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The CPA and Security in Southern Sudan

Another problem facing the implementation of the CPA is the security situation in Southern Sudan which is being destabilized by the northern Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army. This group draws its soldiers mostly from Ugandan Acholi children who have been abducted and forced to commit atrocities by the LRA’s leaders. The precarious security environment wrought by the LRA in the south long pre-dates the signing of the CPA. Between 1994 and 2002 the LRA had been supported by the Khartoum government and essentially functioned, alongside homegrown ethnic militias, as a proxy force for the government of Sudan. The LRA established bases in Sudan and joined the Sudanese army and pro-government southern ethnic militias in attacks on the SPLA in regions to the south and east of Juba.⁶⁴

While Khartoum claims that it never supported the LRA, after the September 11, 2001, attacks it signaled that it was no longer supporting the rebel group. Yet the LRA reportedly continues to receive support through the continued presence of the government (NCP) military garrison and intelligence agents in Juba, and has continued to attack many southerners in raids for food and recruits, even after the 2005 CPA.⁶⁵ As documented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the frequent LRA attacks in the south have forced thousands of southerners to flee across the border to northwestern Uganda as refugees, including in the past year. The presence of the LRA in Southern Sudan has also increased the security risks for humanitarian personnel and relief work in the region.⁶⁶

Human Rights Watch interviewed victims and witnesses of LRA attacks in two towns, Gumbo and Rajaf, near Juba. Among the victims were Sudanese Acholi, who apparently provide no support for the LRA (unlike some of their Ugandan co-ethnics). These two towns were attacked on several occasions from the end of 2004 through 2005, resulting in a number of deaths and injuries, as well as extensive looting.

The Southern government, through both President of Southern Sudan Salva Kiir and Vice President of Southern Sudan Riek Machar, has publicly delivered several ultimatums to the LRA to leave Southern Sudan.⁶⁷ While the SPLA may talk of wanting to “take out” the LRA, the SPLA (or its successor under the CPA, the Southern Sudan Army) is not ready to launch a major operation. It is still coping with the establishment of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) under the CPA,⁶⁸ and it has not finalized working arrangements with the Khartoum army that still (pending withdrawal by mid-2007 under the CPA) has thousands of troops in Juba barracks and elsewhere in the south. This awkward security situation delays measures effectively to counter LRA attacks and stabilize post-CPA Southern Sudan.

Since 2002 the Ugandan army (UPDF) has pursued the LRA rebels into certain areas of the south, with Khartoum’s permission but without success, in a campaign it calls “Operation Iron Fist.”⁶⁹ Since the CPA was signed, SPLA commanders have sought to coordinate military efforts against the LRA with the UPDF, Khartoum army, and even the forces of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS—to be a 10,000-strong force mandated to support the north-south peace process), also without success.⁷⁰ Separately, the SPLM has coupled its ultimatums to the LRA with an offer to mediate between the LRA and the Ugandan government.⁷¹