Background Briefing

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The Bush Administration’s Landmine Policy

The Bush administration announced a new landmine policy on February 27, 2004, following a two-and-one-half year review.  The policy abandons the goal of joining the Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the Ottawa Convention: “The United States will not join the Ottawa Convention because its terms would have required us to give up a needed military capability….  Landmines still have a valid and essential role protecting United States forces in military operations.…  No other weapon currently exists that provides all the capabilities provided by landmines.”12

The policy reframes the focus from only antipersonnel mines to both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and characterizes landmines according to their active lifespan or persistence:  “The United States has committed to eliminate persistent landmines of all types from its arsenal.” 13  A persistent landmine is one that does not self-destruct.  A self-destructing mine blows itself up after a set period of time, which for U.S. mines ranges from four hours to fifteen days. 

Both self-destructing and persistent antipersonnel mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, which bans any mine that is “designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person.”14  Human Rights Watch, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations agencies and pro-ban governments have long argued that a global prohibition must include all types of antipersonnel mines.15    

Under the new Bush administration policy, the use of landmines that self-destruct is permitted without a cut-off date, and without any geographic restriction.  This reverses the decade-long U.S. position that all antipersonnel mines should be banned at some point in time and reverses the decision to stop using the 8.4 million ADAM mines, except in Korea, as of 2003. 

Under the policy, the use of antipersonnel mines that do not self-destruct is permissible until 2010, but only in Korea.  The use of antivehicle mines that do not self-destruct is permissible globally until 2010, but only after presidential authorization if outside of Korea.16  The United States began to destroy antivehicle mines that do not self-destruct in 2004, and a total of 77,171 such antivehicle mines (M15s and M19s) were shipped to Iraq for use in the destruction of captured ammunition.17

In announcing the policy, the U.S. stated that it would no longer have any low metal content landmines (so-called “non-detectable” mines) within one year.  The 696,600 low metal content M14 antipersonnel mines remaining in the U.S. stockpile for use in Korea were made compliant with the detectability requirements of 1996 Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) by the permanent attachment of metal washers.18  In addition, the use of low metal content antivehicle mines was formally prohibited on January 3, 2005.19  

The new policy also committed the United States to seek a global ban on the export of persistent landmines (see below), and to increase the State Department’s mine action funding by 50 percent over fiscal year 2003 baseline levels.  Finally, the search for landmine alternatives was recast into a program for the development of alternatives for persistent antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.20


[12] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Fact Sheet: New United States Policy on Landmines,” February 27, 2004.

[13] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Fact Sheet: New United States Policy on Landmines,” February 27, 2004. 

[14] This is from the definition of antipersonnel mine contained in Article 2.1 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

[15] See, for example, Human Rights Watch Position Paper on “Smart” (Self-Destructing) Landmines, February 27, 2004, available at: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/27/7681.htm. Also, at the First Review Conference for the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2004, Human Rights Watch gave a briefing on U.S. landmine policy that stated: “At its heart, the new policy is just dusting off the U.S. ‘smart’ mine policy from the mid-1990s, with its emphasis on promotion of self-destructing and self-deactivating mechanisms.  The U.S. tried to convince the treaty negotiators in Oslo in 1997 to make an exception for these types of mines, claiming they did not pose dangers to civilians.  The U.S. sent a team of generals to convince the U.S.’s closest military allies, and they failed.  They failed for a number of reasons that are still valid today.  Smart mines are not safe mines; they have failure-to-destruct rates and failure-to-arm rates; they are usually used in great numbers and spread over huge areas, impossible to map or mark; while active, they are indiscriminate just like dumb mines; they will deny land and endanger civilians and require clearance operations.  The 144 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty understand all this.  The United States stands alone in seeking a technological solution to the antipersonnel mine problem.  Many nations have also argued that it would be unacceptable to permit wealthy nations to use sophisticated and expensive mines, but expect poorer nations to give up the cheap dumb mines available to them.”  Steve Goose, Director, Human Rights Watch Arms Division, “Briefing on U.S. Landmine Policy,” Nairobi, November 30, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/11/30/global10233.htm

[16] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Fact Sheet: New U.S. Policy on Landmines,” February 27, 2004.

[17] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Annual Progress Report: U.S. Department of Defense Removal and Destruction of Persistent Landmines and Development of Landmine Alternatives,” December 2004, p. 6.

[18] United States of America, Annual National Report for CCW Amended Protocol II, Form C, November 27, 2003.  The U.S. ratified Amended Protocol II, which contains restrictions on use of mines and booby-traps, on May 24, 1999.

[19] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Media Note: United States Bans Non-Detectable Landmines,” January 3, 2005.  The U.S. had already prohibited the use of low metal content antipersonnel mines as part of its obligations under 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.  It had been U.S. policy not to use low metal content antivehicle mines since May 1996.

[20] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Annual Progress Report: U.S. Department of Defense Removal and Destruction of Persistent Landmines and Development of Landmine Alternatives,” December 2004, p. 7.  However, since 1996, the Pentagon has been permitted to pursue alternatives that are not compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty.  This was allowed to continue because of a certification made by President Clinton to Congress as a condition of the ratification of the Amended Protocol II that excluded compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty as a criterion guiding the landmines alternatives program.  The text of the certification reads, “I will not limit the types of alternatives to be considered on the basis of any criteria other than those specified in the sentence that follows. In pursuit of alternatives to United States anti-personnel mines, or mixed anti-tank systems, the United States shall seek to identify, adapt, modify, or otherwise develop only those technologies that (i) are intended to provide military effectiveness equivalent to that provided by the relevant anti-personnel mine, or mixed anti-tank system; and (ii) would be affordable.”


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