VII. Ending ImpunitySince the beginning of the civil war more than two decades ago, successive Sri Lankan governments have failed to prosecute those in the security forces responsible for serious human rights violations and war crimes. LTTE personnel responsible for abuses also go unprosecuted. Perhaps more than anything else, impunity for human rights violations has helped to perpetuate the cycle of violence and reprisal that continues to plague the country. The Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights has given priority to several serious cases in which the security forces have been implicated, including the extrajudicial killing of five students in Trincomalee, the grenade attack and killings on Mannar Island, the disappearance of eight young men in Jaffna, and the execution-style murders of the 17 ACF workers in Mutur. The ministry hopes that by highlighting these cases, government investigators will devote greater energy and resources to investigating and eventually prosecuting those responsible. These are welcome aspirations. But Sri Lanka has a sorry history of initiating investigations and then letting them slowly fade and disappear. A constant excuse given by the government is the unwillingness of eyewitnesses to come forward, a circumstance that is directly related to the free rein allowed to abusive members of the security forces, as well as the inability of the justice system to provide adequate witness protection. Instead of assisting witnesses to come forward, state investigators have often tried to discourage them from testifying or sought to discredit them. To date, there is little indication that prosecutions will be forthcoming in these or any of the other recent cases if there is evidence that the security forces may be responsible. On April 26, 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict reaffirmed that ending impunity is essential if a society in conflict or recovering from conflict is to come to terms with past abuses committed against civilians affected by armed conflict and to prevent future such abuses.93 A. Provide witness protectionOn the evening of January 2, a grenade was thrown at seven 20-year-old recent college graduates, all Tamils, while they sat near the seafront in Trincomalee town. Soon after, 10 to 15 uniformed officers with the elite police Special Task Force arrived in jeeps. The officers allegedly beat several of the youth with rifle butts, then fired upon them, killing five and wounding two. Three were shot in the head, while two died from gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen. Initially the security forces reported that five LTTE cadres preparing an attack had been killed by their own grenade that had gone off accidentally, a claim soon abandoned.94 A dozen Special Task Force members were placed under restraint pending inquiries; they were effectively discharged in April. In January, President Rajapakse pledged publicly that the perpetrators of the killings would be brought to justice, irrespective of rank. However, the investigation has stagnated. Because of fear of reprisals, only Dr. K. Manoharan, the father of one of the victims, has come forward to testify as a prosecution witness. No one else among the many persons in the vicinity of the killings has been willing to do so. To date, several of the security personnel prominently implicated in the murders remain in Trincomalee, posing a threat to Dr. Manoharan and prospective witnesses. A senior police officer cited in a special investigators report as allegedly being behind the shooting incident received a promotion and remained in Trincomalee until July 31, seven months after the crime.
B. Strengthen the Human Rights Commission of Sri LankaThe effectiveness of the Sri Lankan Human Rights Commission has been undermined by a constitutional impasse that has prevented the proper appointment of new commissioners (the president has appointed commissioners outside of the constitutional process).97 In some cases, field offices of the Human Rights Commission have played an important role in providing a measure of protection to victims of rights abuse and their families by proactively investigating cases and making use of all the investigation and protection powers conferred on them by the Human Rights Commission statute.98 This has proven especially difficult without the presence of constitutionally appointed commissioners since early 2006.
C. Strengthen the National Police CommissionThe Sri Lankan Police Commission is empowered to investigate wrongdoings by members of the national police force. To date, Police Commission investigations have conflicted with the commissions primary role of providing for the welfare of members of the police force. The independence of the current police commissioners has also been called into question by the presidents appointment of commissioners outside of the process required under the constitution.
D. Permit a UN commission of inquiry to investigate recent human rights violationsOn September 4, President Rajapakse announced that the government would invite an independent international commission to probe abductions, disappearances and extra-judicial killings in all areas in the country. [I]nternationally reputed judges, human rights activists and civil society representatives would be invited to form the commission. The president said such a commission was essential in the light of attempts being made in various quarters to discredit the government, security forces and the police.99 On September 10, the government announced that President Rajapakse had decided instead to appoint a five-member Special Presidential Commission of inquiry, consisting of three Supreme Court judges and two other Sri Lankans, to investigate selected high profile cases. International participants will act only as observers to the commission.100 Human Rights Watch welcomes initiatives to bring in foreign experts to conduct independent investigations of human rights abuses. We believe the best way to ensure an independent, impartial and effective investigation is to invite a commission of inquiry under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
93 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006), S/RES/1674, April 28, 2006, para. 7. 94See D.B.S. Jeyaraj, Terrible truth of the Trincomalee tragedy, TamilWeek, January 15, 2006. 95 Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: Protect Witnesses in Trincomalee Killings, press release, June 28, 2006. 96 The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights reported that it is investigating the possibility of introducing witness protections laws. Decisions taken by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights to protect human rights in Sri Lanka, undated, 2006, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/331/99/PDF/N0633199.pdf?OpenElement. 97 See Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka, The Constitutional Council Must Function, April 23, 2006. 98 According to the Human Rights Commission, its mandate is: to investigate and inquire into violations of fundamental rights; intervene in court proceedings with the permission of the court; monitor the welfare of detainees through regular inspections of places of detention; undertake research on human rights issues and public education programs on human rights; and, summon persons before the Commission to procure evidence including documentary evidence and to examine witnesses. See Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, http://www.hrcsl.org/about/mandate.php. 99 Government of Sri Lanka, International body to probe abductions, killings President, September 4, 2006, http://www.news.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=722&Itemid=44. 100 See Arthur Wamanan, SPC to inquire into abductions and killings, Sunday Leader (Colombo), September 10, 2006. |