HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Publications THE UNINDICTED Reaping the Rewards of “Ethnic Cleansing” January 1997, Vol. 9, No. 1 (D) SUMMARY | RECOMMENDATIONS | TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY The same warlords who took control of the town of Prijedor, in northwestern Bosnia and Hercegovina, through systematic policies of ethnic cleansing—including pre-meditated slaughter, concentration camps, mass rape, and the takeover of businesses, government offices, and all communal property—have retained total control over key economic, infrastructure, and humanitarian sectors of the community in the post-war period. The architects of “ethnic cleansing,” many of whom are under investigation by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, interact daily with representatives of international organizations. This contact grants them a wholly undeserved legitimacy, given that they achieved their positions by “disappearing” the duly elected mayor of the town, Muhamed Cehajic, and thousands of other Bosniak or Bosnian Croat community leaders and citizens. While international attention has rightly focused on the atrocities committed during and after the takeover of the town, little attention has been given to the fact that the mayor, deputy mayor, police chief, hospital director and director of the local “Red Cross” got away with their crimes and became rich men in the process, having expropriated businesses, homes, and other assets of the non-Serbs of the community, estimated to be worth several billion German marks. In Prijedor, as elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, the international community’s failure to detain war criminals or to control ongoing abuses by unindicted war criminals has combined with the donation of aid to enrich and empower many of the very people most responsible for genocide and “ethnic cleansing.” As we have recently also done in Doboj and Teslic, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki has conducted field research in Prijedor to uncover who is continuing the cycle of human rights abuses and intimidation and why these criminals remain at large and in positions of power. The detrimental impact that Bosnia’s war criminals continue to have on respect for human rights and on long-term prospects for peace is abundantly clear. It is essential to the peace process in Bosnia and Hercegovina that the international community strategically utilize the economic and political leverage at its disposal to facilitate the successful implementation of the civilian components of the Dayton agreement, most important of which is to hold war criminals accountable and to bring an end to ongoing abuses against vulnerable populations in the region. The Bosnian administrative district of Prijedor, located west of the city of Banja Luka in what is now Republika Srpska, was before 1992 a multi-ethnic area with a non-Serb population of well over 50,000. After the Bosnian Serbs took control of the region in April 1992, the communities and homes of non-Serbs were destroyed, families were separated, and thousands of people were incarcerated in concentration camps, where many were tortured and executed. Tens of thousands were forcibly deported under inhumane conditions. Today, only about 600 Bosniaks remain. The town also has a small Bosnian Croat community, left without a parish priest since the abduction and “disappearance” of Roman Catholic priest Father Tomislav Matanovic in September 1995. According to the Roman Catholic charity Caritas, there are approximately 2,674 Bosnian Croats remaining in the Prijedor municipality (1,405 in the town of Prijedor, 592 in Ljubija, 416 in Ravska, and 261 in Surkovac), out of more than 6,000 Bosnian Croats registered in the 1991 census. The Catholic church and all mosques in Prijedor were destroyed in 1992. Prior to the war, more than half a million non-Serbs lived in what is now the northern region of Republika Srpska. Today, fewer than 20,000 non-Serbs remain throughout the territory. The criminal administration established in the town of Prijedor achieved their goal of eliminating non-Serbs from the society, through planned murder, “disappearance,” and expulsion of non-Serb officials, such as mayor Cehajic, and civilians. According to survivor reports, mayor Cehajic and six other men were removed by Bosnian Serb guards from Omarska camp on July 26, 1992, and have never been seen again. Many of the men responsible for these crimes were members of the “Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor,” or “Crisis Committee of the Serbian Municipality of Prijedor,” established to conduct the usurpation. The police, as will be shown in this report, also played a major part in the takeover and in subsequent abuses, both independently and as members of special units sent to round up community leaders or conduct “ethnic cleansing” operations. The police authorities and officers charged today with protecting the public good in Prijedor, are in many cases the same individuals who have been accused by numerous witnesses of participation in war crimes. As is true for many towns in the Republika Srpska today, the power structure in Prijedor mirrors that which existed during the war. These same local Prijedor authorities have consistently refused to protect non-Serbs or to investigate crimes against them, even following the signing of the Dayton agreement. Civilian and police authorities work in tandem to prevent the return of refugees and displaced persons by organizing or inciting violence against those who attempt to return, and by orchestrating (with the assistance of the Bosnian Serb Army, according to NATO) the destruction of houses (see section “Destruction of Property to Prevent Repatriation”). Restrictions on freedom of movement, the destruction of property, and the ethnically-based eviction of persons through the application of discriminatory laws are further evidence that the Bosnian Serb authorities have maintained their goal of an ethnically pure entity (or as the Republika Srpska authorities put it, “state”)—the goal that led to massive “ethnic cleansing” campaigns during the war. Most recently, according to a reliable local source, the Prijedor authorities have reportedly destroyed property ownership records, which, if true, would make it nearly impossible for refugees and displaced persons who fled under immediate threat to prove ownership of their property. To make matters worse, according to information gathered by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, the international community is investing large sums of money in Prijedor through “community projects,” many of which were funded by the British government relief agency, the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) and implemented by IFOR/SFOR. The illicitly installed local authorities control virtually all economic sectors in Prijedor, including infrastructure, public construction and other companies, the media, health care, education, and humanitarian aid. In at least some cases, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki has learned that persons believed responsible for flagrant abuses of the Geneva Conventions and international human rights law, and in some cases participants in organized crime, have benefited from reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Due to the current power structure in Prijedor, humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance is easily misused. Our research leads us to the conclusion that post-Dayton obstructionism by the Prijedor leadership is not only motivated by economic gain but represents a highly organized effort, directed to a significant extent by the Republika Srpska authorities in Pale (especially by the Ministry of the Interior), to prevent permanently the repatriation of non-Serb refugees and displaced persons to the Republika Srpska and to retain control over all municipal functions. In addition, local Prijedor officials have consistently refused to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and their cooperation with the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations charged with implementing the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreements has been minimal. This non-cooperation is in direct violation of their commitment under the Dayton agreement. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki believes that the failure of the Republika Srpska authorities to cooperate with certain aspects of the Dayton agreement is the result of an overall policy. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki’s recent report on the municipalities of Doboj and Teslic, for example, reveals similar patterns to the policies carried out in Prijedor. Events in the Zone of Separation near Zvornik, the destruction of housing in Brcko, and the expulsion and harassment of minorities in Banja Luka seem to bear this out. According to the U.N. Commission of Experts, “The Bosnian Serb implementation of practically identical strategies and tactics for the conquest of territories and subsequent detention of non-Serb pop[ulation]s suggest an overall plan devised prior to the conflict and carried out locally.” According to a November 29, 1996 report by Laura Kay Rozen of the U.S. newspaper The Christian Science Monitor, of the seventy-four people indicted for war crimes in Bosnia, approximately twenty are in the Prijedor area. In November 1996, four persons indicted for war crimes were discovered to be police officers in the Prijedor area. Two other indicted persons are reportedly serving in the reserve police, and a third as a member of the “special police.” Their commander, Simo Drljaca, who by his own admission was responsible, along with others, for the administration of concentration camps in the Prijedor area, and who is expected to be indicted for war crimes by the ICTY in the near future, continued to serve as police chief of Prijedor until IPTF demanded his removal from office in September 1996 following an armed altercation with soldiers of the International Implementation Force (IFOR). As of January 1997, however, Drljaca has continued to act as chief of police, giving orders directly to Ranko Mijic, his supposed replacement. Control by the Srpska Demokratska Stranka (SDS), or Serbian Democratic Party, expresses itself in abuses of the rights of anyone not pledging loyalty to the SDS agenda and methods. The ongoing removal of non-SDS members from businesses, threats against private business owners by the local mafia, and the control of the media by hard-line SDS representatives, indicate that members of opposition groups and moderates are very limited in their ability to affect the situation and are, in fact, under threat themselves. Despite all the above, some international actors in Prijedor often fail to criticize the municipal authorities. An international monitor, for example, when asked in June 1996 about his interactions with Drljaca, told our investigators: “Drljaca knows he can trust us. [We] are completely neutral...it is not our mandate to judge...we never take any side...we never say who’s right and who’s wrong...we are here to work for [our organization]...and we have fine relations with them all.” The Importance of Conditionality for Reconstruction Aid The international community has squandered much of the leverage available to enforce compliance with the Dayton peace agreement, especially by lifting sanctions against Republika Srpska. Therefore, the strategic use of reconstruction aid in ensuring compliance has become all the more important. The international community has an obligation to reassure donors, including U.S. and European taxpayers, that reconstruction aid is used wisely, and that those who used ethnic nationalism as an excuse to murder, imprison and expel compatriots, to steal the property of others and to control humanitarian assistance do not continue to reap the benefits of their criminal activities. Otherwise, aid intended by donors to benefit the ordinary people of Bosnia who have suffered due to the war will reward their very persecutors or those who have exploited the war situation for personal gain. For this reason, reconstruction aid should be denied to municipalities where the authorities are under investigation for war crimes by the ICTY, or where there has been serious and/or protracted non-compliance with the Dayton agreement, including involvement by the authorities in human rights abuses, incitement to violence against returnees, violation of election rules and regulations, failure to cooperate with the ICTY (e.g. when indicted persons are known to reside in a particular town and are not arrested by the authorities and turned over to the ICTY for trial), and/or non-cooperation with the IPTF or other international organizations charged with assisting in the implementation of the Dayton agreement. Under these guidelines, Prijedor would be ineligible for international reconstruction aid until there was a change in leadership. The guidelines would not restrict humanitarian assistance, although such assistance should be carefully monitored. An international source who spent months in Prijedor told Human Rights Watch/Helsinki in January 1997: “Only about 30 percent of humanitarian aid [to Prijedor] reaches the people.” In towns where there is general compliance with the Dayton agreement, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki recommends targeted reconstruction aid which will assist ordinary people directly, e.g. micro enterprise projects, support of the independent media, support for ethnically neutral educational programs, assistance to medical facilities which have demonstrated equity in the provision of treatment to all citizens, and bypassing publicly owned companies when possible. Strict guidelines should be established regarding equal access for all citizens as beneficiaries of these projects. The World Bank, nongovernmental organizations, and government donors are advised to investigate carefully the ownership and history of companies applying for aid and to monitor closely spending. Donors should keep in mind the possibility that the legitimate owners or directors of companies may have been murdered or forcibly removed by local authorities, who assumed control as the result of an organized strategy, as was the case in Prijedor in 1992. In a more recent example, as the Office of the High Representative reported in November, the SPRS, a Republika Srpska opposition party, alleged that, in 1996 alone, 112 of its members had been removed from their jobs because of their political affiliation. According to a November-December 1996 report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), local courts have ruled in many cases in favor of reinstatement, but in none of the cases have the judgements been enforced. On January 2, 1997, Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic, in a letter to Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, informed him that the indictments of the ICTY were no longer valid and said that the arrest of Radovan Karadzic or Ratko Mladic would “threaten the existing peace” and rekindle “massive civil and political unrest.” She continued, “The present position of the Republika Srpska is that we are unwilling to hand over Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic for trial in the Hague as we believe that any such trial now falls outside of the scope of the tribunal’s constitutional framework.” In a thinly veiled threat to the international community, Plavsic stated, “We believe that massive civil and military unrest would result in the Republika Srpska which might well prove uncontrollable by the civil authorities. The chances of fighting restarting would, in our judgement, be high. These would be even higher were any attempt made to hunt down Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic and forcibly bring them to trial.” (See Plavsic letter attached as Appendix B.) In response to Plavsic’s letter, the European Commission stated that it would not consider giving aid to Republika Srpska (with the exception of inter-entity cooperation projects and humanitarian aid) until the Republika Srpska complied with its obligations to the ICTY. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), however, has sent mixed messages. In a statement to the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Carl Bildt said, “I do not accept that as an answer, and she knows that. I think that was a stupid letter. In direct talks with the leadership of the Republika Srpska, I made it very clear what we expect to happen, and what might be the consequences if that does not happen. Republika Srpska has an interest in cooperating with the tribunal, and they are cooperating with the tribunal better than they did...with the exception of handing over those that are indicted. Which is the fundamental exception. But that will not be tolerated for long, and they know that.” Bildt’s spokesman, however, seemed to send a different message, when he stated on January 10 that Plavsic’s letter to Annan would not cause any disruption in aid going to the Republika Srpska. “It makes no difference as I would see it on the flow of reconstruction aid being discussed in Brussels at the moment,” said spokesman Colum Murphy, who argued that Plavsic’s assertions were legal arguments which she was entitled to make and did not constitute more than that, despite the apparent threat of violence. This response is most disappointing, particularly as it suggests to the Republika Srpska authorities that there will be no financial consequences for the outright defiance of binding agreements. Many argue that economic aid should be used as a carrot rather than a stick. The infusion of aid money does not guarantee peace or respect for the rule of law, however. Huge expenditures of capital (over 260 million DM, or about US165 million) in the city of Mostar was invested to no avail between 1994 and 1996. The assistance did not serve to reunite the city or to prevent ongoing ethnically based harassment, evictions and expulsions. As has been shown in Mostar, in Prijedor, and in other towns, so long as those responsible for war crimes or involved in organized crime are allowed to retain control over resources, ordinary people, especially those who are now in the minority or who do not support the dominant parties, cannot expect to fully benefit from those resources. More than a year has passed since the signing of the Dayton agreement, yet the vast majority of persons indicted for war crimes remain at large. There is increasing outrage about the failure to apprehend, detain and try these individuals. At a conference in Dayton, Ohio last November, OSCE Amb. Robert Frowick remarked, “The whole peace process rests on this issue. There will not be a better moment than right now,” to apprehend the indicted persons. Action must be taken to ensure their apprehension; there must also be more focus on those who have not yet been indicted. Increased financial support to the ICTY is imperative to enable expedited investigations and indictments of those who have so far eluded international censure and to ensure their apprehension. The failure of the Republika Srpska authorities to comply with the orders of the ICTY, combined with the refusal of IFOR/SFOR to arrest persons indicted for war crimes even when encountered in the course of their duty, has permitted war criminals to remain free and retain control. Furthermore, the international community’s willingness to allow money to find its way into the hands of suspected war criminals and/or mafia members, leads to questions about the international community’s willingness to confront the real problems that threaten the peace and place the region’s stability at risk. The international community has tolerated the continued exercise of power by persons responsible for the worst atrocities seen in Europe since World War II. This report names those individuals, describes their involvement in serious abuses of international humanitarian and human rights law, and highlights their continued obstruction of the Dayton agreement, with the expectation that the international community will finally take action to hold them accountable—and, in the meantime, will prevent them from lining their pockets at the expense of their intimidated neighbors, the displaced, the purged and the dead. RECOMMENDATIONS Human Rights Watch/Helsinki urges the international bodies set up by the Dayton agreement, as well as the OSCE, to take action in the following ways:  The Office of
the High Representative (OHR) should form a civilian implementation council or task force, as
recommended by the International Crisis Group. This council or task force, chaired by the High
Representative, would have the authority to dismiss officials who have seriously obstructed or
violated the Dayton Peace Agreement, as documented by the International Police Task Force
(IPTF), the International Implementation Force (IFOR), the Stabilization Force (SFOR), the
Office of the Human Rights Ombudsperson, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), or the OHR itself. Human Rights Watch recommends that such a council
include representatives from the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and from the Republika
Srpska. Independent organizations and individuals, including human rights or advocacy NGOs
or groups, should be permitted to submit evidence to this new council. Annex 7 of the General
Framework Agreement, “Refugees and Displaced Persons,”, Article I, requires the
Parties to engage in “the prosecution, dismissal or transfer, as appropriate, of persons in
military, paramilitary, and police forces, or other public servants, responsible for serious
violations of the basic rights of persons belonging to ethnic or minority groups.”;The
Stabilization Force (SFOR), the OHR, the OSCE and other international organizations operating
in Bosnia and Hercegovina should articulate clearly a duty of their representatives to expose all
serious or continuing human rights abuses, as well as name known perpetrators. While sources
and information which would directly endanger witnesses must obviously be protected, reports
of human rights abuses should not be withheld from the public for political reasons, and
disclosure should be timely. Further, investigations of human rights abuses must not be delayed
or prevented for political reasons;SFOR, in
partnership with the IPTF, should become more actively involved in guaranteeing and protecting
the security, safety and human rights of non-Serbs and targeted Bosnian Serbs in Republika
Srpska, and displaced persons and refugees wishing to return to their place of origin, especially
when the local police have failed to take action or have been implicated in abuses. For example,
SFOR and IPTF should establish and/or increase joint patrols in areas where there has been
ethnically-based harassment.SFOR should
redouble its efforts “to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian
populations, refugees, and displaced persons and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence
to life and person,” as stated in the Dayton agreement. Human Rights Watch commends
IFOR/SFOR on its efforts to assist persons under threat through targeted patrols and its
investigations into bombings in the Zone of Separation, but we recommend more consistent and
strategic protection planning. Further, SFOR is urged to publicly reveal the results of
investigations into the destruction of housing in Hambarine and other villages in the Prijedor
municipality.OSCE,
SFOR, OHR, and IPTF, together with UNHCR, should develop detailed protection plans to
prevent ethnically-based evictions or expulsions throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina, such as
those being developed in Mostar. Human Rights Watch is concerned that any possible exodus of
Serbs from the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia may result in renewed evictions of non-Serbs
in northern Bosnia. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki supports the recommendation of the Forced
Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute to condition reconstruction aid on the repeal of
discriminatory property laws which are used to expel persons on the basis of ethnicity.OSCE should
move immediately to strike all candidates from the roster for the municipal elections who have
demonstrated serious and/or protracted non-compliance with the Elections Annex of the Dayton
agreement and with the rules and regulations set by the Provisional Election Commission (PEC).
Non-compliance should be interpreted to include the failure to permit freedom of movement and
other violations of the annex or the code of Conduct, as described within the PEC’s rules
and regulations.The
international community, specifically High Representative Carl Bildt and IPTF Commissioner
Peter FitzGerald, should demand the removal from office of Dragan Kijac, Republika Srpska
minister of the interior due to his repeated and significant non-compliance with the Dayton Peace
Agreement, i.e. his refusal to comply with the demands of IPTF to remove, arrest, and turn over
for trial those persons indicted for war crimes who continue to work for the Republika Srpska
police (in fact, Kijac denied that they work for the police at all); his refusal to remove Simo
Drljaca, former police chief in Prijedor from a position of responsibility within the police system;
his non-cooperation regarding the restructuring of the police force, which has included, among
other things, a refusal to provide IPTF with a complete list of police officers in Republika
Srpska; his failure to hold local police responsible for the deaths of Bosniaks in police custody
which have occurred since the signing of the Dayton agreement; the holding of unauthorized
weapons by police stations in Republika Srpska which are under his direct command: the use of
Republika Srpska police to escort Radovan Karadzic, an indicted war criminal; and his
interference with freedom of expression.OHR and
OSCE should encourage the development of independent media in Prijedor. This is especially
important since no independent media exist currently, and the media are controlled by persons
who advocated “ethnic cleansing” during the war and have incited ethnically based
violence since the signing of the Dayton agreement.Human Rights Watch, recognizing the critical role that creation of a neutral and professional police force can play in the current situation, urges the International Police Task Force to forward that goal in the following ways: IPTF should
press the Republika Srpska to sign an agreement which mirrors the formal police restructuring
agreement signed by the Federation, including the screening process for all members of the
police force. Failure to do so immediately should be declared non-compliance with the Dayton
agreement and should trigger punitive measures, such as the reimposition of sanctions and the
withholding of economic aid. This restructuring must include secret, “special,” and
reservist police forces, which should be vetted for persons believed responsible for war crimes,
human rights abuses, non-cooperation with IPTF, and non-compliance with other provisions of
the Dayton agreement.IPTF should
ensure that all police officers throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina responsible for post-Dayton
human rights abuses, or who have failed to investigate and punish those responsible for human
rights abuses committed under their jurisdiction, be ineligible for police posts and be removed
from their positions. Acts of non-compliance should be understood to include, but should not be
limited to, the obstruction of freedom of movement, failure to respect the right to remain,
violations of freedom of expression and association, and harassment and intimidation of persons
based upon their ethnic or political affiliation. Police officials or officers who have threatened or
committed acts of violence against IPTF should also be ineligible for police posts and should be
removed from their positions. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki has provided a list of allegations
against specific police officers in Prijedor to IPTF.IPTF should
publicize the screening process of the Republika Srpska police structure through the international
and, most importantly, local media. IPTF, as has been done in the Federation, should create
mechanisms through which the local population can furnish the IPTF with information regarding
abusive police officers and paramilitary members, and establish procedures to protect individuals
who provide information on abusive officials to the IPTF. Without concrete protection
mechanisms, intimidation may prevent civilians from reporting continuing human rights abuses
at the hands of the authorities. For example, names of informants to IPTF should not be kept on
file in IPTF stations due to the presence of local informants.IPTF should
instruct stations in the Prijedor municipality to record, report and make public instances of
continuing human rights abuses and protracted non-compliance with the Dayton agreement by
local police forces or specific members of those forces.IPTF should
instruct its stations throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina to inform IPTF headquarters of any
sightings of persons indicted for war crimes. Any such instances, and specifically the discovery
of indicted individuals within the local police forces, should be treated as a matter of highest
priority. Information about serious human rights abuses gathered by IPTF should not be
withheld from the public, especially in cases where local police are involved in the commission
of such abuses. Specifically, the results of investigations into indicted persons working as police
officers in the Prijedor area should be made public. This includes four regular police officers,
two reserve police officers, and one special police officer.IPTF should
share information regarding police involvement in war crimes or human rights abuses with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). An agreement should be
established between IPTF and the ICTY to exchange information on records in the ICTY on
police officials, politicians and members of paramilitary groups in the area. IPTF should be
advised about any police officers under investigation by the ICTY, so that those police officers
can be vetted.IPTF should
make public its information regarding unauthorized weapons caches and/or weapons violations
by police forces. In Banja Luka, shortly before the election, IFOR caught the Ljubija special
police trying secretly to move anti-aircraft guns and other weapons in a police convoy. Since
that time, a number of surprise visits by IFOR/SFOR have revealed substantial numbers of
unauthorized weapons in police stations. Such acts are clear violations of the Dayton agreement
and should result in appropriate action by IFOR and the international community. IPTF should
also record, report and make public instances of continuing human rights abuses and protracted
non-compliance with the Dayton agreement by local police forces or specific members of those
forces.Human Rights Watch/Helsinki urges the United States, Russia and the European Union to: fully support
the IPTF, OSCE and OHR in carrying out the above recommendations. publicly
disclose or demand the public disclosure of information which implicates government officials,
including police officials, or members of political parties in the direction or support of groups
engaged in the organized commission of human rights abuses through local political, police and
military bodies, agencies or branches.exert pressure
on the Pale authorities to ensure that Republika Srpska respects and upholds the human rights
norms and other obligations relating to the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton
agreement.consider the
establishment of a Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office for the Republika Srpska similar
to the one operating in the Federation entity of Bosnia and Hercegovina, to act as a legal
representative for individual victims of human rights abuses, and to seek remedies for such
abuses from governmental authorities, in liaison with the Office of the Ombudsperson
established by the Dayton agreement.provide
crucial financial and material support for the ICTY to enable the continued investigations of war
crimes which will result in further indictments. We strongly encourage support for
investigations into the war-time activities of Simo Drljaca, Momcilo Radanovic a.k.a.
“Cigo”, Pero Colic, Milomir Stakic, Srdjo Srdic, Milan Kovacevic, Slobodan
Kuruzovic, and other persons named in this report and reportedly responsible for war crimes in
the Prijedor area.Human Rights Watch/Helsinki urges the World Bank, donor governments and agencies, and international non-governmental organizations to: ensure the
linkage of reconstruction assistance given to the entity of the Republika Srpska to cooperation
with the ICTY, respect for human rights, the repeal of wartime property laws, and cooperation
with the UNHCR’s repatriation plan. Aid should be disbursed in a non-discriminatory
manner, with guidelines which ensure assistance to all needy persons regardless of ethnicity.
Projects should be monitored closely for compliance with such guidelines. Donors should
investigate the ownership and control of companies prior to the awarding of contracts to ensure
that persons indicted for war crimes, persons implicated in the commission of war crimes, and
persons who have obstructed the Dayton agreement do not benefit from such contracts.
Companies whose non-Serb directors were killed, imprisoned, or “disappeared,” or
whose directors were removed due to their political affiliation, should not receive any
reconstruction monies whatsoever. Further, given the open defiance of the Republika Srpska
demonstrated by President Biljana Plavsic’s letter of January 9, 1997 to U.N. Secretary
General, Kofi Annan, in which she reiterated that the Republika Srpska has no intention of
cooperating with the ICTY, no reconstruction monies should be given to any government entity
or public company controlled by the SDS. The World Bank and other lending institutions and
donors should give assurances that reconstruction loans or donations will not be given to
structures under the control of the SDS.In towns
where there is general compliance with the Dayton agreement, target reconstruction aid which
will aid ordinary people directly, i.e. micro enterprise projects, support of the independent media,
support for non-biased educational programs, assistance to medical facilities which have
demonstrated equity in the provision of treatment to all citizens, etc., bypassing publicly owned
companies when possible. Strict guidelines regarding equal access for all citizens as
beneficiaries of projects should be established. It is also recommended that reconstruction
assistance be geared toward the development of expertise which would enable privately owned
companies to compete with publicly owned companies for contracts in infrastructure and other
sectors.withhold
economic aid from those specific municipalities controlled by individuals under investigation of
war crimes by the ICTY, or those responsible for human rights violations or other
non-compliance with the provisions of the Dayton agreement. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki
calls
attention specifically to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1088 of December 12, 1996, which
“underlines the link, as agreed by the Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the
conclusions of the Paris Conference, between the availability of international financial assistance
and the degree to which all the authorities in Bosnia and Hercegovina implement the Peace
Agreement, including cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
cooperation with the Action Plan which has been approved by the London
Conference.”link all
financial support which is targeted for the restructuring of the local police with the IPTF
screening/vetting process. Police authorities who fail to agree to participate in the IPTF
screening and vetting process must not receive financial or material aid, and aid should only be
provided upon the completion of the screening process or when significant progress has been
made.Human Rights Watch/Helsinki urges the authorities of the entity of Republika Srpska to: immediately
arrest and remand to the ICTY for trial all persons indicted for war crimes in the Prijedor area,
and immediately to arrest Simo Drljaca for crimes he committed during the 1992 takeover of
Prijedor and for the “disappearance” of Father Tomislav Matanovic and his parents.
As U.N. Security Council Resolution 1032 states, the Security Council “reminds the
parties that, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, they have committed themselves to
cooperate fully with all entities involved in the implementation of this peace
settlement....including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia...and underlines that
full cooperation by States and entities with the International Tribunal includes, inter alia, the
surrender for trial of all persons indicted by the Tribunal and provision of information to assist in
Tribunal investigations.”arrest,
prosecute and punish persons responsible for human rights abuses and the recent destruction of
property in the Prijedor area.cooperate
with UNHCR repatriation plans and permit the return of refugees and displaced persons without
impediment or fear of persecution.immediately
reveal the whereabouts of Father Tomislav Matanovic and his parents,
“disappeared” in September 1995, and the fates of the medical personnel and other
community leaders who “disappeared” during the Serb takeover in 1992.TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY The Importance of Conditionality for Reconstruction Aid RECOMMENDATIONS BACKGROUND THE ROLE OF THE PRIJEDOR AUTHORITIES DURING THE WAR AND AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT The “Crisis Committee”and Co-Conspirators WHO’S WHO IN PRIJEDOR Simo Drljaca: Former Chief of Police and Head of Secret Police Wartime Activities Simo Drljaca and the Prijedor “Mafia” Ranko Mijic: Acting Chief of Police Zivko Jovic: Acting Deputy Chief of Police Grozdan Mutic: Head of State Security Milomir Stakic: Mayor of Prijedor Momcilo Radanovic, a.k.a. “Cigo”: Deputy Mayor of Prijedor Srdjo Srdic: President of the “Serbian Red Cross” Prijedor The Role of the Local Red Cross in “Ethnic Cleansing Milan “Mico” Kovacevic: Director of Prijedor Hospital Pero Colic: (Former) Commander Fifth Kozara Brigade and the Forty-Third Brigade, Prijedor Milenko Vukic: Infrastructure (Electricity) Marko Pavic: Infrastructure (Post Office, Telephone and Telegraph) MEDIA Radio Prijedor Kozarski Vjesnik (Kozara Herald, Newspaper) Television Prijedor THE PRIJEDOR AUTHORITIES AND VIOLATIONS OF THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT Non-Compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement: The Prijedor Police Drljaca Ousted, Turns Up Again Persons Indicted for War Crimes Serve as Police Officers in Prijedor and Omarska Police Weapons Ljubija Special Police Force Obstruction of Freedom of Movement by Prijedor Authorities Elections “Disappearances” Detention Harassment of Journalists and Monitors Evictions and Harassment of Persons Based Upon Their Ethnic or Political Affiliation Destruction of Property to Prevent Repatriation Linkages and Loyalties THE ECONOMICS OF “ETHNIC CLEANSING” Tangled in the Web: Reconstruction Aid and the Architects of “Ethnic Cleansing British ODA Response to Information Gathered by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Aid to the Prijedor Hospital CONCLUSION ACKNOWLEDGMENTS APPENDIX A: Structure of the “Crisis Committee” of Prijedor Municipality: 1992 APPENDIX B: Letter from Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan Human Rights Watch January 1997 Vol. 9, No. 1 (D) To order the full text of this report click HERE. For more Human Rights Watch reports on Bosnia click HERE. To return to the list of 1996 publications click HERE. Or, to return to the index of Human Rights Watch reports click HERE. 
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