

Appendix I:

Letter to Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo

August 13, 2018

Chen Quanguo
Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
Chinese Communist Party Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee
2 Jiankang Road, Tianshan Qu, Urumqi, Xinjiang
People's Republic of China, 830003

Fax: +86 0991-2391440
+86 0991-2398037
+86 0991-2827065

CC: Guo Shengkun
Party Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission
14 Beichizi Street, Dongcheng Qu, Beijing,
People's Republic of China, 100006

Fax: +86 010-85099004

Re: Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang

Dear Secretary Chen,

Human Rights Watch is an independent international human rights organization that monitors human rights developments in more than 90 countries around the world, including in China.

I am writing to inform you that we are preparing a report on human rights violations committed by the Chinese government in Xinjiang under the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign.” We kindly request the Chinese government’s response to several questions related to our report, which we list below.

We would greatly appreciate your response to the questions below, as well as any additional relevant information you wish to provide us on this issue, so that it can be

reflected in our forthcoming report. Human Rights Watch strives to ensure the accuracy of our research and we look forward to being able to include your response in our findings.

In light of our publishing schedule, we would highly appreciate receiving your response by August 31, 2018. Please send your response to Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch, by email at XXX or by fax at XXX.

Thank you for your attention to this matter, and we look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Richardson', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Sophie Richardson
China Director
Human Rights Watch

Questions:

1. In state media reports, Xinjiang authorities have acknowledged the existence of “political education camps” and characterize them as correctional or rehabilitation facilities for “[incorrect](#)” or “[sick](#)” thoughts. Yet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokespersons, when asked by foreign journalists, have repeatedly [denied that these facilities exist](#). Can you clarify whether these camps exist in Xinjiang?
2. Can you clarify the legal basis for these camps?
3. Please provide the number of individuals subjected to political education camps for any period of time from January 1, 2017 to the present, broken down by ethnicity, age, gender, duration of and reasons for detention.
4. Human Rights Watch has learned that local authorities require that police officers and other government officials are required to meet detention quotas for political education camps. Can you confirm whether such requirements exist?
5. Human Rights Watch found that teenage children under 18, pregnant and breastfeeding women, and people with mental disabilities are held in these political education camps. Can you confirm that this is the case?
6. Please provide information on the number of individuals who died while in political education camps since January 1, 2017. Please provide information on the outcomes of investigations into these deaths, including the causes of death, and whether any officials have been held accountable for these deaths.
7. What specific measures have Xinjiang authorities taken to prevent torture and other ill-treatment in official detention centers, and to ensure that detainees have access to lawyers of their own choosing?
8. Human Rights Watch found on official websites that the Xinjiang government [maintains a list](#) of “75 behavioral indicators of religious extremism.” Can you confirm that this is a government list?

9. Human Rights Watch found on official websites that the Xinjiang government maintains a list of 26 “sensitive countries.”²⁴⁹ Can you confirm that this is a government document?
10. International media have reported that children are being detained in boarding schools or orphanages, under terrible and overcrowded conditions, especially once their parents are in political education camps. Can you confirm whether these reports are accurate? If so, what is the legal basis of such a policy?
11. We have received information that in some locales in Xinjiang, authorities have forced Uyghur women to marry Han men. Are these reports accurate? Human Rights Watch also learned that, in some cases, local authorities are giving monetary rewards for intermarriages between Uyghur or ethnic Kazakh people with Hans. Can you clarify whether such policies exist?
12. What is the legal basis for the [recall of passports](#) from residents across Xinjiang, which began in late 2016?
13. What is the legal basis of the Xinjiang government’s restrictions of movement in Xinjiang, particularly of Turkic Muslims, including by requiring that they apply before they can travel outside of the area in which their hukous are registered?
14. Human Rights Watch has [documented](#) the Xinjiang government’s compulsory collection of DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans, and blood types of all residents in the region between the age of 12 and 65. What is the legal basis for such mass biometric collection program?
15. Human Rights Watch has [documented](#) the use of a predictive policing program based on big data analysis in Xinjiang called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform. Can you confirm the existence of such a program?

²⁴⁹ Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.

Appendix II: Letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Kairat Abdurakhmanov

August 3, 2018

Kairat Abdurakhmanov
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
31, Kunayev str.
010000 Astana
Republic of Kazakhstan

Fax: +7 (7172) 72-05-16

Re: Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang, China and the Role of Kazakhstan

Dear Minister Abdurakhmanov,

On behalf of Human Rights Watch, please accept my regards.

I am writing to inform you that we are currently preparing a report on human rights violations committed by the Chinese government in Xinjiang, China, under the “Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism. “We kindly request the Kazakh government’s response to several questions related to our findings, which we list below.

As you may know, Human Rights Watch is an independent international human rights organization that monitors human rights developments in more than 90 countries around the world, including in China and in Kazakhstan.

Human Rights Watch’s forthcoming report finds that the Chinese government is responsible for mass arbitrary detentions, torture and mistreatment in various detention facilities in Xinjiang, including in unlawful “political education camps“, as well as forced political indoctrination, movement restrictions, heightened religious restrictions and mass surveillance throughout the region. These abuses are discriminatory because they disproportionately target Turkic Muslims, including ethnic Kazakhs and Uyghurs.

A part of this report discusses the role of the Kazakhstan government in handling cases of Kazakh citizens and ethnic Kazakhs facing arbitrary detention and persecution in Xinjiang.

Human Rights Watch is grateful for the constructive dialogue with the Kazakh government on a range of mutually important human rights issues over the last two decades. We hope to expand our engagement to include the topic of the rights of Kazakh citizens and ethnic Kazakhs in China as well.

We would greatly appreciate your response to the questions below, as well as any additional relevant information you wish to provide us on this issue, so that it can be reflected in our forthcoming report. Human Rights Watch strives to ensure the accuracy of our research and looks forward to being able to include your response in our findings.

In light of our publishing schedule, we would highly appreciate receiving your response by **August 27, 2018**. Please send your response to Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch, by email at XXX, or by fax to XXX.

Thank you for your attention to this matter, and we look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



Sophie Richardson
China Director
Human Rights Watch

Questions:

1. What is the nature of the Kazakh government's interaction with the Chinese government concerning Xinjiang's Strike Hard Campaign? According to publicly available information, your government has sought the release of Kazakh citizens from political education camps, and is discussing with the Chinese government the cases of 625 ethnic Kazakhs, asking that they be allowed to leave China. Is this description accurate?
2. How many Kazakh citizens are being detained in Xinjiang's political education camps, and how many have been released and returned to Kazakhstan? Does the government of Kazakhstan track the number of ethnic Kazakhs—regardless of their citizenship—being held in political education camps and, if so, what is the number?
3. Has the Kazakh government publicly or privately called on China to end abuses in its Strike Hard Campaign, and called for the release of ethnic Kazakhs detained in political education camps in Xinjiang?
4. Has the Kazakh government asked China to compensate Kazakh citizens for any physical and psychological harm they have endured from China's Strike Hard Campaign?
5. The Xinjiang government maintains a list of 26 "sensitive countries," including Kazakhstan. The government persecutes and detains people in China who have links to these countries, including people who live in or have visited Kazakhstan, or who have families in Kazakhstan, or who express their Kazakh identity? Is Kazakhstan aware of this list and taking any action in response?
6. In response to the escalating persecution of Turkic minorities, including ethnic Kazakhs in China, has the Kazakh government expedited the process of approving citizenship for ethnic Kazakhs and asylum requests for Uyghurs from Xinjiang living in Kazakhstan?

7. Some ethnic Kazakh children are living in Kazakhstan without their parents or guardians as a result of the Strike Hard Campaign. Is the Kazakh government aware of this, and if so, has the Kazakh government taken any steps with regard to their citizenship status?
8. Has the Kazakh government provided financial and other support to Kazakh families in Kazakhstan affected by the Strike Hard Campaign, particularly those with dependent children and older people?
9. Has the Kazakh government investigated claims by some Kazakhstan citizens and residents that they are under surveillance or are being threatened by Chinese security agents while in Kazakhstan?

Response Email from Minister's Office (Unofficial Translation)

August 25, 2018

Dear Sophie Richardson,

My name is Azamat Ayap. I am a Counselor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

With regard to your appeal [case no. redacted], it is my pleasure to inform you that cooperation with the People's Republic of China is one of the foreign policy priorities for the Republic of Kazakhstan. Thanks to personal friendship and regular contacts between the Heads of the two states, the quality level of our interstate relations is gradually increasing based on the principles of mutual respect, equality, a high level of trust, mutual understanding, and good-neighborliness.

The fruitful cooperation is developing between our countries in the political, trade-economic, and cultural-humanitarian fields. The nature of cooperation between Kazakhstan and China in the context of security forces, law enforcement, and special services on all topical issues is developing dynamically.

Against the background of strong ties of friendship and good neighborliness between our countries, a large Kazakh diaspora in the PRC, constantly showing its loyalty to the Central Government of the PRC, is considered by Kazakhstan as a kind of human "bridge of friendship" between Kazakhstan and China. As reported, at present, the number of the Kazakh diaspora in China is about 1.6 million people, with the majority living in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (*about 1.58 million people*).

It should be noted that the Chinese authorities treat the Kazakhs as one of the indigenous peoples and pursue an appropriate policy to support ethnic minorities. There are a number of Kazakh publishing houses and editorial offices, periodicals, television channels, and radio stations broadcasting in the Kazakh language in Xinjiang. In 2016, the Chinese Government allocated significant funds for the development of the editorial office of Kazakh radio and television programming, as well as the translation and printing office. At

the same time, all issues related to the development of language and cultural heritage of ethnic minorities are officially regulated by the state.

According to representatives of the Kazakh diaspora, officials in Beijing in recent years have been generally pursuing a consistent policy with respect to the Kazakh diaspora, supporting representatives of political and business circles of the ethnic group in Xinjiang.

In particular, in 2016, many representatives of the Kazakh elite were promoted and appointed to responsible offices in the People's Government, the People's Political Consultative Council of the Autonomous Region. In the districts of the Ili-Kazakh Autonomous Region, Altai, and Tarbagatai, representatives from the younger generation of the Kazakh diaspora were appointed as mayors.

On the whole, issues concerning the situation around ethnic Kazakhs in China are under constant control of the MFA of the RK and are regularly included in the agenda of bilateral negotiations and consultations between representatives of the Kazakh foreign-policy services and the state bodies of the PRC.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan periodically receives appeals concerning ethnic Kazakhs living in the PRC.

In accordance with Article 55 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963, interference in internal affairs of another State is not permitted. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan conducts negotiations with the Chinese party with regard to such appeals, and sends relevant notes to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

According to the data from the Chinese party, in most cases, there are violations of Chinese law.

It should be noted that our countries on the basis of the key documents signed between the Heads of states in recent years (*the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan, December 2002, Beijing, Joint Statement on Establishing and Developing a Strategic Partnership Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan, July*

2005, Astana; Joint Statement on Developing Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan, June 2011, Astana; Joint Declaration on New Stage of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan, August 2015, Beijing)
continue deepening comprehensive strategic partnership relations and filling them with new content.