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II. Security Rationale for Moving the Trial

The Special Court announced on March 30, 2006 that the previous day its president submitted a request to the Dutch government and the ICC president for Taylor’s trial be transferred to the facilities of the International Criminal Court in The Hague.¹ The request sent to the Netherlands cites security concerns as the basis for the relocation: “It has become apparent to me that security and issues related to the stability in the region would make it impossible for Charles Taylor, the accused…to be tried in Freetown by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.”²

Public comments by Special Court officials have echoed the reasons for the request cited by the Special Court president to relocate the trial. The Special Court prosecutor made comments to the media on the reasons for the request including: “If the security and peace of Liberia is imperiled, it could well spill over into Sierra Leone and thereupon all trials would come to an end.”³ He also stated in a meeting with Sierra Leonean civil society on March 31, 2006:

[V]ery shortly after that we received [Taylor]…we heard voices saying again that you can’t try him in Sierra Leone because it’s going to destabilise the country, it’ll destabilise the region. What am I supposed to do? … There is one person without whom I could not have got him here, and that is President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the newly-elected, very respectable president of Liberia. … And then, 48 hours ago, this great lady said ‘Please, don’t try him in Sierra Leone’ – she went public – ‘because it will destablise my country.’ So what do we do? Here is this lady without whom we couldn’t have achieved what we have achieved, really pleading for her own people.⁴

Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf also has expressed considerable concern over security in Liberia in relation to Taylor, including when she briefed the Security Council in March 2006, shortly prior to Taylor’s arrest and held a press conference after the briefing.⁵ The presence of former Taylor associates and supporters in Liberia, including some who hold positions in the government, reinforces her view.

The situation of Charles Taylor also has a number of unique elements. Consistent reports over the past two years have suggested that while in Nigeria, Taylor continued to maintain contacts with supporters in Liberia and may have been involved in other destabilizing activities in the region.⁶ Taylor’s disappearance from his residence in Calabar and attempted flight from Nigeria to Cameroon once Nigeria announced Liberia could take him into custody further underscore the threat Taylor could pose. Another aspect concerns the Nigerian president’s insistence that in order to consider surrendering Taylor, he would need a request from a duly-elected government in Liberia.⁷ While this condition was unnecessary, it led to newly-elected President Johnson-Sirleaf requesting Taylor’s surrender early in her tenure. She herself characterized this move as “courageous” and “risky” and taken under “serious pressure” during what remains a fragile period in Liberia.⁸

Legitimate concerns, particularly related to security, may make a change in where the court sits for Taylor’s trial necessary and appropriate. For example, changing the location could be needed if the safety of witnesses, judges and court staff, defense counsel, and the accused cannot be adequately ensured given the security situation. Changing the location could also be needed if holding the trial in West Africa creates serious risks to civilians in the sub-region by contributing to destabilization.

Human Rights Watch takes concerns over security seriously. We are not in the position to determine the extent of the security risks posed by conducting the trial in Sierra Leone, particularly for Liberia. Alternative arrangements such as conducting Taylor’s trial in Freetown, but enhancing security for the Special Court and Liberia to address security risks might have been preferable. However, the feasibility of this option, both from a logistical and political standpoint, cannot be assessed.

Some government officials and non-governmental organizations have suggested that if the trial cannot be held in Sierra Leone, it should be held elsewhere in Africa to strengthen the notion of the Special Court as an African court addressing crimes against Africans and the idea that Africa has the capacity to hold such trials.⁹ The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) based in Arusha, Tanzania was explored as a possible location, but the institution apparently declined due to limited capacity and the need to adhere to its completion strategy.¹⁰ It is not clear whether other possible venues in Africa were explored. Having the trial elsewhere in Africa might hold a certain degree of symbolic value. However, such a move would pose similar if not greater technical and logistical challenges to making the proceedings accessible to Sierra Leoneans and West Africans than holding the trial in The Hague.