Political Developments

Since the publication of Waiting for Justice in September 2008, there has been little or no progress i­n the peace process. The main obstacles are ongoing disputes over the implementation of key provisions in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of November 2006, and an increasing lack of trust between the main political actors. This lack of political progress has had direct impact on the human rights situation and the climate of impunity.

Disputes over implementation of the CPA center on the question of the integration and rehabilitation of 19,602 Maoist fighters verified by the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), who have been held in cantonment sites around the country for nearly three years. The Nepal Army and many politicians in the Nepali Congress and other parties maintain that former Maoist combatants should be integrated into society.[14] The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN-M) on the other hand holds the position that the integration agreed to in the CPA refers to integration of Maoist combatants into the security forces.[15]

In mid-July 2009 there was some progress when the Government of Nepal and the UCPN-M finally launched the discharge and rehabilitation process for 4,008 Maoist combatants, including 2,973 minors, whom the UN had found to have been recruited past an agreed cut-off date and/or to have been minors in 2007.[16] However, this process subsequently stalled amid further political instability.

There were increasing levels of mistrust between the UCPN-M and the other political parties as well as between the UCPN-M and the Nepal Army, not only relating to the question of integration but on wider security sector reform, including bringing the Nepal Army under effective civilian control.

This culminated in the resignation of Maoist Prime Minister Pushpa Kumar Dahal (alias Prachanda) in early May 2009 after President Dr Ram Bharan Yadav countermanded a decision by the cabinet to sack the Commander of the Army, General Katuwal. The Prime Minister had accused General Katuwal of insubordination.[17] The ensuing political as well as constitutional crisis lingers with a lack of clarity about the powers of the president under the Interim Constitution.

On May 5, 2009, the crisis deepened when local media leaked a video recording of a speech that Prachanda had made in January 2008 at a cantonment site in Chitwan, during which he said that the party had inflated the number of its army personnel presented for registration and verification. He also said that some money allocated for the cantonments would be used to “prepare for a revolt.” Despite later attempts by Prachanda to explain the context of the statement, it drew wide public condemnation and raised serious doubts about the Maoists’ commitment to the peace process among national and international observers.[18]

Madhav Kumar Nepal of the Communist Party of Nepal–United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), the party which had won 103 of 575 seats during the April 2008 elections, and who himself had lost the elections in two constituencies, was appointed as the new prime minister on May 23, 2009, with the support of a 22-party coalition. Intense negotiations over the allocation of portfolios and the government’s program dragged on for weeks, with intra- and inter-party tensions emerging. The main Madhesi party, the Madheshi People’s Rights Forum, split as a result of these disputes.[19]

Lack of cooperation between the political parties also severely impacted on the Constituent Assembly (which also functions as the parliament). Parties from across the political spectrum on numerous occasions have boycotted sessions contributing to delays in drafting a new constitution, as well as in passing new laws (including one to establish a Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances, as mandated by the CPA). There is growing concern that the deadline of May 2010 for the promulgation of the new Constitution (as stipulated in the Interim Constitution) cannot be met.

After leaving the government in May 2009, the UCPN-M expanded its protests to the streets, declaring bandhs (strikes) calling for “civilian supremacy” over the Nepal Army. Other organizations and political groups took their protests to the streets as they saw the political climate deteriorating and the promise of a “new Nepal”—so prominent during the Jana Andolan of April 2006—not materializing. Prominent among them were members of the Tharu and the Limbu communities, two of the largest Janajati (indigenous groups) in Nepal. Others, including the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML parties, armed Madhesi and other political groups in the southern Terai region, transporters and traders as well as local people organized a total of more than 600 bandhs in the first six months of the year.[20] This high level of disruption had a major impact on the country’s economy, which in addition was hit by a drop in remissions from Nepali migrant workers in the wake of the global economic crisis.

There was no tangible improvement in the human rights situation. Amid continuing concern about a deteriorating law and order situation, the cabinet on July 27, 2009 approved a “Special Security Program.” According to Home Minister Bhim Rawal, the security strategy includes plans to curb organised crime, a special security plan for Kathmandu valley, strengthening of the security situation in the Terai and the eastern and the mid-western hills, and raising public awareness to ensure effective implementation of the strategy.[21]

In 2009 there was a spate of killings of leaders and members of Madhesi armed groups by the Nepal Police and APF, which the authorities described as “encounter” killings. Advocacy Forum is investigating 14 cases of suspected extrajudicial executions between February and July 2009, four of which occurred in four days in July.[22]

The Nepal Police as well as the APF also continue to use torture during interrogation.[23] Furthermore, there are some worrying allegations of illegal detention and torture in private residences by the Nepal Police.[24]

Following the resignation of Prime Minister Prachanda, reported incidents of violence, threats, and intimidation by Maoists increased against individuals affiliated with other political parties, as did local inter-party tensions.[25] As with the incidents during the conflict, there is a complete lack of accountability for these more recent abuses.

Violent activities by armed groups belonging to ethnic communities in several parts of the country, especially in the southern Terai region, continue to take their toll on the civilian population. Incidents of abduction, intimidation, and extortion by these groups as well as by criminal gangs continue unchecked. Several incidents of mob violence by civilians and lynching criminal suspects to death or burning them alive have been reported.[26] This often extreme vigilantism can in part be attributed to failures of justice.[27]

Weaknesses of the main institutions of the criminal justice system—the Nepal Police and Attorney General’s Department—already identified in Waiting for Justice, are yet to be addressed. In May 2009, the new Chief Justice Min Bahadur Rayamajhi introduced some encouraging reforms, including on the establishment of a Court Decisions Enforcement Directorate, the setting up of a telephone hotline service for persons who wish to register complaints about irregularities in the judicial system and the installation of CCTV in the Supreme Court so as to avoid corruption and enhance transparency.

Though the name suggests that the Enforcement Directorate would seek to enforce decisions, it has been restricted to mere monitoring of whether or not decisions are implemented. There was also a detailed judgment by the Supreme Court in May 2009 ordering the government to criminalize torture, but it is yet to be implemented,[28] much like the landmark June 2007 judgment ordering the government to criminalize “disappearances.” The decisions have not been followed by reforms to the lower judiciary, which continues to perform poorly when handling mandamus petitions and other aspects of cases alleging serious human rights violations such as torture and “disappearance.”

The NHRC’s recommendations to the government are rarely implemented, despite repeated calls from civil society and the NHRC itself. In its annual report 2007-2008, the NHRC cited this government inaction as one of the major challenges to its work.[29] On June 26, 2009, it submitted a 10-point memorandum to the new prime minister to express concern about ongoing human rights violations. It also drew the prime minister’s attention to the lack of implementation of NHRC recommendations by successive governments.[30] On August 12, 2009, the NHRC stated it was encouraged to hear that the prime minister had instructed the Home, Defense, and Peace and Reconstruction Ministries to provide information on the implementation of NHRC's recommendations and had asked the ministries to send information on the recommendations implemented and compensation provided.[31] It remains to be seen whether this will result in the compensation recommended by the NHRC being awarded any time soon.

The UN’s role has come under fire from political actors, the media and civil society. They have questioned the role of UNMIN in the registration and verification of Maoist army personnel following the controversial video recording of Prachanda’s claims described earlier. This follows earlier criticism after Maoist soldiers abducted businessman Ram Hari Shrestha in April, 2008 and took him to the cantonment in Chitwan District, where he was tortured. He later died as a result of his injuries.[32]

The NHRC has continued to criticize the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal (OHCHR-Nepal). Members of the NHRC have repeatedly lobbied against the extension of the OHCHR-Nepal mandate. Amid the political crisis, the new government of Madhav Kumar Nepal, in June 2009, initially extended the OHCHR-Nepal mandate by only three months. This was later changed to a one-year extension. Civil society has criticized both OHCHR-Nepal and the NHRC for the lack of success in addressing impunity.[33]

Amid considerable political instability, the promises in the peace agreement of greater respect for human rights and accountability have not been delivered on and impunity remains firmly entrenched. Ending impunity for past and continuing violations and strengthening the criminal justice system are essential if Nepal is to continue to move away from violence and more firmly establish the rule of law. Unfortunately, politicians seem more interested in making empty pledges than addressing truth, justice, and reparations and tackling the lack of public security and rule of law, with all the political consequences that entails.