February 19, 2012

II. Recruitment and Use of Children as Soldiers

The recruitment and use of children in the Somali civil war is not a new phenomenon: children have been used throughout the conflict by clan and warlord militias for the defense of the home and the clan. However, the level of recruitment and involvement of children in the conflict has substantially increased since early 2007 when recruitment became more widespread and targeted.[32] All the current Somali parties to the conflict in Somalia—including the TFG forces, al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam, and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a—have recruited or used children for military service.

Human Rights Watch interviews with Somalis who have fled Somalia since early 2010 indicate that forced recruitment and abductions have intensified in line with an upsurge in fighting. A significant proportion of children interviewed said they were forcibly taken from their schools, though many others recounted being abducted from playgrounds, football (soccer) fields, markets, and homes, primarily by al-Shabaab militants. Girls and boys have both been targeted, with girls taken primarily for domestic duties and boys taken to be trained for combat or other work on the front lines. The ever-present reality of forced recruitment and abduction has caused children to leave school, often fleeing the country with their families.

Children are afforded multiple special protections under the international human rights and humanitarian law framework.[33] All parties to the conflict in Somalia have an obligation to afford special protection to children and to ensure that children do not take part in hostilities.[34]

Human Rights Watch spoke with 19 boys and 4 girls who had been recruited by armed groups, and almost 50 parents, relatives, and others who were witnesses to child recruitment. With one or two exceptions, all of the recruited boys and girls with whom Human Rights Watch spoke said they had been recruited by al-Shabaab. Our research also found that children continue to be associated with the TFG and TFG-aligned militias, largely as a result of a lack of stringent age screening procedures.

Al-Shabaab

I tried to refuse but I couldn’t. I just had to go with them [al-Shabaab]. If you refuse, maybe sometimes they come and kill you or harm you, so I just went with them. One of my friends who was older than me, they came and started with him the same as they did to me and he refused, and they left him but another day they found him on the street and shot him.
—14-year-old boy, Kenya, May 29, 2011

Former child recruits and child and adult witnesses described to Human Rights Watch how al-Shabaab forces took children to their training camps throughout 2010 and 2011.  Most of the children were reportedly between ages 15 and 18 but some were as young as 10 years old. From the camps they were sent to the front lines or forced to act as porters, spies, and suicide bombers. Children have been injured, maimed, and killed.

Al-Shabaab’s recruitment of children has been widely reported.[35] Forced recruitment of children became common practice in 2009, but by April 2010 anecdotal reports indicated that child recruitment increased significantly and has shown no signs of reducing. While exact numbers of children recruited by al-Shabaab is unknown, in April 2011 a report from the UN secretary-general cited military sources stating that al-Shabaab abducted an estimated 2,000 children for military training in 2010.[36]

Fourteen of the twenty-three children whom Human Rights Watch interviewed who were recruited said that al-Shabaab recruited them from school or while they were traveling to and from school. The other children recruited by al-Shabaab said that al-Shabaab took them from parks and playing fields, or even in their own homes. For example, Galaal Y., a 14-year-old boy from Hamar Weyne district in Mogadishu, described how in December 2010 two of his primary school classmates lured him to a field to play football where he was ultimately taken by al-Shabaab and forced to become a fighter:

Two of my classmates, who I later realized were working with al-Shabaab, ages 16 and 18, had written our names down on a list to form a football team. The next day we went along to a field to play, thinking that another team would come along, but when we arrived at the field, al-Shabaab arrived instead. They came in a vehicle and were wearing khamis and headscarves.[37] They were armed with AK-47’s [military assault rifles] and told us that playing football was not helpful and they would turn us into jihadis [Islamic fighters]. They took 16 of us between the ages of 10 and 16.[38]

Children said that al-Shabaab regularly uses children as intelligence gatherers or intermediaries to identify other children of fighting age, and then uses these children to pressure or force their peers to join al-Shabaab. A 16-year-old boy from Mogadishu told Human Rights Watch how he was approached and forced to join al-Shabaab in the mosque while attending evening prayers:

I was a student and al-Shabaab forced me to fight against the TFG…. They came to the mosque when we went for prayers. They pretend they are an imam [preacher] and use Islamic teaching to try and make you join. If you refuse to join they will kill you.
The guy who spoke to me had staff all around him. They were merged into the crowd of the mosque. He spoke to me directly. They were approaching everyone, even teenagers…. He used the words of the Quran and said the government was not concerned with religion.
They tell you to join, and if not, the boys around him (the ones in the crowd) who were 13 and 14 years old will come and kill you. They had guns with them and a grenade attached to the side of their pants.[39]

Despite some territorial gains by TFG and AMSIOM forces in late 2010 and early 2011 in Mogadishu, as of July 2011 al-Shabaab still controlled eight of the sixteen districts of the capital.[40] In al-Shabaab-controlled areas, there was virtually nowhere that children could be assured of their safety. While families sought shelter in their homes during periods of intense fighting between al-Shabaab and AMISOM forces, homes offered no protection from the ongoing forced recruitments by al-Shabaab.[41] Children told Human Rights Watch how al-Shabaab approached homes where families were known to have boys considered old enough to fight and demanded that families hand them over to join their forces.

Several children told Human Rights Watch that they were recruited by their own family members—fathers, brothers, and cousins—who had joined al-Shabaab. A mother described how her husband took their 10-year-old son to battle:

My husband was in al-Shabaab. He came and said to my eldest son [who was 10 years old], “You must also join.” He overpowered me and took my son. Later I heard my son died in the war. I went to where my husband was, Horera mosque, and I said, “I heard my son died.” He said, “I am pleased to inform you that our son died a martyr. He went straight to paradise.” He showed me footage he took of my son being killed in the war. His blood. His body. I cried.[42]

While almost all of the 23 children interviewed by Human Rights Watch were forcibly recruited, there were also reports of some children who joined al-Shabaab “voluntarily,” particularly after intensive campaigns of recruitment. The very notion of voluntariness of any child’s decision, particularly in a context of extreme poverty, hunger, and al-Shabaab’s well-known violence against those who refuse, to join an armed group is questionable.[43]

Al-Shabaab has put various forms of pressure on children to join their forces. Children spoke of multiple tactics to entice them to join, including offering cash and mobile phones and forcing children to study religious propaganda as part of their schooling. Baashi M. described how his 12-year-old brother joined al-Shabaab:

They gave him $100 and convinced him at school that if he became a martyr he would go to paradise. They also bought him clothes. He never told my parents he was going, he just disappeared. He wanted to be a driver and al-Shabaab said they would send him to driving school.[44]

Other children were offered cash incentives to recruit other children, as one 15-year-old witness recounted:

Many of my friends were given incentives—money to enroll others. Depending on how many you enroll you would be given more or less money. Many boys enrolled. If you refused to enroll you were forced to.[45]

A teacher explained how effective these incentives are: “80 percent [of my students] are so poor. They have no money so when they give them money they will join…. A whole generation—95 percent—they join the armed groups because of hunger. There is nowhere to go, just to get a gun and fight. Daily they get money. If they don’t join, they don’t get food.”[46]

Several children told Human Rights Watch that al-Shabaab brought their members into schools to teach subjects such as “jihad,” where children were lectured on their duty to join the jihad and promises of “entry into paradise” if a child died as a martyr. The classes, which ranged from daily to weekly classes, were also used as a way for al-Shabaab to gain entry into the school and recruit children. Children described being lectured on the virtues of jihad, shown Islamist propaganda videos, and given weapons demonstrations. Sometimes these methods convinced girls and boys to join. One young woman said that about 15 of her 40 to 45 classmates—5 girls and 10 boys—decided to join after a jihad class.[47] Other children also described a mix of propaganda and force that led them and their classmates to join. For example, Iskinder P., age 15, said he decided to join both because he was “being forced” and “because the majority of my teachers were al-Shabaab and they used to lecture us and tell us ‘Al-Shabaab is good, let’s defend our country. These are foreigners who are fighting our country.’”[48]

Baashi M., a 27-year-old student who was attending the Juba Primary School in the southern port city of Kismayo, described how al-Shabaab would come into the school and use the classes as a precursor to forcibly taking students to fight:

Al-Shabaab used to come to my school often, sometimes they would come two to three times a day. They came and picked up kids between 12 and 20 years old and would take them to a building in the school and play DVDs of jihadis on the battlefield on a laptop. They would also preach about religion. They took me there in February 2010.[49]

Similarly, an over-age student in primary school from Suuqa Xoola, Mogadishu, said: “Initially they preached ideology, but when they realized that they were not recruiting they decided to recruit forcefully. This is what made me flee.”[50]

Retaliation against Children and Families Who Refuse

Al-Shabaab said to my elder brother, “Come with us.” He refused and they beheaded him. He was 16. They took him and put his head in front of our house.
—Deka R. (not her real name), 13-year-old girl whose brother was killed in El Ashabiya, Somalia, around Ramadan 2010, June 5, 2011

Children repeatedly told Human Rights Watch that they felt powerless to resist recruitment by al-Shabaab. Witnesses spoke of “children who had refused recruitment having their hands cut off” or in some instances beheaded.[51] Knowing that refusal would mean being taken by force or possibly killed, children recounted the fear they felt as al-Shabaab fighters entered their schools and homes and the desperate measures they would take to escape detection. One witness said that at his school, children would “stampede” and “scramble out of windows,” jumping from second and third floor windows and landing on top of each other in desperate bids to escape.[52]

Parents other family members regularly attempt to protect both girls and boys from being recruited by al-Shabaab, according to witnesses. Al-Shabaab has killed and injured relatives, and in some cases school teachers, who get in their way. Human Rights Watch documented half a dozen such cases. In two cases mothers said they personally intervened to prevent their children from being recruited.[53]

One mother told Human Rights Watch how she tried to defend her four youngest children from recruitment. After she pled and physically tried to prevent the children from being taken, her husband, an al-Shabaab member, shot her in the ankle.[54] In another incident, in December 2009, al-Shabaab entered the Shabelle Primary School in Mogadishu and forced parents to sign an agreement allowing their children to join al-Shabaab. An eyewitness told Human Rights Watch:

Two fathers who refused to sign were threatened in the meeting and told they would not survive this. They were shot a day later in the Bakara market with letters pinned on their bodies saying this is what would happen to any parent who refused to allow their children to join al-Shabaab.[55]

Abuses in Training Camps

Once recruited, children are typically taken to an al-Shabaab training camp.[56] Almost all of the children Human Rights Watch interviewed whom al-Shabaab had recruited said that they had spent time in a training camp for durations ranging from several weeks to three years before they escaped.[57] In many instances they were unable to give the exact locations, often because they were blindfolded on the way, but most said they were held somewhere around the outskirts of Mogadishu. Others said they were held in and around former government installations in al-Shabaab-controlled areas in the city, surrounding Kismayo, and in and around the southern Shabelle regions.

Camps varied in their descriptions, ranging from physical structures, including former government buildings, where children were detained in cells with minimal food and poor sanitary conditions, to open, camp-like settings with children sleeping on open ground. Omar A., 17, described the training camp on the outskirts of Mogadishu where he was held for two months:

The place looked like the bush, and there were tents and vehicles. There were many people there, maybe 300. There were adults and children but we didn’t speak much to them. Al-Shabaab said, “You will work with us, you will fight, and we will train you.” You can’t say you don’t want to because they force you and they have weapons and if you refuse they will kill you.[58]

A 17-year-old boy who was kept in one such facility told Human Rights Watch:

There was no good food. Sometimes they beat me. I couldn’t see anyone. Sometimes they threatened to slaughter me. They tied my hands and legs. They threatened that if I identified their place and they released me they will get me again and cut me to pieces. Sometimes they took me outside the room and put cold water on my body….. I was in the dark the whole time. I couldn’t see anyone, seated there, no sleep, they come and tell you they’ll slaughter you.[59]

Girls were reportedly brought to some of the camps to clean, cook, and serve food. They were also forced to marry fighters and raped (see below).

The training camps prepared boys to fight. There were consistent reports from inside the camps of children being trained for combat as well as being given a variety of other domestic and logistical tasks. Training, they said, lasted from one week to several months.[60] At minimum, children told us that training included basic physical and light weapons training with AK-47 assault rifles and pistols. The training followed a regular routine. A 13-year-old boy from Mogadishu explained:

In the morning they told us we were going for training. They told us to jump in holes, climb over piles of trees. It was a hectic training and difficult for my age. At times they told us to crawl or roll on the ground or crawl between metal poles without touching them. It was difficult. We had to do push-ups, walk in a funny style. It was so difficult. After two weeks training, they gave us pistols and a card, made us mark it, put it at a distance, and told us to shoot that mark.[61]

Children described harsh physical conditions, including being forced to sleep in the open, given little food to eat, and forced to undertake grueling physical training schedules to prepare them for combat. If children refused, they said they received harsh physical punishments. As one 14-year-old boy told us: “We trained until 1 p.m. They made us to do sit-ups and walk on our knees. I was saying, ‘I am exhausted, I can’t do anymore,’ and they cut me with a big knife. A big knife that you use to slaughter animals.”[62] Another boy showed a four- to five-inch scar on his upper arm he said he had gotten from being whipped, recounting: “On the first day I shot [an AK-47] three or four times but they found me shaking. When they saw me trembling they encouraged me and said, “You are doing this for religion and you must carry it.”[63]

A majority of children interviewed by Human Rights Watch also reported being given religious education that stressed the importance of participating in the jihad. This sometimes included watching video footage of jihadist groups fighting in other countries.[64] The children also said they conducted regular prayer and religious practice.

Punishment and Executions

Anyone found escaping will be killed. Even at night when we were sleeping and in the morning they would cane us. They wouldn’t tell us why, they would just beat us.
—Amare A. (not his real name), 10-year-old boy previously held in an al-Shabaab training camp, Kenya, June 2, 2011

Several children said they witnessed brutal physical punishments and executions at the

camps, sometimes involving other children. The reasons for execution varied from not obeying orders and attempting to escape to accusations of being a TFG spy.

A 16-year-old boy described how he and other children were forced to watch executions of “enemies of al-Shabaab”:

I was made to watch an execution of a group of people who were considered to be al-Shabaab enemies, as they were accused of supporting the TFG or rejecting al-Shabaab. About 20 people were killed that day. I did not see any children being killed. It was the older recruits who were around 25 and up who were made to execute the people.[65]

In another example, an eyewitness said that he and his classmates were taken to a camp from their Mogadishu primary school, and those who refused to participate in training were executed in front of their peers:

Out of the fifteen abducted, five died in training school. The five never agreed to join al-Shabaab and hid. They [al-Shabaab] brought them and paraded them in front of us and shot them. They were 10, 14, 15, 16, and 17 years old.[66]

Children also said they were forced to hand out violent punishments to people found to be breaching al-Shabaab’s rules. Human Rights Watch interviewed seven children who had been forced to take whips and patrol the town looking for businesses that remained open during prayer time, women wearing clothes al-Shabaab deemed inappropriate, or young people listening to music on their telephones. A 15-year-old boy from Middle Juba explained:

I was given two jobs, to whip women and to punish boys who had music on their mobile phones. I would make them swallow the memory card. I made 20 youth swallow the cards and I must have whipped 50 women. I would go with older men backing me up. They were about 30 years old and there were five of them. They would stand with me and force me. I felt bad to whip someone my mother’s age. Other children were given similar jobs.[67]

Some children said they were sent to patrol towns under al-Shabaab control and identify to catch adults and children who had escaped from training camps. Iskinder, age 15, told us:

Some people escaped with vehicles and I had to catch them. We would shoot the vehicles’ tires so they couldn’t move and take them back. We used to identify the people who escaped. I didn’t want to do it but we were forced many times. We were told to go and stand on the street and identify escapees. We used to beat them and take them to jail. I had a cane and a weapon.[68]

Fighting on the Battlefield

Children, mostly boys, said they were sent to the front lines from the training camps, often with minimal training. There, witnesses said, al-Shabaab uses children for a range of activities, from supplying fighters to serving as “human shields” to protect more experienced fighters.

Fighting between al-Shabaab and the TFG and AMISOM intensified in August 2010, during what was referred to as the “Ramadan Offensive 2010.”[69] During this period and the months to follow, al-Shabaab was engaged in sustained clashes with government forces and African Union (AU) troops in Mogadishu.

A witness told Human Rights Watch that children of all ages could be seen on the front lines during these intense periods of fighting.[70] Children too small to carry large firearms, such as AK-47s, were given pistols and smaller weapons, as well as grenades to throw.[71] A 21-year-old fighter described such a scene: “We would fight early in the morning. I saw small kids, maybe 10 or 11 years old, with pistols, and those who could carry got AK-47s, and a lot of kids between 10 and 18 years old were given whips.”[72]

Before going into battle children were often lectured and encouraged to fight to the death. Al-Shabaab continued to use the promise of martyrdom, as was described to Human Rights Watch by 14-year-old Ali F.:

I participated in a fight. They told me that if I died there, I was going to become a martyr. We were lectured for four to five hours on religion and told not be cowards. There were about a hundred of us in the camp and 20 of us were under 18. The youngest was between eight and ten years old. The smaller ones were taught how to use a pistol and how to throw grenades. They also used them as suicide bombers. They said, “If you participate in suicide bombings you will become a martyr.” They said, “A martyr is rewarded by going to paradise.”[73]

Omar A., 18, described what happened when he was sent to the front lines at age 17:

In the camp there were some previous trainees and they took them to fight in battle and only half came back…. They told us, “You will go and fight for two days and then come back to the camp”…. The place was just before [outside of] Mogadishu, just on the outskirts. They gave us automatic weapons [AK-47s]. As we were driving in, the fighting started. They dropped us and started to fight. We could not see them. There were 15 of us and immediately 10 of us were shot. I dropped my gun and I ran. The ones who were shot were 15, 18, and 19 years old. They were all injured. Al-Shabaab leaves the wounded and they leave and they continue fighting.[74]
Media reports also describe children’s bodies being seen on the battlefields.[75]

A number of children explained to Human Rights Watch that they were sent to the front lines with experienced al-Shabaab fighters behind them using the children as a kind of “human shield.”[76]

Abdikarim K., 15, told Human Rights Watch:

Then they took us to fight. It was between al-Shabaab and the TFG. The fighting started at about 5 a.m. All the young children were taken to the first row of the fighting. I was there. We were defeated. Several of the young children there were killed, including several of my classmates. Out of all my classmates—about 100 boys—only two of us escaped, the rest were killed. Other children were also there on the front lines, about 300. The children were cleaned off. The children all died and the bigger soldiers ran away.[77]

Another 15-year-old boy, Iskinder P., said:

When the two months of training were over, there was a fight between al-Shabaab and the Marehan Clan. Al-Shabaab said it needed 300 fighters and I was among them. We were on the front lines. The heads always stayed behind us. Sometimes when I was firing the gun I would avoid shooting people and the person behind me would hit me.
I have seen someone shot in the head. His brain went all over. I was really shocked, mentally upset. They saw me turning my gun off and on, very upset. Someone said, “This boy is not normal,” and helped me into a vehicle. They took the gun from me. I was shocked and crying.[78]

Besides actually fighting, children, including girls, are also used to serve in a multitude of support roles during combat, including carrying bullets, water, milk, and food to the front lines, and bodies and wounded fighters from the battlefield.[79] Some of these activities, such as carrying ammunition during battle, would be considered direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law, making them liable to attack.[80]

A 14-year-old boy described his experience:

You go in a “technical” [a civilian vehicle mounted with anti-aircraft gun] when they take you to war. We were just helping to carry bullets. They show you your partner who carries the weapon and you go with him. We were trained how to carry bullets, how to be on the front lines. You stay with them; you sleep with them … up to five days, but usually two days. I used to see wounds and even I had seen someone shot. Sometimes boys were wounded and killed.
Sometimes when they pulled back we would run and give them water. When the fighting would start we would run back and we would pull the wounded and dead bodies to the vehicle. We used to carry and wash the bodies and help bury them.[81]

Ridwan R., 10, also said he supported fighters on the battlefield:

Strong children were asked to carry injured fighters. I went with them.… Sometimes I was collecting the wounded, sometimes serving food…. I saw some 7-year-olds. When I talked to them they told me they were used as a shield. They had bullet wounds and metal in their body.[82]

Suicide Bombers

The youngest [in the camp] was between eight and ten years old. The smaller ones were taught how to use pistols and how to throw grenades. Al-Shabaab also used them as suicide bombers. I saw these kids hurling grenades. I heard them talking about suicide bombings. They said, “If you participate in suicide bombings you will become a martyr.” We were told not to discuss this issue with adults as they would discourage us. The ones who talked to us about it had their faces covered. They said, “A martyr is rewarded by going to paradise.”
—Yusuuf J. (not his real name), 16-year-old boy forcibly recruited in Mogadishu in 2010, June 3, 2011

In addition to using children in its more conventional combat operations, al-Shabaab has also used children as suicide bombers. Al-Shabaab’s use of suicide bombers to target TFG ministers and installations as well as AU peacekeepers has been documented in various media reports.[83] Human Rights Watch interviewed one young man who was used in an attempted suicide bombing near an AMISOM base in February 2011 when he was 17 years old, and a teacher who witnessed the killing of eight students when an eleven-year-old suicide bomber disguised as a food vendor detonated explosives on the school grounds in October 2009.[84]

Al-Shabaab seeks out children for use in suicide missions in training camps, and in primary schools. Four children told Human Rights Watch that they saw other children, being prepared and sometimes taken from the training camps to become suicide bombers.[85] This fear of being forced to carry out suicide bombings drove some to make dangerous and often life-threatening attempts to escape. The consequences for failing to carry out a suicide bombing or trying to escape, however, were grave.

Feysal M., who was 12 when al-Shabaab took him with his classmates from school in early 2011, said that al-Shabaab executed some of the boys because they refused to become suicide bombers: “Some of the boys had parents in the TFG so al-Shabaab wanted to use them as suicide bombers. So they gave them a choice to be killed or explode themselves. So they said, ‘Either way we die so just kill us so we don’t kill others.’” Feysal said he was with the boys when al-Shabaab gave them the choice: “I saw them with their hands bound, taken to the bush.” He said he was ordered to watch the execution but he refused: “One was my close cousin…. I didn’t want to see my cousin and my friends butchered. So they started whipping me with a shamut [whip]. Later I was forced to see the bodies. I ran out of words I was so shocked and terrified…. When I remember it, it’s hell.”[86]

The Story of an Escaped Child Suicide Bomber

A 17-year-old boy, fleeing from a suicide bombing mission in Mogadishu, told Human Rights Watch:

In February 2011, I was in Dhobley [near the Kenyan Border]. I was recruited by al-Shabaab and taken back to Medina. The job I was given was a suicide bomber or to place bombs. There were eight of us selected for suicide bombings. I was so scared. I knew I was going to take my life. The eight of us were divided into four groups of two. Each day two would go and bomb. The others were between 18 and 20 years old. They trained us how to drive and gave other training for 10 days. The trainer was Pakistani, but his face was covered.
The first group of two was taken to the livestock market, to a TFG office, and six remained. Next were me and Ali [not his real name], who was 19 years old. We were sent to a place called Kilometer 4 near the AMISOM base. We were given a Toyota Prado [automobile]. There were other vehicles sent to follow us to see that we did the job. We parked and decided to disappear and flee. We didn’t know al-Shabaab were following us. We were meant to take a specific route but we turned off on a side road. Then there were four vehicles which barricaded us in. They asked why we turned off and then started to beat us with the butt of their guns. There were six al-Shabaab beating us.
We were arrested by al-Shabaab and taken to a cell in Medina, Bulaqaraa. It was where the top officials were who would decide our fate. It is the place that in 2008 AMISOM was hosted. They had discussions for four or five days. On the sixth day an official said that we had betrayed al-Shabaab and that we were TFG spies and that we should be killed. We were told that tomorrow at 8 a.m. we would be taken from our cell and would face the knife. We were given cell phones to call our parents and say that we will be killed the following day.
My partner’s father was with the TFG, but he was not from Medina, but I knew everyone in Medina. My colleague was given a phone and called his father and explained. It was a short conversation. He handed the phone to me and I didn’t know who to call … my mother, father, or brother. My mother was in Medina at the time, so I phoned my brother. Al-Shabaab arrested him twice. My brother went to the clan elders. The elders came and pleaded with al-Shabaab to release us but they refused.
It was on the second day of talks that a guy said we had four hours left and then we would be taken to the killing area. We pleaded and explained we had not done anything. This man showed us the way out. I listened to his instructions and the other boy didn’t believe it was true—he thought it was a trap. For me it was do or die, so I tried to escape. My friend stayed behind. I thought the worst case was we will both be dead … but best case, I escape. I followed the escape route. I was lucky.
—Tahlil D. (not his real name), Kenya, June 2, 2011

Role of Girls

Al-Shabaab has frequently taken girls for cooking, cleaning, and other support roles, as well as for rape and forced marriage. Girls and other eyewitnesses told Human Rights Watch that al-Shabaab has targeted girls on the street, at schools, and en route to school, and taken them directly from their homes. This section addresses al-Shabaab’s use of girls to provide support for the fighters. Rape and forced marriage are discussed in a later section.

As described in interviews, the girls and young women targeted ranged in age from around 11 to the early 20s.[87] Girls were often abducted in the same sweeps as boys. A 10-year-old boy from Mogadishu taken by al-Shabaab in late 2010 described how he was abducted along with a group of schoolmates that included girls, en route from school:

We were coming from school with our friends. Al-Shabaab pulled up and dragged us to their vehicle. They had covered heads and faces but they weren’t in uniform. Many children were taken, even girls. They said, “The girls will cook for us, the small boys we’ll send to the markets and the bigger boys will fight.” They took us to a place that looked like the bush. They took the girls to a different place and we didn’t see them after that.”[88]

Similarly, girls are taken from school. A 15-year-old boy from Al Abadir primary school in Mogadishu recounted one incident during Ramadan 2010: “They [al-Shabaab] moved from class to class and took students aged 14, 16, 18, both boys and girls. They took eight girls and fifteen boys. The girls were to cook and carry water to fighters.”[89]

Human Rights Watch interviewed five girls between the ages of 11 and 22 who described the differing roles girls were forced to play in the training camps. These included “being made to clean, cook, and wash their [al-Shabaab’s] clothes.”[90]

Boys and men who had been in training camps said that they regularly saw girls brought to the camps. A 10-year-old boy held at a training camp on the outskirts of Mogadishu described girls in the camp cooking and serving food to fighters.[91] Similarly, a 20-year-old student recalled an incident in which he witnessed the arrival of a group of girls into the training camp where he was being he held. He said, “There were six girls. They had been taken from houses. They were locked in different rooms and we could hear them crying.”[92]

The girls we interviewed also described being kept locked in rooms or houses and only allowed out to work. While the girls we interviewed who were taken for domestic duties said they were not sexually assaulted at the camps, Human Rights Watch received several reports of violence against girls during their detention. As Farax K., 17, told Human Rights Watch:

We would wash their clothes and cook for them. They were not harassing us sexually, but they were beating us. They gave us only one set of clothes and it was very heavy. We used to cook and sometimes the girls would shed tears remembering their freedom. That’s when they would beat us with guns. One day they hit me so hard I fell on the ground.[93]
Girls who were taken to perform domestic duties often said they were kept for shorter periods of time than children recruited for combat training. The girls we interviewed told Human Rights Watch that they were taken for periods ranging from two days to two weeks, and then were released or escaped.[94]

Aamina M., 13, told Human Rights Watch how she and her friends escaped in 2010 after being held for three days by al-Shabaab:

Al-Shabaab went to eat and the girls forced the lock [on the door]. We pushed and pushed and then when it opened we ran away. When we ran, they saw us and opened fire. Four girls were caught by al-Shabaab and another 10 who had been fired upon, we think they got shot. One girl out of the four of us who [successfully] escaped knew the route well and she got us to Medina.[95]

Fear of Re-Recruitment

If children manage to escape from al-Shabaab forces, they remain at risk. Children told us they feared re-recruitment and would hide in remote areas or other towns waiting to flee to Kenya.[96] Other children who escaped from al-Shabaab and managed to return home said they were too fearful to go outside. As 16-year-old Maahir D. explained after his escape from a training camp: “I was scared to be recaptured as the trainers in the camp told us we would be killed if we tried to escape…. I stayed home for 15 days, never leaving the house, and then I travelled to Dhobley.”[97] Another 14-year-old boy described a similar experience of confining himself to his home for three months in order to protect himself from re-recruitment.[98]

The risk of reprisal for escaping was genuine and not only limited to the children themselves. In several cases children’s family members who had remained behind in Somalia were threatened and some killed as al-Shabaab forced the family to inform them of the whereabouts of the child who escaped.

Ibrahim K. of Baidoa, northwest of Mogadishu, told Human Rights Watch that after hiding from al-Shabaab, he returned home to see his family to find that al-Shabaab had gone there to look for him:

They went to my house to my parents and said, “We want your child.” My parents refused. They killed my parents, my four brothers, and three of my four sisters. The girls were crying and then the other boys tried to defend my parents. Only my 10-year-old sister and I survived. I wasn’t there. I came and found my sister crying and the bodies only. My sister was crying and saying, “Go away. They will kill you and I can’t live alone if they kill you.” I just got my sister and fled…. We left the bodies and my sister and I ran away.[99]

Similarly, a 13-year-old boy who was recruited by al-Shabaab in 2011 described how, following his escape from the training camp, al-Shabaab came looking for him: “Al-Shabaab came looking for us at home. My father was asked to bring me. He said he didn’t know where I was. There was a scuffle and they shot my father dead.… With that I decided to go to Kenya. It’s painful that my father died.”[100]

Al-Shabaab’s relentless campaign against children has contributed to many families and children on their own seeking refuge in neighboring Kenya or in other towns across Somalia. Many children and their relatives told Human Rights Watch that fears of recruitment or re-recruitment were one of the primary reasons they fled. Children described being “afraid” and “haunted” by what al-Shabaab had done and found leaving Somalia their only remaining option.[101]

However, even escape to Kenya does not end the children’s fear of re-recruitment or abduction.[102] In Kenya both parents and children described daily fear of the children being seen and taken by al-Shabaab. Parents and children told Human Rights Watch that they felt al-Shabaab had the ability to continue to look for them.[103] A number of interviewees said that al-Shabaab continued to have a presence in Kenya and in the camps in Dadaab.[104] Iskinder P., 15, said: “I am relieved [to be in Kenya] but I am afraid they might come for me here and return me there.”[105] Other children described bumping into al-Shabaab members they had met in their trainings in Kenya and feared direct recruitment upon being recognized, only compounding the constant sense of fear which sometimes stopped them from moving freely.

Children in TFG Forces and in TFG Custody

The TFG officially does not recruit children under the age of 18 into its security forces. However, boys have continued to be found in TFG forces and those of TFG-affiliated militias. While the TFG is not known to forcibly recruit children, it lacks systematic and stringent screening procedures and standards to determine the age of all its recruits and thus ensure children are excluded. The TFG security forces continue to lack formal command and control mechanisms and are, instead, made up of an array of groups, including allied militia and militia linked to TFG officials that are recruited and integrated in different ways. While recruits for TFG forces who undergo EU-funded training in Uganda are formally screened for age by several actors, recruits who are not trained in Uganda or who have been directly recruited from militias typically have not been. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Charter 128 of February 2004 contains an explicit prohibition on the use of children under 18 years of age for military service.[106] In meeting its obligations under international law, the TFG has a positive duty to ensure that all its military units or militias under its control prohibit the recruitment and use of children in fighting forces under the age of 15. To avoid complicity in violations, the TFG cannot allow allied militias to use children under 15.

Use of Children by the TFG and TFG-aligned Militias

The presence of children within the TFG forces, TFG militias, and its allied militias continues to be reported. The UN secretary-general in his April 2011 annual report to the Security Council on children and armed conflict listed the TFG as responsible for the recruitment and use of child soldiers.[107] While Human Rights Watch interviewed only one child who had himself been recruited and served under the TFG, we spoke to several people with firsthand knowledge of children joining TFG forces in 2010. For example, one former Hizbul Islam fighter whose militia group later joined the TFG said he saw children as young as 13 in TFG forces in 2010: “There are children in the TFG, aged 13 to 15 years. There were 80 to 90 in my group of 300 who were between 13 and 16 years old.”[108]

Similarly, Yusri A., a 21-year-old man from Mogadishu, said two of his friends, aged 16, joined the TFG: “I have many friends who have joined the TFG and many of them were under 18. Some are soldiers guarding the presidential palace and some participate in the fighting.”[109]

Neither children nor their families interviewed expressed concerns about forced recruitment of children by the TFG. “I have never heard of the TFG [forcibly] recruiting children,” said an 18-year-old young man from Suuqa Xoola in Mogadishu who knew several boys who had voluntarily joined the TFG forces.[110]

Instead, enlisting by children into the TFG forces appears to be a means of survival. Interviewees spoke to Human Rights Watch of children—classmates, friends, or relatives—joining the TFG in order to earn money and provide for their families. The desire to seek revenge against al-Shabaab for abuses committed against their families also influenced children’s decision to enlist. More vulnerable groups of children who are without care and protection, such as orphans, appear particularly likely to join the TFG. For example, the 21-year-old above said of his underage friends: “They were hungry and were orphans so they joined the TFG. Others who joined were just angry against al-Shabaab. I spoke to them and they told me they have nowhere else to go. The TFG supported them.”[111]

A 15-year-old from El Ashabiya described how boys also joined the TFG in order to escape recruitment from al-Shabaab:

I have friends who joined the TFG because al-Shabaab was threatening them to get them to join. Some didn’t like al-Shabaab so they joined the TFG. I have two classmates, ages 15 and 16, who joined the TFG.[112]

However, the one child Human Rights Watch spoke to who had been recruited by the TFG told a different story. Jaman K., a 16-year-old boy from Mogadishu, described being forcibly taken from his home by seven men dressed in military uniform in late 2010. He was taken to a TFG camp near the seaport where he was trained for 8 months before being sent to Bakara market to fight during Ramadan 2011:

I was given an AK-47 and sent to Baraka market. It was around Ramadan [2011]. They just told me to fire. We fought for six days. Then I was wounded in my leg. Some soldiers bandaged up my leg and then forced me to go back and fight. That night I escaped.[113]

Human Rights Watch spoke to one 15-year-old boy from Wardigley in Mogadishu whom ASWJ forcibly recruited from his home in 2010 and used both as an informant and for fighting on the front line in late 2010 and in early 2011.[114] We also received credible reports from local and international contacts of children within TFG-affiliated militias, including ASWJ and clan militias.[115] The UN secretary-general reported on the presence of children in ASWJ forces in 2011.[116] Similarly, in late 2009, Human Rights Watch reported on the recruitment of ethnic-Somali Kenyan and Somali refugee boys from Dadaab and other areas of northeastern Kenya to fight in a militia backed by Kenya in southern Somalia. [117]

Children associated with the TFG are often used to man checkpoints. A high-level TFG government official told Human Rights Watch that he and his colleagues regularly see children manning TFG checkpoints.[118]

Witnesses also described children fighting for the TFG in 2010. A man who escaped from Mogadishu following the 2010 Ramadan offensive described seeing children on all sides during the offensive both at checkpoints and fighting:

Ramadan witnessed heavier fighting between the groups. I left because I have small children and I was scared. I saw so many children fighting with both sides. The difference is al-Shabaab boys are controlled by their seniors. The TFG children can decide if they want to kill you. I saw children at checkpoints in Afgooye with Hizbul Islam and at the Medina base with the TFG.[119]

Similarly, Xarid M., an 18-year-old student from Suuqa Xoola, described his classmates, including boys under age 18, fighting with the TFG forces:

Some of my classmates joined the TFG. Many were killed or lost limbs fighting al-Shabaab. I know five boys who joined the TFG in July 2010. One was 10 and the others 15, 20, and two were 18. They were angry as all of their parents had been killed. The 10-year-old buys food and lives at the Presidential Palace. He is an orphan. Both his parents were killed by al-Shabaab so he went to the TFG. Anger drove him. He is my cousin. I spoke to him by phone but he refused to come with me to Kenya.[120]

Human Rights Watch also received credible reports of the presence of children on the front lines in Mogadishu with TFG-affiliated militias during fighting in 2011.[121] Lokhman, the 15-year-old boy recruited by ASWJ mentioned above, said he was sent twice to the front lines, first in Wardigley in late 2010 and two months later near Bakara Market. “After months of training I was given an AK-47 and sent to fight. There were many other children. Around 20 children died in the fighting around Bakara market.” The boy also described being used as an informant and sent into al-Shabaab controlled areas to gather information for ASWJ on at least three occasions.[122]

TFG Commitments to End Recruitment and Use of Children

The TFG has on several occasions publicly committed to ending the use of children by its forces but has to date not sufficiently acted on all these commitments.

In November 2010, then-Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed committed to developing a plan of action to eradicate child soldiering in Somalia and to designate a focal person to work on this plan with the UN.[123] A State Minister for Child Protection and Human Rights was appointed by then-Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi in December 2010, but this position was not renewed within the new Cabinet in September 2011. During the Universal Periodic Review session at the UN Human Rights Council in May 2011, the TFG delegation committed again to eradicating the practice of child soldiering.[124] On November 23, 2011 the TFG president and the new prime minister, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, reiterated previous commitments to adopt and implement an action plan when they met with the special representative of the secretary-general for children and armed Conflict in Mogadishu.[125]

Furthermore, on July 15, 2011, the TFG military chief of staff, Gen. Abdulkadir Sheikh Ali Dini, issued a general order to all TFG commanders calling on them to identify cases of human rights abuses, including the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers, and bring the perpetrators to account either through disciplinary action or, if necessary, court martial.[126]

The TFG has taken some concrete measures to address the problem. According to a UN source, a number of underage recruits were identified and separated during a recruitment drive following the release of General Dini’s order, but the exact numbers and fate of these children is not known.[127] A focal point on child protection has reportedly recently been appointed within the Ministry of Defense.[128]

However, as of December 2011, the TFG had not developed an action plan for the prevention of child recruitment, despite its public commitments and pressure by international actors and partners of the TFG, most notably the US and the UN, to do so.[129] The development and implementation of such a plan will determine whether the TFG and its allied militias can be de-listed from the UN secretary-general’s list of all parties responsible for the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch is not aware of any member of the TFG forces being held to account to date for the recruitment and use of children.[130]

Lack of Stringent Screening and Demobilization of Children

Stringent and standardized age screenings are crucial for removing children from the TFG’s ranks and preventing new recruitment. Human Rights Watch received several reports of underage recruits enrolling with the TFG merely by lying about their age. A young man told Human Rights Watch: “I know eight schoolmates who joined the TFG in 2010. The TFG asks if you are over 18 but my friends just lied.”[131]

Although the TFG officially requires recruits to be 18, and while some level of screening is reported to have taken place (particulary since the issuance of the July 2011 general order), a significant proportion of TFG forces are, to date, not known to have been formally screened, leaving significant gaps. The TFG’s backers, including the UN and the US, have often called on the TFG to screen its recruits.[132]

The only formalized age screening process of TFG recruits that Human Rights Watch identified were for recruits being trained outside of Somalia in Bihanga, Uganda, at a training that is funded by the EU. TFG recruits sent to Bihanga for training reportedly undergo several screenings, including age screening by AMISOM, more recently with the assistance of Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) representatives, and the EU.[133] In Mogadishu, AMISOM/IGAD first carry-out a medical and fitness screening. As of 2011 the EU started to carry out a second medical screen in Bihanga, Uganda, which in that year identified at least 46 children among the recruits.[134]

It is critical that this increased vigilance is applied to all recruitments, including past recruits who have, to date, not been formally screened. Most soldiers who currently make up the TFG forces, including TFG soldiers being paid stipends by the US and Italian governments, have not gone through the Uganda-based training and therefore were not subjected to the same screening standards.[135] According to one report, only 1,900 of the current 10,000-strong TFG forces have undergone training at Bihanga.[136] Diplomats involved in the Uganda training and in capacity building of the TFG forces confirmed that recruits integrated into TFG forces from militia groups or who otherwise have not undergone the EU training are less likely to be subjected to stringent screening.[137]

More recently, informal measures have reportedly been taken by actors involved in one way or another with the TFG forces to identify and separate children. Those involved in the distribution of monthly stipends to the TFG forces in Mogadishu are reportedly seeking to identify children during the distribution. Similarly, actors involved in the inclusion of TFG soldiers onto a biometric database system are reportedly seeking to identify children.[138]

However, the identification of children among the recruits sent to Uganda in early 2011, despite the fact that the TFG is expected to request at least three references and dates of birth from each recruit for these trainings,[139] suggests that additional efforts are required by the TFG itself during the first stages of recruitment to strengthen its age screening measures. This includes ensuring that all its recruits—including those recruited directly from clan militias and those posted outside of Mogadishu—face the same screening standards and processes as new recruits sent to Bihanga, and to ensure that all children are removed from its ranks.

The ongoing lack of a clear and consolidated command structure within the TFG forces is clearly a challenge to ensuring stringent screening. Other difficulties include the lack of TFG control over clan militias,[140] as well as the complexity of age screening in Somalia, given the lack of birth certificates and the impact of malnutrition on children’s growth. However, these challenges do not negate the need for formal and systematic screening standards and procedures. Governments and others have attempted to address these complexities in other contexts, with Nepal cited as a relevant example.[141] Especially in light of ongoing calls for integration of TFG-aligned militias into the TFG forces, putting in place systematic screening procedures before further recruitment or integration of militia forces is crucial if the use of child soldiers is to cease. 

TFG Treatment of Children who are Former al-Shabaab

Children from al-Shabaab who escape to or who are captured by TFG or AMISOM forces have had few options for protection or rehabilitation. As Somalia is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and CRC Optional Protocol on children in armed conflict, the TFG should refrain from acts that would defeat these treaties’ object and purpose.[142] It should provide for the “rehabilitation and social reintegration” of child soldiers who come into their control,[143] and ensure that they “are demobilized or otherwise released from service.”[144] The TFG should also refrain from detaining or imprisoning children except in conformity with the law and only as a measure of last resort, for the shortest appropriate time, and separately from adults.[145] Other international standards provide that the release and reintegration of children remains a priority, that children are handed over to “an appropriate, mandated, independent civilian process,” and that all appropriate measures be taken to promote the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of the child and to ensure and reestablish family unity.[146]

Child “Escapees” and Captured Children

In 2011 the TFG began to report instances of individuals, including children, either escaping from al-Shabaab to the TFG and AMISOM or being captured by the TFG or AMISOM on the battlefield.[147] Some of these children reportedly escaped or handed themselves over to AMISOM while others had been taken from al-Shabaab during or following fighting by AMISOM. AMISOM reportedly handed over such children to the TFG. As of late November 2011, there was no standard procedure in place to regulate the treatment of children handed over to TFG custody.[148]

Some, if not most, of the children who escape or are captured from al-Shabaab are initially interrogated and screened by the TFG’s National Security Agency (NSA).[149] The NSA carries out a security screening. Human Rights Watch spoke to only one child who had been detained by the TFG and undergone such a process. The child, a 14-year-old boy from Bardhere, told Human Rights Watch that the TFG picked him up in late 2010 when it took over the al-Shabaab training camp to which he was forcibly recruited. He described how TFG forces took him and other captured children to Villa Somalia, the TFG government compound in Mogadishu, for interrogation and then released him:

We were taken in vehicles to the presidential palace in Mogadishu after an eight-hour drive. I knew the presidential palace. AMISOM was there. We were taken inside the palace—taken to a room with bedding—but we could walk around the compound. We had a lot of freedom. We spent eight days there. I was interrogated by the TFG on three occasions. They took me to a separate room. It was soldiers who interrogated me—they were wearing military uniforms but they were not armed. I was not scared when I was being asked questions as I knew I was in the hands of the right people. I was asked questions about the food I had received and the training I had undergone. After this they located my parents who came to pick me up. I was taken home and stayed indoors for three months.[150]

Key actors, including agencies involved in child protection, have limited information on the process or even access to the children. Reports suggest that a proportion of escaped and captured children are sent to different TFG camps and detention facilities that fail to meet basic international standards. This has raised concerns as to whether the TFG is taking into account the best interests of the children, including how to rehabilitate and reintegrate them into society.

One example concerns a group of al-Shabaab “escapees” who have been held at a TFG training facility known as Marino camp. According to UN staff, as of May 2011, the TFG was holding 136 escapees from al-Shabaab, of whom 40 percent were reported to be children, in this camp.[151] Initially detained by the TFG in cramped facilities at the Villa Somalia compound, these children were moved in June to Marino camp.[152] Human Rights Watch was not able to confirm the exact numbers of children held at the camp, as movement into the camp is reportedly fluid. Despite reported claims by the TFG authorities that basic protection measures, including the separation of adults and children in the camp, were being taken, both child protection agencies and diplomats expressed concerns to Human Rights Watch about the appropriateness of this facility for children and whether basic standards would be met.[153] Human Rights Watch also received several reports that the children in the camp were being used as sources of military intelligence and had been given cell phones in order to collect information for the TFG.[154]

Informal commitments made in June 2011 by then TFG officials regarding the transfer of children to civilian-controlled facilities have not taken place as of November 2011.[155]

In comparison to the reported large number of children recruited by al-Shabaab, the number of child “escapees” held by the TFG in Mogadishu is few. AMISOM staff and Somali civil society activists told Human Rights Watch that the general lack of trust in the TFG is an important reason why many who escape do not turn to the TFG for protection.[156]

The TFG has reportedly sent a number of captured children who were allegedly linked to al-Shabaab to Mogadishu Central Prison.[157] According to a Somali nongovernmental organization, these children have not been convicted and the detention conditions are dire: some children are malnourished and others are held alongside adults.[158] Unconfirmed reports suggest that captured children are also held in other TFG facilities, including the NSA detention facility near Villa Somalia.[159]

However, the number of children held in TFG detention facilities is unknown, in part due to limited access and lack of independent monitoring of the prisons. Human Rights Watch has knowledge of only one Somali organization that has been given clearance to access Mogadishu Central Prison. Access to the NSA detention facilities is severely restricted and media reports point to the presence of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) within NSA facilities.[160] To date there has been no formal or regular international access to monitor and assess the protection-related issues associated with the detention of children captured by AMISOM or TFG forces.

Similarly, while Human Rights Watch was unable to speak to any child who had been detained by TFG-affiliated militias, in March 2011 UNICEF expressed concern about the detention of children at an unknown location by TFG-affiliated militias in the town of Belet Hawa following fighting in Gedo region.[161] In light of the intensified fighting between the TFG and TFG-affiliated militias against al-Shabaab in areas outside of Mogadishu since late 2011, unlawful secret detention of children captured from al-Shabaab could increase if regular independent monitoring does not take place.

The TFG has legitimate security concerns regarding captured al-Shabaab fighters, including those who are children. However, it should seek to ensure that its response makes the children’s protection and longer-term rehabilitation and reintegration a priority. Both the TFG and relevant child protection agencies should ensure that appropriate and adequate civilian rehabilitation and reintegration programs are in place, and that captured children are promptly transferred to such programs. Captured children should not be detained solely for their association with al-Shabaab.

Limited Child Protection Programs

Child protection programs are available in Mogadishu for children formerly associated with fighting forces. However, individuals familiar with these programs say they have been limited due to operational and security constraints. Given the significant number of children who are reported to have been associated in one way or another with al-Shabaab, the TFG, or TFG-aligned militias, and the ongoing vulnerability of children to recruitment, this poses a challenge both to the successful protection and demobilization of children.[162]

Furthermore, such programs do not always respond to the needs of these groups of children. They provide limited financial support to the children involved and lack medium and longer-term opportunities. According to NGOs that met with the children held at Jazeera camp following their return from the Bihanga training, a significant number of the children wanted to remain with the TFG forces primarily for financial reasons rather than sign up for the vocational trainings organized by local Somali NGOs.[163] While recognizing the significant challenges facing child protection and education programs in Somalia, such responses will also be crucial to the success of any effective screening procedures.

[32] Ibid., para. 22.

[33] International humanitarian law prohibits any recruitment of children under the age of 15 or their participation in hostilities by national armed forces and non-state armed groups. See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), rule 136, citing Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 4(3). The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) on children in armed conflict, to which Somalia is a signatory but not a party, prohibits any recruitment by non-state armed groups of children under the age of 18; any forced recruitment or conscription of children under 18 by government forces; and the participation of children under 18 in active hostilities by any party. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts (CRC Optional Protocol), G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000), entered into force February 12, 2002, arts. 1-4.

[34] ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 137, citing Protocol II, art. 4(3)(c).

[35] See for example, UN General Assembly and Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict,” A/65/820–S/2011/250, April 23, 2011, http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/S2011250.pdf (accessed September 22, 2011).

[36] Ibid., para. 130.

[37] A khamis is a traditional, long, loose-fitting robe worn by Muslim men.

[38] Human Rights Watch interview with Galaal Y. (not his real name), 14-year-old boy from Mogadishu, Kenya, June 6, 2011.

[39] Human Rights Watch interview with Hassan M. (not his real name), 16-year-old boy from Mogadishu, Kenya, May 29, 2011.

[40] Roundtable on “Enhancing Respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the Implementation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Mandate,” Kigali, Rwanda, July 6-8, 2011, attended by a Human Rights Watch researcher. For a general overview of al-Shabaab controlled areas during mid-2010, see Katherine Zimmerman, “Mogadishu Map: Al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive,” Critical Threats, September 23, 2010, http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/Mogadishu_20110309.pdf (accessed September 22, 2011).

[41] For full discussion on the fighting in Mogadishu in 2010, see Human Rights Watch, “You Don’t Know Who to Blame.”

[42] Human Rights Watch interview with Nadifa K. (not her real name), mother, Kenya, June 1, 2011.

[43] In her landmark report, “Impact of Armed Conflict on Children,” the UN secretary-general’s former expert on armed conflict and children, Graça Machel, wrote: “In addition to being forcibly recruited, youth also present themselves for service. It is misleading, however, to consider this voluntary. While young people may appear to choose military service, the choice is not exercised freely. They may be driven by any of several forces, including cultural, social, economic or political pressures.” Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 48/157, A/ 51/306, August 26, 1996, http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.51.306.En?Opendocument (accessed January 31, 2012), para. 38.

[44] Human Rights Watch interview with Baashi M. (not his real name), 27-year-old man from Kismayo, Kenya, June 4, 2011.

[45] Human Rights Watch interview with Mansuur K. (not his real name), 15-year-old boy, Kenya, June 5, 2011.

[46] Human Rights Watch interview with Dayax Y. (not his real name), male teacher, Kenya, June 6, 2011.

[47] Human Rights Watch interview with Ayan Y. (not her real name), 20-year-old former student, Kenya, June 5, 2011.

[48] Human Rights Watch interview with Iskinder P. (not his real name), 15-year-old boy, Kenya, June 2, 2011. When Iskinder, whose older brother died fighting for al-Shabaab, told his mother he had decided to join, she immediately took him and fled to Kenya in February 2011.

[49] Human Rights Watch interview with Baashi M., June 4, 2011.

[50] Human Rights Watch interview with Bashiir M. (not his real name), 20-year-old former student, Kenya, June 5, 2011.

[51] Human Rights Watch interview with Labaan M. (not his real name), 12-year-old boy, Kenya, June 1, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Deka R. (not her real name), 13-year-old girl, Kenya, June 1, 2011.

[52] Human Rights Watch interview with Xarid M. (not his real name), 18-year-old young man who was 16 at the time of the incident, Kenya, June 5, 2011.

[53] Human Rights Watch interview with Quman M. (not her real name), mother, Kenya, June 1, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with 30-year-old mother, Kenya, June 1, 2011.

[54] Human Rights Watch interview with Quman M., June 1, 2011.

[55] Human Rights Watch interview with Odawa J. (not his real name), 21-year-old man, Kenya, June 6, 2011.

[56] The use of training camps by al-Shabaab has been widely documented. See, for example, Chris Harnisch, “The Terror Threat From Somalia: The Internationalization of al Shabaab,” Critical Threats, February 12, 2010, http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/terror-threat-somalia-internationalization-al-shabaab-feb-12-2010 (accessed September 18, 2011). Al-Shabaab has also posted a variety of videos of alleged training camps on You Tube, such as http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E57E1S7nGpo(accessed September 18, 2011).

[57] Human Rights Watch interview with Kaariye S. (not his real name), 15-year-old boy, Kenya, June 2, 2011.

[58] Human Rights Watch interview with Omar A. (not his real name), 18-year-old boy, Kenya, May 29, 2011.

[59] Human Rights Watch interview with Demissie H. (not his real name), 17-year-old boy, Kenya, May 30, 2011.

[60] Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Kenya, November 29, 2010.

[61] Human Rights Watch interview with Feysal M. (not his real name), 13-year-old boy, Kenya, June 1, 2011.

[62] Human Rights Watch interview with Ibrahim K. (not his real name), 14-year-old boy, Kenya, June 2, 2011.

[63] Human Rights Watch interview with Feysal M., June 1, 2011.

[64] Human Rights Watch interview with Kaariye S., June 2, 2011.

[65] Human Rights Watch interview with Khorfa S. (not his real name), 16-year-old boy, Kenya, June 2, 2011.

[66] Human Rights Watch interview with Kaariye S., June 2, 2011.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Human Rights Watch interview with Iskinder P., June 2, 2011.

[69] See “Somalia: Stop War Crimes in Mogadishu,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 14, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/14/somalia-stop-war-crimes-mogadishu

[70] Human Rights Watch interview with man, Kenya, November 29, 2010.

[71] Human Rights Watch interview with Inshaar C. (not his real name), Kenya, June 3, 2011.

[72] Human Rights Watch interview with Hussein S. (not his real name), 21-year-old man, Kenya, June 2, 2011.

[73] Human Rights Watch interview with Ali F. (not his real name), 14-year-old boy, Kenya, June 2, 2011.

[74] Human Rights Watch interview with Omar A., May 29, 2011.

[75] See Cathy Majtenyi, “Aid Workers Say Child Soldiers Involved in Escalating Somali Violence,” Voice Of America, April 25, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Aid-Workers-Say-Child-Soldiers-Involved-In-Escalating-Violence-120595459.html(accessed January 9, 2011); JD, “Al-Shabaab Pushes School Kids to Frontline” Somalia Report,December 7,2011, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2232 (accessed January 9, 2011).

[76] International humanitarian law prohibits the deliberate use of civilians or other protected persons to render military forces immune from attack. ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 97, citing Third Geneva Convention, art. 23; Protocol I, art. 51(7); see also Protocol II, art. 13(1). It would be a war crime to use children in this manner only if they were not directly participating in hostilities, such as by actively carrying weapons.

[77] Human Rights Watch interview with Abdikarim K. (not his real name), 15-year-old boy, Kenya, June 3, 2011.

[78] Human Rights Watch interview with Iskinder P., June 2, 2011.

[79]In addition to prohibitions on the participation of children in hostilities, the use of children in support roles such as porters or runners contravenes international standards. The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, endorsed by 76 UN member states, broaden the traditional definition of child combatant to ensure protection includes “any person below 18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking, or has taken, a direct part in hostilities.” The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (“The Paris Principles”), January 30, 2007, http://www.unicef.org/protection/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf (accessed September 10, 2011), para. 2.1.

[80] See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 6, citing Protocol II, art. 13(3).

[81] Human Rights Watch interview with Ali F., June 2, 2011.

[82] Human Rights Watch interview with Ridwan R. (not his real name), 10-year-old boy, Kenya, June 2, 2011.

[83] Muyhadin Ahmed Robel, “Confessions of a Would-Be Suicide Bomber,” Somalia Report, June 21, 2011, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/964/Confessions_of_a_Would-Be_Suicide_Bomber (accessed September 18, 2011); Chris Welch, “FBI investigating reported Somali-American suicide bomber,” CNN Online, June 2, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-02/world/somalia.us.suicide.bomber_1_shabaab-suicide-bomber-somali-american (accessed September 18, 2011); “Somalia MP’s killed in suicide bomb attack on Mogadishu hotel,” The Telegraph, August 24, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/7961482/Somali-MPs-killed-in-suicide-bomb-attack-on-Mogadishu-hotel.html (accessed September 18, 2011); “2 AU Troops Die in Suicide Bomb Raid,” ABC News, August 1, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=14204580 (accessed September 18, 2011).

[84] Human Rights Watch interview with Tahlil D. (not his real name), 18-year-old man, Kenya, June 2, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Qamar R. (not her real name), 46-year-old school teacher, Kenya, May 31, 2011.

[85] Human Rights Watch interview with Zahi J. (not his real name), 16-year-old boy, Kenya, May 31, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Tahlil D., June 2, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Yusuuf J. (not his real name), 16-year-old boy, Kenya, June 3, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Abdikarim K., Kenya, June 3, 2011.

[86] Human Rights Watch interview with Feysal M., June 1, 2011.

[87] Human Rights Watch interview with Atirsa T. (not her real name), 20-year-old woman, Kenya, June 4, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Dawo G. (not her real name), 16-year-old girl, Kenya, June 5, 2011.

[88] Human Rights Watch interview with Amare A., June 2, 2011.

[89] Human Rights Watch interview with Gacir D. (not his real name), 15-year-old boy, Kenya, June 5, 2011.

[90] Human Rights Watch interview with Safiyo Y. (not her real name), mother of three daughters taken by al-Shabaab, Kenya, May 30, 2011.

[91] Human Rights Watch interview with Amare A., June 2, 2011.

[92] Human Rights Watch interview with Cabaas G. (not his real name), 20-year-old man, Kenya, June 3, 2011.

[93] Human Rights Watch interview with Farax K. (not her real name), 17-year-old girl, Kenya June 3, 2011.

[94] Human Rights Watch interviews with Safiyo Y., May 30, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Mariam K. (not her real name), 17-year-old girl abducted by al-Shabaab, Kenya, June 3, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Aamun G. (not her real name), mother whose daughter was abducted and temporarily held, May 31, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Kaafi B. (not his real name), 14-year-old boy, Kenya, June 2, 2011.

[95] Human Rights Watch interview with Aamina M. (note her real name), 13-year-old girl, Kenya, June 1, 2011.

[96] Human Rights Watch interview with Ridwan R., June 2, 2011.

[97] Human Rights Watch interview with Maahir D. (not his real name), 16-year-old boy, Kenya, May 30, 2011.

[98] Human Rights Watch interview with Galaal Y., June 6, 2011.

[99] Human Rights Watch interview with Ibrahim K., June 2, 2011.

[100] Human Rights Watch interview with Feysal M., June 1, 2011.

[101] Human Rights Watch interview with Labaan M., June 1, 2011.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Human Rights Watch interview with Aadil K. (not his real name), 19-year-old man, Kenya, June 1, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Taban S. (not his real name), 16-year-old boy, May 29, 2011.

[104] Recent media reports following a spate of attacks in Dadaab since October 2011 also make reference to al-Shabaab in the Dadaab camps in Kenya, see for example, “Kenya-Somalia: Refugee Leaders Flee after Killings, Threats,” IRIN, January 9, 2012, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94596 (accessed January 26, 2012).

[105] Human Rights Watch interview with Iskinder P., June 2, 2011.

[106] Transitional Federal Charter of the Republic of Somalia, 2004, http://www.so.undp.org/docs/Transitional%20Federal%20charter-feb%202004-English.pdf (accessed October 31, 2011), ch. IV, art. 26 (d), (“Forced labour or military service for children under 18 years shall not be permitted”).

[107] UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict,” annex I.

[108] Human Rights Watch interview with Abshir S. (not his real name), young man, Kenya, November 29, 2010.

[109]Human Rights Watch interview with Yusri A. (not his real name), 21-year-old man, Kenya, June 5, 2011.

[110] Human Rights Watch interview with Xarid M., June 5, 2011.

[111] Human Rights Watch interview with Yusri A. (not his real name), 21-year-old man, Kenya, June 5, 2011.

[112]Human Rights Watch interview with Waberi B. (not his real name), 15-year-old boy, Kenya, June 5, 2011.

[113] Human Rights Watch interview with Jaman K. (not his real name), 16-year-old boy, Kenya, February 8, 2012.

[114] Human Rights Watch interview with Lokhman M. (not his real name), 15-year-old boy, Kenya, February 8, 2012.

[115] Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Nairobi, August, 18, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with diplomatic mission, Nairobi, June 31, 2011; See also UN General Assembly and Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict,” para. 131.

[116] UN General Assembly and Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict,” para. 131.

[117]“Kenya: Stop Recruitment of Somalis in Refugee Camps,” Human Rights Watch news release, October 22, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/22/kenya-stop-recruitment-somalis-refugee-camps.

[118] Human Rights Watch interview with TFG official, Kigali, July 8, 2011.

[119] Human Rights Watch interview with Aasim T. (not his real name), father, Kenya, November 28, 2011.

[120] Human Rights Watch interview with Xarid M., Kenya, June 5, 2011.

[121] Human Rights Watch interview with diplomatic staff, Nairobi, Kenya, June, 29, 2011.

[122] Human Rights Watch interview with Lokhman M., Kenya, February 8, 2012.

[123] “New Somali Prime Minister pledges to work towards ‘action plan’ to end recruitment and use of child soldiers,” Office of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General on children and armed conflict press release, OSRSG/201110-18, November 3, 2010,http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/pr/2010-11-03247.html (accessed August 26, 2011).

[124] UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council, Draft report of the working group on the Universal Periodic Review on Somalia, A/HRC/WG.6/11/L.4, May 6, 2011, para. 24; Human Rights Watch notes, Universal Periodic Review session on Somalia, Geneva, May 3, 2011.

[125]“New Somali Government commits to ending child recruitment,” UN Office of the Special Representative for the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict press release, November 23, 2011, http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/pr/2011-11-23277.html(accessed December 6, 2011).

[126] Joint Chief of Staff of Somali National Armed Forces, SAFFAR 17/11, July 15, 2011, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[127]Human Rights Watch email correspondence with UN staff, November 29, 2011.

[128] Human Rights Watch interview with Gen. Abdulkadir Sheikh Ali Dini, Nairobi, December 16, 2011.

[129] Human Rights Watch interviews with UN staff, Nairobi, August 18, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with diplomatic staff, Nairobi, June 1, 2011.

[130] Human Rights Watch interview with Gen. Abdulkadir Sheikh Ali Dini, Nairobi, December 16, 2011.

[131] Human Rights Watch interview with Yusri A., June 5, 2011. The TFG military chief of staff, General Dini, acknowledged that children might lie about their age to join TFG forces. Human Rights Watch interview with Gen. Abdulkadir Sheikh Ali Dini, Nairobi, Kenya, December 16, 2011.

[132] Joint Security Committee communique, Djibouti, January 20, 2011, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[133] Human Rights Watch interview with diplomatic staff, Nairobi, June 29, 2011, and June 30, 2011. In April 2011 the EU identified 46 children among the TFG soldiers that had been sent to Bihanga as part of cohort 4; the children were sent back to Mogadishu. They were held at the Jazeera camp, an AMISOM training camp. As of November 2011, some of the children had joined a vocational training program while others have reportedly returned home. Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Nairobi, August 18, 2011; Human Rights Watch email correspondence with Somali NGO, August 21, 2011. Over the summer, an additional group of children were identified at Bihanga from among the same cohort and sent to Jazeera camp. Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Nairobi, August 18, 2011; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with diplomatic staff, August 26, 2011.

[134] Human Rights Watch interviews with diplomatic staff, Nairobi, June, August, and October 2011.

[135] Human Rights Watch interview with diplomatic staff, Nairobi, June 31, 2011.

[136] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with diplomatic staff, November 3, 2011. Only one cohort, known as cohort four, of nine hundred individuals, completed its training in 2011; in November 2011 a new cohort was sent out to Bihanga.

[138] Human Rights Watch interviews with diplomatic staff, Nairobi, December 2011.

[139] Human Rights Watch email correspondence with diplomatic staff, August 28, 2011.

[140] Ibid.

[141]Human Rights Watch email correspondence with UNICEF staff, January 31, 2012. Lessons can also be drawn from age screening conducted for asylum screening and juvenile justice proceedings for groups with low birth registration. See Terry Smith and Laura Brownlees, UNICEF, "Age assessment practices: a literature review & annotated bibliography,”2011, http://www.unicef.org/protection/Age_Assessment_Practices_2010.pdf (accessed February 9, 2012).

[142] See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, entered into force January 27, 1980, UNTS, vol. 1155, p. 331, art. 18.

[143] CRC Optional Protocol, art. 7(1).

[144] CRC Optional Protocol, art. 6.

[145] CRC, art. 37(b-c).

[146] The Paris Principles, paras. 3.11, 7.6, and 7.21.

[147] This group of children is sometimes termed “defectors.” Human Rights Watch has avoided this term because it implies a certain level of choice in the initial recruitment, which does not appropriately apply to children associated with armed forces.

[148] Human Rights Watch email correspondence with UN staff, November 29, 2011.

[149] Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Nairobi, June 28, 2011; Human Rights Watch with diplomatic staff, Nairobi, June 31, 2011.

[150] Human Rights Watch interview with Galaay Y., June 5, 2011.

[151]Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Nairobi, May 31, 2011.

[152] Human Rights Watch interview with AMISOM Civil Military Cooperation staff, Nairobi, June 8, 2011.

[153] Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Nairobi, June 28, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with AMISOM Civil Military Cooperation staff, Nairobi, Kenya, June 8, 2011.

[154] Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Kenya, June 28, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Nairobi, Kenya, October 21, 2011.

[155] Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Nairobi, June 28, 2011; Human Rights Watch email correspondence with Somali NGO, August 21, 2011; Human Rights Watch email correspondence with UN staff, Nairobi, Kenya, November 29, 2011.

[156]Human Rights Watch interview with Somali civil society activist, Nairobi, Kenya, June 10, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with diplomatic staff, June, 31, 2011.

[157] Human Rights Watch email correspondence with Somali NGO, July 17, 2011; UN General Assembly and Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict,” para. 133.

[158]Human Rights Watch email correspondence with Somali NGO, July 17, 2011.

[159] Human Rights Watch interview with Somali civil society activist, Nairobi, Kenya, June 10, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with diplomatic staff, Nairobi, December 16, 2011.

[160]See for example, Jeremy Scahill, “The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia,” The Nation, July 12, 2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia (accessed August 22, 2011).

[161] “Ongoing Somalia crisis is a children’s crisis says UNICEF,” UNICEF news release, March 11, 2011, http://www.unicef.org/somalia/media.html (accessed August 22, 2011).

[162]Human Rights Watch interviews with diplomatic staff, Nairobi, June, August, and November 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with UN staff, Nairobi, August 19, 2011.

[163]Human Rights Watch interviews with Somali civil society activist, Nairobi, June 10, 2011; Human Rights Watch interview with Somali civil society activist, Nairobi, July 4, 2011.