IX. CHILD SOLDIERS

As noted above, both the RUF rebels and the government Civil Defense Forces (CDFs) in Sierra Leone have a history of recruiting and using child soldiers in the thousands. Refugee children in Guinea, particularly those in camps closer to the border, remain at risk of being used in armed forces. Human Rights Watch has not documented active recruitment or abduction of children from the camps by the RUF rebels, although children risk being abducted during cross-border attacks.¹⁷³ Human Rights Watch has, however, documented a significant presence of Kamajors, a civilian defense force that fights on behalf of the Sierra Leone government, in the camps, with children in their ranks, a situation which UNHCR has proven unable or unwilling to address.¹⁷⁴

International Legal Standards

The presence of combatants is fundamentally incompatible with the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps. This principle is reflected in several UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions, including the 1987 Conclusion on Military or Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements, as well as in the preamble to the 1969 O.A.U. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, to which Guinea is a party.¹⁷⁵

The Convention on the Rights of the Child fixes a minimum age of fifteen for participation of child soldiers in hostilities.¹⁷⁶ Article 4(3)(c) of Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions likewise prohibits recruitment of children under the age of fifteen or allowing them to take part in hostilities. In addition, there is a growing international consensus among governments and nongovernmental organizations to raise the minimum age for child soldiers to eighteen. This new consensus, on age eighteen, is reflected in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which Guinea has signed but which has not yet entered into force. Human Rights Watch and UNHCR, along with other independent international agencies, support the adoption of an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to raise the minimum age for recruitment and participation in hostilities from fifteen to eighteen.¹⁷⁷

Presence of Combatants
Many Kamajors have registered with UNHCR in at least two refugee camps and, in early to mid 1999, were using the camps as bases to support their military activities, which were conducted in border areas.¹⁷⁸ During the February 1999 registration exercise in one camp, a Kamajor commander reportedly announced, "I have a group of Kamajors here. Can we please register them immediately so that they can return to the front?" Other refugees cheered for the Kamajors and permitted them to pass them in line. The census administrator for the camp, as well as the refugees waiting to register, agreed.¹⁷⁹ In another camp, the census administrator told a group of Kamajors that he could not register them as Kamajors, but later registered the same individuals as civilians.¹⁸⁰

The exact number of Kamajors in the camps is not clear, but substantial numbers are involved. One Kamajor commander in the Fangamadou camp informed Human Rights Watch that there were 1,400 Kamajors operating with the Guinean military in the border area near the camps.¹⁸¹ An international aid worker estimated that there were 300-400 Kamajors based in the Kundou-Lengo-Bengo camp alone.¹⁸² Human Rights Watch also received reports that the Kamajors maintained a presence in Fangamadou, Koulomba, Konin, and Sowedu camps.¹⁸³

Several other sources also told Human Rights Watch that Kamajor civil defense forces operating in Guinea worked in conjunction with the Guinean military. One international aid worker told Human Rights Watch, "this is a country friendly to Sierra Leone, there is almost an official relationship between the Kamajors and the Guinean authorities."¹⁸⁴ A Kamajor commander told Human Rights Watch that he took orders from Guinean military commanders, as well as from the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defense.¹⁸⁵ Kamajors have reportedly often served as scouts for Guinean troops because they are familiar with the border area, and have also served in combat at the front lines on both sides of the border. They have also played a significant role in assisting the Guinean government in separating suspected RUF rebels from the refugee population.

Participation of Children

The Sierra Leone government and leadership of its Kamajor auxiliaries have made public commitments to stop using child soldiers.¹⁸⁶ However, despite these commitments, the Kamajors have continued to recruit, ritually initiate, and use children in their forces.¹⁸⁷ The Kamajor commander in Fangamadou admitted to Human Rights Watch that there are refugee children under his command.¹⁸⁸ Eight children, the youngest of whom was nine, were identified on a list of eighteen Kamajors which Human Rights Watch saw in the Fangamadou camp. One international aid worker told Human Rights Watch that he had observed "many youth" among the Kamajors in the Kundou-Lengo-Bengo camp. At one of the regular Kamajor group meetings which the aid worker observed in the camp, most of those present appeared to be between the ages of ten and fourteen.¹⁸⁹ All but one of the Kamajors who serve under one commander are illiterate. This young "student" works as a "secretary," based at the border to keep track of deaths and casualties among the Kamajors.¹⁹⁰

Although there are children in the Kamajors' ranks both in Guinea and Sierra Leone, Human Rights Watch did not find evidence of active recruitment of children in the refugee camps. However, in late February 1999, a Kamajor commander told Human Rights Watch that he was ready to begin recruitment at any time-as soon as the following week, depending on instructions from the governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone and pending the outcome of peace negotiations.¹⁹¹ He did not deny that new recruits might be children. Shortly after that, the Kamajors embarked upon a large-scale recruitment drive inside Sierra Leone, primarily in Bo and Kenema. Human Rights Watch research in Sierra Leone in 1999 has found that, after initiation into the Kamajor society, many children and adolescents are called upon to perform the most dangerous actions undertaken by Kamajor local defense forces, including use as active combatants in the conflict and in major military operations.

The Role of UNHCR

It is unacceptable under international law for combatants to use refugee camps as a base or to recruit or use child soldiers.¹⁹² UNHCR's guidelines on refugee children require UNHCR staff to maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the camps, because "the presence of armed resistance fighters in or near refugee camps or settlements increases security challenges and other problems."¹⁹³ In addition, the guidelines on refugee children set forth several steps for UNHCR staff to take to prevent the militarization of refugee camps and the recruitment of child soldiers, including to:

· Relocate camps or settlements if they are in danger of being raided by military forces.
· Increase staff in camps and settlements in order to deter and monitor recruitment.
· Provide proper security guards for camps and settlements.
· Convince political and military leaders not to recruit refugee children, and to demobilize those who are soldiers.
· Publicly condemn the recruitment of refugee children.
· Cooperate with efforts to rehabilitate refugee children who have been used as soldiers.¹⁹⁴

UNHCR's office in Guinea has repeatedly disregarded reports by headquarters staff, field staff, and international NGOs indicating the presence of Kamajors and child soldiers in some of the camps and has yet to develop a strategy to deal with the problem. Some staff members are ignorant about the situation and need to be informed and told to take action. Others are or should be aware of the situation but have chosen to ignore it. Still others understand the problem but need more direction and support in addressing this difficult situation.¹⁹⁵

Many refugees and aid workers told Human Rights Watch that they found the presence of Kamajors in the camps acceptable because the Kamajors were on the "right" side of the war.¹⁹⁶ Aid workers also expressed the view that the Guinean Government may have been legitimately concerned that the Sierra Leonean conflict could spill over its borders and, consequently, was justified in taking actions such as collaborating with the Kamajors to prevent this.¹⁹⁷ Because the Kamajors appeared to be operating in conjunction with the Guinean government, as noted above, UNHCR action on this issue could be in direct conflict with the host government. In addition, in at least one case, Kamajors made a thinly veiled threat by "informing" a U.N. employee that they were responsible for his personal security.¹⁹⁸

Nevertheless, the Guinean government and UNHCR have a responsibility to address this problem. The only action UNHCR has taken is to move a small number of refugees away from the border, where it would be more difficult for active combatants to use the new camps as a base. Despite knowledge that the Kamajors are present among the refugee population, neither UNHCR nor the Guinean Government has taken steps to screen or separate active pro-government combatants from civilians in the camps. UNHCR chose not to use one recent opportunity to do so, the refugee census in February 1999, and told Human Rights Watch that it did not have plans to screen for combatants in the foreseeable future.¹⁹⁹ Nor have UNHCR or the Guinean government taken any concrete actions to prevent the Kamajors from recruiting, initiating, or using children as soldiers.

As has been noted above, UNHCR employs only two protection officers and one community services officer in Gueckedou and seven field staff for more than 300,000 refugees. Only three of the field staff maintain a regular presence in the border areas. Neither the Guinean government nor UNHCR provide security guards in the refugee camps. Human Rights Watch is not aware of any efforts by UNHCR in Guinea to publicly condemn the use of child soldiers or to educate the public or community leaders not to recruit or use child soldiers. Here, as with other issues, Human Rights Watch urges UNHCR to implement its existing guidelines on refugee children and on preservation of the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements in order to protect the human rights of refugee children.

See above. At least seven refugees were abducted during the RUF attack on Koulou-Bengu, but (probably by chance) they were all adults. UNCHR told Human Rights Watch that refugee children have been abducted from Guinea. Correspondence November 24, 1998.

This militia should be distinguished from, but draws upon, the traditional Sierra Leonean society known as the Kamajors. (See above.) Kamajor militia have actively participated as combatants throughout the conflict and it is in this role that their presence in the camps is scrutinized.

Conclusion on Military or Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements, No. 48 (1987), para. (b). See also Conclusion on Refugee Children and Adolescents, No. 84 (1997), para. (a)(ii); Conclusion on Refugee Children, No. 47 (1987), para. (e); Conclusion on Personal Security of Refugees, No. 72 (1993), para. (b); and Conclusion on Safeguarding Asylum, No. 82 (1997), para. (d)(vii).

Article 38(3).

UNHCR has taken the position that eighteen should be the minimum age for child soldiers in international negotiations to draft an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child raising the minimum age for combat. However, this position is not currently reflected in its guidelines on Refugee Children. UNHCR, Refugee Children, pp. 8, 24, 85-6.

178 A Kamajor commander in Fangamadou told Human Rights Watch that he succeeded in registering all but seven of the Kamajors in the camp. He was confident that he would nevertheless be able to provide for those seven and their families in the camps. Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou, February 19, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interview, February 18, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interview, February 19, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou, February 19, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interview, Kundou-Lengo-Bengo camp, February 19, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interview, Gueckedou, February 17, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interview, Kundou-Lengo-Bengo camp, February 19, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interviews, Fangamadou, February 19, 1999 and February 24, 1999.

The Government of Sierra Leone, on behalf of the regular armed forces as well as the Kamajors and other CDFs, made a commitment to the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general for children and armed conflict that it would refrain from recruiting or using children under the age of eighteen, demobilize all children in government forces, and facilitate the reintegration into society of children demobilized from all sides. The government has also made commitments in this regard to the government of the United Kingdom.

Boys and men must go through a ritual initiation to join the Kamajors, which is based on a traditional hunting society. Many Sierra Leoneans apparently believe that, once initiated, Kamajors become immune to bullets.

Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou, February 24, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interview, Kundou-Lengo-Bengo camp, February 19, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou, February 24, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interviews, Fangamadou, February 19 and February 24, 1999.

However, there is an inconsistency on this issue in UNHCR's guidelines on refugee children. In interpreting article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides that children capable of forming their own views should be able to participate in deciding matters that affect them, the guidelines state "for example, under national law adolescents may have the right to . . . join the army." UNHCR, Refugee Children, p. 24. Insofar as adolescents may be under the age of fifteen, this position is incompatible with article 38(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is also inconsistent with guidelines in the same book concerning military recruitment, and with the emerging international norm prohibiting recruitment or use of children under the age of eighteen in armed forces.

193 UNHCR, Refugee Children, p. 83. It should be noted, however, that the presence of any armed fighters, whether resistance fighters or otherwise, is incompatible with the humanitarian character of refugee camps.

194 UNHCR, Refugee Children, p. 86.

Human Rights Watch interviews with UNHCR officers in Kundou-Lengo-Bengo camp, February 19, 1999; Fangamadou, February 19, 1999 and February 24, 1999; Gueckedou February 17, 1999; Conakry, February 26, 1999; and Geneva (telephone interview) June 2, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interviews in Fangamadou February 19, 1999 and February 24, 1999; and in Kundou-Lengo-Bengo on February 19, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interview, Conakry, February 26, 1999.

Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou, February 19, 1999.

UNHCR's rationale for not using the census for screening was twofold. First of all, the Guinean military has actively screened suspected RUF rebels to keep them out of the refugee camps (although this policy had not been applied to Kamajors or other CDFs). Second, the Guinean students hired as census takers were not trained as protection officers and, consequently, not qualified to conduct screening. Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR officer, Gueckedou, February 16, 1999. However, UNHCR did not have any specific plans to screen for combatants following the census. Moreover, UNHCR field staff actually registered Kamajors during the census in two camps.