Backgrounders
Antivehicle Mines with Sensitive Fuzes or Antihandling Devices
Human Rights Watch Backgrounder
February 25, 2002
Printer Friendly PDF - 17 pages, 80 Kbytes
Key Sections

Index Page

Part I: Introduction and Progress to Date

Part II: Sensitive Fuzes

Part III: Antihandling Devices

PART III: ANTIHANDLING DEVICES

There are many types of and terms for devices, features, and characteristics designed to "protect" AVM. Some AVM can be expediently equipped with an AHD in the field using common ordnance items such as firing devices (igniters). Some AHD are built into the mine and no deliberate action is necessary to activate them during the mine's employment. Other AHD are the result of deliberate modification, attachment, or activation during the emplacement of the mine. In this instance, the mine itself has either a primary or secondary feature that allows the deliberate modification of the mine for antihandling purposes. Additionally, several AVM have sensitive fuzes resulting from intended and unintended design consequences that may serve as a de facto AHD (sensitive fuzes are addressed and analyzed in the previous section).
Participants in the ICRC seminar had trouble developing recommendations on the best practices for AHD. Experts noted the difficulty in distinguishing or quantifying the differences in physical stimuli between an intentional attempt to tamper or neutralize an AVM with an AHD and an unintentional act. No recommendations were agreed upon for best design practices to minimize the risk to civilians from AVM with AHD while still preserving the military function of the AHD. The experts called upon states to examine the sensitivities of their AHD with the goal of establishing a minimum level needed to fulfill their function.
States Parties have been reluctant to report on the measures taken to insure that AVM with AHD are compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty. Some States Parties have simply indicated that their AVM with AHD are compliant with the treaty. Unfortunately, States Parties have not provided technical detail to support this determination.

Firing Devices and Manually Emplaced AHD
Most AVM with auxiliary fuze wells can be fitted with AHD by the attachment of a firing device and activator. Anti-lift and anti-removal fuzes, designed to deter military countermine clearance, can also be built into the primary fuze. The sensitivity of these devices may also be dependent on whether the mine is placed on the surface or buried.
Some firing devices work on the same principle as a mousetrap and are activated by the release of as little as 2.25 kilograms of pressure. Lifting or removing a restraining weight releases a hinged striker to fire it. Other types of firing devices can function by the application of pressure (11 kilograms or more), release of pressure (between 2 and 67 kilograms), application tension (3 kilograms or more), or the release of tension. Activators are detonator boosters that magnify the explosive force generated by a firing device. The activator also performs the function of an adapter for attaching the firing device to the mine.
States Parties that are reported to have produced anti-lift, anti-disturbance, or anti-removal fuzes include the Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. The former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union produced and widely proliferated these devices, which can be fitted to many types of mines because of the common screw threading in auxiliary fuze wells.

Summary of Practice by States Parties on Firing Devices or Anti-Lift Fuzes

· Belgium has banned pressure and tension release firing devices (igniters) as booby traps.
· France has destroyed a number of unspecified pressure and tension release fuzes.
· Germany states that the DM-39 anti-lift device is no longer in the inventory.
· Slovakia destroyed all of its PT-Mi-K antivehicle mines with anti-lift firing mechanisms.

Inherent Antihandling Features
Several types of AVM have an AHD installed at the time of manufacture. Often, there is no observable indication for presence of the AHD on these types of mine. There is insufficient data to render judgment regarding the stimuli or forces necessary to activate the mine's kill mechanism for these AHD.
Prototype AVM were often marketed by the manufacturers as having an antihandling capability, but it is not publicly known whether a state produced or purchased the mine with the feature. International reference publications and databases often list the AVM as having some kind of inherent antihandling feature without indication whether the feature was included in the mines currently in stockpile. For example, according to Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 2000-2001 the anti-disturbance feature of the FFV-028 was discontinued, but States Parties have not explicitly clarified if the FFV-028 procured and stockpiled by them possess the feature.
Certain AVM are factory equipped with an AHD called a "ball in cage" mechanism. Detonation of the mine occurs when the mine is moved and a metal ball bearing inside a metal housing (cage) moves to complete a simple electrical circuit. This mechanism is dependent on a battery to provide power and will become inert once the battery expires. AVM reported to have a "ball in cage" antihandling mechanism include the SB-81/SB-81AR and the AT2.

Practice by States Parties on AVM Reported to have an Inherent AHD

Mine Type

Stockpiling Country

Notes

ACPRF1

France

· France acknowledges in the 2001 CNEMA report, that the ACPRF1 does possess an auxiliary fuze well for a pull type AHD, but it is forbidden to use the mine in this way.

AT2

Germany, Italy, Norway, United Kingdom

--

Disp F1

France

· France has stated that the Disp F1 is not produced with a device specifically conceived as an anti-lifting system.

FFV-028
(DM-31)

Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden

· Some have raised questions about the FFV-028 and the possibility that it can explode when swept by a mine detector.

HPD F2

France, Belgium, Switzerland

· Belgium acknowledged stocking the HPD F2, but states that the forces necessary to activate are greater than those of an unintentional act.
· France has stated that the HPD F2 is not produced with a device specifically conceived as an anti-lifting system.
· France states that any attempt to remove the HPD F2 could not be considered an unintentional act as the mine is buried.
· Switzerland acknowledged owning AVM fitted with AHD.

PT-Mi-D1M

Czech Republic,
Slovakia

· The Czech Republic confirmed it produced and supplied to its army a remotely delivered AVM with AHD

Pz 88

Austria

· Austria has confirmed that the Pz-88 has an AHD but states that the amount of disturbance necessary to initiate the mine would be greater than an unintentional act.

SB-81
SB-81AR

Portugal, Spain

· Spain confirmed that it stockpiles some versions of the C-5 (SB-81) that have antihandling devices.
· Portugal reportedly produced the M453 (SB-81), but the Portuguese Ministry of Defense declared it does not possess a stockpile of the mines.

TMD-1

Bulgaria

--

Sources
Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, 2000-2001; "Report on the Technical Expert Meeting on anti-vehicle mines with sensitive fuses or with sensitive anti-handling devices, hosted by the ICRC in Geneva, 13-14 March 2001," prepared by Robert Gravett, April 2001; ORDDATA II, Version 1.0 CD-ROM; MINEFACTS, Version 1.2 - a CD-ROM; Landmine Monitor Reports (1999,2000,2001) published by the ICBL; and, materials contained in Human Rights Watch's files.

ATTACHMENT 1: Types and Characteristics of Antivehicle Mines Reported to be Stockpiled by States Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty

Country

Mine

Emplacement Method

Primary Fuzing Mechanism

Antihandling Capability

Argentina

FMK-3

Manual

Pressure (150-250 kg)

--

FMK-5

Manual

Pressure (300 kg)

--

Austria

Pz 75

Manual

Pressure

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Pz 88

Manual, Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Reported

Belgium

HPD F2

Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Reported

Brazil

AE T1

Manual

Pressure (60-140 kg)

--

T-AB-1

Manual

Pressure (200 kg)

--

Bulgaria

PTM-80P

Manual

Pressure (150-600 kg)

--

TM-46
TMN-46

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (120-400 kg), Tilt Rod (21 kg lateral)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

TM-57

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (120-400 kg), Tilt Rod (21 kg lateral)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

TM-62M PZ

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (150-600 kg), Magnetic Influence

Fuze dependant

TMD-1

Remotely Delivered

Contact, Magnetic Influence

Reported

NV-PDTM Fuze

--

Contact, Magnetic Influence

--

Canada

FFV-028

Manual, Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Reported

Chile

APVL 83 F4

Manual

Pressure

Unknown

M-15

Manual

Pressure (158-338 kg) Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

M-19

Manual

Pressure (157-225 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

MAT-80 F5

Manual

Pressure

Auxiliary Fuze Well

MAT-84 F5

Manual

Pressure

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Colombia

M-19

Manual

Pressure (157-225 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Croatia

TMRP-6

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (150-360 kg)
Tilt Rod (1.5kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well
Tilt Rod has trip wire capability

Czech Republic

PD-Mi-PK

Manual (Off Route)

Contact Wire, Tripwire

--

PT-Mi-BA (three variants)

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (200-450 kg)

Compatible with Anti Lift and Removal Fuzes

PT-Mi-D1M

Remotely Delivered

Contact, Scratch Wire

Reported

PT-Mi-K

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (330 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

PT-Mi-P

Manual

Tilt Rod (5 kg)

--

PT Mi-U

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure, Tilt Rod

Auxiliary Fuze Well

RO-3 Fuze

--

Anti Lift Fuze

--

RO-4 Fuze

--

Anti Lift Fuze

--

RO-7-III Fuze

--

Anti Removal Fuze

--

Denmark

M/52

Manual

Pressure

Unknown

M/75 Pansermine
(Barmine)

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure, Additional Fuzes (Contact, Magnetic, Seismic)

M/88 Fuze adds anti-disturbance capability

M/88 Fuze

--

Anti Lift Fuze

--

France

ACPR F1

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (153 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Disp F1

Mechanical, Remotely Delivered

Magnetic Influence

Reported

HPD F2

Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Reported

HPD F3

Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Reported

MIACAH F1

Manual (Off Route)

Breakwire

--

MIACAH F2

Manual (Off Route)

Breakwire

--

Country

Mine

Emplacement Method

Primary Fuzing Mechanism

Antihandling Capability

Germany

AT-2

Vehicle Scattered, Remotely Delivered

Scratch Wire

Reported

DM-11

Manual

Pressure (150-400kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

DM-12
(PARM-1)

Manual (Off Route)

Breakwire

--

DM-21

Manual

Pressure (180-350 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

DM-31
(FFV-028)

Manual, Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Reported

MIFF

Remotely Delivered

Acoustic, Magnetic Influence

Unknown

MUSPA

Remotely Delivered

Acoustic, Contact, Random Self-Destruct

Unknown

Italy

AT-2

Vehicle Scattered, Remotely Delivered

Scratch Wire

Reported

MATS/1.4

Manual, Remotely Delivered

Pressure (180-310 kg)

--

MATS/2

Manual, Mechanical, Remotely Delivered

Pressure (180-310 kg)

--

MATS/2.6

Manual, Mechanical, Remotely Delivered

Pressure (180-310 kg)

--

SB-81
SB-81 AR

Manual, Remotely Delivered

Pressure (150-310 kg)

Feature in Electronic Fuze

SH-55

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (180-220 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze --

TC/3.6

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (180-310 kg)

--

TC/6

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (180-310 kg)

--

VS-SATM VS-SATM-1

Manual, Remotely Delivered

Magnetic Influence

--

Honduras

M-15

Manual

Pressure (158-338 kg) Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

M-19

Manual

Pressure (157-225 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Hungary

UKA-63

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure, Tilt Rod

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Japan

Type 63/63B

Manual

Pressure (200 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Jordan

M-15

Manual

Pressure (158-338 kg) Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Mali

TM-57

Manual, Mechanical

Tilt Rod (21 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Netherlands

FFV-028

Manual, Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Reported

NR29
(MIACAH F1)

Manual (Off Route)

Breakwire

--

Norway

AT-2

Vehicle Scattered, Remotely Delivered

Scratch Wire

Reported

HPD F2

Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Reported

M-15

Manual

Pressure (158-338 kg) Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Peru

MGP.31

Manual

Pressure

--

Portugal

M453
(SB-81 AR)

Manual, Remotely Delivered

Pressure (150-310 kg)

Anti-Removal Feature in Electronic Fuze

Romania

MAT-46

Manual

Pressure

--

MAT-62B

Manual

Pressure (200 kg)

--

MAT-76

Manual

Pressure (200 kg)

--

MAT-87

Manual

Pressure

--

MC-71

Manual

Tilt Rod (10-20 kg)

--

Slovakia

PD-Mi-PK

Manual (Off Route)

Contact Wire, Tripwire

--

PT-Mi-D1M

Remotely Delivered

Pressure, Scratch Wire

Unknown

PT Mi-U

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure, Tilt Rod

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Slovenia

TMRP-6

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (150-360 kg)
Tilt Rod (1.5kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well
Tilt Rod has trip wire capability

Country

Mine

Emplacement Method

Primary Fuzing Mechanism

Antihandling Capability

Spain

C-3-A
C-3-B

Manual

Pressure (275 kg)

--

C-5
(SB-81 AR)

Manual, Remotely Delivered

Pressure (150-310 kg)

Antihandling Feature in Electronic Fuze

Sweden

FFV-016

Manual (Off Route)

Command, Infrared, Breakwire

--

FFV-028

Manual, Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Reported

M/41-47

Manual

Pressure (200-400 kg)

--

M47-52B

Manual

Tilt Rod (14.5 kg)

--

M/52
M/52B

Manual

Pressure (250 kg),
Tilt Rod (14.5 kg)

--

Mine Fuze 15

--

Tilt Rod

--

Mine Fuze 16

--

Magnetic Influence

--

Switzerland

HPD F2

Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Reported

Thailand

M-15

Manual

Pressure (158-338 kg) Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

M-19

Manual

Pressure (157-225 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Tunisia

M-19

Manual

Pressure (157-225 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

United Kingdom

AT-2

Vehicle Scattered, Remotely Delivered

Scratch (Contact) Wire

Reported

Barmine

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure, Additional Fuzes Available (Contact, Magnetic, Seismic)

RO-150 Fuze adds anti-disturbance capability

L35A1 Shielder

Vehicle Scattered

Magnetic Influence

--

RO 150 Fuze (Danish M/88 Fuze)

--

Anti Lift/Disturbance

--

ATTACHMENT 2: Types and Characteristics of Antivehicle Mines Produced by Other Countries and Known to Have Been Exported

CHINA

Mine

Emplacement Method

Primary Fuzing Mechanism

Antihandling Capability

Notes

Type 69
Type 72
Type 81

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (300-800 kg)

--

Used in Angola, Bosnia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Somalia, Zambia

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Mine

Emplacement Method

Primary Fuzing Mechanism

Antihandling Capability

Notes

TMA-1
TMA-1A

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (100 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Used in Bosnia, Croatia

TMA-2
TMA-2A

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (100 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Used in Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Namibia, Zambia

TMA-3

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (180 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Used in Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Namibia, Zambia

TMA-4

Manual

Pressure (100-200 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Used in Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Lebanon, Namibia, Zambia

TMA-5
TMA-5A
TAM-5

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (100-300 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Used in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Chad, Croatia, Lebanon, Namibia, Zambia

TMD-1/2

Manual

Pressure (200 kg)

--

Used in Bosnia, Croatia

TMM-1

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (130-420 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Used in Bosnia, Croatia

TMRP-6

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (150-360 kg)
Tilt Rod (1.5kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well; Tilt Rod

Used in Bosnia, Croatia

Yu-S-AT
(KB-2)

Remotely Delivered

Magnetic Influence

Possible

Unknown

FORMER SOVIET UNION

Mine

Emplacement Method

Primary Fuzing Mechanism

Antihandling Capability

Notes

PTM-1S

Remotely Delivered

Pressure

--

Similar in principle to PFM-1 AP mine Used in Afghanistan

TM-46 TMN-46

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (120-400 kg)
Tilt Rod (21 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Used in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

TM-57

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (120-400 kg)
Tilt Rod (21 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Used in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somalia, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

TM-62 B

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (120-750 kg)

--

Used in Afghanistan, Angola

TM-62 M

Manual, Mechanical

Pressure (150-550 kg)
Magnetic Influence

Possible

Used in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somalia, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

TM-72

Manual, Mechanical

Magnetic Influence

Possible

Used in Afghanistan

TMK-2

Manual

Tilt Rod (8-12 kg)

--

Used in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia

PAKISTAN

Mine

Emplacement Method

Primary Fuzing Mechanism

Antihandling Capability

Notes

P2 Mk. 2

Manual

Pressure (180-300 kg)
If pressure plate removed, can be initiated with 10 kg

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Uses P2 Mk. 2 AP mine as fuze/booster, packed with detector ring for recovery, used in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tajikistan

P2 Mk. 3

Manual

Pressure (180-300 kg)
If pressure plate removed, can be initiated with 10 kg

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Uses P4 Mk. 1 AP mine as fuze/booster, packed with detector ring for recovery, used in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia

P3 Mk. 1

Manual

Pressure (180-300 kg)
If pressure plate removed, can be initiated with 10 kg

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Uses P4 Mk. 1 AP mine as fuze/booster, used in Afghanistan, Somalia

P3 Mk. 2

Manual

Pressure (200 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Uses P4 Mk. 1 AP mine as fuze/booster

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mine

Emplacement Method

Primary Fuzing Mechanism

Antihandling Capability

Notes

M-15

Manual

Pressure (158-338 kg)
Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Used in: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Cyprus, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia
Exported to: Chile, Greece, Honduras, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey

M-19

Manual

Pressure (157-225 kg)

Auxiliary Fuze Well

Used in: Angola, Chad, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Lebanon, Zambia
Also Manufactured by: Chile, Iran, South Korea, Turkey
Exported to: Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Honduras, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey

M-21

Manual

Pressure (130.5 kg)
Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)

--

Four exported to the United Kingdom in 1992

M87A1

Vehicle or Remotely Delivered

Magnetic Influence

--

Exported to United Kingdom.

RAAMS

Remotely Delivered

Magnetic Influence

Percentage have Integrated Antihandling Device

Exported to: Greece, South Korea, Turkey

M-5 Firing Device

Auxiliary Fuze

Pressure Release (2.25 kg)

--

Can be fitted to M-15 and M-19 mines

M-142 Firing Device

Auxiliary Fuze

Pressure (11 kg)
Pressure release (2-67 kg)
Tension (3 kg)
Tension Release

Acts as antihandling device when attached in fuze well

--

ATTACHMENT 3: The Diplomatic History Regarding Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices

Prepared by Stephen Goose, deputy head of the official ICBL delegation to the Oslo Diplomatic Conference

On September 1, 1997, the opening day of the Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban of Anti-personnel Landmines in Oslo, President Selebi formed five working groups to work on difficult articles. One was the Working Group on Article 2 (Definitions), chaired by Ambassador Thomas Hajnoczi of Austria. Ambassador Hajnoczi was the person mainly responsible for producing the draft treaty that formed the basis for the negotiations.
The Article 2 Working Group first met on September 3, with some 28 governments participating, as well as the ICBL and ICRC. The United States made a proposal to permit its "mixed mine" systems (with both antipersonnel and antitank mines in a single canister) under the definition of antihandling device - a proposal that was eventually rejected by the negotiators. Among its arguments, the United States maintained that its mixed mine systems were less dangerous to civilians than the antivehicle mines (AVM) with antihandling devices (AHD) permitted under the draft treaty. Canada and Norway responded that AVM with AHD that functioned as antipersonnel mines that exploded from an innocent act were not permitted under the treaty. Further discussion was deferred until the following day.
On September 4 the Working Group met again, and discussed Article 2(3), the definition of antihandling device. The language in the draft treaty was identical to the CCW Protocol II: "`Anti-handling device' means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with the mine."

The United Kingdom offered an amendment: "...tamper with OR OTHERWISE DISTURB the mine." Norway then proposed to add the word "intentionally": "...tamper with OR OTHERWISE INTENTIONALLY DISTURB the mine." A discussion ensued, with Canada, Belgium, Zimbabwe (on behalf of the OAU), Chile, ICBL and ICRC supporting Norway, and Sweden supporting the language proposed by the United Kingdom. Those supporting Norway repeatedly emphasized that the word "intentionally" was needed to establish that if an AVM with an AHD explodes from an unintentional or innocent act, it is an antipersonnel mine, and banned under the treaty. The chair, Ambassador Hajnoczi, stated the Norwegian proposal had the most support and asked for consensus. The United Kingdom asked for additional time to consider the Norwegian proposal. The following day the chair again asked for consensus on the issue, and the United Kingdom said it would accept "intentionally." The United States reserved the right to raise the issue again.
On Monday, September 8, Ambassador Hajnoczi reported to the Committee of the Whole the deliberations and recommendations of the Definitions Working Group, including a summary of the discussion on the UK and Norway proposals, and the agreed upon Norwegian language. No comments or objections were made from any delegation. That afternoon, President Selebi went back through articles in the Committee of the Whole, asking for comments, objections, or amendments to the recommendations of the working groups, and seeking agreement on each. In the Article 2 discussion, Australia noted the importance of a record of proceedings to assist in interpretations, and asked for recognition of a clear consensus on a number of things, including that antivehicle mines functioning as antipersonnel mines are prohibited by the convention. No dissent or objection was raised by any delegation.
President Selebi left the article open due to a controversy over another matter. The following day that controversy was solved and the Committee of the Whole agreed to all of Article 2. No attempt was made to re-open Article 2 by any delegation during the rest of the negotiations, and the convention was formally adopted on September 18. In its closing remarks, the ICBL noted the importance of the clear understanding of the negotiators that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that explode from an unintentional act are to be considered antipersonnel mines and banned by the convention.