December 14, 2006

Evidence

Even though the lengthy trial process did not lead to a verdict, the information introduced at trial was itself important. Future generations will use the evidence to understand the region's history and how the conflicts came to pass. Because no truth commission has been established to look into the events in the region, the Milosevic trial may be one of the only venues in which a great deal of evidence was consolidated about the conflicts. The fact that Milosevic had the opportunity to test the prosecutor's evidence in cross-examination enhances its value as a historical record. The evidence will also be useful in other trials at ICTY.

Court proceedings that required disclosure by the Serbian government of previously withheld documents revealed previously unknown information; in response to viewing the public proceedings some insider witnesses came forward voluntarily and other new material was revealed for the first time. One of the important items to come out in this way was the "Scorpion video" that showed members of the notorious "Scorpion" unit, believed to have been acting under the aegis of the Serbian police, executing men and boys from Srebrenica at Trnovo. Although the video was never admitted as evidence, it was shown at the trial[26] and would not have become public but for the trial.[27] It had an enormous impact on Serbia: having been shown at the trial it was aired as news on a number of Serbian national television stations and reached a broad audience, sending shockwaves through society. The airing of the video engendered a great deal of national discussion, forcing people to confront the fact of atrocities they had previously denied. Also the video prompted the national government to arrest the perpetrators seen in the film.[28]

On a broader scale, the Milosevic trial was the first ICTY case in which evidence was introduced relating to all three conflicts: Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. It is also likely to be the only ICTY trial that comprehensively examines Belgrade's role in Bosnia and Croatia. Although it was widely assumed that Serbia supported the Serb combatants in the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, the full extent of the support and the mechanisms by which it was accomplished were not public until the Milosevic trial.[29] Much of Belgrade's involvement in the war was kept secret. Milosevic himself discussed the secrecy involved in a statement to a Belgrade investigating judge who was looking into allegations of misappropriation of customs funds in 2001. In his statement, admitted as an exhibit at trial, Milosevic admitted the money was used to help rebel Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia:

As regards the resources spent for weapons, ammunition and other needs of the Army of Republika Srpska [in Bosnia and Herzegovina] and the Republic of Serbian Krajina [in Croatia], these expenditures constituted a state secret and because of state interests could not be indicated in the Law on the Budget, which is a public document. The same applies to the expenditures incurred by providing equipment, from a needle to an anchor, for the security forces and special anti-terrorist forces in particular, from light weapons and equipment to helicopters and other weapons which still remain where they are today, and this was not made public because it was a state secret, as was everything else that was provided for the Army of Republika Srpska. In my opinion, these matters should still constitute a state secret. . .[30]

The Milosevic trial opened the door on these state secrets. Evidence introduced at trial showed exactly how those in Belgrade and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia financed the war; how they provided weapons and material support to Bosnian and Croatian Serbs; and the administrative and personnel structures set up to support the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb armies. In short, the trial showed how Belgrade enabled the war to happen. As a former UN official testified "The [Serbs] relied almost entirely on the support they got from Serbia, from the officer corps, from the intelligence, from the pay, from the heavy weapons, from the anti-aircraft arrangements. Had Belgrade chosen even to significantly limit that support, I think that the siege of Sarajevo probably would have ended and a peace would have been arrived at somewhat earlier rather than having to force them militarily into that weaker position."[31]

Human Rights Watch did not attempt an exhaustive review of the evidence introduced a trial. Human Rights Watch did consider Milosevic's cross-examination and defense and we did not include evidence where we felt Milosevic had raised valid questions in rebuttal as to the value of the evidence. Milosevic's defense focused on Kosovo, and because the evidence discussed in this paper relates primarily to allegations of Serbia's involvement in the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, much of it was not directly challenged by the defense. This paper also does not attempt to undertake a review of the chain of command evidence that, if proven, would establish Milosevic's criminal liability. The material we reviewed, however, shed light on the following three important areas.

Financial Assistance

Without Serbia, nothing would have happened, we don't have the resources and we would not have been able to make war. [32]

-Radovan Karadzic, former president of Republika Srpska, to the Assembly of the Republika Srpska, May 10-11, 1994

Money is a sine qua non for warfare. As Gen. Ratko Mladic (commander of Bosnian Serb forces) told the National Assembly of the wartime self-declared Republika Srpska, "You can not wage a war without financial support."[33] A military expert confirmed at trial "finance is a key element of warfare."[34]Serbia, through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), supported the Serb parties to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia both financially and militarily.[35] Although Slobodan Milosevic had acknowledged this assistance and the steep price paid by the Serbian people to assist Serbs elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, the extent of the financial contribution was not public until the trial.[36]

Neither wartime Republika Srpska (RS) nor the self-declared Republic of the Serbian Krajina (RSK) had the resources to finance a war.[37] In his testimony, the former Krajina president, Milan Babic, explained that the RSK municipalities were in an underdeveloped part of Croatia. When Croatia stopped providing financial support to them, they had to turn to Serbia for assistance.[38] Babic testified that "under no circumstances could [the RSK] exist" without support from Serbia or Yugoslavia.[39] Former U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith described Krajina as "a completely impoverished region that could not exist even at the very low level that it existed without financial support from Serbia."[40] Milan Martic, at the time the RSK minister of the interior, acknowledged to Milosevic in a letter admitted as an exhibit at the Milosevic trial, "the [RSK] has no real sources from which to fill its budget, as you certainly know."[41]Belgrade, through the federal government, financed more than 90 percent of the RSK 1993 budget.[42]

Similarly, evidence showed that wartime Republika Srpska was dependent on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to support its war effort. Testimony of a former UN official indicated that "The Republika Srpska is not a very well-endowed region. There was virtually no functioning economy during this period [after the imposition of sanctions in 1992] other than smuggling."[43] He described the wartime Republika Srpska as "an entity which had no real means of economic subsistence."[44] Indeed, for 1993, expert testimony indicated 99.6 percent of the RS budget came from "credits" from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 95.6 percent of that budget was used to fund the military and police. As retired JNA Gen. Aleksandar Vasiljevic testified, "There are the Krajina and the Republika Srpska who have their own governments, who have their own armies, but the funding comes from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."[45]

Milosevic presented the economics of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a different light, noting that it was considered an insufficiently developed region in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and that Serbia had been providing the region with money for years as part of "the fund of the federation for support to the insufficiently developed regions of the SFRY."[46] He further contended that the financial assistance to wartime Republika Srpska and Krajina also went to humanitarian aid, education and health care, though he admitted that the largest part of their budgets was for the army.[47]

The need to hide from the public the massive assistance to the wartime RS and the RSK was acknowledged in Supreme Defense Council (SDC) minutes (made public for the first time as part of the Milosevic trial). The Supreme Defense Council was comprised of the presidents of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It met from 1992 to 2000 to make decisions about FRY's defense and security. The meetings' minutes and shorthand notes were introduced at trial as a result of the prosecutor's pursuit of court orders requiring Serbia and Montenegro to comply with outstanding requests for documents under rule 54bis,which allows the parties to obtain documents from states.[48] The notes indicate, inter alia, the Supreme Defense Council recognition of the need to hide aid to Republika Srpska and Krajina from the public and from some deputies in parliament.[49] Although not all of the financing was done in secret,[50] the Milosevic trial was important in that evidence introduced at trial shed new light on both the financial structures set up to facilitate support for the new entities and the sources of the money used to fund the conflicts.

As a structural matter, in order to enable the FRY to provide the new entities with financial support, a system had to be established to enable funds to be transferred efficiently. Evidence showed that a single integrated monetary and banking system was created in order to facilitate this transfer of funds. National banks were established in Republika Srpska and the Republic of the Serbian Krajina in 1992 under the auspices of the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY).[51] The new banks were subordinate to the NBY and ultimately restructured so that the three banks formed a single entity under NBY control.[52]

Evidence showed that the restructuring of the banks ensured close financial links between the NBY and the satellite banks, which was necessary because of the RS and RSK's acute funding needs. As Milan Babic testified, the National Bank of the RSK "practically operated as a branch office of the National Bank of Yugoslavia."[53] By March 1994 the FRY and the two Serb satellite republics used a single currency. Integration of the banking system improved the functioning of the civil and military institutions in the satellite republics. Expert testimony indicated that the banks' integration enabled the FRY to circumvent United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia pursuant to Security Council resolution 757 on May 30, 1992, because the transfer of funds was done between the parent bank, NBY, and the two subsidiary banks and money was not directly given to the entities. (Other aspects of the impact of Resolution 757 on the financing of the war will be discussed below.)

Prosecution evidence also showed that another crucial mechanism for ensuring that federal money was available to wartime Republika Srpska and Krajina was the Public Accountancy Service, a financial transfer system that existed before the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. The importance of its availability should not be underestimated. Without it, physical movement of cash would have been the only means of transferring money between Serbia and the Serb republics. Evidence showed that the need to control the system was recognized early on. In Serb-controlled areas of Croatia, testimony and documents demonstrated that branches of the Public Accountancy Service were incorporated into Serbia's accountancy system beginning in May 1991.[54] On November 1, 1991, Radovan Karadzic told an audience at the Plebiscite of the Serb People:

Be prepared soon to take over the SDK [Public Accountancy Service] decisively. I mean, to appoint your own man in the SDK. Prepare/the ground/, first talk to them, ask them whether they're ready to work in a moment that is not legal, in accordance with laws and regulations which you, as the municipal authority, will give them.[55]

The Public Accountancy Service and the integrated banking system allowed for efficient transfer of funds from FRY to the satellite republics.[56] Testimony indicated that the funds themselves came from three main mechanisms: primary issues, grey issues, and diverted customs funds. Each of these will be discussed in turn.

The RSK and RS budgets were initially supported entirely by "primary issues"-the printing of new money.[57] As a general matter, it is an undesirable method for raising funds because it can easily lead to severe inflation.[58] Thus most Western countries rely on commercial lending or increased taxation to finance budget shortfalls. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, however, did not have many options. Security Council resolution 757 made it unlawful to transfer any funds to the FRY except as "payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs." According to the testimony of Zoran Lilic, the FRY president from 1993 through 1997, the sole source of money for the FRY after the sanctions were imposed was primary issue.[59] Although Milosevic argued that the sanctions themselves were the cause of hyperinflation, the prosecution's financial expert Morten Torkildsen explained that the link was slightly more indirect. The sanctions enhanced the need for primary issue which in turn provoked hyperinflation.[60]

Evidence indicated the new money was distributed to the RS and the RSK through the Public Accountancy Service and was the main means of supporting Serb-controlled districts in Bosnia and Croatia. Torkildsen concluded, based on his examination of documents, that the Belgrade-based NBY was essentially printing money for Bosnian Serb use. Supreme Defense Council minutes from February 10, 1993, indicate that primary issue funded a large percentage of the army's budget and that, because of the economic recession in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the RSK's requests for funds should all come from primary issue.[61] In the meeting, Milosevic concludes that based on the needs of the RSK and the RS, "we should issue 500 billion from the primary emission [issue]."[62]

The satellite republics' dependence on the National Bank of Yugoslavia for primary issue is evident in the large number of both the RS and RSK governments' direct requests to the National Bank of Yugoslavia for money during the war, many of which were introduced as exhibits.[63] The documents show that the money financed RS and RSK budget deficits, comprised almost entirely of military and police expenditures:[64] Army expenditures were often characterized as "special purpose" expenditures.[65] A May 1992 RS government decision indicates that "up to 80 percent of primary issue will be used for special purposes."[66]

In addition to direct financing from the NBY, primary issues were also a source of loans to the RS to be repaid at a 5 percent interest rate over 10 years.[67] However, as Torkildsen testified, severe inflation meant the loans were paid back at a real value of much less than the amount borrowed and thus amounted to a gift.[68] Evidence also indicated that primary issue was used to extend credit to manufacturers of supplies for the Republika Srpska army.[69]

In addition to primary issue, testimony indicated "grey issues" also were used to raise money for military expenses. "Grey issue" is money printed by the bank but, unlike primary issue, is unauthorized and not recorded on the books of the central bank. The benefit of using grey issue is that because no records are kept, whoever issues the money can spend it in secret for whatever purposes they determine. Thus grey issue is likely used for purposes of which the issuer wants no record kept. It is particularly dangerous for the economy since the uncontrolled printing of money leads to hyperinflation.

From 1990 to 1994 FRY used grey issue in an effort to obtain hard currency from Serbian citizens.[70] Experts estimate that Serbian citizens had 8 billion deutschmarks in savings that the government could potentially buy back.[71] The foreign currency reserves that the state managed to obtain were then sent to the branch of a Yugoslav bank in Cyprus.

Evidence showed that by 1994 federal authorities realized they needed to address the hyperinflation and could no longer continue to print money to cover budget deficits.[72] Another source of hard currency had to be found, and it was the FRY Customs Department. In 1994 Mihalj Kertes became director of the Customs Department. Beginning that year some Customs Department funds were not recorded in the accounting records of FRY and at least some of these funds were transferred to the same Cyprus accounts that had previously been receiving the currency obtained through the grey issues.[73]

The testimony of Radomir Markovic, head of the Serbian State Security Service from November 1998 until 2000, provided a description of how this money was used. Markovic testified that Serbia's budget for security services only covered about 50 percent of its budget needs. Funds to pay for purchase of equipment for state security and the army came from the federal customs administration.[74] He described how employees of the state security sector in charge of finance went to the Customs Department for cash and carried it back to the Ministry of the Interior's financial department. The Minister then deposited it into Belgrade Bank accounts in Cyprus. That money was then used to pay for helicopter equipment, jeeps and other equipment from abroad.[75] Markovic also testified that these funds paid for the construction of the Kula training center that was used to train special Serb police units deployed in Bosnia and Croatia.[76]

Material Support

Materials are the essence of armed conflict.[77]Evidence introduced in the Milosevic trial showed that the Croatian and Bosnian Serb armies relied on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia for more than just financial support: they also depended almost entirely on the Yugoslav army for equipment and supplies.[78] The extent of the reliance was demonstrated by documents and testimony introduced at the Milosevic trial. Evidence showed that the JNA, the Serbian Ministry of Interior and other entities (including Serb civilian groups and police) armed Serb civilians and local territorial defense groups in Krajina and Bosnia prior to the start of conflict and the official formation of armed forces. Later, the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and the Army of the Serbian Krajina (SVK) were formed on the basis of materiel and personnel the JNA left behind when it withdrew from Croatia and Bosnia.[79] Because the RSK and RS had almost no production capacity, they were only able to meet their ongoing materiel needs through Serbia and the FRY's continuing transfer of weapons and ammunition.

As with financial support, much of the material support provided to the armies was done in secret. Federal and Serbian support to the RSK and the RS was officially characterized as "humanitarian aid" though it was meant for the armed forces.[80] Evidence introduced in the Milosevic trial highlighted several mechanisms by which the secret weapons transfers and material support occurred.

Arming of Bosnian and Croatian Serbs

Evidence introduced at trial showed that various state mechanisms armed local Serb territorial defense units and civilians in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo prior to the start of conflict.

JNA support

A great deal of armaments was passed to local Serb territorial defense units in Bosnia and Croatia by members of the Yugoslav army, with senior authorities' approval. Former JNA General Vasiljevic's testimony indicated that for weapons previously held on federal territory to be released to Serbs, the highest level of authority-in this case approval from the presidency-would be required.[81] An expert military witness explained that "[w]eapons can only be issued from a well-guarded military armoury in accordance with well-regulated issue procedures, on the orders of a person with authority to issue."[82] That person is usually someone quite senior and not a local commander.[83]

In some instances weapons distribution took the form of local civilians making lists of their requirements, which were then supplied from JNA warehouses. Milan Babic testified that in the summer of 1991 a JNA colonel offered Babic his services to procure weapons for Serbs in Croatia. The colonel took weapons orders from the Krajina Serbs and then distributed weapons from a JNA warehouse in Bihac, Bosnia (near the Croatian border).[84]Similarly, in Bosnia witness B-24, a police officer and member of the Crisis Staff in Zvornik, described how in April 1992 a person working in Zvornik under the pseudonym "Marko Pavlovic" made a phone call to JNA officers and within 24 to 48 hours, weapons and ammunition shipments would arrive for the "defense" of Zvornik.[85] He estimated that at least two-thirds of the total weapons brought into Zvornik were from JNA depots and warehouses.[86]

General Vasiljevic testified about other cases of JNA soldiers handing over small arms to Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. In late 1991 a security officer in the counter-intelligence department of the JNA was caught by the head of security attempting to transfer weapons from a warehouse in Croatia to Serbs in Slavonia. General Vasiljevic testified that a colonel who tried to transfer weapons to Serbs in Croatia told him that he had done so on verbal orders from Gen. Zivota Panic, the commander of the JNA's First Army District during Vukovar operations.[87] General Vasiljevic also testified that weapons were moved from warehouses when the JNA pulled out of Croatia and taken to JNA warehouses in Bosnia and Herzegovina and deeper into Croatia where they were intended for Serb territorial defense units in Krajina.[88]

By the end of 1991, evidence showed that due to the large number of direct requests by the new territorial defense units for military equipment from JNA reserves, the JNA administration recognized the need to be more systematic in supplying arms to territorial defense units. Expert analysis and documents indicate that on December 30, 1991, the JNA made explicit plans for equipping local Serb territorial defense units in an orderly fashion.[89] This confidential order establishing a system for weapons requests was later referenced in a letter from Bosnian Serb Territorial Defense Headquarters asking for 2,000 weapons.[90] Whether formally or informally, a great deal of arms was clearly flowing between the JNA and local Serb civilian defense units prior to the conflicts. By March 1992, two months before official formation of the Republika Srpska army, military documents introduced at trial concluded that the "JNA has distributed 51,900 weapons [to Bosnian Serbs]."[91]

In Kosovo, expert analysis demonstrated that the Yugoslav army also supplied weapons to Serb civilians in 1998, prior to the outbreak of armed conflict. The analysis cites a June 8, 1998 minister of the interior report that states that "given the more frequent armed attacks of Albanian terrorist gangs, which are aiming to ethnically cleanse the area, we believe that it is necessary to distribute weapons to the threatened population."[92] The effort to arm locals was in response to a recognition that civilians were already arming themselves without official control. The program was meant to arm citizens and not members of the military or Ministry of the Interior (MUP), who were armed directly by the state. At the same time that this secret arming of Serb civilians was being conducted in Kosovo, a program was underway to disarm ethnic Albanians.[93]

Serbian Ministry of Defense

Evidence showed that the Serbian Ministry of Defense played a major role in supplying weapons to Bosnian Serbs as well. This was done in a number of ways.

Exhibits show that the RSK leadership made direct requests for large quantities of ammunition, weapons, and supplies from the Serbian minister of defense in 1991.[94] A November 1, 1991 confidential "Report on providing assistance to the Serbian districts in Croatia," by the Republic of Serbia Defense Ministry indicates "assistance has already been provided to the Serbs in Croatia, but there is still an urgent need."[95] In the report, the Serbian defense minister recommended that in addition to a great deal of financial assistance, the Serbian government send a large amount of communications and civilian protection equipment and weapons to Krajina by the end of 1991. In support of his request, the minister of defense stated, "We believe that very good results would be achieved towards joint aims if the Republic of Serbia ensured the assistance to meet the said needs, with the help of all social institutions and this Ministry, which could allocate assistance from the supplies it still has in its depots."[96]

Another important means by which material and equipment were supplied to Bosnia and Croatia was through the sending of arms with Serbian volunteers and personnel who traveled from Serbia. Dobrila Gajic-Glisic, a former Serbian Defense Ministry employee, testified that Serbia's Ministry of Defense armed volunteers for the wars in Bosnia and Croatia beginning in October 1991. According to her testimony, the Ministry of Defense bought a great deal of supplies for volunteers that was registered as "hunting equipment," including 800 bulletproof vests, 10 laser sights and between 10 and 20 infrared sights.[97] In addition, thousands of rifles and pistols and other equipment for volunteers were obtained overseas, in some instances paid for with cash carried abroad by suitcase.[98] The means by which weapons were purchased underscores the secrecy of the operations.

Serbian Ministry of the Interior

The Ministry of the Interior in Serbia also played an important role in arming Serbian defense units in Bosnia and Croatia. Milan Babic testified that in early 1991, after a meeting with Milosevic and the Serbian Interior Minister discussing weapons for the defense of the RSK, the Ministry of the Interior distributed arms to Krajina from the warehouses of the territorial defense units in Serbia.[99]General Vasiljevic testified that three men were arrested by the Croatian Ministry of the Interior for transporting weapons supplied by the Serbian MUP to Serbs in Croatia in early 1991; the Serbian minister of the interior intervened to secure their release.[100] Milan Milanovic, a former acting RSK minister of defense, described how Radovan Stojicic, commander of a special unit of the Ministry of the Interior, arrived in Krajina on October 5, 1991, with personnel and equipment from the Serbian MUP and continued to receive equipment from Serbia as well as his salary.[101]

Testimony also indicated that Serbian police stations (which were part of the Ministry of the Interior) directly provided some support to Serb territorial defense units in Bosnia. As witness B-24, a Bosnian Serb police officer, testified, "We didn't have the technical equipment, I mean, the uniforms, the clothing that in those days were the same as in Yugoslavia as in Serbia. So we received aid in the form of uniforms, some communications equipment from police stations in Mali Zvornik and Loznica [both in Serbia]."[102]

Association of Serbs and Emigrants of Serbia

Perhaps one of the most significant ways in which the Ministry of the Interior worked to arm Serb defense units-unknown before the Milosevic trial-was in conjunction with the Association of Serbs and Emigrants of Serbia.

The association, also known as "Matica," was founded to provide humanitarian aid to Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. Although ostensibly a humanitarian organization, it provided supplies for the battlefield.[103] The role it played in arms distribution was brought out in trial testimony. Dobrila Gajic-Glasic testified that during discussions about raising money to arm the Serbian war volunteers, Brana Crncevic, the Matica president, promised to finance the purchase of 8,000 rifles with money raised abroad.[104] Two insider witnesses provided details as to how weapons were distributed by the association in Bosnia and Croatia.

According to B-179, a witness formerly employed by the Association of Serbs and Emigrants of Serbia, Serb villages in Bosnia and Croatia would regularly send requests for supplies including automatic rifles, silencers, etc. to the association.[105] Every day a small group of state security leaders including Jovica Stanisic and Mihalj Kertes[106] met to discuss the kind and amount of supplies and ammunition that were needed in various parts of Bosnia and Croatia. The meetings initially took place at a large JNA warehouse outside of Belgrade where weapons and ammunition were stored (Bobanj Potok), but were later moved to the Belgrade fairgrounds.[107]

After the meetings, the Serbian Ministry of the Interior issued orders concerning where the trucks went and the loading of weapons. B-179 testified that in 1992, 1,200 trucks, most with more than 20 tons of carrying capacity, transported weapons and ammunition from Bubanj Potok to front lines throughout Bosnia and Croatia. Weapons also came from Ministry of the Interior warehouses.[108] He testified that convoys of 10-15 large trucks went to Bosnia and Croatia on practically a daily basis.[109] Most convoys included a Serbian Ministry of Interior truck and were never checked at checkpoints.[110] Although Milosevic argued the Association of Serbs and Emigrants of Serbia provided humanitarian assistance,[111] B-179 estimated that only one out of 10 or 15 trucks in a convoy would carry humanitarian aid; the rest contained military assistance. B-179 confirmed that no one paid for the supplies. They were just received.[112]

The trucks used for weapons transport also included private transporters from the RSK and the RS that would come to Serbia for this purpose.[113] The equipment was initially taken to RS and RSK front lines. B-24, the Serbian police officer and member of the crisis staff in Zvornik, Bosnia, described his participation in the weapons transport from the association to Serb villages in Bosnia. He testified that he was instructed to drive to a Belgrade fairgrounds parking lot and leave a truck full of fuel with keys in the vehicle. A few hours later he would return and find the same truck loaded with weapons. The trucks would also have some wheat and flour and would contain a fictitious invoice, though they were not checked at the borders. When the trucks arrived back in Zvornik, the weapons would be distributed among Serb villages on the basis of an assessment of their degree of danger.[114] B-24 personally participated in the transport of weapons twice and each time the truck contained 200 to 300 pieces.[115]

After sanctions were imposed on Serbia and Montenegro in May 1992,[116] testimony indicated the distribution of weapons continued unabated. The only difference was that trucks could not stay at Bubanj Potok for long.[117] B-179 testified that after the embargo, one or two trucks came to the warehouse at a time and left after being loaded. This was done in an effort to prevent information leaks about the loading of weapons. Also, trucks were kept at the Belgrade fairgrounds since they were not supposed to be at MUP locations. The fairgrounds and other "innocent locations" were found for the trucks in order to keep the public from becoming aware of the weapons distribution.[118]

1992 formation of the SVK and VRS

The January 1992 Constitution for the Republic of the Serbian Krajina declared that the "Territorial Defense of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina shall constitute the armed forces of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina [known by its initials SVK]."[119] The Republika Srpska's National Assembly officially established the Army of Republika Srpska BH [known as VRS] on May 12, 1992.[120] Both armies had an enormous head start as a result of assistance from the JNA.

The JNA officially withdrew from Bosnia and Croatia in May 1992, but it left staff and supplies behind. Evidence showed that this was one of the primary ways by which the JNA supported the VRS and SVK. The materiel left behind formed the basis for the creation of the new armies. Although it was well known at the time that the JNA left its weapons and personnel in Bosnia and Croatia for use by local Serbs when it withdrew, the extent of the reliance on the transfer of supplies and the mechanisms by which the transfer occurred were brought out in depth during the Milosevic trial.[121]

Testimony showed that when the JNA pulled out of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the second half of 1992, it left the Serbs there with a nearly complete army supplied with the remains of the JNA's 2nd military district.[122] Former US Ambassador to CroatiaPeter Galbraith testified that in May 1992, in withdrawing from Bosnia, the JNA "left behind, under the control of the Bosnian Serbs, 85 percent of its men and most of its equipment."[123] A 1992 report to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that was introduced as evidence noted that "JNA stockpiles provide the virtually unlimited ammunition that the Bosnian Serbs now use against civilians."[124]

That JNA weapons formed the basis for the VRS was acknowledged by the Bosnian Serbs. On the day the wartime Republika Srpska's National Assembly met and officially established the Army of the Republika Srpska, May 12, 1992, General Mladic noted "we are not starting from scratch, which is important."[125] Maj. Gen. Milan Gvero later said to the RS National Assembly in September 1993, "We kept all that could be kept of the weapons, combat equipment, air force/equipment/, materiel and the like of the former JNA."[126] Mladic reported in September 1992 to the VRS main staff, "Our army is one of the rare ones in history to have started a liberation war with a very solid material base especially as concerns combat hardware, ammunition, and food reserves."[127] Mladic's overview of the source of arms to the VRS from the beginning of the war through 1994, provided in April 1995 to the 50th Republika Srpska National Assembly Session, illustrates the extent to which the RS relied on arms from JNA reserves to support combat operations:

From the beginning of the [Bosnian] war to 31 December 1994, a total of 9,185 tons of infantry ammunition has been expended. 1.49% self-produced; 42.2% came from supplies inherited by the VRS and withdrawn from enclaves and kasernes [military barracks] of the former JNA, 47.2% was provided by the Yugoslav Army; and 9.11% was imported or purchased. At the present we have 9.11% of the total needs for 1995. We have expended 18,151 tons of artillery munitions, 26.2% of it from production, 39% from supplies, 34.4% provided by the Yugoslav Army and 0.26% imported. At the present we have 18.36% of the needs for this year. As for anti-aircraft ammunition, we expended 1,336 tons. We secured none from production, which means we didn't produce one shell, one bullet 42.7% came from supplies, 52.4% were provided by the Yugoslav Army, and 4.9% came from imports.[128]

Additional explanation of what was left behind may be found in another exhibit entered at trial, the Republika Srpska's 1992 Combat Readiness Analysis. The confidential internal analysis acknowledges the enormous debt the VRS owed the Yugoslav People's Army in virtually all areas of operations.[129]

Weapons the JNA left in Croatia were also an essential source of weapons for the Croatian Serb army in Krajina. Former acting RSK Minister of Defense Milan Milanovic testified that "[w]hen the JNA withdrew in May 1992, a part of the JNA hardware remained in the territory of the SBZS [Krajina]: around 50 tanks, around 70 anti-aircraft guns, a large number of mortars and other smaller artillery pieces, as well as personal weapons for around 30,000 soldiers."[130] In his testimony Milan Babic explained that the Krajina territories were not demilitarized in accordance with the 1992 Vance Plan:

Weapons and military equipment and material was [sic] not taken away from the area completely, and most of the equipment was hidden, and through the Krajina police force, which was in possession of those weapons still, the military units and formations remained armed in the area. And also, later on, from the beginning of 1993, in fact, the heavy weapons were taken from the [JNA] warehouses which were held by the [UN] peace forces, and from the beginning of 1993 onwards, the armed formation existed under the name of the Serb army of the RSK, although it existed from May 1992 in actual fact, this Serbian army with part of the [JNA] weaponry.[131]

Continuing supply of ammunition and other military materials

Without a re-supply of ammunition and other materials, combat could not have continued.[132] Neither the RS nor the RSK had the capacity to produce its own weapons or ammunition, or the funds to buy them. As Mladic stated to the RS National Assembly in May 1992, "We do not make ammunition and we can only use as much as we can get hold of."[133] The 1992 VRS Combat Readiness report also notes that in spring 1993 "[m]aterial needs for the successful conduct of combat operations are being met from the existing reserves and by relying on the FRY Army. [W]ar production to meet the needs of the VRS has not been instituted."[134] On September 29, 1993, VRS Major General Gvero informed the RS National Assembly that "We had no budget or material supplies for the war to rely on. We have not purchased a single plane, helicopter, tank, artillery piece, etc."[135] Yet despite sanctions and a lack of production capacity and resources, observers testified that Bosnian Serb forces showed "no sign of being short of either [fuel or ammunition]," noting the VRS's ability to redeploy forces in various parts of Bosnia.[136] Evidence introduced at trial indicated how supplies were distributed to the territories after JNA withdrawal, despite sanctions.

In Bosnia, an expert report by military analysts introduced at trial described a plan of supply codenamed "Izvor" (source) to facilitate the provision of large quantities of fuel and weapons from the FRY to the VRS and circumvent the September 1991 UN arms embargo. Documents cited in the report indicate that the VRS was able to procure ammunition and fuel in the FRY and that between August 5 and September 14, 1992, large quantities of material including small arms, artillery, and tank and rocket ammunition were in fact received by the VRS. An expert testified that under the Izvor plan, 445 tons of ammunition were supplied to the VRS.[137] Other documents also point to the receipt of tons of ammunition and technical equipment via Izvor .[138] The analysts' report describes ongoing FRY and Serbian support for the VRS as demonstrated by documents referencing military equipment repairs being carried out in the FRY. One exhibit mentions the return of three thousand 82mm mortar shells that had come back from repairs in the FRY.[139]The heavy reliance on FRY for continuing support is also demonstrated by the 1992 VRS Combat Readiness report, which even suggests that the VRS establish a logistics base in the FRY for "coordinating procurement and the execution of logistics support tasks on the territory of the FRY for the needs of the VRS."[140]

Testimony from a former UN official indicated that it was impossible for the UN to monitor comprehensively Serbia's borders. However, from the monitoring that could be done, confidential UN cables that were introduced as evidence at trial suggest that Serbia was violating the arms embargo. Documents and testimony indicate that observers noted several helicopter flights originating from or going towards Serbia beginning in September 1994.[141] In some instances 10 to 15 helicopters were observed flying at night, a feat that testimony indicated would be virtually impossible for the Bosnian Serb army.[142] Testimony indicated that a "very, very considerable number" of aircraft was observed violating the no-fly zone between Serbia and Bosnia.[143] UN observers also described increased air defense measures undertaken by Bosnian Serbs in the autumn of 1994 that led them to conclude that the FRY was supplying new or additional air defense equipment to the VRS.[144] Confidential UN cables admitted into evidence at trial also raised concerns about the observed transfer of infantry and tanks across the border from Serbia to Bosnia.[145]

A Serbian journalist observed border crossings by JNA vehicles and testified that the "[a]ssistance to the army of the Republika Srpska was practically a non-stop process."[146] He said this was obvious in any border town, though he noted a brief period where, due to the presence of international monitors, convoys were sent in a more discreet fashion.[147] He observed Yugoslav army vehicles crossing the border several times between 1992 and August 1994.[148] Others also testified about observing military convoys crossing the river from Serbia to the RS.[149]

The SVK also depended on the FRY for continuing support. An exhibit introduced at trial shows that in a November 1992 meeting about the mode of financial assistance for RSK forces, the RSK president and Milosevic decided that financing for the RSK's defense would come from the Serbian Ministry of Defense. Other support, including equipment maintenance and financing for the active officers who stayed behind, would be via the Yugoslav army.[150]

Documents and testimony introduced at trial show that military support was indeed provided to the SVK by the Yugoslav army.[151] A December 17, 1993 "Memorandum for the coordination of tasks meeting at the Yugoslav Army General Staff," for example, lists "[s]cheduled equipment (KUB/SA-6 surface-to-air missiles) has been taken possession of and stored at SVK depots" as an implemented task from the previous coordination meeting. The document then notes further SVK requests for ammunition and spare parts as well as a request for the coordination of Yugoslav Army teams to be sent to repair complicated systems and equipment.[152] Another exhibit is an April 8, 1993, request from the RSK to the JNA chief of general staff for 200 rockets.[153] Milan Babic in his testimony confirmed that the rockets were received.[154] Milanovic's witness statement also describes an incident in which an oral request for a tank battalion was granted:

In 1993, there was a situation whose details I cannot remember, but I know that I believed we were under threat so, together with Bogdan Sladojevic, I went to meet with General Momcilo Perisic, the VJ NGS [Yugoslav Army Chief of General Staff]. We asked Momsilo Perisic to give us a tank battalion (50 tanks). Momcilo Perisic approved this a few days later and handed the tanks over to Colonel Sladojevic.[155]

The tanks were delivered in secret.[156]

Personnel

It is well known that when the JNA withdrew from Bosnia and Croatia, it left behind not only its materiel, but also many of its military personnel. An August 1992 US Senate staff report introduced at trial, for example, stated that "in May 1992, Serbia withdrew the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) from Bosnia, but left behind 85 percent of its men."[157] However, the extent to which the JNA remained involved in staffing the new armed forces was not known until the Milosevic trial. Evidence from the trial demonstrated that the FRY set up administrative structures and continued to pay-and to promote-officers and non-commissioned officers who were members of the VRS and SVK, even those who were known for committing war crimes, until as late as February 28, 2002. Although Milosevic contended that "practically all the armies created in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the Croatian army, the Muslim army, and the Slovenian army, and the Macedonian army, and of course the army of Yugoslavia were created basically from the former JNA, at least as far as officer personnel is concerned" evidence showed that the continued link of former JNA officers in the VRS and SVK to the Yugoslav army was unique to those institutions.[158]

Transfer of JNA staff

Evidence showed that the transfer of officers from the JNA to Serb forces in Krajina and Bosnia began before the official formation of the RSK and RS armies. Starting in 1991, orders were issued to transfer JNA personnel to the Croatian territorial defense units in Serb-majority areas. Top secret military documents introduced at trial included orders from the Personnel Department of the Federal Department for National Defense from September 1991 transferring high-ranking JNA officers to garrisons in the RSK.[159] Milan Babic testified that officers from the JNA who volunteered to serve in Croatian territorial defense units were on the JNA payroll.[160] Milan Milanovic also testified that "[f]rom May 1992 each brigade [in the Territorial Defense Units for the RSK] had two or three active JNA officers, with ranks from major to colonel, who were deployed in the commands of these brigades. The officers were responsible to the commander of the TO [Territorial Defense] zone staff, Bogdan Sladojevic, who was responsible to the commander of the RSK TO, General Dukic, also a JNA officer. These officers received salaries from the JNA"[161] Former JNA General Vasiljevic confirmed in his testimony that in the Knin area of the RSK, commanders of the territorial defense staffs were mostly active duty officers assigned these duties through the personnel department.[162] Staff from Serbia's Ministry of Interior were also appointed as commanders of the territorial defense staff in Vukovar.[163]

In 1992, when the JNA officially withdrew from Bosnia and Croatia, it took a more aggressive approach to ensuring that the staff remained with the new armed forces. On April 26, 1992, an agreement was reached between acting FRY President Branko Kostic, JNA Chief of Staff Blagoje Adzic, and President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that all members of the JNA who were born in Bosnia and Herzegovina should remain/return there.[164] The soldiers who remained in Bosnia did not lose their status with the JNA. A military order marked "strictly confidential" dated May 7, 1992, introduced at trial, states "it has been ensured that members of the JNA who remain on the territory of the Republic of BH or are sent to this territory shall retain all the rights enjoyed by other members of the JNA. In keeping with this, and in order to implement this decision in a systematic and organised manner, all members of the JNA who have BH citizenship shall be retained in their current duties in units and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Members of the JNA who do not have BH citizenship may remain in their current duties in the Republic of BH or may request a transfer to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."[165] As this order demonstrates, Serb JNA soldiers born in Bosnia were officially transferred by the JNA to the Serb territorial defense units when the JNA officially withdrew from the country. They did not have a choice about the transfer. General Vasiljevic also testified that in Croatia, Serb JNA officers who left the RSK and returned to the Yugoslav army without permission received a summons to return to the RSK and that these summons were enforced in practice.[166]

Serb career JNA officers born in Bosnia or Croatia felt compelled to join the new armies in order to continue their professional careers. A Serbian journalist with statements from a number of officers testified that almost all the officers in the VRS had been JNA soldiers or officers. He explained that when the Yugoslav Army "withdrew" from Bosnia, Serb personnel who were born in Bosnia or Croatia were given a choice: "either to be transferred to the army of the Republika Srpska or the army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina or to be dismissed from the army altogether. So most career officers, of course, opted for the first possibility"[167]

The benefits of the shared personnel were enormous. It would have been impossible to train specialized personnel and create an armed service in such a short amount of time otherwise. As a former UN official testified,

[B]oth the forces of the so-called Krajina republic and the forces of the Bosnian Serb republic had their origins in the old Yugoslav army, namely the JNA. What one saw was a fairly regular rotation of officers between the JA [Army of Yugoslavia] and Bosnian Serb forces and Croatian Serb forces and the ability of both the Croatian Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs to undertake some operations for which they did not on the surface of it have sufficient logistical and technical capability. I mean, one aspect of this, for example, would be helicopter flights. Another aspect of this would be the strengthening of the air defense system in Bosnia in the course of 1994. I mean, you cannot simply build an air defense system out of nothing. You can't do that overnight.[168]

Continuing Yugoslav army links to Serb forces in Bosnia: The 30th and 40th Personnel Centers

In his remarks to the 50th Session of the RS National Assembly on April 15-16, 1995, which were introduced at trial, General Mladic states, "From the beginning of the war, RS did not participate in [the] financing of professional army members."[169] The 1992 VRS Combat Readiness Report prepared in April 1993 also notes, "It is important to mention that the salaries of officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers under contract and workers in the RS Army, who until 19 May 1992 had been members of the JNA, continued to be the responsibility of the FR Yugoslavia, so that these expenditures were not debited from the budget of the Army of the Republika Srpska."[170] However, the report also raised "an unclarified situation concerning the payment of salaries of officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers under contracts and workers of the former JNA who remained in or joined the Army of the RS."[171] To address this issue, and to regularize what by then was an accepted practice, the chief of general staff of the Yugoslav army on November 15, 1993, ordered the establishment of the 30th and 40th Personnel Centers for Yugoslav army staff serving in Bosnia and Croatia respectively.[172]

Then-FRY President Lilic signed the orders creating the new 30th and 40th Personnel Centers. According to his testimony, the personnel centers were established because "there were people who remained within the JNA but outside this territory [Serbia and Montenegro] who were not citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and therefore they could not be members of the Army of Yugoslavia, and that was the basic reason why the 30th personnel center was established, primarily to resolve the existential status of these people who formerly belonged to the JNA and who were outside of the territory of the FRY and who were citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."[173] He testified that the annual allocations for the members of the 30thPersonnelCenter amounted to about 8 million from 1993 until 1997, though for one year the federal government suspended some payments.[174]

Lilic's testimony supported Milosevic's initial contention that the personnel centers were established only to keep records of assistance given to former JNA soldiers in relation to salary and social insurance rights acquired before the JNA became the Army of Yugoslavia. Lilic contended that the personnel centers primarily existed to support the families of former JNA soldiers who were "refugees" in the FRY and agreed with Milosevic that the Yugoslav army did not have command responsibility over the Bosnian and Croatian Serb armies.[175]

Aside from eliminating the uncertainty over the status of Yugoslav Army members remaining in Bosnia and Croatia, evidence showed there was another benefit to establishing separate administrative structures for staff serving outside the FRY. A military expert testified that there was "an urgent need to regularize it [personnel practice], so that towards the outside world it was not visible that people were actually serving in an armed force abroad"[176] This need for secrecy was described by witness B-127, who was assigned to the 30th Personnel Center. He testified that his Yugoslav army identity card, which was endorsed by the colonel in charge of the 30thPersonnelCenter, was his only military identification until 1996 when IFOR [the NATO-led force charged with implementing the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement] entered the area and VRS identity cards were issued.[177] The VRS identity cards were issued as a second identity card to show IFOR and later SFOR [the NATO-led stabilization force that later replaced IFOR] members who asked for identification, to avoid the possibility of arrest as a member of the Yugoslav army in Bosnia.[178]

Witness testimony indicated that the 30th and 40th Personnel Centers paid a wide range of people. Milanovic's testimony showed that in addition to RSK army officers, members of the RSK Ministry of Defense were considered Yugoslav army employees.[179] B-127 also described the different groups of people paid salaries by the 30thPersonnelCenter:

As far as the categories of military employees are concerned belonging to the 30thPersonnelCenter, let me take this in order. There were the officer, high-ranking officers and generals. Then there was the non-commissioned officers category, the NCOs; and the civilians employed in the JNA, which later became known as workers in the army. They, too, belonged there throughout that time that is to say, belonged to the 30th Personnel Center and a certain number of soldiers who were there on a contract basis and who until the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a signed contract with the then JNA.[180]

B-127 further testified that in his branch, which was technical, over 90 percent of the officer cadres and all of the civilian staff that had previously been with the JNA were paid by the 30thPersonnelCenter.[181]

Salaries and Benefits

The Yugoslav Army paid not only the salaries of its Bosnia and Croatia staff, but provided additional benefits as well. B-127, a Yugoslav Army officer stationed in Banja Luka, Bosnia, testified that he did not receive a single dinar from the Republika Srpska government during the time he was assigned to the Republika Srpska Army. Rather, payment was given in cash in Yugoslav dinars collected from Belgrade by financial services.[182] Testimony showed that the personnel centers "kept records of where the people were serving in order to prepare documents related to their compensation, not only financial compensation for the time served in hardship but also for extra pensionable time."[183] Testimony indicated that service in Bosnia was counted as double credit towards Yugoslav Army pension.[184] Officers assigned to the 40thPersonnelCenter also received extra compensation for services in combat operations or "service under aggravating (special) circumstances."[185] Furthermore, members of the 30thPersonnelCenter serving in Bosnia had regulated housing or were entitled to remuneration and an added sum of money towards their housing costs.[186]

The significance of the heavy reliance on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for salaries and benefits was noted by a senior British army officer. When asked whether FRY's payment of officers meant that they were under the command of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in any way, Gen. Rupert Smith, former commander of the UN protection force in Bosnia-Herzegovina replied, "The man who pays the check is usually the man who is in command eventually."[187]

Testimony indicated that the FRY continued to pay salaries and pensions through the 30th and 40th Personnel Centers until February 28, 2002. [188]

Promotions

The FRY's power over salaries also gave it ultimate control over promotions and appointments. Testimony indicated that the law governing the Army of Yugoslavia governed all promotions for members of the VRS serving in the 30thPersonnelCenter.[189] Suggested promotions had to be verified by the Army of Yugoslavia since they set salaries.[190] Senior staff promotions were approved at the highest levels. Several Supreme Defense Council minutes show the FRY presidency making decisions about military promotions.[191] Testimony indicated that other "volunteers" from the Ministry of the Interior were also promoted in recognition of their service in the conflicts.[192]

In addition to promotions, the FRY presidency made decisions about appointments. Milan Babic testified that "[m]ost of the commanding cadre, commanding staff [in the Croatian Serb army], were active officers of the JNA who were on the JNA payroll. They were paid by the General Staff of the Yugoslav army and appointed to those positions by the personnel department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army. The commanders of the army were appointed by the president of Serbia and later the president of Yugoslaviapresident of Serbia up until 1995, Slobodan Milosevicand it was financed, logistics support was given from Yugoslavia."[193]

In remarks to the Republika Srpska National Assembly in April 1995, Karadzic provided some insight into the appointment process: "Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for. I asked for Mladic."[194] Draft minutes of the 148th Session of the Members of the Presidency of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia held October 7, 1991, also note the presidency has "consented to grant extraordinary decorations for JNA members for their dedication and carrying out combat tasks."[195]

Evidence cited in an expert report showed that the federal army promoted or retired under favorable conditions Yugoslav army officers serving in the VRS and RSK despite their being publicly associated with criminal acts. For example, Dorde Dukic was still an active Yugoslav army officer when the ICTY indicted him for crimes he committed in Sarajevo while serving in the VRS.[196] Dukic and General Mladic were part of the 30th Personnel Center as was Maj. Gen. Radislav Krstic, also accused of perpetrating crimes in Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 but handed a new command in July 1995 and promoted in April 1998 nonetheless.[197] Krstic was serving as commander of the VRS 5th Corps but was in possession of a federal army identity permit when he was arrested in 1998.[198] Lt. Col. Dragan Obrenovic was promoted in December 1995, April 1996, and again in August 1998 and retired under favorable conditions despite allegations of involvement in the 1995 Srebrenica attacks.[199] Mile Mrksic, who was implicated as a JNA leader in the 1991 shelling of Vukovar after which the JNA allegedly shot hundreds of captured non-Serb men at Okcara farm, was promoted by the Supreme Defense Council more than once before his retirement in 1995.[200]

Reservists

In addition to transferring Croatian and Bosnian Serb JNA members from Croatia and Bosnia to the VRS and SVK, testimony indicated that JNA reservists also came from Serbia to Bosnia to participate directly in operations. Witness B-127 testified that in the autumn of 1992 he saw approximately 180 reservists who were bused to the front lines in Bosnia from Serbia and that one of them told him that he "would have lost his job" had he refused to respond to the call-up for mobilization.[201] Another witness told a similar story.[202] Babic testified that recruits from the FRY did their service in the RSK throughout the period of the RSK's existence.[203] Former acting RSK Minister of Defense Milanovic also testified that the Serbian MUP participated in joint military actions with RSK territorial defense units.[204]

Furthermore, FRY officials helped mobilize conscripts in response to mobilization calls from the RSK. For example, when in 1993 the RSK issued a general mobilization call, the FRY Ministry of Defense issued an order for conscripts found in the FRY to be enrolled and accommodated at barracks there, including being issued with weapons, a combat kit of ammunition, a daily ration, and a uniform.[205] Evidence introduced at trial also indicated that the Yugoslav Army continued to train SVK and VRS recruits until at least March 1995.[206]

[26] The videotape was shown as part of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Obrad Stevanovic, former assistant interior minister.

[27] Human Rights Watch interview with member of the prosecution, May 16, 2006 .

[28] See "Serbia holds video 'executioners,'" BBC News, June 2, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4602949.stm.

[29] See, for example, Exhibit P471.5, "The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Herzogovina, A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate August 1992," p. 27 ("Former JNA commanders are pursuing the war against Bosnian Muslims and Croatians using former JNA troops, artillery and aircraft."); see also Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 20, 2002, p. 13116 (describing how Milosevic told him to describe the Krajina as coming out in favor of FRY, not Serbia "so that his direct links and links with Serbia would not be seen, links to what was happening in Krajina.").

[30] Statement of April 2, 2001, admitted into evidence as Exhibit P427.3(a).

[31] Testimony of David Harland, Trial Transcript, November 5, 2003, p. 28706.

[32] Exhibit 537.2(a), p. 60.

[33] The Recording of The Republika Srpska National Assembly's 16th Session held on 12 May 1992, Exhibit P352.174(a), p. 21.

[34] Statement of General Vegh, Exhibit P644, para. 209.

[35]After the dissolution of the (S)FRY, Serbia funded 95 percent of the FRY budget. Lilic testified that Serbia "bore the full burden of financing the Army of Yugoslavia." Testimony of Zoran Lilic, Trial Transcript, June 18, 2003, p. 22760. Indeed, Montenegro at some point defaulted on its small share of the budget so Serbia shouldered the entire burden. Ibid. The relationship between FRY and Serbia was so close that the minister of finance for Serbia, Jovan Zebic, also held the same position for the FRY. Testimony of Zoran Lilic, Trial Transcript, June 17, 2003, p. 22621.

[36] Text of report of statement by Slobodan Milosevic to Tanjug news agency datelined May 11, 1993, Exhibit P427.56(a) ("In the past two years, the Republic of Serbia by assisting Serbs outside Serbia has forced its economy to make massive efforts and its citizens to make substantial sacrifices. Serbs find it difficult to sustain the burden of the great assistance which goes to Bosnia, and of the sanctions which have been imposed on Serbia because of its solidarity with Serbs outside Serbia.").

[37] See, for example, Statement of Ante Markovic, former Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Exhibit P569(a), para. 25 ("These Serb controlled districts had no other major source of finance than Serbia.").

[38] Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 18, 2002, pp. 12947-48, 12955; see also Testimony of Michael Williams, Trial Transcript, June 24, 2003, pp. 22912-13 ("[T]he situation in the Krajina, the heart of the Serb Republic in Croatia was even even more dire. There was some elements of subsistence economy, but people essentially got by from UN humanitarian deliveries and from support that was given by Belgrade. This was a very small area with really no prospect whatsoever of surviving as a cohesive, coherent, self-support supporting unity. that's why I believe the leadership there .. was more beholden to Belgrade, because it had no other options.").

[39] Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 19, 2002, pp. 12970-71, ("SAO Krajina and RSK were completely economically and financially dependent on Serbia.").

[40] Testimony of Peter Galbraith, Trial Transcript, June 25, 2003, p. 23087.

[41] Letter from Milan Martic, Minister of the Interior of the RSK, to Slobodan Milosevic, Nikola Sainovic and Zoran Sokolovic, April 28, 1993, Exhibit P352.20(a).

[42] Testimony of Morten Torkildsen, Trial Transcript, April 10, 2003, pp. 19027-28; see also Testimony of Milan Milanovic, (former acting RSK Minister of Defense), Trial Transcript, October 14, 2003, p. 27501 ("I do know that money came from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that it filled the coffers of our budget. Mostly it was spent on the army and police."); Exhibit P325.5(a) (Report from the Serbian Minister of Defense on providing assistance to Serbian districts in Croatia, indicating that for November and December 1991 financial assistance that should be provided amounts to 1,205,200,000.00 dinars); Exhibit P352.13(a) (Official note from the talks between representatives of the RSK government and Milosevic in which it was decided that funding for the defense of the Serbian Krajina would be planned through the Serbian Ministry of Defense); Exhibit P352.15(a)(Letter from the Republic of the Serbian Krajina Minister of Finance to the Yugoslav National Bank requesting payment of 12,900,000,000 dinars to the budget); Exhibit P352.18(a) (July 24, 1995 request for a cash grant of 10,000,000.00 dinars from the governor's office of the Serbian Krajina to the Yugoslav National Bank in order to cover its expenses); Exhibit P427.42(a) (Request for funds to the Serbian Ministry of Defense from the RSK Ministry of Defense asking for "the planned funds of approximately 200 million per month.").

[43] Testimony of Michael Williams, Trial Transcript, June 24, 2003, p. 22912.

[44] Ibid., p. 22942.

[45] Testimony of Aleksandar Vasiljevic, Trial Transcript, February 6, 2003, p. 15839.

[46] Cross-examination of Morten Torkildsen, Trial Transcript, April 11, 2003, pp. 19051-52.

[47] Ibid., pp. 19114-16

[48] The proceedings to obtain documents from Serbia and Montenegro were primarily confidential. See, for example, Preliminary Order on Prosecution Application for an Order Pursuant to Rule 54bis Directing Serbia and Montenegro to Comply with Outstanding Requests for Assistance and Prosecution Second Motion for Further Action in Relation to Previous Rule 54bis Applications, December 16, 2005; Decision on Prosecution Application for Further Action in Relation to Previous Rule 54bis Applications, October 31, 2005.

[49] SDC minutes, Exhibit 667, March 12, 1993; see also Letter from Branislav Kuzmanovic, Deputy Minister of Defense, to the Secretary of the Republic of the Serbian Government, November 1, 1991, Exhibit P352.4(a), in which it is proposed that a meeting relating to a report on assisting Serb areas in Croatia be discussed at a "session closed to the public" given its "level of confidentiality."

[50] In his cross-examination of Morten Torkildsen, Milosevic noted the April 25, 1993 Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska Krajina, number 3, which on page 205 publicly states that additional funds from the FRY are used as a source of finances. Trial Transcript, April 11, 2003, pp. 19117-19.

[51] As a practical matter, the National Bank of Yugoslavia was under Serb control. As described in a book by Mladan Dinkic, currently a governor of the NBY, "In autumn of 1991, the Serbian Leadership took complete control over Yugoslavia's monetary policy. The NBJ [NBY] remained the central monetary institution only on paper. Naturally no one made this public because the main aim was to enable republican authorities to conduct monetary policy in complete secrecy" See Second Expert Report of Morten Torkildsen, Exhibit P426, para. 23.

[52] Exhibit P427.18(a) ("Official note from a meeting of the governors of the national banks of Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska and the Republic of the Serbian Krajina held on 12 May 1994 on the premises of the Yugoslav National Bank in Belgrade," concluding, inter alia, that "[o]nly the Yugoslav National Bank shall establish and carry out control over the operations of the National Bank of Republika Srpska, the National Bank of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and commercial banks in Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina.").

[53] Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 19, 2002, p. 12970.

[54] Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 18, 2002, pp. 12948-53, and December 3, 2002, p. 13761. See also Exhibit P427.20(a) and Exhibit P427.17(a) (Request for a unified credit and monetary system from the Republic of Serbian Krajina to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Montenegro and the Governor of the Yugoslav National Bank, May 12, 1992: "Since the first day of the state of war in the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, bank transactions and the transfers of payments are conducted through commercial banks and branches of the Public Auditing Service from the Republic of Serbia." (emphasis in the original)).

[55] Exhibit P427.19(a), p. 2; Second Expert Report of Morten Torkildsen, Exhibit P426, para. 56.

[56] Testimony of Ante Markovic, Trial Transcript, October 23, 2003, p. 28044 ("Generally speaking, money transactions, financial transactions went through the public auditing service, the SDK. There was no other way of communication.").

[57] See, for example, Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 19, 2002, p. 12970.

[58]Ante Markovic resigned as prime minister of the FRY because the 1992 budget for FRY allocated 81 percent to cover the expenses of the JNA, the funds for which were to come from the printing of money. Statement of Ante Markovic, Exhibit P569(a), paras. 21-24.

[59] Testimony of Zoran Lilic, Trial Transcript, June 17, 2003, p. 22622.

[60] Testimony of Morten Torkildsen, Trial Transcript, April 10, 2003, p. 19044.

[61] SDC Minutes, Exhibit P667, February 10, 1993, p. 29.

[62] Ibid., p. 30.

[63] See, for example, Exhibit P352.15(a) (Letter from the Republic of the Serbian Krajina Minister of Finance to the Yugoslav National Bank requesting payment of 12,900,000,000 dinars to the budget); Exhibit P352.18(a) (July 24, 1995 request for a cash grant of 10,000,000.00 dinars from the governor's office of the Serbian Krajina to the National Bank of Yugoslavia in order to cover its expenses); Exhibit P427.42(a) (Request for funds to the Serbian Ministry of Defense from the RSK Ministry of Defense asking for "the planned funds of approximately 200 million per month"); Exhibit P427.53(a) (Request from the Republic of the Serbian Krajina to the FRY Ministry of Defense for financial and military resources in the amount of 100,000,000 dinars dated November 22, 1994).

[64] Second Expert Report of Morten Torkildsen, Exhibit P426, para. 73 (citing the Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska, March 30, 2004, indicating that financing the VRS constitutes 95.6 percent of the budget for 1993); Exhibit P427.59(a).

[65] Exhibit P427.24(a) (Decision on using primary issue funds, Official Gazette of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 4/92 "In order to avoid adverse effects of the war on the economy of the Serbian Republic of BH, up to 80 percent of primary issue will be used for special purposes"); Exhibit P388; Second Expert Report of Morten Torkildsen, Exhibit P426, para. 73.

[66] Exhibit P366; Second Expert Report of Morten Torkildsen, Exhibit P426, para. 73.

[67] Exhibit P427.33(a).

[68] Second Expert Report of Morten Torkildsen, Exhibit P426, para. 76.

[69] Exhibit P427.35(a) (request for credit from the primary emissions from a manufacturer of uniforms which was approved by the general staff of the army of the Republika Srpska on November 30, 1992).

[70] Second Expert Report of Morten Torkildsen, Exhibit P426, para. 83.

[71] See Annual Report for Year 1992, The National Bank of Republika Srpska, Exhibit 427.14(a) ("Realisation of foreign currency inflow during the war and under the embargo was impossible so the Bank decided to start creating foreign currency reserves of the state through buying off foreign currency from citizens through commercial banks. In this way first foreign currency reserves were formed."). The report also notes deterioration of financial discipline and enforcement of irregular money issue, especially primary. See also Second Expert Report of Morten Torkildsen, Exhibit P426, para. 80.

[72] See Second Expert Report of Morten Torkildsen, Exhibit P426, paras. 81-83. Also, at the beginning of 1994 the Yugoslav dinar was pegged to the deutschmark at a ratio of 1:1 in order to prevent hyperinflation.

[73] Second Expert Report of Morten Torkildsen, Exhibit P426, para. 83; Exhibit 427.61(a).

[74] Testimony of Radomir Markovic, Trial Transcript, July 25, 2002, p. 8685.

[75] Ibid., pp. 8685-87.

[76] Ibid., pp. 8688-89.

[77] Statement of General Vegh, Exhibit 644, para. 201.

[78] On April 27, 1992, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was to become the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The name of the army was also changed from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) to the Army of Yugoslavia (JA). For purposes of this report, "Yugoslav army" is used to refer to both the JNA and the JA.

[79] See, for example, Testimony of Wesley Clark, Trial Transcript, December 15, 2003, p. 30375 ("We knew that the Serb military had been had been carved out of the Yugoslav military").

[80] See, for example, Exhibit P464.23, Letter from an RS Colonel to Talic in the FRY dated May 28, 1993, requesting "1000 tons of D-2 [fuel] and certain quantities of MB-86 or 98 [fuel]," noting that the request should be from some organ of civilian authority for humanitarian aid and that "it shouldn't be mentioned that this is for the needs of the army." In addition, Milan Babic testified that the code for weapons in the intercepted communications was "blankets and medicines" as well as "planks, wooden boards flour, sugar and batteries." Trial Transcript, November 22, 2002, pp. 13292-93. See also Exhibit P352.29.

[81] Testimony of Aleksandar Vasiljevic, Trial Transcript, February 18, 2003, p. 16402.

[82] Statement of General Vegh, Exhibit P644, para. 127.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 22, 2002, pp. 13274-76.

[85] Testimony of Witness B-24, May 23, 2003, pp. 21171-73.

[86] Ibid., p. 21184.

[87] Testimony of Aleksandar Vasiljevic, Trial Transcript, February 6, 2003, p. 15777.

[88] Ibid., pp. 15778-79.

[89] "Military Analysis Team Expert Report Case IT-02-54-T: The SFRY Armed Forces and the Conflict in Croatia JNA Activity in BiH and JNA (VJ) Support to Bosnian-Serb Forces," Part III: JNA Activity in BiH and JNA(VJ) Support to Bosnian-Serb forces, Exhibit P643.1, para. 16; Exhibit P427.48(a).

[90] Exhibit P464.15(a), March 3, 1992; "Military Analysis Team Expert Report," Part III, Exhibit P643.1, para. 16. Direct requests from former JNA soldiers in the Krajina to the JNA continued after the formation of the SVK. The problem was so prevalent that in December 1993 an official attempt was made to control direct requests for weapons coming from officers in the Krajina. Testimony of Aleksandar Vasiljevic, Trial Transcript, February 6, 2003, pp. 15855-56. One of the exhibits introduced at trial is an order about the procedure for securing materials from the FRY made in response to the problem that individuals were using connections at the federal army directly to get supplies, bypassing the Main Staff who coordinated assistance. Exhibit P352.157(a).

[91] Exhibit P352.90 ("Conclusions based on assessment of the situation in the territory of BH/Bosnia and Herzegovina/ in the area of responsibility of the 2.VO/2nd Military District", March 1992), p. 5. See also Exhibit P427.32, p. 14 ("The infantry units formed are equipped with weapons received from the former JNA, which were distributed by officers, members of the Serbian Democratic Party, or other representatives of the Serbian people.").

[92] Exhibit P318, "Report on the Organisation and Command & Control Measures for Armed Organisations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia," Part IIA-11/13.

[93] Exhibit P318, "Report on the Organisation and Command & Control Measures for Armed Organisations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia," Part IIA-12-13/13.

[94] See Exhibits P427.36(a) and P427.40(a), which contain lengthy requests for weapons and ammunition.

[95] Exhibit P352.5(a).

[96] Ibid.

[97] Statement of Dobrila Gajic-Glasic, Exhibit P567, para. 18.

[98] Ibid., para. 21; Testimony of Dobrila Gajic-Glasic, Trial Transcript, October 21, 2003, p. 27846.

[99] Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 20, 2002, pp. 13103-04. See also Testimony of Aleksandar Vasiljevic , Trial Transcript, February 13, 2003, p. 16038.

[100] Testimony of Aleksandar Vasiljevic, Trial Transcript, February 5, 2003, p. 15772.

[101] Testimony of Milan Milanovic, Trial Transcript, October 8, 2003, pp. 27253-54.

[102] Testimony of Witness B-24, Trial Transcript, May 26, 2003, p. 21311.

[103] Testimony of Witness B-179, Trial Transcript, September 15, 2003, pp. 26589-90.

[104] Statement of Dobrila Gajic-Glisic, Exhibit P 567, para. 22.

[105] See Exhibit 539.8(a).

[106] Jovica Stanisic was chief of Serbia's state security service (secret police) until late 1998; Mihalj Kertes was a deputy interior minister in Serbia before becoming director of theFRY Customs Department in 1994.

[107] Testimony of Witness B-179, Trial Transcript, September 15, 2003, pp. 26605-07.

[108] Ibid., pp. 26596-98.

[109] Ibid., pp. 26612-14.

[110] Ibid., pp. 26611-14.

[111] Cross-examination of Witness B-179, Trial Transcript, September 15, 2003, pp. 26639-41.

[112] Testimony of Witness B-179, Trial Transcript, September 15, 2003, p. 26614.

[113] Ibid. p. 26596.

[114] Testimony of Witness B-24, Trial Transcript, May 23, 2003, p. 21182.

[115] Ibid., pp. 21182-83.

[116] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 757 (1992), S/RES/757 (1992) http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u920530a.htm (accessed December 4, 2006).

[117] Testimony of Witness B-179, Trial Transcript, September 15, 2003, p. 26618.

[118] Ibid., pp. 26618, 26642.

[119] Constitution of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, January 1992, article 102.

[120] Exhibit 352.174.1(a), Tape Recording of The Republika Srpska National Assembly's 16th Session held on May 12, 1992, p. 30.

[121] Milosevic seemed to make the argument that Muslim and Croatian forces also benefited from material and equipment left behind by the JNA. See, for example, cross-examination of Morten Torkildsen, Trial Transcript, April 11, 2003, p. 19128. However, retired JNA and Croatian Army Gen. Imra Agotic testified that except for part of the weapons belonging to the Croatian Territorial Defense Units, the JNA "took all weaponry and equipment. The part they were not able to take away they left in such a state that it wasn't operational. It couldn't be used." Trial Transcript, June 27, 2003, pp. 23270-71.

[122] Testimony of Morten Torkildsen, Trial Transcript, April 10, 2003, p. 19014; Exhibit P427.32(a); Exhibit P437.11; Statement of General Vegh, Exhibit P644, para. 292 ("The JNA 2nd Military District formed the skeleton of the VRS The JNA left many personnel, and much equipment and material behind, and provided necessary support required to form the new armed force.").

[123] Testimony of Peter Galbraith, Trial Transcript, June 25, 2003, p. 23080. See also "Analysis of the combat readiness and activities of the Army of the Republika Srpska in 1992," April 1993, Exhibit P427.32, p. 93 ("The material reserves of basic and expendable material and supplies found in the territory of former BH, and left behind by the former JNA in the warehouses and units and rear bases, were mainly put under the control of, and made available to, the VRS.."); Testimony of David Harland, Trial Transcript, September 18, 2003, pp. 26973-74 ("[O]bviously Serb domination of the battlefield was largely a function of support from from Belgrade. In fact, the the Bosnian Serbs were outnumbered by their enemies. They were substantially outnumbered by the Bosnian Muslims alone, but they had provided the Bosnian Serbs with very substantial armaments. Or strictly speaking, they had left them in place when when they withdrew from Bosnia-Herzogovina in 1992, but effectively it was simply a a transfer to their proxies."); Exhibit P471.5, p. 27.

[124] "The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Herzogovina, A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate August 1992," Exhibit P471.5, pp. 27-28.

[125] Tape Recording of the Republika Srpska National Assembly's 16th Session, May 12, 1992, Exhibit 352.174(a), p. 22.

[126] Address of Major General Milan Gvero at the 34th Session of the NS/People's Assembly /of RS/Republika Srpska/, Banja Luka, September 29, 1993, Exhibit P427.13(a), p. 2.

[127] September 1992 report from General Mladic to the VRS main staff, Exhibit P427.2(a), p. 5.

[128] Exhibit P427.54(a), p. 18; "The Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1992-95: Highlights and Excerpts" (Statement of Expert Witness Robert J. Donia submitted July 29, 2003), Exhibit P537.2(a), pp. 69-70; Testimony of Robert Donia, Trial Transcript, September 12, 2003, pp. 26504-06

[129] See, for example, "Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992," Exhibit P427.32(a), p. 33: "The Army of Yugoslavia has extended great assistance to us in putting into place this type of communications link, as it has made available to us a number of its connecting pathways and the available capacities of its communications channels"; p. 14: "The infantry units formed are equipped with weapons received from the former JNA"; p.23: "All these resources [armored-mechanised units] have been received from the former JNA or the Army of Yugoslavia"; p. 43: "The AROS system inherited from the former JNA was made capable of interfering with enemy communications"; p. 77: "Combat equipment were inherited. from the FRY Army after its withdrawal from the territory of the Republika Srpska"; p. 85: "Of late, cooperation has also been intensified with the intelligence and security organs of the Army of Yugoslavia"; p. 93: "The material reserves of basic and expendable material and supplies found in the territory of the former BH, and left behind by the former JNA were mainly put under the control of, and made available to, the VRS"; p. 99: "VRS Units were supplied with technical equipment from the ... reserves of the Army of Yugoslavia"; p. 101: "[T]he basic sources of quartermaster supplies were JNA reserves evacuated to Serbian territory, aid from the Army of Yugoslavia"; p. 104: "Thanks to the timely arrival and engagement of experienced personnel from the Army of Yugoslavia the Transportation Service very quickly took adequate measures to properly organize transportation support efforts."; p. 109: "The Military Service cooperated with the Medical Corps of the Army of the FRY and the health care institutions of the Army of the FRY. . ."; p. 113: "In the initial period, the material base of the Service was comprised of establishment of veterinary kits left behind by the former JNA"; p. 114: "The FRY Army has agreed to give us 20 working dogs for special purposes, and to train our personnel to work with the same."; p. 115: "[F]ire-fighting support is functioning on the remnants of the former JNA's system."; p. 129: "[S]alaries of officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers under contract and workers in the RS army, who until May 19, 1992 had been members of the JNA, continued to be the responsibility of the FR Yugoslavia"; p. 131: "Care was extended to injured soldiers as well as to the population, thanks in the first place to the assistance of the Army of the FRY, both in terms of the provision of care itself and of the supply of medicaments and other medical supplies and expendables."

[130] Statement of Milan Milanovic, Exhibit P550, para. 87.

[131] Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 21, 2002, pp. 13231-32, and see also p. 13234. The Vance Plan was the UN-mediated ceasefire agreement establishing four United Nations Protected Areas in the Croatian territory claimed by the RSK .

[132] Statement of General Vegh, Exhibit P644, para. 224.

[133] Tape Recording of the Republika Srpska National Assembly's 16th Session held on 12 May 1992, Exhibit 352.174(a), p. 22.

[134] Exhibit 427.32(a), p. 96.

[135] Exhibit 427.13.

[136] Testimony of Michael Williams, Trial Transcript, June 24, 2003, p. 22953. See also United Nations Security Council Resolution 819 (1993), demanding that "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

[137] Testimony of Reynaud Theunens, Trial Transcript, January 27, 2004, p. 31513.

[138] "Military Analysis Team Expert Report," Part III, Exhibit P643.1, para. 99.

[139] Ibid., para. 100.

[140] "Analysis of Activities Concerning Elements of Combat Readiness in 1992," February 1993, Exhibit P427.50(a), p. 28.

[141] Testimony of Michael Williams, Trial Transcript, June 24, 2003, pp. 22961-63; Exhibits P470.39.1-7.

[142] Testimony of Michael Williams, Trial Transcript, June 24, 2003, pp. 22961-62; "Military Analysis Team Expert Report," Part III, Exhibit P643.1, para. 45.

[143] Testimony of Michael Williams, Trial Transcript, June 24, 2003, p. 22963.

[144] Ibid., pp. 22947-48.

[145] Cable to Akashi from Annan, April 6, 1995, Exhibit P470.40 ("The U.S. considers this [transfer of weapons through FRY] a gross violation of Security Council resolutions and wishes to have a full explanation from the Secretariat In particular, the question of the complicity of the Russian battalion in this affair is raising the gravest concern."); Cable to Akashi from Annan, January 31, 1994 re: Alleged Yugoslav Army Activities in BH, Exhibit P470.30; Letter dated 5 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, Exhibit P645.8, stating: "During the night of 4 April 1993, a convoy of armoured vehicles entered Zeleni Jadar, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the territory of the Republic of Serbia."

[146] Testimony of Dejan Anastasijevic, Trial Transcript, October 10, 2002, p. 11484.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Ibid., p. 11485.

[149] Testimony of Edhem Pasic, Trial Transcript, July 10, 2003, pp. 24035-36; Witness B-161, May 22, 2003, pp. 21044-47; Witness B-1453, October 16, 2003, pp. 27728-30; Witness B-1448, October 29, 2003, pp. 28284-86.

[150] "Official Note from the Talks between representatives of the RSK government and President Slobodan Milosevic," Exhibit P352.13(a).

[151]This was not always done as expedititiously as the RSK would have liked, however. See Letter from President of the Serbian Krajina Goran Hadzic to Slobodan Milosevic, June 24, 1993, Exhibit P352.156(a), in which he requests his help in expediting SVK requests from the Yugoslav Army.

[152] "Memorandum for the coordination of tasks meeting at the Yugoslav Army General Staff on 17 December 1993," Exhibit 427.52(a), pp. 4-6.

[153] Exhibit P352.153(a).

[154] Testimony of Milan Babic, November 22, 2002, p. 13377.

[155] Statement of Milan Milanovic, Exhibit P550, para. 90.

[156] Testimony of Milan Milanovic, Trial Transcript, October 8, 2003, p. 27284.

[157] "The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Herzegovina, A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate August 1992," Exhibit P471.5, p. 2. In his testimony about the report, former US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith clarified, "[W]e noted that the Bosnian Serb army was created in May of 1992 when the Yugoslav Army was dissolved, that it was supported and supplied from Serbia, that Serbia paid the salaries, that the Bosnian Serbs themselves were supplied and supported economically from Serbia." Trial Transcript, June 25, 2003, pp. 23081-82. Dejan Anastasijevic, a Serbian journalist, testified that it was generally known that salaries and pensions went through the Yugoslav army. Trial Transcript, October 10, 2002, pp. 11483-84. See also Testimony of Robert Donia, Trial Transcript, September 12, 2003, p. 26504.

[158] Milosevic's Cross-examination of Zoran Lilic, Trial Transcript, June 18, 2003, p. 22755. See also cross-examination of Imra Agotic, Trial Transcript, June 30, 2003, p. 23419.

[159] Exhibit P406.4(a); Exhibits 352.175(a) and P352.176(a).

[160] Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, December 9, 2002, p. 14099.

[161]Statement of Milan Milanovic, Exhibit P550, para. 89.

[162] Testimony of Aleksandar Vasiljevic, Trial Transcript, February 6, 2003, pp. 15798-99.

[163]Ibid., p. 15802.

[164] On April 26, 1992, an agreement was reached that all members of the JNA who were citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina should remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that Muslims and other citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina within a fixed period of time and that all senior officers and soldiers who were not citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina would leave Bosnia and Herzegovina within a certain time period. Ibid., p. 15833; Exhibit P387.15(a);Testimony of Borisav Jovic, Trial Transcript, November 18, 2003, pp. 29154, 29173.

[165] Exhibit P464.17(a).

[166] Testimony of Aleksandar Vasiljevic, Trial Transcript, February 6, 2003, pp. 15836-37.

[167]Testimony of Dejan Anastasijevic, Trial Transcript, October 10, 2002, pp. 11483-84. He noted it was generally known that salaries and pensions went through the Yugoslav army.

[168] Testimony of Michael Williams, Trial Transcript, June 24, 2003, p. 22955.

[169] "Tape Recording of the 50th National Assembly Session held on 15 and 16 April, 1995 in Sanski Most", Exhibit P427.54(a), p. 16.

[170] "Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the Army of the Republika Srpska in 1992," April 1993, Exhibit P427.32(a), pp. 127, 129.

[171] Ibid.

[172]See, for example, Testimony of Milan Milanovic, Trial Transcript, October 8, 2003, pp. 27245-46 ("[Military post number 4001-the 40th Personnel Center] is a military post that concerned itself with these officers and civilians in the army of Yugoslavia who were located in the territory of the former Republic of Serbian Krajina, and it was located in Belgrade."). See also "Military Analysis Team Expert Report," Part II: The SFRY Armed Forces and the Conflict in Croatia, Exhibit P643, p. 89.

[173] Testimony of Zoran Lilic, Trial Transcript, June 17, 2003, p. 22592.

[174] Ibid., pp. 22592-93.

[175] Testimony of Zoran Lilic, Trial Transcript, June 18, 2003, pp. 22755-56.

[176] Testimony of Reynaud Theunens, Trial Transcript, January 27, 2004, pp. 31514-15.

[177] Testimony of Witness B-127, Trial Transcript, July 16, 2003, p. 24618.

[178] Ibid., pp. 24619-21.

[179]Testimony ofMilan Milanovic, Trial Transcript, October 8, 2003, p. 27245 ("It is well known that officers of the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina were active-duty officers of the army of Yugoslavia and that they were deployed and assigned to work in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, or they went there voluntarily, and they received their salaries from the army of Yugoslavia. Since the Ministry of Defence is a specific body that is closely linked to the army, the decision was taken that all the people in the Defence Ministry of the Republic of Serbian Krajina should be employees of the army of Yugoslavia."); Statement of Milan Milanovic, Exhibit P550, para. 48 ("While I worked at the RSK Ministry of Defence, the twenty or so of us with the Ministry, both civilians and officers, received salaries from the FRY Ministry of Defence."); Testimony of Milan Milanovic, pp. 27272-73 (Colonel Bozo Kosutic and Colonel Rajko Kovacevic were JNA officers and they continued to receive a salary from the VJ and were paid by them).

[180] Testimony of Witness B-127, Trial Transcript, July 22, 2003, p. 24627.

[181] Ibid., pp. 24627-28.

[182] Testimony of Witness B-127, Trial Transcript, July 16, 2003, p. 24615.

[183] Testimony of Reynaud Theunens, Trial Transcript, January 27, 2004, pp. 31514-15.

[184] Testimony of Witness B-127, Trial Transcript, July 22, 2003, pp. 24631-32, 24636; Exhibits P505.11.1(a), P505.14.1(a), P505.11.5 (a), P505.17.1(a), and P505.13.1(a).

[185] "Military Analysis Team Expert Report," Part II: The SFRY Armed Forces and the Conflict in Croatia, Exhibit P643, p. 81; Exhibits P505.17(a) and P505.17.1(a).

[186] Testimony of Witness B-127, Trial Transcript, July 22, 2003, p. 24632.

[187] Testimony of General Rupert Smith, Trial Transcript, October 9, 2003, p. 27368. See also Testimony of Robert Donia, September 12, 2003, p. 26504 (testifying that a delegate in the RS National Assembly stated during a discussion about the military, "We have to see about these people who Milosevic pays, whether they fight on our side or not. A good number of officers receive their pay there.").

[188] See also Defense & Security (Belgrade), Issue No. 059, September 5, 2002, Exhibit 427.57(a), p. 4 ("VRS officers and non-commission officers received pay as members of the 30thPersonnelCenter of the Yugoslav Army, until 28 February 2002.").

[189] Testimony of Witness B-127, Trial Transcript, July 22, 2003, p. 24631; Exhibit P505.15(a); Exhibit 469.17.

[190] Testimony of Witness B-127, Trial Transcript, July 22, 2003, p. 24629.

[191]Exhibit P667: SDC minutes, September 7, 1993; SDC minutes, October 11, 1993; SDC minutes, September 27, 1994; SDC minutes, June 13, 1995.

[192] Milan Milanovic testified, "Radovan Stojicic, Badza, as I said, the reason for his coming was to liberate Vukovar. I mentioned the number of men. And this is rather a large number for a special unit. And he came with weapons and equipment and not for a moment was it my understanding that they were there on a voluntary basis, especially in view of several examples, as you requested. For example, the equipment and weapons and uniforms, the system of communications, their salaries, they received them in Serbia, and upon the completion of the assignment all of them, or at least the commanding staff, were promoted. For example, Badza came as a commander of a special unit of the MUP of Serbia, and while he was still with me, just prior to his return, he was appointed assistant minister of internal affairs [in Serbia]. So it's not logical for somebody to volunteer to a combat area and then to be promoted." Trial Transcript, October 14, 2003, pp. 27471-72.

[193] Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 21, 2002, p. 13234.

[194] Statement of Expert Witness Robert J. Donia, Exhibit P537.2(a), p. 69.

[195] Exhibit P596.19, p. 5. (In the margin a handwritten note says "But the JNA is not at war!", illustrating the contradiction between the JNA's official position and its actual one.)

[196] "Military Analysis Team Expert Report," Part III, Exhibit P643, para. 86.

[197] Ibid., para. 88.

[198] Ibid., para. 86.

[199] Exhibits P505.11(a), P505.11.1(a), P505.11.2(a), and P505.11.5(a).

[200] See Exhibit P667: SDC minutes, October 11, 1993, pp. 1-2; SDC minutes, July 11, 1994, pp. 1-2.

[201] Testimony of Witness B-127, Trial Transcript, July 16, 2003, p. 24598.

[202] Testimony of Witness C-020, Trial Transcript, October 22, 2002, pp. 12192-12201.

[203] Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 22, 2002, pp. 13374-75; Exhibit P352.113(a).

[204]Testimony of Milan Milanovic, Trial Transcript, October 8, 2003, p. 27252. Others confirmed the MUP was present and fought alongside the RSK Territorial Defense Units. See Testimony of Witness B-050, April 14, 2003, p. 19243; Testimony of Jovan Drulovic (Witness C-004), October 16, 2002, pp. 11672-11674; Testimony of Witness C-020, October 22, 2002, pp. 12149-12154.

[205] Exhibit P352.152(a), "Strictly confidential" Order dated January 27, 1993, from the Headquarters of the Federal Department for the National Defense to Commands of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies inter alia.

[206]See, for example, Order by Mile Novakovic dated February 22, 1994, Exhibit P348.5(a) ("Immediately start the organised and planned preparation of young recruits for departure to do training in the Yugoslav Army in March 1994"); Letter from Minister Pavkovic to the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia, March 22, 1995, P352.41(a), requesting continuation of a course in higher sabotage for members of his service; "Analysis of the combat readiness and activities of the Army of the Republika Srpska in 1992," April 1993, Exhibit P427.32, p. 142 ("In addition to training recruits, training was also organized for soldiers seconded from FRY.").