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From October 30 to November 7, Human Rights Watch conducted interviews with over one hundred East Timorese returning to transit centers in Dili from camps in West Timor. Based on these interviews, conversations with aid workers, and a range of published reports and other documentary sources, this report describes the continuing obstacles to return for East Timorese refugees in West Timor and presents new evidence of direct Indonesian military involvement in the forced expulsions.
The report adds to the growing body of evidence of Indonesian military responsibility for the expulsions, including evidence that they were the result of a planned, systematic campaign coordinated and facilitated by the military. The evidence set forth below also points to the urgent need for systematic investigation of militia leaders who have been linked to specific human rights abuses both prior to and after the vote in East Timor. Many of these leaders are present in the camps in West Timor and can be easily apprehended should further investigations confirm existing accounts or further implicate them in abuses. Stepped up efforts to collect eyewitness testimonies for use in future prosecutions may also help put an end to intimidation in the camps.
From the accounts of refugees recently returned to East Timor from West Timor, it is obvious that significant barriers to return are still in place. These barriers include the presence of feared militia leaders in the camps, death threats against families seeking to leave, attacks on convoys heading back for East Timor, a misinformation campaign portraying East Timor as a desperate and dangerous place, and a general climate of intimidation in which refugees report that at least some of those who have signed forms saying they wish to stay in West Timor did so under duress. As more refugees return to East Timor, conditions for those who remain in some ways have grown worse: the armed militias who control many of the camps and settlements appear to have become more desperate, their position and prestige weakened with each additional departure. In the last week of November, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that it twice had to intervene to stop militias from taking hostages from families planning to return. Notwithstanding a new agreement between leaders of Interfet and the Indonesian armed forces, signed on November 22 and designed to facilitate return of refugees, UNHCR in early December continued to report encounters with militia on a daily basis. Although many of the East Timorese still in West Timor may be associated with Indonesian rule and may not wish to return, there are likely thousands of others who have not yet been able to make a free and informed choice.
Reports from refugees and humanitarian organizations and a visit by Human Rights Watch to makeshift barracks for refugees in West Timor suggest that those left behind in West Timor often live in deplorable conditions. The conditions under which many refugees are living and their precise numbers, however, are not known with any certainty because, notwithstanding pledges of renewed efforts by the new Indonesian government of AbdurrahmanWahid, access to camps and refugee centers continues to be limited by a hostile militia presence. The problem was exacerbated in late November by the onset of monsoon rains that washed out roads, making remote settlements unreachable.
Conditions are potentially even worse for East Timorese refugees on neighboring islands that have not yet been visited by representatives of aid organizations. Although this report does not provide new information on refugee camps and settlements outside West Timor, unconfirmed reports suggest that as many as 5,000 refugees are present on the nearby island of Kisar alone, with other makeshift settlements rumored on other islands. Conditions in such settlements, where they exist, are unlikely to be any better than those existing in camps in West Timor, making it imperative that international aid organizations work with Indonesian authorities to identify the location of all refugees and ensure unimpeded access to them.
The testimony of recent returnees from West Timor also vividly demonstrates the extent of military involvement in the forced expulsion of East Timorese across the border. Significantly, East Timorese were forced into West Timor not only in the days immediately following the August 30 ballot and announcement of the results on September 4, but over a period of more than two weeks. The evidence collected here suggests that forced expulsions actually intensified after martial law was declared by Jakarta on September 7 and continued right up to the arrival of Interfet troops on September 20. The testimony shows that the expulsions were systematic, with similar patterns manifested across East Timor. The logistics involved, the similarity of the process from one end of East Timor to the other, and direct witness testimony all point to a planned and systematic operation. In many cases, district military command posts served as way stations for East Timorese civilians forced from their homes and subsequently transported to West Timor.
The testimony adds to the mounting evidence that the expulsion of East Timorese was an orchestrated campaign that required advance planning. East Timorese from Dili, Ermera, Aileu, Baucau, and Los Palos all told Human Rights Watch that militia members, often residents of the kampung (subdivision of a village) where they were charged with rounding up the population for expulsion, and often accompanied by local army officers, forced families at gunpoint into the district or subdistrict army headquarters, threatening them with death if they did not leave and burning their houses after they departed. After a period ranging from overnight to a week in the military command, they were taken to West Timor by car or truck, or, less frequently, by ship or plane. In some cases the trucks were provided by the district military command; in many cases, they were commandeered by the militias from the families they were expelling.
There is also documentary evidence. While in Dili, Human Rights Watch obtained a copy of a May 5, 1999 telegram from Jakarta military headquarters to the commander in Bali responsible for East Timorese operations ordering the latter to prepare for possible removal of East Timorese to West Timor should pro-independence voters prevail in the ballot. The document shows that plans to move East Timorese across the border were initiated well in advance of the vote.
As this report was being prepared, a new problem was emerging: what to do with militia members, former civil servants, and other East Timorese in West Timor who favored or might be perceived to have favored integration with Indonesia who now wish to return but fear revenge attacks. Although this issue is not addressed in this report, it is important for UNHCR, U.N. authorities, and East Timorese leaders to guard against vigilantism against suspected militia members returning to East Timor, which appears to be on the increase, and take action to prosecute individuals within East Timor who seek to take the law into their own hands.