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VII. Small Arms

The militia groups operating in Delta State—Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo—are well armed. Among the weapons in use are fully and semi-automatic rifles, shotguns, machine guns, and shoulder-fired rockets (known as “bazookas”); as well as more traditional weapons such as fishing spears and cutlasses used for agriculture.⁸⁹ These weapons are readily available for purchase in Warri at prices that according to one investigation range from around x80,000 (U.S.$570) for a shotgun or x120,000 ($850) for a Kalashnikov rifle, to up to x300,000 ($2,150) for a “bazooka.”⁹⁰ While Human Rights Watch could not itself investigate the weapons flows to Delta State, among the immediate sources of weapons reported to us were weapons issued to thugs hired by politicians—including by Governor Ibori—to intimidate their opponents during the election campaign, or to youth hired to protect the operations of illegal oil bunkerers. Politicians allegedly paid youth operating on their behalf during the elections up to x10,000 ($70) to participate in attacks and intimidation of political opponents. Similar sums are apparently paid for youth to protect illegal oil bunkering activities. Among those hired are former policemen and soldiers or sailors. The origins of the weapons are less clear, but many have likely been recycled from other areas of violent conflict in Africa. Boats carrying arms are reported to offload at Warri town and Bonny, Rivers State, among other places. In 2002, the Nigerian Customs Service reported that it had intercepted small arms and ammunition worth more than x4.3 billion (U.S.$30 million) at border posts during the first six months of the year.⁹¹ Cross-border flows of small arms in West Africa are contrary to a 1998 small arms moratorium agreed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), under which states in the sub-region commit themselves not to import, export, or manufacture small arms or light weapons. In addition to importing weapons, armed militants steal (as in Koko) or purchase small arms from government soldiers and sailors. Sometimes, members of the security forces appear to be arms dealers themselves. Some small arms are made in Nigeria itself, especially in the industrial zones of the south-east, including Aba and Awka.⁹²

Arms proliferation in the delta (and elsewhere in Nigeria) has substantially increased the casualties from the violence, and has already made it significantly more difficult to achieve a peaceful resolution to the political issues involved. In June 2003, a coalition of nongovernmental organizations in the delta launched a “Mop up the Arms” campaign.⁹³ Nigeria is a signatory to the ECOWAS moratorium, and in May 2001 President Obasanjo established a national committee on its implementation. But practical action remains limited. In September 2003, the federal government announced an “arms surrender” policy to recover weapons being used by the ethnic militia in the Niger Delta. A few guns were handed over as a symbolic gesture, but no real strategy for recovering firearms seems to be in place. Any process to resolve the crisis must involve a carefully thought-out program for disarmament and demobilization of the ethnic militia, and the creation of legitimate alternative income generating activities or other community development projects for affected communities. Simple weapons raids on the villages where they live by government forces will likely achieve little in the way of arms recovery, is likely to result in abuses against civilians, and be counterproductive in the longer run by increasing the alienation of ordinary people from the government forces. Conflict documented by Human Rights Watch in other parts of the country suggests that strategies to take weapons out of circulation should be deployed nationwide.⁹⁴