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VIII. Conclusion

The Warri crisis is in many regards a classic example of a “resource war.” Many of those on the ground on all sides claim that it is indeed a war; and the level of weaponry deployed by the various militant groups does indeed indicate a dangerous escalation in the violence. The solutions to the crisis must therefore address the equitable distribution and illegal diversion of resources: both by attempts to improve the democratic legitimacy and accountability of government (including the re-holding of the elections in Delta State and strong measures against corruption), and by closing off the possibilities for the theft of crude oil and its sale on the open market.

The Nigerian government, both at state and federal level, has failed to intervene in ways that fully address the multi-layered dimensions of the problems in Delta State, focusing only on security force interventions and pro forma meetings with elite groups that lead to no concrete outcomes. There is a tendency for politicians to lay the entire blame for the violence on criminals carrying out illegal oil bunkering, without acknowledging that many of those running illegal bunkering operations are allegedly within government. Nor is there official recognition that corruption, mismanagement and discrimination in the spending of public funds mean that competition for political office—especially at election time—also leads to violence; which in turn undermines the legitimacy of those who hold those offices. The government must seek to analyze the many sources of conflict in the Niger Delta and elsewhere, and the actors that have a role to play in ending it; and include both civil society and the international community in efforts to find sustainable solutions.

Much as there is a need for additional security in the Niger Delta, especially Delta State, policing and other security operations cannot be successful unless they are impartial and do not themselves result in further violations of human rights. Given the difficulty of conducting police operations in the terrain of the delta, government efforts to end violence must have the support of the people living there. But though there is widespread anger at the impunity enjoyed by those employing violence, public support for government action will require a level of professionalism on the part of the security forces that has not yet been displayed.

As in every other outbreak of ethno-political violence in Nigeria, impunity is a major cause of continued conflict. There is an urgent need to end the impunity of the ethnic militia and their organizers, of those controlling the illegal oil bunkering activities, and of the security forces when they are themselves are responsible for abuses. Since the first outbreak of serious violence in 1997, there have been no credible investigations of the responsibility for murder and other crimes, and few arrests or prosecutions. Various government commissions of inquiry and similar exercises have not led to any action against those alleged to be responsible for violence. Perpetrators assume that they will get away with murder.

The Warri crisis is not necessarily typical of the entire delta: though many of the same issues surrounding management of the oil revenues (legal and illegal) arise across the delta, the particular political dynamics of Delta State, based on the three-way ethnic split in the Warri local government areas, have given the conflict over oil a much greater urgency. The situation in Delta State is, however, a warning of what the other oil producing communities could face unless the underlying causes of the violence are addressed. The crisis in Delta State could itself be much worse at the time of the next scheduled state and federal elections in 2007, and during any earlier local government elections, unless action is taken.