Background Briefing

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Disarming Rwandan Armed Groups

The Congolese government is responsible for providing security in eastern Congo as elsewhere in the country. To do so, it must disarm and demobilize many armed groups, not just those of Rwandan origin. But it bears an additional responsibility under the Lusaka Accords and the Pretoria Agreement to disarm and repatriate Rwandan armed groups. The international donor community, anxious to avert any further Rwandan intervention in Congo, put heavy pressure on the Congolese government to intensify its disarmament efforts soon after the Bukavu mutiny of June 2004.

Congolese Government Relations with Rwandan Armed Groups

Congolese soldiers are being ordered to disarm Rwandan armed combatants but previously they were allies in military operations against Rwandan troops and the RCD-Goma. In 2002 the Congolese government supposedly agreed to halt cooperation with and the supply of arms to Rwandan armed groups. The members of these groups were to be disarmed, demobilized, repatriated, rehabilitated, and reintegrated in Rwanda, a process known as DDRRR. But according to some witnesses, Congolese army soldiers called on Rwandan armed groups for assistance as recently as June 2004, when rebel RCD-Goma troops attacked other Congolese army troops in Bukavu.33 On two occasions when FARDC officers met with Rwandan armed groups supposedly to insist they give up their arms or face military attack, the FARDC officers reportedly failed to deliver the message clearly and firmly. According to local sources, General Budja Mabe, commander of the Congolese army Tenth Military Region, was initially unwilling to confront the Rwandan Hutu leaders directly, preferring instead to let MONUC take charge.34

A New Mandate for MONUC

In July 2003 the U.N. Security Council authorized MONUC under Resolution 1493 to assist and participate in the program to disarm Rwandan Hutu and return them to Rwanda by means of voluntary repatriation. By December 2004 some 3,900 former Rwandan combatants had been repatriated, though not all of them through the MONUC program.35 After U.N. investigators established that Rwanda had played a part in the Bukavu mutiny in June 2004, international actors became increasingly determined to remove Rwandan armed groups from Congo in order to limit Rwandan pretexts for further intervention.36 In August 2004 the U.N. Secretary General told the Security Council that voluntary repatriation would not solve the problem “within an acceptable time period” and recommended a more robust approach.37

Rwanda has repeatedly insisted that Rwandan armed groups be disarmed and disbanded, but U.N. officials have reported a pattern of non-cooperation by Rwandan and RCD-Goma soldiers and officials with disarmament efforts over a period of years. On at least six occasions Rwandan or RCD-Goma soldiers intervened to prevent MONUC officials from completing agreed-upon procedures for contacting, meeting, or transporting candidates for disarmament and repatriation back to Rwanda.38 In one incident in South Kivu a MONUC team was blocked by the RCD-Goma from getting to a site where Rwandan armed combatants had been gathered for demobilization. RCD-Goma troops arrested some of the combatants and scattered the rest.39 When a Security Council delegation met with President Kagame in 2003, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. asked Kagame to explain some of these cases, but did not receive a satisfactory answer.40

To make the disarmament program more effective, the U.N. Security Council strengthened and clarified the MONUC mandate in October 2004, authorizing the use of all necessary means to carry out the disarmament in support of FARDC operations.41 Some MONUC officials hold the view that the mandate allows for the use of force in assisting the Congolese army in disarmament operations, while others, apparently including some international diplomats, hold contrary views: they believe that MONUC does not have the capacity for such operations and that it is unrealistic to raise expectations that they can carry them out successfully.42

Shortly before MONUC and FARDC began the disarmament operation in South Kivu, MONUC officials in North Kivu began achieving better results than in the past with voluntary disarmament. Beginning in October, they found increasing numbers of combatants registering for disarmament and demobilization, reaching forty to fifty combatants a week. In November they were making arrangements for the disarmament and repatriation to Rwanda of a group of several hundred combatants and their dependents. Rwandan authorities were aware of the increasing success of this program because officers of the Rwandan army participated in the screening of candidates for the disarmament program.43

On November 21 the head of a visiting Security Council delegation in Kigali spoke once again of MONUC assisting in “voluntary disarmament.” President Kagame immediately responded that voluntary repatriation had failed.44 On November 23, Rwandan officials notified international diplomats that Rwanda would again intervene in the Congo to eliminate the supposed threat from Rwandan armed groups.45

 

The Disarmament Operation in Walungu

The joint operation to disarm Rwandan armed groups in Walungu began in early November with a combination of a show of force and an intensified effort to increase awareness about the demobilization program—an effort called sensitization (sensibilization). These activities were called a “dress rehearsal” for a next stage of collaboration on forced disarmament. MONUC set up a joint command-and-control center with FARDC troops in Walungu town; together with FARDC soldiers, MONUC troops carried out joint patrols and joint high-level meetings with Rwandan armed group leaders. Cognizant of the links between the former Mayi Mayi and the Rwandan groups, the FARDC began replacing Mayi Mayi with other FARDC troops who have no history of collaboration with them.46 It was expected that two more MONUC battalions would also arrive in South Kivu soon to provide further support for the operation.

By early December, only ten or so Rwandan armed combatants had volunteered for demobilization in the Walungu area.47 Impatient with the lack of success in his region, the FARDC commander of South Kivu said that the Rwandan armed combatants were laughing at MONUC and the Congolese army. He called for moving immediately to the use of force.48 Others from outside central Africa concurred. The South African Deputy Foreign Minister called on the UN to move to forcible disarmament, while at the same time urging the Rwandan government not to send more troops to the Congo.49

Even at the current limited level of operations, the FARDC has encountered serious organizational problems. The army is not yet an integrated, well-disciplined fighting force: troops from the former rebel movements are more loyal to the movements from which they originated than to the national government. When asked about the troops under his command, one officer did not know the number of soldiers or even the location of units he was responsible for.50 In some units, soldiers have not been registered, making it difficult to establish accountability for any abuses they might commit. According to both FARDC and MONUC officers, the FARDC troops in South Kivu lack communication equipment and other logistical support, including adequate food.51 As is clear from innumerable examples throughout this region in recent years, soldiers short of supplies and lacking discipline often resort to looting civilians.

MONUC does not have the capacity or the responsibility to provide materials needed by FARDC, nor does it have enough troops to provide peacekeepers to accompany all FARDC operations. In interviews with a Human Rights Watch researcher, MONUC staff were unclear how they could ensure disciplinary measures against FARDC soldiers who disobeyed orders or committed abuses.52 They said that decisions about the operation would be made jointly between MONUC and FARDC officers.53 As a partner in the command-and-control of the Walungu operation, MONUC officers also share in responsibility for the conduct of the troops in the joint operation.



[33] Human Rights Watch interviews, Bukavu, July 21, Walungu, November 18, 2004.

[34] Human Rights Watch interviews, Bukavu, November 19, 2004.

[35] Statistics on repatriation prepared by MONUC, December 6, 2004.

[36] Human Rights Watch interviews, Brussels, October 7, 8, 2004.

[37] Third special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, August 16, 2004, S/2004/650.

[38] Human Rights Watch interviews, U.N. officials, Bukavu, Goma, and Kinshasa, October and November 2004.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Human Rights Watch interview, international diplomats, New York, July 2003.

[41] U.N. Security Council Resolution 1565, October 1, 2004, S/RES/1565, paras. 5 and 6.

[42] See U.N. Security Council statements during a visit to Rwanda, November 2004; Human Rights Watch interviews, Bukavu, November 2004 and by phone to Kinshasa, December 2004; International Crisis Group Briefing, Back to the Brink in the Congo, December 17, 2004.

[43] Human Rights Watch interviews with MONUC officials, December 3 and 7, 2004.

[44] Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), “Rwanda: Voluntary repatriation of Hutu rebels has failed, Kagame says,” November 22, 2004.

[45] Human Rights Watch interview, by telephone, Washington, D.C., November 24, 2004.

[46] Human Rights Watch interviews, Bukavu and Walungu, November 2004.

[47] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with MONUC official, December 3, 2004.

[48] Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), DRC-Rwanda: “Kabila to send troops to counter threat from Rwanda, November 30, 2004.

[49] “Disarm Rwandan rebels in DRC,” The Independent, November 25, 2004.

[50] Human Rights Watch interview with FARDC officer, Walungu, November 19, 2004.

[51] Human Rights Watch interviews, Bukavu, November 11 and Walungu, November 19, 2004.

[52] Human Rights Watch interviews, MONUC military and staff, Bukavu, November 11 to 15, 2004.

[53] Ibid.


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