To Whom It May Concern:

Through this letter, Human Rights Watch ("HRW") requests copies of documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.

We request these documents on an expedited basis; we also seek a public interest fee waiver and news media fee status.

As explained below, our request concerns final and working policy and other documents that relate to the ability of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to obtain access to communications and related data that the US government has acquired under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (also known as Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, "FISA") or Executive Order 12333 ("EO 12333"). In the context of this request, "related data," also commonly known as "metadata," refers to data that describe a communication: for example, the date, time, and duration of a telephone conversation, or the data, time, sender, and recipients of an e-mail. For our purposes, "related data" also includes location data.

Below, we list our specific requests, followed by an explanation of the relevant laws. We also provide details regarding our requests for expedited processing, a public interest fee waiver, and news media fee status.

I. Requested records

Human Rights Watch respectfully requests, preferably in electronic format and on a rolling basis as the DOJ locates them, copies of formal, final, or implemented legal opinions or determinations that meaningfully address or discuss:

1. The acquisition or collection of communications or related data under Section 702 or Executive Order 12333 as part of efforts to prevent, detect, assess, investigate, or prosecute drug- or immigration-related activities.
a. Please note that some materials may refer to Section 702 simply as the “FISA Amendments Act” (or “FAA”), of which it was a part.

2. The receipt, dissemination, retention, minimization, use, or querying of communications or related data obtained under Section 702 or Executive Order 12333, insofar as these actions are (or have been) part of efforts to prevent, detect, assess, investigate, or prosecute drug- or immigration-related activities.

3. Formal, final, or implemented legal opinions and determinations, procedures, policies, training materials, and memoranda of agreement (with appendices where applicable) concerning the DOJ’s ability to request raw signals intelligence the NSA has acquired pursuant to Executive Order 12333.

4. The authority or practice of any federal, state, local, tribal, or private entity that did not directly acquire or collect such information to query information concerning drug, immigration, or other offenses where that information was originally obtained pursuant to Section 702 or Executive Order 12333.

5. The acquisition, collection, dissemination, receipt, retention, minimization, querying, or use of attorney-client communications pursuant to Section 702 or Executive Order 12333.

6. The use of attorneys’, journalists’, or medical professionals’ identifiers (for example, e-mail addresses, or telephone numbers) as selectors or query terms for the purposes of acquiring, collecting, or querying data pursuant to Section 702 or Executive Order 12333.

7. The authority or practice of any agency or state, local, tribal, or private entity to nominate targets to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (“NSA”) or Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) for the purposes of surveillance conducted pursuant to Section 702.

8. The authority or practice of any agency or state, local, tribal, or private entity to nominate targets to any Intelligence Community element for the purposes of surveillance conducted pursuant to Executive Order 12333.

9. The authority or practice of any agency to acquire, collect, retain, minimize, disseminate, receive, or query communications or related data obtained pursuant to Section 702 or Executive Order 12333 for the purposes of identifying or evaluating potential confidential human sources or informants.

10. The interpretation or application of United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (“Legal Compliance and U.S. Persons Minimization Procedures”), Section 4.1 (“Collection”) and exceptions thereto, insofar as those provisions apply to United States persons.
11. The types of communications that the DOJ regards as constituting “radio communications” for the purposes of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or for the purposes of procedures or policies relevant to Executive Order 12333, including United States Signals Intelligence Directives SP0018 and SP0018J (“Procedures for Monitoring Radio Communications of Suspected International Narcotics Traffickers”).

12. The source of legal authority and/or the legal process for acquiring or collecting, from inside the United States and for foreign intelligence purposes, radio communications between a US person located inside the United States and a non-US person located outside the United States.

13. Any other formal, final, or implemented legal opinions and determinations, as well as policies, that meaningfully discuss or address the interception, collection, processing, or retention of radio, microwave, ultra-high frequency, or cellular wireless communications.

14. The interpretation and application of the terms “foreign intelligence” or “foreign intelligence information” as they appear in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or Executive Order 12333.
   a. This request includes, but is not limited to, the application of the terms “foreign intelligence” or “foreign intelligence information” to drug- or immigration-related activities.

15. The interpretation and application of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(2), which provides that the acquisition of information pursuant to Section 702 “may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States.”

16. The interpretation or application of FISA provision 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4), which concerns “the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communication.”

17. The interpretation or application of “transnational criminal threats” as employed in Section 2 of Presidential Policy Directive 28.

18. The interpretation and application of “[i]nformation … collected with the consent of the person concerned” for the purposes of Section 2.3(a) of Executive Order 12333.
19. The use or request of pretextual stops (potentially also known as “whisper” or “wall”/“wall-off”/“walled-off” stops) of persons or vehicles, or other forms of “parallel construction” or “parallel reconstruction.”

HRW also requests any reports or other conclusions of relevant Inspectors General concerning activities or topics of the nature described in (1)-(19) above.

Please note that where Executive Order 12333 is concerned, we request policies and procedures only insofar as they remain in effect as of the date of this request. Where new policies or procedures are adopted following this request but prior to disclosure, we also request the policies and procedures that are in effect as of the date of disclosure.

II. Background

a. Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act

In 2005, the New York Times reported that the US executive branch had been monitoring the international telephone and Internet communications of people in the United States, based on an executive order and without obtaining judicial warrants. Congress ultimately responded to these revelations by adopting the FISA Amendments Act (“FAA”) of 2008, which added a set of provisions to FISA.

One of these new provisions, Section 702, is now found at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a and empowers the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to authorize surveillance that “target[s] persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States,” so long as a “significant purpose” of the surveillance is to obtain “foreign intelligence information.” Elsewhere, FISA defines the latter term as including, among other things, information related to “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”

Section 702 requires the Attorney General to adopt “targeting” and “minimization” procedures that are “reasonably designed” to provide certain protections to “United States persons.” (The latter term includes US citizens, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and certain corporations and unincorporated associations.) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court must review these targeting and minimization procedures annually; however, the Court does not authorize or approve any individual surveillance targets. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has declassified and released

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3 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a), (g)(2)(v).
4 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(2).
5 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i).
6 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a), (i).
the 2015 minimization procedures for the NSA, FBI, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Counterterrorism Center.⁷

Following former Booz Allen Hamilton contractor Edward Snowden’s disclosure of materials concerning NSA surveillance, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (“PCLOB”) confirmed and described, in a public report whose contents are entirely unclassified, two types of surveillance activity the executive branch conducts pursuant to Section 702. Through the first of these two activities, “PRISM collection,” the executive branch “sends a selector, such as an email address, to a United States-based electronic communications service provider”; the provider is then “compelled to give the communications sent to or from that selector to the government.”⁸

Through the second Section 702 surveillance activity described by PCLOB, “upstream collection,” the government compels communications companies to search the telephone and Internet communications that flow over certain basic pieces of communications infrastructure (including the circuits that are known as the “Internet backbone”).⁹

After the NSA or FBI has acquired data through Section 702 surveillance, these agencies have the ability to “query” (i.e., search) the data in a manner that is similar to searches an Internet user conducts using a search engine, including by using terms such as “a key word or phrase.”¹⁰ Although individuals may only view unminimized data acquired through Section 702 surveillance if the government has authorized them to do so, the relevant PCLOB report and other documents indicate that individuals without such authorization may nevertheless query databases that contain Section 702 data, and that these databases will indicate (in response to the query) that such data exists.¹¹ The individual conducting the search may then ask someone with the appropriate authorization to reveal the Section 702 data itself.¹² Applicable policies that have been declassified permit elements of the Intelligence Community to query Section 702 data using identifiers associated with United States persons under some circumstances.”¹³

Where the dissemination of US domestic communications acquired through Section 702 surveillance is concerned, the NSA’s minimization procedures allow the Agency to share with “appropriate Federal law enforcement authorities” any such communication that “is

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⁹ Id. at pp. 35-37.

¹⁰ Id. at p. 55.

¹¹ Id. at pp. 55-56.

¹² Id.; Memorandum Opinion and Order, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Nov. 6, 2015, pp. 28-29 (hereinafter “FISC Opinion”). This opinion has been declassified and released; see Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Release of Three Opinions Issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,” IC on the Record, Apr. 19, 2016, https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/143070924983/release-of-three-opinions-issued-by-the-foreign.

¹³ PCLOB Report, supra n. 8, pp. 56-59; FISC Opinion, supra n. 12, pp. 26-27.
reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed.”

Meanwhile, the FBI’s minimization procedures generally grant the Bureau broad powers to disseminate “information that is assessed to be evidence of a crime.”

Section 702, along with other provisions of Title VII of the FAA, is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2017 unless Congress renews it.

b. **Executive Order 12333**

Originally issued in 1981, EO 12333 governs United States intelligence activities and was most recently amended in 2008. It provides, inter alia, that the US Intelligence Community must “collect information concerning, and conduct activities to protect against … international criminal drug activities.” The order also authorizes the Intelligence Community to collect, retain, and disseminate “[i]nformation obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence” or “international drug” investigation, as well as “[i]ncidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate Federal, state, local, or foreign laws” and “information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts” and “information necessary for administrative purposes.”

On January 12, 2017, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence publicly released procedures permitting the NSA to disseminate raw signals intelligence obtained pursuant to EO 12333—including communications of US persons—to other Intelligence Community elements in some circumstances.

III. **Request for expedited processing**

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E) and 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(e), HRW seeks expedited processing of this request.

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15 “Minimization Procedures Used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Connection With Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended,” July 10, 2015, pp. 9, 20, 30-32.

16 FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-238), § 2.


18 Id. at § 1.4(b).

19 Id. at §§ 2.3(c), (f), (j).

There is a “compelling need” for the information we have requested, as HRW is “primarily engaged in disseminating information” and there is an urgent need for the organization to “inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government activity” in the area of surveillance practices (5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(e)(ii)).

a. Human Rights Watch is primarily engaged in disseminating information

Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit organization comprised of human rights professionals who engage in extensive fact-finding and reporting on human rights conditions in the United States and elsewhere, providing original factual information and analyses to the US and global public and to media outlets. Where the practices of the United States’ Federal and state governments are concerned, for example, HRW has investigated and reported on interrogation techniques allegedly used by the Central Intelligence Agency, the impact of US surveillance on journalists and attorneys, consequences of the criminalization of the possession of drugs for personal use, and the harms of US border prosecutions.

HRW’s fact-finding work regularly forms the basis of reports by print, broadcast, and Internet media. The organization also disseminates original reports and other factual content to the public, including through its website, www.hrw.org, which receives approximately 15 million unique visitors per year.

HRW therefore meets the statutory definition of a “representative of the news media” as an “entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii); see also Nat’l Sec. Archive v. Dep’t of Def., 880 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Department of Homeland Security recognized HRW as a representative of the news media when responding to a Freedom of Information Act request in 2008 (reference number DHS/OS/PRIV 08-832 PoKempner request).


b. There is an urgent need to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government surveillance activity

As noted above, Section 702 of FISA is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2017, unless Congress renews it. Particularly following the Snowden disclosures that began in June 2013, there has been intense media and public interest, as well as reporting by government-appointed panels, concerning programs conducted under this authority. 23 Multiple books have been published, and feature-length films created, that address Section 702 and/or other US government surveillance topics. 24 In May 2015, the United States Senate held a public hearing concerning the FAA (which includes Section 702), and two legislative amendments have previously been introduced in the House of Representatives with the intention of restricting the querying of Section 702 data. 25 This interest in actual or alleged federal government activities conducted pursuant to Section 702 is likely to intensify as the legislation’s sunset deadline approaches and Congress is forced to decide whether to re-authorize this controversial provision. The public therefore urgently requires the information Human Rights Watch is seeking regarding the federal government’s interpretation of Section 702 (and related policies and procedures) and its treatment of data acquired under this legal authority.

EO 12333 also continues to be the subject of public controversy and debate. Documents disclosed by Snowden that allegedly describe programs the United States operates pursuant to this Executive Order have been the subject of extensive media reporting. 26


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Additionally, whistleblower John Napier Tye has repeatedly raised public concerns about the federal government’s use of this authority in media outlets. As mentioned above, on January 12, 2017, the government publicly released procedures concerning the NSA’s dissemination of data obtained through EO 12333 to other US intelligence agencies; these procedures led to an expression of concern by the American Civil Liberties Union.

The publicly available procedures concerning Section 702 and EO 12333 explicitly contemplate the acquisition and dissemination of US persons’ communications and related data, as well as attorney-client communications. As explained above, EO 12333 also expressly authorizes the Intelligence Community (of which the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration, both DOJ entities, are members) to collect intelligence information as part of an “international drug” investigation or “foreign intelligence” investigation, while the PCLOB report on Section 702 and other publicly available government materials confirm that Section 702 data may be queried or disseminated in connection with criminal inquiries. Additionally, documents previously released by the Drug Enforcement Administration acknowledge the practice of using “parallel construction” or “parallel reconstruction” to prevent the disclosure of Intelligence Community sources and methods court. The requests we have made are therefore of a type that concern actual or alleged Federal government activity.

Thus, there is an urgent need for the public to be as fully informed as possible concerning the government’s activities pursuant to these two major surveillance authorities.

I, Dinah PoKempner, certify that this demonstration of compelling need is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

IV. Request for public interest fee waiver

HRW requests that the DOJ search for, review, duplicate, and furnish any documents responsive to this submission without charge, as the “disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester” (5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii); 28 C.F.R. § 16.10(k)). HRW is a

non-profit organization and has no commercial interest in the DOJ’s response to this request for documents. Additionally, this request is “in the public interest” as defined at 28 C.F.R. § 16.10(k)(2), as it fulfills the four criteria set forth therein: (1) the request concerns “identifiable operations or activities of the Federal Government,” (2) the disclosure of the records sought would be “meaningfully informative about government operations or activities,” (3) the disclosure would “contribute to the understanding of a reasonably broad audience of persons interested in the subject,” and (4) “[t]he public’s understanding of the subject in question” would be “enhanced by the disclosure to a significant extent.”

a. The request concerns identifiable federal government operations or activities

HRW’s request concerns documents pertaining to federal government surveillance activities conducted pursuant to two specific legal authorities: Section 702 of FISA and EO 12333. These authorities explicitly authorize or otherwise contemplate the government’s use of surveillance in the circumstances described therein. As noted above, the federal government’s surveillance activities under Section 702 of FISA have also previously been identified by PCLOB.

b. The disclosure of the records sought would be meaningfully informative about government activities

Through this request, HRW seeks legal analyses, policies, procedures, and training materials. Just as such foundational rules or guidance would presumably be intended to provide meaningful information about the activities in question to DOJ personnel, it would equally provide meaningful information to the public about the nature and processes of these activities as well as applicable limits and safeguards.

c. The disclosure would contribute to the understanding of a reasonably broad audience of persons interested in the subject

As described above, the US’ surveillance practices have generated prolonged and widespread interest on the part of the public as well as news media and Members of Congress, particularly following Snowden’s disclosure of materials in 2013. The disclosures HRW has sought through this request would contribute to the understanding of this broad audience of federal legislators, journalists, legal professionals, civil-rights and privacy activists, and members of the general public who have demonstrated an interest in US surveillance by, e.g., voting on legislation, purchasing books, producing and consuming media reports, submitting motions for discovery, engaging in public discussions and debates, or signing online petitions.

d. The disclosure would enhance the public’s understanding of the subject matter to a significant extent
As indicated above, the disclosures HRW seeks concern foundational legal interpretations, policies, rules, guidance, and instructions that (insofar as they exist) presumably establish the parameters and operations of, as well as safeguards applying to, the relevant US surveillance programs. The disclosure of such foundational materials would enable the public to ascertain the extent and nature of the DOJ’s relationship with these surveillance activities—a matter regarding which the public currently possesses little, if any, unambiguous and detailed information.

HRW disseminates information widely to other members of the media and to the general public (see above); information disclosed in response to this request would therefore contribute significantly to the public’s understanding of the matter in question.

e. Request for news media fee status

HRW also requests an exemption from search fees, and a waiver of other fees that might otherwise apply, as a member of the news media (5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II)-(III); 28 C.F.R. § 16.10(c)(1), (d)(1), (k)); see Part III(a) above for an explanation of our status as a representative of the news media.

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Responses should be addressed to:

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The addressee may also be contacted by e-mail at pokempd@hrw.org or by telephone at (212) 290-4700.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Dinah PoKempner
General Counsel