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II. A NOTE ON SOURCES

The evidence in this report of chemical weapons production in pre-war Yugoslavia is based on a variety of sources, including persons who were involved in the JNA’s program, a JNA manual on the use of certain chemical munitions, and reports containing western intelligence assessments. Human Rights Watch has obtained detailed descriptions of the JNA’s chemical weapons program from two former JNA chemical and biological warfare officers (one living in Croatia, the other in Bosnia and Hercegovina) and three former technicians at PRETIS, an ammunition factory in Vogosca, near Sarajevo (one living in Croatia, the other two living in Bosnia-Hecegovina), all interviewed by Human Rights Watch in 1996.2 These testimonies corroborate and expand on an earlier description of the JNA’s program contained in an unpublished paper, obtained by Human Rights Watch, that was written by the late Croatian General Zlatko Binenfeld, formerly a senior officer in the JNA’s chemical weapons program.3

The two chemical and biological warfare officers, when interviewed separately, gave similar descriptions of the role and activities of their units and their visits to several of the chemical agent production facilities in the former Yugoslavia. The three PRETIS technicians gave detailed descriptions of their roles in the production and development of chemical munitions before the war, including the production of a 122mm shell and the development of other munitions with demands for tolerances and quality control that far exceeded those for conventional munitions.4 One of the technicians also claimed to have visited several of the JNA’s chemical agent production facilities and gavedescriptions of their function similar to those provided by the chemical and biological warfare officers.5 Human Rights Watch also obtained testimonial evidence, supported by published sources, of the production by the Bosnian army of munitions filled with toxic chemicals during the war.6

Among documentary materials, Human Rights Watch obtained a copy of a classified 1981 JNA manual on the use of grenades filled with BZ, a psychochemical incapacitant, or CS, a tear gas.7 The existence of the manual indicates that by 1981 the JNA’s chemical munitions program was well advanced.

Moreover, both NATO and U.S. intelligence have prepared internal reports concluding that the JNA had, and the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslav inherited and maintains, a chemical weapons production capacity.8 Neither the United States nor NATO has made public pronouncements on these conclusions. Furthermore, an internal NATO intelligence report claims that Yugoslavia may have conducted research into biological weapons and that this research may be continuing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia today.9

2 Human Rights Watch interviews, Bosnia and Hercegovina and in Croatia, February-March and July-August 1996. 3 Gen. Binenfeld distributed a paper entitled “Chemical Weapons Development Program” at a seminar on “National Authority and National Implementation Measures for the Chemical Weapons Convention” in Warsaw, Poland on December 7-8, 1993 (hereinafter: Binenfeld Paper). 4 Human Rights Watch interviews, Bosnia and Hercegovina and in Croatia, February-March 1996. 5 This technician also claimed that on one visit in 1981 he saw Iraqi scientists at a chemical agent production facility in Lucani, Serbia, where they were being trained in the production of the blister agent sulfur mustard. Human Rights Watch interview, Sarajevo, February 27, 1996. The Iraqi military is first reported to have used sulfur mustard agent against Iranian troops in 1983. Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 99. These weapons were later used by Iraqi forces against Kurdish towns and villages in the 1988 Anfal campaign. Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). 6 Human Rights Watch interviews, Tuzla, July-August 1996. 7 Yugoslav National Army, Specijalne Rucne Bombe M79 I Leðni Rasprišivac M1 (Special Hand Grenade M-79 and Sprayer M-1), (Belgrade, 1981). 8 Acknowledgment of the existence of the JNA’s chemical weapons program is contained in a 1995 NATO-wide intelligence assessment of chemical and biological weapons programs in the former Yugoslavia, excerpts of which were obtained by Human Rights Watch (hereinafter: NATO Intelligence Assessment); and in the U.S. Department of Defense, Bosnia Country Handbook (December 1995), pp. 6-32 to 6-33, a copy of which was obtained by Human Rights Watch. 9 NATO Intelligence Assessment.

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