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The CPA as a Model for Settlement of Darfur?

Some diplomats at the ongoing rounds of talks in Abuja, Nigeria, between the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels, and even representatives of the parties to the conflict, have suggested that the CPA might serve as a framework for ending the war in Darfur.

The CPA, as noted, had no provisions for human rights accountability, and in this respect it certainly cannot serve as a model for a solution to Darfur, which requires accountability for the massive crimes against humanity and war crimes committed there. The Darfur rebels, however, have been much more enthusiastic about accountability for war crimes than the SPLM negotiators were. The fifth round of Darfur negotiations at Abuja, held in June-July 2005, concluded with a Declaration of Principles that referred generally to respect for human rights, but the details must be hammered out in future negotiations.

The most relevant aspects of the CPA to the Darfur peace talks are power and wealth sharing. The SPLM’s tentative view was that the Darfur rebels should receive a 70 percent share of the legislative and executive positions in the three Darfur states, which is what the SPLM has in the Southern region and states.⁷² This position, if adopted by the National Unity government, would have marked a serious change in the government delegation’s approach to the Abuja talks. In his visit to the United States in late 2005, Sudan’s First Vice President Salva Kiir mentioned that the SPLM had a proposal for a joint bargaining position between the SPLM and NCP for the National Unity government, although he refused to disclose the details. He even said that the SPLM would not attend the talks unless it could bring a different approach.⁷³

The seventh round of peace talks opened in Abuja on November 28, 2005, and continues to the writing of this report, without a discernible change in the Sudanese government’s approach to the issues or the Darfur rebels.⁷⁴ SPLM representatives are present at the negotiations, however, as part of the Sudanese government delegation, and as members of committees, including on power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security arrangements. But the SPLM efforts to effect a change in the negotiating posture of the government has been apparently without success.

One knowledgeable U.N. official observed that the Darfur rebels were “on their own” at the talks, without the backing they expected from the SPLM. He credited this to the SPLM’s weakness vis-à-vis the NCP, and the SPLM’s continuing primary need to secure NCP compliance with the CPA for the benefit of southerners.

Moreover, the evidence that the NCP has not complied with many basic provisions of the CPA, as outlined above in respect of, for example, security service reform, and hindrance or non-compliance with the work of commissions set up under the CPA, provides a profound reason for the Darfur rebels to be wary of the NCP’s good faith.