Human Rights Watch News

Lesbian Women Set on Fire in Argentina

Human Rights Watch — Tue, 14 May 2024 04:00:00 -0400

Click to expand Image People light candles during a vigil on May 8, 2024, in front of the house where three lesbian women were killed following an attack in Buenos Aires. © 2024 Juan Mabromata/AFP via Getty Images

Three lesbian women have died and one more is in critical condition in Buenos Aires, Argentina, after a man threw a Molotov cocktail into their boarding house room on May 6, setting them all on fire. One woman, Pamela Fabiana Cobas, was severely burned and died almost immediately. Her partner, Mercedes Roxana Figueroa, died of organ failure two days later, with burns covering 90 percent of her body. Andrea Amarante died in the hospital on May 12.

Police arrested a 62-year-old male suspect but have not announced a motive for the attack. Local human rights defenders have expressed concern that disparaging comments about lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people and their rights made by prominent politicians, some of whom are now holding high office, are contributing to already high levels of violence against queer communities. The 2023 report from Buenos Aires’ LGBT ombudsman found that offensive speech by members of President Javier Milei’s political party, as well as on social media and in the streets, in the context of the 2023 presidential campaign “built a climate of segregation, rejection and discrimination; the most fertile ground for violence toward historically vulnerable groups.”

In May 2023, then-candidate Milei said on TV that education on gender and sexuality seeks to “exterminate the population” and causes “the destruction of the most important social nucleus within society ... the family.” In November 2023, now-Foreign Minister Diana Mondino claimed to support marriage equality, but then compared it to head lice in a nationally televised interview, saying: “If you prefer not to bathe and be full of lice and it is your choice ... then don't complain if there is someone who does not like that you have lice.”

A 2023 Human Rights Watch investigation found that around the world, lesbian, bisexual, and queer (LBQ+) couples have been murdered, sexually assaulted, dismembered, or physically attacked alongside their partners. The report found that this “risk of lethal violence” to couples is chronically under-documented. In 26 countries, including Argentina, interviewees repeatedly cited “the extreme danger of appearing in public with an LBQ+ partner as a reason to stay home, refrain from holding their partners’ hand, or otherwise limit their movement and queer signaling.” In Argentina, where government data from 2023 showed 41.7 percent of the population lives in poverty, lesbian couples face heightened barriers to secure housing, limiting their ability to use the privacy of a home to protect themselves.

Authorities in Argentina should conduct a thorough and transparent investigation into the killings and ensure proper medical care and housing for the surviving woman. Government officials should cease and condemn rhetoric that stigmatizes queer women and may contribute to a climate in which they are seen as deserving of violence.

Gaza: Israelis Attacking Known Aid Worker Locations

Human Rights Watch — Tue, 14 May 2024 00:00:00 -0400

(Jerusalem, May 14, 2024) – Israeli forces have carried out at least eight strikes on aid workers’ convoys and premises in Gaza since October 2023, even though aid groups had provided their coordinates to the Israeli authorities to ensure their protection, Human Rights Watch said today. Israeli authorities did not issue advance warnings to any of the aid organizations before the strikes, which killed or injured at least 31 aid workers and those with them. More than 250 aid workers have been killed in Gaza since the October 7 assault in Israel, according to the UN.

One attack on January 18, 2024, injured three people who were staying in a joint guest house belonging to two aid organizations and was most likely carried out with a US-made munition, according to one of the organizations and to a report by UN investigators who visited the site after the attack, which Human Rights Watch reviewed. One of the aid organizations, Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP), said UN inspectors concluded that the bomb was delivered by an F-16 aircraft. F-16 aircraft use British made components according to campaigners.

The eight incidents reveal fundamental flaws with the so-called deconfliction system, meant to protect aid workers and allow them to safely deliver life-saving humanitarian assistance in Gaza.

“Israel’s killing of seven World Central Kitchen aid workers was shocking and should never have happened under international law,” said Belkis Wille, associate crisis, conflict, and arms director at Human Rights Watch. “Israel’s allies need to recognize that these attacks that have killed aid workers have happened over and over again, and they need to stop.”

Israel’s attack on April 1 on the World Central Kitchen convoy, which killed seven workers, far from being an isolated “mistake,” is just one of at least eight incidents that Human Rights Watch identified in which aid organizations and UN agencies had communicated with Israeli authorities the GPS coordinates of an aid convoy or premises and yet Israeli forces attacked the convoy or shelter without any warning.

In these eight incidents, Israeli forces killed at least 15 people, including 2 children, and injured at least 16 others. Five of these attacks were the subject of a recent New York Times investigation that included visual evidence and internal communications between aid organizations and the Israeli military.

The other seven attacks are:

Attack on a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF or Doctors without Borders) convoy, November 18, 2023Attack on a guest house of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), December 9, 2023Attack on an MSF shelter, January 8, 2024Attack on an International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) guest house, January 18, 2024Attack on an UNRWA convoy, February 5, 2024Attack on an MSF guest house, February 20, 2024Attack on a home sheltering an American Near East Refugee Aid Organization (Anera) employee, March 8, 2024

As of April 30, the UN reported that 254 aid workers had been killed in Gaza since October 7, 2023, with UNRWA personnel accounting for 188 of these fatalities. On May 13, a UN vehicle was hit on the way to a hospital in Gaza, killing at least one UN staff member and injuring at least one more. According to UNRWA, 169 of its facilities have been affected by the hostilities in 368 incidents and at least 429 displaced people have been killed in UNRWA shelters. Israeli forces have, according to the UN, also shot at and shelled people congregating to collect aid, killing and injuring hundreds. These attacks are having a chilling effect on efforts to provide lifesaving aid in Gaza.

Aid workers have also been unable to leave Gaza, since Israeli forces seized control of and closed the Rafah Crossing on May 7.

During a recent trip to Cairo and northern Sinai, near the border between Egypt and Gaza, Human Rights Watch met with staff from 11 humanitarian organizations and UN aid agencies operating in Gaza who said that Israeli attacks on aid workers had forced them to take various measures that for some included suspending activities for a period of time, reducing their staff inside Gaza, or severely restricting their aid activities in other ways.

“I can’t risk sending more staff into Gaza because I cannot rely on deconfliction as a way of keeping them safe,” a senior employee from one of the organizations whose guest house was attacked told Human Rights Watch. He said this was a key factor in limiting the organization’s ability to provide medical services. “You can build docks and send shipments, but without a safe operating environment, you will have a pile up of shipments that people aren’t able to deploy safely to help people.”

This pattern of attacks despite proper notification of Israeli authorities raises serious questions about Israel’s commitment and capacity to comply with international humanitarian law, which some countries, including the UK, rely on to continue to license arms exports that end up in Israel.

Human Rights Watch has found that Israeli authorities are using starvation as a method of warfare in Gaza. Pursuant to a policy set out by Israeli officials and carried out by Israeli forces, the Israeli authorities are deliberately blocking the delivery of water, food, and fuel, willfully impeding humanitarian assistance, apparently razing agricultural areas, and depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to its survival. Children in Gaza have been dying from starvation-related complications.

Israel has not responded to a Human Rights Watch letter sent on May 1, requesting specific information about the attacks on aid workers documented in this report.

The laws of war prohibit attacks that target civilians and civilian objects, that do not discriminate between civilians and combatants, or that are expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects that is disproportionate to any anticipated military advantage. Indiscriminate attacks include attacks that are not directed at a specific military target or use a method or means of combat whose effects cannot be limited as required.

Warring parties must take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians, including by providing effective advance warnings of attacks unless circumstances do not permit, and by sparing civilians under their control from the effects of attacks. Serious violations of the laws of war committed by individuals with criminal intent – that is, deliberately or recklessly – are war crimes.

Israel should make public the findings of investigations into attacks that have killed and injured aid workers, and into all other attacks that caused civilian casualties. The Israeli military’s long track record of failing to credibly investigate alleged war crimes underscores the importance of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) inquiry into serious crimes committed by all parties to the conflict.

Israeli and Palestinian officials should cooperate with the ICC in their work, Human Rights Watch said. Israel should also provide the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel access to Gaza to conduct its investigations.

Given the pattern of attacks on aid groups that have provided Israeli authorities with proper information about their locations, a group of recognized international experts should conduct an independent review of the humanitarian deconfliction process. Israel should give these experts full access to its processes, including the coordination and communications that occur before, during, and after such attacks as well as information regarding any alleged military target in the vicinity and any precautionary measures taken to mitigate harm.

Israel’s allies, including the United States and United Kingdom – both states sending the weapons parts apparently used in at least one of the documented attacks – should suspend military assistance and arms sales to Israel so long as its forces commit systematic and widespread laws-of-war violations against Palestinian civilians with impunity. Governments that continue to provide arms to the Israeli government risk complicity in war crimes.

They should also use their leverage, including through targeted sanctions, to press Israeli authorities to cease committing grave abuses and enable the provision of humanitarian aid and basic services in Gaza, in accordance with Israel’s obligations under international law and recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) orders to Israel in the case brought by South Africa concerning alleged violations of the Genocide Convention.

“On one hand, Israel is blocking access to critical lifesaving humanitarian provisions and on the other, attacking convoys that are delivering some of the small amount that they are allowing in,” Wille said. “Israeli forces should immediately end their attacks on aid organizations, and there should be accountability for these crimes.”

For details of attacks on the aid organizations, please see below.

Attack on the World Central Kitchen Workers

On April 1, just before 11 p.m., Israeli forces carried out a drone strike with three missiles targeting a convoy of three World Central Kitchen (WCK) vehicles, two marked with the organization’s logo on the roof, in central Gaza, all carrying civilians, that were escorting eight aid trucks. The attack killed seven aid workers. The convoy had just left a food warehouse in Deir al-Balah and was traveling a route that the organization said they had agreed upon with the Israeli military. The attack was reportedly carried out by an Israeli-made Hermes 450 drone.

After the attack, WCK paused its operations in Gaza for several weeks, as did American Near East Refugee Aid (Anera). At the time, the two groups had together been providing an average of 300,000 meals across Gaza daily. Photographs of the damaged vehicles were initially verified by the independent investigative collective Bellingcat and later independently verified by Human Rights Watch researchers.

A preliminary Israeli investigation into the attack found that Israeli forces’ conduct was “contrary to the Standard Operating Procedures” and had occurred because of “a grave mistake,” including a lack of coordination between different levels of the army and the mistaken identity of a man in one of the vehicles, according to the Israeli armed forces. The preliminary investigation also found that the two additional drone missiles were fired against army protocol.

In its response, WCK reiterated its call for an independent commission to investigate the incident because, it said, the “[Israeli Defense Forces] cannot credibly investigate its own failure in Gaza.” WCK resumed its operations in late April because, it said, “The humanitarian situation in Gaza remains dire,” but said it had still received “no concrete assurances” that the Israeli military’s operational procedures had changed.

This incident elicited widespread condemnation, including from leaders of countries whose citizens were killed in the attack, including United States President Joe Biden, United Kingdom Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.

Attack on a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Convoy, November 18

On November 18, 2023, armed forces attacked a convoy of five marked MSF vehicles, killing two people, witnesses said. The group had been trying to evacuate 137 civilians from its guesthouse near al-Shifa Hospital in Rimal, northern Gaza, where they had been trapped for a week, to southern Gaza. MSF said that it had coordinated the convoy’s movement with the Israeli armed forces and followed the route prescribed by the army. Once the convoy reached a crowded checkpoint near Wadi Gaza, Israeli soldiers did not allow the vehicles to clear the checkpoint for hours.

When gunfire rang out near the checkpoint, MSF staff, who were still waiting to go through the checkpoint, decided to return to the guest house, 7.5 kilometers to the north. They said they maintained contact with the Israeli Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA), the military unit responsible for the coordination of access to and from Gaza in connection with the facilitation of civilian and humanitarian needs, throughout their travel back and informed them that the convoy had to return to their guest house.

As they were approaching their office, between 3:30 and 4 p.m., MSF said that the Israeli army attacked the convoy, hitting two of the vehicles. The organization quoted one staff member as saying: “I was terrified when I saw that the snipers and the tanks were pointing their weapons at us, especially at the fourth and the fifth van [in the convoy].” MSF said that the staff there during the incident saw no military targets in the area. The organization has requested an explanation from Israeli authorities, but has received no response, a representative told Human Rights Watch.

“This incident shows just how ineffective the coordination mechanisms put in place by Israeli authorities have been,” said the representative of MSF. In this instance, “The latter appeared to have little or no influence on the operational troops on the ground, including to let the vehicles pass through the checkpoint.”

This failed coordination with the CLA has been cited in previous UN reporting.

Attack on a Guest House of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), December 9

On December 9, the Israeli navy fired 20mm cannon rounds at an UNRWA guest house consisting of two buildings in Rafah, Gaza’s southernmost governorate, the agency told Human Rights Watch. The rounds damaged the west side of both buildings. The attack occurred late in the evening, while 10 staff were asleep inside. The agency said it had shared the coordinates of the guest house with Israeli authorities on a regular basis prior to the attack, including on the date of the attack, and was not aware of any military targets in the area at the time. UNRWA told Human Rights Watch that it had received no warning of the attack. Following the attack, the deputy commander of the Israeli Southern Command told UNRWA that the attack had been carried out in error, UNRWA told Human Rights Watch.

Attack on an MSF Shelter, January 8

On January 8, an Israeli projectile pierced the side of a building in which over 100 MSF staff and their families were sheltering in Khan Yunis, MSF said. The strike killed the 5-year-old daughter of an MSF worker and injured four people. At the time, the staff saw no military targets in the area and received no warning of the attack, which took place in an area under no evacuation order, the organization told Human Rights Watch. The organization said it had shared the coordinates of the building with Israeli authorities on a regular basis, saying it was being used as an MSF shelter.

MSF published a video in which Léo Cans, the MSF head of mission for Palestine, described the attack and showed two parallel holes in the wall that munitions had passed through, he said. The video also included two photographs of remnants lying on the grass, allegedly outside the building. Human Rights Watch could not confirm the location of these remnants but was not able to find them online prior to January 8. The New York Times analyzed the photographs and reported that they showed the remnants of an Israeli 120mm tank shell with Hebrew markings outside the shelter. Human Rights Watch independently verified the type of remnants.

The Israeli military denied to the New York Times that it had struck the building. However, MSF said that Israeli authorities later told the organization that the damage to the guest house had been collateral in an attack on a “terror” target.

Attack on an International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) Guest House, January 18

On January 18, an Israeli air attack hit the perimeter wall around a guest house being used by both the IRC and MAP north of Khan Younis, where 12 people, including 4 doctors, were staying at the time, according to the 2 organizations. No one was killed in the strike but three people suffered light injuries, MAP told Human Rights Watch.

Satellite analysis shows the attack left a roughly 15-meter-wide crater in the sandy ground, destroyed the wall marking the perimeter of the property, and significantly damaged the house. MAP confirmed to Human Rights Watch that the organization had shared the coordinates of the guest house with the Israeli authorities and with the UN twice in late 2023 to ensure it did not come under attack. The building stands alone, with no other buildings or structures around it, and MAP said they knew of no military targets in the area at the time of the attack and received no warnings.

Human Rights Watch reviewed a report of an on-site independent assessment by a multi-agency UN team after the attack, which concluded that the damage was the result of an airstrike, most likely involving a US-made guided GBU-32 air-dropped bomb. MAP said inspectors concluded that the bomb was delivered by an F-16 aircraft. The organizations said that, since the attack, Israel has provided six different and often contradictory explanations as to whether and why the attack took place, but they said the explanations had not provided clarity or accountability.

Attack on an UNRWA Convoy, February 5

On February 5, Israeli naval gunfire hit an UNRWA aid truck, the agency said. The attack occurred while a convoy of 10 trucks flanked by marked UN vehicles were parked on a road in western Nuseirat, waiting at a previously agreed holding point for permission from the Israeli military to proceed to an Israeli checkpoint. The shelling damaged the last truck in the convoy. No one was injured. UNRWA said it had coordinated with Israeli authorities the planned movement of trucks prior to the attack, including reporting to Israeli authorities when the convoy had reached the holding point and when aid workers in the convoy began to hear naval gunfire in proximity to the stationary convoy.

Because of this incident, UNRWA and its partners had to pause assistance activities to northern Gaza, affecting 200,000 people, for 19 days, a UNRWA representative said. Since March 24, the Israeli government has restricted access to northern Gaza for UNRWA , refusing to allow UNRWA to provide food assistance to the north, despite UNRWA’s mandate. Israeli authorities have taken other steps that have undermined the ability of UNRWA to distribute aid in Gaza, which has contributed to the dire humanitarian situation, given that UNRWA has maintained the largest humanitarian aid operation in Gaza.

The Israeli military told CNN the same day that it was looking into the incident. An UNRWA official told Human Rights Watch that Israeli authorities have since acknowledged the attack and said they have put in place “prevention measures to prevent another such occurrence.”

Attack on an MSF Guest House, February 20

Just after 8 p.m. on February 20, an Israeli tank fired a medium- to large-caliber weapon at a multi-story apartment building in al-Mawasi neighborhood of Khan Younis housing only MSF staff and their families, 64 people in all. The attack killed two people and injured seven others. MSF said that the weapon was an Israeli tank shell. It said that staff saw no military objects in the area at the time and received no warning.

Click to expand Image On February 20, 2024, an Israeli tank fired a medium- to large-caliber weapon at a multi-story apartment building in al-Mawasi neighborhood of Khan Younis in Gaza. The building housed only Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) staff and their families, killing two people and injuring seven more. © 2024 Mohammed Abed/MSF

Photographs and videos included in a Sky News report on the attack and reviewed by Human Rights Watch confirm that a large MSF flag was draped on the outside of the building at the time of the attack. The images and satellite imagery also show that the building is secluded, with the nearest buildings approximately 50 meters away.

MSF said that armed forces fired additional rounds at the building’s exterior and the interior of the ground floor. It told Human Rights Watch that an independent investigation, which was corroborated by witness accounts, confirmed that there had been an Israeli tank in the area at the time of the incident. The investigation found that the projectile causing the explosion was fired by an Israeli Merkava tank. The small-caliber bullet impacts on the building are consistent with the secondary armament of Merkava tanks, it also concluded. Human Rights Watch verified a photograph posted on X (formerly known as Twitter) by MSF on February 22, showing damage to the exterior of the building.

MSF said that the organization had shared the coordinates of the building with the Israeli authorities prior to the attack. It received no warning. MSF said that, after the attack, Israeli authorities reconfirmed that they had received the coordinates of the building.

In response to the attack, the Israeli army told Sky News the tank opened fire on the building because it had been “identified as a building where terror activity is occurring.” It committed to an examination by the Israeli Army's General Staff's Fact Finding and Assessment Mechanism, a permanent “independent” body established in 2014 to examine “exceptional incidents” that take place during military operations. No results have been made public.

“These killings underscore the grim reality that nowhere in Gaza is safe, that promises of safe areas are empty and deconfliction mechanisms unreliable,” Meinie Nicolai, MSF general director, told Sky News after the incident.

Attack on a Home Sheltering an American Near East Refugee Aid (Anera) Employee, March 8

On October 13, Doaa Shawwa, her husband Mousa Shawwa, and their children Dima, 13, and Karim, 6, fled their home in Tal al-Hawa and moved into the second-floor apartment of a friend in al-Zuwaida, in a building with three apartments further south. The attack killed at least three people and injured at least three more. Doaa told Human Rights Watch the neighborhood had avoided the worst of the hostilities over the subsequent months. Mousa was the Anera supply and logistics coordinator, and, upon moving to al-Zuwaida, he had communicated the coordinates of the home with his Anera colleagues, the organization confirmed.

Click to expand Image On March 8, an Israeli attack on an apartment in al-Zuwaida, killed Mousa Shawwa, the American Near East Refugee Aid (Anera) supply and logistics coordinator. © Private

Anera showed the New York Times emails it had sent to Israeli authorities in which it included the coordinates of the house, as well as photographs of the building, informing them that this was where one of their workers was living with his family. In the emails, Israeli authorities confirmed that the location was being “processed” in their “system.”

On Friday, March 8, at about 4 p.m., an Israeli strike hit the building without warning, Doaa said. Mousa was standing in the doorway of the apartment with Doaa’s visiting brother, Baha al-Gifri, speaking to Doaa when the strike hit. “He was halfway through his sentence when we were hit. I don’t remember anything from that moment, I lost consciousness immediately and only woke up later in the hospital to find out that I had lost Mousa and my brother,” she said.

Mousa had injuries all over his body and died as he arrived at al-Aqsa Hospital, Doaa said she was later told. Baha died at the moment of impact, with wounds to his head and face. Doaa’s 6-year-old son, Karim, had a head injury, but medical staff did not realize he had a skull fracture and internal bleeding in his brain, so his injuries went initially untreated. He died at al-Arish Hospital in Egypt, 11 days after the attack.

With the assistance of Anera, Doaa, Karim, and Dima had been transferred to Egypt from Gaza eight days after the attack. The attack fractured Doaa’s right hand and caused a large wound to her face and head. It fractured Dima’s right foot, and covered her body and face with wounds from metal fragments. Dima also had burns on her right hand. A friend who owned the home in Gaza where they were attacked also had burns on his face, Doaa said.

Doaa said that, as far as she knew, the other two apartments in their building had only been housing civilians, and that she knew of no presence of armed forces in the neighborhood. Human Rights Watch verified Al Jazeera footage, posted on YouTube on March 9, of the building after the attack which shows considerable damage to the second floor of the building, and experts consulted by the New York Times concluded the attack was carried out with a precision-guided air-dropped munition. Israel told the New York Times in response to its request for comment that the attack had targeted a Hamas member who participated in the October 7 assault in Israel. Anera said it had received no information from Israel about who or what had been targeted, or why.

“We did not receive any warning from the Israelis before the attack,” Doaa said. “This is the thing that upsets me the most. My husband works for an American organization and the Israelis knew we were there. They should have sent us a message to warn us to get out. Why didn’t they?” Doaa said she keeps asking herself. “This was something beyond our imagination. Our hearts were destroyed.”

Guilty Verdict in High-Profile Kazakhstan Domestic Violence and Murder Case

Human Rights Watch — Mon, 13 May 2024 18:05:34 -0400

Click to expand Image Members of the Kazakhstan diaspora and supporters attend the “Justice for Saltanat” rally in Krakow, Poland, April 21, 2024. © 024 Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via AP

A Kazakh court has delivered a guilty verdict in the high-profile trial of the country’s former economy minister, Kuandyk Bishimbayev. On May 13, the court found Bishimbayev guilty of the torment and murder with extreme cruelty of his partner Saltanat Nukenova and sentenced him to 24 years in a maximum-security prison. Murder with extreme cruelty carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, while torment carries a maximum sentence of seven years.

The prosecution presented evidence during the trial showing how Bishimbayev severely tormented Nukenova before she died of a traumatic brain injury and provided audio and video material, witness testimony, and forensic reports to convince the court of his guilt. Bishimbayev has 15 days to appeal the verdict from the day he formally receives it and should not be eligible for parole until 2040.

Saltanat Nukenova is just one of hundreds of women who suffer violence at the hands of their partners in Kazakhstan each year. The Prosecutor General’s office has estimated that about 80 women die annually from domestic violence in Kazakhstan, while 150 women sustain injuries amounting to grievous bodily harm and more than 4,000 incur light bodily harm.

Every woman or girl who is beaten or killed at the hands of abusive partners or within the family deserves justice, and Kazakhstan’s authorities should conduct thorough investigations into every case of family abuse and hold those responsible to account.

In June, a new law criminalizing ‘battery’ and ‘light bodily harm,’ dubbed as Kazakhstan’s “domestic violence law” or “Saltanat’s law,” named for Nukenova, will come into force. Its effective enforcement is crucial to ensuring other women in Kazakhstan do not suffer the same fate.

During the trial, which I followed, the defense made many statements blaming Nukenova for the violence she suffered. This victim-blaming is outrageous, but sadly not unusual in Kazakhstan. Nukenova’s horrific killing and the spectacle of Bishimbayev’s trial should prompt the authorities to introduce measures to prevent investigations and prosecutions of domestic violence cases from becoming spaces for victim-blaming and revictimization.

While Kazakhstan has yet to heed the calls of women’s rights activists and others to make domestic violence a discrete criminal offense, full implementation of recent changes to laws offers Kazakh officials a way to meaningfully tackle the scourge of domestic violence and take action to save the lives of Kazakh women.

Chad: Political Transition Ends with Déby’s Election

Human Rights Watch — Mon, 13 May 2024 13:30:00 -0400

(Nairobi) – The political transition in Chad ended with violence as at least 9, and possibly more, civilians were reported killed by celebratory gunfire from soldiers and civilians, Human Rights Watch said today. On May 9, 2024, the National Election Management Agency (Agence nationale de gestion des élections, ANGE) announced that the interim president, Gen. Mahamat Idriss Déby, had won the May 6 election outright, citing provisional results. His main challenger, Prime Minister Succès Masra, declared himself the winner in a separate announcement on social media.

The run up to the election and the days around the vote were violent. On February 28, members of the security forces killed Yaya Dillo, the president of the Socialist Party Without Borders (Parti socialiste sans frontières, PSF) and a potential election opponent, during an attack on the party’s headquarters in N’Djamena, the country’s capital. Human Rights Watch has called for an independent investigation into his killing. On the day of the vote, violence broke out in the southern city of Moundou and a man attempting to vote was killed. After the results were announced, celebratory gunfire by security forces and civilians broke out across N’Djamena, killing at least nine people according to local media reports.

“President Déby has consolidated his power as the transition period has now ended,” said Lewis Mudge, Central Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “As the result has already been contested, an investigation into the violence before and after the vote should be paramount.”

The election authorities announced that Déby won 61.03 percent of the vote, well over the 50 percent needed to avoid a runoff. The authorities announced that Masra won 18.53 percent.

While international organizations, like the International Organization of la Francophonie (Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, OIF), made some attempts to observe the election, they did not have the capacity to systemically monitor the vote across the country. The interim government denied national civil society organizations funded by the European Union the accreditation to monitor the election. Masra has reported threats against him and his supporters since the vote.

On March 23, the civil society platform Wakit Tamma, which had been instrumental in leading pro-democracy protests, had called for a boycott describing the election as a “masquerade” aimed to support a “dynastic dictatorship.”

Former President Idriss Déby died in April 2021 in fighting with an armed group, and the military gave power to his son, Mahamat Idriss Déby, in a transition that violated the constitution. Mahamat Déby’s government violently suppressed continuing protests demanding a return to civilian rule, culminating in a bloody crackdown on October 20, 2022. On that day, thousands took to the streets in N’Djamena and several other towns in southern Chad, including Moundou, Doba, and Sarh, to protest the transitional government’s decision to extend a transition period. The constitution was replaced in a referendum in December 2023 by a new one enabling Mahamat Idriss Déby to run for president.

In the months leading up to the vote, the political space tightened for Masra’s party Les Transformateurs (The Transformers, in English). Despite an arrest warrant issued for Masra, he was named prime minister in January as part of a political deal.

Dillo, the president of the Socialist Party Without Borders, was considered Déby’s leading political opponent. The two men are reported to be cousins from the same Zaghawa ethnic group. Dillo had been widely reported to be preparing to run for president though he had not announced his intention. An independent investigation into Dillo’s death should be a priority for the Déby government, Human Rights Watch said.

On election day, a group of men tried to access a polling place in Moundou. When they failed to produce identification cards the men were asked to leave the center. A witness told Human Rights Watch that the men then started shooting in the area around the polling site. “It was chaos, and a man was hit,” the witness said. “The military and the gendarmes came, but by then the attackers had left and the officials said they did not have any idea as to whom they may be.” The victim, Enock Neratar, was shot in the stomach while waiting to vote and died on the spot. He was buried on May 9.

While the ANGE, the national election body, had an additional 12 days to announce results, it released the provisional tally on May 9. In his speech on social media just before the results were announced, Masra claimed victory and called on security forces and his supporters to oppose what he deemed an attempt to steal the vote. To the Chadian people he said, “Don’t let your destiny be stolen,” however, Masra reiterated that any mobilization should be “with a spirit of peace.”

Human Rights Watch reviewed multiple videos and photos from N’Djamena on May 9, which show large numbers of Chadian military taking up key positions across the city, and multiple videos of soldiers firing off their weapons to celebrate Mahamat Déby’s victory. Local media reported that the shooting across the capital killed at least 9 civilians and wounded 60 others.

Some of the shooting was concentrated in neighborhoods considered strongholds for Les Transformateurs party. “These shots are a threat to us, they are sending us a message: if you take to streets to protest, we will kill you,” one member of the party told Human Rights Watch. On their Facebook page, Les Transformateursannounced that there was heavy firing outside of Masra’s residence in Gassi neighborhood, 7th arrondissement, in a heavily populated neighborhood outside the city center.

“The lead up to this election has been fraught with violence and civil society, journalists, and opponents fear that some Chadians, frustrated with the outcome of the election, may take to the streets,” Mudge said. “President Déby should instruct the security services unequivocally and publicly not to resort to violence against protesters, and warn them that those who do will be held accountable and met with severe sanctions.”

Philippines’ Marcos Forms Toothless Rights ‘Super Body’

Human Rights Watch — Mon, 13 May 2024 10:51:45 -0400

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has created a “super body” to promote human rights protection in the Philippines.

On paper, the Special Committee on Human Rights Coordination looks impressive, and its stated purpose is admirable. But as constructed, the body will have little authority to address the serious rights abuses facing the country.

At best, the special committee is a coordinating mechanism among its members: the Presidential Human Rights Committee, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, which oversees the Philippine National Police, and the Department of Foreign Affairs. None of these entities have distinguished themselves combatting rights violations, including thousands of extrajudicial killings in the “war on drugs” since 2016.

The administration said the special committee will replace the structures set up by the United Nations Joint Programme, a technical cooperation and capacity-building program run by the UN to institutionalize human rights reforms. However, the program proved unable to fulfill its mandate because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Philippine government’s initial lack of engagement. The three-year program is set to expire in July after Manila and UN member countries decided not to extend it.

The Philippine government has sought to frustrate attempts by the UN Human Rights Council and now the International Criminal Court to investigate grave abuses committed in the “drug war.” This meant haphazard cooperation with the UN Joint Programme.

Excluded from the new special committee is the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), created as an independent body under the 1987 Philippine Constitution and mandated to investigate human rights violations. The CHR is in the best position to do what the “special committee” is tasked to do. If Marcos were serious about improving human rights protections and accountability for abuses, he would seek an expanded role for the CHR, including by ensuring they were part of the new special committee. He would also create a clear role for the involvement of nongovernmental human rights groups.

The human rights “super body” might impress some foreign observers, but what would impress people in the Philippines would be rescinding the “war on drugs,” ending the targeting of activists through often deadly “red-tagging,” and fairly prosecuting government officials implicated in serious rights violations. Another layer of questionable bureaucracy will do little to protect anyone’s rights in the Philippines.

Iraq: Looming Camp Closures in Kurdistan

Human Rights Watch — Mon, 13 May 2024 00:00:00 -0400

(Beirut) – The planned closure of displaced people’s camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) by a July 30 deadline will imperil the rights of many camp residents from the northern Sinjar district, Human Rights Watch said today.

Sinjar remains unsafe and lacks adequate social services to ensure the economic, social, and cultural rights of thousands of displaced people who may soon be forced to return. The 23 camps across the KRI currently host about 157,000 people many of whom are from Sinjar, according to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Interior Ministry.

“Many Sinjaris have been living in camps since 2014 and they deserve to be able to go home, but returns need to be safe and voluntary,” said Sarah Sanbar, Iraq researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Given the lack of services, infrastructure, and safety in the district, the government risks making an already bad situation worse.”

Sinjar, a mountainous district in northwestern Iraq, is home to a mixed population of Kurds, Arabs, and Yazidis, an ethnic and religious minority. Eighty percent of public infrastructure and 70 percent of homes in Sinjar town, the largest city in the district, were destroyed during the conflict against the extremist armed group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) between 2014 and 2017. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), about 183,000 people from Sinjar remain displaced, including 85 percent of the district’s Yazidi population. At present, 65 percent of towns and villages in Sinjar host half or less than half of their original populations, and 13 towns and villages have not recorded any returns at all since 2014.

The Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement announced the July 30 deadline on January 24. To encourage returns, the Ministry also announced a package of aid and incentives for returnees, including a one-time payment of 4 million Iraqi dinars (about US$3,000) per family, some government jobs, social security benefits, and interest-free small business loans.

On March 19, a delegation from the Prime Minister’s Office visited Chamishko camp in Dohuk. “They outlined three options for IDPs: to return to Sinjar, to relocate to other cities under federal control, or to remain in the KRI but outside the camps,” a teacher and resident of the camp who attended a meeting with the delegation told Human Rights Watch. “But the government should provide compensation for us to rebuild our homes and offer services before expecting us to return.”

Human Rights Watch found in a 2023 report that the main barriers to Sinjaris’ return were the government’s failure to provide compensation for the loss of their property and livelihoods, delayed reconstruction, an unstable security situation, and lack of justice and accountability for crimes and abuses against them.

In May 2023, Human Rights Watch found that not a single person from Sinjar had received financial compensation for the loss of their property and livelihoods as required under Law No. 20 of 2009, with 3,500 approved claims awaiting payment by the Ninewa Finance Department. By February 2024 the number of completed claims had risen to 8,300, and still not a single person had received any payment, Judge Ammar Mohammed, head of the Tel Afar Compensation Committee, which oversees the Sinjar Compensation Sub-Office, told Human Rights Watch.

Over the last months, multiple government officials have told a Human Rights Watch researcher that the funds for compensation payments for Sinjaris would be released soon, with one stating “as soon as next week,” and that reconstruction projects were imminently scheduled to break ground. But a year on, there have been few improvements.

Two government officials told Human Rights Watch that the delays in compensation payments were a result of “budgetary issues” that prevented disbursement of the earmarked funds, without providing any further detail.

Dr. Dilshad Ali, head of the Sinjar General Hospital, told Human Rights Watch on April 4 that the hospital remains damaged and abandoned, with medical staff still operating out of a location that was meant for temporary use. “We are waiting for the reconstruction project to be forwarded to an executive entity in order to start the rebuilding process,” he said. “Chain of Hope NGO is building an extension of 27 beds at the temporary location to give us more capacity, which is almost done. But it won’t be enough, especially if more people return.”

Many Sinjaris have been living in camps since 2014 and they deserve to be able to go home, but returns need to be safe and voluntary. Given the lack of services, infrastructure, and safety in the district, the government risks making an already bad situation worse. Sarah Sanbar

Iraq Researcher, Human Rights Watch

Dr. Ali said one primary health center in Gohbal village, north of Mount Sinjar, had been rebuilt and was now operational.

An employee in the Ninewa Education Department told Human Rights Watch on May 2 that four of the 24 schools damaged or destroyed during military operations had been rebuilt and were soon to reopen. However, he said only 86 schools are currently operational out of the 206 that existed before 2014, and that they are overcrowded and facing a teacher shortage. Parents interviewed said they pay 5,000 Iraqi dinars (about US$3.82) per child per semester so schools can hire teachers, in a country where free public education is required.

“I told the Prime Minister during his last visit that we need to build at least 100 schools if the IDPs return, because there are 100 schools in the camps” the employee said.

The employee said that two schools in Khanasour village are being occupied by armed groups, one by the police and the other by the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), a Yazidi-led militia with perceived links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). A third school was occupied by the Iraqi Security Forces until the end of 2023, when they returned it to the Education Department.

Only one of the 14 displaced people from Sinjar whom Human Rights Watch interviewed in March 2023, Khalil Hasan, has returned home. “Returning to Sinjar in July 2023 was a decision rooted in my personal well-being, as I felt the camp life was no longer sustainable,” Hasan said. “Governmental support for our return was nonexistent. My primary drive was to reclaim my homeland and rebuild my life independently.”

The others, like Abdo Alo, are still living in the camps. “I am still in Khanke camp,” he said. “Several factors, such as the absence of essential services, security concerns, and the devastation of my home, have prevented my return.” He expressed concern about an uncertain future as the date of camp closure looms near, and the prospect of being forced to return to Sinjar without anywhere else to go.

International human rights law and the Iraqi constitution guarantee citizens’ rights to health, education, housing, and an adequate standard of living. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement say that competent authorities should provide compensation or other appropriate forms of compensation to displaced people when recovery of their property is not an option. The Guiding Principles also require authorities to provide them with basic shelter and housing.

“Nobody wants to live in an IDP camp forever, but closing these camps when home isn’t safe is not a sustainable solution to displacement,” Sanbar said. “The funds to rebuild Sinjar are there; the government needs to disperse them so that Sinjaris can return and rebuild their lives.”

UK Football Regulator Should Not Give Abusers Blank Check

Human Rights Watch — Sun, 12 May 2024 19:00:00 -0400

A new Football Governance Bill currently being debated in the United Kingdom’s parliament will establish a much-needed independent regulator for English football. It is being established, following years of rising financial inequality between clubs, greed, and the politicization of the game, which was typified by a failed attempt by six of the larger football teams to break away from English football and join a European Super League in 2021.

However, unless a dangerous provision is repealed, the bill could leave a backdoor open in the legislation to states looking to “sportswash” their rights abuses through English football.

A key function of the new regulator will be to improve the current “owners’ and directors’ test” that is used to assess the suitability of prospective football club owners and directors. This test was shown to be ineffective in October 2021, when it failed to block the takeover of Newcastle United by Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), credulously relying on false assurances the Saudi state does not control the PIF.

The bill proposes new disqualification criteria for prospective owners, including looking into whether the source of owners’ wealth is linked to “serious criminal conduct,” such as environmental crimes, a criteria which would have clearly blocked the acquisition of Newcastle United, and also the acquisition of Manchester City by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2008.

However, a regressive clause in the bill will undermine the regulator's independence, and has led to organizations such as Fair Game and FairSquare saying it may lead to an increase in state ownership of English football clubs. Section 37(2) requires the regulator to consider the UK governments “foreign and trade policy objectives” when assessing prospective owners, which could hamper the regulators’ ability to block allied state actors from acquiring football clubs. Clearly, given the UK’s trade interests in the region, countries like Saudi Arabia or UAE seeking to acquire teams could trigger the application of Section 37(2).

Sportswashing is on the rise across global sport. Authoritarian states are increasingly looking to sport and sports’ infrastructure as potential public relations vehicles to launder their reputations and exert geopolitical influence. Acquiring football clubs has proved a particularly effective sportswashing tactic, as they hold considerable cultural significance and lobbying power. This is especially true in the UK, where teams enjoy a cult-like following.

The future of English football is at a critical juncture. UK lawmakers have an opportunity and responsibility to uphold human rights and should ensure this back door to rights abusers is closed. Anything less would be an own goal for English football.

With Pause, US Joins Other States Stopping Arms Transfers to Israel

Human Rights Watch — Fri, 10 May 2024 17:05:17 -0400

This week, United States President Joe Biden announced that his administration has “held up” at least one shipment of 3,500 bombs and artillery shells to Israel, saying the US wouldn’t transfer certain weapons to Israel if it proceeded with an assault on the city of Rafah’s densely populated areas.

This partial pause on weapon transfers doesn’t go far enough in response to Israel’s international law violations and US rules on arms transfers. Nonetheless, Biden’s decision represents a shift from the unconditional support the US has offered Israel, particularly since Biden acknowledged that “civilians have been killed as a consequence of those bombs and other ways [Israel] goes after population centers.”

Biden should resist congressional opposition to the pause and go further. Immediately stopping all transfers of arms and military support would be consistent with the US’s international and domestic legal obligations.

Since November, Human Rights Watch has called for the suspension of arms transfers to Israel and Palestinian armed groups given the real risk that weapons would be used to commit grave abuses. Providing weapons that knowingly and significantly would contribute to unlawful attacks can make those providing them complicit in war crimes. Other human rights organizations and dozens of United Nations human rights experts have echoed with their own calls to stop transfers to Israel.

Recently, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered Nicaragua’s legal challenge to bar Germany’s military assistance to Israel, among other things. The ICJ declined that request based on Germany’s assertion that it was not exporting any “war weapons” for use by Israeli forces. However, the court allowed the case to move forward and left the door open for a different outcome if Germany begins providing more “war weapons,” language that two legal scholars have characterized as “might hang like a sword of Damocles over States providing military support to Israel.”

Several of the US’s Western allies have already revised their policies of supplying weapons to Israel. In March, Canada announced it would cease future arms exports to Israel. Italy and Spain also stopped new licenses.

Legal action has also effected changes in state policies. In the Netherlands, a lawsuit forced the government to pause sales of F-35 fighter jet parts. In Germany, civil society groups filed a similar suit seeking to stop weapon sales.

Mounting public and legal pressure is making it harder for governments such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Denmark to continue selling arms to Israel. Biden’s shift in tone will add to the pressure. In the face of continuing atrocities, “full-blown famine” in northern Gaza, and Israel’s obstruction of aid for Gaza, these countries need to stop sending weapons now.

Germany: British-Palestinian Doctor Denied Schengen Entry

Human Rights Watch — Fri, 10 May 2024 00:00:01 -0400

Click to expand Image Dr. Ghassan Abu Sittah, a Palestinian-British plastic surgeon specializing in conflict medicine, speaks during an interview at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, Lebanon, December 9, 2023. © 2023 AP Photo/Hussein Malla

(London, May 10, 2024) – Germany’s government needs to explain publicly if it has imposed a Schengen-wide entry ban on a prominent British-Palestinian surgeon and academic, Dr. Ghassan Abu Sittah, and, if so, the reasons why, Human Rights Watch said today. Dr. Abu Sittah has in recent weeks been denied entry to Germany and France and, on May 9, 2024, Dutch officials informed the Palestinian Ambassador to the Netherlands that Dr. Abu Sittah would not be allowed to enter the country on May 15 for an event at the Palestinian Embassy in The Hague.

Dr. Abu Sittah was denied entry to France on May 4, 2024, where he was due to speak about Gaza at the French Senate. He said on social media and to Human Rights Watch that French authorities at Charles de Gaulle airport informed him that he was barred from entering due to a year-long ban imposed by Germany. Dr. Abu Sittah’s lawyer told Human Rights Watch that German authorities had not informed him about the ban, nor disclosed the basis for it. A French official told the Associated Press that Germany’s entry ban applied across the Schengen area, a 29-country zone where internal border controls have generally been removed.

“Dr. Ghassan Abu Sittah has seen first-hand the atrocities taking place in Gaza,” said Yasmine Ahmed, UK Director at Human Rights Watch. “Germany should immediately explain why it has denied him entry and imposed this far-reaching ban on a leading health professional to speak in Berlin, Paris, and The Hague about what he witnessed in Gaza.”

The attempts to prevent him from sharing his experience treating patients in Gaza risks undermining Germany’s commitment to protect and facilitate freedom of expression and assembly and to nondiscrimination, Human Rights Watch said.

On April 24, Human Rights Watch wrote to the German government asking for an explanation of how its actions are consistent with Germany’s international and domestic obligations to protect and facilitate freedom of expression and assembly and nondiscrimination. Human Rights Watch has not received a response.

The Palestinian Ambassador to the Netherlands invited Dr. Abu Sittah to speak at an event in The Hague on the 76th anniversary of Nakba Day, which commemorates the more than 700,000 Palestinians who fled or were expelled from their homes and the more than 400 villages destroyed in the events surrounding the establishment of Israel in 1948. The director-general of The Hague-based intergovernmental Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) also invited Dr. Abu Sittah in May to provide a briefing on the use of white phosphorus by Israeli forces in Gaza. Dr. Abu Sittah said that he witnessed the use of white phosphorus munitions, which cause especially harmful injuries, while working in Gaza.

Dr. Abu Sittah said that the Dutch officials informed the Palestinian Ambassador to the Netherlands that he would not be permitted to enter the Netherlands for the Nakba Day event on May 15, but they would consider allowing him to enter for the meeting with the director-general of the OPCW on the condition that he only attend that meeting and leave immediately thereafter. On May 09, the Palestinian Mission to the Netherlands announced that they cancelled the event due to the Schengen-wide entry ban against Dr. Abu Sittah. The announcement states that Dr. Abu Sittah was also scheduled to meet with international organizations, civil society actors, Dutch members of Parliament, and universities.

Dr. Abu Sittah had planned to speak to the French Senate at the invitation of Green Party parliament members at a meeting about France’s responsibility for the application of international law in Palestine. Dr. Abu Sittah spoke at the meeting via video link.

Germany blocked Dr. Abu Sittah from entering the country on April 12 to deliver a speech at a Palestine conference in Berlin. He said German officials told him that if he were to attempt to participate in the conference remotely or if he sent in a video message to the conference, that would be a criminal offense for which he could be fined or imprisoned for up to one year. He told Human Rights Watch that the airport authorities told him that they were refusing him entry due to “the safety of the people at the conference and public order.” Dr. Abu Sittah said he plans to challenge the Schengen-wide entry ban in Germany.

Freedom of expression and peaceful assembly can only be restricted in limited circumstances, and the enjoyment of these rights cannot be subject to any discrimination, for example on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or political opinion. Any restriction must not put in jeopardy the right itself.

The UK and Scottish governments should press the German government to explain the legality of banning the British surgeon from entering its territory and imposing a Schengen-wide visa ban, Human Rights Watch said. The German government should also immediately clarify the reasons for, and process followed, in imposing such a ban.

Dr. Abu Sittah treated patients at al-Shifa and al-Ahli hospitals in Gaza in October and November 2023. He has provided evidence about what he witnessed in Gaza to the Metropolitan Police War Crimes Unit in London. The UK Police have said that they would pass any relevant information on to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as appropriate.

The ICC prosecutor confirmed that his office has, since March 2021, been conducting an investigation into alleged atrocity crimes committed in Gaza and the West Bank since 2014, and that his office has jurisdiction over crimes in the current hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed groups that covers unlawful conduct by all parties.

The reported travel ban on Dr. Abu Sittah may hinder his ability to provide information about crimes in Gaza to other judicial authorities and bodies across Europe, Human Rights Watch said.

Following the Hamas-led October 7 attacks in southern Israel that included deliberate killings of civilians and taking civilians hostage, acts that amount to war crimes, Israeli forces have carried out repeated apparently unlawful attacks, including on medical facilities, personnel, and hospitals in Gaza. Israeli forces continue to block the provision of basic services and humanitarian assistance into Gaza, acts that amount to war crimes, including the use of starvation of civilians as a weapon of war.

“In the midst of ongoing atrocities in Gaza, countries should be prioritizing ending complicity and promoting accountability,” Ahmed said. “Instead, Germany, in blocking Dr. Abu Sittah from sharing his experience, is trying to block citizens from even hearing about the grave abuses taking place in Gaza. The UK government should immediately raise the reported ban with their German counterparts.”

Nigerian Journalist’s Detention Threatens Press Freedom

Human Rights Watch — Thu, 09 May 2024 18:00:00 -0400

Click to expand Image Daniel Ojukwu © Foundation for Investigative Journalism

Journalists and human rights activists in Nigeria are protesting the arrest and detention of Daniel Ojukwu, a reporter at the Foundation for Investigative Journalism, who went missing in Lagos on May 1. He was later discovered to be in police custody, accused of violating Nigeria’s cybercrimes law.

The authorities have since moved Ojukwu between various police units, including the National Cyber Crimes Center and the Force Criminal Investigations Department in Abuja, the nation’s capital. Nigeria’s constitution requires that anyone suspected of a crime be charged before a court within 48 hours of arrest. Ojukwu has been in detention without charge for more than nine days.

The Foundation for Investigative Journalism said thatOjukwu was arrested over an online report he authored in November, alleging that Adejoke Orelope-Adefulire, a former senior special assistant to the president on sustainable development goals, transferred 147 million naira (about US$106,000) of government funds marked for school construction into a restaurant’s bank account.

Nigeria’s cybercrimes law makes a broad range of online interactions a criminal offense. Several activists and journalists have been arrested and charged under the law. The Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Court of Justice in 2022 ruled that certain provisions of the law should be amended, citing violations of the rights to freedom of expression and information.

In February, the government amended the law, but the Committee to Protect Journalists and others contend that the amendments are not extensive enough to prevent the law from being used for censorship and intimidation. In particular, section 24 of the law vaguely criminalizes messages sent with the intention of “causing a breakdown of law and order [or] posing a threat to life.”

Nigeria’s constitution, along with international and African human rights conventions, protects press freedom and the right to free expression. Nigerian authorities are obligated to respect such rights by allowing criticism of the government without fear of retaliation, censorship, or legal sanctions.

The detention of a journalist for doing his job is a violation of these rights. The authorities should immediately and unconditionally release Ojukwu if he has not been charged with a criminal offense.

Anti-Loitering Laws Will Not Help California Fight Human Trafficking

Human Rights Watch — Thu, 09 May 2024 13:57:51 -0400

Click to expand Image Activists across the United States have worked to repeal laws which disproportionately criminalize Black and LGBT communities and subject them to police violence, including anti-loitering legislation in California and New York. Above, protesters gather in Union Square in New York City on May 30, 2020. © 2020 Ron Adar/Shutterstock

In January 2023, California removed “loitering in a public place with the intent to commit prostitution” from the state’s penal code. It was a victory for transgender people, Black communities, trafficking survivors, sex workers, and others disproportionately targeted by the ban.

Unfortunately, just over a year later, three bills before the California State Legislature proposed reinstating this harmful and discriminatory loitering ban. Though none progressed beyond committee hearing, some of their more harmful elements deserve a closer look, because they keep cropping up in California legislation.

AB-2034 and AB-2646 specifically targeted “loitering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense.” This language recodifies laws that have had a stark discriminatory impact on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) and Black communities. As Governor Gavin Newsom wrote when he signed the law striking down the loitering ban: “Black adults accounted for 56.1% of the loitering charges in Los Angeles between 2017-2019, despite making up less than 10% of the city's population.”

SB-1219 went further, proposing to criminalize anyone operating “a motor vehicle in a public place” who slows down their car “with intent to solicit prostitution,” in addition to re-criminalizing “loitering in a public place with the intent to commit prostitution.” The criminalization of clients in different countries has repeatedly been associated with increases in sexual violence, murder, police abuse, and exclusion from social services, while having no demonstrable effect on the eradication of trafficking. In fact, research has shown that anti-prostitution laws endanger and undermine the work of human rights defenders doing life-saving anti-trafficking work.

Loitering laws have existed for centuries. They are definitionally vague and have historically been used against the working class, migrants, sex workers, people who use drugs, people living in poverty, and other stigmatized groups to restrict their access to the public sphere. What anti-loitering laws do not do is end sex work or trafficking. Much like the criminalization of the purchase of sex, loitering bans merely provide cover for abuses against already marginalized groups. Reinstating loitering as a crime in California would be a step backwards.

Georgia: ‘Foreign Influence’ Bill Threatens Rights

Human Rights Watch — Thu, 09 May 2024 00:00:01 -0400

(Berlin, May 9, 2024) – The Georgian parliament’s introduction of a bill obliging certain nongovernmental groups and media outlets to register as “organizations serving the interests of a foreign power” threatens fundamental rights in the country, Human Rights Watch said today.

The bill, under debate since mid-April 2024, prompted harsh criticism from Georgia’s bilateral and international partners and led to some of the largest peaceful protests in the country in recent decades. There have been multiple, credible reports of unjustified police use of violence to disperse them. The bill has passed two readings and is scheduled for its final adoption the week of May 13.

“Georgian parliamentarians and government officials formally defend the bill as providing transparency, but they make no secret of its intended purpose,” said Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “By labeling independent groups and media as serving foreign interests, they intend to marginalize and stifle critical voices in the country that are fundamental for any functioning democracy.”

Parliament should reject the bill at its final reading. The government should ensure respect for fundamental rights to freedom of assembly and expression and effective investigations of all allegations of excessive use of police force.

The bill, the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, is nearly identical to a draft law the Georgian parliament tried to adopt in 2023 but withdrew following mass protests. In the new version, the ruling party, Georgian Dream, substituted the term “agents of foreign influence” with “organizations serving the interests of a foreign power.”

The bill requires nongovernmental groups and print, online, and broadcast media that receive 20 percent or more of their annual revenue – either financial support or in-kind contributions – from a “foreign power” to register with the Ministry of Justice as “organizations serving the interest of a foreign power.”

If adopted, the bill will impose additional onerous, duplicative reporting requirements, inspections, and administrative liability, including the equivalent of up to US$9,300 in fines for violations.

Georgian legislation already requires nongovernmental organizations to register grants with the tax authorities, including the amounts and duration of the projects, to benefit from certain tax exemptions. They also file monthly financial reports that include information on the number of employees and service contracts and income tax paid. Media outlets also file monthly reports on their income and expenses to the Communications Regulatory Commission. All information that the nongovernmental groups and media outlets file is public and anyone could request a copy.

The bill’s initiators and the ruling party leaders have made clear in public statements that they intend the law to be used against groups and media that criticize the government, advocate for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights, or engage in other work that irritates the authorities.

Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze justified the need for the bill by pointing to initiatives that criticize the authorities or challenge government policies, claiming that some civic groups tried to “organize a revolution” in 2020 and 2022, “engage in LGBT propaganda,” and “discredit the police, judiciary, and the Georgian Orthodox Church.”

Georgian Dream introduced the bill amid other efforts to restrict rights as the country heads toward parliamentary elections, scheduled for October. In late March, the ruling party introduced another bill that would restrict the rights of LGBT people and ban, among other things, “gatherings aimed at popularizing same-sex family or intimate relationships… and non-use of gender-specific terminology.”

Bidzina Ivanishvili, the Georgian Dream founder and leader, in a rare public speech on April 29, said that by introducing the “transparency law” now, the ruling party aimed to exhaust the political opposition in advance of parliamentary elections. He also vowed to punish the National Movement, the opposition party that ruled Georgia under Mikhael Saakishvili from 2003 until 2012. Ivanishvili also attacked Georgia’s political opposition and civic groups, painting the latter in one broad stroke as “having no homeland” and accusing foreigners of plotting to bring the political opposition to power through “non-transparent NGO funding.”

The bill’s supporters falsely allege that the bill is similar to the United States Foreign Agent Registration Act. But the US law does not equate receiving foreign funding, in part or in whole, with being under the direction and control of a foreign principal. It primarily regulates lobbyists and does not serve as a mechanism for weakening civil society organizations and media. Russia also uses this false equivalence argument to justify its draconian and abusive legislation.

Tens of thousands of people have protested the bill continuously in recent weeks, in Tbilisi and several other cities. On multiple occasions during especially large demonstrations in front of the parliament building in Tbilisi, police used tear gas, water cannons, and pepper spray to disperse mainly nonviolent protesters, including on the night of April 30, the eve of bill’s second reading. There were credible reports of police using rubber bullets at least once on the night of May 1.

Human Rights Watch spoke with three people, including a 17-year-old high school student, who were all beaten viciously by police in separate incidents the night of April 30 to May 1. They each said that multiple police officers at the protest grabbed them unprovoked, then kicked them to the ground, beat them for several minutes, and then detained them. The authorities charged them with misdemeanor disobedience or petty hooliganism and released them. If the charges are not dropped, the three will face trial.

Ted Jonas, a 62-year-old lawyer who has been living in Georgia for 30 years, had numerous bruises, including a black eye, abrasions, and a bloody nose. Forty-nine-year-old Vakhtang Kobaladze had multiple bruises on his back, chest, hand, legs, and jaw. The 17-year-old said that five police officers dragged him to the ground and beat and kicked him repeatedly, leaving him with head trauma, a broken lip, and bruises on his left eye and all over his chest, shoulders, back, and hands.

The Georgian Special Investigation Service reported receiving 80 calls to its hotline from protesters and journalists alleging police violence. It said it had initiated a criminal investigation.

The bill, police violence, and detentions triggered statements of concern and criticism within Georgia and from multilateral organizations and Georgia’s international partners. In a public statement, Georgia’s human rights ombudsperson said there were no grounds for the police to use pepper spray to disperse protesters at the entrance to parliament and that police used water cannons and tear gas without adequate warning or reason, as “the rally had a peaceful character and there was no reason to terminate it....” A statement by 10 Georgian civic organizations called on Georgian authorities to investigate “cases of disproportionate use of force by law enforcement officers” that night.

In a May 2 statement, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, Volker Turk, urged Georgian authorities to “conduct prompt and transparent investigations into all allegations of ill-treatment” and urged Georgian authorities to withdraw the bill, [which] “… poses serious threats to the rights to freedom of expression and association.”

On April 16, Joseph Borrell, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, and Olivér Várhelyi, its commissioner for EU enlargement, jointly urged authorities to withdraw the bill, which if adopted, they said would “negatively impact” Georgia’s EU candidacy. On May 1, Borrell condemned the violence against protesters.

In a letter to the chair of Georgia’s parliament, the Council of Europe human rights commissioner, Michael O’Flaherty, asked parliament to refrain from adopting the draft law because, if adopted, it would “likely result in the stigmatization and discreditation of the civil society organizations.”

The draft law is incompatible with legal obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Georgia is a party. While certain limitations on the rights to freedom of expression and association are permissible under international law, the proposed bill far exceeds any legitimate interference with these rights, Human Rights Watch said.

In 2022, the European Court of Human Rights found Russia’s “foreign agents” law, which is similar to the Georgian bill, in violation of article 11 of the European Convention, protecting the right to association. The court ruled that creating a special status and legal regime for organizations that receive funding from international or foreign sources was not justified, and that such restrictions interfered with their legitimate functions. The right to seek, receive and utilize resources from national, international, and foreign sources is an inherent part of the right to freedom of association.

“The foreign influence bill tramples on fundamental rights and Georgian authorities should drop it,” Williamson said. “They should also promptly and effectively investigate the allegations of police violence and safeguard the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression.”

Sudan: Ethnic Cleansing in West Darfur

Human Rights Watch — Thu, 09 May 2024 00:00:00 -0400

Click to expand Image Incendiary damage to the Imam al-Kazem school, an IDP gathering site in El Geneina. © 2023 Roots for Human Rights and Monitoring Violations Attacks by the Rapid Support Forces and allied militias in El Geneina, capital of Sudan’s West Darfur state, killed at least thousands of people and left hundreds of thousands as refugees.Committing serious violations that targeted the Massalit people and other non-Arab communities with the apparent objective of at least having them permanently leave the region constitutes ethnic cleansing.The United Nations and African Union should urgently impose an arms embargo on Sudan, sanction those responsible for serious crimes and deploy a mission to protect civilians.

(Nairobi, May 9, 2024) – Attacks by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied militias in El Geneina, the capital city of Sudan’s West Darfur state, from April to November 2023, killed at least thousands of people and left hundreds of thousands as refugees, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. The crimes against humanity and widespread war crimes were committed in the context of an ethnic cleansing campaign against the ethnic Massalit and other non-Arab populations in and around El Geneina.

May 9, 2024 “The Massalit Will Not Come Home”

Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan

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The 218-page report, “‘The Massalit Will Not Come Home’: Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan,” documents that the Rapid Support Forces, an independent military force in armed conflict with the Sudan military, and their allied mainly Arab militias, including the Third-Front Tamazuj, an armed group, targeted the predominantly Massalit neighborhoods of El Geneina in relentless waves of attacks from April to June. Abuses escalated again in early November. The attackers committed other serious abuses such as torture, rape, and looting. More than half a million refugees from West Darfur have fled to Chad since April 2023. As of late October 2023, 75 percent were from El Geneina.

Play Video Read a text description of this video

Jamal Abdullah Khamis, Human Rights Lawyer from El Geneina

Of everything that happened what disturbed me most was what happened at the Mohamed Adam Clinic.

When I walked in, I found my friend Mudather in the southeast corner of the clinic.

It was as if he was sleeping.

He didn’t look like he was dead.

He looked completely normal.

But in fact, he was dead.

When I arrived, they told me that he’d been shot in the back by a bullet.

They told me he was shot with a DShK gun because the bullet was big.

It went in, and it didn’t come out.

Narration by Mohamed Osman, researcher, Human Rights Watch

On April 15, 2023, war breaks out in Sudan.

It marks an escalation of the power struggle between two military leaders who have vied for power since they jointly overthrew a power-sharing government in October 2021.

The war pits the military against an autonomous force known as the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF.

By April 24, 2023, the conflict spreads to El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur.

The atrocities that follow are documented by Jamal and other local human rights activists with the aim of bringing those responsible to justice.

Jamal Abdullah Khamis, Human Rights Lawyer from El Geneina

I was at al-Sadaqa Clinic on April 24, from the first day of the events, with a group of my colleagues from our organization.

We were working in the clinic.

Our role was documenting violations against the injured and the dead.

Everyone who was brought to the clinic we would document.

The number, their names, (ethnic) backgrounds and information.

We were documenting all of these things.

Narration by Mohamed Osman, researcher, Human Rights Watch

Jamal and his colleagues notice a pattern to the killings.

The RSF and allied Arab militias were targeting doctors, lawyers and human rights activists.

Majority-Massalit neighborhoods and camps for internally displaced people were also being systematically targeted.

The violence feels all too familiar to Jamal and others in West Darfur state, who recall fleeing their home villages in the early 2000s after being attacked by the Janjaweed, the predecessor of the RSF.

Thousands were displaced, including many Massalit people.

They found refuge in the camps for internally displaced people that swelled the outskirts of El Geneina.

The conflict then occurred against a backdrop of long-standing tensions over land and other resources between non-Arab farmers, such as the Massalit, and nomadic Arab communities who were starting to settle.

On June 15th, 2023, RSF and Arab militias overwhelm the remaining Massalit-majority neighborhoods.

Tens of thousands of Massalit and other non-Arabs try to flee central El Geneina for its northern suburb of Ardamata, where there’s a Sudanese Armed Forces base.

The RSF and militias attack the convoy, injuring and killing men, women, and children.

Jamal Abdullah Khamis, Human Rights Lawyer from El Geneina

I was accompanying my (injured) friend, Yousef Haroun Kabello.

Minutes later around eight militiamen appeared wearing RSF uniforms.

There were others with them from these well-known Arab militias.

They were arguing with people.

They stopped the cars.

They opened fire on us.

They shot at the chests of children, women, old and young men.

It was a harrowing scene.

We thought about how to escape.

But we needed a way to escape.

How were we going to escape?

They started chasing people down the valley and firing on people who were in the water.

It was terrifying.

We couldn’t go back or move forward.

We hid in some grass and bushes on the edge of the valley.

That was at dawn on (June) 15th before sunrise.

Then a chance came to run back.

In al-Majliss neighborhood we experienced something terrifying.

When we were going down the street we saw bodies everywhere, of women and children.

They were the bodies of people we knew personally.

But you can’t stop and help someone who is dead in the street.

We kept running because we were being chased.

TEXT: The killings continue for several days in El Geneina and on the road to Chad, where tens of thousands of civilians, including Jamal, flee in search of refuge.

Jamal Abdullah Khamis, Human Rights Lawyer from El Geneina

I found someone I knew and said, “Let my friend Kabello ride with you, he’s injured. It’s not a problem, I’ll walk behind with everyone else.”

He said, “My car is full, but he can get in.”

After a while we were attacked.

Bullets started showering us from all directions and people were being killed.

A child of around nine years old, came to me crying hysterically and was holding on to me.

While we were walking, we came to a big trench.

But the militiamen probably saw us going in there, because they were nearby.

They forced us out and started beating us, torturing us, and firing just over our heads.

They were arguing about whether to kill us or not.

Those who had belongings, they took them.

I had my two mobile phones, a USB stick, and some cash.

The nine-year-old child was lying down by my side.

The beating and torturing intensified, they were using a metal rod, some sticks, and whips to beat us.

We were lying on our stomachs, and he stood up.

The young boy couldn’t handle it anymore.

They shot him in the head, and his head exploded.

He died immediately.

A second group also started beating and interrogating us.

They asked what tribes we were from.

If you answered that you are Massalit, they would kill you immediately.

I denied that I am Massalit even though I am Massalit.

They pressured me, and I told them I am from the Bargo tribe.

They brought someone to talk to me in the Bargo language and I replied because I know how to speak it.

He said, “Brother, go.”

We entered Chad.

We were shocked to see Chadian officials in front of us.

Chadian military uniforms are very similar to RSF uniforms.

They were also carrying whips.

They all had a whip and a gun.

The RSF have the same.

When our group ran towards them (the troops) they told us to stop running.

We were surprised, and thought it was the RSF again.

We ran back towards Adikong (in Sudan).

The soldiers ran after us and said, “We are Chadian officials.”

We weren’t convinced until we saw the Chadian flag on their uniform.

“We’re Chadian officials. This is Chad, you are safe.”

“Many of your people arrived here before you. Welcome.”

I was very tired, and they took me to the hospital.

When I was in the hospital, who did I find?

The man who was with me.

My friend Kabello that I helped into the car.

He made it, and they took him to the hospital.

That was our horrific journey.

Despite the huge shock and gruesome massacres that happened in West Darfur, I still have a lot of hope.

Life in refugee camps and abroad is very tough.

It’s no place to live.

I have hope that El Geneina will recover, and we will go back soon.

That depends on rebuilding the justice system.

We need justice to be carried out.

We need the principles of human rights and international law.

That speak of the dignity of human life and the dignity of people.

If these are embodied in West Darfur, then there is hope that we can return to El Geneina.

The international community should deploy a mission to protect civilians in Sudan.

TEXT: The international community should also impose sanctions against those responsible for atrocities and establish an arms embargo on Sudan.

“As the UN Security Council and governments wake up to the looming disaster in El Fasher, the large-scale atrocities committed in El Geneina should be seen as a reminder of the atrocities that could come in the absence of concerted action,” said Tirana Hassan, executive director at Human Rights Watch. “Governments, the African Union, and the United Nations need to act now to protect civilians.”

Targeting the Massalit people and other non-Arab communities by committing serious violations against them with the apparent objective of at least having them permanently leave the region constitutes ethnic cleansing. The particular context in which the widespread killings took place also raises the possibility that the RSF and their allies have the intent to destroy in whole or in part the Massalit in at least West Darfur, which would indicate that genocide has been and/or is being committed there.

Between June 2023 and April 2024, Human Rights Watch interviewed more than 220 people in Chad, Uganda, Kenya, and South Sudan, as well as remotely. Researchers also reviewed and analyzed over 120 photos and videos of the events, satellite imagery, and documents shared by humanitarian organizations to corroborate accounts of grave abuses.

The violence in El Geneina began nine days after fighting broke out in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital city, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Sudan’s military, and the RSF. On the morning of April 24, the RSF clashed with a Sudanese military convoy travelling through El Geneina. Then the RSF and its allied groups attacked majority Massalit neighborhoods, clashing with predominantly Massalit armed groups defending their communities. Over the following weeks – and even after Massalit armed groups lost control of their neighborhoods – the RSF and allied militias systematically targeted unarmed civilians.

The violence culminated in a large-scale massacre on June 15, when the RSF and its allies opened fire on a kilometers-long convoy of civilians desperately trying to flee, escorted by Massalit fighters. The RSF and militias pursued, rounded up, and shot men, women, and children who ran through the streets or tried to swim across the fast-flowing Kajja river. Many drowned. Older people and injured people were not spared.

A 17-year-old boy described the killing of 12 children and 5 adults from several families: “Two RSF forces … grabb[ed] the children from their parents and, as the parents started screaming, two other RSF forces shot the parents, killing them. Then they piled up the children and shot them. They threw their bodies into the river and their belongings in after them.”

That day and in subsequent days, the attacks continued on tens of thousands of civilians who tried to cross into Chad, leaving the countryside strewn with bodies. Videos published at the time show crowds of civilians running for their lives on the road linking El Geneina to Chad.

Human Rights Watch also documented the killing of Arab residents and the looting of Arab neighborhoods by Massalit forces, and Sudanese Armed Forces’ use of explosive weapons in populated areas in ways that caused unnecessary harm to civilians and civilian objects.

The RSF and allied militias escalated their abuses again in November, targeting Massalit people who had found refuge in the El Geneina suburb of Ardamata, rounding up Massalit men and boys and, according to the UN, killing at least 1,000 people.

During the course of these abuses, women and girls were raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence, and detainees were tortured and otherwise ill-treated. The attackers methodically destroyed critical civilian infrastructure, targeting neighborhoods and sites, including schools, in primarily Massalit displaced communities. They looted on a grand scale; and burned, shelled, and razed neighborhoods to the ground, after emptying them of residents.

These acts were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the Massalit and other non-Arab civilian populations of Massalit-majority neighborhoods, and as such also constitute the crimes against humanity of murder, torture, persecution, and forcible transfer of the civilian population, Human Rights Watch said.

The possibility that genocide has been and/or is being committed in Darfur requires urgent action from all governments and international institutions to protect civilians. They should ensure investigation as to whether the facts demonstrate a specific intent on the part of the RSF leadership and its allies to destroy in whole or in part the Massalit and other non-Arab ethnic communities in West Darfur, that is, to commit genocide. If so, they should act to prevent its further perpetration, and to ensure those responsible for its planning and conduct are brought to justice.

The global community should support the investigations of the International Criminal Court (ICC), while states party to the court should ensure it has the financial resources needed in its regular budget to carry out its mandate in Darfur and across its docket.

Human Rights Watch identified the commander of the RSF, Mohammed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo, his brother Abdel Raheem Hamdan Dagalo, and the West Darfur RSF commander Joma’a Barakallah as those with command responsibility over the forces that carried out these crimes. Human Rights Watch also named RSF allies, including a commander of the Tamazuj armed group and two Arab tribal leaders, as bearing responsibility for fighters that committed serious crimes.

The United Nations in coordination with the African Union should urgently deploy a new mission to protect civilians at risk in Sudan. The Security Council should impose targeted sanctions on those responsible for serious crimes in West Darfur, and individuals and companies that have and are violating the arms embargo. It should widen the existing arms embargo on Darfur to cover all of Sudan.

“The global inaction in the face of atrocities of this magnitude is inexcusable,” Hassan said. “Governments should ensure those responsible are held to account, including through targeted sanctions and by stepping up cooperation with the ICC.”

China Forcibly Returns 60 Refugees to North Korea

Human Rights Watch — Wed, 08 May 2024 19:00:00 -0400

Click to expand Image Photos of the North Korean refugees helped by the North Korea Refugees Human Rights Association of Korea are displayed in Seoul, South Korea on June 11, 2019. © 2019 Josh Smith/Reuters

The Chinese government forcibly returned about 60 North Korean refugees on April 26, putting them at grave risk of enforced disappearance, torture, sexual violence, wrongful imprisonment, forced labor, and execution.

This round of forced returns came soon after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met with China’s third highest official, Zhao Leji, on April 13, seeking stronger bilateral ties.

The meeting had raised concerns among North Koreans in exile and rights activists that China might speed up forced repatriations of North Koreans.

Stephen Kim, the pseudonym of an underground missionary, said the Chinese government had forcibly returned this group of North Koreans from China’s Jilin and Liaoning provinces. He said that the Chinese authorities had apprehended at least 92 North Koreans since January. He could not confirm whether anyone among the 92 was forcibly returned on April 26, but thought it was highly unlikely.

Human Rights Watch has separately confirmed that the Chinese government has forcibly returned more than 670 North Koreans since Pyongyang closed its northern border in early 2020. This includes more than 500 North Koreans on October 9, 2023, 40 others on September 18, 2023, 80 on August 29, 2023, and about 50 in July 2021.

The Chinese government routinely labels North Koreans as illegal “economic migrants” and forcibly repatriates them under a 1986 bilateral border protocol. But as a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the United Nations Convention against Torture, China is obligated not to force back anyone who would be at risk of persecution or torture, a breach of the fundamental principle of nonrefoulement.

North Korean authorities consider departures from the country without permission a serious crime. Since anyone who returns to North Korea after fleeing will likely be subjected to torture or otherwise mistreated, everyone who flees North Korea has a claim for refugee status in whichever country they reach and should be given the opportunity to have that claim heard.

Governments around the world, including South Korea, should call for an end to all forced returns to North Korea. The Chinese government should provide asylum to North Koreans in China or give them safe passage to South Korea or another safe third country. It should also allow the UN Refugee Agency to exercise its mandate and provide access to all detained North Korean refugees.

Philippines: Supreme Court Rejects ‘Red-Tagging’

Human Rights Watch — Wed, 08 May 2024 16:30:00 -0400

(Manila) – The Philippine Supreme Court issued a major ruling on May 8, 2024, declaring “red-tagging” a threat to people’s life, liberty, and security, Human Rights Watch said today. The Philippine government has been using red-tagging—accusing individuals and groups of supporting the country’s communist insurgency—to harass, threaten, and at times assault or kill critics of the government.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. should publicly endorse the Supreme Court decision and promptly adopt measures to end the practice and appropriately discipline or prosecute officials who engage in red-tagging.

“The Supreme Court’s important ruling affirms that red-tagging is a dangerous form of harassment that violates people’s rights,” said Carlos Conde, senior Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “This decision acknowledges the suffering of countless victims of this government policy.”

In its ruling, the Supreme Court overturned a lower court's 2023 decision dismissing a 2020 petition brought by an activist, Siegfred Deduro, who alleged that the Philippine military and anti-communist groups “explicitly identified” him as having links to the communist New People’s Army. Deduro sought a writ of amparo, which allows a person to seek various remedies from the courts, such as protection orders. The writ of amparo, which the Supreme Court approved in 2007 as a response to increased incidents of red-tagging, is “a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.” The writ covers extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court that dismissed Deduro’s petition erred and violated due process, and they ordered the trial court to conduct a summary hearing to essentially retry the case and come up with a verdict within 10 days. “Red-tagging, vilification, labelling, and guilt by association threaten a person’s right to life, liberty, or security, which may justify the issuance of a writ of amparo,” the court said in a news release announcing the ruling.

The Philippine government has long used red-tagging or red-baiting as part of its efforts against the communist insurgency, which began in the late 1960s. The government’s counterinsurgency tactics include trying to discourage potential recruits and sympathizers.

Those targeted have included leaders and members of leftist activist groups and human rights organizations, as well as religious, Indigenous, and environmental groups. The government uses red-tagging to identify these groups and individuals publicly and intimidate them.

Red-tagging intensified after then-President Rodrigo Duterte in 2018 issued Executive Order 70, which created the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC). The task force has become the main agency behind red-tagging of leftist activists along with journalists, Indigenous leaders, teachers, and lawyers. A bill criminalizing red-tagging is pending in the Philippine congress.

Human rights groups, as well as UN experts and foreign governments, have recognized the pernicious effect of red-tagging, Human Rights Watch said.

“The Marcos administration should abandon red-tagging, including by eliminating the abusive task force promoting the practice,” Conde said. “Foreign governments that have spoken out on this issue should press the government to put the Supreme Court ruling into effect.”

Vietnam: False Claims on Labor Rights

Human Rights Watch — Wed, 08 May 2024 15:30:00 -0400

Click to expand Image Do Hung Viet, Vietnam’s deputy minister of foreign affairs, at the Universal Periodic Review of Vietnam’s human rights record at the UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, Switzerland, May 7, 2024 © 2024 UN Web TV

(Washington) – Vietnam is providing false or misleading information to the United States and other economic partners to secure or maintain preferential trade preferences, Human Rights Watch said today.

The US Department of Commerce held a public hearing about Vietnam’s trade status on May 8, 2024. The US government is currently considering a reclassification of Vietnam under the US Tariff Law as a “market economy,” which would provide Vietnam major economic benefits, even though Vietnam does not satisfy basic labor rights standards.

In arguing for the reclassification of its economy under US law, the Vietnam government contends that its labor law standards are in line with international standards and that workers’ wages in Vietnam are “determined by free bargaining between labor and management,” as called for under applicable US standards. US officials are set to rule on the issue in July.

“It’s patently false to claim that Vietnamese workers can organize unions or that their wages are the result of free bargaining between labor and management,” said John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “Not a single independent union exists in Vietnam and no working legal frameworks exist for unions to be created or for workers to enforce labor rights.”

Human Rights Watch takes no position on Vietnam’s economic status, but the redesignation is legally contingent on basic labor rights protections and stated US policy on promoting labor rights. The US Congress should hold hearings on the topic and act to ensure that Vietnam’s record is properly reflected in the decision-making process. The European Union, which reached a free trade agreement with Vietnam in 2020, in part contingent on Vietnam’s pledges on labor rights, should initiate a review of its compliance.

In determining whether to classify a country as a nonmarket economy, US law requires consideration of six factors, including how tightly its government controls natural resources, prices, currency exchanges, and other factors, including, “the extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are determined by free bargaining between labor and management.”

As a matter of law and practice, Vietnam does not allow independent unions to represent workers. Chapter 13 of Vietnam’s 2021 labor code provides for “enterprise-level worker organizations,” and its Trade Union Law provides for “trade unions” as well as “worker representative organizations,” a term that appears in both laws. However, Vietnam’s Trade Union Law only allows government-controlled “unions.” The labor code still requires implementing regulations to be issued for the law to go into force. And no enterprise-level worker representative organizations exist in Vietnam.

“Vietnam’s claims to respect labor rights relies on empty words and promises, laws and regulations that have no connection to the realities of the county’s actual labor rights situation,” Sifton said.

At the same time, the Vietnam government continues to call the government-led Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL) a “labor confederation” of enterprise-level “labor federations.” But the VGCL is led by Vietnamese government appointees. The “unions” and “federations” that exist under the VGCL are almost all led by people appointed by management at the enterprise level. Workers or labor leaders do not choose leaders or representatives who can bargain to set wages on their behalf. Insofar as the VGCL does bargain with management or at the state-wide level, it does so in the interests of the government and the Vietnamese Communist Party, not on behalf of workers and not in a representative capacity.

The dynamic of state control of the VGCL has been further demonstrated by new information about a recent directive issued by the Communist Party of Vietnam, “Directive 24,” which orders enhanced scrutiny of labor groups, civil society, and foreign organizations, specifically in the context of Vietnam’s implementation of new trade agreements with other countries and with the International Labour Organization.

Directive 24, issued in July 2023, is intended to clarify the control of the government and party over the implementation of all new labor regulations and laws, noting that the “implementation of trade agreements has created new difficulties and challenges for national security.” The directive references orders that prohibit independent labor unions from operating in Vietnam, and states that all unions must be affiliated with the government and Communist Party of Vietnam. It instructs the government to take: “active initiative” in “piloting” labor organizations and in implementing labor standards to “ensure the ongoing leadership of the Party, leadership of party cells, and government management at all levels.”

Multiple sources told Human Rights Watch that in late April, Vietnamese police arrested Nguyen Van Binh, a senior official in Vietnam’s labor ministry who had advocated for more meaningful labor reforms and some independence of trade unions.

Numerous articles in state-run media reflect the Vietnam government’s hostility to independent labor organizations or unions, calling them “hostile forces” that use “plots and tricks” to “oppose the Party and the State… causing social disorder and hindering the lives of laborers in our country,” or arguing that the purpose of “so-called independent trade unions” is to “form a domestic oppositional political force, proceeding to carry out a ‘color revolution’ or ‘street revolution’ to overthrow the Communist Party and eliminate the political regime in Vietnam.”

“Vietnam is a closed society with an authoritarian government hostile to labor rights,” Sifton said. “Workers cannot openly organize, let alone bargain with management. The US government should recognize this.”

Indonesian Government Acts to Protect Student Media

Human Rights Watch — Wed, 08 May 2024 10:51:05 -0400

Click to expand Image Participants at a student-journalist organized conference on the “legal umbrella” (payung hukum) of laws and regulations that protect media outlets, in Solo, Central Java, May 2023. © 2023 Andreas Harsono/Human Rights Watch

As student journalists in Indonesia face increasing intimidation, censorship, and newsroom closures, the Ministry of Education has agreed to have the national Press Council mediate all defamation disputes involving student journalists and publications. It’s an important step toward better protecting student media in the country.

Until now, criminal defamation cases involving student journalists and publications were handled by universities or the police, who were more likely to be swayed by influential local elites pressing cases against student publications. The new agreement, signed on March 18, provides a mechanism that no longer requires these defamation disputes to be referred to the police or public prosecutors.

One year ago, Human Rights Watch called on the Indonesian government to work with the Press Council and set up such a mechanism to support and protect student media. While the 1999 Press Law had established the Press Council to mediate defamation disputes faced by media organizations, student media did not fall under its purview. Instead, student journalists operate under the jurisdiction of their educational institution and, by extension, the Ministry of Religious Affairs for Islamic schools and the Ministry of Education for all others. The Press Council said it hopes to sign a similar agreement with the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Most Indonesian universities have student media outlets, such as magazines, online news sites, or radio stations. Many of these outlets operate like traditional independent newsrooms. This has often brought them in conflict with the university administration when student reporters uncover and report on malfeasance, corruption, sexual misconduct, and other sensitive issues at the school.

Between 2020 and 2021, the Indonesian Student Press Association (Perhimpunan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia) recorded 48 cases of university administrators intimidating or shutting down student media outlets among 185 cases of alleged press-related abuses on campuses around the country. In addition to intimidation and shuttering outlets, the abuses ranged from threats to physical assault to the expulsion of students because of their journalism work.

Student journalism has a long history in Indonesia and this latest decision will bolster press freedom on Indonesian campuses. University leaders and administrators should protect, encourage, and applaud student journalists instead of censoring them.

West Bank: Israeli Forces’ Unlawful Killings of Palestinians

Human Rights Watch — Wed, 08 May 2024 00:00:00 -0400

Click to expand Image Israeli forces enter the Balata refugee camp in the occupied West Bank city of Nablus during a large-scale search-and-arrest operation on November 23, 2023. © 2023 Sipa via AP Images Israeli security forces have unlawfully used lethal force in fatal shootings of Palestinians, including deliberately executing Palestinians who posed no apparent security threat, based on documentation of several cases since 2022.The United Nations reported that such killings are now taking place at a level without recent precedent in an environment in which those responsible need not fear the Israeli government will hold them accountable.Governments should support the International Criminal Court’s probe into serious crimes committed in Palestine and impose targeted sanctions against those responsible for grave abuses.

(Jerusalem, May 8, 2024) – Israeli security forces have unlawfully used lethal force in fatal shootings of Palestinians in the West Bank, Human Rights Watch said today, based on documentation of several cases. Research into eight deaths in four incidents between July 2022 and October 2023 concluded that Israeli forces wrongfully fatally shot or deliberately executed Palestinians who posed no apparent security threat.

Human Rights Watch and other human rights groups have long documented the unlawful and excessive use of lethal force by Israeli forces in the West Bank and the Israeli government’s failure to hold those responsible to account. According to the United Nations, Israeli security forces killed more than twice the number of Palestinians in the West Bank in 2023 than in any year since systematic data collection began in 2005, and the rate of killings was even higher during the first quarter of 2024.

“Israeli security forces are not just unlawfully killing Palestinians in Gaza, but have been killing Palestinians without a legal basis in the West Bank, including deliberately executing Palestinians who posed no apparent threat,” said Richard Weir, senior crisis and conflict researcher at Human Rights Watch. “These killings are taking place at a level without recent precedent in an environment in which Israeli forces have no need to fear that their government will hold them accountable.”

Between May and November 2023, Human Rights Watch interviewed 14 witnesses and 6 family members of victims of fatal shootings by Israeli security forces in the West Bank. Human Rights Watch also spoke to medical personnel in the West Bank and reviewed medical records, verified videos posted on social media, and news reports. Human Rights Watch wrote to the Israel Defense Forces on August 8, 2023, and April 23, 2024, with questions about the eight fatalities and the military’s rules regarding the use of force, but has not received a reply to either query.

Human Rights Watch has also released a question-and-answer document on the international legal framework applicable to violence and the use of force in the West Bank.

In one case that Human Rights Watch investigated, Israeli forces in Jenin repeatedly fired upon Sidqi Zakarneh, who was crawling injured on the ground, killing him. Videos showed that he was not participating in violence and did not appear to have weapons. In another case, in the northern West Bank, family members said Rafiq Ghannem went out apparently unarmed early one morning to investigate loud noises. He encountered Israeli forces, who fatally shot him when he tried to flee.

Israeli forces in 2023 killed 492 Palestinians, including 120 children, in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). That figure is more than twice as many as in any other year since the UN began systematically documenting fatalities. About 300 were killed in the nearly three months following the October 7 Hamas-led attacks on Israel, though the increase in killings dates back to 2022. Between January 1 and March 31, 2024, Israeli forces killed 131 Palestinians in the West Bank.

In 2023, Palestinians killed 25 Israeli civilians in the West Bank, the highest figure in at least 15 years, and 5 members of the Israeli armed forces, according to OCHA.

Palestinians have been at risk of being killed by Israeli security forces throughout the West Bank, whether traveling to and from work or in their own neighborhoods. Children on their way to school have been fatally shot, as Human Rights Watch documented in August 2023. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz found that in 2022, in only 45 percent of incidents in which Palestinians were killed did the Israeli military even allege that the victims were armed or that there were “clashes in which there was an exchange of gunfire.”

Between October 7, 2023, and March 18, 2024, Israeli forces conducted a monthly average of 640 search-and-arrest and other operations in the West Bank, nearly double the 340 such operations during the first nine months of 2023, according to OCHA. These operations resulted in the killing of 304 Palestinians, out of a total of 409 killed by Israeli forces during this period.

During a search-and-arrest operation near the West Bank city of Tulkarem on October 19, Israeli forces shot and killed 15-year-old Taha Mahamid and, minutes later, wounded his father, Ibrahim, who went to retrieve his body. Video and other evidence shows no sign that either was carrying a weapon. Ibrahim Mahamid died of his injuries four months later. Witnesses said, and video footage supported, that the shootings occurred at a time when there were no active confrontations in the area and neither Taha nor his father posed any imminent threat to Israeli forces.

Israeli security forces in the West Bank are bound by international human rights law. The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provide that the “intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”

Israel does not make public the rules on the use of force that it applies to the army. However, in the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, Israeli military personnel engaged in law enforcement used lethal force when it was not strictly unavoidable to protect life, including firing on people who were fleeing or were considered to be linked to clashes or possible violent acts.

Repeated unlawful killings and endemic impunity are among the inhumane acts that make up the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution that Israeli authorities commit against Palestinians, as Human Rights Watch and other rights groups have documented.

Governments should suspend arms and other military support to Israel because of the risk of complicity in grave abuses in Palestine, take action to ensure accountability including supporting the International Criminal Court’s probe into serious crimes committed in Palestine, and impose targeted sanctions against those responsible for grave abuses.

“The Israeli government’s permissive and discriminatory practices on the use of force and endemic impunity are one facet of the apartheid and structural violence Palestinians face every day,” Weir said. “The unlawful killings in the West Bank will continue so long as the Israeli authorities’ systemic repression of Palestinians continues.”

Impunity for Unlawful Use of Lethal Force

Human Rights Watch has previously documented that some senior Israeli officials have encouraged soldiers and police to kill Palestinians suspected of attacking Israelis, even when they are no longer a threat. Haaretz reported that since “December 2021, soldiers are allowed to shoot at Palestinians who are fleeing if they had previously thrown stones or Molotov cocktails.” In April 2022, then-Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said there would be “no restrictions” on Israeli forces’ response to Palestinian violence. In October 2022, Itamar Ben-Gvir, now the national security minister, said while running for election that it should be legal to use lethal force against anyone throwing stones.

Such statements, coupled with the lack of accountability for abuses, contribute to a permissive environment for security forces to unlawfully use lethal force, Human Rights Watch said.

Despite decades of frequent unlawful killings of Palestinians in policing situations, Israeli authorities continue to use tactics that contravene international human rights norms. Israeli security forces do not use a similar pattern of unlawful lethal force against Jewish Israelis, even during disruptive demonstrations, including by West Bank settlers, that involve stone-throwing and blocking roads. This indicates that Israeli authorities use of unlawful excessive force is discriminatory and is used to further their policy of maintaining domination by Jewish Israelis over Palestinians.

The Israeli rights group Yesh Din found that between 2017 and 2021, fewer than one percent of complaints of violations by Israeli forces against Palestinians, including killings and other abuses, resulted in criminal indictments. During the same period, Yesh Din found that only three soldiers were convicted for killing Palestinians, and all received short sentences of military community service. The Israeli rights group B’Tselem, which for years filed claims and reported on the military justice system, have characterized the military’s internal law enforcement system as a “whitewash mechanism.”

The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, Karim Khan, has confirmed that his office has, since March 2021, been conducting an invesetigation into serious crimes committed in Palestine since 2014.

Cases of Killings of Palestinians

Taha and Ibrahim Mahamid, Nur Shams, October 19, 2023

On October 19, 2023, just before 3:30 a.m., as captured in a voice note sent by a local resident, sirens went off in Nur Shams refugee camp, in Tulkarem in the northern West Bank, warning residents that the Israeli military was preparing to enter the camp. At 3:31 a.m., as confirmed in a video that Human Rights Watch verified, 15-year-old Taha Mahamid was approaching Nablus Street, the main street in front of his home in the al-Malash neighborhood in the camp, near its entrance, when at least two bullets struck him.

Taha’s sister Sara, who filmed the video, told Human Rights Watch that, after hearing the sirens, she opened her bedroom window to observe what was happening. Sara saw Taha outside with their neighbor and asked Taha what he was doing. “I won’t be long,” he said. “I want to see the [military] jeeps and come back up.” She said he was holding only a cellphone.

The video shows two males, one identified as Taha, stepping cautiously toward Nablus Street in Nur Shams from Taha’s home. As he approaches the main road, Taha turns his body to the right to look east along Nablus Street. One second later a shot is heard and Taha collapses to the ground. Two more shots ring out, and Taha lies there motionless. No Israeli forces or armed Palestinians were in the area, Sara said. The video shows no sign of an active confrontation or of Taha carrying a weapon of any kind.

Click to expand Image Taha Mahamid’s mother holds a photo of her son, whom Israeli forces killed on October 19, 2023 when he was 15, at the Nur Shams Refugee Camp in the occupied West Bank city of Tulkarem, November 2, 2023. © 2023 Human Rights Watch

The preliminary forensic medical report by the Martyr Dr. Thabet Hospital in Tulkarem recorded that Taha was dead when he was brought by ambulance to the emergency room of the hospital. It states that two bullets hit Taha in the front of his body “from below the right eye” and that they “exited from the back of the head,” indicating that the shots were most likely fired from the direction in which Taha was looking.

Minutes after Taha was shot, his father, Ibrahim Mahamid, 58, left the house and went toward Taha. He told Human Rights Watch that he could not bear the sight of his son bleeding on the ground or the thought of Israeli forces taking him. When he reached Taha, a bullet struck the father in the abdomen, he said and medical reports confirmed. Videos reviewed by Human Rights Watch show him next to Taha, rolling over in an attempt to stand up, until a neighbor arrives and helps him to reach his house.

Sara made two phone calls to the Palestinian Red Cresent Society, at 3:37 a.m. and 3:43 a.m., requesting ambulances. The neighbor, a volunteer paramedic, also called for ambulances. The Red Crescent informed them that ambulances would not be able to immediately reach them, as Israeli forces were blocking entry to the camp.

An ambulance arrived at the scene at 4:44 a.m., more than an hour after Taha had been shot, according to a video Sara shared and that Human Rights Watch verified. About 10 minutes later, another ambulance came for Ibrahim Mahamid. “All this time, there was absolutely nothing outside,” Sara said. “No sound, no movement … no one came to him.” She said that Taha lay motionless, with blood around his head.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights documented that Israeli authorities “prevented Palestinian paramedics from accessing the injured” during the October 19 raid, which the office said “reflect[s] a growing pattern.” This obstruction could have denied Ibrahim Mahamid and possibly his son access to life-saving medical care, Human Rights Watch said.

Ibrahim Mahamid succumbed to his injuries on February 29, OCHA reported. A death certificate from the Palestinian Interior Ministry, signed by the Health Ministry, identified “aspiration, septic shock,” as a result of an “abdominal bullet injury,” as the cause of death.

Human Rights Watch concluded, based on its research, that Israeli forces shot both Taha and Ibrahim Mahamid. The shootings occurred at the entrance to the camp, at about the time that Israeli forces entered the camp. Residents said that Israeli forces had a practice of taking positions in and atop buildings in the camp to provide cover for troops to enter. As far as Human Rights Watch could determine, while Israeli authorities made no statement regarding the shooting of Taha and Ibrahim Mahamid, the Israeli military said that they had killed “more than 12 terrorists” in Nur Shams camp during the entire operation.

The Israeli military operation in Nur Shams camp that day lasted 27 hours, according to OCHA, resulting in the death of 14 Palestinians, including 6 children. The Israeli military said that its Duvdevan Unit of the Commando Brigade and its Duchifat Battalion and Sayeret Haruv of the Kfir Brigade carried out the operation, alongside the Israeli Border Police, including its Yamas Unit, which conducts covert and special operations. Israeli authorities said the operation in the camp was intended to “arrest wanted persons, destroy terrorist infrastructure, and confiscate weapons.” They said a member of the Yamas Unit of the Border Police was killed during the operation. They have not indicated that they are investigating the deaths, including those of Taha or Ibrahim Mahamid.

There was no apparent basis for shooting Taha and Ibrahim Mahamid, Human Rights Watch found. They posed no imminent threat to life or serious injury, making their killings unlawful.

During a subsequent 50-hour Israeli military incursion in Nur Shams on April 18-20, Israeli forces killed 14 Palestinians and severely damaged infrastructure in the refugee camp, OCHA reported.

Atta Shalabi, Sidqi Zakarneh, and Tareq Damaj, Jenin, December 8, 2022

At about 5 a.m. on December 8, 2022, Israeli forces shot dead three Palestinian men on a main road in the middle of Jenin city, while Israeli forces conducted a search-and-arrest raid nearby. Video verified by Human Rights Watch indicates that Sidqi Zakarneh, 29, Tareq Damaj, 29, and Atta Shalabi, 46, were all seemingly unarmed.

Zakarneh was shot as he approached an intersection near where the raid was taking place and then, after being seriously wounded, was shot repeatedly as he tried to crawl away. Damaj and Shalabi were both shot apparently after they stopped near where Zakarneh had been shot. Israeli forces were apparently deployed in a café on the second floor of a building that overlooked an intersection about 50 meters from where the arrest raid was taking place.

Human Rights Watch verified and reviewed six videos on social media that show: Zakarneh and Damaj being shot; the apparent moment when Shalabi was shot and Shalabi’s motionless body; men dragging Shalabi away; and Israeli forces exiting the area following the killings.

The first shooting took place as Zakarneh and two other men were leaving a car parked on Al-Malek Faysal Street about 25 meters north of the intersection with Al-Nahda Street. A closed-circuit television video posted online shows Zakarneh being wounded by gunfire a few meters from the car. One man flees north, away from the intersection and the nearby raid. Zakarneh begins to slowly crawl on his stomach back toward the vehicle, and then at least two successive shots can be seen striking him, apparently in the head. At no time does it appear that Zakarneh or the men he was with were openly carrying weapons or engaged in acts of violence.

In a closed-circuit television (CCTV) video filmed just after Zakarneh was shot, another vehicle pulls alongside the car that carried Zakarneh. The driver, whom a witness later identified as Damaj, exits the vehicle and can be seen approaching cars driving on Al-Malek Faysal Street, near where Zakarneh lies, gesturing in his direction. As Damaj approaches Zakarneh, he is shot repeatedly and falls to the ground. The other vehicles in the area speed away, leaving the two men motionless in the street. From the videos alone, it is not clear where the shots originated.

The witness who identified Damaj said that minutes after Damaj was shot, the witness approached the scene, driving behind an ambulance to help recover the men. “When we got out of the car, we saw two martyrs, their bodies full of bullet holes, especially in their heads,” he said.

The witness said that while he and medics from the ambulance attempted to move one of the men, bullets struck the area around them. They could not confirm the direction from which the bullets came. The witness said he and the medics fled after managing to get one of the men into the ambulance. The witness said he did not see any weapons on or near the men.

At the same time, several men, including Shalabi and his brother, were near the intersection, as seen in a CCTV video verified by Human Rights Watch. At one point in the video, Shalabi approaches the ambulance, then walks back toward Al-Nahda Street and out of view of CCTV cameras. Seconds after he disappears from view, a man nearby is seen flinching and running for cover, apparently under gunfire.

The video then shows Shalabi’s brother running from where he and Shalabi had just moved out of view. Two videos posted online show Shalabi face down on Al-Nahda Street. One of these then shows Shalabi’s brother dragging his body back toward Al-Malek Faysal Street, in view of the CCTV cameras. At no time do any of the videos show anyone carrying weapons, weapons near the bodies of those shot, or anyone engaging in acts of violence.

Shalabi was shot immediately below the café that Israeli forces were apparently occupying during the raid. Shalabi’s motionless body is just a few meters from a door to a stairway that leads up to the café. Human Rights Watch visited the site and saw that the large door had been damaged. Residents said the damage occurred when Israeli forces forced it open on the morning of the raid. One shop worker said that he reviewed his CCTV camera footage after the raid from early that morning, which showed Israeli forces driving past the entrance and then returning. Human Rights Watch did not review this footage.

The location of the victims’ bodies, impacts visible in videos circulated online, and damage on the asphalt are consistent with small arms fire coming from an elevated position on the corner where the café is located.

Shortly thereafter, a witness who was helping to recover the body on Al-Malek Faysal Street said, Israeli armored vehicles drove up and stopped near the intersection with Al-Nahda Street. A CCTV video posted online also shows Israeli forces pulling up in multiple armored vehicles, with seven members of the armed forces coming from Al-Nahda Street just meters from the entrance to a stairwell that leads to the café. All seven armed forces personnel are seen boarding one of the armored vehicles through its rear doors.

Human Rights Watch visited the site where the men were killed and identified damage on the asphalt consistent with small arms fire in the locations where a witness said the three men were shot. Videos circulated on social media show the men shot or lying apparently dead in positions consistent with the damage on the asphalt that Human Rights Watch observed.

Following the killings, the Israeli military released a statement about its operations in Jenin city, saying that during an operation to arrest two suspects, the soldiers were “targeted with direct fire and responded with live fire, hits were identified.” They said that they had confiscated a weapon used by one of the suspects.

The Jenin branch of the armed group Palestinian Islamic Jihad made a statement following the raid in Jenin claiming to have attacked Israeli troops with gunfire and explosives. They do not specify the location or time of the attacks. Human Rights Watch found no evidence that Shalabi, Zakarneh, or Damaj were engaged in any acts of violence.

The totality of the video and witness evidence shows that Zarkaneh, Damaj, and Shalabi did not present an imminent threat to life or serious injury in the moments leading up to when Israeli forces shot and killed them. At no time immediately prior to their killings did any of these men appear to possess or use weapons. The men’s conduct, as captured on video, does not show them engaged in violent acts, nor does it show Israeli forces attempting to exercise restraint. Instead, Israeli forces appear to have immediately intentionally used firearms, in violation of international norms.

Following the killings, the Palestinian armed group Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed Zakarneh as a member and a “fighter,” while Islamic Jihad’s Al-Quds Brigade claimed that Damaj was a member. There is no further information about the extent of their respective memberships and their activities. Photos and posts circulated online before and after the incident show the two men posing with rifles. Shalabi does not appear to have participated in any armed group.

Regardless, membership or the past activities of Zakarneh and Damaj in any group is not a relevant factor in determining the standards on the intentional lethal use of force or firearms by forces acting in a law enforcement role. If Israeli authorities had a legal basis to arrest the men, the security forces could have acted to take them into custody and, depending on their response, used the minimal force necessary to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective.

The repeated shooting of Zakarneh while he crawled on the ground injured and posed no imminent threat and the shooting of the other men likely amount to extrajudicial killings outside of the existing legal framework.

Jawad Rimawi and Thafer Rimawi, Kafr Ein, November 29, 2022

On November 29, 2022, Israeli forces on patrol in the village of Kafr Ein, northwest of Ramallah, shot and killed the brothers Jawad Rimawi, 22, and Thafer Rimawi, 19, who were from nearby Beit Rima. They and other Palestinians had confronted an Israeli armored vehicle convoy with rock-throwing and an apparent “Molotov cocktail” (gasoline bomb). After being shot, the brothers were taken in private vehicles to a nearby hospital, where they died from their injuries.

Early that morning, an Israeli convoy of armored vehicles approached Kafr Ein from the east. Witnesses said that Palestinians from nearby villages alerted Kafr Ein residents that forces were heading toward them, and residents awake at the time saw the vehicles approaching. One resident heard a commotion from the center of town, including what he described as gunshots, and began filming from his rooftop.

The convoy made its way from the center of Kafr Ein toward its periphery. A witness said that up to four people, including the Rimawis, had also moved there, to the front yard of an unoccupied house along the main road leading out of the village to the south.

Another witness said that as the armored vehicles approached this house, people threw rocks at them and attempted to set tires alight on the road. A video shared with and verified by Human Rights Watch shows at least five Israeli armored vehicles passing by the front of the house, where the brothers were in the yard. In the video, the call to prayer can be heard starting, indicating that it was filmed shortly before 5 a.m.

A bright fireball erupts on or near the house’s front patio, at least 25 meters from the road, as one of the vehicles drives past. A small fire is seen in the yard first, followed by an intense larger fire apparently on the patio that dissipates within seconds. It is unclear if the two fires were ignited with the same material.

An independent expert on fire dynamics reviewed the video and concluded that the characteristics of the fires are consistent with the use of an incendiary device like a Molotov cocktail.

Just after the fireball erupts, nine gunshots are heard on the video. As the gunshots are ringing out, a man’s voice, identified by his family as Thafer’s, is heard screaming for Jawad. Approximately eight seconds after the last of the nine gunshots, a single shot is heard.

A witness said that Jawad, who was meters away across the yard, was coming to assist his brother when he was shot.

Less than 10 seconds after this single shot, an Israeli armored vehicle, which now appears in the video in front of the house, continues forward, following the other vehicles in the convoy. The remaining 40 seconds of the video do not show any more vehicles, suggesting that the gunfire came from this vehicle, the last in the patrol. No Israeli personnel appear to be outside of the vehicles at any time, and witnesses said they saw no forces on foot as the vehicles passed.

Human Rights Watch found what appeared to be a grouping of bullet holes about 1.5 meters up from the ground in a window on the side of the house where the fireball erupted.

After the shooting, residents raced to the wounded Rimawi brothers, placed them in separate private vehicles and rushed them to a hospital in Salfit, eight kilometers away. Based on interviews with doctors, reviews of medical reports, and witnesses, Thafer was hit by bullets at least twice in the chest. Jawad was hit in the lower abdomen.

Doctors at the hospital rushed Jawad into surgery and transferred Thafer by ambulance to a specialist hospital in Ramallah.

Jawad died during surgery. A hospital report, which Human Rights Watch viewed, documented a single gunshot entry wound in Jawad’s lower abdomen with no exit wound.

Thafer had no pulse when he arrived at the Ramallah hospital, said his sister Ru’a, who rode in the ambulance with him, and was pronounced dead. A report by the Palestinian Medical Complex said he had “several bone wounds in the sternum and lower neck.” A death certificate from the Palestinian Interior Ministry says that Thafer had “multiple gunshot injuries to the chest.”

A Molotov cocktail can cause serious injuries or death. However, were one to ignite and burn 25 meters or more from a moving armored military vehicle, it would not place those inside the vehicle at continuing risk.

One witness said that when Thafer was shot, he was not throwing a Molotov cocktail. Even if he were involved with the Molotov cocktail attack that had exploded at the house, when Israeli forces shot him, he no longer presented an imminent threat to life or serious injury. There were no Israeli forces on foot in the vicinity and the last armored vehicle was driving away. The use of deadly force against Jawad and Thafer Rimawi by Israeli forces appears unjustified.

Rafiq Ghannam, Jaba, July 6, 2022

At about 2:30 a.m. on July 6, 2022, Israeli forces fatally shot Rafiq Ghannam, 20, outside his home in Jaba in the northern West Bank between Jenin and Nablus. His family members said that Ghannam was asleep, his clothes laid out for his workday in Israel, when loud noises outside awakened him. According to residents, Israeli soldiers had surrounded his small neighborhood and were attempting to arrest the Ghannams’ neighbor, who lived on the other side of a high wall to the east that separated the two homes. The Ghannams’ house has a tall steel gate and is next to an olive tree grove at the end of a cul-de-sac, about 100 meters down a road connecting the cul-de-sac to a larger road.

Ghannam got out of bed wearing a white tank-top and brown shorts and put on his sandals. His brother and mother were already awake. Ghannam joined his brother at the gate to their house and peered out. Unable to see anything, Ghannam walked out of the gate. Three people said that they saw him step cautiously from his house; they said they did not see a weapon. As he reached the edge of a neighbor’s house, about 10 meters from his home, there was a simultaneous eruption of gunfire and shouting by Israeli forces, based on witness accounts and a video that Human Rights Watch reviewed.

Witnesses said several shots were fired as Ghannam approached the corner of his neighbor’s house, where there is an opening to the olive tree grove. At least seven shots can be heard on the video. Human Rights Watch could not establish the direction from which the forces fired and found no evidence that bullets struck the area around where Ghannam was standing, either on the ground or walls, indicating that the shots could have been fired into the air.

Witnesses said Ghannam ran from the gunfire, down the cul-de-sac leading to the main road. The video has audio of several gunshots and shows an individual who appears to be wearing a helmet and a backpack running in the direction that witnesses said Ghannam ran.

Witnesses lost sight of Ghannam as he ran down the cul-de-sac but said that shortly after, they saw Israeli forces return to the area around his house and walk back and forth. After the forces left, residents found a large pool of blood at the end of the cul-de-sac nearest to the main road.

Within hours, an Israeli intelligence officer called a relative of Ghannam who lived nearby, saying that Israeli forces had Ghannam and would provide information about him if the neighbor they had come to arrest surrendered. Shortly thereafter, the officer called again and told the relative: “I have a present for you.” The authorities had detained the wanted neighbor’s younger brother, gave him Ghannam’s blood-stained cellphone, and then released him. The brother handed the phone to Ghannam’s family.

At about 8 a.m., the Palestinian Coordination and Liaison Office informed the family that Ghannam had been killed. Israeli authorities took 21 days to return his body to the family.

Click to expand Image Rafiq Ghannam, 20, after he enrolled at Al-Quds Open University in Jenin, specializing in social work. The photo was taken in 2022, the same year he was killed by Israeli forces. © 2022 Private

An autopsy report from the Palestinian National Authority’s Public Prosecution Office notes a 0.5 centimeter wound on Ghannam’s back under the left shoulder, that it assessed as the bullet entry wound, and a 3.5 centimeter wound with irregular edges on Ghannam’s chest, that it assessed as the exit wound. The entry and exit wounds suggest that Ghannam was facing away from his shooter.

In a statement released later on July 6, the Israeli military said: “the force initiated a suspect apprehension procedure, which included opening fire at a suspect who fled from a building, and detected an injury to the suspect. The force provided medical aid to the suspect, but he was later pronounced dead. The circumstances of the case are being investigated.” Haaretz initially reported that the military said Ghannam threw a Molotov cocktail at the forces who had entered his neighborhood to arrest “a terror suspect.”

A subsequent report by Haaretz indicated that the Israeli forces’ investigation was complete and had been submitted to the military advocate general to decide whether any charges would be brought.

The outcome of the investigation has not been disclosed, and there have been no further announcements. The Israeli military did not respond to a Human Rights Watch letter requesting information on the status of the case.

There is no evidence that indicates that Rafiq Ghannam engaged in any acts of violence or that he presented an imminent threat of serious injury or death to Israeli forces. The Israeli military said on July 6 that it shot Ghannam because he fled a building and did not stop, an insufficient justification for the use of lethal force under the applicable international standards.

Mali: Islamist Armed Groups, Ethnic Militias Commit Atrocities

Human Rights Watch — Wed, 08 May 2024 00:00:00 -0400

Click to expand Image The National Road 15, going from Mopti region in southern Mali – where the Islamist armed group JNIM attacked two villages on January 27, 2024 – to Burkina Faso. © 2021 AMAURY HAUCHARD / AFP

(Nairobi) – An Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist armed group killed at least 32 civilians, including 3 children, and set fire to over 350 homes in central Mali in January 2024, forcing about 2,000 villagers to flee, Human Rights Watch said today. Earlier in January, an ethnic militia killed at least 13 civilians, including 2 children, abducted 24 other civilians, and looted property and livestock in central Mali. These attacks violate international humanitarian law and are apparent war crimes.

Human Rights Watch documented two attacks by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, JNIM) on the villages of Ogota and Ouémbé, Mopti region, on January 27, and two attacks by Dozo militia on the villages of Kalala and Boura, Segou region, in early January. These attacks occurred amid recurrent tit-for-tat killings and communal violence in central Mali. Mali’s transitional military authorities, which took power in a May 2021 coup, should urgently investigate the abuses, fairly prosecute those responsible, and provide better protection for all civilians at risk.

“Islamist armed groups and ethnic militias are brutally attacking civilians without fear of prosecution,” said Ilaria Allegrozzi, senior Sahel researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The authorities need to act to end the deadly cycles of violence and revenge killings and better protect threatened civilians.”

Between February and April, Human Rights Watch interviewed 25 people by telephone with knowledge of the attacks, including 15 witnesses, 3 Malian activists, and 7 international organization representatives. Human Rights Watch also analyzed satellite imagery of burned homes in Ogota and Ouémbé.

Mali has been fighting Islamist armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the extremist armed group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) since 2015. In December 2023, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), pulled out of the country at the request of Mali’s transitional military authorities, raising concerns about protecting civilians and monitoring abuses. In January, the transitional authorities announced that Mali would leave the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), depriving abuse victims of the ability to seek justice through the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice.

Witnesses said that on January 27 the JNIM attacked Ogota, populated mainly by ethnic Dogon, as retaliation for the presence of Dan Na Ambassagou militia in the vicinity. “They invaded the village, shooting at anything and anyone for more than an hour,” said a 40-year-old woman. “They set the whole village on fire.”

On January 6, Dozo militia attacked Kalala, a predominantly ethnic-Fulani village, and killed 13 civilians. “We found six bodies in front of the mosque, and the others inside homes or outside,” said a herder. “The Dozo targeted us because we are Fulani, and they think all Fulani are terrorists.” Witnesses from Kalala said the attack was retaliation for JNIM’s attacks against ethnic Bambara in surrounding villages in October and November.

Malian transitional military authorities have not adequately investigated incidents implicating members of Islamist armed groups or ethnic militias, Human Rights Watch said. In his February report, Alioune Tine, the UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali, stated that he regrets “that no significant progress has been made in prosecuting the alleged perpetrators of multiple violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law attributed to violent extremist groups, militias and community self-defence groups and Malian forces.”

Witnesses to the JNIM attacks said that the Malian security forces failed to adequately protect their communities. “The Malian state has abandoned us,” said a 34-year-old man from Bankass, Mopti region. “Since 2018, the jihadists have imposed Sharia [Islamic law] on us, attacked our villages, mined our roads, [and] kidnapped our children. We have always called for help from our authorities, but there has been no response. These attacks continue because terrorists enjoy freedom of action and are never held accountable.” A witness to the Dozo militia attack in Boura on January 3, however, found the authorities willing to respond promptly, saying that local gendarmes “acted quickly … and arrested three militiamen.”

Human Rights Watch has also documented serious abuses by the Malian security forces and apparent Russia-backed Wagner forces during counterinsurgency operations in central Mali.

Under international humanitarian law, the fighting in Mali is considered a non-international armed conflict. Applicable law includes Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary laws of war, which apply to non-state armed groups as well as national armed forces. The laws of war prohibit summary executions, torture, attacks on civilians and civilian property, and looting, among other violations. The government has an obligation to impartially investigate and appropriately prosecute those implicated in war crimes, which are serious violations of the laws of war committed with criminal intent.

“The Malian transitional government’s failure to hold Islamist armed groups and ethnic militias to account only emboldens abusive forces to commit further atrocities,” Allegrozzi said. “The authorities should ramp-up efforts to appropriately investigate and prosecute all those responsible for grave abuses.”

For witness accounts and other details, please see below. The names of those interviewed have been withheld for their protection.

Abuses by the JNIM

The Islamist armed group JNIM emerged in March 2017 as an umbrella coalition of Al-Qaeda-aligned groups, including Ansar al-Din, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Mourabitoun, and Katibat Macina. Human Rights Watch has previously documented serious abuses by the JNIM across Mali.

The JNIM has concentrated its recruitment efforts on ethnic Fulani, exploiting their frustrations over government corruption and competition over natural resources. This has exacerbated tensions between the Fulani and other ethnic groups, especially the Bambara and Dogon, leading to the formation of ethnic self-defense groups, such as the Dozo and Dan Na Ambassagou, which have taken protecting their villages and property into their own hands.

Ogota and Ouémbé, Mopti Region, January 27

On January 27 at about 6 p.m., scores of JNIM fighters armed with Kalashnikov-style assault rifles and riding motorbikes and vehicles mounted with heavy machine guns led simultaneous attacks on Ogota and Ouémbé villages, three kilometers apart, four witnesses said.

The fighters, who wore headscarves and spoke Fulfulde, a language widely spoken in Mali, killed 28 villagers in Ogota, including 8 women, 4 older men, and 3 children, and 4 villagers in Ouémbé, including 2 women. Witnesses said the fighters burned at least 150 homes in Ogota and 130 homes in Ouémbé, then returned on February 1 to burn the remaining intact homes.

On January 29, international media reported the attacks, citing information from local authorities. In a February 1 statement, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, said he was “alarmed by reports that about 30 civilians were killed in attacks by yet unidentified gunmen” on Ogota and Ouémbé, and called for an impartial investigation and for those found responsible to be “brought to justice in trials observing international standards.”

A 46-year-old farmer from Ouémbé said:

I saw the terrorists coming. They split into two groups: one headed toward Ouémbé, and the other toward Ogota. The group heading toward Ouémbé … was made up of about 20 motorcycles and a pickup truck with a machine gun mounted on top. The group heading to Ogota was larger. A few minutes after the convoy passed me, gunshots were heard from Ogota, then gunshots could also be heard from Ouémbé. The shooting lasted about an hour and a half.

Villagers said they believed they were attacked because some members of the Dan Na Ambassagou militia refused to lay down their weapons following a deal between the militia and the JNIM. The Dan Na Ambassagou is an umbrella organization of self-defense groups started in 2016 “to protect the Dogon country” that provided security in Ogota, Ouémbé and surrounding villages.

A 24-year-old former Dan Na Ambassagou militiaman from Ogota said:

At the beginning of the movement, we fought the jihadists, but in late 2018, we realized that the jihadists were better armed and that our involvement in the militia made our villages the targets of the jihadists. The jihadists cut off market roads, kidnapped our relatives, prevented us from practicing agriculture, and besieged our villages to the point that our children died of hunger. Some of us decided to negotiate with the jihadists and lay down weapons. However, some militiamen refused the negotiations, so our movement split into two: we accepted a deal with the jihadists, others continued to fight them. It’s because of those who kept fighting that our village was attacked.

Witnesses from Ogota and Ouémbé said that residents learned days earlier about an imminent threat from the JNIM. They contacted Malian soldiers based in Bankass and in Bandiagara, respectively about 40 and 70 kilometers from Ogota and Ouémbé, seeking protection, without success.

A 46-year-old farmer from Ouémbé said:

We have been living with the terrorists since 2018. When they have bad intentions against a village, they say it clearly in the WhatsApp groups. So, we contacted our relatives who are civil servants in Bandiagara asking them to inform the soldiers about the threats against our village and Ogota. They met with the military authorities in Bandiagara and told them that the terrorists were gathering in the bush at Bankass and that they planned to attack our villages. But the soldiers didn’t do anything.

Killings in Ogota

Villagers from Ogota said JNIM fighters came at sunset from the southern side of the village. They started shooting heavily from the top of a hill causing villagers to panic and flee. They then stormed the village, firing at people trying to escape or hide.

A 40-year-old woman said:

The jihadists spoke in Fulfulde language and shouted “Allah Akbar” [God is great]. They cheered saying the “enemy village has fallen,” and “this is what we are going to do with all the villages that do not respect Islam.” My husband fled as the shooting started, leaving me and my children in the house. Two women with their children came and hid with us. When the shooting stopped, we decided to leave, but as soon as we went out, gunfire resumed, I was hit in my legs and fell. The two women left me behind and ran with my children.… When the jihadists left, my husband came back to rescue me.

The former militiaman said that when the attack started, he phoned members of the Dan Na Ambassagou militia for help, “but they only came when the jihadists had already left.”

A 34-year-old man said:

When the attack started, I was about four kilometers from Ogota. I heard bursts of machine-gun fire for an hour and a half, and I saw flames coming out from the village. When the shooting stopped, I went back to Ogota and found some villagers and militiamen who were trying to rescue the injured.… The village was covered in smoke, and we could see dead bodies inside and outside homes. Some people had been shot while running, others were executed in their homes. Homes were still on fire. In one house, we found five bodies charred: one woman, a 50-year-old man, and three older men.

Human Rights Watch reviewed two lists of victims compiled by survivors and residents, with the names of 28 people killed, including 3 children under age 2, 4 men over age 68, and 8 women between 30 and 50. At least 5 of those killed appeared to have been shot in the head, 9 were burned, and the remaining were riddled by bullets, witnesses said.

“We buried the bodies the day after the attack,” said a 45-year-old farmer. “Some bodies had bullet wounds everywhere. Others, especially those charred, could not be lifted, so we buried them where we found them. The others were buried separately.”

Killings in Ouémbé

Villagers from Ouémbé described a similar scenario.

“I was home when I heard heavy gunfire,” said a 43-year-old farmer. “By the time I had gathered my family, I saw the terrorists coming in large numbers. They screamed ‘Allah Akbar’ and shot continuously. I fled to Segué.”

A 46-year-old man said:

We heard repeated gunshots and bursts of machine-gun ‘pa-pa-pa.’ I fled to the bush before the terrorists invaded the village.… When shooting stopped at night, I came back and found the bodies of four people, two men and two women, in a home where they were probably hiding.… They had been shot in the chest and the head. We buried them the following day.

Human Rights Watch reviewed two lists of victims compiled by survivors and residents, with the names of four people killed, two men, between ages 50 and 60, and two women, between 30 and 40.

Arson in Ogota and Ouémbé

Witnesses said that during the January 27 attacks, JNIM fighters set on fire at least 150 homes in Ogota and about 130 in Ouémbé, forcing about 2,000 villagers to flee. They also said that the fighters came back four days later to burn remaining homes in Ogota and Ouémbé.

“It was a ghost village,” said the 45-year-old man from Ogota who returned to the village after the attack and later fled with his family to Bankass.

“There was nothing left of the village,” said the 46-year-old man from Ouémbé who returned to the village after the attack. “People had fled, the houses were still burning. All the people have been displaced, including myself and my family. We are now in Bankass and lack everything.”

On satellite imagery that Human Rights Watch analyzed, burn marks are visible all over Ogota and Ouémbé villages. They first appeared over both villages on an imagery from January 28, 10:38 a.m. local time, and were not visible the previous day at the same time. Additional burn marks appeared over both villages on an imagery of February 1, 10:38 a.m. local time, that were not visible the day before.

Infrared satellite image comparison between January 26 and February 1, 2024, shows burn marks all over the village of Ogota, Mopti region, Mali. On infrared images, the vegetation appears in red and the burned areas more clearly in dark.

Infrared satellite image comparison between January 26 and February 1, 2024, shows burn marks all over the village of Ouémbé, Mopti region, Mali. On infrared images, the vegetation appears in red and the burned areas more clearly in dark.

Abuses by Dozo Militia

The Dozo, or “traditional hunting societies,” consisting mainly of ethnic Bambara, have acted as village self-defense forces in Segou and Mopti regions since about 2014. Human Rights Watch has previously documented serious Dozo abuses against Fulani civilians, as well as allegations that Dozo and other self-defense groups have acted as Malian army proxies.

Kalala, Segou Region, January 6

On the evening of January 6, Dozo militia attacked Kalala and killed 13 people, including 3 older men, one of them blind, an older woman, and 2 children, 3 witnesses said. They also burned at least one home, 10 huts, and 20 sheds.

Villagers believe that the Dozo attacked Kalala, with a predominantly Fulani population, in retaliation for JNIM attacks against ethnic-Bambara in several surrounding villages in late 2023.

A man from Kalala said:

Between October and November 2023, some people from Berta, Diado, Kéré, Goumba and Kafagou, which are mainly populated by ethnic Bambara, began arming themselves, breaking the deals they had made with the jihadists. The jihadists then chased them out of their villages. Those driven out of their homes organized themselves and attacked Kalala, a village mostly inhabited by ethnic Fulani. A Fulani village in our area is considered a jihadist village by other communities.

Witnesses said that scores of Dozo militiamen riding motorbikes, wearing distinctive brown hunting clothes and amulets around their necks, and carrying Kalashnikov-style assault rifles and hunting guns, arrived in Kalala after sunset. They stopped at the village football field and started shooting. They headed to the mosque and summarily executed at least six men.

A villager said:

When I saw a dozen Dozo heading towards the mosque, I hid in the mosque’s toilet.… The Dozo rounded up six men in front of the mosque and one Dozo shot each person in the head. I watched the scene from the door [of the toilet]. Among the six were the village chief, the muezzin [who makes the call to the daily prayer], an 83-year-old blind man, and an 80-year-old man.

Witnesses said that, after the killings, the Dozo went door-to-door, looting, burning huts and other properties, and killed seven more people.

A 45-year-old woman said:

I bumped into two Dozo militiamen. One asked me: “Where are your children and your husband?” I replied that my children were not around and that my husband is visually impaired, I begged them to have mercy on us.… They left but set fire to the shed in front of the house.… My husband told me to leave him behind and flee.… I joined 20 other women and children. We walked through the bush at night.… At 6 a.m., we split, some went east, toward Tionce; others went west, toward Saye. I went to Kalala Bamara where a woman helped me and took me in her wheelbarrow back to my village to look for my husband.

The woman said that when she arrived in the village, she saw the bodies of 13 people. “Some [were] shot in the head,” she said, and “the village had been looted” with “several huts and sheds burned.” She found her husband alive and fled with him to Saye.

A man who helped bury the bodies in Kalala said:

We could not bury our relatives for many days because we feared more attacks by the Dozo. On February 3, we decided to go back and found that the bodies of the six men killed in front of the mosque had already been buried in a mass grave, which was uncovered. We don’t know who dug it, but we think the jihadists [JNIM] did it. We just covered it with sand, buried the seven other bodies, and left in a hurry.

Human Rights Watch obtained three lists of victims compiled by survivors and Kalala residents, with 13 names of people between ages 4 and 83. Among those killed, witnesses said, was the village chief and an older woman whose charred body was found in her house.

Boura, Segou Region, January 3

On January 3 at about 8 a.m., scores of Dozo militiamen, riding at least 100 motorbikes, stormed the village of Boura, abducting 24 people, including the 72-year-old village chief, three witnesses said. They also looted homes and livestock.

Witnesses said that the Dozo came from the locality of Ndokoro, 14 kilometers away, and attacked the predominantly ethnic Fulani village. Since late 2023, JNIM had abducted Dozo militiamen in several villages surrounding Boura.

“At the beginning of 2023, the army patrolled our area, so the jihadists suspected that the Dozo were collaborating with the military,” said a 40-year-old woman. “The jihadists then started to kidnap some Dozo. And in retaliation, the Dozo attacked our village.”

Human Rights Watch has previously reported allegations that Dozo and other self-defense groups acted as Malian army proxies.

Witnesses said that the militiamen came with motorbikes, wore distinctive brown hunting clothes and amulets, and carried Kalashnikov-style assault rifles. They said the assailants went door-to-door looking for men and looting homes.

The 40-year-old woman said:

My husband was able to escape. I tried to escape too with my children, but the village was already cordoned off. I went back home and prayed to God. Two Dozo came to my house, asked me where my husband was. I said he wasn’t there. They broke into the house and forced me to give them my silver jewelry.… At about 10 a.m., they left the village.… Everything had been looted. All the men had fled. Only the women and children remained.

Human Rights Watch reviewed a list compiled by survivors and Boura residents with the names of the people abducted, including 23 men, ages 18 to 80, and a 17-year-old boy.

A 50-year-old man, who fled at the Dozo’s arrival, said he went to Segou city, 140 kilometers away:

I went to the gendarmerie to inform the gendarmes that our village had been attacked by a hundred of the Dozo who looted the village, took our animals, and kidnapped people. The gendarmes registered my complaint.… The gendarmes acted very quickly and went to seal off the road connecting Segou to our village.… The following day, the gendarmes were able to stop a truck carrying our looted animals, more than 60 cows, and arrested three Dozo.

Witnesses said that family members of those abducted did not look for their loved ones out of fear of attacks by the Dozo. “Some people told us that they had been killed, but none found their bodies and there is no evidence of that,” said the 40-year-old woman. The 50-year-old man who reported the attack to the gendarmerie said he also informed gendarmes about the abductions, but “we still have no news.”

Trinidad and Tobago: Bring Home Children, Women Held in Iraq

Human Rights Watch — Tue, 07 May 2024 18:08:00 -0400

Click to expand Image Women allegedly associated with the Islamic State (ISIS), wait inside a small room at a court in Bagdad, Iraq, April 17, 2018. © 2018 Afshin Ismaeli/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images

(New York) – The government of Trinidad and Tobago should urgently bring home Trinidadian children and their mothers imprisoned in Iraq because of their alleged association with the Islamic State (ISIS), Human Rights Watch said today. Four Trinidadian women have been held along with their seven children, aged approximately 7 to 15, for nearly seven years.

On May 2, 2024, Iraqi prison authorities forcibly removed two Trinidadian brothers, ages 13 and 15, from their mother’s cell in Rusafa women’s prison in Baghdad and transferred them to a cell with other youths. Their mother, in a voice recording shared with Human Rights Watch, expressed fear that the two boys would be transferred to another prison. She said her youngest son suffered from asthma, anemia, and malnutrition.

“Trinidad and Tobago has publicly promised that it would bring home its nationals from Iraq and Syria, but not a single Trinidadian has returned home in more than five years,” said Jo Becker, children’s rights advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “These children, who are not responsible for any crime, should be in school in Trinidad and Tobago, not languishing in an Iraqi prison.”

The mother in the voice recording expressed further concern about her younger son with health problems: “They took my son from me, they told me he was too big to be staying in a cell with us. They put him in a cell with about 10 boys. We have no education for our children. Nothing. We are going on our seventh year in prison and our children are growing up here.”

Iraqi authorities are holding an estimated 100 children with their mothers at Rusafa prison. Many of the women are foreign nationals who have been charged with or convicted of terrorism-related offenses.

The imprisoned women said that they are willing for their children to be returned to Trinidad and Tobago without them. They said the Red Cross has visited them and that they communicated with the repatriation committee established by Trinidadian Prime Minister Keith Rowley in March 2023, but have had no response from the government regarding their or their children’s situation.

The four women were convicted of ISIS affiliation by Iraqi courts. Human Rights Watch has found serious, widespread flaws in the prosecutions of terrorism suspects, including foreign women. Three of the women are held with five of the children in Rusafa prison, where the women are serving 20-year sentences. A court in the Kurdistan region of Iraq convicted the fourth, who is being held with her two children in Erbil. She recently completed her 6-year sentence and is technically free to leave the prison, but the Trinidadian government has made no effort to assist her return.

The Iraqi authorities’ apparent denial of the children’s right to education over many years, possible responsibility for their lack of access to health care and adequate food, and recent separation of children from their mothers should galvanize Trinidadian authorities to urgently seek their nationals’ repatriation, Human Rights Watch said. The Iraqi and Trinidadian authorities should weigh the children’s best interests and right to family unity and consider repatriating both the children and their mothers, so their children could regularly visit their mothers as they serve out their sentences in Trinidad and Tobago, Human Rights Watch said.

“We are here just waiting, and time is wasting,” said one of the imprisoned Trinidadian women in a voice recording shared with Human Rights Watch on May 4. “Our children remain uneducated without any knowledge.”

A February 2023 Human Rights Watch report documented the unlawful detention of Trinidadian nationals in life-threatening conditions in Kurdish-controlled northeast Syria. Since 2019, at least 39 countries have repatriated well over 8,000 of their nationals from the region. Trinidad and Tobago has repatriated none of their nationals during that time.

“Trinidad and Tobago’s prime minister has pledged to bring the Trinidadians detained in Iraq and Syria home,” Becker said. “He shouldn’t wait any longer.”