July 1997 Vol. 9, No. 6 (C)

BURMA/THAILAND

No Safety in Burma, No Sanctuary in Thailand

I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2

Recommendations 3

II. BACKGROUND 6

III. REFUGEES FROM BURMA'S KAREN AND MON STATES AND TENASSERIM DIVISION 7

Human Rights Violations by the Burmese Military 7

Repatriations and Denial of Access By the Royal Thai Government 13

Instances of Refoulement 13

Attacks on the Refugee Camps 18

Conditions in the Refugee Camps 19

IV. SITUATION OF THOSE FROM BURMA'S SHAN STATE 20

Human Rights Violations by the Burmese Military 20

Treatment of Shan Refugees by the Royal Thai Government 23

V. CONCLUSION: ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 24

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 26

I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) prepares to admit Burma as a full member at the annual ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on July 24-25, 1997, thousands of Burmese continue to flee into neighboring countries to escape gross human rights abuses committed by the Burmese military. Thailand has borne the main burden of refugees in the past year, but Bangladesh has also received an estimated 10,000 Muslim Rohingyas since March 1997. As the major refugee producing country in the region, Burma has been denounced in successive United Nations resolutions and by many governments, yet ASEAN has largely remained silent. If membership of ASEAN is to have any positive effect in restraining the worst abuses of the Burmese military and bringing about an improvement in the overall human rights situation there, as many ASEAN governments have claimed it will, then the treatment of ethnic minorities is one of the most pressing problems. In addition, since February 1997, the Royal Thai government is responsible for the treatment of more than 20,000 new refugees; it has violated international legal norms by forcibly repatriating and refusing access to persons fleeing armed conflict.1 Even more ominous are indications that Thailand will grant only temporary refuge to all the 115,000 refugees from Burma in camps along the border, and may attempt to repatriate them once there is an end to sustained military activity on the Burma side. This is based on the false assumption that the right to asylum is limited to those fleeing armed conflict. In fact, Human Rights Watch/Asia has found that most are fleeing abuses which justify a well-founded fear of persecution, even in areas where rebel groups have signed cease-fire agreements with Burma's central government, or where there is otherwise no fighting.

This report documents the continued systematic violation of internationally recognized human rights by the Burmese military against ethnic minority villagers in Burma's Karen, Mon and Shan States during 1996 and 1997. It also catalogues the treatment by the Thai authorities of those who fled these abuses and sought refuge in Thailand.2

In February 1997, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) launched an offensive against the remaining rebel-held territory along the Thai border causing an estimated 20,000 refugees to flee into Thailand. The majority came from areas which had been controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU) for decades, and all of them would therefore be considered by the SLORC to be enemies of the state. As such they would be at risk of being subjected to beatings, torture and death by the Burmese armed forces. Even before the February offensive began, human rights abuses in the form of summary executions, forced labor, forced portering and forced relocations in Burma's ethnic minority areas had been increasing markedly since March 1996. None of these abuses had declined in areas where ethnic armies had signed cease-fire agreements with the SLORC; to the contrary, in many cases an increased Burmese military presence had only increased the burden of forced labor.

As the refugees sought sanctuary in Thailand, some 8,500 found that long-standing Thai policy allowing asylum seekers from Burma temporary refuge had been reversed: soldiers of the Ninth Division of the Thai First Army (Ninth Division) forced them back across the border, or otherwise refused to allow them safe refuge in Thailand. Those who were allowed to cross the border were sent to sites where no preparations for the refugees had been put in place and where they were forced to sleep on the earth with only plastic sheeting as cover. In other areas,Karen and Karenni refugees who have been granted temporary refuge in Thailand for some years remained vulnerable to attacks by Burmese paramilitary forces.

The growing hostility of the Thai authorities towards refugees from Burma has grown in direct proportion to the increased economic cooperation between the Burmese and Thai governments. It is feared that as economic interests continue to grow, all of the 115,000 refugees living in camps in Thailand will be increasingly vulnerable to pushbacks and that new asylum seekers will be denied access into Thailand. The new Karen arrivals were in imminent danger of repatriation as this report went to press, but all other refugees from Burma also remained vulnerable. In May, refugees further north along the Thai/Burmese border were threatened with new draconian restrictions and a group of refugees from the Shan State, who have never been granted permission to establish refugee camps, were pushed back. This report also documents the abuses to which villagers in the Shan State were subject to from March 1996 onwards, in particular, forced relocations affecting an estimated 100,000 people, and the refusal of the Thai authorities to allow them refuge in camps where they could receive urgently needed humanitarian assistance.

Recommendations

Since the Royal Thai government clearly lacks the political will to offer more than temporary refuge to asylum seekers from Burma, only sustained international pressure will ensure their protection in Thailand and curb further outflows. This pressure needs to come not only from western governments and Japan, but also from ASEAN governments, which have an interest in promoting stability in the region and a peaceful transition in Burma. In July, ASEAN was reconsidering Cambodia's admission in light of the coup against its elected government, but has so far indicated it will hold to plans to admit Burma. In addition, the international community must continue to press Burma to implement the recommendations of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution adopted unanimously on April 16, 1997, and to cease the abusive practices which lead to refugee outflows, while creating the necessary conditions for the voluntary return of refugees in safety and dignity.

In particular, Human Rights Watch/Asia recommends the following measures be taken:

To the State Law and Order Restoration Council

* Burma should take immediate steps to comply with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution of April 16, 1997 (E/CN.4/1997/L.97) and the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 12, 1996 (A/RES/51/117). In particular the paragraphs urging the SLORC "and all other parties to the hostilities in Myanmar to respect fully its obligations under international humanitarian law, including Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions" and "to create the necessary conditions to remove the causes of displacement and of refugee flows to neighboring countries and to create conditions conducive to their voluntary return and their full reintegration in safety and dignity, in close cooperation with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees."

* Burma should cooperate fully with Judge Rajsoomer Lallah, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Burma, and allow him to visit Burma with unrestricted access to all ethnic minority areas. Though he has tried to get access since 1996, the SLORC has refused to grant him permission to visit Burma.

* Burma must comply with its obligations under general international law not to subject those under its jurisdiction to extrajudicial executions, torture or other forms of serious ill-treatment and to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for such violations.

* Burma must stop the practice of forced labor immediately in accordance with the International Labor Organization's Convention No. 29, which Burma ratified in 1955 and allow this to be independently verified. Those found to be responsible for the practice should be prosecuted and punished.

To the Royal Thai Government

* Thailand should accede to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

* Thailand must abide by its obligations under international law and provide safe asylum to all those fleeing from persecution inside Burma in a consistent manner and in particular to ensure that the border is not closed to those currently fleeing persecution. The refugees must not be repatriated against their will and any repatriation must comply with the obligation of non-refoulement and the Conclusions of Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Programme; the UNHCR should be permitted to carry out its role in relation to any such voluntary repatriation as elaborated in its voluntary repatriation handbook.3

* Thailand should establish procedures under which nationals from Burma can seek asylum in order to prevent refoulement occurring of people arrested, convicted and deported for illegal entry into Thailand.

* Thailand must stop equating an absence of fighting as the sole condition for Burma to be considered safe for the return of the refugees. Those fleeing Burma should be treated as refugees where there is a well-founded fear of persecution, regardless of whether or not this is experienced in the context of fighting. An end to fighting in Burma does not in itself mean an end to human rights abuses.

* Thailand should allow the UNHCR to carry out its mandate in relation to the refugees from Burma on the Thai/Burmese border.

* Thailand should continue to allow access to the refugee camps on the Thai/Burmese border to those nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who provide assistance and relief to the refugees.

* Those camps which are vulnerable to cross-border attacks and raids by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the SLORC should be moved to safer sites located further inside Thailand, away from the border; Thailand should take immediate steps to provide an adequate level of security in the camps.

* The refugees housed in camps on the Thai/Burmese border must be allowed to live in humane conditions.

* Refugees from Burma's Shan State should be allowed to establish refugee camps at which they are able to receive humanitarian assistance.

* Thailand must abide by its treaty obligations as they concern refugees under the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

To the Association of South East Asian Nations

ASEAN should establish a working group to promote a peaceful end to violence and continued repression in Burma and the implementation of measures to create conditions under which refugees could voluntarily return to Burma in safety and dignity.

* All ASEAN member states should be encouraged to abide by international standards for the treatment of refugees. Concern should be expressed to both the Thai and Burmese governments where these standards are violated.

* As a means of demonstrating Burma's willingness to cooperate with the international community as a responsible member of ASEAN, member states should press Burma to permit the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma to carry out his mandate and visit the country, especially ethnic minority areas, in time for him to be able to report to the U.N. General Assembly in November 1997.

* ASEAN governments should also urge Burma to implement other key recommendations in the U.N. resolutions, including the release of all political prisoners, detained solely for the exercise of their internationally recognized rights, ensuring full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, opinion, expression, association and assembly, and protecting the safety of all political leaders including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

* ASEAN governments should agree, in advance of the next ASEAN meeting in December in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to informally review the situation in Burma and consider additional initiatives that might be undertaken jointly or on a bilateral basis.

* ASEAN's dialogue partners-including Japan, the European Union, Australia, the United States and Canada-should raise these concerns during the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Malaysia, July 28-29, 1997. They should also urge China, which will be represented at the conference and gives substantial economic and military assistance to Burma, to use its influence with the SLORC.

To the International Community

* Until such time as UNHCR can assume a genuine protective role, countries with embassies in Bangkok should continue to closely monitor the situation for refugees in Thailand, visiting the refugee sites and places where repatriations take place as often as possible, and intervening with the Thai government to ensure that international norms concerning refugee protection are respected. They should also continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the refugees through the NGOs in Thailand and should relieve Thailand of some of the burden by offering third country resettlement where possible.

* Coordinated pressure must be applied to ensure that human rights are respected in Burma. Governments should explore ways of exerting economic pressure on the SLORC, including further measures by the European Union (E.U.), following the March 1997 withdrawal of trade benefits to Burma under the Generalized System of Preferences, to press for an end to all forced labor. E.U. governments should prohibit all new private investment in Burma until forced labor is ended and this has been independently verified. Australia, Canada and other trading partners should move urgently to take similar steps. Japan should continue the suspension of most of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Burma, discourage further private investment by Japanese companies and increase humanitarian assistance to refugees in Thailand through NGOs.

* In order to ensure that they do not directly or indirectly benefit from or contribute to the use of forced labor, foreign companies should not invest in Burma until and unless there is verifiable evidence that all forms of forced labor have ceased in all parts of the country.

* International financial institutions, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank, should maintain the current ban on assistance to Burma. At the World Bank's annual meeting in Hong Kong in September 1997, donor governments should issue a joint statement urging respect for the rule of law, accountability, transparency and other measures to ensure "good governance" in Burma,strongly reaffirming the donors' position that under current economic conditions in Burma due to the repressive political situation, World Bank assistance should not be extended.

To the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

* The UNHCR should continue to strive by way of negotiations with the Royal Thai government to establish a formal presence at the Thai/Burmese border in order to carry out its mandate in relation to the refugees situated there. In the meantime, it should continue its practice of visiting all the refugee camps on a regular basis.

* The UNHCR should be mindful of Thailand's obligation not to return refugees under customary international law and publicly condemn all instances of refoulement, including denial of access to those seeking refuge at the Thai/Burmese border.

* The UNHCR must press the Royal Thai government to ensure that any return of the refugees to Burma is voluntary. UNHCR should not involve itself, even as an observer, in repatriations which fall short of the standards contained in UNHCR's voluntary repatriation handbook. UNHCR should clearly state that letters consenting to return to Burma from individuals purporting to represent refugee groups do not establish voluntariness on the part of the group of refugees.