November 19, 2009

IV. The Legal Foundation of Repression in Cuba

Cuban law empowers the state to criminalize virtually all forms of dissent. While it includes broad statements affirming fundamental rights, Cuban law also grants officials extraordinary authority to penalize individuals who attempt to exercise their rights. All rights are conditional on compliance with the government. Article 62 of the constitution explicitly states that no rights may be exercised against the state and makes punishable any failure to respect this subordination of rights.

Cubans who dare to criticize the government are subject to draconian criminal and “pre-criminal” charges. These include the Orwellian “dangerousness” provision, which can be used to punish individuals who have not yet committed a crime, on the suspicion that they will commit one in the future; as well as the National Protection Law, which is so broad that it renders any criticism of the government prosecutable as a form of collaboration with the US embargo and thus treason.

Cuba’s judiciary lacks independence, denying dissidents meaningful judicial protection and ensuring that those tried will not receive a fair trial. The constitution states that the judiciary is “subordinated hierarchically” to the executive and legislative branches, which have the power to remove judges at any time. And the Cuban government denies victims of abuse virtually all external protections by refusing to allow monitoring by independent domestic groups, international human rights organizations, and groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Criminalizing Dissent

The Cuban Criminal Code lies at the core of Cuba's repressive machinery, granting Cuban authorities extraordinary power to silence dissent. Numerous Cuban criminal provisions explicitly penalize the exercise of fundamental freedoms, while others are so vaguely defined as to offer Cuban officials broad discretion in repressing critics. 

Cuban authorities routinely characterize peaceful government opponents as “counterrevolutionaries,” “mercenaries,” and “traitors,” and then use these classifications to sentence them under laws protecting Cuban sovereignty.

Cuba’s invocation of state security interests to control nonviolent dissent—for acts as innocuous as publishing articles critical of the government, handing out copies of human rights treaties, or holding peaceful marches—represents a clear abuse of authority. Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, restrictions of fundamental rights are only permissible:

for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.[9]

Cuba’s efforts to silence critics fall far outside of these limits.

The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information specify certain types of expression that should always be protected, including expression that:

  • “advocates non-violent change of government policy or the government itself”; 
  • “constitutes criticism of, or insult to, the nation, the state or its symbols, the government, its agencies, or public officials”; and
  • “is directed at communicating information about alleged violations of international human rights standards or international humanitarian law.”[10]

All of these forms of expression are punishable under Cuban law.

 

Contempt

Cuba penalizes anyone who “threatens, libels or slanders, defames, affronts or in any other way insults or offends, with the spoken word or in writing, the dignity or decorum of an authority, public functionary, or his agents or auxiliaries.”[11] Such expressions of contempt for authority (desacato) are punishable by three months to one year in prison, plus a fine. If the person demonstrates contempt for the president of the Council of the State, the president of the National Assembly, or other high ranking officials—the sanction is imprisonment for one to three years.[12]

Contempt or “insult” laws, which criminalize expressions deemed to offend the honor of public officials and institutions, directly contravene international human rights norms.[13] The Inter-American and European human rights systems both consider contempt and insult laws incompatible with the free debate essential to democratic society. In a landmark 1995 report, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) concluded that these laws are incompatible with article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to freedom of thought and expression. The commission noted that “the fear of criminal sanctions necessarily discourages people from voicing their opinions on issues of public concern particularly when the legislation fails to distinguish between facts and value judgments.”[14] 

Similarly the European Court of Human Rights has stressed that the protection of freedom of expression must extend not only to information or ideas that are widely accepted, but also to those that “offend, shock or disturb.” As the European Court noted in a case involving a politician accused of insulting the government of Spain, “Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society.”[15] In a joint declaration, the special rapporteurs on freedom of expression of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Organization of American States recommended in 2000 that "laws which provide special protection for public figures, such as desacato laws, should be repealed."[16]

Insubordination

The Cuban Criminal Code outlaws a range of forms of insubordination to authorities, including “disobedience,” “resistance,” and “attacks” on government officials. Someone who “disobeys the decisions of the authorities or public functionaries”—an act of desobedencia—may be punished with imprisonment of three months to one year.[17] An individual who “resists an authority, public functionary, or his agents or auxiliaries in the exercise of his functions”—an act of resistencia—may be punished with imprisonment of three months to one year. If the resistance occurs while the authority is carrying out an arrest, the prison sentence may rise to five years.[18] And an individual who “employs violence or intimidation against an authority, public functionary or his agents and auxiliaries”—an act of atentado—may incur a sanction of one to eight years, depending on the nature of the attack.[19] 

The UN Committee against Torture raised concern about these “nebulous offences, namely ‘disrespect’, ‘resisting authority’ and ‘enemy propaganda’,” in a 1998 report on Cuba, noting that such laws posed a risk “because of the uncertainty of their constituent elements and the room they provide for misuse and abuse.”[20]

It is appropriate to criminalize physical attacks on officials and there are limited circumstances in which even acts of disobedience and resistance to officials may be properly outlawed, as with suspects resisting arrest. But, as a number of cases documented here illustrate, Cuba uses these overly broad provisions to punish individuals who engage in peaceful activities, including forming independent unions and attending unsanctioned meetings.

Collaboration with the United States

The Law for the Protection of Cuban National Independence and the Economy[21] (Ley de Protección de la Independencia Nacional y la Economía de Cuba, hereafter the National Protection Law), which took effect in March 1999, creates harsh penalties for actions that could be interpreted as supporting or collaborating with the objectives of the US Helms-Burton Act.

Helms-Burton, which became US law in March 1996, tightened the US economic embargo on Cuba and set out a plan to assist Cuba once it began a transition to democracy.[22] In response, Cuban authorities passed the National Protection Law, which prohibits:

those actions designed to support, facilitate, or collaborate with the objectives of the “Helms-Burton” Law, the blockade, and the economic war against our people, leading toward the destruction of internal order, the destabilization of the country and the liquidation of the socialist state and the independence of Cuba.[23]

The National Protection Law is often used in conjunction with article 91 of the Cuban Criminal Code (hereafter article 91), which punishes any act made “for the purpose of undermining the independence of the Cuban state or the integrity of its territory” with ten to twenty years in prison or the death penalty.[24]

While the preamble to the National Protection Law provides that it will not infringe upon the “fundamental guarantees” afforded by the Cuban constitution,[25] most of the specific provisions of the law target dissemination of opinions or exchanges of information—activities that should be protected rather than penalized. The law’s overly broad definition of proscribed activities grants officials extraordinary authority to punish government opponents for exercising dissent.

For example, the law criminalizes the accumulation, reproduction, or distribution of “material with a subversive character” with three to eight years of imprisonment.[26] Cubans risk two to five years in prison for ”collaborating in any way with radio or television stations ... or other foreign media” deemed to be advancing Helms-Burton and related objectives.[27]

The law also creates seven- to twenty-year penalties for persons who commit “any act designed to impede or prejudice the economic relations of the Cuban state or the economic relations of any industrial, commercial, or financial institution or any other type of institution.” Those whose actions influence the US government to take measures against foreign investors in Cuba face the longest sanctions under this provision.[28]

Association

Although Cuban law guarantees the rights of association and assembly, it also empowers the state to deny these rights to groups that are critical of the government.[29] Cuba’s Associations Law (Ley de Asociaciones) entrusts the Justice Ministry with reviewing all aspiring associations. According to the law, the ministry must refuse legal status to groups:

  • “whose activities could prove damaging to social interests”;
  • “whose applications demonstrate the impossibility of attaining their proposed objectives and activities”; and
  • “whose objectives or denomination is similar or identical to another registered [association],” among other qualifications.[30]

These regulations condition the right to associate upon cooperation with the “social interests” of the state and other arbitrary guidelines, effectively allowing the government to deny recognition to any group critical of its actions.

Even associations that are granted legal status are subject to constant review by the state, and may have their recognition revoked at any time. The Regulations for the Associations Law (Reglamento de la Ley de Asociaciones)empowers government officials to disband any association “whose activities become damaging to the social welfare.”[31]

The government has consistently refused to recognize associations that are critical of its policies and practices. Human Rights Watch was unable to document a single local civil society organization that expresses dissent—including alternative political parties, human rights groups, independent labor unions, journalist associations, and other groups—that has received approval from the state to operate.

Not only is recognition denied to such groups, but individuals who participate in “illicit” groups, meetings, or demonstrations without state authorization are subject to harassment, discrimination, and even criminal sanctions. According to the Criminal Code, belonging to an “illicit” association may be punished with imprisonment for three months to a year, as well as fines; while attending an unapproved meeting or demonstration may result in fines and a sentence of one to three months.[32]  

 

“Dangerousness

The most Orwellian of all of Cuba’s laws is the “pre-criminal” offense of “dangerousness.” A law which has been in existence for some time, it allows individuals deemed “dangerous” to be imprisoned before they have committed or planned any crime, merely on the suspicion that they are likely to offend in the future.[33] Not only is the law completely arbitrary and subjective, but it is also explicitly political. Human Rights Watch opposes the unlawful use of preventative and pre-emptive detention—in particular for the purpose of social control and when it circumvents minimum procedural guarantees—irrespective of the context or the government implementing it for this reason.[34]

The Criminal Code defines “dangerousness” as “the special proclivity of a person to commit crimes, demonstrated by conduct that is observed to be in manifest contradiction with the norms of socialist morality.”[35] In other words, “dangerousness” is a pre-criminal state in which a person’s behavior suggests that he or she is of the type likely to commit a crime in the future. This behavior may manifest itself in habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, or “antisocial behavior.”[36] When “dangerousness” is applied to persons who voice dissent, it is most commonly for exhibiting “antisocial behavior.”[37]

A person engaged in “antisocial behavior” is one who:

habitually breaks the rules of social coexistence by committing acts of violence, or by other provocative acts, violates the rights of others or by his or her general behavior breaks the rules of coexistence or disturbs the order of the community or lives, like a social parasite, off the work of others or exploits or practices socially reprehensible vices.[38]

The Cuban Criminal Code states that the government may punish “antisocial behavior” through “pre-criminal measures” (medidas predelectivas), which are preventive measures applied before a crime is committed.[39]

The law assigns two types of “pre-criminal measures” for “antisocial behavior.” One is “re-education,” which is ostensibly carried out in specialized work or study centers, or in work collectives (colectivos de trabajo),[40] for a duration of one to four years.[41] The other is “orientation and control of conduct” by the National Revolutionary Police, which is applied for the same duration.[42]

The concept of “re-education” contravenes international standards protecting freedom of thought.  And as the subsequent chapters of this report show, dissidents sentenced under the “dangerousness” provision are routinely sent not to special work centers, but to regular prisons, where they are held alongside prisoners convicted of violent offenses. These individuals are effectively imprisoned for crimes that were never committed.   

All cases of “dangerousness” are to be processed “summarily,”[43] with judges determining the duration and type of punishment based on the person’s level of dangerousness.[44] Judges may modify the sentence at any time, either on their own initiative or at the suggestion of the officials responsible for “re-educating” or “orienting” the individuals sentenced.[45]

The law also states that an individual who is at risk of being charged with “dangerousness” should receive an official warning in writing, “to prevent the individual from pursuing socially dangerous or criminal activities.”[46] Such warnings are in theory designed to inform individuals why they are at risk of being charged with “dangerousness” so that they can modify their behavior. They are also supposed to offer the accused an opportunity to provide their own account of their behavior, which, according to the law, is supposed to be included in the written warning.[47]

An individual may even receive an “official warning” for having ties to people who are considered dangerous. The law states that as a result of “an individual’s ties or relations with persons who are potentially dangerous to society ... that individual may become prone to crime.”[48] By this reasoning, being connected to someone likely to commit a crime translates into a kind of “dangerousness” by proximity.

The “dangerousness” law is essentially a status law—criminalizing individuals for who they are or for a proclivity rather than for criminal acts. As such, it violates the basic principle that criminal law should target specific conduct accompanied by the requisite intent.[49]  As the Inter-American Court has ruled, “crimes must be classified and described in precise and unambiguous language that narrowly defines the punishable offense.”[50] Human rights standards and the rule of law require that the law be foreseeable and predictable, obligating states to define precisely and in a foreseeable manner all criminal offences.[51] The law also undermines basic due process and fair trial rights, such as the presumption of innocence, in that it punishes individuals on the presumption that they may commit an offense.

Finally, the “dangerousness” law offends against basic human rights standards, as it seeks to criminalize lawful behavior protected by human rights law—that is, the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, and association, and the right not to be deprived of liberty and security without due process of law.

Restricting Rights

The Cuban constitution contains a broad range of guarantees of fundamental rights. Yet it conditions those rights on conformity to the government and its socialist project.[52]

The constitution pledges "the full freedom and dignity of men, [and] the enjoyment of their rights..."[53] These include the freedom of expression and press,[54] the right to a competent tribunal and legal defense,[55] the right to assemble, protest, and associate,[56] and freedom of conscience and religion,[57] among others.

However, the constitution explicitly states that none of these rights can be exercised against the state. Article 62 states that:

None of the rights recognized for citizens may be exercised against that which is established in the Constitution and the laws, nor against the existence and the ends of the socialist state, nor against the decision of the Cuban people to construct socialism and communism.[58]

Because the constitution explicitly recognizes the Cuban Communist Party as “the superior leading force of society and the State,”[59] by extension no fundamental freedoms can be exercised if they run contrary to the Communist Party.

The constitution also deems the failure to subordinate basic freedoms to the goals of the state “punishable,” according to article 62, meaning that any judge, prosecutor, or government official who upholds such rights may him or herself be criminally sanctioned.[60] And it broadly empowers Cuban citizens to fight against anyone who opposes the state, granting them the right, “to combat in all forms, including through armed struggle, when another option is not available, against anyone who tries to overthrow the political, social, or economic order established by this Constitution.”[61]

Beyond the ideological conformity and conditionality of rights created by the provisions detailed above, several constitutional articles restrict the very rights they claim to ensure. Freedom of speech and the press, for example, exist ”in accordance with the goals of the socialist society.”[62] In its contradictory logic, the constitution claims to ensure free speech and a free press by mandating that “press, radio, television, films, and other mass media are state or social property, and may in no instance be the object of private ownership.”[63] 

While Cuba’s constitution also provides that state officials who commit abuses will face consequences and victims will receive restitution, in practice authorities do not enforce these rights. The most vigorous provision on accountability provides that:

Any person who suffers damage or injury wrongfully caused by State officials or agents, in connection with the discharge of the duties inherent in their positions, is entitled to demand and obtain the pertinent reparation or compensation in the manner stipulated by law.[64]

The constitution directs that state officials responsible for coercing statements “shall incur the penalties established by law.”[65] Another provision grants every citizen the right “to address complaints and petitions to the authorities,” and to receive a response “within a suitable period of time, according to law.”[66]

Cuba’s utter lack of judicial and prosecutorial independence ensures that when officials commit abuses, they are not held accountable by the courts and their actions are not taken into account when considering the culpability of dissidents.

Denying Judicial Protection

The Cuban judiciary is not an independent branch of government, but is subordinate to the legislative branch and ultimately to the head of state.

Although the Cuban constitution states that judges are “independent, and owe obedience solely to the law,”[67] it also explicitly establishes that courts are “subordinated hierarchically to the National Assembly and the Council of State.”[68] Furthermore, the Law of the Popular Tribunals (Ley 82 de los Tribunales Populares) states that the courts “are obligated to comply with... the instructions of a general nature originating from the Council of State.”[69] The Council of State is Cuba’s 31-member executive body, which is presided over by President Raúl Castro.

The constitution grants the National Assembly of People’s Power (hereafter, National Assembly)—Cuba’s highest legislative body—the authority to appoint and dismiss members of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo Popular), the attorney general, and all deputy attorneys general.[70] These judges and prosecutors must report at least once a year to the National Assembly,[71] which retains the authority to remove them at any time.[72] Similarly, judges in Cuba’s municipal and provincial courts are appointed and are subject to dismissal by municipal and provincial assemblies.[73] Like the National Assembly, these lower assemblies are empowered to receive reports from the respective judiciaries and remove judges at any time.[74] The process by which judges are appointed and removed undermines the security of tenure, a key element of judicial independence.

The lack of judicial independence in Cuba is inextricably linked to the lack of legislative independence. In theory, the composition of the 614 member[75] National Assembly is determined by direct elections held every five years through a “free, direct, and secret” vote.[76] The constitution states that all Cuban citizens over the age of 18 have the right to be elected to the assembly.[77] But in reality, the selection of candidates is a highly controlled political process. A 1992 Electoral Law requires that the number of candidates on the ballot for the National Assembly equal the number of open positions.[78] To determine the candidates, a short list is drawn up by a national commission made up of representatives from all of the major official mass organizations, such as the Cuban Workers Federation. That short list is then passed along to another state-run commission, which selects a single candidate for each position.[79] As a result, the only way for voters to register dissent is to write in candidates or leave ballots blank.

Real power in the Cuban government is vested not in the National Assembly, but in the Council of State, which the constitution calls “supreme representation of the Cuban State.”[80] The 31-member council carries out all legislative functions when the assembly is not in session, which is most of the year.[81] Though by law the National Assembly elects the Council of State and may override its decrees,[82] in practice it is the council that controls the composition and agenda of the National Assembly, and by extension Cuba’s judiciary. The council can appoint ministers and other high level officials, issue decrees with the force of law, declare war, and ratify treaties, among other powers.[83]

The Council of State is headed by a president, who is also the president of the Council of Ministers, Cuba’s main executive body. It is a staggering and disproportionate concentration of power in a single position: this head of state essentially wields power over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.

Judicial independence is further weakened by the involvement of lay judges (jueces legos) in proceedings, who serve alongside professional judges on both the municipal and provincial courts. In these courts, lay judges occupy two of the three seats on the judges’ panel—a majority.[84] Lay judges lack the formal legal training of professional judges and are elected by local assemblies whose composition is completely controlled by the Cuban Communist Party.[85] The law states that these judges must “maintain a good attitude before the work or the activity of social interest which they carry out,” and that they “possess ... good moral conditions and enjoy high standing in public opinion,”[86] qualifications which in the Cuban context are used to ensure ideological allegiance, and which call into question judges’ impartiality.[87]   

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has emphasized the essential link between judicial independence and democratic rule of law:

The observance of rights and freedoms in a democracy requires a legal and institutional order in which the laws prevail over the will of the rulers, and in which there is judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of the acts of public power, i.e., it presupposes respect for the rule of law. Judiciaries are established to ensure compliance with laws; they are clearly the fundamental organs for preventing the abuse of power and protecting human rights. To fulfill this function, they must be independent and impartial.[88]

In addition to the Inter-American Charter, other human rights treaties—including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the American Convention on Human Rights—require states to protect the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.[89] The United Nations Human Rights Committee, the body that monitors the implementation of the ICCPR, has ruled that for a tribunal to be “independent and impartial,”[90] the executive must not be able to control or direct the judiciary,[91] judges “must not harbor preconceptions about the matter put before them, and ... must not act in ways that promote the interests of one of the parties.”[92]

The practical safeguards that this obligation entails are set forth in a series of “basic principles” on the independence of the judiciary endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. These principles include:

  • The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats, or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
  • Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law.
  • The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions, and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.[93]

As this chapter demonstrates, Cuba has flouted all of these principles, severely undermining the rights of its citizens. 

Denying External Protections

Cuba is almost entirely closed to human rights monitoring. It is the only country in the hemisphere that does not allow the International Committee of the Red Cross access to its prisons. International human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, are prohibited from carrying out human rights fact-finding missions. Cuba refused to engage in dialogue or allow a visit from the Personal Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Christine Chanet, during her mandate from 2002 to 2007.[94]

In several instances Cuba has failed to fulfill its reporting requirements with the treaty bodies of international human rights treaties it has ratified. It has not submitted reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child since 1995; to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination since 1997; and to Committee against Torture since 1996. It has also not responded to requests for visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion, in 2003 and 2006 respectively. It received a visit from the UN Special Rapporteurs on the right to food (in 2007) and violence against women (in 1999); and an invitation has been issued to the UN Special Rapporteur on torture.[95]

Cuba has an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the rights guaranteed under customary international law and numerous international treaties it has ratified. It also has an obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of treaties, or take regressive measures with respect to rights protected by them, which it has signed pending ratification.

The core provisions of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) are broadly recognized as customary international law and an authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions in the UN Charter. Cuba has repeatedly stated that its domestic laws respect the rights contained in the UDHR.[96]

In addition, Cuba has ratified several key international human rights treaties, which impose on it the obligation to comply with the treaties’ provisions and incorporate their protections into domestic legislation.[97] Cuba signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in February 2008. As a result, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Cuba is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the two covenants until they come into force.[98]The Cuban government has also publicly asserted its compliance with the provisions of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.[99] 

Despite Cuba’s ratification or signing of key treaties, and its stated willingness to abide by international standards including those set out in the UDHR, Cuban laws, institutions, and practices continue to directly contravene the human rights of the Cuban people.

 

[9]Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted December 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), art. 29(2).

[10] The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (Johannesburg Principles), E/CN.4/1996/39(1996), Principles 2(a), 7(a)i, 7(a)ii, and 7(a)iv. An authoritative set of guidelines regarding permissible limitations which may be placed on freedom of expression, adopted in 1996—were drafted by an international team of legal scholars, diplomats, and United Nations human rights specialists meeting in Johannesburg.

The Johannesburg Principles also distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate invocations of national security interests. Legitimate reasons to invoke national security interests are to: “protect a country’s existence or its territorial integrity against the use or threat of force, or its capacity to respond to the threat or use of force, whether from an external source, such as a military threat, or an internal source, such as incitement to violent overthrow of the government.” In contrast, illegitimate justifications for invoking national security interests include acting to: “protect the government from embarrassment or exposure of wrongdoing, or to entrench a particular ideology, or to conceal information about the functioning of its public institutions, or to suppress industrial action.”

[11]Código Penal (Criminal Code), Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, No. 62, 2001, http://www.gacetaoficial.cu/html/codigo_penal.html (accessed January 12, 2009), art. 144. The National Assembly is Cuba’s highest legislative body, while the Council of State is its highest executive body. The structure of the Cuban government is discussed in greater detail in the section Denying Judicial Protection.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Insult laws are “a class of legislation that criminalizes expression which offends, insults, or threatens a public functionary in the performance of his or her official duties.” Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), “Report on the Compatibility of Desacato Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights,” Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1994, OEA/Ser/.L/V/11.88, 1995, http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/94eng/chap.5.htm (accessed September  15, 2009). The offense does not necessarily involve a false assertion; for this reason proving its truth is generally no defense. Moreover, it is usually classified not only as a detriment to the honor of the public official in question but also to his or her office. By extension it is often considered an offense against public order.

[14] The commission wrote, “[t]he special protection desacato laws afford public functionaries from insulting or offensive language is not congruent with the objective of a democratic society to foster public debate.” It also noted that in democratic societies, political and public figures must be more, not less, open to public scrutiny and criticism. “Since these persons are at the center of public debate, they knowingly expose themselves to public scrutiny and thus must display a greater degree of tolerance for criticism.” IACHR, Report on the Compatibility of Desacato Laws, 1994.

More recently, in Palamara Iribarne v. Chile (2005), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that “in the case of public officials, individuals who perform public services, politicians, and government institutions a different threshold of protection should be applied, which is not based on the specific individual, but on the fact that the activities or conduct of a certain individual is of public interest.” Inter-American Court, Palamara Iribarne Case, Judgment of November 22, 2005, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 35 (2005), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_135_ing.pdf (accessed September 15, 2009), para. 88.

[15] European Court of Human Rights, Castells v. Spain, Judgment of 23 April, 1992, Series A no. 236, p. 22, available at www.echr.coe.int, para. 42.

[16] “Joint declaration issued by Abid Hussain, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression; Freimut Duve, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media; and Santiago Cantón, OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression,” United Nations press release, December 1, 2000, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/EFE58839B169CC09C12569AB002D02C0?opendocument (accessed September 15, 2009).

[17] Criminal Code, art. 147.

[18] Criminal Code, art. 143.

[19] Criminal Code, art. 142.

[20] UN Committee against Torture (CAT), “Report of the Committee against Torture: Conclusions and Recommendations, Cuba,”  CAT/C/SR.314, March 27, 1998, Section D, para. 4.

[21] Ley de protección de la independencia nacional y la economía de Cuba (The Law for the Protection of Cuban National Independence and the Economy), Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, No. 88, 1999, http://www.cubavsbloqueo.cu/Default.aspx?tabid=248 (accessed March 13, 2009) (“National Protection Law”).

[22] Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 104thCongress of the United States, Public Law 104-114http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ114.104.pdf (accessed March 14, 2009).

[23] The National Protection Law, art. 1.

[24] “Anyone who, in the interest of a foreign state, commits an act with the aim of undermining the independence of the Cuban state or the integrity of its territory shall be punished by imprisonment of ten to twenty years or death” (“El que, en interés de un Estado extranjero, ejecute un hecho con el objeto de que sufra detrimento la independencia del Estado cubano o la integridad de su territorio, incurre en sanción de privación de libertad de diez a veinte años o muerte”). Criminal Code, art. 91.

[25] The National Protection Law, Preamble.

[26] The National Protection Law, art. 6(1).

[27] The National Protection Law, arts. 4(1) and 4(2).

[28] The National Protection Law, arts. 9(1) and 9(2).

[29] Constitución de la República de Cuba (Cuban constitution), 2002, http://www.gacetaoficial.cu/html/constitucion_de_la_republica.html (accessed January 11, 2009), art. 54.

[30] Ley de Asociaciones (Associations Law),  Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, No. 54, 1985, http://www.asanac.gov.cu/espanol/leyes/Ley%20N%BA%2054%20Asociaciones.html, arts. 8(c), 8(ch), 8(d).

[31] Reglamento de la Ley de Asociaciones (Regulations for the Associations Law), Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, No. 56, 1986, art. 79(b). 

[32] Criminal Code, arts. 208 and 209.

[33] This law is not to be confused with the offenses of conspiracy or attempt under which a person can be arrested and prosecuted before a crime has been committed or completed, but where a decision to commit a specific crime has been reached. Conspiracy is when a person has made an agreement with at least one other person to commit a specific criminal offense. Generally, in law, to prove conspiracy it is necessary to show that such an agreement—formal or informal—exists, and that at least one overt act in the furtherance of the agreed crime has taken place. Attempt is when a person, either alone or with others, makes a substantial but unsuccessful effort to commit a crime. Generally, in law, to prove attempt there must be intent to commit the crime, an overt act beyond mere preparation, and an apparent ability to complete the crime.

[34] This does not include cases of legitimate pre-trial detention of persons held on criminal charges, provided for in  international law.

[35] Criminal Code, art. 72.

[36] Criminal Code, art. 73(1).

[37]The United Kingdom and Ireland also have legislation which renders “anti-social behavior” subject to sanction by way of a civil order from a court. See the UK Anti-social Behaviour Act of 2003 and Irish Criminal Justice Act of 2006, parts 11 and 13. Anti-social Behaviour Bill, The House of Commons of the United Kingdom, 2003, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/083/2003083.pdf (accessed September 5, 2009); Criminal Justice Act of 2006, The Houses of the Oireachtas of Ireland, No. 26 of 2006, http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2006/A2606.pdf (accessed September 5, 2009), parts 11 and 13.

Anti-social behavior is generally defined as that which causes harassment, significant or persistent alarm, distress, fear, or intimidation to someone who is not from the same household as the offender. The order directs the offender not to engage in specific conduct such as vandalism or begging, and failure to comply with the order may result in a fine or detention. While these anti-social behavior orders are civil not criminal measures and are subject to specific conditions, they have still been very controversial and widely criticized by human rights organizations and bodies. Council of Europe: Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles on his visit to the United Kingdom, 4th November to 12th November 2004,” CommDH(2005) 6, Strasbourg, June 8, 2005, paras. 108 - 120;  Council of Europe: Commissioner for Human Rights,” Memorandum by Mr. Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, following his visits to the United Kingdom 5-8 February and 31 March-2 April 2009,” CommDH (2008) 27, Strasbourg, October 17, 2008, paras. 29 - 30; United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom, CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6, July 30, 2008, para. 20.; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom,  CRC/C/GBR/CO/4, October 4, 2008 para. 79 – 80.

[38] Criminal Code, art. 73(2).

[39] Criminal Code, art. 80.

[40] Criminal Code, art. 80(1).

[41] Criminal Code, art. 81(3).

[42] Criminal Code, arts. 80 and 81.

[43] “Summarily” is defined by 12 provisions laid out in article 415. Ley de Procedimiento Penal (Criminal Procedural Law), Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, No. 5, 1977, art. 415.

[44] Criminal Code, art. 82.

[45] This modification can be made according to the court’s discretion (de oficio) or at the request of the “agency in charge of its execution” (organo encargado de su ejecución). Criminal Code, art. 83(1).

[46] Criminal Code, art. 75(1).

[47] Criminal Code, art. 75(2).

[48] Criminal Code, art. 75(1).

[49] The legal maxim, nulla poena sine lege (no penalty without a law), is the basis for requiring clarity in the law.

[50] Inter-American Court, Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Judgment of May 30, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 52 (1999), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_52_esp.pdf (accessed September 15, 2009), para. 121.

[51] The doctrine and rationale were set out by the Inter-American Court in a case against Peru, when it explained, “crimes must be classified and described in precise and unambiguous language that narrowly defines the punishable offense.” Inter-American Court, Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Judgment of May 30, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 52 (1999), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_52_esp.pdf (accessed August 20, 2009), para. 121.

The requirement of “clarity” of the law is to be found in two aspects of human rights law. Firstly, it is required when defining proscribed criminal behavior in penal statutes –a doctrine often referred to as the “void for vagueness” doctrine enshrined in article 15 of the ICCPR and article 9 of the ACHR. And secondly, it is required in the limitations on the enjoyment of certain fundamental rights, which must be prescribed by, established by, or in accordance with “law” (such as those enshrined in articles 17 – 22 of the ICCPR or articles 12 – 13, 15 – 17 of the ACHR). Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd rev. ed,. (Kehl am Rhein: Engel, 2005), p.361.

[52] Parts of this section are drawn from Human Rights Watch, Cuba’s Repressive Machinery (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/cuba/ pp. 27-68. The legal and institutional underpinnings of Cuba’s repression have changed little since publication of that report.

[53] Cuban constitution, art. 9A.

[54] Ibid., art. 53.

[55] Ibid., art. 59.

[56] Ibid., art. 54.

[57] Ibid., art. 55.

[58] Ibid., art. 62.

[59] Ibid., art. 5.                

[60] Ibid., art. 62.

[61] Ibid., art. 3.

[62] Ibid., art. 53.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., art. 26.

[65] Ibid., art. 59.

[66] Ibid., art. 64.

[67] Ibid., art. 122.

[68]Ibid., art. 121.

[69]Ley de los tribunales populares (Law of the Popular Tribunals), Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, No. 82, 1997, http://www.gacetaoficial.cu/html/tribunalespopulares.html (accessed April 7, 2009), art. 5 (“Law 82”).

[70] According to the Cuban constitution, the Attorney General is “the body of the State concerned with control and preservation of legality as fundamental objectives.” Cuban constitution, art. 75 (m) and (n); Criminal Procedural Law, art. 45.

[71] Cuban constitution, art. 130.

[72] Ibid., art. 129.

[73] The Cuban government lists 171 municipal courts, one for each municipality; and 15 provincial courts for the 14 provinces and la Isla de Juventud. Ibid., art. 105(h);  Supreme Court, (Tribunal Supremo Popular), mapa de los Tribunales Provinciales Populares, http://www.tsp.cu/Archivos/Principal_TPP.asp (accessed September 22, 2009); Supreme Court, (Tribunal Supremo Popular), “Tribunales Municipales Populares,” http://www.tsp.cu/Archivos/tribunales_municipales.asp (accessed September 22, 2009).

[74] Cuban constitution, arts. 128 and 129. See also Law 82, art. 46.

[75] The exact number of delegates is determined by the size and proportional distribution of the Cuban population. Cuban constitution, art. 135.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid., art. 133.

[78]Jorge I. Domínguez, “Government and Politics,” in Cuba: A Country Study , ed. Rex A. Hudson (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2002), http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~jidoming/images/jid_government.pdf (accessed September 22, 2009), p. 234.

[79] Ibid., 234. Other organizations include: Cuban Workers Federation (CTC), Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), Federation of University Students, and Federation of Secondary School Students (FEEM).

[80] Cuban constitution, art. 89.

[81] Ibid. The National Assembly only meets for two or three sessions of a few days each year.

[82] Cuban constitution, art. 75(n).

[83] Domínguez, “Government and Politics,” p. 235; Cuban constitution, art. 90.

[84] Law 82, arts. 35 and 38.

[85] Law 82, art. 49.

[86] Law 82, art. 43.

[87] “The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats, or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.” Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 August to 6 September 1985, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 121/22/Rev. 1 at 59 (1985), art. 2.

[88] IACHR, “Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela,” OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, December 29, 2003, http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/venezuela2003eng/toc.htm (accessed September 3, 2009), paras. 150-151.

[89] The American Convention on Human Rights provides that: “Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of (. . .) any other nature” (emphasis added). American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact of San José, Costa Rica”), adopted November 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force July 18, 1978.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also imposes an obligation to guarantee the independence of the judiciary in article 14 (1): “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law…” (emphasis added). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted December 16, 1966, General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), entered into force March 23, 1976, signed by Cuba on February 28, 2008.

[90] ICCPR, art. 14 (1).

[91] UN Human Rights Committee, Decision: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, Communication No. 468/1991, October 20, 1993, CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991, para. 9.4.

[92] UN Human Rights Committee, Decision: Karttunen v. Finland, Communication No. 387/1989, October 23, 1992, CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989, para. 7.2.

[93] Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 August to 6 September 1985, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 121/22/Rev.1 at 59 (1985), arts, 2, 10, and 11.

[94]UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Personal Representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Christine Chanet, on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, A/HRC/4/12, June 12, 2007. 

[95] UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, “Compilation Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [on Government of Cuba],” A/HRC/WG.6/4/CUB/2, December 18, 2008.

[96] In its 2008 report to the UN’s Universal Periodic Review, Cuba stated, “Chapter VII of the Constitution, on ‘Fundamental rights, duties and guarantees,’ basically sets forth the principles and guarantees of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which are in line with the rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the other international human rights instruments. These are complemented by other chapters of the Constitution and the provisions of ordinary law.” Government of Cuba, Periodic Report to the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/WG.6/4/CUB/1, November 4, 2008.

[97] The key international human rights and labor agreements ratified by Cuba include the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ratified in May 1995; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), ratified in August 1991; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), ratified in June 1980; and various International Labor Organization conventions, including Convention 87, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, ratified in June 1952; Convention 98, the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, ratified April 1952; Convention 105, the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, ratified June 1958; and Convention 141, the Rural Workers' Organizations, ratified in April 1977.

[98]By signing, a country “has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded May 23, 1969, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/28, 1155 UNT.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), art. 18.

In February 2009, Cuba’s Minister of Justice affirmed Cuba’s commitment to complying with the ICCPR and ICESCR, stating before the UN Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review that: “We signed the international covenants on human rights as a demonstration of our will and commitment to the postulates of both of these instruments.”

[99] Government of Cuba, “Cuba is complying with the precepts of the International Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,” Statement by the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Cuba, María Esther Reus, Presentation of the National Report to the Human Rights Council, Geneva, February 5, 2009, http://america.cubaminrex.cu/DiscursosIntervenciones/Articulos/Otros/2009/2009-02-06-Ruas_ING.html (accessed April 19, 2009).