The attacks prompted a massive manhunt that led to systematic human rights violations being committed by the Indonesian forces.

Arbitrary Detention

One of the most serious problems in East Timor continues to be that of arbitrary arrest and detention. The problem is exacerbated by the number of different units of the security forces involved. Under the Indonesian criminal procedure code, only police are authorized to carry out arrests, but in East Timor, not only the army but even the civilian militia take on this function. The problem of widespread arbitrary arrest and detention was so serious in June and July 1997 after the attacks noted above that the Baucau police were forced to deny publicly that mass round-ups were underway and the army that people were being arrested at whim (main tangkap).16 In Dili, the police commander said that many people had complained to him that innocent people were being arrested without a warrant, and he said that not only did he personally sign a warrant for every single arrest that took place, but the International Committee of the Red Cross also saw every one of them from the outset. This was blatantly untrue.17

Detention in East Timor can be arbitrary in several different ways. It can be arbitrary because those carrying out the arrest and detention are not authorized to do so under Indonesian law. It can be arbitrary because the persons detained are shown no warrant, given no reason for their arrest, and have severely limited access to legal counsel. It can be arbitrary because it is based solely on information extracted under torture or other duress. It can be arbitrary because the law under which detainees are held is itself so broadly worded that its application often constitutes a violation of the right to freedom of expression or assembly.

The May 28 attack on the Brimob company led to dozens of arrests in East and West Dili. Some of the arrests may have been based on reasonable suspicion of involvement, but many others were not. Angelo Paiceli Ribeiro, for example, thirty-one, was arrested and kept as a hostage for his two older brothers who were thought to be involved. The police knew that Angelo was not involved but held him from May 31 until July 4 in the provincial police headquarters in Dili in the hope that his brothers would turn up. Filomeno da Costa, arrested at the same time, was apprehended because some of those believed to have been involved in the attack were members of a martial arts group he founded. He reportedly had no knowledge of the attack and was not involved in any way, but like Angelo, he was held until July 4 before being released. Both men were arrested by a combined team of Brimob officers and members of SGI, the Kopassus-led intelligence body. Of the twenty-six people known to have been arrested in connection with the attack, an arrest warrant was prepared beforehand in only one instance, that of the veteran activist David Dias Ximenes, who was arrested on May 31. In most cases the families were not informed of the whereabouts of their relatives and had to find out themselves where they were detained.

On June 15, two young men, Domingos Soares, eighteen, and Cerilio Gusmao, twenty-nine, were riding a motorcycle on the way to a wedding when the motorcycle ran out of gas in front of a Brimob barracks in Bairopite. The two got off and started to push it when they were arrested by Brimob soldiers, apparently thinking the two were going to mount an attack. Domingos was carrying a pocket knife as he usually did. The two were taken to police headquarters where they were severely beaten. Cerilio was released after three days. Domingos remained in custody because of the knife; police told his family they would release him for an undisclosed amount of money. The family has complained to the Justice and Peace Commission in Dili as well as to other organizations.

On June 17, a student named Vasco da Gama from the agriculture faculty of the University of East Timor was arrested together with his brother, Basilio Guterres, by a police team that came to their house in Becora-Camea, Dili, at about 4:00 a.m. in a convoy of six trucks. The arrest team was led by a Lt. Petrus. Both men were handcuffed and blindfolded, and Vasco was reportedly gagged. Witnesses reported they were beaten with rifle butts as they were pushed into one of the vehicles. They were questioned for three hours, and then Basilio was released. The abuse he endured during the three hours was entirely due to his relationship to Vasco; there was apparently no information suggesting that Basilio himself was a suspect. (Vasco was charged with rebellion and as of late July was detained in the East Timor provincial police headquarters.)

On June 19, a man named Tomas da Silva Hornai, an employee of the Mahkota Hotel, was arrested on charges of facilitating exchanges of information between the underground network and international organizations through use of a fax machine (presumably the hotel fax). He was charged with rebellion and is currently detained in the East Timor provincial police headquarters.

Outside Dili, large numbers of arrests took place in response to the guerrilla attacks, without warrant and with the army rather than the police making the arrests. In situations like this, according to one source from the area, it is rare that the arresting units have any specific evidence against any one individual. Rather, a mass arrest takes place, usually of young men who are beaten or terrorized until they come up with names that the army can then use to make a formal arrest. Those beaten are then sent back home, having been detained no more than a few days. They have no access to lawyers when they are detained, no way of contacting their families, and no protection against torture. The following cases, documented by local church sources, are indicative of this pattern. (Note that the same family name does not necessarily mean that the individuals are related.)

The attack that prompted the largest round-up was a grenade attack on May 31 in Quelicai. On June 5, a joint team from the special counterinsurgency unit, Saka; the Rajawali II unit of Kopassus; and army infantry battalion 312; entered the hamlet of Mumana, Abfala village in Quelicai, and arrested Luis Maria Da Silva, fifty-four; Cosme Belo, fifty; Manuel Gusmao Belo, fifty-four; Sidonio Belo, forty-five; Paulito Belo Mudo; Manuel Belo, twenty-two; Faustino Belo, seventeen; Joao Manuel Belo, sixteen; Martinho da S. Belo, forty-three; Gaspar Belo, thirty-five; and Venancio Belo, thirty-five, on suspicion of having information about the Quelicai attack. They were all being held in the Baucau district military command in July, except for Luis Maria da Silva, whose whereabouts were unknown. In addition, Francisco Cabral, thirty-six, from Lai-Soro-Lai was arrested on June 6, and Mario Felipe, twenty-three, from Sara-Ida, Baguia village, Quelicai, on June 7. Mario Felipe is known to have been taken to the subdistrict military command, KORAMIL 2806, in Quelicai for questioning and then to the district military command. Families of Cabral and da Silva have been unable to contact the men, and as of late July, there was growing concern for their safety.

On June 7, Dagal, twenty-two, from Butileo, Baguia, Quelicai, was arrested and taken to KORAMIL 2806 in Quelicai. Domingos Savio Freitas, twenty-four, from Kampung Gamana, Uai-Tame village, Quelicai, was arrested and taken to the police station in Baucau. Jose Moreira, twenty-three, from Gugulai, Uai-Tame, and Eusebio Pascoal da Conceicao, twenty-three, from Sara-Ida, Baguia, was arrested and taken to the KORAMIL in Quelicai. Local sources believe the men were detained only in order to see if they could produce information about others rather than because of any evidence of direct involvement themselves.

More people were arrested from other hamlets between June 6 and 9 in connection with the same incident: Adelia Ximenes, twenty-five, Joao Manuel Ximenes, twenty-seven, and Augusto Ximenes, twenty-three, all from Lebenei, Letemumo, and Felisberta Freitas, twenty-three, from the hamlet of Defadae, Macalaco village, Quelicai. Execpt for Augusto, who was taken to the Baucau police station, their place of detention was unknown as of late July.

On June 9, at least six people were arrested in their homes by the same joint team in connection with the May 31 attack. They included Cancio Ximenes, twenty-seven, from Butileo, Baguia; Jose Freitas, twenty-three, from Gamana, Uai-Tame village, Quelicai; Alexander Freitas, twenty-three, and Albino Freitas, twenty-six, both also from Gamana. All were detained at the Baucau police station. Raimundo Xavier Sarmento, twenty-two, from Sara-Ida, Baguia, Quelicai, and Fortunato Ximenes, twenty-four, from Lebenei, Letemumo, Quelicai, were also arrested from their homes and detained.

On June 16, the operations of the joint team moved to the village of Macalaco in Quelicai, where seven people were taken into custody: Domingos Freitas, thirty-three, and Virgilio Martins, twenty-eight, from Boci-Lai, Macalaco; Natalia Belo, twenty-six, from Defadae, Macalaco; Justino Freitas, twenty-eight, and Filomeno Freitas, eighteen, from Boci-Lai; and Marcos Belo, twenty-six, and Boaventura Belo, also twenty-six, both from Defadae. All were arrested from their homes and were forced to accompany the army team into the forest to point out hiding places of other villagers who had fled into the forest as the army team approached. As of late July, Domingos's whereabouts were unknown; the others were detained in the Quelicai KORAMIL.

A further set of arrests took place on June 24. Those arrested, all from Uai-Gae in the village of Vemasse, subdistrict Vemasse, were suspected of having contact with the guerrillas. They included Jeronimo da Costa, twenty-eight, Pedro Freitas, twenty-nine, Guillermo Freitas, twenty-eight, Serafim Freitas, twenty-two, Alexander Freitas, twenty-six, Alberto Faria, twenty-four, Lamberto Freitas, twenty-nine, Quintino Freitas, twenty-eight, Rui Manuel Freitas, twenty-four, Carlos Freitas, twenty-nine, and Ciquito Freitas, twenty-four. All but the first, Jeronimo, were taken to the Flamboyan Hotel in Kota Baru, Baucau, long known as an interrogation center for Kopassus. Jeromino was taken to the Baucau police station.

Two others from Uai-Gae village, Miguel Armindo Freitas and Saturnino da Costa, were arrested by five "civilians" who were taking part in the army raid, one of them a Gardapaksi member also named (confusingly)Jeronimo da Costa and four hansip members, Inacio, Jose Beras, Amandio and Domingos. Finally, two more men from Uai-Gae, Fortuna da Costa and Marcelino da Costa, were arrested by an armed unit called Tripika, based in Vemasse.

On June 25, David Alex, the guerrilla commander whom the Indonesian army accused of being the mastermind of the Quelicai attack, was shot and wounded as he and a group of six others were captured by a thirty-eight man military team composed of the same forces that were carrying out the above arrests. Alex died the same day in still unexplained circumstances. Arrests were stepped up in the days that followed.

On July 2, for example, a joint military team of Saka, Kopassus and Battalion 312 arrived in the villages of Letemumo and Lacoliu. A group of about forty young men, fearing arrest, fled to nearby Uada-Boro mountain where fourteen of them were hidden in a cave by an older man, Lucas Gaio, sixty-three. At about 11:00 a.m. on July 2, the military team arrived in pursuit. The soldiers burned down Gaio's house and in the course of capturing the fourteen men, shot dead one of them, Antonio Freitas. The circumstances under which Freitas died are not known, but there is no indication that the youths hiding in the cave were armed. Those arrested included Cesario Marcal Freitas, thirty, and Felix Freitas, twenty-seven, from the hamlet of Mocobubo in Laculiu village; Marcos Pereira, twenty-three, from Uaule, Laculiu; and nine men from the hamlet of Lenei, Letemumo village. The nine were Celestinho Ximenes, twenty; Domingus Ximenes, twenty-six; Gregorio Ximenes, twenty-five; Leopoldo Ximenes, twenty-four; Januario Ximenes, twenty-five; Virgilio Ximenes, twenty-five; Domingos Ximenes, twenty; Amaro Ximenes, nineteen, and Luciano Ximenes, twenty-five. (None of the Ximenes' are brothers, although they may be more distantly related.) Lucas Gaio was also captured.

On July 9, another man, Guilherme Moreira, thirty-five, of Uai-Tame, Quelicai, was taken into custody. The whereabouts of all those arrested on July 2 and 9 was unclear as of late July.

Police in East Timor are also making use of an anachronistic law that is increasingly being used to arrest political suspects when no strong evidence against them is available. The law, Emergency Regulation No.12/1951, banning possession of certain kinds of weapons, was used in 1997 to convict at least five East Timorese accused of taking part in a riot in Baucau on June 10 and 11, 1996: Orlando Moreira, Miguel Correia, Armando da Costa, Jose Armindo and Celestino Correia. The five were among a group of twenty-one young men, three of them minors, sentenced for their part in a riot that followed the desecration of a picture of the Virgin Mary by an Indonesian security guard at a mosque in Baguia, outside of Baucau. The twenty-one were convicted on different charges, including assault and damage to property. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, in an opinion dated May 15, 1997, concluded that the detention of all twenty-one was arbitrary because several fundamental rights of the suspects had been ignored by authorities, including presumption of innocence, the right to counsel of one's own choice, and the right not to be compelled to confess guilt.

The use of Emergency Regulation 12, however, is an additional problem. The law has suddenly come into use again throughout Indonesia after being a legal museum piece for decades and was most recently used to arrest dozens of young men in West Kalimantan following communal violence there in early 1997. It was adopted at a time when Indonesia was just emerging from a long guerrilla war of independence against the Dutch, and the young republic was trying to both restore order, ensure that external threats were minimized, and transform a bewildering array of militias into a national army. The current arrests are taking place under Article 2 of the law which reads as follows:

Article 2 (1): Whoever illegally enters Indonesia to make, receive, try to obtain, hand over or try to hand over, transport, possess, store, use or take out of Indonesia a weapon for striking [as an ax or machete], thrusting [as a spear], or stabbing shall be sentenced to a prison term of up to ten years.

(2) Striking, thrusting or stabbing weapons do not include objects which are clearly intended to be used in agriculture or household use or for legitimate occupational purposes or which are clearly heirlooms, antiques or magical objects.

The "illegally enters" phrase should by itself make the law inapplicable to the current conflict in East Timor. Moreover, in a place like East Timor where possession of various kinds of sharp implements is common, the law can easily be used to arrest almost anyone. Indonesian legal commentators themselves note that almost all the terms used in the law are vague and relative ("antique" and "household use" and "striking" among them).18

One other case of arbitrary detention in East Timor deserves note. On March 30, 1997, Jose do Rosario Rangel Pires was sentenced to one year in prison. He had been arrested on charges of insulting the president (Article 134 of the Criminal Code) for holding up a banner during a demonstration in Dili on November 11, 1996, that depicted President Soeharto biting a bone, standing next to guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmao. The demonstration had taken place in the complex of the Dili diocese following a press statement read by Bishop Belo on the occasion of a ceremony to bless a controversial statue of Christ, built by the Indonesian government, in Pasir Putih, outside Dili. Pires had gone to Dili from his home in Manatuto to attend the ceremony. After Pires had returned to Manatuto and was harassed by an intelligence agent, he turned himself in to the Manatuto police.19

Witnesses testified that during the demonstration, he had held up a corner of the one-meter banner, but no one heard him say anything disparaging about the president, and no one heard him take part in the pro-independence shouts of "Vive Xanana!" Pires himself freely acknowledged that he had helped hold the banner with three others but said he had not seen it before it was unfurled. Whether he had or not, however, his action was clearly a peaceful exercise of his right to freedom of expression, and he never should have been arrested or detained.


As noted above, torture continues to be endemic in East Timor, a standard method used by intelligence operatives and others to get information about suspected guerrilla activity or to force confessions. Standard methods including application of electric shocks to sensitive parts of the body, using a wire either plugged into a wall socket or attached to a small generator; burning the skin with lighted cigarettes; placing the hand or foot under a chair or table leg which the interrogator then sits on; and kicking and severe beating, sometimes with pieces of plywood, pipe or electric cable.

The Indonesian government has learned that torture can be politically costly in cases of internationally-known activists or those likely to be the subject of diplomatic inquiries or prolonged political trials. But there is almost no cost to torturing villagers who are only briefly in detention, and when information about torture emerges several months after the abuse took place, it commands no attention whatsoever.

The perpetrators can be any branch of the military, including the police, but the most feared interrogators are those from Kopassus, the army special forces, and the various joint counterinsurgency teams they command, and the joint intelligence unit, Satuan Gabungan Intelijen or SGI, also believed to be directed by Kopassus.

Liquica District

On February 26, 1997, six people were arrested in the hamlet of Nassuta, Ulmera village, in the Bazartete subdistrict of Liquica district.20 The military apparently suspected that Falintil had set up a guerrilla post nearby and believed the six had information about it. Those arrested included Natalino Soares, forty-one; his wife, Maria Ribeiro Sarmento, forty; their twenty-two-year-old daughter, Ivonia; and three young men, Adao de Jesus Pereira, twenty-two; Augusto Nunes Marques, twenty-two; and Caetano de Jesus Araujo, twenty-one. A joint team consisting of the district military command of Liquica and SGI arrived at the Soares home at 8:00 a.m. and took the six to the Liquica district command where they were held and continuously questioned until the next day when they were released. Some of the men were given electric shocks, and Natalino Soares was reportedly forced to agree to become an informant for the military.

On April 30, five others from the same subdistrict were arrested on charges of having contact with the guerrillas. Felix da Concecao, seventy-two; his wife, Aurora da Silva, fifty-six; their son, Jose da Conceicao, thirty-one; a housewife, Lourenca Ribeiro, twenty-nine; and a civil servant, Florindo da Costa, forty-eight, were arrested at 9:00 a.m. by troops from infantry battalions 713 and 721. All lived in the hamlet of Metagou in Bazartete subdistrict. They were brought to the police command in Bazartete where they were beaten with rifle butts and given electric shocks. The length of their detention is not known.


On March 26, 1997, at about 1:00 p.m., a joint team of Kopassus, Makikit and the youth militia Gardapaksi, arrested Vicente da Costa on suspicion of having contact with the guerrillas. Da Costa, from the hamlet of Buanurak, Loihuno village, Ossu subdistrict, was reportedly tortured with lighted cigarettes in Kopassus Post No.1 before being released on March 28 with his body covered in burn marks.


Torture was reported by many of the youths arrested in connection with the December 24, 1996 violence following Bishop Belo's return home after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, and with the March 23 incident at the Mahkota Hotel when demonstrators tried to see a U.N. representative.21

Luis Afonso, a nineteen-year-old student, was one of those arrested on suspicion of having beaten up a suspected intelligence agent named Tukiran as well as the district police commander Lt. Col. Beno Kilapong on December 24. (He admitted to having thrown one stone at the intelligence agent; he said he had not intended to hit the police commander.) He was arrested on the street by a member of the police intelligence unit in Dili on December 28; the officer had no warrant. Luis Afonso was brought by taxi to the district police command where he was put in a cell. After about twenty minutes, he was taken out for interrogation. He said he was ordered to strip, and interrogators proceeded to torture him until he mentioned everyone he could think of who had taken part in the incident. He was hit over the head with a plastic chair, his head was put in a plastic bag, and his genitals were burned with lighted cigarettes. The fingernails of his thumbs and his big toes were also pulled out, according to his lawyer. Several police officers joined in kicking him. A wound over his right eye later had to be stitched by a police doctor, who told him that the ferocity of the abuse he received was linked to the fact that one of two people he was alleged to have beaten was the commanding officer of his interrogators.

Agusto Raimundo Matos, twenty-one, was one of those arrested in the Mahkota case. In an affidavit given to his lawyer, he states that on March 23 at 5:00 a.m., he left his house in East Dili to take part in a demonstrationat the Hotel Mahkota where Jamsheed Marker, the special representative of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was staying. The demonstration, in support of independence, began at about 6:00 a.m. and had been underway for about an hour when police arrived and began beating and arresting those involved. Agusto was one of those arrested. He said that while still at the Mahkota, he was beaten with a piece of plywood, an iron pipe, and a piece of rattan, then thrown in a car where he continued to be beaten until he lost consciousness. At the police station, he was interrogated about who ordered the demonstration and who was present, and then was forced to say that it was he who brought the banners and flag used in the demonstration and that he had been one of those who had broken windows at the hotel. He said he was repeatedly beaten and burned with lighted cigarettes.

When the questioning was over, he was taken to the provincial police command (polda) where he was held overnight. The next day, March 24, at 7:15 p.m., he was taken back to the district command, and from there to Becora Prison. He was interviewed there by delegates from the International Committee of the Red Cross. (On April 4, all of the detainees from the Mahkota demonstration were removed for one day because Bishop Belo was making a visit there; they were taken to the police command, then brought back to Becora prison on April 5.)

Testimonies from others arrested at the same time are similar. Miguel Alves, twenty-nine, was burned with lighted cigarettes while being questioned in the district police command; Luis de Fatima Pereira, twenty, was cut with a razor; and Domingos da Costa, twenty-one, lost a front tooth from being kicked in the face.

The Death of David Alex

Reports of summary executions in Indonesia are frequent but often difficult to confirm. One death which received widespread attention in June 1997 was that of guerrilla commander David Alex who died in custody after being shot by members of a military team who captured Alex and six others. The circumstances of his death remain very unclear, despite an investigation by Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission.

On June 25 at about 11:00 a.m., a joint team of thirty-eight men composed mainly of Kopassus soldiers and troops from infantry battalion 312 (from West Java) and the local district military command (Kodim 1628) captured Alex and five others in the hamlet of Watume in Caobada village, near Baucau, about 140 kilometers east of Dili. The military presented the capture as a major victory. In a press conference the next day, attended by Brig. Gen. Syahrir, the commander of the army division based in Bali that includes East Timor; Col. Slamet Sidabutar, the newly appointed regional commander based in Dili, and his chief of staff; the East Timor police commander; and several intelligence officers, the military said Alex was responsible for both the May 31 grenade attack in Quelicai and the burning of the old market in Dili on June 7. (A report from CNRM dated June 3, 1997, indeed claimed that forces under his command were responsible for the burning of polling stations on May 29 in the Laga, Ossu, Baguia, and Baucau, all in Baucau district, and in Viqueque district.) Colonel Sidabutar told reporters that the joint team, tipped off by a member of the public, had come upon five suspicious-looking people standing over a cave. A member of the group fired a shot at the team, which fired back; the group then tried to flee, according to the military, but they were surrounded. The team ordered them to surrender and when they did not do so, the team was forced to shoot, wounding Alex in the upper part of the right lung and the right leg, severing an artery and causing major blood loss.22 Sidabutar said at the press conference that he flew directly to Baucau when he got the news, reaching the site at about 6:00 p.m. He then accompanied Alex back to Dili by helicopter for treatment at the Wira Husada military hospital, but Alex died there from blood loss.

The East Timorese opposition and many solidarity groups around the world immediately assumed Alex was killed, suggesting he had been deliberately killed in the hospital. Reuters quoted Sidabutar responding to these charges by saying Alex died while he was receiving a blood transfusion and in any case, the army had no reason for wanting him dead because he could have supplied valuable information about the resistance. But no one has beenable to verify the military's account; the only people who might have an alternative version are in custody. The account itself, however, raises serious questions. If Alex was shot at 11:00 a.m. and was only taken to Dili sometime after 6:00 p.m., what happened in the intervening time period, and why, if blood loss was so apparent, was it necessary to transport him to the military hospital in Dili when medical treatment was available at a hospital in Baucau? Denial of available medical care can also constitute a form of killing, although Indonesian army sources said the facilities in Baucau were inadequate for treatment of injuries as severe as Alex's.

Another controversy arose over the burial of David Alex. The military reported he was buried in Dili on June 26 in a ceremony attended by family members and at which a Catholic priest officiated. The body was not made available for autopsy before burial. The family denied that they attended. Alcino da Costa, Alex's fifteen-year-old son, said he was summoned to witness the burial, but when he arrived at the Bida Santana cemetery, accompanied by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the burial had already taken place, and military personnel simply pointed out the grave. He said he would not believe the grave was his father's unless he could see his father's face.23 On June 30, Alex's sister, brother, nephew and sister-in-law wrote a letter to Colonel Sidabutar asking where Alex was buried and requesting that he be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs and cultural traditions. On July 4, however, the nephew, reportedly under pressure, said he was satisfied with the military's explanation of his uncle's death and thanked senior officers for their assistance.24 Colonel Sidabutar said he would not oppose an independent investigation into Alex's death.25 Because the Indonesian government does not allow access to East Timor to human rights investigators, however, no such inquiry has been possible.

16 "Kapolda Timtim: Tak ada penangkapan massal di Baucau," Suara Timor Timur, June 30,1997, and "Posisi GPK bercerai berai," Suara Timor Timur, July 11, 1997. 17 "Kapolda: Tak benar ada penangkapan liar," Suara Timor Timur, June 9, 1997. 18 Andi Hamzah, Delik-Delik Tersebar di Luar KUHP, PT Pradnya Paramita (Jakarta), no date, p.7. 19 Aniceto Guterres Lopes, S.H. and Nikolaus Ladae, S.H., "Nota Pembelaan: Mencari Tumbal Penghina Soeharto,"(defense document), Dili, March 25, 1997. 20 The material in this section comes from confidential documents made available to Human Rights Watch in July 1997 by investigators not connected to either side of the conflict. 21 Handwritten affidavits of victims made available to Human Rights Watch in Jakarta, July 1997. 22 "David Alex tewas," Suara Timor Timur, June 27, 1998. 23 ""Keluarga David Alex kirim surat ke Danrem," Suara Timor Timur, July 4, 1997. 24 " Keluarga David Berterima Kasih, Abri Telah Kuburkan David," (David's Family Thanks ABRI for Burying David), Antara News Agency (Jakarta), July 5, 1997. 25 "Indonesian Military Says Inquiry Could Be Held into Guerrilla Death Source," Radio Australia, Australian Broadcasting Corporation International News, July 3, 1997 (4:22 p.m. AEST).