II. The Strategic Plan and Maximizing the ICC’s Impact with Affected CommunitiesA. Why Making the Court Meaningful to Affected Communities MattersWith the ICC based far from the countries where the crimes were committed, the court runs the risk of being perceived as distant and irrelevant by the people it was created to serve. Unlike a national court whose authority is implicitly accepted, the ICC has no deep-rooted legitimacy in the situations it investigates. It may be viewed with suspicion, if not hostility, by those who fear its work. As a result, taken by themselves, fair and expeditious investigations and trials will not be enough for the ICC to be a success, regardless of how difficult these tasks are. The ICC also needs to prioritize robust, sustained, and strategic efforts to reach local populations in situation countries. Engaging these communities will not change the minds of those seeking to subvert the ICC’s work, but it will provide an essential counterweight to inaccurate or misleading information. While the communities most affected by the crimes may be difficult to reach, the ICC cannot afford to neglect them. The experience of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals underscores the adverse effect of failing to maximize impact with affected communities. Outreach at those tribunals—which are seated away from where the crimes occurred, as the ICC will be—was not pursued until years after the tribunals were established. Communities in the countries where the crimes occurred perceived the tribunals as very removed. In the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) the initiative to conduct outreach was indeed prompted when court officials realized their work was poorly perceived by affected communities, which was hampering investigation efforts. Although outreach programs since then have worked to improve public opinion, it has been difficult to overcome negative and inaccurate perceptions of the tribunals’ work. Making the ICC’s work meaningful to affected communities is also essential to help strengthen respect for the rule of law in situation countries and the court’s potential deterrent effect. In this regard, targeted initiatives by the ICC to act as a catalyst for effective investigations and fair and expeditious trials of serious crimes by national courts will be crucial. The fact that the ICC will conduct only a limited number of trials in each situation it investigates makes such efforts all the more important. The ICC needs to integrate into every facet of its activities that it is working on behalf of multiple audiences. While the international community is one important constituency, so too are local populations in situation countries. These populations must have the opportunity to take meaning from the court’s efforts. B. ICC Strategic PlanFollowing a request from the Committee on Budget and Finance in 20045 the court developed the Strategic Plan, which helps to identify common institutional goals, to guide budgeting, and to increase states parties’ understanding of ICC operations. The plan is an excellent initiative. The plan allows the court to articulate how it perceives its mandate, and to identify objectives and concrete strategies to achieve its goals. The plan is also an important vehicle through which states parties and the ASP can have appropriate and crucial substantive dialogue with the ICC about its policy and practice. As a judicial institution, the ICC’s independence, including its ownership over the Strategic Plan, must be respected at all times. However, while recognizing that the court retains exclusive control over the plan, states parties and the ASP can and should provide the ICC with feedback and input on it. Over the past year, the ASP Working Group in The Hague (HWG) organized a sub-group on the plan, which met five times and invited briefings by ICC officials and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Following consultation with states parties and NGOs, the ICC prepared a revised plan.6 The fifth session of the ASP provides a significant opportunity that we urge states parties to utilize to discuss the revised plan and take action to promote further improvements. As discussed below, the plan includes key objectives, but continues to lack crucial elements. Human Rights Watch recommends:
We understand that the HWG sub-group on the Strategic Plan will present to the Bureau and the ASP a report reflecting discussions among participating states parties to date. However, we believe that time should also be devoted to discussing the Strategic Plan and the sub-group’s report during a working group at the ASP session. This would allow states parties that are not represented in The Hague, or have otherwise been unable to participate in the work of the sub-group throughout the year, to discuss the plan.
The Strategic Plan reflects substantial effort by the ICC and should be welcomed.7The plan also appropriately features the need for impartial investigations, quality prosecutions, and fair and expeditious judicial proceedings. These are at the heart of the ICC’s achieving its difficult and unprecedented mandate. The plan further includes crucial objectives such as ensuring the full exercise of victim participant rights, and promoting awareness about the ICC. Nevertheless, the plan continues to lack critical elements, namely in relation to maximizing the ICC’s impact with affected communities. 8 The latest version of the plan shows increased attention to the importance of reaching local populations in situation countries. However, it does not reflect a comprehensive vision, series of objectives, or strategies to make the ICC’s work meaningful to these populations, including by promoting justice at the national level. This is of particular concern as, over time, the Strategic Plan will likely become standard reading for those seeking to familiarize themselves with the ICC. States parties should encourage for the plan to better reflect that affected communities are a key ICC constituency that must be adequately reached. In this regard, additional objectives and strategies in the following areas should be added to the Strategic Plan in order for the ICC to more appropriately seek to maximize impact with affected communities:
The lack of detail and strategies to achieve objectives throughout the plan is another gap.13 States parties should encourage more information and implementation strategies to be provided as a matter of priority, especially with regard to key areas listed above. We understand that the HWG has requested more dialogue with the court on a number of these same key areas, which is welcome. In order to allow wider participation by states parties in the discussions, discussion with the ICC on these areas should start at the ASP session if possible.
We understand that an ASP resolution on the plan is intended at the upcoming session, which we welcome. In addition to highlighting a number of substantive points about the plan (as detailed above), the resolution should provide for continued dialogue by states parties on this important issue by: C. Office of the Prosecutor Strategic Plan, Policy and PracticeAs part of the Strategic Plan process, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has developed its own strategic plan.15 As the OTP is the “driving engine” of the court, this is particularly welcome. The OTP also has recently issued several documents for consultation with states parties, civil society, and other stakeholders.16 Taken together, these documents are crucial to understanding OTP policy and practice. They also increase the transparency of the OTP. This is important to avoid questions about the OTP’s independence and impartiality given the political sensitivities of the ICC’s work. In decisions on policy and practice, the independence of the prosecutor must be vigorously respected. This does not mean, however, that states parties should avoid dialogue on these issues. Discussion will contribute to the ICC’s best possible development by allowing the OTP to have feedback based on accumulated experience. It will also enable the OTP to further increase transparency and understanding of its work. Hearings with state parties, civil society, and other stakeholders on OTP policy and practice were held in The Hague and New York in September and October 2006. We look forward to continued dialogue on these issues. Human Rights Watch recommends:
While the OTP has taken impressive strides in the past three years and made positive evolution in certain practices, a number of concerns, which are discussed below, exist. Only a few years after the election of the prosecutor, the office is carrying out investigations in three situations that bear out the reasons the court was created. These are situations characterized by mass murder, widespread use of rape, and forced displacement of populations on the basis of ethnicity. The OTP has obtained six arrest warrants and custody of one accused. Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch believes certain policies and decisions raise concerns, particularly as they could undermine perceptions of the prosecutor’s impartiality or capacity to have impact in the fight against impunity.17 The most notable of these are the OTP’s stated policies of inviting voluntary referrals,18 utilizing a sequential approach to investigations,19 and targeting “those who bear the greatest responsibility.”20 There are also concerns regarding discrepancies between policy and practice, such as in regards to the policy of filing charges that are representative of crimes committed.21 As for the OTP strategic plan, we believe the objectives articulated in the plan are in general sensible.22 However, we see problems with the estimates put forward. Although we understand why both states parties and the OTP would like to have a sense of the future quantitative workload of the OTP, the “figures”—proposing to conduct four to six investigations and two trials in the next three years23—are not particularly informative or helpful. They unnecessarily limit the scope of the OTP’s action as they cannot take into account that more serious crises could arise that would require the OTP’s urgent attention. These figures also are unclear as to whether these investigations and charges will be representative of the crimes committed and target those persons most responsible for the crimes committed, including those in the upper echelons of power, as they should do. As a result, we note that these figures will not provide an appropriate benchmark for evaluating the OTP’s performance.
Dialogue on the OTP plan is valuable and should be continued, while respecting the OTP’s ownership over the plan. One way to ensure that dialogue on the OTP plan continues is for states parties to indicate that the HWG sub-group on the Strategic Plan should be utilized as one means of future discussion about the OTP plan. In addition to the concerns above, the OTP plan lacks adequate detail. Of particular note, “positive complementarity” is referenced as a guiding principle without any significant elaboration.24 More detail is needed in revised versions of the OTP plan. D. Outreach and CommunicationsEffective outreach and communications in situation countries is a key means for the ICC to maximize its impact. It provides the tools to local communities to understand the court’s prosecution of alleged perpetrators and the commitment by the international community to ensure accountability for serious crimes. Effective outreach and communications are all the more important for communities that are polarized and war-torn. Those threatened by the ICC can be expected to promote misinformation about it.
During the fourth ASP session, states parties aptly stressed the importance of outreach to the ICC’s success.25 Prompted by this interest and a request from the ASP, the court has now produced a “Strategic Plan for Outreach” (Outreach Strategy).26 As discussed below, the Outreach Strategy is a highly positive step, although some areas still require improvement. At this ASP session, we urge states parties to take action to promote further positive development in the ICC’s outreach and communications efforts. Human Rights Watch recommends:
The ICC has made significant progress in its outreach and communications over the year and demonstrated a heightened commitment to these issues, which states parties should welcome. This is reflected through outreach workshops, recruitment of national and international staff to conduct outreach and communications, and requests for increased funding for outreach and communications activities.27 The Outreach Strategy also reflects a dramatic improvement in the court’s conceptualization of outreach. Specifically, the strategy recognizes the importance of outreach to the court’s work, the need for outreach to start as early as possible in the situations under investigation, and that outreach is the responsibility of the Registry, in collaboration with other judicial actors (such as the OTP and defense). The Outreach Strategy further incorporates key elements—including practical measures—to conduct effective outreach by identifying target groups;28 specific tools;29 the creation of a specialized unit in headquarters and teams in the field on outreach;30 and tailored strategies for each situation under investigation.31 The development of situation-specific strategies is particularly important as the ICC faces different contexts and challenges that must be overcome in each country in which it operates. The strategies demonstrate enhanced analysis of the needs in each situation, along with creative ways to respond to them. At the same time, other components are needed and states parties should urge their incorporation. Specifically, in addition to conducting outreach with elite groups (such as religious and cultural leaders), more efforts to reach a wider audience should be included where possible (such as through “town hall” meetings). Targeting elite groups is important, but such groups may have interests that affect how they relay information to others. This can make them inappropriate intermediaries between the ICC and the general public. The Outreach Strategy also does not sufficiently identify current perceptions in each situation or initiatives to address misconceptions or outstanding questions. Increased interaction with the general public will allow the ICC to better understand these issues, thereby helping the ICC to prioritize appropriate initiatives for each situation. The hiring of local teams will hopefully also facilitate this process. Plans related to Darfur are too minimal. We recognize the immense difficulties of operating in the context where a government opposes ICC involvement. However, significantly more can and must be done. With no arrest warrants issued some two years after the Security Council referral, states parties should stress that there is an intense need for outreach and communications to explain the court’s work and counter disillusionment in Darfur.
The Outreach Strategy must be implemented as a matter of priority. To date, even with increases in 2006, outreach and communications activities have been insufficient, with only a minimal portion of society in situations under investigation reached.32 This is largely due to resource allocations for outreach and communications that as requested by the ICC were not sufficient, and were even less so as approved by the ASP.33 This has already led to lapses in information and misperceptions that have detrimentally impacted views about the court in country situations.34
Effective outreach and communications require adequate resources. In this regard, increased resources requested by the court this year for an outreach unit in headquarters, teams of five local staff in country situations, and funds for production of materials are welcome;35 cuts proposed by the Committee on Budget and Finance (CBF) to outreach and communications efforts in situation countries raise concern and should be rejected.36 The ICC has taken an important step forward in producing a strategy that reflects substantial progress in the court’s approach to outreach. It is now up to the ASP to step up and to approve the resources necessary for the ICC to implement the strategy. While the CBF has criticized the Outreach Strategy for lacking clarity,37 this should not be the basis for cutting funding for outreach and communications, but rather for encouragement to improve the strategy. Moreover, cutting resources would send a signal that outreach is not a priority. The ASP must not on the one hand encourage the court to intensify its outreach activities and then cut funding for increased activities, which remain relatively limited. E. Geographic Location of Court Activities and PremisesThe Strategic Plan rightly recognizes the importance of in situ proceedings and field offices, and indicates that a priority objective is for the courtto, “[f]ormulate options for different geographical locations of the Court’s resources and activities, including the requirements for the permanent premises.”38 Below we discuss recommendations for the ASP to promote ICC activities and presence in situation countries and to resolve premises issues. Field activitiesAdequate field engagement39 is an absolutely essential way for the ICC to bridge the gap between its base in The Hague and communities in situation countries. It is a crucial means through which the ICC can reach affected communities by bringing the court physically and culturally closer to these populations. A number of states parties have rightly emphasized the importance of activities in situation countries, particularly at this year’s United Nations (UN) General Assembly session in which the Report of the ICC was considered.40 The HWG sub-group on the Strategic Plan has also indicated that “options for the geographic location” for the court’s activities are a priority area for future dialogue with the ICC. During the fifth session of the ASP it will be crucial for states parties to build upon engagement to date to promote enhanced field engagement. Human Rights Watch recommends:
The ICC has made important advances in its field engagement over the past year, with a substantial strengthening of field offices. International and national staff from the Victims Participation and Reparations Section and from the Victims and Witnesses Unit now are working in offices in both the DRC and Uganda. Recruitment of outreach teams comprised of national staff has also been finalized for the DRC and Uganda field offices.41 In addition, in this year’s proposed budget, the ICC shows the potential cost of in situ proceedings and expenses related to visits to situation countries by ICC officials.42 States parties should utilize the ASP general debate and working group on the Strategic Plan to further advance field engagement, by stressing the importance of field activities and their role in making the court’s work meaningful to affected communities. States parties should also encourage the ICC to include the following field activities in its “geographic options” to assist the court in maximizing its impact:
It will come as no surprise that field presence and activities require funding. Given their importance, all allocations for such efforts should be approved. PremisesAt the upcoming ASP, major questions over both interim and permanent premises for the ICC are again on the agenda. Over the past year, the ICC has had to work from buildings in four locations in different parts of The Hague due to overcrowding at the primary interim premises. This situation is far from ideal as it can hamper effective coordination among staff within and across divisions at the ICC. Moreover, no decision has been made regarding the type of permanent premises that will be established, namely whether a new building will be constructed or an existing building will be adapted. It will be important for the ASP to resolve these issues, especially so that ICC officials who have already devoted substantial attention to premises issues can turn their attention to other matters. In order to address this:
The Hague Working Group has worked on these issues in the past year and an expert meeting was recently convened to move the process forward. We understand that the working group is preparing a draft resolution for the ASP about permanent premises, and that this resolution may express an intention to move forward with the Alexanderkazerne site. A resolution that decides on the type of permanent premises that will be established would be welcome. The resolution should also approve a new plan for interim premises that better addresses the need for efficiency and coordination across the ICC without additional costs to the court. Finally, the resolution should establish a mechanism through which informed and timely decisions on next steps to create permanent premises can be made. In order to be effective, the mechanism should include representatives from the ICC, the host state, the Committee on Budget and Finance, and the ASP, as well as persons with technical expertise, and should meet regularly.
This will allow the court to develop necessary in-house expertise, and allow staff who have been working on this issue to return to their core functions. This requires approval of two positions for this office included in the proposed budget,43 which the CBF has endorsed. F. BudgetThe CBF is responsible for the technical examination of documents submitted to the assembly that are of a financial, budgetary, or administrative nature, including reviewing and making recommendations concerning the court's budget.44 As discussed below, we have several concerns about current CBF practice and about proposed cuts to priority areas, which we believe may need to be rejected. These include proposed cuts to investigations,45 cooperation,46 outreach and communications,47 and witness protection.48 We see these as priority areas for the ICC, given their connection to the court’s fundamental task of investigating and prosecuting serious crimes and maximizing the impact of this work with affected communities. Human Rights Watch recommends:
There are a number of proposed cuts for which insufficient or no justification is provided in the most recent CBF report, including for activities to promote cooperation.49 In order to properly complete its work, we believe the CBF must explain the reasoning behind proposed cuts. Otherwise its decisions appear arbitrary. The lack of justification for cuts further raises questions as to whether CBF sessions have become too short for adequate interaction with ICC officials and full consideration of the budget.50
Consistent with the ASP’s functions under article 112(d) of the Rome Statute, the ASP cannot abdicate its responsibility to “[c]onsider and decide the budget for the Court.” The ASP must not adopt the CBF’s proposed cuts, especially in priority areas, without first determining that they are appropriate and do not undermine needed funding. The CBF indicated that the ICC framed its budget proposals for 2007 in comparison to the 2006 budget, but the 2006 budget was based on assumptions that only partially materialized.51 The CBF further indicated that a preferable approach would have been to compare the 2007 budget proposals to actual anticipated expenditures for 2006; it noted that “such an approach would [have] highlight[ed] a difference of an approximately 40 percent increase between projected implementation for 2006 and the 2007 budget.”52 We see the benefits of comparing future budgets to the previous year’s actual anticipated expenditures, and hope that the ICC will do this next year. It will also be important for the ICC to continue to enhance its expertise in making cost projections concerning its functions. Nevertheless, the fact that the court’s approach in preparing its budget figures may not be the most preferable and that the budget has effectively undergone a significant increase are not sufficient to justify specific cuts, particularly in priority areas. Toward this end, the ASP must at the least review and critically assess the implications of the proposed cuts. Indeed, increases in investigations, witness protection, outreach, and cooperation appear reasonable—and even conservative—given the demands of these tasks. Moreover, it is important that the ASP not simply indicate that the court could compensate for the cuts with funds from other areas; the ASP should at least identify suggestions from which functions “funds from other areas” might be taken. To avoid duplicating the work of the CBF, the ASP might consider holding thematic discussions to discuss the CBF recommendations, as was done during the ASP’s fourth session. During such discussions, we would recommend that the ASP pose questions to ICC officials regarding the impact of proposed CBF cuts for priority areas. Such questions should include the following: Moreover, given their importance, the ASP should tend toward rejecting cuts to priority areas such as investigations, outreach and communications, witness protection, and cooperation. Finally, to facilitate consideration of the budget and CBF report in the future, the ASP should also request the CBF to make its report available at least several weeks before the ASP session.
5 Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC-ASP), “Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance,” ICC-ASP/3/18, August 13, 2004, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-18-_CBF_report_English.pdf (accessed October 27, 2006), para. 46. 6 ICC-ASP, “Strategic Plan of the International Criminal Court,” August 4, 2006, ICC-ASP/5/6, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-6_English.pdf (accessed October 27, 2006) (“Strategic Plan”). 7 Consistent with the ICC’s independence, it would be wholly inappropriate for the ASP to seek to vote, approve, or decide in any way on the plan. As noted by the Committee on Budget and Finance “it [i]s essential that ownership of the strategic plan should remain with the Court and that it enjoy the support of States Parties.” ICC-ASP, “Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance on the work of its sixth session,” ICC-ASP/5/1, May 4, 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-1_English.pdf (accessed October 27, 2006), para. 56. 8 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Human Rights Watch Memorandum on the Strategic Plan of the International Criminal Court, July 2006, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/memo0706/index.htm. While the memorandum comments on a previous version of the plan, many of the concerns remain. 9 For example, the Strategic Plan should envision widely disseminating information to affected communities on the role of victims at the court, and on policies and procedures for participation and reparations. Such information should be accessible to persons who speak languages or dialects particular to the local community, and available to victims in remote areas or places where security is fragile. For more information, see Human Rights Watch Memorandum on the Strategic Plan of the International Criminal Court, pp. 4–7. 10 For more detail on how field activities can be utilized to promote the court’s impact in situation countries, see below, Section II.E (“Geographic Location of Court Activities and Premises”). 11 For more detail on how outreach and communications can be utilized to promote the court’s impact in situation countries, see below, Section II.D (“Outreach and Communications”). 12 For example, the Strategic Plan should envision implementing targeted initiatives to enhance the capacity of national courts in situation countries to prosecute serious crimes. This could include: sharing expertise with national justice system staff through dialogue about investigating and trying serious crimes; providing relevant evidence to national justice sector staff when the ICC-OTP comes across it; and encouraging states parties and intergovernmental organizations to assist in strengthening national judicial systems. For more information, see Human Rights Watch Memorandum on the Strategic Plan of the International Criminal Court, pp. 12–14. 13 In this regard, however, we welcome recent consultations by the Registrar with staff to develop strategies to implement the Registry’s mandate and mission. See “Eighth Diplomatic Briefing of the International Criminal Court, 26 October 2006,” Information Package, document on file with Human Rights Watch, p. 7. 14 This is consistent with the ICC’s welcome intention to report annually on progress on the Strategic Plan. See Strategic Plan, para. 56. This report could also include a description of the challenges faced in implementing the Strategic Plan. 15 Strategic Plan, p. 6. See also Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (ICC-OTP), “Report on Prosecutorial Strategy,” September 14, 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_Prosecutorial-Strategy-20060914_English.pdf (accessed November 6, 2006) (“OTP Report on Prosecutorial Strategy”). 16 For example, see ICC-OTP, “Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June 2003 – June 2006),” September 12, 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_3-year-report-20060914_English.pdf (accessed October 27, 2006) (“Activities Report”); ICC-OTP, “Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases,” draft policy paper on file with Human Rights Watch, June 2006. 17 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Human Rights Watch, The Selection of Situations and Cases for Trial before the International Criminal Court, No. 1, October 2006, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/ij1006/index.htm; and ICC Prosecutor’s Public Hearing for NGOs: Intervention by Richard Dicker, October 18, 2006, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/oral1006/. 18 Investigation resulting from voluntary referrals where the other criteria of the Rome Statute are met is not in itself problematic. However, the prosecutor’s emphasis and encouragement of voluntary referrals creates the risk that the OTP—and as a consequence, the court as a whole—may be perceived as a tool in the hand of the referring government. The possibility for the prosecutor to use his proprio motu authority to conduct investigations is, among other things, an important tool to preserve his independence. For more detailed discussion of this point, see Human Rights Watch, Intervention by Richard Dicker, pp. 3–4. 19 The prosecutor has indicated that his office will investigate all groups in a situation “in sequence,” suggesting that one case will be investigated at a time. In some instances, for practical reasons, it may be necessary to conduct investigations in this manner. However, the formal adoption of this approach may have negative implications, including for the perception of the prosecutor’s impartiality. For example, while the ICC has issued an arrest warrant against a Hema militia leader, Thomas Lubanga, our recent field research in eastern DRC indicates that the absence of warrants against Lendu leaders has led to a strong perception within the Hema community and others that the ICC is carrying out “selective justice.” See Human Rights Watch, Selection of Situations and Cases, pp. 5–6. 20 The substantive thrust of this approach, targeting those accused at the highest levels in government and among insurgent armed groups, is sensible. However, adopting a stated policy to focus on “those who bear the greatest responsibility” limits unnecessarily the OTP’s scope and, as a result, its potential deterrent effect. See Human Rights Watch, Selection of Situations and Cases, pp. 11–15. 21 For instance, two years of investigation by the OTP in the DRC has not yielded a broader range of charges against Lubanga. Charging those responsible for the most serious crimes committed in Ituri with representative crimes for which there is a strong evidentiary basis is crucial for the victims of these crimes, and for ending the culture of impunity in the DRC and in the Great Lakes region. For more information, see Joint letter from Human Rights Watch and other groups to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor, International Criminal Court, July 31, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/01/congo13891.htm. 22 The objectives are: “to further improve the quality of the prosecution, aiming to complete two expeditious trials[;] to conduct four to six new investigations of those who bear the greatest responsibility in the Office’s current or new situations[;] to gain the necessary forms of cooperation for all situations to allow for effective investigations and to mobilize and facilitate successful arrest operations[;] to continuously improve the way in which the Office interacts with victims and addresses their interests[; and] to establish forms of cooperation with states and organisations to maximize the Office’s contribution to the fight against impunity and the prevention of crimes.” OTP Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, p. 3. 23 Strategic Plan, p. 6; OTP Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, p. 7. 24 OTP Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, p. 4 25 For example, Sierra Leone, Germany, and Belgium convened a joint hearing at the 2005 ASP to discuss the importance of outreach for international justice institutions. States also made supportive statements during the general debate of that ASP. See, for example, Statement delivered by Ambassador Allieu I. Kanu, Head of Delegation of Sierra Leone, at the Fourth Session of the ICC-ASP General Debate, Statement of the Republic of Uganda at the Fourth Session of the ICC-ASP, delivered by Amb. Mirjam Blaak, and Statement of H.E. Mr. Vital Budu Tandema, Head of Delegation of DRC (delivered in French), December 2, 2005. Statements from the general debate are available at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=browserdoc&type=13&module=592 (accessed November 8, 2006). See also ICC-ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/4/Res.4, adopted December 3, 2005, ICC-ASP/4/32, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-4-Res4_English.pdf (accessed November 6, 2006), para. 22 (“Recognizes the importance for the Court to engage communities in situations under investigation in a process of constructive interaction with the Court, designed to promote understanding and support for its mandate, to manage expectations and to enable those communities to follow and understand the international criminal justice process and, to that end, encourages the Court to intensify such outreach activities and requests the Court to present a detailed strategic plan in relation to its outreach activities to the Assembly of States Parties, in advance of its fifth session”). 26 ICC-ASP, “Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court,” ICC-ASP/5/12, September 29, 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-12_English.pdf (accessed November 6, 2006) (“Strategic Plan for Outreach”). 27 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the International Criminal Court,” U.N. Doc. A/61/217, August 3, 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/presidency/ICC_Report-to-UN_2006_English.pdf (accessed November 6, 2006), paras. 33–38 (“ICC Annual Report to the UN”); ICC-ASP, “Proposed Programme Budget for 2007 of the International Criminal Court,” ICC-ASP/5/9, August 22, 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-9_English.pdf (accessed November 6, 2006), pp. 135–139 (“ICC Proposed Programme Budget for 2007”). 28 This includes, inter alia, victims, women, journalists, and the public at large. ICC-ASP, “Strategic Plan for Outreach,” paras. 18–31. 29 This includes, inter alia, radio debates, town hall meetings, trainings, and visual materials. Ibid., paras. 48–61. 30 Ibid., paras. 69–76. 31 Ibid., paras. 85–127. 32 ICC-ASP, “Report on the activities of the Court,” ICC-ASP/5/15, October 17, 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-15_English.pdf (accessed November 6, 2006), para. 72 (reporting that over the year the court held 16 workshops and informational meetings in the DRC involving 1,300 participants, and 14 workshops and seminars in Uganda, involving 700 participants). 33 See ICC-ASP, “Proposed Programme Budget for 2006 of the International Criminal Court,” ICC-ASP/4/5, August 24, 2005, paras. 405–419; Official Records of the 4th Session of the ICC-ASP, “Part II: External audit, programme budget for 2006 and related documents,” ICC-ASP/4/32, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/Part_II_-_External_audit_and_programme_budget_for_2006.pdf (accessed November 7, 2006), para. 30; see also Human Rights Watch Memorandum for the 4th ICC Assembly of States Parties, November 2005, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/memo1105/index.htm, pp. 2–5. 34 For example, as discussed above, in the DRC our recent field research suggests that there are perceptions that justice is selective due to the absence of warrants issued against persons associated with more than one militia group. In Uganda, we understand there has been a perception that the court is an instrument of the Ugandan government. 35 ICC Proposed Programme Budget for 2007, pp. 135–139. 36 Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court, Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance on the work of its seventh session, ICC-ASP/5/23, November 1, 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-23_English.pdf (accessed November 6, 2006), para. 77 (“CBF Report”). 37 The CBF indicated that it “remained concerned that there appeared to be no clear system for determining the levels and extent of engagement for the target audience, or any process to evaluate whether that had been achieved.” CBF Report, para. 31. 38 Strategic Plan, p. 7. 39 By field engagement, we mean a substantive, sustained presence of the court in situation countries when the security situation allows it. 40 For example, African states parties encouraged “the Court to make plans for holding hearings in the area where the crimes have been committed as this would enhance the deterrent effect of the Court and justice will be seen to be done.” Statement by Mr. Sabelo Sivuyile Maqungo, on behalf of African Member States to the International Criminal Court Statute before the General Assembly, October 9, 2006, http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/pmun/view_speech.php?speech=271690 (accessed October 27, 2006). At the 2005 session of the ASP, African states parties also expressed that “trials should, as much as possible, be carried out in the localities or region where the crime took place.” Statement by Professor J.A. Ayua, Solicitor-General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, on behalf of African States Parties to the ICC at the 4th ASP, December 3, 2005, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/NigeriaAfricanSPs_GeneralDebate_3Dec05.pdf (accessed November 6, 2006). 41 “Public Information and Outreach Teams for DRC and Uganda recruited,” ICC Newsletter, No. 9, October 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/newsletter/files/ICC-NL9-200610_En.pdf (accessed October 27, 2006), p. 3. 42 ICC Proposed Programme Budget for 2007, Annex X, p. 189. 43 ICC Proposed Programme Budget for 2007, paras. 419–424. 44 ICC-ASP, First Session, “Establishment of the Committee on Budget and Finance,” ICC-ASP/1/Res.4, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/basicdocuments/asp_records(e).pdf (accessed November 7, 2006), para. 3. 45 The CBF proposes to cut a P3 analyst for the fourth investigation. CBF Report, para. 66. 46 Proposed cuts to the ICC’s work related to ensuring cooperation are addressed in greater detail in Section III.B, below. 47 These cuts are addressed in detail in the previous section. 48 The CBF recommended that three P2 associate protection officers not be established and converted them into general temporary assistance; that a P2 associate operations officer for situation IV be cut; and that an increase in travel intended for missions to negotiate witness relocation agreements and the provision of witness protection and support, including witness escort travel, be cut. CBF Report, para. 75. 49 For example, the CBF “recommended that the P-3 International Cooperation Adviser post should not be approved” without providing any explanation. 50 In its latest report, the CBF agreed that its April session should be extended from three to four days. CBF report, para. 128. The ASP should support this request and consider whether extending the October session, during which the CBF specifically considers the draft budget of the court, would also assist the CBF in providing more explanations about its decisions. Extending sessions could also enable the CBF to consult experts in particular court functions, such as witness protection. The ASP should consider recommending that the CBF consult such experts, as appropriate. 51 “The Court explained that the 2006 budget had been based on assumptions of trials starting in May and July. Neither of those assumptions had materialised…” CBF Report, para. 40. 52 “The Committee welcomed the clarity of the budget presentation and the layout of the proposed budget document itself, noting a continuous improvement in the Court’s work in that area. The Committee was nevertheless concerned at the general approach. In each of the programmes and sub-programmes, the budget proposals for 2007 were compared with the 2006 budget, which had been developed to meet workload assumptions as they appeared in the summer of 2005, that had only partially materialised. As a result, the 2006 budget had been significantly underspent and could not therefore be considered a sound baseline for consideration of the 2007 budget. Similarly, much of the commentary related only to perceived growth rather than justifying the overall budget… A preferable approach would have been to compare the 2007 budget with projected implementation for 2006, linking the increases to workload assumptions.” CBF Report, paras. 48–49. 53 CBF Report, para. 66. 54 Ibid., para. 75. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid., para. 77. |