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Introduction

On August 15, the government of Algeria published the text of a long-promised “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation” in the Journal Officiel.¹ This came a day after a major speech by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announcing that Algerians will be asked to approve the Charter in a referendum on September 29.² The Charter makes good on the pledge first made by President Bouteflika on October 31, 2004, to submit to the electorate a new amnesty plan designed to further what he describes as the peace and national reconciliation process begun by his 1999 Civil Harmony Law (Law n^o 99-08). 

The Charter is not itself a legal text but rather a declaration of principles concerning the causes and cures of the civil strife that has plagued Algeria since 1992, and a framework for future policies.  According to the text, popular approval of the Charter would “mandate the President of the Republic to take all measures that aim to concretize its provisions.”  These measures would still have to be enacted into law in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Constitution.³

In the six weeks before the referendum, Algerians have an opportunity to study and debate the Charter.  Human Rights Watch is concerned both by the content of the Charter and by the political climate in Algeria, which is unfavorable to the free and informed public discussion that Algerians should have about its merits.  This background paper enumerates Human Rights Watch’s concerns both about the content of the Charter and the circumstances surrounding the referendum.

The Charter reinforces a climate of impunity that has aggravated the country’s human rights crisis since the 1990s.  It renews and extends the partial amnesty offered by the 1999 Civil Harmony Law to members of armed groups who voluntarily surrendered and turned in their arms.  While it does not explicitly mention amnesty for state agents, the Charter contains no language to suggest that their de facto impunity will be disturbed.  On the contrary, the wording of the Charter gives rise to concern that, if it is approved by voters, an amnesty law for state agents could be introduced that ratifies their impunity.⁴

The Charter addresses the issue of persons who were “disappeared” by state agents and who remain missing, proposing to compensate their families and help them to overcome their ordeal with “dignity.”  In addition, it mandates President Bouteflika to seek, “on behalf of the nation,” the “pardon” of all “victims of the national tragedy.” That phrase is not defined in the text but is commonly understood to denote victims on both sides of the political violence involving armed groups and the state forces that became endemic in 1992, and has since claimed the lives of over 100,000 Algerians.⁵

The Charter mentions nowhere the duty of the state to investigate serious human rights abuses, to prosecute those found to be responsible, or to address the right of families of the “disappeared” and other victims and their survivors to know the truth and see that justice is done.  The document makes no mention of the possibility of establishing a truth commission of any kind. 

The Charter on the one hand offers a gesture of pardon toward victims, but on the other hand seeks to stifle discussion about the traumatic events that caused so much suffering. It states, “In adopting this Charter by their sovereign authority, the Algerian people affirm that no one in Algeria or abroad is empowered to use or to instrumentalize the wounds of the national tragedy to harm the institutions of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, to weaken the State, to undermine the honor of all its agents who served with dignity, or to tarnish the image of Algeria internationally.”  This vague and ominous passage could pave the way for legislation penalizing expression that is deemed critical of the state’s human rights practices.

The Charter also implicitly rejects any political role for the banned Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, or FIS) and its leaders, thereby limiting the right of Algerians to choose freely their elected representatives.

Human Rights Watch does not oppose amnesties in principle.  It believes, however, that amnesties should not contravene international human rights standards. This means that they must not prevent the emergence of the truth and accountability before the law for individuals who may have been responsible for gross human rights abuses. (Of course, suspected perpetrators must enjoy all of their rights to due process and a fair hearing.) The government should reserve consideration of clemency measures benefiting perpetrators of serious human rights violations until after they have been brought to trial and their responsibilities have been established.  Similarly, if authorities were to consider mitigating punishments for serious human rights violations, the reduced punishments should nevertheless remain commensurate with the gravity of the offense.

The fact that the government is putting its proposal before a national referendum does not free it from its international human rights obligations.  In a real sense, the referendum on the Charter is asking Algerians to vote on the rights of victims – on whether victims will ever come to know the truth, have a chance to be heard, and see that justice is done.  While there is room to debate how the rights of victims are implemented in a given context, a state’s internationally recognized human rights obligations are non-negotiable, and cannot be negated by a majority vote.