headquarters staff can better address the needs of refugee children. However, in an alarming trend, staff and other resources available to the senior coordinator for refugee children have recently been cut back severely. Ostensibly, this represents an effort to "mainstream" children's issues and to incorporate child protection into the general work of UNHCR. However, this approach overlooks the very reason for creating a child protection unit in the first place-that UNHCR has not demonstrated sufficient commitment to protect the human rights of refugee children through its general programs and governments have not held it accountable for failure to do so.24


"A Human Rights Approach to the Protection of Refugee Children," Statement by Dennis McNamara, Director, Division of International Protection, UNHCR, London School of Economics, November 14, 1998.


The RUF was formed in 1991 and entered eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia, and has committed atrocities from the outset. Originally, the RUF was a mix of members of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), NPFL-trained Sierra Leoneans and others.


Most government forces defected to join the RUF during the reign of the AFRC. After returning to power in February 1998, Kabbah dissolved what remained of the national army. The Sierra Leonean government is currently in the process of recruiting and training a new national army with the assistance of the Governments of Nigeria and the United Kingdom.


CDFs, which fight on behalf of Kabbah's government, were developed primarily in the early 1990s as local protection responses to insecurity and violence throughout Sierra Leone. The "Kamajors," meaning traditional hunter in the Mende language, are the largest and most powerful of these groups, and most Kamajors are from the Mende ethnic group. They dress in traditional clothing, often wearing charms and mirrors. Other ethnic groups, including the Temne, Mandingo, and Kuranko have also formed CDFs known as "traditional hunters" in their respective languages. The Kamajors became an important fighting force under the previous government of Captain Valentine E.M. Strasser, helping to combat the RUF, but also committing human rights violations. The Kamajors were armed by and grew in number under the first Kabbah government, allegedly fueling resentment among the Sierra Leonean military and leading to the subsequent military coup and AFRC government.


See Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, and Rape: New Report from the Field, vol. 11, no. 3(A), June 1999; Human Rights Watch, Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone, vol. 10, no. 3(A), July 1998.


Notwithstanding the signing of the Lome Accord, the rights of Sierra Leonean refugees, including children, must continue to be protected in Guinea regardless of their predicted length of stay, and repatriation to Sierra Leone must be voluntary. No refugee can be forced to return, and return should only take place if there are full guarantees for refugees' safety and security and respect for their human rights. At present, Human Rights Watch is concerned that, due to severe food shortages and continued instability in many parts of Sierra Leone, as well as the need to disarm combatants, the safety and security of refugees cannot be guaranteed.

12 After the January 1999 offensive, tens of thousands of civilians fled to Guinea, most of whom have settled in refugee camps in Forecariah or in Conakry, the capital of Guinea.

13 UNHCR, Africa Fact Sheet, June 2, 1999. In addition, UNHCR estimates that more than 200,000 Liberian refugees returned home to Liberia in 1998, and UNHCR has continued to support voluntary repatriation of Liberian refugees in 1999. UNHCR conducted a refugee census in February 1999 but, as of June 1999, had not released the results of the census.

14 Sierra Leonean refugees and members of the local Guinean population do mix, though they usually live apart. Although the refugees' movement is restricted, trading does occur and the refugees sell their labor, food obtained from UNHCR, wood, kerosene and other items to nationals. They also trade their rations for a variety of other items, such as salt or rice. This interaction is made easier by similarities in the languages and heritage of the groups, and many share family relationships.

15 For example, UNHCR requested $4 million in February 1999 in order to move refugees away from the border before the rainy season began in June. As of July 1999, UNHCR had not received any contributions towards this appeal.


UNHCR maintains a country office in Conakry, the Guinean capital, and branch offices in Gueckedou, Forecariah (where most Sierra Leoneans who arrived in 1999 have settled), and Nzerekore (where most Liberian refugees have settled).


The community services officer and one of the protection officers are U.N. Volunteers. This has, at times, been supplemented. The Danish Refugee Council, for example, has seconded a protection officer and a community officer, both women, to work on the Victims of Violence program which provides assistance and protection for, among others, women and girls who were sexually abused by RUF rebel soldiers in Sierra Leone.

18 UNHCR developed field monitoring teams in October 1998, but did not receive sufficient resources or any additional personnel for the teams.

It should be noted that all of the UNHCR field and protection officers in Guinea are men, despite the fact that their responsibilities include prevention of and response to sexual violence.

19 According to the Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR and UNICEF, UNHCR is ultimately responsible for the wellbeing of child refugees, while "UNICEF's assistance to refugees, agreed in each case with the host government and with UNHCR, is selective and subject to the availability of resources over and above those committed in its Master Plan of Operations for the relevant country programme." Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR and UNICEF, March 14, 1996, p. 2.

20 UNHCR had attempted to eliminate the education post last year, but later reinstated it at a lower level.


Graça Machel, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996), pp. 22 - 29. In response to the Machel study, the secretary-general appointed Olara Otunnu as his special representative for children and armed conflict.


Conclusion on Refugee Children and Adolescents, No. 84 (1997); Evaluation of UNHCR's Efforts on Behalf of Refugee Children and Adolescents, No. EC/47/SC/CRP.50 (1997); Refugee Children and Adolescents, Including Follow-Up to the 1997 Evaluation and Report on Implementation of the Machel Study, No. EC/48/SC/CRP.38 (1998).


Sadako Ogata, Inter-Office Memorandum No. 40/97, Field Office Memorandum No. 47/97, 15 July 1997.


A similar trend has taken place with respect to refugee women.

Previous PageTable Of ContentsNext Page