

TIGHTENING UP IN INDONESIA BEFORE THE APEC SUMMIT

Weeks before the opening of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Jakarta on November 15, the Indonesian government was tightening controls on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the press and taking harsh anti-crime measures involving what appeared to be extrajudicial executions of suspected criminals. A draft presidential decree designed to prevent NGOs from expressing dissent or opposition to government policies was generating protests from human rights, labor, environmental and student organizations, and meetings of NGOs in September and October to discuss the decree were broken up by security forces. Individual activists, from academics to human rights lawyers, were being subjected to various forms of intimidation and harassment. Members of a new independent journalists association, formed after the banning of three news publications in June, found themselves facing threats of dismissal; in mid-October, moves were underway to ban them from covering the APEC meeting. All of these developments seemed intended to ensure that no incidents, organizations or individuals "blackened the good name" of Indonesia prior to or during the APEC summit.

Freedom of Association and the Moves Against NGOs

The draft decree on NGOs was a particularly ominous development. Drafted by the Directorate-General of Social and Political Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior, the decree was made public in February 1994. It took several months for the full implications of the draft to hit home, but by August and September, NGOs were mobilizing to try and prevent its promulgation. The new decree would impose stricter registration procedures and provide for closer government monitoring of NGOs than existing law, in particular the 1985 law on social organizations.¹

Article 4 of the new draft, "Functions, Rights and Obligations," and Article 8, "Procedures for the Freezing and Dissolution of an Organization" are of particular concern. Both give wide scope to the government to shut down any NGO deemed to be engaging in political activity or threatening the national interest. Given government statements during the year, anything from criticism of a Cabinet minister to protesting the construction of a dam to organizing workers in a factory can be considered inimical to the national interest.

The threat posed by Article 8 to freedom of expression and association is obvious:

A community organization engaging in activities which threaten public security and order, and/or receives foreign assistance without the prior approval of the central government

¹ See Asia Watch, *Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor*, (New York: 1989), pp.43-44.

and/or provides assistance to foreign parties that may be detrimental to national or state interests is liable to have its operations suspended...[Article 8(a)(1)]

Activities considered to be a threat to public security and order include: inciting ethnic, racial, religious or class-based hostility; undermining national unity and integrity; undermining the authority of the government and/or discrediting the government; obstructing the implementation of development programs; other activities which have the potential to adversely affect political stability and security. [Article 8(b)(1-5)]

Aid from foreign parties that must have central government approval includes financial aid and assistance in the form of equipment, staff and facilities. [Article 8(c)]

Assistance considered to be detrimental to the nation and state and which may not be provided to foreign parties includes: assistance with the potential to damage Indonesia's relations with foreign countries; assistance with the potential to threaten, challenge, hinder or interfere with national security; assistance which is a threat to national stability; assistance damaging to Indonesia's foreign policy. [Article 8(d)(1-4)]

The last clause could effectively outlaw provision of information by Indonesian NGOs to their international counterparts, particularly if the information then became the basis for diplomatic demarches or international human rights or environmental campaigns -- or even adverse publicity in the international press. Minister of Defense General Edy Sudrajat reinforced the threat in a speech on September 29, 1994 at Syiah Kuala University in Aceh, when he said that Indonesian NGOs were responsible for generating pressure on the government from developed countries in the fields of human rights, labor rights and democracy. He cited in particular the efforts to condition trade on respect for labor rights.²

The decree states that an offending NGO will be given two written warnings prior to being officially banned, but makes no provision for contesting a ban.

The reaction of Indonesian NGOs to the proposed decree was defiant. On August 22, forty NGOs in North Sumatra engaged in human rights, labor, environmental and community development activities signed a declaration to reject the new decree. The declaration said that the draft decree violated Article 28 of the Indonesian Constitution which guaranteed freedom of association and the right to organize. Moreover, it noted, any presidential decree was legally subordinate to the Constitution.

On August 29, a similar declaration was signed in Surakarta, Central Java by forty Javanese NGOs. It urged that the participation of NGOs in the development process not be seen by the government as a threat to its power and authority but as a way of ensuring that development would continue through strengthening communities at the grassroots level. NGOs in West Java issued another such declaration on September 26, noting that the draft decree violated the democratic principle of popular sovereignty.

The arguments had little impact. On September 22, soldiers from the regional military command, Korem 072 Pamungkas, broke up a discussion of NGOs in Yogyakarta on the proposed decree, citing their failure to obtain a permit for the meeting. About thirty people were present at the time, including a lecturer at the law faculty of Gajah Mada University and the executive director of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta, Mulyana W. Kusumah. The organizers of the meeting, from a group called the Yogyakarta NGO Forum (Forum LSM-LPSM D.I.Yogyakarta), had informed the police the day before of their plans to hold the

² "Ada LSM Mengemas Isu Untuk Menekan Negara," *Kompas*, September 30, 1994.

meeting, but said because it was an "internal discussion", they had seen no need to apply for a formal permit.

The meeting was rescheduled for September 27, but it too was broken up shortly after it began at the offices of the Yogyakarta branch of the Legal Aid Institute. Among those who had made presentations to the participants before the police intervened were Arief Budiman, a well-known activist academic, and Soetandyo Wignjosebroto, a member of the national Human Rights Commission. Organizers again refused to apply for a permit on the grounds that it was an internal and not a public meeting. Article 510 of the Indonesian Criminal Code provide for a Rp.25,000 (about \$12) fine for anyone who holds a public meeting without a permit.

Despite, or perhaps because of the draft decree hanging over their heads, NGOs in Indonesia were as willing as they had ever been to test the limits of their room to maneuver. NGOs have begun referring to themselves not as "community development organizations" (*lembaga swadaya masyarakat* or LSM, a euphemistic term preferred by the government) but as "non-governmental organizations" (*organisasi non-pemerintah* or *ornop*, a term that the government has seen as provocative and a challenge to its authority). In August, the largest and best-known Indonesian environmental organization, WALHI, brought a lawsuit against President Soeharto in a Jakarta administrative court. The lawsuit argued that the president, through a presidential decree, had effectively given a no-interest loan to Research and Technology Minister B.J. Habibie from funds earmarked for a reforestation program. The loans was to be used for the development of a new airplane. (It was reporting on financial aspects of Minister Habibie's involvement with the defense industry that led to the banning of *Tempo* in June.)

On October 12, in another bold move, the Indonesian secretariat of INFID (International Forum on Indonesian Development, which includes some of Indonesia's largest NGOs) called on the APEC meeting to look beyond trade liberalization issues to problems of environmental degradation, labor rights, women's rights and distributive justice. Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, director of a non-governmental public policy institute called ELSAM, drew particular attention to the possible negative consequences of trade liberalization on the welfare of workers, in terms of both wages and quality of life.³

Under the terms of the draft decree, such frank statements may be seen by the government as detrimental to the national interest and thus become the pretext for dissolving the organization concerned. It is not clear when the proposed decree will be formally promulgated or whether there is any chance that it might be amended before it becomes law. Many NGO leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch/Asia believe that the Indonesian government will wait until shortly after the APEC meeting to promulgate the decree, and that the final version will differ little from the draft.

Freedom of the Press

³ Heri Akhmadi, "Tiga Usul LSM Untuk APEC," *Jawa Pos*, October 13, 1994.

The Indonesian government has also continued to restrict press freedom, after banning the magazines *Tempo* and *Editor* and the tabloid weekly newspaper, *DeTik* on June 21, 1994.⁴ Members of the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), set up in August 1994 as an alternative to the government-backed Indonesian Journalists Association (*Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia* or PWI), have faced intimidation from their editors, while the editors have in turn faced warnings from the Ministry of Information. Information Minister Harmoko said on September 21 that AJI's existence "could not be justified", and on October 4, Minister of Information Harmoko and PWI head Sofyan Lubis met with leading Jakarta-based editors and obliquely suggested that AJI journalists be fired. Harmoko said that many young journalists who were not members of PWI were opposed to the government and were being manipulated by a third party, perhaps the communists.

At another meeting on October 8, to which editors of all leading newspapers were summoned, PWI officials called for the "re-education" of AJI journalists, and sources in Jakarta said that PWI was seeking to deny AJI members access to the APEC meeting. In the meantime, articles that could possibly be construed as controversial have disappeared from the pages of the surviving press -- neither of the two main morning newspapers in Jakarta, *Kompas* and *Republika*, covered the WALHI lawsuit, for example.

Press bans have also continued. On October 3, Eros Djarot, editor of the banned *DeTik*, launched a new tabloid that looked exactly like the closed weekly except for its title: *Simponi*. A paper with the same name had been authorized to publish in 1985 under the editorial direction of a man named Syamsu Hadi, and Eros Djarot apparently persuaded Syamsu Hadi to lend his name to the revival of the paper under Eros's control. The first issue of the new paper was as lively as the old *DeTik*, with articles on possible CIA involvement in student demonstrations against Soekarno, Indonesia's first president, in 1966; the banning of the Arnold Schwarzenegger film, *True Lies*, on the grounds that it insulted Islam; and the reasons for massive forest fires in Kalimantan.

But after one day, *Simponi* ran into problems. The publishing company that printed *Simponi*, P.T. Golden Web, refused to print another issue until it received guarantees that its printing operations would not be shut down by the government. An article in a bulletin called *Kompak* run by independent journalists out of the West Java city of Bandung, said the Golden Web company had received a warning from the Ministry of Information.

Then, on October 5, the Jakarta branch of the government-backed journalists association, PWI, issued a statement officially cancelling a recommendation it had given Syamsu Hadi in October 1985 that allowed *Simponi* to begin publication. The statement noted that Syamsu Hadi had not lived up to his commitments as a journalist, that journalists who were not PWI members were involved in the running of the revived *Simponi* (some 40 former staff members of *DeTik* were involved in the new tabloid), and that PWI remained the only authorized association of journalists. The effect of the cancellation was to ban *Simponi*, since in order for a newspaper to get a publishing license, the editor-in-chief must have a recommendation from PWI.

⁴ See Human Rights Watch/Asia, *The Limits of Openness*, Human Rights Watch (New York:1994), Chapter II.

The next day, October 6, the central office of PWI endorsed the actions of its Jakarta branch. Syamsu Hadi was then called to a meeting at the Ministry of Information, at which the head of PWI and the Ministry's Director-General for Press Guidance and Graphics, Drs. Subrata, was present. The men noted that an internal dispute within the paper had led in 1989 to the publisher stepping down, and he was never replaced. The fact that *Simponi* was thereby "organizationally incomplete" was another pretext used by the PWI and the Ministry of Information to force the new paper's closure. "It was clear that *Simponi* did not meet the conditions to publish," Subrata was quoted as saying.⁵

Syamsu Hadi, who said the meeting at the Ministry took place in a family-like atmosphere, then issued a statement saying he would not publish *Simponi* for the moment, that he would try and get the organizational questions taken care of, and that he hoped the paper would be back on the streets by the third week in October. He would need, however, the endorsement of the Jakarta branch of PWI, PWI headquarters, and the Newspaper Publishers Association before he can go back to the Ministry and seek permission to publish.⁶

The fate of *Simponi* drew protests within Indonesia and abroad. On October 8, the United States embassy in Jakarta made available a statement criticizing government pressure to suspend publication and calling the suspension "a retrograde step that further diminishes press freedom in Indonesia." The statement said that the U.S. had urged the government to lift the bans on the publications closed in June and saw the action against *Simponi* as "particularly unhelpful."⁷

Simponi was not the first publication to be shut down since June. On September 13, in a move which struck at NGOs as much as at freedom of expression, a bulletin published by Kalyanamitra, a women's rights organization, was shut down by order of Drs. Subrata of the Ministry of Information. In a letter numbered 174/Ditjen/PPG/K/1994, Subrata ordered Kalyanamitra to cease publication immediately because the bulletin, called *Mitra Media*, did not have a license to publish, either as a commercial or as a non-profit paper. The bulletin carried news on international conferences on women as well as discussions of feminist issues.

One radio program, called Jakarta Round-Up, was also shut down, although not by the Ministry of Information. Produced by a commercial broadcast company, Trijaya FM, the program covered controversial political and economic topics and was highly popular in Jakarta. Its troubles started with an interview on the shortage of cement, where a member of the opposition party, PDI, accused the government of being responsible for a widely-publicized shortage of cement out of a desire to raise cement prices. (Cement is produced through one of the conglomerates in which the Soeharto family has a controlling interest.) Then, after the publication of *Simponi* was suspended, the former editor of *Tempo*, Goenawan Mohamad, and another senior journalist, Aristides Katoppo, were interviewed by telephone. They both made hard-hitting comments about the implications of the press closures for democracy in Indonesia. The owner of Trijaya FM then cancelled the program. But the owner was the Bimantara group, a conglomerate owned by one of Soeharto's sons, Bambang Trihatmodjo.

The fate of *Tempo*, the best-known of the magazines shut down in June, continued to hang in the balance. As of mid-October, two magazines were competing to get the facilities,

⁵ "Simponi (Sementara) Tidak Terbit," *Jawa Pos*, October 8, 1994.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "U.S. 'Dismayed' Over Magazine Suspension," *Reuter*, October 12, 1994.

publishing license, and perhaps staff of *Tempo*. One, originally to be called *Opini*, was supported by most *Tempo* journalists and was backed by Goenawan Mohamad. The second, initially to be called *Masa*, was backed financially by Soeharto crony and timber magnate Bob Hasan. (The proposed name was later changed to *Gatra*, after it turned out that a Muslim students' organization already had a magazine called *Masa*.) Hasan was claiming openly that he had obtained the license and expected his new magazine to be on the streets by November 1994 -- before the APEC meeting begins; he was also trying to recruit as many former *Tempo* staff as possible, with financing provided by a new company created for the purpose, PT Era Media Informasi, or EMI. The company promised to hire back journalists at the same salaries they had been making when the magazine was closed, and as of October, twenty-three of some seventy-five journalists had thrown in their lot with Hasan.

On October 8, copies of a magazine that looked exactly like *Tempo* but with the name *Berita* on the cover appeared in Jakarta. (The name *Opini* was also already in use, and *Berita* was the second choice.) In response to a question about how he dared to publish when the magazine did not have a license, Putu Sedia, the editor, said, "As human beings, we propose, but God -- I mean the Ministry of Information -- disposes." He then said the new publication was awaiting "guidance" from the Ministry about whether it could continue publication. As of mid-October, PWI was demanding to see a list of all journalists affiliated to *Berita*, presumably as a way of screening out members of AJI before any decision to issue a publishing license would be granted. The Ministry of Information was also raising questions about the ownership of *Berita*, which was the same company that owned *Tempo*. It was called the Foundation for the Welfare of *Tempo* Employees and was part employee-owned. The Ministry apparently said the name of the company smacked too much of the old magazine and would have to be changed if a new license was to be considered. Chances of getting a new license seemed low in mid-October.

As for the third banned magazine, *Editor*, its editorial staff was reported to be negotiating with the Alatief Corporation, owned by Minister of Labor Abdul Latief, about trying to obtain a new publishing license with capital provided by the corporation.

Harassment of Individual Activists and the Case of George Aditjondro

As noted above, individual activists from human rights lawyers to labor leaders to university professors appear to have been targeted for intimidation in the run-up to the APEC summit. In mid-October, one of Indonesia's most outspoken academics, George Aditjondro was summoned by police in Yogyakarta to be examined as a "witness" in a case involving alleged defamation of government officials.

Aditjondro, who obtained his doctorate in rural sociology from Cornell University in the United States and who now teaches at Satya Wacana Christian University in Salatiga, Central Java, is one of the best-known figures in Indonesia's NGO movement. Before returning to graduate school, he was the director for many years of a community development organization in Irian Jaya and became both a critic of and an authority on development projects involving logging, mining and dam construction. In March 1994, he created a major stir when details of his research on East Timor were published in the Australian press; he became one of the first Indonesians to so publicly take on his own government about abuses in the former Portuguese territory.

On October 5, Aditjondro was attending a conference on East Timor in Lisbon, Portugal, when police officers from the Yogyakarta Resort Command came to his house in Salatiga with a summons,

calling him in for questioning in connection with a violation of Article 207 of the Criminal Code, insulting the authorities of the state of Indonesia through oral remarks. No specific offense was cited, but the summons was based on a police report of August 31.

In interviews in Europe and after he returned to Indonesia, Aditjondro said he believed the summons was in connection with remarks he made on presidential succession at a meeting at the Islamic University of Indonesia on August 11. He had apparently discussed three possible scenarios: Soeharto would be appointed to another term in 1998; that he would formally turn over power to Vice President Try Sutrisno or Minister Habibie but continue to exercise behind-the-scenes control; or that a "people power" movement would emerge as in the Philippines. He also referred in the meeting to the controversy over Habibie's purchase of East German warships, the issue that got *Tempo* closed down, and joked that the power structure in Indonesia could be summed up as "ha ha ha ha": Harto (Soeharto), Habibie, Harmoko (Minister of Information) and Hasan (Bob Hasan, the timber tycoon trying to buy up *Tempo*).

Aditjondro returned to Salatiga on October 9, went to Yogyakarta to give a lecture and got back to Salatiga on October 12 to be confronted by a second summons. It was delivered by a police intelligence officer, Sgt. Ahmad Muchlis, and asked Aditjondro to appear in Yogyakarta on October 15.

Indonesian sources speculated that the summons was part of a pattern of harassment to deter critics of the government from speaking out during the APEC meeting. Others harassed in September and October include Mulyana W. Kusuma of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta, who was visited by officers of the national intelligence agency, BIA, and whose house has been under surveillance; Luhut Pangaribuan, director of the Jakarta branch of the Legal Institute, who was visited by police; members of the independent labor union SBSI and others.

The Anti-Crime Campaign

Pre-APEC moves to present a harmonious image of Indonesia are not confined to restrictions on the press, NGOs, and intellectuals. An anti-crime campaign called *Operasi Bersih* or Operation Clean-Up began in Jakarta in April 1994 under the coordination of Jakarta military commander Maj. Gen. Hendropriyono in his internal security capacity, and at least thirteen suspected criminals had been shot dead in its first month. The operation initially involved some 16,700 military and police personnel, drawn largely from the Greater Jakarta police force and the Jakarta military command, with smaller units from the strategic air command, Kostrad; the air force, the mobile police brigade, and the marines. By June 2, the total personnel involved in the operation was up to 48,000.⁸

Operasi Bersih or its shortened form, *Opsih*, was announced as an effort to rid Jakarta streets of the petty criminals who, according to the police, were "terrorizing" the local population. The Jakarta press quoted officials as saying crime statistics had risen alarmingly, indicating "increasing brutality" as grounds for initiating this "new and firm action." In the words of Maj. Gen. Hendropriyono, "shock therapy" was needed to make the community safe again.⁹

⁸K "Kejahatan Tetap Merajalela," *Editor*, June 2, 1994.

⁹ "Pangdam Jaya: Semua Kejahatan Harus Ditindak Tegas," *Kompas*, March 3, 1994.

The term had grisly connotations. President Soeharto used it in his autobiography to describe a wave of "mysterious killings" (*pembunuhan misterius*, usually shortened to *petrus*) that were in fact not so mysterious: the Indonesian army shot and killed an estimated 4,000 suspected criminals between 1983 and 1985 as a means of deterring crime.¹⁰ The term was used again during counterinsurgency operations in Aceh, the special region on the northern tip of Sumatra, between 1989 and 1991 when military forces left dead bodies along roads as a way of warning others that separatist rebellions would not be tolerated.

Drs. Hindarto, police commander for the Jakarta metropolitan area, also supported the use of the term "shock therapy" to describe the new anti-crime campaign. While he denied the existence of a shoot-to-kill order, he did add that the police "don't want to take risks. If a criminal acts brutally or sadistically, as police we have to protect the community". But he added, "There can be no risks taken with regard to the situation and conditions of the capital city in the future, especially as we approach the APEC meeting in November. With *Operasi Bersih*, we calculate that before November, Jakarta will be free from robbery or any other criminal acts that are now alarming the community."¹¹

The operation revealed Indonesia's concern with its international image as it began preparing for the upcoming meeting. It targeted not only extortion, burglary, murder, drunkenness, and street fighting, but also "displays that are not in accordance with civilized people such as marking up walls which dirty the city's beauty."¹² Alcohol, considered a major trigger of violence, was to be more strictly regulated. All Jakarta's residents were warned not to carry weapons of any type in order to speed up the stopping and searching of vehicles, public transportation and private citizens in high crime areas. All conduct deemed disorderly would be stopped, and anyone who resisted would be considered a criminal, Hendropriyono warned. As proof of the early success of the operation, its spoils were displayed regularly to journalists. In the first nine days, the operation netted five guns, 161 "sharp objects", 478 criminals, 38,000 bottles of alcohol, 3,126 illegal pills and sixteen envelopes of marijuana.¹³

In early May, under orders from *Opsih*'s commander, twenty police officers stopped and searched every passenger on each bus that passed by Jalan Panjaitan, a main avenue in East Jakarta, in the name of *Operasi Bersih*. They were looking for weapons, pornographic magazines and other "suspicious objects." Prostitutes, beggars and street children were also targeted, to improve Jakarta's image for the summit, according to residents who reported seeing officials pulling them off the streets.¹⁴ In June, troops wearing black T-shirts with the word *Opsih* written across them were involved in the violent suppression of a peaceful demonstration in Jakarta to protest the closure of the three newspapers.

¹⁰ Some of these killings had political overtones, as underworld gangs were reportedly often used by factions of the military or the ruling party, GOLKAR, to foment localized unrest or intimidate opponents.

¹¹ "Kapolda Metro:Sebelum November Jakarta Bersih Dari Pencoleng," *Suara Karya*, April 30, 1994.

¹² "Menko Polkam: Uluran Tangan Kopassus Harus Dilihat Positif," *Kompas*, April 16, 1994.

¹³ "478 Penjahat dan Pemabuk Diserok Operasi Bersih," *Suara Karya*, April 20, 1994.

¹⁴ Victor Mallet, *Financial Times*, September 29, 1994.

The initiation of *Operasi Bersih* followed directly from an earlier operation in February called *Operasi Kilat Jaya*, also designed to "calm the people" by stepping up arrests and shooting criminals. Eighteen suspected criminals were shot dead in the first month of the operation. In the week ending February 25, ten suspects were killed, six alone on February 22. The shootings all followed a similar pattern, with the police claiming the suspects were trying to escape. The move to *Operasi Bersih*, in which the army was more directly involved, appeared to be prompted by the killing of a Special Forces (*Kopassus*) general by street thugs in Jakarta in early April. The *Kopassus* commander, Brig. Gen. Agum Gumelar, then offered his forces to the police operation, saying, "We will give all the troops they request, as many as they want, of sharp-shooters or others...The latent danger of communism cannot be forgotten."¹⁵

In addition to the combined police-army force of *Operasi Bersih*, Maj. Gen. Arie Sudewo announced that some 9,000 military personnel would be deployed to safeguard security during the APEC meetings.

Conclusions

The threats against NGOs, the curbs on the press and the stepped-up anti-crime campaign are linked to the APEC summit in different ways. The Soeharto government would clearly prefer to have no unruly demonstrations or expressions of dissent as the meeting nears, although it may hold off imposing the new draconian restrictions on NGOs until the heads of state, including President Clinton, have safely departed. APEC preparations are also playing into the battle over press freedom -- will a new news weekly be out on the streets before the summit to dampen international criticism of violations of freedom of expression, or will the influx of international journalists for the meeting inspire the independent journalists to demand greater freedom of the press? The diplomatic community and foreign press corps are more likely to be concerned about the NGOs and the press than the fate of suspected criminals, but the anti-crime campaign will result in the arbitrary detention of hundreds and more extrajudicial executions before the foreign delegations arrive.

It is imperative that those delegations be prepared to address human rights concerns, and make it known to their Indonesian hosts that an atmosphere of lively debate and respect for the rule of law would be far preferable to one of enforced tranquility, purchased at the price of intimidation, harassment, press bans, arrests, and a shoot-to-kill campaign to wipe out crime. In bilateral meetings with President Soeharto or Indonesian cabinet ministers, delegates to the APEC meeting should raise concerns in particular about the proposed draft decree on NGOs and the efforts to restrict independent journalism. Such attacks on freedom of association and freedom of expression are clear setbacks for moves toward greater transparency in governance.

Human Rights Watch/Asia (formerly Asia Watch)

Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in 1978 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and among the signatories of the Helsinki accords. Kenneth Roth is the executive director; Cynthia Brown is the program director; Holly J. Burkhalter is the advocacy director; Gara LaMarche is the associate director; Juan E. Mendez is general counsel; and Susan Osnos is the communications director. Robert L. Bernstein is the chair of the executive committee and Adrian W. DeWind is vice chair. Its Asia division was established in 1985 to monitor and promote

¹⁵ "Kopassus Siap Bantu Tangkap Penjahat Kakap," *Kompas*, April 15, 1994.

the observance of internationally recognized human rights in Asia. Sidney Jones is the executive director; Mike Jendrzeczyk is the Washington director; Robin Munro is the Hong Kong director; Zunetta Liddell, Dinah PoKempner, Patricia Gossman and Jeannine Guthrie are research associates; Mark Girouard is a Luce fellow; Diana Cheng and Jennifer Hyman are associates; Mickey Spiegel is a research consultant.