February 19, 2012

I. Background

Civilians, including children, have borne the brunt of the ongoing civil armed conflict in Somalia. Children have suffered both from the conflict generally and because they have been specifically targeted for recruitment, rape, forced marriage, and other grave violations of international law by the parties to the conflict. In addition, Somalia currently faces one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises as a result of ongoing fighting, drought, and the blocking of humanitarian assistance by al-Shabaab forces. From July 2011 to February 2012, famine was declared by the UN in six regions of south-central Somalia, a number later reduced to three. As statistics demonstrate, children are most affected by famine.

Brief Summary of Somalia’s Conflict

The current armed conflict in Somalia began with the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and intensified following the overthrow of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which was an alliance of sharia courts that aligned itself to rival the administration of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in December 2006. The ICU gained control of Mogadishu and other parts of south-central Somalia in mid-2006 and brought a temporary semblance of stability to Mogadishu but was seen as a security threat by Ethiopia, which subsequently intervened militarily, driving out the ICU in late 2008.[1]

For two years following the Ethiopian intervention in December 2006, Ethiopia and the weak TFG of Somalia (set up in 2004)[2] were involved in intense fighting against Islamist armed groups, including al-Shabaab.[3] The fighting focused on Mogadishu, where Ethiopian forces with TFG support were responsible for frequent indiscriminate artillery attacks causing high civilian casualties in violation of the laws of war. These forces and Islamist armed groups were also responsible for unnecessarily placing civilians at risk, unlawful killings, rape, torture, and looting.[4] None of the warring parties made any effort to hold those responsible for war crimes to account. Nor did the international backers of the TFG and Ethiopian forces, namely the US, the UN, and the EU, acknowledge the level of abuses or take action to end them.

In January 2009 the Ethiopian armed forces withdrew following the UN-led Djibouti peace agreement.[5] This agreement also yielded a new and expanded Somali administration and led to the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former head of the ICU, as the new TFG president.

Many ordinary Somalis were optimistic that the conflict and massive rights abuses that had become part of their daily lives would end with the Ethiopian withdrawal. However, within months they once again faced open warfare, this time between the TFG, now backed by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and Islamist armed groups, including the increasingly powerful al-Shabaab. This fighting was once again characterized by indiscriminate attacks and abuses committed with complete impunity. While mandated by the UN Security Council to protect TFG institutions, AMISOM increasingly became seen as a party to the conflict, as they began to actively engage in running battles with al-Shabaab fighters. 

Fighting intensified in May 2010 with laws-of-war violations being committed by all warring parties.[6] During the Islamic holy month of Ramadan in August and September 2010, al-Shabaab called for a final offensive to topple the TFG, and fighting escalated. In response, in September the TFG launched an offensive, with AMISOM’s support, to reclaim areas of Mogadishu under al-Shabaab control. Serious violations of the laws of war were committed by both sides during these offensives, including the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas and infrastructure with rocket and mortar fire that resulted in high civilian casualties and the displacement of tens of thousands of people.[7]

Between February and April 2011 the TFG, again supported by AMISOM, launched a series of offensives in Mogadishu and further afield against al-Shabaab forces,[8] capturing several parts of the capital. The TFG and pro-TFG militias, including Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) and Raskamboni, primarily supported by Ethiopia and Kenya respectively, also gained control of small areas in the Gedo and Lower Juba region, along Somalia’s Kenyan and Ethiopian borders.

In August 2011 the TFG and AMISOM launched a new offensive against al-Shabaab in Mogadishu, reportedly to preempt another possible Ramadan offensive. On August 6, al-Shaabab declared that it was pulling out its forces from Mogadishu. On October 16, Kenyan military forces entered border areas in Somalia and indiscriminately bombed several towns in which al-Shabaab forces were allegedly deployed. Despite its withdrawal from Mogadishu, at the time of writing, al-Shabaab continues to control more of southern Somalia’s territory than any other faction and retains the ability to carry out attacks in Mogadishu.

The ability of the TFG to stabilize zones that have come under the government’s control has been hampered by the longstanding political crisis between President Sheikh Sharif and the speaker of the parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, who has presidential ambitions.

In June 2011 the TFG extended its mandate and the transitional period, scheduled to end in August 2011, for another year. The “Kampala Accord,” signed on June 9, 2011, by President Sheikh Sharif and Speaker Sharif Hassan, called for the resignation of the popular prime minister, Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed, and postponed elections to 2012. It also called for the development of a “roadmap” with clear benchmarks to guide the implementation of priority transitional tasks: the constitution, a security and stabilization plan, and reconciliation and anti-corruption efforts.

Major Parties to the Conflict

The following is an overview of the major parties to the armed conflict in Somalia as of late 2011.[9]

Transitional Federal Government (TFG)

Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), set-up in 2004, is recognized by the UN and almost all key foreign governments (with the notable exception of Eritrea) as the legitimate government of Somalia. Until 2011, it controlled only a small section of southern Mogadishu, but extended its control over several areas of the city in the course of 2011. The embattled TFG depends on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for its survival and security, and on donor funds. It has proved unable to assert political control, build key government sectors, or provide the essential services that would build its credibility. Infighting between different factions and components of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), of which the TFG is a component, has significantly hampered political developments.

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab is a militant Islamist group that began as part of the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) when the courts rose to power in Mogadishu in 2006. Al-Shabaab is not a monolithic entity but rather an alliance of factions that initially rallied under its banner with the aim of forcing the Ethiopian troops to leave Somalia. These groups retain a limited common agenda of defeating AMISOM and the TFG and extending its extreme interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) across Somalia. Al-Shabaab currently controls more territory in southern Somalia than any other faction and became the largest armed insurgent group in December 2010 following its merger with Hizbul Islam, another Islamist armed group led by former ICU member Hassan Dahir Aweys. Al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu in August 2011 but continues to carry out attacks in the war-torn capital.

Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a

Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) is a moderate Sufi Islamist group that has on paper been officially affiliated with the TFG since March 2010. The group exists primarily in central Somalia, where it has managed to maintain control over large swathes of territory, predominantly in Galgadud and Hiraan regions of central Somalia. It has more recently captured small areas of territory in the Gedo region along the Ethiopian border from al-Shabaab. It receives financial and military support from Ethiopia.

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Initially deployed to Mogadishu in 2007, AMISOM is mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council to provide protection to the Somali transitional institutions, including the TFG and Parliament. However, since 2009, and especially since coming under attack from al-Shabaab, it has increasingly taken part in the conflict.[10] AMISOM has as yet not approached its authorized troop strength of 12,000; its current contingent at least 10,000 Burundian, Ugandan, and more recently Djiboutian forces.[11]

Drought, Famine, and al-Shabaab’s Restrictions on Humanitarian Access

Compounding the dire effect of ongoing fighting on civilians is unrelenting drought, famine, al-Shabaab’s severe restrictions on humanitarian aid and ongoing diversion of aid in TFG-controlled areas.

Severe drought in south-central Somalia worsened from October 2010 onwards. By August 2011, the UN had declared six regions—primarily in southern Somalia—to be in a state of famine. An estimated four million people, more than half of the Somali population, were in crisis as of that month, around three million of whom were in the south in predominantly al-Shabaab-controlled areas.[12] As of January 2012, according to the UN, four million Somalis remain in need of humanitarian assistance.[13] The Somali population of internally displaced persons and refugees—already one of the largest in the world—has further escalated: one-quarter of Somalia’s estimated population of 7.5 million was either internally displaced or lived outside the country as refugees as of December 2011.[14]

Aid agencies have been limited not only by conflict and insecurity but also by al-Shabaab, which has restricted some agencies’ work. The group has imposed a ban on over a dozen individual agencies since 2009, placed significant financial and logistical burdens on organizations that are working in areas under their control, and threatened and attacked humanitarian workers. In early July 2011 al-Shabaab declared that it was lifting the ban it had imposed on certain foreign aid agencies in areas under its control as long as the distribution of aid was their only objective.[15] But the ban has yet to be lifted and by November al-Shabaab had proclaimed a fresh ban on 16 aid organizations, including UN agencies.[16] Al-Shabaab also continues to severely restrict the freedom of movement of those seeking access to humanitarian assistance in areas under its control.

Access to humanitarian assistance in areas under TFG control has also been hampered by diversion and looting of humanitarian aid.[17] Media reports in August 2011 suggested that food aid diversion in Mogadishu was occurring on a large scale.[18]

Counterterrorism legislation, and most notably the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions that seek to prevent support reaching designated terrorist organizations, have also negatively impacted humanitarian operations in Somalia, resulting both in a significant decrease in US funding of humanitarian organizations since 2008 and the imposition of burdensome measures on those receiving US support. [19]

Children in the Somali Conflict

Children continue to be killed or maimed as a result of indiscriminate shelling, gunfire, widespread insecurity, and the targeting of schools. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that in 2010, 43 percent of patients admitted to the two main referral hospitals in Mogadishu with war-related injuries were women and children.[20]

The difficulties that humanitarian agencies face trying to access south-central Somalia further aggravates the situation of children, who are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity and disease. Severe acute malnutrition rates among children doubled between March and July 2011.[21] By August the number of children suffering from acute malnutrition was estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands.[22] Half of the tens of thousands of individuals who have died as a result of the famine are reported to be children.[23]

The destruction of livelihoods, traditional protection structures, and separation or destruction of families as a result of the length of the conflict, the humanitarian crisis, the number of civilian casualties, and repeated displacement of a significant proportion of the population has left children particularly vulnerable. The numbers of abandoned, orphaned, or separated children and children living and working in the streets has skyrocketed over the course of the last four years. While child labor has long been a part of Somali culture, children are now often the sole source of income to their families or siblings.

Children are also among the most vulnerable groups of internally displaced persons and refugees for both protection and health reasons. The number of unaccompanied minors and child-headed households among the displaced person and refugee population has increased over the course of the conflict, particularly since 2007. [24]

Children’s Access to Education in Somalia

Children’s right to education in Somalia is severely restricted.[25] According to UNICEF, Somalia has one of the lowest rates of school enrollment in the world, with a net primary school enrollment rate of around 23 percent in 2010.[26] Disparity between levels of enrollment between girls and boys even at the lower levels of primary school is alarming: according to the latest available data, the gross primary enrollment ratio was only 23 percent of girls, compared with 42 percent of boys.[27] Enrollment in secondary schools is minimal: gross secondary enrollment was only 11 percent for boys and 5 percent for girls in the late 2000s.[28] School dropout rates reportedly reached 50 percent following the Ramadan offensive in 2010 and 38 percent in the first four months of 2011.[29]

There are only five government-run schools in all of south-central Somalia, all located in Mogadishu. Other schools are financed primarily by parents, communities, or private individuals either in Somalia or in the diaspora, or by national or international donor and development organizations. While the total number of schools in south-central Somalia is unknown, agencies involved in the Education Cluster—the UNICEF- and Save the Children-led entity that coordinates organizations and agencies working in the education sector—funds 4,822 schools in these regions.[30] Secondary schools are scarce and found mainly in Mogadishu.

While not clearly standardized, there are generally four categories of schools in Somalia: primary and secondary schools employing Arabic, Somali, or Kenyan curriculum, as well as non-formal duqsi (Quranic schools). There is no unified national curriculum.

Despite the dire situation of the education system in south-central Somalia, the sector remains inadequately funded. As of November 2011, of the US$29 million requested under the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for the education sector, only $18 million—62 percent—had been funded, in large part via UNICEF funding.[31] It is within this already terribly restricted environment that children are struggling to go to school.

[1] From 2006 to 2008 Ethiopian troops held a military presence in south-central Somalia in an effort to push out the ICU. The presence of Ethiopian troops was supported by the then president of Somalia, Abdullahi Youssef.

[2] The Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), of which the Transitional Federal Government is a component, were established in 2004 as part of a Kenya-brokered agreement following failure of a first transitional government. The TFIs also include a Transitional Federal Charter that serves, to date, as an interim constitution and a Transitional Federal Parliament.

[3] Harakat al Mujahadeen al-Shabaab controls much of south-central Somalia and was the radical youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union. 

[4]For a more detailed account of this recent history see: Human Rights Watch, Shell-Shocked: Civilians Under Siege in Mogadishu, vol. 19, no. 12(A), August 2007, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/08/12/shell-shocked-0; Human Rights Watch, “So Much to Fear”: War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia, December 2008, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/12/08/so-much-fear-0; Human Rights Watch, Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by Al-Shabaab, The Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM in Somalia, April 2010, http://www.hrw.org/node/89646.

[5]For a discussion of the Djibouti peace process, see Human Rights Watch, “So Much to Fear,” pp. 20-21.

[6] For a more detailed assessment of the human rights and international humanitarian law impact of these offensives, see Human Rights Watch, “You Don’t Know Who to Blame”: War Crimes in Somalia, August 2011, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/08/14/you-don-t-know-who-blame.

[7] “Somalia: Stop war crimes in Mogadishu,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 14, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/14/somalia-stop-war-crimes-mogadishu.

[8] Human Rights Watch, “You Don’t Know Who to Blame.

[9] For a more detailed description of the main actors involved in the conflict, see Human Rights Watch, Harsh War, Harsh Peace, pp. 14-19.

[10] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1744, S/RES/1744 (2007), para. 4.

[11] On January 5, 2012, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union called for the number of UN-sponsored AMISOM forces to be increased from 12,000 to 17,731, and to include a Djiboutian contingent, the re-hatted Kenyan troops, as well as an AMISOM police component. See, Peace and Security Council, “Communique of the 306th PSC meeting on the Situation in Somalia,” PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCVI), January 6, 2012, http://amisom-au.org/2012/01/commuique-of-the-306th-psc-meeting-on-the-situation-in-somalia/ (accessed January 31, 2012). The UN Security Council had not responded to this request at the time of writing.

[12] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Somalia, “Somalia: Famine and Drought, Situation Report No. 12,” September 6, 2011, http://reliefweb.int/node/445205 (accessed September 7, 2011); “The UN declares famine in Somalia,” Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia press release, July 29, 2011, http://reliefweb.int/node/426914 (accessed July 29, 2011).

[13]OCHA, “Horn of Africa Crisis, Situation Report No. 30,” January 13, 2012, http://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F_R_537.pdf (accessed January 26, 2012)

[14] UNHCR, “Somali Refugees in the Region,” December 21, 2011, http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/somalia.php (accessed January, 26, 2012).

[15] “Somalia Islamists lift aid ban to help drought victims,” BBC News Online, July 6, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14046267 (accessed September 18, 2011).

[16] The banned agencies and organizations include: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Health Organization (WHO), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Concern, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), German Agency For Technical Co-operation (GTZ), Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Solidarity, Saacid, Swedish African Welfare Alliance (SAWA), and Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI).

[17] Human Rights Watch unpublished interviews with internally displaced persons, Mogadishu, August to December 2011.

[18] Katharine Houreld, “Somalia Famine: Food Aid Stolen,” Associated Press, August 8, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/15/somalia-famine-aid-stolen_n_927126.html, (accessed January 27, 2012).

[19] See, for example, Overseas Development Institute, “Counter-terrorism and humanitarian action. Tensions, impact and ways forward,” HPG Policy Brief 43, October 2011, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7347.pdf (accessed January 27, 2012).

[20] “Somalia: ever higher numbers of war-wounded in Mogadishu hospitals,” International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) news release, January 27, 2011, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2011/somalia-news-2011-01-27.htm, (accessed August 1, 2011).

[21] “Malnutrition brings children to the brink of death,” ICRC news release, July 13, 2011, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2011/somalia-news-2011-07-13.htm (accessed July 20, 2011).

[22] According to the UN Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), as of August 2011, 450,000 children in Somalia were malnourished, 190,000 of who suffered from severe acute malnutrition (see OCHA, “Horn of Africa Drought Crisis, Situation Report No. 7,” July 29, 2011, http://reliefweb.int/node/438038 (accessed September 18, 2011). Some figures suggest the number to be much higher. According to UNICEF, as of July 29, 2011, an estimated 1.25 million children throughout southern Somalia were in need of life-saving interventions and 640,000 children were acutely malnourished. See “Famine spreads into Bay region; 750,000 people face imminent starvation,” Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) press release, September 5, 2011, http://www.fsnau.org/downloads/FSNAU_FEWSNET_050911_press_release.pdf, (accessed September 11, 2011).

[23]“Famine spreads into Bay region; 750,000 people face imminent starvation,” Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) press release, September 5, 2011, http://www.fsnau.org/downloads/FSNAU_FEWSNET_050911_press_release.pdf, (accessed September 11, 2011).

[24] Amnesty International, “In the line of fire: Somalia’s children under attack,” Index: AFR 52/001/2011, July 2011, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR52/001/2011/en, (accessed December 12, 2011), p. 52

[25] The Transitional Federal Charter of Somalia that serves as the basis for a future constitution in Somalia recognizes education as a basic right for all Somali citizens and states that all citizens shall have a right to free primary and secondary education. Transitional Federal Charter of the Republic of Somalia, 2004, http://www.so.undp.org/docs/Transitional%20Federal%20charter-feb%202004-English.pdf (accessed September 20, 2011), arts. 24(1) and 24(2).

[26] UNICEF, “Somalia, Statistics,” http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/somalia_statistics.html#77 (accessed October 19, 2011). Statistics on education in south-central Somalia are rare and unreliable as a result both of the lack of a functioning state and the limited presence of humanitarian actors on the ground able to ensure systematic reporting.

[27] UNICEF, “State of the World’s Children, Adolescence. An age of opportunity,” February 2011, http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/SOWC_2011_Main_Report_EN_02242011.pdf (accessed August 2, 2011), p. 106.

[28] Ibid., p. 106 (figures from the most recent year available from 2005 to 2009).

[29] Human Rights Watch email correspondence with UN staff, Nairobi, August 11, 2011.

[30] Human Rights Watch interview with UNICEF Education Cluster coordinator, Nairobi, June 7, 2011.

[31] The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) is an advocacy tool for humanitarian financing, in which projects managed by the United Nations, NGOs, and other stakeholders coordinate to approach the donor community in funding program activities in multiple sectors. Financial Tracking Service, Consolidated Appeal: Somalia 2011, November 6, 2011, http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R32sum_A927___6_November_2011_(02_05).pdf (accessed November 6, 2011).