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IV. The Implications of Moving Taylor’s trial to The Hague

Moving Taylor’s trial from Freetown to The Hague brings with it some major disadvantages, most significantly the possibility of severely limiting the accessibility of the proceedings to Sierra Leoneans and West Africans.

The success of the Special Court, and international justice mechanisms more generally, is dependent on their ability to maximize the impact of a limited number of fair and expedient trials. This involves conveying a sense that justice has been done, building respect for the rule of law, and promoting stability in the country where the crimes occurred by enhancing the potential deterrent effect of the trials and the capacity of the domestic justice system.

In order to maximize impact, it is critical to make the proceedings accessible to the communities most affected by the crimes. The Special Court’s location in-country combined with its robust outreach and communications activities have made a major contribution to ensure that the people of Sierra Leone and West Africa are aware of the court’s work.²³ Indeed, the Special Court has had one of the most successful outreach and communications programs of any international or mixed national-international court to date, and may be considered a model for other such courts.

Having the Special Court sit in The Hague to conduct Taylor’s trial creates significant challenges to maintaining the accessibility of the proceedings. The distance between Sierra Leone and the Netherlands risks contributing to a perception that the justice process is far removed and of limited significance to Sierra Leoneans and West Africans. The ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have faced serious difficulties in demonstrating the relevance of their operations to the communities most affected by the crimes. These institutions are not located in the countries where the crimes they try were committed and had limited outreach programs during the first years of their operations.²⁴ It will also be difficult, if not impossible, for many Sierra Leoneans to attend proceedings in The Hague.

The effect which these limitations on the accessibility of Taylor’s trial to people in Sierra Leone and West Africa may have must not be underestimated. Taylor is widely seen as the “biggest fish” of all the Special Court’s living indictees and Sierra Leoneans have attached enormous importance to his surrender and trial.²⁵ Particularly if held in Freetown, this trial could be expected to galvanize new and intensified interest and media coverage of the Special Court. This could in turn promote increased discussion among the general public in Sierra Leone and West Africa about the Special Court’s work and expand general knowledge about the court. Secondly, the trial could also be expected to result in increased physical attendance in the Special Court gallery in Freetown by ordinary citizens to observe proceedings, which has tended to be fairly minimal to date.

Other negative implications of holding the trial in The Hague include increased costs of conducting the trial, potential complications related to witnesses traveling outside Sierra Leone, and a risk of confusion about whether the Special Court or the International Criminal Court is trying Charles Taylor.