Background Briefing

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The Failure to Arrest Radovan Karadzic

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted the wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic on July 24, 1995, for genocide and war crimes against non-Serbs in various parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On November 16 of the same year, ICTY prosecutor also indicted Karadzic for genocide in Srebrenica. Notwithstanding the indictments, Karadzic remained president of Republika Srpska until July 1996, when the U.S. mediator Richard Holbrooke brokered a deal in Belgrade with Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, and two leading Bosnian Serb politicians—Momcilo Krajisnik and Aleksa Buha—to force Karadzic out of politics and public life.12 

Over the past decade, there have been only three confirmed attempts by NATO to arrest Karadzic. Each one resulted in failure. Other reported activities were limited to creating preconditions for eventual arrest.

Karadzic is not an ordinary criminal. He remains widely popular among Bosnian Serbs and enjoys a well-financed support network, including police officers and members of the intelligence services in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, and possibly of the Serbian Orthodox Church. He is also guarded by a loyal cadre of security officers. These factors have certainly helped Karadzic to remain at large. But the poor performance of NATO troops in Bosnia and lack of political will on the part of NATO governments are arguably more important factors in explaining his continued freedom.

1995-1998: NATO Unwilling to Act Decisively

Even if one accepts that Radovan Karadzic is hard to locate today, there was undoubtedly a time when that was not the case, and NATO let him get away. The ICTY indicted Karadzic in July 1995, but he traveled freely through Republika Srpska until the summer of 1997. It was not until 1997 that Karadzic went into hiding, following the first NATO arrest operation against persons indicted by the ICTY in July of that year.13 

Until mid-1997, NATO commanders argued that their task was not to track down war crimes suspects. Initially, NATO claimed that the mandate of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) did not cover apprehension at all. It later modified that argument, suggesting instead that the Dayton peace agreement required IFOR and the successor Stabilization Force (SFOR) to make arrests only if peacekeepers “encountered” the suspects in the line of duty.14 A western diplomat quoted by US News and World Report in December 1996 claimed that he had been in negotiations with Karadzic’s chief adviser Jovan Zametica in the spring of 1996 over Karadzic’s surrender, but that Zametica had broken off negotiations after reportedly receiving assurances from the U.S. government that it would not risk the safety of U.S. troops by arresting war crimes suspects.15

In July 1997, U.K. special forces mounted an arrest operation in the town of Prijedor, Republika Srpska, against two war crime suspects indicted by the ICTY, detaining one and killing the second.

Beginning in 1996, the United States reportedly spent tens of millions of dollars over several years preparing missions, training commandos and gathering intelligence to arrest Karadzic and Mladic. The National Security Agency, an agency within the U.S. Department of Defense which conducts electronic eavesdropping, likewise spent tens of millions of dollars during the same period tracking Karadzic and Mladic. FBI agents and U.S. Marshals traveled to Bosnia from the United States, and inspected the fugitives’ homes and hideouts.16 

Towards the end of 1997, numerous Western officials made statements to the effect that the arrest of Karadzic and Mladic was “imminent.” The spokesperson for the Office of the High Representative, the senior civilian post in Bosnia, told the media in September 1997 that “the clock started ticking for indicted war criminals several weeks ago and their time is up.”17A top NATO military source told the Washington Post in October that “it's a good bet we will get Karadzic and a few others before the end of the year.”18 The same month State Department spokesperson James Rubin said that ICTY indictees who were still at large “must know that the United States remains committed to keeping open all possible options for making them available to the tribunal for prosecution.”19

Despite these statements and the intelligence gathering and other efforts made, no arrest attempt was carried out against either man during this period. Concerns over potential NATO casualties arising during arrest operations, and from subsequent reprisals from the Bosnian Serb population (so-called “force protection” issues) weakened the resolve of NATO commanders to act. NATO officials were also concerned that the arrests would result in the deaths of hundreds of Serbs attempting to protect Karadzic and Mladic, which could provoke further violent reactions by radical Serb elements and reignite the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.20

Mutual distrust among NATO members also hindered the efforts. According to New York Times sources, “French officers, whose international peacekeepers control the zone where Karadzic and Mladic have been living, were deeply skeptical. U.S. officers were reluctant to share intelligence with the French, fearing it would leak.”21 The U.S. distrust was mainly based on an incident from mid-1997, when the U.S. discovered that a French liaison officer in Bosnia, Herve Gourmelon, was leaking plans of Karadzic’s arrest to the ICTY indictee.22 The French Defence Ministry claimed that its liaison officer had “maintained various contacts consonant with his orders,” and denied that these contacts jeopardized arrest of Karadzic. Yet, the French Defense Ministry recalled Gourmelon to France in December 1997, “as soon as the course of these contacts could have appeared questionable.”23 A Time magazinejournalist who co-authored a book about the Amber Star plan—named after a secret cell of United States and NATO military officers who shared intelligence and developed ideas—concluded that Washington’s distrust of Paris was among the reasons military operations to capture Karadzic did not take place.24

According to the New York Times, U.S. and French officials dropped the Amber Star plan in mid-1998. Although U.S. officials contacted by Time in late July or early August 1998 denied this, they admitted that a raid had become unlikely.25 Their hope was that the economic, political, and personal power of the two men would gradually wane. As a result, the two fugitives would, in the words of one U.S. official, “drop like rotten fruit” into NATO's hands.26 This has proved to be wishful thinking.

1999-2005: Inaction and a Handful of Failed Arrest Efforts

After several years of inaction, NATO peacekeepers renewed their efforts to apprehend Karadzic in 2002. Between 2002 and 2004, NATO made three confirmed attempts to arrest him. (As noted below, there were also reports of another effort in 2001, which SFOR denied took place.) In addition, NATO troops carried out a number of high-profile operations linked to the effort to arrest Karadzic. Like the flurry of NATO activity in 1997 and 1998, these operations failed to deliver Karadzic to justice.

July 13, 2001

The alleged 2001 arrest operation was first reported by The Observer (London). Relying on three anonymous SFOR sources, the newspaper claimed that U.K. special forces had tried to apprehend Radovan Karadzic on July 13, 2001, in the area around Foca, in southeastern Republika Srpska. According to the newspaper, at least two NATO soldiers were wounded by Karadzic’s bodyguards during the operation.27 Some media in Serbia went even further and claimed that ten British soldiers were killed in the operation.28  However, a spokesman for the British Defense Ministry and an SFOR spokesperson both denied that the event had taken place at all.29 Similarly, the head of the main political party in Republika Srpska said in an interview later the same month that that Bosnian Serb police had no information about a rumored failed arrest attempt by British special forces.30

February 28-March 1, 2002

The first publicized attempt to capture Radovan Karadzic occurred on the morning of February 28, 2002, when NATO-led forces staged “Operation Daybreak Celebici.” According to Reuters, “Soldiers from the NATO-led SFOR peacekeeping force disembarked from helicopters and poured into the village of Celebici in mountainous southeastern Bosnia on Thursday morning and sealed it off…. Soldiers used explosives to break into buildings.”31 Soldiers searched around forty buildings in Celebici, and entered eighteen with the use of explosives.32 U.S. troops led the airborne forces, while French, German and Italian troops were on the ground to seal off roads.33 A NATO official confirmed to Reuters that explosives were used.34 SFOR reportedly cut off electricity and phone lines in the area during the operation.

Karadzic and his men were not found. Notably, SFOR troops launched the raid at dawn on February 28, more than twenty-four hours after Karadzic had been sighted at Celebici (on the night of February 26).35 Moreover, armored vehicles approaching Celebici along the only road from Foca would have warned locals that a raid was about to begin.36 

Subsequent information suggests that the arrest attempt may have been thwarted from within. According to the Sunday Herald newspaper, citing military sources, on the morning of the Celebici raid, “a French officer took a call from a Republika Srpska policeman inquiring about a large SFOR presence. In the call, monitored by peacekeeping forces, the French officer obliquely referred to the area being of interest, ‘today in particular.’”37 A Croatian newspaper also claimed that the French had tipped off Bosnian Serbs loyal to Karadzic about the NATO action.38 However, Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, made a statement soon after claiming that “allegations …about a leak to the Bosnian Serb authorities regarding the raid on Celebici on the morning of 28 February are pure speculation.”39

The day after the first operation in Celebici, SFOR made a second failed attempt to apprehend Karadzic, reportedly acting upon intelligence that he was still hiding in the area.40 In a statement, SFOR said that SFOR multinational soldiers conducted the operation with combined ground and air forces.41 An eyewitness told CNN that SFOR helicopters landed on hills near the village and about twenty-five soldiers disembarked to conduct searches for an hour. 42 In contrast to the action from the previous day, the soldiers did not enter any houses, confining their search to woods surrounding the village.

January 11-13, 2004

A second arrest attempt took place in January 2004. Between January 11 and 13, NATO troops raided the house of Radovan Karadzic, a Serb Orthodox church, a local clinic and other buildings associated with the Karadzic family in Pale, the former capital of the Republika Srpska, located 10 miles east of the Bosnian capital Sarajevo. A spokesman for the Alliance said NATO was acting on a tip that Karadzic had sought urgent medical attention in Pale.43 Hundreds of U.S., British, and Italian soldiers, some with sniffer dogs, searched the area. NATO seized a number of documents44 and detained three people for questioning.45 Karadzic was not among those detained.

April 1, 2004

A third effort took place during the night of April 1, 2004. British NATO troops, backed by local police, sealed off the area surrounding the residence of a Serbian Orthodox priest in the center of Pale and used explosives to break into the building.46The priest, Jeremija Starovlah, 52, and his son Aleksandar, 28, were seriously wounded during the operation.47 A NATO spokesman in Bosnia said that the sweep was an attempt to capture Karadzic.48 The local Bosniac press reported that Karadzic managed to escape only a few hours before the search operation started, because the Republika Srpska Army Intelligence Service uncovered the plan and arranged Karadzic’s transfer to a military barracks near Pale.49

Other NATO Activities Linked to the Apprehension of Karadzic

In addition to the three (or four) arrest operations, NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia have carried out a variety of activities related to the overall effort to bring Karadzic to justice. Whether these activities have generated valuable intelligence on Karadzic’s whereabouts or merely created the appearance of progress is hard to say.

Raids on the homes of Karadzic family members

NATO has made a number of raids on the homes of Radovan Karadzic’s family members in Pale since 2002. NATO claims the raids were aimed at obtaining evidence that could help NATO capture him or other war crimes indictees. On July 2, 2002, about thirty masked French soldiers, backed by a helicopter, stormed the house of Radovan Karadzic. The troops broke a metal gate and ransacked the house50 and seized a computer hard drive and three handguns.51 On August 26 and 27, 2003, peacekeepers from the United States, France, and Italy inspected the home of Karadzic’s daughter, a private medical practice belonging to his wife, a police station, and two other sites.52 On February 19, 2004, SFOR troops searched Radio St. Jovan, owned by Karadzic’s daughter, and the communication system of the Pale post office.53

Most recently, on May 26 and 27, 2005, dozens of U.S. NATO troops searched the house of Karadzic’s wife and the homes of his son and daughter. The troops “look[ed] for evidence and information about movements and whereabouts of Karadzic, his support network and other war crimes suspects,” a NATO spokesperson said.54 According to the spokesperson, Republika Srpska police assisted the U.S. troops to prevent possible unrest by the local Serb population. U.S. soldiers seized a computer and unspecified boxes from the homes of Karadzic’s children.55

The August 2002 “Information Gathering Operation”

Between August 14 and 16, 2002, hundreds of SFOR peacekeepers carried out a three-day operation in south-eastern Republika Srpska. The principal stated goal was to gather information on Karadzic’s support network in the region.56 In the areas of Foca, Visegrad, and Trebinje, SFOR troops established checkpoints to monitor persons and vehicles; SFOR also questioned several individuals and searched a number of locations.57 SFOR stated that the focus of the operation was not Karadzic’s arrest, although “SFOR would do so if circumstances permit.”58 No one was detained during the operation.59

Dissemination of leaflets

On March 13 and 19, 2002, SFOR helicopters dropped so-called K-mark leaflets in eastern Republika Srpska, calling on citizens to help arrest Radovan Karadzic, as part of the U.S. government's Rewards for Justice program.60 The leaflets, offering a five million-dollar reward for information leading to Karadzic’s arrest, showed his photograph and information on the award on the front, and a color photocopy of a fifty convertible mark (Bosnian currency) note on the back.61 SFOR used helicopters to distribute copies of the arrest warrants against Karadzic in the towns of Srebrenica, Vlasenica, and Han Pijesak. On July 2 and 3, SFOR dropped further leaflets over several towns in eastern Republika Srpska, including Vlasenica, Han Pijesak, and Visegrad.62

Alleged Sightings of Radovan Karadzic

After 1997, when Karadzic went into hiding, the NATO forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina have often claimed that lack of knowledge of his whereabouts makes it difficult to arrest him. That claim is hard to assess without knowing the state of knowledge of NATO forces. But several factors suggest that the claim is primarily a fig-leaf for NATO inaction.

First, it is clear that when significant intelligence assets were directed at locating Karadzic between 1996 and 1998, those assets generated specific information on his whereabouts. There is no reason to conclude that if similar efforts had been made in the past five years, the world’s most technologically advanced armies would have come up empty-handed.

Second, regular sightings of Karadzic reported by the ICTY Prosecutor and leading Bosnian newspapers call into question NATO’s claim that it is unable to locate Karadzic. The alleged sightings have been particularly frequent during 2005, in connection with the death and funeral of Karadzic’s mother. In none of the cases documented below did the NATO forces or the local police attempt to capture Karadzic.

Sightings of Karadzic Before 2005

The majority of reported sightings of Karadzic have occurred in the region between Sarajevo and the southeastern corners of Bosnia, near the border with Serbia and Montenegro. On September 7, 2000, for example, a leading Bosnian daily, Oslobodjenje, quoted a source close to the Bosnian Serb government as saying that Radovan Karadzic had been present at a small bar in Lukavica, the Serb-controlled suburb of Sarajevo, on September 2.63 

Karadzic has been sighted elsewhere in Bosnia. In May 2002, ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte told the daily La Tribune de Geneve that her sources indicated that Karadzic was hiding in the Banja Luka region, in northwestern Bosnia.64

Karadzic also appears to have made use of the porous border in the mountainous region between Bosnia and Montenegro. On March 6, 2003, Del Ponte claimed that Karadzic was moving between Republika Srpska and Montenegro, and that he might be at the Ostrog monastery, near Niksic (Montenegro).65 The information was reportedly based on monitored telephone communications.66 Montenegrin officials denied that Karadzic was in Ostrog. Milan Filipovic, Montenegrin Interior Minister, said on March 11, 2003, that his ministry “contacted all sources of this information, but no one has confirmed it.”67 In January 2004, Dragisa Burzan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, said that the allegation that Karadzic was hiding in the Ostrog monastery was “nonsense.”68

Sightings of Karadzic in 2005

Reported sightings of Karadzic have multiplied since April 2005. According to The Guardian, Radovan Karadzic had lunch with his wife on April 14, 2005, in a restaurant on the Foca-Gacko roadway, in southeastern Republika Srpska, “apparently in readiness for the death of his mother and to prepare for her funeral.”69 

The head of the Bosnian Federation police, Zlatko Miletic, told the media in early May 2005 that the actual date on which Karadzic had the lunch with his wife was April 7, 2005. Miletic said that the Federation police believed the information about Karadzic’s presence at the location was reliable, and that the police had therefore notified the office of the Bosnian state prosecutor, as well as the all-Bosnian intelligence service, the State Investigations and Protection Agency.70 The prime minister of Republika Srpska, Pero Bukejlovic, stated that his government had no knowledge of the sighting of Karadzic—a claim denied by Miletic.71 Karadzic’s wife denied that she had seen her husband in mid-April, saying that “it is not possible, as those who follow me know well.”72

In mid-April, according to The Guardian, Karadzic was spotted again, this time in Belgrade, with his brother, presumably to prepare for their mother’s funeral.73 The alleged meeting took place “a week after th[e] sighting [with his wife].”74 

According to the Sarajevo daily Dnevni avaz, Karadzic was also present at his mother’s funeral on May 7, in Niksic in Montenegro. Invoking an experienced Bosnian intelligence officer who has reportedly tracked Karadzic for foreign intelligence services, Dnevni avaz claimed that Karadzic stayed inside the St. Peter church during the burial ceremony, where only priests and members of the close family were allowed access.75 If true, this information would indicate that the international forces in Bosnia failed to apprehend Karadzic as he crossed the border from Bosnia into Montenegro, despite having reportedly stepped up their patrols on the border in case of a sighting.76

Anybody Left To Capture Karadzic?

The local government in Bosnia and Herzegovina retains primary responsibility for arresting war crimes indictees. The government of Republika Srpska, where Karadzic is believed to be hiding, bears much of the blame for the fact that he is still at large. In practice, Republika Srpska’s dismal record on war crimes accountability means that Karadzic is unlikely to face justice without action by international forces in Bosnia.

There are currently 7,000 European Union Force (EUFOR) troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUFOR’s mandate is to ensure compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.77 Among its key “supporting tasks” is to “provide support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and relevant authorities, including the detention of PIFWCs [persons indicted for war crimes].”78 As of April 2005, Germany was contributing with the greatest number of troops—1227, followed by Italy (1032), United Kingdom (669), Spain (538), The Netherlands (447), and France (381). Sixteen more E.U. member states have smaller contingents in theater, and so do eleven non-E.U. states.79 In addition, a 150-men contingent of U.S. troops remains in Bosnia, as part of a small NATO mission, to carry out anti-terrorist operations and hunt war crimes suspects.80 

Between 1997, when NATO carried out its first arrest of an indicted war crimes suspect in Bosnia, and today, the number of the international troops has shrunk from 31,000 to 7,000. However, the reduction in troop strength does not necessarily render the task of apprehending war crimes suspects more difficult. Political will and good intelligence are more important than large numbers of troops. A small group of well-trained commandos may be able to carry out the task more effectively, by preserving the element of surprise.

[12] “Sedam godina u balkanskim brdima” (“Eight Years in Balkan Hills”), Dani (Sarajevo), January 11,  2002.

[13] Ibid.

[14] “West debates catching Bosnia war crimes suspects,” Reuters, December 20, 1996 (quoting George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe). IFOR ended on December 20, 1996, and was replaced by SFOR on December 21, 1996.

[15] Colin Soloway and Stephen J. Hedges, “How Not to Catch a War Criminal,” US News and World Report, December 9, 1996.

[16] Tim Weiner, “U.S. Cancels Plans for Raid on Bosnia to Capture 2 Serbs,” The New York Times, July 26, 1998.

[17] Tom Walker, "Karadzic arrest is imminent, NATO says, The Times (London), September 26, 1997.

[18] William Drozdiak, “NATO Ministers Agree Force Must Stay in Bosnia; Cohen, However, Warns of Difficulties With Congress and a Need to Observe Deadlines,” The Washington Post, October 2, 1997.

[19] “U.S. Warns Serbs To Follow Croatia's Suit on Suspects,” Reuters, October 6, 1997.

[20] Tim Weiner, “U.S. Cancels Plans for Raid on Bosnia to Capture 2 Serbs,” The New York Times, July 26, 1998.

[21] Ibid.

[22] R. Jeffrey Smith, “Secret Meetings Foiled Karadzic Capture Plan; U.S. Says French Jeopardized Mission,” The Washington Post, April 23, 1998; Thomas Sancton and Gilles Delafon, “The Hunt For Karadzic,” Time, August 10, 1998.

[23] Charles Trueheart, “France Denies Officer Who Met With Karadzic Compromised Plans for Arrest,” The Washington Post, April 24, 1998.

[24] “Washington, Paris Planned Raid to Seize Serb ex-Leader, Book Says,” Chicago Tribune, January 6, 1999 (quoting journalist Tom Sancton of Time Magazine, co-author of the book “Dear Jacques, Cher Bill”). See also, R. Jeffrey Smith, “Secret Meetings Foiled Karadzic Capture Plan; U.S. Says French Jeopardized Mission,” The Washington Post, April 23, 1998.

[25] Thomas Sancton and Gilles Delafon, “The Hunt For Karadzic,” Time, August 10, 1998.

[26] Tim Weiner, “U.S. Cancels Plans for Raid on Bosnia to Capture 2 Serbs,” The New York Times, July 26, 1998; see also, Thomas Sancton and Gilles Delafon, “The Hunt For Karadzic,” Time,  August 10, 1998.

[27] Nicholas Wood & Peter Beaumont, “Karadzic escapes NATO's night raiders,” The Observer, July 15, 2001 [online],,6903,522097,00.html (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[28] Tanjug news agency, “SFOR denies British SAS members killed in attempt to arrest Karadzic,” BBC Monitoring European, July 15, 2001.

[29] Philippa Fletcher, “Milosevic arrest child's play compared with Karadzic,” Reuters, July 26, 2001; see also, Tanjug news agency, “SFOR denies British SAS members killed in attempt to arrest Karadzic,” BBC Monitoring European, July 15, 2001.

[30] Philippa Fletcher, “NATO best for war crimes hunt-Bosnian Serb leader,” Reuters, July 19, 2001 (interview with Dragan Kalinic, then-leader of the Serb Democratic Party). A week later, approximately 1,200 NATO troops carried out military exercises code-named Cerberus, again in the Foca area, amid press reports that the troops might be getting ready to seize Radovan Karadzic. A NATO spokesman however denied that the exercises were linked to Karadzic's fate. “NATO troops hold exercise near reported Karadzic hideout,” Agence France-Presse, July 18, 2001.

[31] Damir Sagolj, “NATO fails to net Karadzic in Bosnia village swoop,”Reuters, February 28, 2002 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[32] Ibid. (statement by Republika Srpska Prime Minister Mladen Ivanic, based on the information provided to him by SFOR's commander John Sylvester).

[33] Ibid.

[34] Damir Sagolj, “NATO fails to net Karadzic in Bosnia village swoop,”Reuters, February 28, 2002 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[35] Robert Fox & Julius Strauss, “German troops seal border to bar Karadzic's escape,” The Sunday Telegraph, March 3, 2002.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Russ Baker, “Special report: The hunt for Radovan Karadzic,” The Sunday Herald (U.K.), February 8, 2004 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[38] Ana Raic-Knezevic & Boris Pavelic, “SFOR u protekla dva mjeseca najmanje tri puta tocno znao gdje je Ratko Mladic” (“In The Past Two Months SFOR Knew Three Times Exactly Where Ratko Mladic Was”), Novi List (Rijeka, Croatia), March 6, 2002 [online],
858285A286328962897289E28632863285E2859285A285D28632863286328582863V (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[39] “No proof of French tip-off, says Nato,” BBC News Online, March 4, 2002 [online], (retrieved June 22, 2005).

[40] “Reuters: NATO troops fail to seize Karadzic in second swoop on Friday,” OHR Media Round-up, March 01, 2002 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[41] Ibid.

[42] “NATO dismay over Karadzic mission,” CNN web site, March 4, 2002 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[43] “Karadzic eludes NATO raid,” Reuters, April 1, 2004.

[44] Nicholas Wood, “NATO troops step up hunt for ex-Bosnian Serb leader,” Chicago Tribune, January 15, 2004.

[45] “Karadzic eludes NATO raid,” Reuters, April 1, 2004.

[46] Radul Radovanovic, “NATO Fails to Net Serb War-Crimes Suspect,” Associated Press, April 1, 2004 [online],,0,2171264.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[47] “NATO effort to capture Karadzic fails,” International Herald Tribune, April 2, 2004 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[48] Radul Radovanovic, “NATO Fails to Net Serb War-Crimes Suspect,” Associated Press, April 1, 20 04 [online],,0,2171264.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[49] “War criminal Karadzic saved by VRS intelligence officers,” NATO/SFOR Main News Summary [Source: Dnevni avaz], April 7, 2004 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[50] Julius Strauss, “French in raid on deserted Karadzic home,” The Daily Telegraph, July 3, 2002; “SFOR raids Karadzic’s house in Pale,” OHR Media Round-up, July 3, 2002 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005); Dejan Jazvic & Branka Stevandic, “Pripadnici francuskog bataljuna SFOR-a jucer izveli prepad na praznu kucu jednog od najtrazenijih haskih optuznika” (“Members of the French SFOR Raided the Empty House of One of the Most Wanted Hague Indictees Yesterday”), Vecernji list (Zagreb), July 3, 2002 (statement by Zoran Glusac, spokesperson for the Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior).

[51] Julius Strauss, “French in raid on deserted Karadzic home,” The Daily Telegraph, July 3, 2002.

[52] “NATO says operations at Karadzic family homes ‘successful,’” Agence France Presse,

August 28, 2003; Radul Radovanovic, “Peacekeepers patrol outside home of top U.N. war crimes fugitive's daughter for second day,” Associated Press, August 27, 2003.

[53] “Main News Summary,” NATO/SFOR Main News Summary, February 20, 2004 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[54] “NATO intensifies search for war crimes fugitive Karadzic,” Irish Times, May 27, 2005.

[55] S. Turcalo, “Nastavljena potraga za ratnim zlocincem na Palama” (“Pursuit of the War Criminal Continued”), Dnevni avaz, May 27, 2005.

[56] SFOR Press release, August 16, 2002 [online], (retrieved June 9, 2005); “SFOR zadovoljan akcijom u Celebićima kod Srbinja” (“SFOR Satisfied with the Action in Celebici near Srbinje”), Nezavisne (Banja Luka), August 17, 2002.

[57] Ibid.

[58] “SFOR official says Celebici action against Karadzic’s support network,” OHR Media Round-up, August 15, 2002 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[59] “Zavrsena akcija otkrivanja mreze podrske Radovanu Karadzicu” (“The Action Aimed at Discovering the Radovan Karadzic Support Network Ends”), Nezavisne (Banja Luka), August 16, 2002.

[60] The program covers persons indicted by the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as well as persons suspected of involvement in terrorism. See the War Crimes page of the Rewards for Justice Program, n.d. [online],

[61] ”SFOR Drops a Second Wave of Karadzic Leaflets in Bosnia,” DPA, March 19, 2002 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[62] Beta news agency, “NATO force in Bosnia drops leaflets requesting information on Karadzic, Mladic,” BBC Monitoring European, July 3, 2002.

[63] “Karadzic seen in Bosnia capital Sarajevo – report,” Reuters, September 7, 2000.

[64] ”Carla Del Ponte: Mladic in Belgrade, Karadzic in RS,” OHR Media Round-up, May 02, 2002 [online],
default.asp?content_id=7671 (retrieved June 5, 2005). Del Ponte claimed that local authorities hesitated to arrest Karadzic because of his numerous armed guards. Republika Srpska defense minister Slobodan Bilic stated that he had no information about Karadzic being in Banja Luka. See, V. Popovic, “Ministar odbrane RS i SFOR povodom izjave Karle del Ponte” (“RS Defense Minister and SFOR About Carla del Ponte’s Statement”), Nezavisne (Banja Luka), May 3, 2002.

[65] “Daily Survey,” web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro, March 7, 2003 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[66] See, Russ Baker, “Special report: The hunt for Radovan Karadzic,” The Sunday Herald (U.K.), February 8, 2004 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[67] [SRNA News Agency,] “Hague Heavies in Montenegro,” UNMIK - Division of Public Information/Media Monitoring, March 11, 2003 [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[68] “Allegation that Karadzic was hiding in Ostrog monastery is nonsense,” NATO/SFOR Main News Summary, Thursday, January 29, 2004, [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[69] Ian Traynor, “Dying mother brought war crimes suspect out of hiding,” The Guardian, May 9, 2005.

[70] Az. Kalamujic, “Zlatko Miletic obavijestio Tuzilastvo BiH i SIPA” (“Zlatko Miletic Notified the BH Prosecutor and SIPA”), Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), May 11, 2005. According to the witnesses, Miletic said, there was only one person in the restaurant who appeared to be acting as Karadzic’s guard.  

[71] Az. Kalamujic, “Zlatko Miletic obavijestio Tuzilastvo BiH i SIPA” (“Zlatko Miletic Notified the BH Prosecutor and SIPA”), Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), May 11, 2005.

[72] “Ljiljana Zelen – Karadzic: Nisam vidjela Radovana” (“Ljiljana Zelen – Karadzic: I Did Not Meet With Radovan), Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), May 11, 2005.

[73] Ian Traynor, “Dying mother brought war crimes suspect out of hiding,” The Guardian, May 9, 2005.

[74] Ibid.

[75] E. S., Ipak bio na sahrani u Niksicu!” (“He Was at the Funeral in Niksic, After All!”), Dnevni avaz (Sarajevo), May 10, 2005.

[76] Ian Traynor, “Dying mother brought war crimes suspect out of hiding,” The Guardian, May 9, 2005.

[77] "EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR website, n.d. [online], (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[78] Ibid.

[79] "EUFOR Troop Strength," EUFOR web site, April 7, 2005, [online] (retrieved June 5, 2005).

[80] "U.S. Troops Mark End Of Mission In Bosnia," Associated Press, November 25, 2004. EUFOR replaced SFOR in December 2004.

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