

LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2000

Toward a Mine-Free World

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

Landmine Monitor Core Group:
**Human Rights Watch · Handicap International · Kenya
Coalition Against Landmines · Mines Action Canada ·
Norwegian People's Aid**

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The International Campaign to Ban Landmines calls for

An international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and sale, transfer, or export of antipersonnel landmines;

The signing, ratification, implementation, and monitoring of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty;

Increased resources for humanitarian demining and mine awareness programs;

Increased resources for landmine victim rehabilitation and assistance.

ABOUT LANDMINE MONITOR

Landmine Monitor is an unprecedented initiative by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to monitor implementation of and compliance with the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally to assess the efforts of the international community to resolve the landmines crisis. It is the first time that non-governmental organizations are coming together in a coordinated, systematic and sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly document progress and problems.

The main elements of the Landmine Monitor system are a global reporting network, a central database, and an annual report. *Landmine Monitor Report 2000: Toward a Mine-Free World* is the second such annual report. The first annual report was released in May 1999 at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique. To prepare this report, Landmine Monitor had 115 researchers from 95 countries gathering information. The report is largely based on in-country research, collected by in-country researchers. Landmine Monitor has utilized the ICBL campaigning network, but has also drawn in other elements of civil society to help monitor and report, including journalists, academics and research institutions.

It should be understood that Landmine Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an effort by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations that they have taken on with regard to antipersonnel mines; this is done through extensive collection, analysis and distribution of information that is publicly available. Though in some cases it does entail investigative missions, Landmine Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Landmine Monitor is meant to complement the States Parties reporting required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It was created in the spirit of Article 7 and reflects the shared view that transparency and cooperation are essential elements to the successful elimination of antipersonnel mines. But it is also a recognition that there is a need for independent reporting and evaluation.

Landmine Monitor and its annual report aim to promote and facilitate discussion on mine-related issues, and to seek clarifications, in order to help reach the goal of a mine-free world. Landmine Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole. It seeks to be critical but constructive in its analysis.

Landmine Monitor Report 2000 contains information on every country of the world with respect to landmine ban policy, use, production, transfer, stockpiling, mine clearance, mine awareness, and survivor assistance. Thus, the Monitor does not only report on States Parties and their treaty obligations, it also looks at signatory states and non-signatories as well. All countries—as well as information on key players in mine action and victim assistance in the mine-affected countries—are included in this report in the belief it will provide an important means to gauge global effectiveness on mine action and banning the weapon.

As was the case in our first year, Landmine Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report has its shortcomings. It is to be viewed as a work in progress, a system that will be continuously updated, corrected and improved. We welcome comments,

clarifications, and corrections from governments and others, in the spirit of dialogue and in the search for accurate and reliable information on a difficult subject.

Landmine Monitor 2000 Process

In June 1998, the ICBL formally agreed to create Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. A Core Group was established to develop and coordinate the Landmine Monitor system. The Core Group consists of Human Rights Watch, Handicap International, Kenya Coalition Against Landmines, Mines Action Canada, and Norwegian People's Aid. Overall responsibility for, and decision-making on, the Landmine Monitor system rests with the Core Group.

Research grants for Landmine Monitor 2000 were awarded in September 1999. The global research network met in Brussels, Belgium 31 January-2 February 2000 to discuss initial findings, exchange information, assess what research and data gathering had already taken place, identify gaps, and ensure common research methods and reporting mechanisms for the Monitor. In mid-March draft research reports were submitted to the Landmine Monitor Core Group for review and comment. On 15-17 May the members of the research network met again in Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands to present their final reports and discuss their main findings through a peer review process. Throughout May, June and July the Core Group regional and thematic coordinators verified sources and edited country reports, with a team at Human Rights Watch taking responsibility for final fact-checking, editing and assembly of the entire report. *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* also includes appendices with reports from major actors in the mine ban movement, such as key governments, UN agencies and the ICRC. This report was printed during August and presented to the Second Meeting of States Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva, Switzerland in September 2000.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An unprecedented compilation of this magnitude requires contribution from a broad network of individuals, campaigns and organizations, coordination by a dedicated team and financial support from a number of donors.

This report contains country reports written by 115 Landmine Monitor researchers from 95 countries of the world selected by the Landmine Monitor Core Group. They are cited separately in the List of Contributors. Landmine Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report, especially those individuals, campaigns and organizations who contributed reports at their own cost. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, non-governmental and international organizations, mine action practitioners, and governments, who provided valuable and timely information to our researchers.

We are grateful to the Coordination Team and Working Groups of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines for providing the sections on ICBL activities and for their essential assistance in the release and distribution of the annual Landmine Monitor reports. We thank the invited governments, United Nations agencies, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and non-governmental organizations for submitting reports on their activities which are included in the appendices to this report. We are deeply appreciative to the researchers who provided thematic reports, of which the summaries are included in the Appendices. The entities contributing to the appendices of this report do not necessarily endorse the rest of the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* and they are in no way responsible for other material contained in this report. Likewise, Landmine Monitor does not necessarily endorse, nor does it take responsibility for the accuracy of, material included in the appendices.

Responsibility for the coordination of Landmine Monitor's reporting network lies with the five Core Group organizations and additional organizations and individuals.

- Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose, Mark Hiznay, Alex Vines and Mary Wareham) is the main contact point for Landmine Monitor, thematic coordinator on ban policy and regional research coordinator for the Middle East/North Africa, Pacific, Lusophone Africa, and Central Asia.
- Handicap International (Anne Capelle, Pauline Crick, Luciano Loicano-Clouet, Bertrand Cagne and Emmanuelle Amar) is the thematic coordinator on victim assistance and regional research coordinator for Asia and Francophone Africa.
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- Mines Action Canada (Rita Armstrong, Charlie Avendaño, Kathleen Gotts, Paul Hannon and Celina Tuttle) is responsible for Landmine Monitor's Database and regional research coordinator for the Americas. The tables contained in this report were prepared by Mines Action Canada.
- Norwegian People's Aid (Ellen Heggstad, Per Nergaard, Janecke Wille, and Christian Ruge) is thematic coordinator for mine action.
- Stuart Maslen provided the thematic overview on mine awareness.
- The Institute for Practical Research and Training (Ahmed H. Esa) provided research coordination for the Horn of Africa.

- From April 2000 onwards, the U.K. Working Group on Landmines (Ian Doucet) provided research coordination for Europe.

Initial edits on *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* were completed by the regional research coordinators in May-July 2000 and final editing was done by the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch in June-July 2000. The HRW editing team consisted of Stephen Goose (chief editor), Mary Wareham, Alex Vines, Mark Hiznay, and Jody Williams (ICBL Ambassador and member of the Advisory Committee of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch). Editorial assistance and review was provided by various members of the Human Rights Watch staff. Mary Wareham served as the overall coordinator for the production of the report. Jasmine Juteau and Hannah Novak of the Arms Division proofread, formatted, and provided production assistance, with the aid of Haizam Amirah-Fernandez, Karen Binger, Nicola Brandt, Christian Phillips, and Patrick Minges. Human Rights Watch was responsible for the printing of *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* and for web publication, in cooperation with the ICBL webmaster Kjell Knudsen.

We are grateful to the hosts of the two international meetings necessary to bring together the Landmine Monitor's reporting network and facilitate production of this second annual report:

- Handicap International and the Government of Belgium's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for co-hosting the February 2000 meeting in Brussels, Belgium;
- NOVIB and The Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs for co-hosting the May 2000 meeting in Noordwijkerhout, The Netherlands.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAR	Association for Aid and Relief, Japan
AFD	Agence Française pour le Développement
AFP	Agence France Presse
AHD	Antihandling Device
AP or APM	Antipersonnel Mine
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AT or ATM	Antitank Mine
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CBR	Community Based Rehabilitation
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMAC	Entity Mine Action Center
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU	European Union
FMSP	First Meeting of States Parties
GIS	Geographic Information System
GTZ	German Development and Cooperation Agency
HI	Handicap International
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IADB	Inter-American Defense Board
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDRC	International Development Research Council
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
IFOR	Implementation Force
INAROOE	Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Obstacles
IPPNW	International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network (UN)
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service
LM	Landmine Monitor
LSN	Landmine Survivors Network
MAC	Mine Action Center
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MARMINCA	Mission of Assistance for the Removal of Mines
MASG	Mine Action Support Group

MAT	Mine Action Team
MBT	Mine Ban Treaty
MERCUSOL	Declaration of the Southern Commercial Market
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P. II	Landmines Protocol II of the CCW
QA	Quality Assurance
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCF	Save the Children Federation
SCS	Special Clearance Services
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDHA	UN Dept. of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNMAC	United Nations Mine Action Center
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

INTRODUCTION

The *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction* (“Mine Ban Treaty”)¹ was opened for signature on 3 December 1997. It entered into force on 1 March 1999.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has often been called the “engine” that has driven the antipersonnel mine ban movement that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty, and the ICBL received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for its contribution. But the ICBL has insisted that, as significant an accomplishment as the treaty is, the only real measure of success will be the concrete impact that it has on the global mine problem – in terms of fewer mine victims, more land demined, reduced use of the weapon, diminished production and export, increased destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, a growing number of governments joining and fully implementing the treaty, and greater adherence by non-state actors (armed rebel groups) to the norm against any possession or use of the weapon.

This *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* is intended to help measure that impact.² Some two and one-half years after the Mine Ban Treaty opened for signature, and just over one year since it entered into force, it is apparent that the treaty, and the ban movement more generally, are already making a significant difference. While antipersonnel mines continue to be laid and to take far too many victims, great strides have been made in nearly all aspects of eradicating the weapon. The pace is not as fast as the ICBL would like, and major problems remain, but progress is striking all the same. The world is embracing the new, emerging international norm against the antipersonnel mine.

It appears that use of antipersonnel mines is on the wane globally, production has dropped dramatically, trade has halted almost completely, stockpiles are being rapidly destroyed, funding for mine action programs is on the rise, while the number of mine casualties in some of the most affected states has fallen greatly. And very importantly, even non-States Parties and non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty are taking some important steps toward eliminating antipersonnel mines and joining the ban treaty.

It should also be emphasized that there is no credible, verifiable evidence of any State Party violating the core prohibitions in the Mine Ban Treaty, those banning use, production, and trade. Among the notable developments since *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* is the establishment of the Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts work program to promote full and effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

On the other hand, among the most deplorable developments since *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* are: (1) extensive use of antipersonnel mines in the conflicts in Chechnya and Kosovo, especially by Russian and Yugoslav forces, and (2) continued

¹ The ICBL generally uses the short title, Mine Ban Treaty, although other short titles are common as well, including Ottawa Convention and Ottawa Treaty.

² The reporting period for the first Landmine Monitor annual report was December 1997 to February 1999. The reporting period for this second annual report is March 1999 to May 2000. Editors have where possible added important information that arrived in June and July 2000.

use of antipersonnel mines by treaty signatory Angola, and likely use of antipersonnel mines by treaty signatories Burundi and Sudan. In this reporting period, there was use of antipersonnel mines in three additional conflicts: Chechnya/Dagestan; Kashmir; and the Philippines.

Concerns remain that insufficient resources are devoted to mine action programs, including mine clearance, mine awareness, and victim assistance activities. At a time when there is a danger of the international community turning its attention elsewhere, to deal with the next "hot" issue, there is instead a need for a re-doubling of efforts to get mines out of the ground more rapidly and to better address the needs of mine victims and mine-affected communities.

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

Universalization

One hundred and thirty-seven countries have signed or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty as of 31 July 2000, including two since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*: Tajikistan (acceded 12 October 1999) and Liberia (acceded 23 December 1999). Tajikistan became the second former Soviet republic to become a State Party; Liberia the twentieth African nation (now at 27); mines were used in both countries in the near past. Thirteen other nations have signed or acceded since the Ottawa signing conference on 3-4 December 1997. Since the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify at a later date.

Considering the relatively short time that this issue has been before the international community, the number of signatories -- more than two-thirds of the world's nations -- is exceptional. This is a clear indication of the widespread international rejection of any use or possession of antipersonnel mines.

Every country in the Western Hemisphere has signed except the U.S. and Cuba, every member of the European Union except Finland, every member of NATO except the U.S. and Turkey, 41 of the 48 countries in Africa, and key Asian nations such as Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia. Several of the most heavily mine-affected countries are States Parties -- Cambodia, Mozambique, Bosnia, and Croatia. Several others are signatories -- Angola, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Major past producers and exporters are now States Parties, including Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Moreover, awareness is clearly growing among non-state actors about the global movement toward eradication of antipersonnel mines, and several have in 1999 and 2000 unilaterally pledged to discontinue use.

Still, fifty-six countries have not yet signed the treaty. This includes three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council -- the United States, Russia, and China. It includes most of the Middle East, most of the former Soviet republics, and many Asian nations. Major producers such as the US, Russia, China, India and Pakistan are not part of the treaty. Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and Eritrea are perhaps the most heavily mine-affected countries that have not signed. For the first two, however, there is no internationally recognized government capable of signing, and the Taliban in Afghanistan have unilaterally declared a comprehensive ban.

Virtually all of the non-signatories have endorsed the notion of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines at some point in time, and many have already at least partially embraced the Mine Ban Treaty. There has been no change in the ban policies of some of the key states in the past year. U.S. policy is still aimed at joining the treaty in 2006, if it is successful in developing alternatives to AP mines. Even though Russia has been using AP mines in Chechnya, it reiterated in March 2000 that its policy is “aimed at the banning of landmines.” China has said it supports “the ultimate objective of comprehensive prohibition” of antipersonnel mines. Likewise, India re-stated in December 1999 that it “remains committed to the objective of a non-discriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel mines.”

Universalization clearly remains the biggest challenge facing ban supporters. The fact that only two new countries have acceded to the treaty since its entry into force on 1 March 1999, and none have in 2000 (in contrast to the large number of ratifications by existing signatories), is testament to that.

Ratification³

After achieving the required forty ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. This is believed to be the fastest entry into force of any major multilateral treaty ever. For a State that ratifies or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for it on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State deposited its instrument of ratification. That State is then required to make its implementation report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days, destroy stockpiled mines within four years, and destroy mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.

One hundred nations have ratified the Mine Ban Treaty as of 31 July 1999 -- more than half the world's nations and three-quarters of the Mine Ban Treaty signatories. Twenty-nine governments have ratified since publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*. As with the number of signatories, the number of ratifications is very impressive for the relatively short time the treaty has been in existence. The milestone of 100 ratifications was a major objective of -- and cause for coordinated action by -- the ICBL, the ICRC, and key States Parties.

There is concern that the pace of ratifications has fallen off considerably, although perhaps a predictable and expected occurrence. There were three ratifications in December 1997 at the time of the treaty signing conference, 55 in 1998, 32 in 1999, and 10 from January-July 2000. However, there were six ratifications in June and July 2000, and *Landmine Monitor* research indicates a number of other signatories are aiming to deposit their instruments of ratification with the UN prior to the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000.

³ Throughout this report, the term ratification is used as a short-hand for “consent to be bound.” The treaty allows governments to give consent to be bound in a variety of ways, including ratification, acceptance, approval or accession -- all of which give binding legal status beyond signature. Also for the purposes of this report, those countries who have given their consent to be bound, but have not yet completed the six-month waiting period, are included in the “States Parties” sections of the Regional Chapters.

Regionally, 27 of 41 signatories in Africa have ratified; 26 of 33 in the Americas; 11 of 18 in Asia/Pacific; 32 of 40 in Europe/Central Asia; and, four of five in the Middle East/North Africa.

There are 37 governments that have signed but not ratified the Mine Ban Treaty. Statements and actions on the part of several signatory countries have raised the possibility that these nations are not committed to ratifying the treaty in the near future. Among them are: Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan; Brunei; Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, and Poland.

Implementation – The Intersessional Work Program

At the First Meeting of States Parties, governments agreed to create an “intersessional” work program to be carried out during the year between the annual meetings of States Parties.⁴ The purpose is to ensure swift and effective implementation of the treaty in all its aspects. Five Standing Committees of Experts (SCEs) were formed: General Status and Operation of the Convention; Stockpile Destruction; Mine Clearance; Technologies for Mine Action; and, Victim Assistance. Each SCE met twice to identify areas of concern and develop plans to ensure effective implementation. Their work has served to facilitate better coordination and to spur progress globally on the range of mine issues.

Global Use of Antipersonnel Mines

Perhaps the most disturbing findings of *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* are that:

- Angola, a treaty signatory, continues to use antipersonnel mines.
- It is likely that Burundi and Sudan, also treaty signatories, have used antipersonnel mines in 1999 and 2000. Sudan has denied using AP mines. Landmine Monitor has been unable to get a confirmation or denial from Burundi.

The ICBL condemns any use of AP mines, but is particularly appalled at these governments’ disregard for their international commitments. While none of these governments have ratified the treaty, the use of AP mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty....” Clearly, new use of mines defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.

Landmine Monitor is also very concerned about continued allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by a number of armies in the complicated regional conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), including the armies of three Mine Ban Treaty States Parties: Rwanda,⁵ Uganda, and Zimbabwe. All three of those governments deny use of AP mines, and Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify who is responsible for laying mines in the DRC. Uncertainties about who is responsible for use of

⁴ For more information on the intersessional process and activities of the SCEs, see the reports to Landmine Monitor from the ICBL and the ICBL Working Groups.

⁵ Rwanda ratified the treaty on 8 June 2000. Thus while it has given its consent to be bound, the treaty will not formally enter into force for Rwanda until 1 December 2000. The treaty entered into force for Zimbabwe on 1 March 1999 and for Uganda on 1 August 1999.

antipersonnel mines in the DRC have continued for more than two years now. Landmine Monitor believes that it has reached the point where States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty should make detailed requests for clarification from Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, and should make all necessary efforts to establish the facts regarding mine use in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Even if those States Parties have not used AP mines themselves, they may have engaged in cooperative military action with armed forces that have laid AP mines, which could also constitute a treaty violation. (See below under Joint Operations).

There have also been allegations of use by signatory Ethiopia, in its border conflict with Eritrea. The government of Ethiopia denies using AP mines.

Despite these disturbing findings, as noted in last year's report, AP mines are no longer being used on the scale of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s when millions per year were being emplaced, and when mines were clearly being laid at a much greater rate than being removed. Today, that is no longer the case; we have turned the tide in the battle against mines.

In the reporting period for this Landmine Monitor Report, since March 1999, the heaviest use of mines occurred in Chechnya, by both Russian and Chechen fighters, and in Kosovo, by both Yugoslav and Kosovo Liberation Army forces. Although it is impossible to be certain, some reports indicate hundreds of thousands of mines were used in Chechnya, mostly by Russian forces. Fighting and mine-laying continue at a diminished level as this report goes to print. The UN Mine Action Coordination Center in Kosovo estimates about 50,000 mines were planted during that conflict, nearly all by Yugoslav forces.

It appears likely that since March 1999 there was new use of antipersonnel mines in the following:

Africa

Angola: government and rebels (UNITA)
Burundi: government
Democratic Republic of Congo: government and rebels
Eritrea: government
Senegal: rebels (MFDC)
Somalia: various factions
Sudan: government and rebels (SPLA)
Uganda: rebels (LRA)

Americas

Colombia: rebel groups (FARC, ELN)

Asia-Pacific

Afghanistan: opposition forces (Northern Alliance)
Burma: government and 10 rebel groups
India/Pakistan (Kashmir): Pakistan government and militants
Nepal: rebels
Philippines: rebel groups (MILF, NPA, Abu Sayyaf)
Sri Lanka: government and rebels (LTTE)

Europe/Central Asia

Georgia: non-state actors (use in Abkhazia)
Russia: government (in Chechnya, Dagestan) and rebels (Chechnya)
Turkey and Northern Iraq: rebels (PKK)
FR Yugoslavia: government and rebels (KLA)

Middle East/North Africa

Lebanon: Israel and non-state actors in occupied south Lebanon

Thus, Landmine Monitor believes that from early 1999 to mid-2000, it is likely that antipersonnel mines were used in 20 conflicts. Eleven governments and at least 30 rebel groups/non-state actors used mines. In two conflicts, only governments used AP mines; in nine conflicts only rebels/non-state actors used AP mines; and in nine conflicts both governments and rebels/non-state actors used AP mines.⁶

Moreover, Uzbekistan, though not actively involved in ongoing conflict, was reported to have reinforced its border with Kyrgyzstan with landmines.

The UN reported that Cyprus, a treaty signatory, engaged in minefield refurbishment on its side of the cease-fire line. Landmine Monitor is disturbed that a treaty signatory would engage in such activity. No other signatories are known to have refurbished existing minefields. It is likely that a number of non-signatories have done so.

Compared to last year's *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, the above list includes the addition of use in Chechnya/Dagestan, Kashmir, and the Philippines due to the outbreak of new conflict. For the other additions to the list (Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, Senegal, Sudan, and Nepal), it is likely in each case that AP mines were being used in the previous reporting period (December 1997-February 1999) as well, but such use has now been confirmed through additional research; also, in each case there appears to have been expanded use of AP mines. Those who were listed as using antipersonnel mines in the first Landmine Monitor reporting period but not the second include the governments of Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Turkey, and rebels in Djibouti (who apparently used only antitank mines in 1999-2000).

Global Production of Antipersonnel Mines

Among the developments in the global situation with respect to antipersonnel mine production since *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*:

- Landmine Monitor research did not uncover any evidence of new production of antipersonnel mines by treaty State Parties or signatories.
- Egypt told a UN assessment mission in February 2000 that it no longer produces antipersonnel mines, but it is unclear if this is an official policy or if it constitutes either a moratorium or prohibition on production.

⁶ It also appears there has been mine use since March 1999 by rebels in Djibouti and Ethiopia/Kenya (OLF), but in both cases may involve only antitank mines, not AP mines. There have also been allegations of use by rebels in Algeria (GIA). The governments of India and Armenia have also been accused of mine use in this period, but Landmine Monitor found no supporting evidence.

- In June 2000, Turkish officials told a representative of the ICBL that Turkey no longer produces AP mines, but there has been no formal confirmation of this information.
- While Israel has stated frequently since 1997 that it no longer produces AP mines, an Israeli official told the ICBL in December 1999 that Israel does not rule out production of AP mines in the future if the situation requires it; it is not known if this is official policy.
- There was one unconfirmed U.S. government report that identified Sudan as a current producer of landmines, an allegation not seen before.
- Singapore and Vietnam both confirmed to Landmine Monitor researchers that production of AP mines continues.
- In December 1999, Russian military reconfirmed that the Russian Federation stopped producing blast AP mines.
- The U.S. Department of Defense is seeking to produce a new mine system called RADAM that combines into a single canister existing antipersonnel mines and antitank mines; such a system would be prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty that the U.S. aims to join in 2006;
- India has stated that its production agencies have been instructed to cease production of landmines incompatible with CCW Amended Protocol II. India indicates it will be producing new mines that meet Protocol II standards, including AP mines with self-destruct and self-deactivation features.
- In December 1999, a Pakistani diplomat told the ICBL that new production was required because of the deteriorating condition of many mines in its stockpile, both hand-laid mines and remotely-delivered mines. Pakistan has stated that it has taken steps to produce only detectable AP mines, and mines that meet Amended Protocol II technical standards.
- The South Korean Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that in 1999 its only produced 1,363 Claymore-type mines.
- There is some new evidence that Syria may have been a producer in the past, which was previously unknown.

The number of AP mine producers has dropped dramatically in recent years, from 54 to 16. Of the 16 who are still producers, eight are in Asia (Burma, China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, and Vietnam), three are in Europe (Russia, Turkey, FR Yugoslavia), three are in the Middle East (Egypt, Iran, Iraq), two are in the Americas (Cuba, US), and none are in Africa.

The 38 who have stopped production include a majority of the big producers in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Eight of the twelve biggest producers and exporters over the past thirty years are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and have stopped all production and export: Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

The United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1996, and has a formal cap on its AP mine inventory, but has refused to announce a moratorium or ban and explicitly retains the right to produce at any time in the future. The U.S. banned

production of so-called “dumb” mines, those without self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms, in 1996. Russia in 1998 announced that it had banned production of “blast” mines -- the most common type of mine that explodes from pressure. This would include the PMN mine, which, along with the Chinese Type 72, is one of the most frequently encountered mines around the world. As a result of the new restrictions in Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), production of non-detectable mines by CCW States Parties is stopping, which would include the Type 72 by China.

Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

Landmine Monitor research did not find evidence of antipersonnel mine exports or imports by treaty State Parties or signatories, though some allegations have been made; some concerns have also been raised about possible transit or trans-shipment of AP mines through treaty nations. In two incidents that received a good deal of media and diplomatic attention, attempts were made by Romanian and Pakistani state-owned companies to sell AP mines. (See country reports for details). Romania, a treaty signatory, said that the incident was a “regrettable error” on the part of a low-level company employee and that no AP mines were actually available for purchase. Pakistan, which has a unilateral export ban in place, offered a similar explanation.

There are 34 nations that are known to have exported antipersonnel landmines in the past. Today, all of those nations with the exception of Iraq have at the least made a formal statement that they are no longer exporting. Twenty-two have signed the treaty and thus stopped exporting (though many had unilateral restrictions in place prior to signing). Among non-signatories, one has an export ban in place (USA), four have a moratorium in place (Israel, Pakistan, Singapore and Russia), and six have made declaratory statements that they no longer export (China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Vietnam, FR Yugoslavia).⁷ It is possible, of course, that some of these nations continue to export AP mines despite their public policy pronouncements.

Landmine Monitor researchers did not identify a single significant shipment of antipersonnel mines from one nation to another in 1999 or 2000. This does not mean that no AP mines have been transferred; there are great difficulties in tracking mine trade. But the findings (or lack thereof) are consistent with the observations of military specialists that in fact there have been no major mine shipments of AP mines dating back some five years. A de facto global ban on export already seems to be in place; a norm against AP mine supply seems to already have taken hold.

Global Stockpiles of Antipersonnel Mines

Landmine Monitor estimates that there are more than 250 million antipersonnel mines stored in the arsenals of 105 countries. The largest stockpiles are believed to be held by China (110 million), Russia (60-70 million), Belarus (10-15 million), U.S. (11 million), Ukraine (10 million), Pakistan (6 million) and India (4-5 million).

⁷ Russia’s moratorium and China’s declaratory policy only apply to export of non-detectable and non-self-destruct mines, in keeping with CCW restrictions. However, neither nation is known to have made a significant export since 1995.

Treaty non-signatories have an estimated 225-250 million AP mines in stock, while treaty signatories and states parties account for an estimated 25-30 million. Landmine Monitor had previously estimated Pakistan's stockpile at hundreds of thousands, but discussions with Pakistani officials have resulted in a drastic upward revision to at least 6 million. Other non-signatories believed to have large stockpiles are Iran, Iraq, FR Yugoslavia, Egypt, Israel, Vietnam, and Finland.

In addition to Ukraine (10 million), Mine Ban Treaty signatories with large stockpiles are likely to be Romania, Greece, Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan. None of these nations will reveal information about their mine stocks.

According to the latest data made available by them, the biggest stocks among States Parties are: Italy (4.8 million), Albania (1.6 million), Sweden (1.2 million), Japan (1 million), and Bulgaria (778,455). However, these numbers are out-of-date, as rapid destruction programs are underway in all these countries, except Albania which requires financial assistance.

In addition to governments, many rebel groups also have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.

Destruction

Landmine Monitor research shows that more than 20 million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed in recent years by more than 55 nations.

Twenty-one States Parties have completed destruction of stocks, totaling some 10 million AP mines. Six States Parties have completed destruction in this reporting period (since March 1999): Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, France, Hungary, and United Kingdom.

Others that have completed destruction include: Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Mali, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland. (Note: many of these are keeping a small number of mines for training, as permitted under the treaty).

Another twenty-seven States Parties and signatories are in the process of destruction: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This represents an additional nine nations from last year.

States Parties that have not begun the destruction process include: Argentina, Brazil, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mozambique, Niger, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. Malaysia has developed a plan for destruction.

In addition, several non-signatories have destroyed significant numbers of AP mines. The United States has destroyed 3.3 million AP mines as part of its commitment to eliminate use of dumb mines everywhere but Korea. China destroyed 1.7 million mines, and Russian 500,000 mines, and Belarus 5,000 mines, that were not compliant with CCW requirements. Finland has also destroyed non-CCW compliant mines, but has not revealed the number.

Mines Retained for Training

During the Oslo negotiations, technical experts from the ICBL questioned the need for the Article 3 exception permitting retention (and transfer) of antipersonnel mines “for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...” In its closing statement to the Oslo conference, the ICBL noted that “a number of governments also indicated for the diplomatic record that in Article 3, the ‘minimum number absolutely necessary’ for training mines should be hundreds or thousands, not tens of thousands or more.”

It appears that the majority of States Parties that have stockpiles of AP mines are opting to exercise the Article 3 exception. Many intend to keep between 1,000-5,000 mines. Several intend to keep significantly more: Croatia 17,500; Thailand 15,600; Japan 15,000; Australia 10,000; Peru 9,526; Italy 8,000; Slovakia 7,000; and Slovenia 7,000. Ecuador stated in its Article 7 report that it was going to keep 170,334 mines, but in an SCE meeting indicated that was a mistake and a true number would be forthcoming.

After the ICBL raised this issue repeatedly in the SCE meetings, a number of countries have decided to decrease the number of mines kept: Bulgaria from 10,446 to 4,000; Spain from 10,000 to 4,000. Croatia, Thailand, and Slovakia have indicated they too are re-evaluating their needs.

The ICBL continues to question the need for live mines for training. The ICBL believes that it is important not only to have complete transparency on this, but also to continue to evaluate the necessity for the exception and the potential need for an absolute numerical limitation.

Special Issues of Concern

Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices (Article 2)

During the Oslo treaty negotiations in 1997, the ICBL identified as “the major weakness in the treaty” the sentence in the Article 2.1 definition of antipersonnel mine that exempts antivehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices: “Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.” The ICBL expressed its belief that many antivehicle mines (AVMs) with antihandling devices (AHDs) could function as antipersonnel mines and pose similar dangers to civilians.

To address this concern, which was shared by many government delegations, negotiators changed the draft definition of antihandling device (which had been identical to the one in CCW Protocol II) by adding the words “or otherwise intentionally disturb”: “‘Anti-handling device’ means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with *or otherwise intentionally disturb* the mine.”

It was emphasized by Norway, which proposed the language, and others, that the word “intentionally” was needed to establish that if an AVM with an AHD explodes from an unintentional act of a person, it is to be considered an antipersonnel mine, and banned

under the treaty. This language was eventually accepted by all delegations without dissent.⁸

In *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*,⁹ the ICBL expressed concern that there had not been adequate recognition by States Parties that AVMs with AHDs that function like antipersonnel mines are in fact prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, nor discussion of the practical implications of this. Thus, at the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, and at the meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention in January and May 2000, the ICBL called on States Parties to be more explicit about what types of antivehicle mines and antihandling devices, and what deployment methods, are permissible and prohibited.

At the January 2000 SCE meeting, there was a lengthy discussion on this topic. Nine States Parties reiterated that AVMs with AHDs that can explode from an unintentional act of a person are banned by the treaty. No delegation disputed that fact. Ireland proposed that the SCE form an informal technical experts group to look at the issue and help determine which mines and antihandling devices might fall within the scope of the treaty. It was agreed that the SCE co-chairs would consult with States Parties on the proposal, but at the May 2000 SCE meeting, the co-chairs reported that there was not a consensus on the formation of such an experts group. The ICRC then offered to host technical discussions on the issue, which delegates agreed would be a useful step forward. The ICRC expects to hold a seminar in early 2001, but is encouraging States to prepare technical papers on these issues prior to then. The ICBL supports the ICRC initiative and stresses the importance of thorough advance preparation by States Parties, in which they determine and make explicit which AVMs with AHDs in their arsenals are permitted under the treaty and which are not.

The ICBL has expressed the view that antivehicle mines using tilt rods, tripwires, or breakwires will explode from an unintentional act by an individual, and therefore should be considered banned by the treaty. It also appears that at least some antivehicle mines with certain other sensitive fuzes might explode from the unintentional act of an individual. This is an issue that needs to be addressed explicitly and urgently by States Parties.

The ICRC, Human Rights Watch, and the German Initiative to Ban Landmines have all produced lists and publications regarding antivehicle mines of concern.¹⁰ Landmine Monitor researchers have identified such mines in their individual country studies contained in this report.

The need for clarity on this issue has been underlined by this year's Landmine Monitor research. Some States Parties are destroying certain types of mines classified as antivehicle mines, because the State Party has determined that they will function as an AP mine. But other States Parties are electing to keep the same types of mines. For example, Canada destroyed 20,000 M-21 AVMs with tilt rods; Hungary destroyed

⁸ For a detailed description of the diplomatic history on this issue, see Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," January 2000.

⁹ See Executive Summary, p. 9.

¹⁰ See ICRC, "Information Paper: Anti-Vehicle Mines Equipped with Anti-Handling Devices," April 1999; Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," January 2000; and GIBL website at: <http://www.landmine.de>

100,000 UKA-63 AVMs with tilt rods, and Slovakia destroyed all of its PT-Mi-K antivehicle mines with anti-lift firing mechanisms. Yet the Czech Republic has apparently decided to keep its PT-Mi-K mines, as well as other AVMs with tilt rod fuzes. Likewise, Sweden apparently has several types of AVMs with tilt rod fuzes, but has not said if it intends to destroy them. France reports that it has destroyed a dozen different types of AVMs with tilt rod fuzes and various antihandling devices, though it is not known when or why destruction took place.

The ICBL has also expressed concern that the Mine Ban Treaty does not define “antivehicle mine.” At the least, States Parties should agree on a minimum amount of pressure necessary to explode a pressure-activated antivehicle mine.

Joint Operations (Article 1)

In last year’s *Landmine Monitor Report*, the ICBL raised concerns about the possible participation of States Parties in joint military operations with non-States Parties that use antipersonnel landmines. There is serious concern about the consistency of such operations with the treaty’s Article 1 obligation for a State Party “never under any circumstance...[t]o assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Such joint operations at the least would go against the spirit of a treaty aimed at an end to all possession and use of antipersonnel mines.

These concerns were heightened in this reporting period both by the turn of global events and by information uncovered in the research process. Since the last report, the NATO alliance was involved in the military conflict in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. During the conflict the US maintained the right to use AP mines (though it never did), making concerns about the implications of use of AP mines by a non-State Party in a joint military operation more immediate and tangible than before.

Moreover, research shows that some type of joint operation involving AP mines is already occurring. In May 2000, the UK acknowledged participating in fifteen joint military operations involving use of AP mines over the last three years, while stressing that in no instances were UK armed forces responsible for their use.

This is by no means a problem limited to the NATO alliance. It appears that a number of States Parties in Africa are engaged in military operations with (or in support of) armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines. This would include Namibia (with Angola against UNITA and with DRC government forces against rebels), Zimbabwe (with DRC government forces), Uganda (with opposition forces in DRC), and Rwanda (with opposition forces in DRC). Those states should make clear the nature of their support for other armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear their views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of their military operations with these armed forces. As parties to the treaty, they should state categorically that they will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.

A number of countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, have adopted legislative provisions or made formal statements with regard to possible participation of their armed forces in joint military operations with a treaty non-signatory that may use antipersonnel mines. In each of these cases, government officials have stated that the intent is to provide legal protections to their military personnel who

participate in joint operations with a non-signatory who may utilize AP mines. The ICBL does not cast doubt on the stated motivations of these nations; it does not believe that these provisions and statements are intended to undermine the core obligations of the treaty.

However, the ICBL continues to believe that the legality of State Party participation in joint operations with an armed force that uses antipersonnel mines is an open question, and that participation in such operations is contrary to the spirit of the treaty. The ICBL has called on States Parties to insist that any non-signatories do not use antipersonnel mines in joint operations, and to refuse to take part in joint operations that involve use of antipersonnel mines.

As reported in this *Landmine Monitor Report*, several NATO members have made strong statements rejecting use of AP mines in NATO operations. In June 1998, the French Minister of Defense said that France had already declared before the Atlantic Alliance that France will prohibit the planned or actual use of antipersonnel mines in any military operation whatsoever by its military personnel. He said that France will refuse to agree to rules of engagement in any military operation calling for the use of antipersonnel mines, and that this was made effective in a directive sent out by the Joint Chief of Staff in November 1998. Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, also said that official directives forbid any French military personnel to use AP mines, participate in planning operations implying use of AP mines, or give an agreement to any document mentioning a possible use.

Foreign Minister J.J. van Aartsen of the Netherlands stated on 23 March 1999 that none of the NATO partners will assist the U.S. or Turkey with the use of AP mines, or with preparations for use, and will not tolerate the use of AP mines on their territory. He has also stated that within NATO operations AP mines can no longer play a role. The Dutch military will not participate in any preparatory operational activity with the intention to use AP mines. Dutch soldiers are not allowed to assist with the use of AP mines, nor incite or request the use of these weapons. The command structure has also been made subordinate to this policy: a Dutch commander in joint operations will not order the use of AP mines and Dutch soldiers under U.S. or Turkish command will not execute any order to use AP mines but look for alternative methods to achieve the objective.

“Active Assistance”

In this context, the question has been raised as to what “assist” means in the treaty’s Article 1. A number of governments have interpreted this to mean “active” or “direct” assistance in actual laying of mines, and not other types of assistance in joint operations, such as provision of fuel or security. This narrow interpretation of assistance is of concern to the ICBL; in keeping with the spirit of a treaty aimed at total eradication of the weapon, interpretation of assistance should be as broad as possible.

During the meetings of the SCE on General Status of the Convention, the ICBL has emphasized the need for States Parties to reach a common understanding of the term “assist,” especially as it applies to joint military operations, foreign stockpiling of AP mines, and foreign transit of mines across the territory of a State Party. Full and effective

implementation of the treaty will be enhanced if States Parties are clear and consistent with regard to what acts are permitted and what acts are prohibited.

Stockpiling and Transit of Foreign AP Mines (Articles 1, 2, and 4)

The United States has antipersonnel landmines stored in at least five nations that are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (Germany, Japan, Norway, Qatar, and United Kingdom at Diego Garcia), as well as treaty signatory Greece. The U.S. has engaged in discussions with these nations in an effort to convince them that it is permissible under the treaty to allow U.S. mines to stay. The ICBL believes that it certainly would violate the spirit and likely the letter of the treaty for States Parties to permit the U.S. (or any other government or entity) to stockpile antipersonnel mines on their territory.

On a related issue, the United States has also discussed with a number of treaty States Parties the permissibility of the U.S. transiting mines through their territory. A debate has emerged over whether the treaty's prohibition on "transfer" of AP mines also applies to "transit," with some States Parties maintaining that it does not. This would mean that U.S. (or other) aircraft, ships or vehicles carrying antipersonnel mines could pass through (and presumably depart from, refuel in, restock in) a State Party on their way to a conflict in which those mines would be used. The ICBL believes that if a State Party willfully permits transit of AP mines which are destined for use in combat, that government is certainly violating the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, is likely violating the Article 1 ban on assistance to an act prohibited by the treaty, and possibly violating the Article 1 prohibition on transfer.

The ICRC has also expressed its view that transiting of mines is prohibited by the treaty. Landmine Monitor research shows that States Parties are of divided opinion on this. Nations including South Africa, France, Denmark, Spain, and Slovakia have indicated transit is prohibited, while Canada, Norway and Germany indicate it is permitted.

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

To date, 48 reports have been submitted by States Parties to the United Nations as required by Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹¹ In general the ICBL has found that governments have complied admirably with Article 7. A wealth of information has been put forward, greatly enriching our collective knowledge on the mines situation and showing a commitment to true transparency on the part of States Parties. This information will improve the quality of mine action activities. To be sure, there are concerns about the content of some reports; such concerns are described in the individual country reports of *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.¹²

¹¹ Initial Article 7 reports are due 180 days after entry into force of the treaty for that State Party. Thereafter, annual reports are due by 30 April of each year. Sixteen States Parties have submitted their second annual report.

¹² See also in the appendices the submission by VERTIC on the United Nations and Mine Ban Treaty implementation.

At the January and May 2000 meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, the ICBL outlined a number of overall concerns regarding Article 7 reporting:¹³

Late Reporting. 36 countries are late in submitting their first Article 7 report. These governments have thus far failed to meet a treaty obligation; Article 7 reporting is not optional and due dates are legal deadlines, not targets.

Inconsistent reporting. While some reports are very detailed with a good deal of supplemental information, others have provided a bare minimum. There should be a minimum standard, or “best practices” approach adopted.

Need for Expanded Article 3 reporting. Article 3 reports on mines retained for training and development should also include the specific anticipated purpose and then the actual use of any retained mines.

Need for reporting on Victim Assistance programs. Victim assistance reporting is conspicuously absent from treaty obligations. The SCEs have recommended remedying this by use of an optional Form for Article 7. The ICBL strongly encourages all States Parties to adopt this optional Form and utilize it in the next round of reporting.

Lack of reporting on prohibited AVMs with AHDs. Since some AVMs with AHDs are prohibited because they function like AP mines, there should be Article 7 reporting on any stockpiling or destruction of such mines.

Lack of reporting on Claymore-type mines. Since use of non-command detonated directional fragmentation mines is not permitted under the treaty, States Parties should report on the number of such mines kept in stock, and the steps that have been taken to ensure that they can be used only in command detonated mode.

Lack of reporting on foreign stocks. The United States has AP mines stockpiled in at least five States Parties (Germany, Japan, Norway, Qatar, and United Kingdom at Diego Garcia). None of those states have reported on the U.S. stocks, which should be done to be consistent with the spirit if not the letter of the treaty.

At the May 2000 SCE meeting, the ICBL recommended that States Parties should develop a reporting guide as a means of increasing the quantity and quality of reports. The recommendation was favorably received and the ICBL will work with interested governments to help develop such a guide.

National Implementation Measures (Article 9)

Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty (“National Implementation Measures”) states “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty. However, relatively few of the 100 governments that have signed and ratified the treaty have passed domestic laws implementing the treaty.

The following 20 governments report that they have enacted implementation legislation: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

¹³ See Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Mine Ban Treaty Transparency Reporting,” January 2000.

Macedonia and Sweden report that adequate implementation measures have been taken. A number of other states indicate that the treaty has been incorporated into domestic law, or that existing law is adequate, and new, separate legislation is not needed: Denmark, Ireland, Jordan, Mexico, Namibia, Portugal, Slovakia, and Yemen.

The following states have drafted legislation, but it has not yet become law: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Trinidad and Tobago. Albania, Iceland, and South Africa report that preparations are underway.

Some governments have indicated that they do not believe an implementation law is required, because they have never possessed AP mines and are not mine-affected, thus, no special action is necessary to fulfill the terms of the treaty.

The ICBL is concerned, however, about the need for all states to pass legislation that would impose penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and would provide for full implementation of all aspects of the convention.

HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION

The concept of Humanitarian Mine Action was developed as a response to the growing concern about the impact of landmines on people and communities. Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) seeks to minimize the impact of landmines as a threat to life and limb, and as an impediment to the progress of post-conflict reconstruction and social and economic development. Today, HMA encompasses a wide range of activities: surveys and assessments, the marking, mapping and clearing of mines, mine awareness activities, victim assistance, capacity and competence building, coordination, planning, and quality assurance. The information presented here is based upon data collected by Landmine Monitor researchers for *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, various UN documents, reports, and information from various mine action agencies, media reports, and on the findings from *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.

Landmine Problem

A total of eighty-eight states are affected to various degrees by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Of the mine-affected countries, thirty-three are states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and an additional eighteen are signatories. In addition, Landmine Monitor has conducted research on eleven areas which are not internationally recognized states, but which are mine and UXO-affected: Abkhazia, Chechnya, Falklands/Malvinas, Golan Heights, Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, Nagorny-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan, and Western Sahara.¹⁴

¹⁴ In most places with a mine problem, there is also a problem with UXO. For convenience sake, the term mine-affected will often be used to include both mines and UXO.

AFRICA	AMERICAS	ASIA-PACIFIC	EUROPE/ CENTRAL ASIA	MIDDLE EAST/ NORTH AFRICA
Angola	Chile	Afghanistan	Albania	Algeria
Burundi	Colombia	Bangladesh	Armenia	Egypt
Chad	Costa Rica	Burma (Myanmar)	Azerbaijan	Iran
Congo (Brazzaville)	Cuba	Cambodia	Belarus	Iraq
Democratic Republic of Congo	Ecuador	China	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Israel
Djibouti	Guatemala	India	Bulgaria	Jordan
Eritrea	Honduras	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	Croatia	Kuwait
Ethiopia	Nicaragua	Korea, Republic of	Cyprus	Lebanon
Guinea-Bissau	Peru	Laos	Czech Republic	Libya
Kenya	<i>Falkland/Malvinas</i>	Mongolia	Denmark	Morocco
Liberia		Nepal	Estonia	Oman
Malawi		Pakistan	Georgia	Syria
Mauritania		Philippines	Greece	Tunisia
Mozambique		Sri Lanka	Kyrgyzstan	Yemen
Namibia		Thailand	Latvia	
Niger		Vietnam	Lithuania	<i>Golan Heights</i>
Rwanda		<i>Taiwan</i>	Moldova	<i>Northern Iraq</i>
Senegal			Russia	<i>Palestine</i>
Sierra Leone			Slovenia	<i>Western Sahara</i>
Somalia			Tajikistan	
Sudan			Turkey	
Swaziland			Ukraine	
Tanzania			Yugoslavia	
Uganda			<i>Abkhazia</i>	
Zambia			<i>Chechnya</i>	
Zimbabwe			<i>Kosovo</i>	
<i>Somaliiland</i>			<i>Nagorny-Karabakh</i>	

Survey and Assessment

HMA programs set about reducing, and ultimately removing, the threat of landmines and UXO through a series of phased activities. In order to implement efficient responses to the landmine problem, assessment and survey work is required in order to generate good baseline data. Without good data it is difficult to allocate resources properly, set priorities and measure progress. So far, reliable and comparable data on the landmine problem has been scarce, both concerning the actual location of mines and minefields and concerning the social and economic impact of landmines and UXOs on countries and communities.

In many mine-affected countries, militaries claim to have all the information needed to begin mine action activities. Over a decade of field experience in a variety of mine-affected areas has taught mine action agencies that this is seldom the case. Even in relatively peaceful situations the information available to the military often does not represent the complete picture of the mine situation. Nor does the information available about the location of minefields provide much insight into the impact on affected communities. In order to address the mine problem in a rational manner, and to be able to allocate resources, it is necessary to address the impact of the mines in relation to the affected communities, rather than limit the assessment to the geographical location of the minefields.

According to Landmine Monitor research, between 1997 and 2000, regional or national assessments and surveys have taken place or are underway in twenty-four mine-affected countries and areas. These range from comprehensive impact surveys, to UN assessment missions, to single agency studies. There are concrete plans for surveys in nine additional countries and areas in the near future.

The principal tool for making this assessment is a Level One Impact Survey. This survey provides an assessment of the amount and general location of mines, as well as the impact on the population and other areas affected by the mines. Different international bodies are now conducting assessment missions and surveys in several countries, building on national operations and the knowledge base made available by the military in the different countries.

In Yemen, the first Level One Impact Survey is due to be completed by July 2000. Similar Level One Impact Surveys are either underway or planned in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Mozambique, Somaliland, Thailand, and Western Sahara. The operations are conducted by different organizations, mostly NGOs, and in some cases based on surveys already conducted in the country.

UNMAS has conducted assessment missions in 1999 and 2000 in the following countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Ecuador, Egypt, Namibia, Peru, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. A mission to Belarus is to be conducted in 2000. Additionally, surveys have been undertaken by various national or entity level institutions in such places as Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Kuwait, and Vietnam.

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance operations can be divided into military and humanitarian. Military clearance is mainly for tactical purposes such as clearing access roads and breaching

enemy minefields. Humanitarian mine clearance is clearance of mine and UXO infested areas for civilian purposes, and is regulated by a set of standards developed by the UN and the mine action community in 1995. Central to humanitarian mine clearance is the complete removal of all dangerous objects from a given area, including antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and UXO.

The UN standards regulate both the end effect, as well as the methods for operations, including safety measures for the deminers. Humanitarian mine clearance as defined by the UN can be, and is, implemented by commercial companies, humanitarian NGOs, local authorities, military agencies and personnel, and other actors. The NGOs involved in mine clearance usually also have aims that go beyond the clearance of mines; for example the opening up of affected areas for productive use by marginalized groups. A comprehensive framework for this kind of humanitarian mine action was formulated in the NGO Bad Honnef guidelines.

Humanitarian Mine Action can be divided into different categories by implementing agency: mine action conducted by the army/ministry of defense; mine action conducted by an NGO; and mine action funded by/conducted through a UN organ. In each country it is possible that a mixture of these categories is operational, with various funding sources and implementing agencies.

Most mine-affected countries have a capacity for clearing mines and UXO, for example by deploying military forces or special police. However, clearing large areas to the humanitarian standards established by the international community¹⁵ demands efforts of a different character.

Mine clearance in some form is taking place in sixty-five mine-affected countries or areas. There are Humanitarian Mine Action programs in forty-six countries or areas: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Peru, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

There is smaller scale mine and UXO clearance—spot, on demand, or limited military clearance—in nineteen more countries and areas: Armenia, Belarus, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Oman, Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, Western Sahara, and Yugoslavia.

According to the information made available to Landmine Monitor researchers, in 1999 seven of the largest humanitarian mine/UXO clearance programs cleared a combined total of 168.41 square kilometers of land.¹⁶

- Afghanistan, 110 square kilometers cleared in 1999. Between 1993-1999, 465 square kilometers were cleared.

¹⁵ The recognized standard is that a defined area can be considered cleared if it can be put to use by civilians without exposing them to danger. UN Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance are under revision in 2000, to be completed 2000-2001.

¹⁶ Comprehensive information on areas cleared in 1999 was not available for clearance programs in other nations.

- Bosnia-Herzegovina, 3.7 square kilometers cleared in 1999.
- Cambodia, 11.9 square kilometers cleared in 1999. Between 1993-99, 155 square kilometers were cleared.
- Croatia, 23.59 square kilometers was cleared in 1999.
- Kosovo, 8 square kilometers were cleared in 1999.
- Laos, 6.22 square kilometers cleared in 1999.
- Mozambique, 5 square kilometers were cleared in 1999 bringing the country total to 194 square kilometers.

Coordination of Mine Action

The lack of coordination of mine action efforts is a problem in many areas. Mine action coordination, either by a designated body or by existing planning and coordination structures, is necessary to ensure that resources are spent according to needs and priorities, as well to ensure quality assurance, necessary accreditation of operators, and to avoid duplication of efforts. A competent and strong mine action coordination mechanism is of particular value in situations where donors and operators converge in large numbers.

The absence of coordinating bodies increases affected states' dependence on donors and foreign operators and this also affects the setting of mine action priorities. Similarly, only a minority of the mine-affected countries is reported to have included mine action in the overall planning and priority setting for social and economic development.

Landmine Monitor has identified coordination structures in nineteen mine-affected countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, Guatemala, Jordan, Laos, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen, as well as in Abkhazia, Kosovo, and Iraqi Kurdistan. In the rest of the mine-affected countries and areas, mine action is mainly the domain of the military structures.

Planning of Mine Action

A national plan for removing landmines helps to ensure that priority areas most needed by the population are cleared. A national plan also helps to establish a measure against which to assess the social and economic impact of mine clearance. In this sense, planning is in part dependent on the survey and assessment activity conducted in an affected country. However, few countries have national plans with clearly delineated priorities.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EMAC is responsible for making sure that areas are clear. EMAC also develops Annual Workplans in which the priorities and tasks for demining are addressed. In Abkhazia the HALO Trust and AMAC set the priorities for mine action (e.g. to ensure a return of refugees/IDPs, to demine agricultural land, and to demine infrastructure such as schools and bridges). The Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) is responsible for the implementation of the AMAC policy. In Croatia the government has a Plan for the Demining of Croatian State (priorities therein include the repatriation of refugees, and reconstruction of residential and public areas). The Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center (KMACC) is responsible for the planning of mine action and has divided this into three phases: the preliminary, the emergency, and the consolidation phase.

Rwanda has established the National Demining Organization (NDO), responsible for implementation of the plans decided by the government and the Mine Action Center. In Eritrea the Humanitarian Demining Program (HMP) has put out priorities for demining. These priorities are resettlement for refugees; transportation infrastructure; and use of land resources by the general population. In Vietnam there has been some discussion by the government concerning a national mine and UXO clearance plan. In Egypt the Army defines the priorities, as is the case throughout the Middle East—when priorities exist at all. In Kuwait, the Ministry of Defense set the national demining plan in 1991, and this plan still determines priorities.

Reconstruction and Development of Cleared Land

In many areas, mine action programs are freeing up a scarce resource, safe land. It is vital to ensure that cleared land is being put to good use by those entitled to it. Ownership of and entitlement to land in post-conflict areas is a general problem, and to ensure that poor or marginalized groups are not denied the cleared land they are entitled to, it is vital to have proper procedures in place. Although little systematic information is collected on this important aspect of mine action, this year's Landmine Monitor research indicates that both operators and coordinating agencies have not made this issue enough of a priority.

Once demining operations have been completed, the next step is to ensure that the land is transferred to those entitled to it. This is directly related to the national plan and the priority setting in the countries, and will play a key part in any measure of the socio-economic impact of the demining operations. In order for the communities to benefit from the operations, and to make sure that the cleared land is being used, it is often necessary to carry out studies after the operations are finished. For example, in Cambodia the HALO Trust conducted a study between 1993 and 1999.

In Yemen in December 1999, after the first group of deminers in the country completed a clearance operation, an area was delivered to local villagers. In Zimbabwe a 220 square meter field was handed over to the local town council, while a 359 square meter minefield was cleared by a private company and handed over to the Ministry of Defense. In accordance with Guatemala's National Plan for Demining, cleared land was handed over to a community for the first time in January 2000. CMAC (Cambodia) conducted a socio-economic assessment in 1999 of some 9,977,573 square meters of cleared land. The study indicated that 12% of the land was used for settlement, 50% for agriculture, 2.7% for roads, 22% for other and that 14% remained contentious.

In Norway, a research project called Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC) has explored the impacts of landmines and of HMA. The project is based at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, and has been conducting studies in Afghanistan, Angola and Mozambique. Through conducting case studies of communities hosting HMA operations, the AMAC project has found that agencies tend to focus mainly on the technical aspects of their work, while paying insufficient attention to the needs and capacities of affected populations. Whereas this applies to all aspects of HMA operations, one example taken from AMAC's research is that it often takes years for cleared land to be taken into use, because agencies have failed to see that building confidence requires enduring interaction with the local population. The AMAC project is gradually moving

from researching impact issues and organizational approaches to HMA, toward offering capacity-building for agency staff and for representatives from mine affected communities. AMAC's main funder has been the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Research and Development

In Austria, the Schiebel Austria Company produces mine detectors and related equipment. Currently it is concentrating on developing the CAMCOPTER, an unmanned, remote controlled mini-plane that can detect mines from the air. Belgium has engaged in numerous initiatives in the development of mine detection and clearance technologies, including protection equipment, detection by physical methods, satellite minefield mapping, ground-penetrating radar, electronic- and animal-assisted detection, and processes for the destruction of devices containing explosives or harmful residues such as chemical munitions. It allocated \$1.4 million for R&D in 1999.

In the Netherlands, the International Institute for Aerospace Survey and Earth Science (ITC) in 1999 presented an airborne remote sensing minefield detection system that was tested in Mozambique. This system is a result of a joint international project, involving Luxembourg, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands, and it is financed by the European Commission, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and ITC.

Germany has allocated around \$5.13 million to test field projects in Mozambique, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Cambodia. Sweden has supported tests of Swedish mechanical mine clearance equipment in Croatia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there have been several foreign-made products that have been tested. Norwegian People's Aid has been working with Development Technology Workshop on development of different mechanical mine clearance equipment. In Lithuania since 1994 intensive development has been underway of systems capable of locating and identifying underground objects.

The U.S. Department of Defense has a Humanitarian Demining Research and Development program which researches, tests, and modifies existing technology and equipment. R&D in the U.S. accounts for about 22% of the total HMA funding (some \$64 million to date, including \$18 million in 1999). In Canada, the total budget for research and development in FY 1999-2001 is US\$1.7 million, which goes to the Canadian Center for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT); perhaps the most significant contribution to date is the development of "surrogate" mines for use in the test and evaluation of equipment.

The Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization (funded by the government) will spend US\$2,426,000 over the next five years on mine detection and neutralization. The research program for 1999-2000 is examining, among other things, deminers' needs, the current tools and methods for demining, evaluation of new tools, and development of techniques for more accurately estimating of the costs of mine clearance. The South African company Mechem has been involved in the mine issue for more than twenty-eight years. In March 1999, the U.S. Defense Department awarded Mechem a \$494,000 contract to field-test a mine sniffing electronic dog's nose. South Africa is also doing research on a multi-sensor mine-detecting suite consisting of ground penetrating radar, infrared and metal detector sensors.

LANDMINE CASUALTIES AND SURVIVOR ASSISTANCE**New Victims in 1999-2000**

In the reporting period from March 1999 to May 2000, Landmine Monitor finds that there were new landmine and UXO victims in 71 countries.¹⁷ Landmine Monitor researchers also registered mine casualties in nine areas not recognized internationally as states, but which suffer significantly from landmines and thus have received special scrutiny.¹⁸

In the time period covered by this report mine accidents occurred in:

¹⁷ Landmine Monitor researchers definitively registered mine casualties in 55 countries and one area. In another 16 countries and eight areas, casualties were not formally reported, but evidence points to the strong likelihood of new victims, based on the scope of the landmine problem and previous reports of victims in 1998 and earlier years in those countries.

¹⁸ These include Abkhazia, Chechnya, Golan Heights, Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, Nagorny-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

Mine and UXO Victims in 1999 and 2000				
AFRICA	ASIA-PACIFIC	AMERICAS	EUROPE CENTRAL ASIA	MIDDLE EAST NORTH AFRICA
Angola	Afghanistan	Chile	Albania	Algeria
Burundi	Bangladesh	Colombia	Armenia	Egypt
Chad	Burma (Myanmar)	Ecuador	Azerbaijan	Iran
Djibouti	Cambodia	Nicaragua	Belarus	Iraq
DR Congo	China	Peru	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Israel
Eritrea	India		Croatia	Jordan
Ethiopia	Korea, DPR		Cyprus	Kuwait
Guinea-Bissau	Korea, RO		Estonia	Libya
Kenya	Laos		Georgia	Lebanon
Mauritania	Nepal		Kyrgyzstan	Oman
Mozambique	Pakistan		Latvia	Syria
Namibia	The Philippines		Moldova	Yemen
Niger	Sri Lanka		Russia	<i>Golan Heights</i>
Rwanda	Thailand		Tajikistan	<i>Northern Iraq</i>
Senegal	Vietnam		Turkey	<i>Palestine</i>
Sierra Leone			Ukraine	<i>Western Sahara</i>
Somalia			Yugoslavia, FR	
Sudan			<i>Abkhazia</i>	
Tanzania			<i>Chechnya</i>	
Uganda			<i>Kosovo</i>	
Zambia			<i>Nagorny-Karabakh</i>	
Zimbabwe				
<i>Somaliland</i>				

Scale of the Problem

Trying to get a complete picture on new landmine casualties for the past year (incidence) is as difficult as trying to quantify the number of landmine survivors in the world over time (prevalence). Information remains difficult to collect and it is not possible to obtain a precise global total for mine victims in a single year. However, on the basis of information gathered for 1999-2000, it is clear that landmines pose a significant, lasting and non-discriminatory threat.

As shown in the chart above, in 1999-2000 mine accidents were still occurring in every region of the world: in 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in 17 countries in Europe and Central Asia, in 15 countries in Asia and the Pacific, in 12 countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and in 5 countries in the Americas.

Moreover, there are landmine victims among people coming from mine-free countries – nationals sent abroad for military operations, peacekeeping, or demining operations. This would include victims from: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Italy, Kenya, Liberia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Moldova, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, Turkey, USA, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Senegal, Argentina, Belarus, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

While landmine accidents of course occurred during the armed conflicts being waged in 1999-2000, Landmine Monitor has found that a majority (39) of the 71 countries that suffered mine casualties in 1999-2000 had not experienced any active armed conflict during that time. In some cases the conflict has ended recently; in many other cases the conflict ended a decade or more ago. Civilian casualties during peacetime continue to account for a significant proportion of total landmine casualties.

Although in most instances casualty figures are sketchy and incomplete, a sampling of the findings from the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* country reports follows. It is important to note that not all these findings are for the same time period, and some include casualties only for certain regions of a country.

- In *Albania*, 136 casualties were recorded from June 1999 to July 2000;
- In *Angola* 1,004 casualties were officially recorded from mid-1998 to 2000;
- In *Bosnia-Herzegovina*, there were 94 casualties in 1999;
- In *Burma* there were an estimated 1,500 casualties in 1999;
- In *Cambodia*, 1,012 casualties were recorded in 1999;
- In *Chechnya*, there have been reports of hundreds of victims in 1999 and 2000;
- In *Colombia*, 63 victims were identified in 1999, and 35 in the first half of 2000;
- In *Croatia*, 51 mine casualties were reported in 1999;
- In *Djibouti*, 69 casualties were recorded between 1999 and early 2000;
- In *Eritrea*, 504 casualties were reported between 1994 and mid-1999;
- In *Ethiopia*, 100 deaths were reported from 1998 to 1999;
- In *Jammu and Kashmir [India]*, 835 civilian casualties were recorded in 1999;
- In *Kosovo*, 492 casualties were recorded between June 1999 and May 2000;
- In *Laos*, 102 casualties were reported in 1999;
- In *Lebanon*, there were 50 casualties in 1999 and at least 35 by June 2000;
- In *Mozambique*, 60 casualties were recorded in 1999;
- In *Namibia*, 89 casualties were reported in one region between December 1999 to mid-May 2000;
- In *Pakistan*, 405 victims were identified in Bajaur area;
- In the *Philippines*, 33 mine casualties were reported in year 2000;
- In *Senegal*, 59 mine casualties were registered in 1999;
- In *Sudan*, 51 casualties were found in Chukudum (1999 to May 2000);
- In *Western Sahara*, 42 casualties were reported from Nov. 1999 to March 2000.

Based on Landmine Monitor research, it would appear that casualty rates increased in 1999-2000 in a number of countries and areas, due to a new or expanded conflict:

Albania, Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Chechnya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kosovo, Lebanon, Namibia, and the Philippines.

However, in a number of other heavily mine-affected countries, it appears that the casualty rate is declining, in some cases quite substantially: Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Mozambique, Senegal, and Uganda.

- In *Afghanistan*, the casualty rate is now between 5 to 10 every day, down from 10 to 12 in 1998 and a significant decrease from 20 to 24 in 1993.
- In *Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 94 were casualties recorded in 1999, down from 149 in 1998, 286 in 1997 and 625 in 1996.
- In *Cambodia*, the Landmine Monitor registered 1,012 casualties in 1999, a decrease from 1,715 in 1998 and 3,046 in 1996.
- In *Croatia*, 51 casualties were reported in 1999, down from 77 in 1998.
- In *Mozambique*, 60 casualties were recorded in 1999 down from 133 casualties in 1998.
- In *Senegal*, 59 mine casualties were registered in 1999, down from 195 in 1998.
- In *Uganda*, in Kasese district, where ADF rebels are most active, casualties declined from 17 in 1997, to 28 in 1998, to only one in 1999.

Casualty rates appear to have fallen in other countries as well, but specific data is not available. The reasons for these reductions could be many, including achievement of a cease-fire or peace agreement, or a decline in armed combat. But it is notable that in several of these countries, major mine action programs have been underway. The increased removal of mines from the ground and the increased mine awareness education appears to be having a real impact.

In addition to the 71 states and nine areas with a casualties incidence in 1999-2000, Landmine Monitor has found that more than 30 other countries have a prevalence of victims. Prevalence is where victims were registered in 1998 or before, even if no information on casualties in 1999-2000 is available; in other words, these countries have survivors but no new casualties reported. Combining the incidence and prevalence shows that more than half of the countries of the world are affected by the landmine epidemic and the survivors issue.

States and Victim Assistance

The Mine Ban Treaty requires, in Article 6.3, that “*Each State in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs.*”

Donors to mine victim assistance in 1999 include U.S., UK, Norway, Germany, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Netherlands, Australia, Italy, Denmark, Switzerland, Finland, France, Belgium, Ireland and Austria. Others who have contributed to international programs and funds that include victim assistance are Czech Republic, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa and Spain.

Most of the countries that allocate funds for mine action do not specify the amount that is provided for victim assistance. The policy of many countries is to consider victim assistance as an integrated part of humanitarian mine action. The aid, which might have come from different ministries (Foreign Affairs, Development, etc.), may be given

directly to the affected countries, to multilateral organizations, to NGOs, or to the agency responsible for development.

Components of Victim Assistance

The principal actors in victim assistance generally agree that victim assistance includes the following components:¹⁹

- Pre-hospital Care (First Aid and management of injuries);
- Hospital Care (medical care, surgery, pain management);
- Rehabilitation (Physiotherapy, Prosthetic appliances and assistive devices, Psychological support);
- Social and economic Reintegration (Associations, skills and vocational training, income generating projects, sports);
- Disability policy and practice (Education and public awareness and disability laws);
- Health and Social Welfare Surveillance and Research capacities (Data collection, processing, analysis, and reporting).

Capacities of affected States to provide assistance to landmine victims

States differ in their capacities to meet the needs of landmine victims. One tool used to measure the socio-economic health of states is the Human Development Index.²⁰ Only five out of the 71 countries that reported landmine incidents in 1999 scored high on the HDI scale, and those are countries that are minimally affected by mines. Nearly every mine-affected country in Africa scored low on the HDI scale. Mine-affected countries in other regions score low and medium on the HDI scale. The challenges of providing assistance to landmine victims are obviously greater for less developed countries with a large number of casualties, such as Cambodia, Afghanistan or Angola, than for countries higher on the HDI scale with fewer casualties.

Disability laws and policies in countries reporting accidents

Officially recognized disability laws and policy are essential for establishing equal opportunities for disabled people. Landmine victims living in States with such laws in place can hope to receive better assistance than those living in States without such laws. Unfortunately, only 32 out of 71 countries reporting an incident in 1999-2000 have explicit policies and/or legislation on disability. Countries without specific legislation on disability (especially relatively new States) may include articles in their Constitution which protect the disabled against discrimination in various arenas, a first step towards

¹⁹ Beside the core of health and social capacities and activities, a wide interpretation of assistance may also include socioeconomic development in former mined zones, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons into mine-cleared zones, legal assistance, and other social and economic measures for mine (and UXO) affected communities.

²⁰ The Human Development Index reflects a country's level of health, education, and income. The UNDP calculates the Index using three measures: life expectancy at birth, adult literacy and schooling levels, and the Gross Domestic Product per inhabitant. Countries are assigned to three groups according to the HDI: .8 or higher indicates high human development, between .5 and .79 indicates medium human development, and under .5 indicates low human development.

recognizing disability issues. Finally, some States use common laws with specific amendments to guarantee equal opportunities. Even where policies and legislation exist, they are often implemented slowly and with difficulty. Clearly, the legislative and policy aspects of victim assistance require much development.

In Africa, the countries with a clear national policy on disability are Uganda and Namibia. South Africa, Uganda, and Mozambique have national disability laws. Kenya, Rwanda, and Senegal are in the process of elaborating new laws. Tanzania has a national coordination body on disability. Half of the countries in Africa however have no laws or specific policies regarding disabled people.

In the Asia-Pacific region, half the affected countries have disability laws. In Cambodia, the government is making efforts to assure legal protection to the disabled. Cambodia, Pakistan, and the Philippines have a coordination body on disability.

In Europe, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Estonia have disability laws. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia and Cyprus have a national coordination body on disability.

In the Middle East and North Africa, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq have laws which directly address disability issues; Israel, Palestine, and Yemen are elaborating existing laws and policies. None of the countries in this region has a coordination committee on disability.

In the CIS, most of the countries have disability laws, but only Belarus and Ukraine have coordination bodies on disability. As everywhere in the former Soviet Union, the implementation of the laws remains considerably dependent on the economic capacities of the public administration. In Chechnya, it is likely that legal protection for disabled people has been disrupted to at least the same degree that general health and social welfare have been disrupted.

Health and Social Capacities

A thorough understanding of States' efforts in the field of victim assistance would require the consideration of a wide range of indicators over a long period of time beginning with emergency medical care and continuing until the social and economic reintegration of the victim is complete and secure. Some useful indicators would include victim profiles set against the backdrop of population demographics for each country and over time, medical and social needs that arise as a result of the accident, and the accessibility of services from a logistical and financial perspective. Although such in-depth data is not available for all of the countries, some observations can be made.

Pre-hospital Care (Emergency medical treatment)

The Landmine Monitor has information regarding the existence of pre-hospital care services in eleven of the 71 countries and nine mine-affected areas. Djibouti, Eritrea, Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, Thailand, Belarus, Albania, Azerbaijan, Israel, and Syria, as well as the Golan Heights, are mentioned as having first aid services with variable physical and geographical access. Sparse information is available regarding the financial access to those services.

In a dozen other countries and areas with landmine incidents such services appear to be non-existent. This situation may be particularly dramatic where the presumption of casualties is high, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo or in Chechnya.

There is no information from the remaining countries regarding pre-hospital care. However, it should be stated that emergency care is particularly difficult to provide in heavily mined areas and evacuation to health centers is often problematic.

Hospital Care (medical care, surgery, pain management)

The information collected by Landmine Monitor regarding hospital care confirms some trends which have already been underlined by various actors in victim assistance:

- geographical access: most of the medical services are in urban centers whereas the rural areas are usually the most polluted by mines;
- financial access: the economic situation of affected countries is an obstacle for adequate care of landmine victims;
- political and military constraints are another significant obstacle;
- International Organizations and NGOs working near the affected zones and supporting the urban public services can help improve accessibility.

In 1999, all the governments in Africa provided medical care, mainly in the biggest cities. In the rural areas, medical services often lacked personnel, equipment, and medicines. Military health services usually have better equipment (Angola, Burundi, Niger, Senegal, Uganda) and sometimes care for civilians as well. In about half the affected countries, hospital care is the patient's financial responsibility. Victims without geographic or financial access to hospital services may turn to traditional medicines. NGOs in Africa made a significant difference by adding to and improving government services in 1999.

In the Americas, medical services are reported for Chile. In Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru, only the urban centers, typically far from mined areas, benefit from medical infrastructures.

For the Asia-Pacific region, medical services for landmine victims are located far from the mined areas. In about half the affected countries, medical services are the patient's financial responsibility. NGOs in the Asia-Pacific region made a significant contribution to public services in 1999.

In the affected countries of the former Soviet Union as well as in Central Europe, modern health care services are located in the urban centers. In the majority of cases, there is no information about the hospital fees. Again, Chechnya seems to face the worst situation since the medical infrastructures have been destroyed.

In the Middle East and North Africa, there are medical services in all countries. In Iraq, the international embargo places the same obstacles to health care for landmine victims as it does for the general population.

Rehabilitation (physiotherapy, prosthetics and assistive devices, psychological support)

Government rehabilitation services usually have long waiting lists and require payment both of which landmine victims can ill afford. NGOs have been of great assistance in providing free or subsidized prosthetics in a timely manner. Psychological support is rarely a component of government services. For many countries, services are also concentrated in the capitals or in urban areas, whereas mine-affected areas are in remote places. Community Based Rehabilitation programs (CBR) can provide a partial

remedy to this situation, providing assistance to victims in the villages. It should be noted as well that rehabilitation services are often quite good for military victims but not for civilians. This is the case in the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas.

In Africa, each of the affected countries has rehabilitation services for landmine victims with the exception of Somalia for which no information is available. However, these services are scarce and almost impossible to reach for most victims, especially in Angola, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, and in Casamance. Prostheses are provided free of charge in Burundi, Eritrea, and Mozambique, and at a subsidized cost in Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. Many NGOs and private groups provide prostheses free of charge. Countries that do not produce prostheses locally, e.g. Djibouti, have to import them at high prices. Psychological support is given in Namibia and Sierra Leone. Community Based Rehabilitation programs exist in Mozambique, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

In Central and South America, rehabilitation services are generally provided by States. An exception is Honduras. Costa Rica and Nicaragua provide psychological support to victims and Colombia provides it to disabled soldiers. Services are concentrated in the regions' capitals or in major cities. In Costa Rica, rehabilitation services are free for the most part. In Colombia, it is difficult to get prostheses as well as subsequent adjustments to prostheses. CBR programs are expanding only in Nicaragua.

In the Asia-Pacific region, governments provide rehabilitation services, except in Laos. Often however, these services are inadequate and require substantial help from NGOs, especially in Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, and Sri Lanka. In Cambodia, all services are free of charge thanks to the numerous NGOs. Victims pay for their own rehabilitation in Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam. The governments of Afghanistan, China, and Vietnam are implementing CBR programs.

In Europe, all countries for which data is available have rehabilitation services. Services are only in the capitals for Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; services are provided at no cost to Albanians through the ICRC and to Yugoslavians through the government. Victims in Bosnia & Herzegovina have to pay for their own rehabilitation, although services are generally accessible. Needy Croats receive some rehabilitation services at no cost, but for proper care Croats have to travel to Slovenia. CBR programs and NGO's are very active in rural areas.

In the Russian Federation and in the CIS, excluding Chechnya, rehabilitation services are available in all countries. Azerbaijan has services only in the capital. In Abkhazia and Azerbaijan, services are provided by the government in cooperation with the ICRC. However, in the Russian Federation, governments appear to leave rehabilitation to NGOs. Prostheses are well distributed and free in the whole of Belarus; however, Ukrainian victims must wait a long time for a prosthesis. Abkhazia covers all victims' expenses related to rehabilitation; Azerbaijan only provides free wheelchairs. Finally, psychological support is given to children in Georgia and to all Abkhazians although not on a regular basis. Chechen rehabilitation services have collapsed.

In the Middle East and North Africa, rehabilitation services are available for all victims, with the exception of the Golan Heights and a restriction for the Western Sahara where services are limited. In Egypt, services are especially poor in the mined areas. There is a charge for prostheses. Military victims have better services than civilians. Access to services is especially limited in the Western Sahara but is improving in Yemen. The government provides free services for all victims in Israel and Kuwait; services are

free for the neediest in Syria. Lebanon no longer subsidizes rehabilitation and compensation for Palestine victims is irregular.

Social and economic Reintegration (associations, skills and vocational training, income generating projects, peer counseling, sports)

Socio-economic reintegration activities are not often implemented in mine-affected countries. Where there are such activities, they are usually implemented in urban areas while the affected population is located in rural areas. NGO's implement most of the activities; governments tend to limit their financial commitment to pensions.

In Africa, socio-economic reintegration activities for landmine victims were reported in twelve countries (Angola, Eritrea, Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Burundi). There are no projects in Djibouti. Reintegration activities seem to be geographically accessible only in Kenya and Namibia. Generally, services are concentrated in the capital, far from the affected population of the rural areas. Existing reintegration activities are generally free, in so far as they are mostly provided by international organizations and NGOs. Allowances and benefits are provided by governments in Angola, Djibouti, Mauritania, Mozambique, and Rwanda, while pensions and grants are offered in Eritrea and Namibia.

In the Americas, only El Salvador is reported to have implemented free socio-economic reintegration activities for landmine victims. Colombia certainly lacks this kind of service. Grants or benefits are provided by the governments in El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Chile; pensions are allocated in Costa Rica and in Colombia, in the latter only to military personnel.

In the Asia-Pacific region, most countries have socio-economic reintegration activities for landmine victims implemented by governments with the assistance of NGOs. These countries are Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, India, the Republic of Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Such activities are not carried out in the Philippines. The importance of reintegration activities seems to be understood in the Asia-Pacific countries more than in other regions. Allowances, benefits, or pensions are given by governments in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Cambodia, China, and the Republic of Korea where the beneficiaries are mainly soldiers.

In Europe, these countries have implemented socio-economic reintegration activities: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Croatia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, Cyprus, and Estonia proceed mainly through the allowance of benefits and pensions.

In the countries of the former Soviet Union, socio-economic reintegration activities are very weak. Only the Russian Federation has implemented these activities for landmine victims. No efforts towards socio-economic reintegration were reported in Abkhazia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, or Chechnya. Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan provide pensions.

In the Middle East and North Africa, Jordan, the Golan Heights, Kuwait, Syria, and Israel have implemented socio-economic reintegration activities for landmine victims. Geographical access is problematic in Jordan and the Golan Heights. Most of the time, these services are provided free by governments. Benefits and pensions are allocated in Yemen, Egypt, Israel, and Kuwait.

The Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts

One of the most important outcomes of the First Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty held in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999 was the establishment of the Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness (ISCE-VA). Intersessional work has been open to participation by governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The ISCE-VA was co-chaired by Mexico and Switzerland, with the help of co-rapporteurs, Japan and Nicaragua (who will become co-chairs in September 2000). Over 160 people attended the ISCE meetings on victim assistance, including representatives from at least 43 countries, nine international and regional organizations, 22 NGOs and thirteen other institutions.

The ISCE emphasized the need: to promote an exchange of experiences; to support a wider and more integrated scope of landmine victim assistance; to facilitate the practical use of planning tools at the country level; to share information on resource allocation at the donor, country, and operational agency levels; to formulate methodology and systems for the evaluation of programs.

Important work was accomplished during two intersessional meetings, held in September 1999 and March 2000, in Geneva, Switzerland. Following the first meeting five network groups were established to address the following issues: information and data collection, victim assistance reporting, portfolio of victim assistance programs, strategic approach to guidelines, and donor coordination. Mine awareness was added as a sixth group for the second ISCE meeting.

One result of the ICSE-VA process was clarification of a broad definition of "landmine victim." Another result was much discussion that victim assistance needs to be integrated into the larger development perspectives such as humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction, and public health strategies. Victim assistance was also considered in the context of disability issues. A key question is how to meet the specific needs of landmine victims without setting them apart from larger groups such as victims of violence and trauma as well as people with other disabilities.

Plans for a portfolio composed of one-page descriptions of victim assistance programs from around the world were elaborated. The portfolio is intended to facilitate the sharing of information, promote transparency among actors, and highlight funding gaps.

Various guidelines and tools related to victim assistance and mine awareness were collected and presented. Donor coordination was approached through the key issues of concerted efforts, identification of gaps, and reporting mechanisms.

For affected countries, national coordination bodies were seen as necessary to bring together all actors of victim assistance, to facilitate communication, strategic planning and to coordinate policies and practices. All the actors expressed the need for improvement of mine information systems especially in the field of evaluation.

Victim assistance reporting was taken up as a specific topic for the SCE-VA because there is no explicit requirement in the Mine Ban Treaty for countries to report their contributions to victim assistance. Consultations resulted in a draft proposal regarding a voluntary reporting mechanism with a format similar to other aspects of mine action (Article 7 of the Treaty). The exact method of reporting will continue to be

discussed, but all interested parties agreed to continue to work towards an efficient and effective means to monitor the implementation of Article 6.3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The objective of the information and data collection on Victim Assistance was restated: to deliver baseline data and to quantify the impact on public health and reintegration systems, on human and socioeconomic development, and on the daily life of people and communities. All the actors have expressed the need for the improvement of mine information systems, especially in the field of evaluation (indicators).

A significant result of the first year of the ISCE process was to engage the whole range of actors to continue to work on effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, and to promote quality in victim assistance and mine awareness programs. It was recommended that future work should focus on the rationalization of the roles of the major interlocutors in victim assistance. The ISCE-VA will also continue to focus on identification of gaps in terms of financial, technical, and other resources needed, and to measure progress toward implementation to the Treaty provisions. To increase the efficiency of the ISCE process, it was proposed to merge future work into two types of activities: the implementation of key recommendations and action points from the first year of intersessional work, and analysis of several new themes.

MINE AWARENESS

Mine Awareness, or Mine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Education (MAE) as it is otherwise known, is, in its purest form, a community-level education program that seeks to provide (or generate) viable alternatives to high-risk behavior to populations living or working in, or travelling through, mine-affected areas.²¹ It works best on the basis of two-way information exchange, learning from communities how they survive the daily threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and working cooperatively to identify how the risk of death and injury can be minimized. Mine awareness is frequently confused with public information about the effects of mines and UXO. Such information campaigns are extremely valuable but do not in a strict sense constitute mine/UXO awareness programs.

In fact, the term “mine awareness” is a bit of a misnomer since the need for community education applies to all unexploded devices, including booby-traps, cluster bomblets and other UXO, not just antipersonnel and antitank mines. Moreover, it is less frequent than one might expect that people are “unaware” of the danger of mines. In many situations,²² people know or suspect that an area is mined but go into or through it intentionally. The reasons for this are various: curiosity or adventure seeking, a feeling of invincibility or inevitability, or in most cases just economic or survival pressures. If the alternative to entering the mined field or forest is starvation, community members must sooner or later run the gauntlet of death and serious injury. Seen in this light, the

²¹ The term also includes programs or briefings for humanitarian field staff working in mine-affected countries. In this regard, UNMAS and CARE International are preparing a field handbook intended for concerned non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations staff.

²² Refugee/IDP situations tend to be an exception.

tendency to transfer information such as “don’t go!” or “don’t touch!” from the “experts” to the “unknowing” is likely to enjoy little success.

Key Actors

Among international organizations (IOs) and NGOs, the main players operationally are Handicap International (HI),²³ the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Rädna Barnen. There are a substantial number of other international and local NGOs involved in implementing mine awareness programs. Within the UN system, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is the focal point and leading actor; the New York office of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has a person dedicated to mine awareness.

Country Coverage

There are currently mine awareness programs of varying size and effectiveness in at least the following countries and areas: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Guatemala, northern Iraq, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yemen. Local or small-scale initiatives are also running in Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia (Abkhazia), Swaziland, and Uganda, among others.

But despite this seemingly impressive list of mine awareness programs (MAPs), Landmine Monitor researchers have identified a number of other places where mine awareness may be needed. These include Burundi, Chad, Chechnya, Chile, the Democratic Republic of Congo,²⁴ the Golan Heights,²⁵ Jordan,²⁶ Iran,²⁷ Burma (Myanmar),²⁸ and Vietnam.²⁹ Of course, feasibility studies have to be carried out to

²³ According to Hugues Laurence in HI France, HI implements or supports “mine-risk education” in eight countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ethiopia (in the border refugee camps along the border with northern Somalia), Kosovo, Mozambique, Senegal, and Thailand (in refugee camps along the borders with Cambodia and Burma). He states that all of these programs include data-gathering, the use of media tools and instruction. Email correspondence of 15 June 2000.

²⁴ An UNMAS assessment mission is planned for the DRC if and when the security situation improves.

²⁵ A proposal for a local mine awareness program in the Golan Heights has been drafted by the Ramallah-based NGO, Al Haq.

²⁶ A “child-to-child” program is apparently planned for the country. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000—Jordan*.

²⁷ An UNMAS assessment mission was originally planned for Iran in 2000 although it now appears that this will not take place.

²⁸ Somewhat strangely, the local Red Cross society claims that a mine awareness program is not necessary both because there have been no victims (clearly an inaccurate statement) and because peace deals have been signed with most of the insurgents pitted against the military regime in the country. Information provided by Landmine Monitor researcher for Burma (Myanmar).

²⁹ Although a national needs assessment for mine awareness has not been carried out in the country, there have already been local and international mine awareness initiatives in certain provinces, and the Landmine Monitor researcher for Vietnam firmly believes that mine awareness should be carried out in all provinces.

confirm whether or not a program in a given context is needed and can be safely and effectively implemented in the prevailing circumstances.³⁰

A number of new mine awareness programs are in the process of being initiated. Following the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, a number of NGOs, including Save the Children Sweden and Save the Children US, were preparing to implement programs in the former security zone, as landmines continued to claim victims.³¹ On the other hand, in Sri Lanka, the UN Development Program (UNDP) mine awareness program in Jaffna was suspended in April 2000 because of the upsurge in fighting on the peninsula.

Needs Assessment

Any MAP should be initiated with a detailed needs assessment as set out in the International Guidelines on Mine and UXO Awareness Education Programs adopted by the UN system in May 1999.³² The appropriate needs assessment is the responsibility of each and every organization operationally involved in mine awareness.³³ Sadly, such assessments have frequently not been done well,³⁴ and sometimes not at all.³⁵ Without baseline data, it is almost impossible to plan an effective communication strategy that reaches those in danger with messages and techniques that are both culturally appropriate and targeted to the specific risk behavior. Thus, a needs assessment for mine awareness should consider the severity of the problem from a humanitarian point of view, analyze high-risk behavior and groups, and identify linguistic, cultural or logistical factors that will influence the success of a potential MAP.³⁶

There are times when a MAP has been initiated primarily because funding was available, notwithstanding the actual needs of the country or region. Kosovo is an example where, while clearly mine awareness is needed, funding availability may have

³⁰ For example, UNMAS conducted an assessment mission to Sierra Leone in February 2000 and concluded that the limited mine and UXO problem did not justify a nationwide awareness campaign. See the UNMAS home page, <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine>>, for a copy of the mission report.

³¹ Kananfani, S., "NGOs race to alert South to peril of mines," *Daily Star*, 1 June 2000.

³² For example, UNICEF conducted a needs assessment mission for mine awareness in Chad in June 2000.

³³ Obviously needs assessments can be carried out jointly; indeed, often this is the most effective way to proceed.

³⁴ In this regard, it is not enough even for locally-based organizations to assert that they know who needs mine awareness training; without systematic information gathering, a program is unlikely to accurately target those most at risk.

³⁵ For example, Colombia and Croatia still have not undertaken a needs assessment for mine awareness; nor apparently has Afghanistan, which has one of the longest running mine awareness programs. Information provided by Landmine Monitor researchers for Afghanistan, Colombia and Croatia.

³⁶ Of course, agencies should always be alert to the danger of "over-surveing." The community should be considered a partner, not a guinea pig. In a number of places, such as Kosovo, mine victims are tired of being asked the same questions time after time by different organizations and different journalists.

led to excess, relative to needs in other locations. Once the ethnic Albanian refugees returned to the province, a plethora of NGOs became involved in mine awareness programs.³⁷ By early spring 2000, organizations involved in mine awareness still numbered around a dozen, potentially making Kosovo the most “mine aware” region in the world.

In terms of operational focus, many mine awareness programs concentrate the bulk of time and resources on school children, even though they may form only a small percentage of the number of mine victims,³⁸ and are potentially at limited risk in many contexts. In Croatia, for instance, considerable funding has been directed to conducting mine awareness in schools even though no children were killed by mines in 1999 and only three out of the total of fifty-one victims (i.e., killed and injured) were children.³⁹ Researchers noted a similar focus in Laos and Vietnam, despite available data demonstrating that other target groups were far more in need of preventive education.

Methodology

Concern remains as to the pedagogical basis for much of the methodology used to implement MAPs around the world. Although often advertised as “community-based,” “participatory,” “interactive,” or employing “child-to-child” techniques, it appears that the typical mine awareness program relies on one-way presentations and/or mass media to get its message across. Such an approach takes little notice of the skills and knowledge already existing in the community, frequently fails to target those most at risk, and is unlikely to have anything other than a negligible long-term impact on casualty rates.⁴⁰

Most mine awareness resources tend to be devoted to the production and dissemination of various communications media, such as television/video, radio, posters, T-shirts, and comic books. According to the Landmine Monitor researcher for Rwanda, as much as US \$100,000 has been spent on airing mine awareness messages on Rwandan radio, an astonishing amount in such a small country.⁴¹ Yet, the effectiveness of these media approaches is open to question. In March 2000, UNICEF announced its intention to commission a multi-country study of mine awareness media and messages from the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining; as of this writing, the study has

³⁷ Mine awareness, as with other mine action programs in Kosovo, is coordinated by the UN Mine Action Co-ordination Center, which requires all implementing organizations to follow its Best Practice Guidelines for Mine/UXO Awareness Activities, based on the *International Guidelines for Mine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Education* developed by UNICEF on behalf of the United Nations system.

³⁸ Such is not the case where contamination is largely unexploded ordnance, especially cluster bomblets; here, children are often 50% or more of the total number of victims.

³⁹ Information provided by the Landmine Monitor researcher for Croatia, 15 May 2000.

⁴⁰ Indeed, mine awareness badly done is worse than useless, it is potentially life-threatening. Particular concerns were expressed about mine awareness messages being disseminated in Colombia, that could encourage children to move around mined areas. Information provided by Diana Roa Castro, Landmine Monitor researcher for Colombia.

⁴¹ The choice of radio as the main media for disseminating mine awareness messages appears sound, though, as it is the most popular means of communication in the country, and there are no local languages to impede understanding. Information provided by the Landmine Monitor researcher for Rwanda.

not yet been initiated. An HI study on lessons learned using mine-risk education tools in six countries is eagerly awaited.

Most attention, however, has been focused on the Superman comic book, with concerns being widely expressed as to both its technical accuracy and cultural appropriateness. The comic book has apparently been used to advantage as one of a number of media items in Guatemala but overall the reaction has been extremely negative.⁴² As a result, the original version produced for Bosnia-Herzegovina has now been withdrawn from distribution; a Spanish version was not distributed in Colombia;⁴³ and a version planned for Mozambique appears to have been shelved, at least for now. Independent testing of the Superman comic book in Kosovo concluded that it was suitable for children in the 10-14 age group but not for children in the 7-9 age group, who might infer incorrect and dangerous messages. A controlled distribution in the classroom for the elder age group was recommended as part of the school mine awareness education curriculum. At the beginning of June 2000, the ICBL sent a letter to UNICEF Executive Director, Carol Bellamy, to formally “request UNICEF to openly address the cultural and technical concerns” raised by the Superman comic book.

Consonant with a frequent preoccupation to protect children from landmines and UXO, “child-to-child” training entered the mine awareness vocabulary with a vengeance in 1999, with a number of organizations claiming to be incorporating “child-to-child” methodology into their awareness programs, most notably in Kosovo.⁴⁴ In a number of instances, though, it seems that the component was actually little more than “kids teaching other kids,” a far cry from the participatory methodology delineated by the Child to Child Trust in London which developed the concept.⁴⁵ Yet in a context where teaching is typically authoritarian and learning is by rote, child to child techniques can be liberating and empowering both for the children and for their teachers; they are, however, labor intensive as training can take a considerable time.

But more participatory mine awareness is being practiced as well as preached in a number of countries. The ICRC implements well-thought-out community level mine awareness programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo, each with an integral

⁴² Information provided by Landmine Monitor Researcher for Guatemala, 16 May 2000.

⁴³ The decision not to distribute the comic book in Colombia followed a letter from the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines to the UNICEF Representative in Bogotá. Information provided by Diana Roa Castro, Landmine Monitor Researcher, 16 May 2000.

⁴⁴ Concerns have also been expressed about so-called “child-to-child” mine awareness in Colombia. Information provided by Diana Roa Castro, Landmine Monitor researcher for Colombia.

⁴⁵ Child-to-child programs, that were developed as a more participatory alternative to public health education, give children the opportunity to explore subjects without the framework of the traditionally authoritarian and disempowering methods of teaching practiced in many countries around the world. In child-to-child initiatives, the teacher is involved more as a facilitator to guide the learning process than the central fulcrum around whom all wisdom revolves. Training teachers and instructors in these methods is a time-consuming (and therefore expensive) procedure. For details of the Child-to-Child Trust work on landmines see for instance *Land Mine Awareness*, an activity sheet available from its offices in London: Child-to-Child Trust, Institute of Education, 20 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AL, United Kingdom, Tel: (+44-207) 612 6648; Fax: (+44-207) 612 6645; E-mail: c.scotchmer@ioe.ac.uk.

data-gathering element that assists in the national mine action coordination process; in Kosovo the communities themselves decide on their local mine awareness volunteer whose task is to pass on valuable information to the community and also update the regional mine awareness teams with relevant information on incidents or discoveries of mines or cluster bomblets.

Data Gathering and Analysis, Integration and Coordination

As the mine action community begins to recognize the role of socio-economic data and analysis in planning mine action programs, it is clear that mine awareness should be looking to exploit its comparative advantages. In its capacity as a community-level initiative, mine awareness should, in theory at least, generate a large amount of precious quantitative and qualitative data that can help to prioritize mine clearance and marking, identify unfulfilled needs for mine victim assistance,⁴⁶ and provide information in support of the prohibition of anti-personnel mines and its implementation.

Community mapping exercises, for instance, involve a community liaison officer working with different target groups to elicit the impact of mines and UXO on daily life and identify existing community approaches and coping mechanisms. This data can help in the prioritization of other mine action tasks. In this regard, Kosovo is possibly the first time that mine awareness teams have been able to provide direct input into the prioritization process, thanks to the weekly mine action meetings held in the different KFOR sectors around the province. But the need to strengthen the IMSMA component on mine awareness is clear—this was one of the recommendations by ICBL to the March 2000 SCE meeting mentioned below.

Training and Staff Selection

In 1999 and early 2000, UNICEF was instrumental in developing pre-service training modules for both mine awareness program managers and community mine awareness facilitators. This is seemingly the first time that such comprehensive training packages have been prepared. Although primarily aimed at UNICEF programs and program managers, they have a much wider validity. It is intended that regional training workshops be held over the next two years—this process in itself should succeed in widening the net of available expertise, thereby strengthening competence.

Allied to training is the issue of staff selection which is of obvious importance, especially for the community mine awareness facilitators who will be the direct link with the community. In the past, there was a tendency to favor people with a military or technical background. It is clear, however, that this can be counter-productive as mine experts can rarely resist the temptation to show off how much they know about weapons. Thus, in Kosovo, KFOR has been implementing a “soldier to child” program in schools around the province; the UN Mine Action Coordination Center has been trying to end this practice. In Laos, as well as other countries, U.S. Army Psychological Operations personnel have been involved in training mine awareness teams; it is at least questionable how appropriate such a military-style approach is to a community liaison program such

⁴⁶ The mine awareness program in Yemen supported by Rädä Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) has begun a pilot project using the national Mine Awareness Association to conduct a survey on mine victims and their needs.

as mine awareness. In the words of the Landmine Monitor researcher for Nicaragua, “soldiers aren’t teachers.”

Monitoring and Evaluation

Given the amount of funding poured into mine awareness (estimated to be between US \$5 million and US \$10 million each year), it is somewhat surprising that donors have not been more insistent on being shown substantive proof of efficacy.⁴⁷ To date, operational efficiency and effectiveness has largely been evidenced by the quantity of posters printed and the number of individuals “briefed” or “reached.” Although valuable information for the program manager in and of itself, this tells little of the extent to which behavior has been changed or safety information learned and internalized.

Likewise, the mine action community at large (especially organizations involved in mine clearance) need to be shown that not only is there a genuine role for mine awareness within mine action, but that the role is an essential one, enhancing the effectiveness of the other three “pillars” of mine action: mine clearance (including survey and marking), mine victim assistance, and mine ban advocacy.

Organizations *are* beginning to realize the importance of evaluating the worth of MAPs. UNICEF has commissioned detailed evaluations of its mine awareness programs in Angola and Cambodia, for example, and future evaluations are planned in Ethiopia and Laos; in 1997, a national evaluation of mine awareness in Afghanistan was conducted by the Canadian organization, CIET; and Rädde Barnen has begun an evaluation of the program it supports in Yemen, and an internal evaluation of mine awareness in schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina is planned to take place in the fall of 2000. However many programs simply carry over from year to year with little attempt to be accountable to the communities they claim to serve. With a view to developing international guidelines for the monitoring and evaluation of mine awareness programs, as recommended by ICBL and requested by the Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness in March 2000, UNICEF is planning to circulate a first draft before the end of 2000 prior to a large-scale technical consultation on the issue in 2001.⁴⁸

Future Challenges

The overall challenge for 2001 is to speed up the tortuously slow process of professionalizing mine awareness. This demands commitment on the part of all organizations involved—none has much cause for complacency.

HI’s study of lessons learnt in mine-risk education programs in six countries should give a useful indication of possible reorientation in mine awareness. Within the context of mine action, ICBL’s call for UNMAS to study the integration of mine awareness and victim assistance should be speedily acted upon. UNICEF, for its part, has spent considerable effort in ensuring the adoption of international guidelines for mine awareness and the preparation of training modules to effectively operationalize the

⁴⁷ To counter the assertion sometimes made, for instance, that the best mine awareness is a mine incident.

⁴⁸ UNICEF contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*—Appendices.

guidelines. Guidance on how to monitor and evaluate mine awareness and how to field-test materials, media and messages would be extremely beneficial, as would minimum international standards for mine awareness programs and the accreditation of competent organizations.

It appears that mine awareness programs may be needed in Chile, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Golan Heights, Jordan, Iran, Burma (Myanmar), and Vietnam; where they do not exist, in-depth needs assessments should be undertaken by competent agencies at the earliest possible juncture. Finally, efforts must continue to try to strengthen coordination and integration with the other pillars of mine action and other emergency or developmental activities, such as water and sanitation, food security initiatives, or HIV/AIDS education programs. The days of the stand-alone mine awareness program must surely be numbered.

MINE ACTION FUNDING

Tracking financial support for mine action is still very difficult, despite greater transparency and better reporting mechanisms. Nevertheless, drawing from Landmine Monitor research it is possible to give a representative and informative picture of the global funding situation. In 1999, Landmine Monitor identified \$219 million allocated for mine action by seventeen major donors. This is far from a complete global total for mine action spending in 1999, not just because it reflects funding by only seventeen donors. This total does not include in-kind (as opposed to cash) contributions from some of these donors, nor the substantial in-kind contributions made by other donors. Landmine Monitor has not included funds for research and development into demining technologies and equipment in this total. Also left out of this total is \$27.45 million, including \$12.4 million in research and development,⁴⁹ in mine action funding from the European Community, because in at least some cases the major mine donors reported donations to the EC as part of their domestic mine action spending. Victim assistance funding is included where possible.

(All figures are U.S. dollars)

U.S.	\$63.1 million (FY Oct. 1998 – Sept. 99) ⁵⁰
UK	\$25.7 million (FY April 1999 - March 2000) ⁵¹
Norway	\$21.7 million
Germany	\$18.1 million
Canada	\$15 million
Japan	\$13.1 million

⁴⁹ Converted to US\$ by Landmine Monitor, July 2000; See EC Contribution to Appendices of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

⁵⁰ This figure does not include \$10 million allocated for the Leahy War Victims Fund in 1999, which includes assistance to mine victims.

⁵¹ About 90% is mine action, the rest on research and development into demining technologies and equipment, and advocacy. Victim assistance is considered part of wider spending and no figures are available for FY 1999-2000.

Sweden	\$11.5 million
Netherlands	\$10 million
Australia	\$8 million (FY July 1999-June 2000)
Italy	\$7.3 million (FY May 1999-March 2000)
Denmark	\$7 million
Switzerland	\$5.8 million
Finland	\$5 million
France	\$2.7 million
Belgium	\$2.3 million
Ireland	\$1.5 million
Austria	\$1.25 million

AFRICA

STATES PARTIES

BENIN

Bénin signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 25 September 1998. It submitted its Article 7 transparency report on 15 October 1999. This report is in French and covers the period from 1 August to 31 December 1999.¹ The report states that there are currently no legal measures in place to implement the treaty.² An interdepartmental commission comprised of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry for Industry has been set up to propose a text for national legislation to be adopted relating to antipersonnel mines.³

Bénin attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with a representative from the Ministry of Defense. Benin has not attended any of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty. In September 1999, President Mathieu Kérékou stated that he will do everything in his capacity to further the ban on antipersonnel mines.⁴ In December 1999, Bénin voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. A conference organized by the ICRC in Cotonou on 9 August 1999 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions included the ban treaty in its discussions.⁵

Bénin is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but not to the original or amended Protocol II. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

There is no production of AP mines in Bénin and transfer of AP mines is not allowed.⁶ According to its Article 7 report, Bénin does not possess any stockpiled AP mines, including any for training. This was confirmed in an interview with the Ministry of Defense.⁷ While Benin has the national capacity and resources for mine clearance, no further information was available on Bénin's contributions to humanitarian mine action.⁸

¹ Interview with Colonel Mathias Adjou-Moumouni, Ministry of National Defense, Cotonou, 28 April 2000.

² Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A. "Aucune mesure juridique en la matière n'existe aujourd'hui."

³ Interview with Joseph Agani, official in charge of antipersonnel mine policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cotonou, 18 July 2000.

⁴ Letter from Joseph H. Gnonlonfoun, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Jean Noel Sersiron, President, Handicap International, dated 9 September 1999.

⁵ Email from Isabelle Daoust, Coordinator, Advisory Service, ICRC office in Abidjan.

⁶ Interview with Colonel Mathias Adjou-Moumouni, Ministry of National Defense, Cotonou, 28 April 2000.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

BOTSWANA

Key developments since March 1999: Botswana ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2000, the first anniversary of global entry into force. The Botswana Defense Force acknowledged that it retains a small stockpile of AP mines for training.

Mine Ban Policy

Botswana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 1 March 2000. The treaty will enter into force for Botswana on 1 September 2000. The process of incorporating the provisions of the treaty into domestic law has not started. According to a government official, efforts to abide by the requirements of the treaty have started and they are in the process of preparing the necessary information to be sent to the Attorney General's chambers for implementation.¹

Botswana did not attend the Maputo First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999. It did not attend any meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees of Experts in 1999 or 2000. Botswana voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

Botswana is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use

Botswana has not produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. Botswana Defense Force (BDF) officials say that the military has never laid any landmines in Botswana nor in any other country.² On allegations that Botswana maintained a stockpile, the official said the term stockpile did not give the right picture as it implied a large quantity. He said that the force maintains only a small quantity of AP mines for training purposes, explaining that in the past BDF soldiers have been deployed to mine-infested Mozambique. Therefore there was a need for the soldiers to know about the mines.³

Mine Action

Botswana is not known to be mine-affected. A military official refuted the statement in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* that landmines were laid in northern Botswana during the Rhodesian (now Zimbabwe) war.⁴ According to an official of the Botswana Council for the Disabled (BCD), the council has never handled any cases of disability caused by injuries from landmines in Botswana.⁵

¹ Interview with a government official, Gaborone, 20 March 2000.

² Interview with Colonel J. T. Masisi, Botswana Defence Force, Gaborone, 26 November 1999.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Interview with Mr. C. Gabanakemo, the Executive Secretary of the Botswana Council for the Disabled, Gaborone, November 1999.

A military trade publication indicates that at some point, Botswana procured the Rapid Antipersonnel Minefield Breaching System Mark 3 (RAMBS 3) produced by the UK company Pains Wessex Ltd.⁶

The Botswana Red Cross (BRC) society has been conducting regular training of the BDF on landmines. This activity has been done in conjunction with the regional office of the ICRC based in Harare, Zimbabwe.⁷ The BRC has also involved itself in landmine awareness education of the society. In 1998, BRC produced a fifteen-minute radio program on landmines, which was in vernacular on Radio Botswana for one month. Among the topics covered were: what are landmines, what do they look like, what are their effects on people, animals and land. At the end of the program people were allowed to phone in and ask questions and also give their opinions on the issue of landmines. The program was reportedly a success and many people said it was the first time that they had heard anything about landmines.⁸

BURKINA FASO

Key developments since March 1999: Burkina Faso has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999.

Burkina Faso signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and on 16 September 1998 the instruments of ratification were deposited at the United Nations, making Burkina Faso the 40th country to ratify the treaty and thus allowing the treaty to enter into force on 1 March 1999. According to one source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, domestic implementation legislation is not viewed as necessary because Burkina Faso has never produced, stockpiled, or used landmines.¹ Some deputies in the National Assembly are prepared to propose legislation.²

Burkina Faso has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999. An official in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs blamed the late report on the current socio-political crisis that has focused government priorities elsewhere. But he stated that there is absolutely no question of Burkina Faso's transparency or willingness to promote the treaty.³ When asked for an update following a letter from the ICBL

⁶ *Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance*, online update, 20 June 2000.

⁷ Interview with Mr. P. Moswetsi, Acting Secretary General Botswana Red Cross Society at BRC offices in Gaborone, 6 December 1999.

⁸ *Ibid.*

¹ Name withheld at the request of the interviewed official.

² Interview with Psacal Benon, President of the parliamentary governmental party Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès, 15 December 1999.

³ Interviews with Sawadogo Mahama, Head of the Europe-America-Oceania Service, Directorate General of Political, Legal and Consular Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ouagadougou, 12 November and 14 December 1999.

Coordinator encouraging timely submission of Article 7 reports, the same official replied that the report was in preparation.⁴

Burkina Faso attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. It did not attend any intersessional meetings of the MBT. Burkina Faso voted in support of the pro-treaty UN General Assembly resolution 54/54B in December 1999. Burkina Faso is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but attended the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II. Burkina Faso is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Burkina Faso neither produces nor exports AP mines. There have been allegations of illicit weapons passing through Burkina for rebels in Angola and Sierra Leone. Harouna Ouédraogo, Chief of the Cabinet at the Ministry of Defense, told Landmine Monitor that Burkina Faso has never used AP mines.⁵ In July 1998, Defense Minister Albert Millogo told the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Defense Commission that Burkina Faso's armed forces possess only inactive mines for military training purposes.⁶

Burkina Faso is not mine-affected. It is not involved in mine clearance or awareness programs and has not made any financial contribution to mine action programs.

CHAD

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Chad on 1 November 1999. A Level One Impact Survey is currently underway and mine clearance is due to begin this year. At least 127 mine and UXO-related casualties are reported to have occurred from September 1998 to October 1999. Chad has not submitted its Article 7 report which was due by 29 April 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Chad signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 6 July 1998 and ratified it on 6 May 1999. Thus, the treaty entered into force for Chad on 1 November 1999. Chad has not enacted domestic implementation legislation for the treaty.

Chad attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. In a statement to the plenary, the head of delegation Adoum Hassan Bakhit stated, "Chad, in spite of all its limited resources, will do everything in its power to address the source of the problem posed by the presence of mines in its territory. The probability of success of this program is strongly reinforced by the visible adhesion of the Government of Chad to

⁴ Letter from ICBL Coordinator Elizabeth Bernstein to Foreign Minister, Burkina Faso, dated 24 November 1999. Interview with Sawadogo Mahama, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ouagadougou, 5 January 2000.

⁵ Interview with Mr. Harouna Ouédraogo, Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Defense, Ouagadougou, 9 November 1999.

⁶ Parliamentary Debate, 29 July 1998.

the program, by a stable political environment, the absence of conflict, and long-term engagements to several international partners. Chad will not succeed alone. This will not occur without the aid of the international community, which is capable of constructing an efficient, national demining program.”¹

Chad did not participate in any of the treaty intersessional meetings of Standing Committees of Experts. Chad has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 29 April 2000. Chad voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

Chad is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Chad is not known to have produced or exported AP mines. It is believed that Chad has a sizable stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but no details are available.² There have been reports of rebels, particularly in the mountainous north, using mines, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify these reports. There is no evidence of government armed forces using antipersonnel landmines.

Landmine Problem

Decades of conflict and the 1973 Libyan invasion have left Chad with a landmine and UXO problem. Minefield records are close to non-existent, and there is not yet a comprehensive mine database.³ In 1999, the UN Development Program and Chad’s mine action center, the Haut Commissariat National au Déminage (HCND) identified the following types of mines:

¹ Statement by delegation of Chad to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

² Landmine Monitor was told by local sources that there could be several hundred thousand mines in stock, but Landmine Monitor has no means of assessing the accuracy of such a claim. Likewise, Landmine Monitor was told that some 3,000 antipersonnel and antitank landmines were destroyed in early 2000, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify that information.

³ The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software has been provided to the HCND but it is not yet operational.

<i>Landmines Present in Chad⁴</i>	
Antipersonnel	Antitank
NR409	PRB M3 (NR441)
NR413	PRB M3 A1(NR201)
NR442	TC6
PRB M 35	M 19
NR 109	M 7 A2
M14	TM 46
M18A1	TM 57
PMD6	TM DB
PMN	PT MI Ba 2
PMA 3	TMA 4
PPM 2	TMA 5

Mine-affected areas in Chad are mostly located in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) mountain and desert area in the north of the country. Salamat, Guera and Moyen Chari regions are also reported mine-affected but to a lesser degree than the BET. The Aozou-Bardaï-Wour-Zouar zone in the north is mine-affected as a result of internal conflict and also from the Libyan incursion into the Aozou strip. Faya Largeau is also mined due to its position as the staging point for a military advance upon the capital Ndjamenā. In the east, the Iriba and Guereda areas along the Sudanese border are mined, as are certain key points inwards towards Ndjamenā.⁵ Mined areas generally include both antipersonnel and antitank mines, but unexploded ordnance is also a problem, especially in the north and east.

Mine Action Funding

Several meetings have been held to attract donor support for mine action in Chad, including a July 1998 donor conference in New York, a round table in Geneva, and another donor conference in New York on 29 October 1999. At the donor conference in New York, the UNDP and HCND indicated a funding shortfall of \$2.425 million for mine action in Chad.⁶

Contributions for mine action programs have been received from the UNDP (\$2 million) Italy (\$500,000), Japan (\$400,000), Chad (\$245,000) and Canada (\$66,000).⁷ Germany has also donated forty-two Ebinger mine detectors to Chad. A total of \$1.4 million in funding for the Level One Impact survey has been secured from the U.S. Department of State and the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action.⁸

⁴ Republic of Chad, Mine Action Chad presentation, December 1999.

⁵ United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Haut Commissariat National au Déminage (HCND), "Mine Action Chad: Program Overview," prepared for Donors Conference, New York, 29 October 1999, p. 1.

⁶ UNDP/HCND, "Chad Mine Action: Program Overview," October 1999, p. 14.

⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

⁸ Ibid. The Survey Action Center lists the U.S., the UN Foundation, and the United Kingdom as donors. See SAC appendix to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

Through its fiscal year 1999, the U.S. had provided \$1.9 million in assistance to Chad to support and sustain the training of military engineers as deminers. In 1999 and 2000, the U.S. was planning to provide \$3.5 million in in-kind and financial assistance for mine action.⁹ This includes for the rehabilitation of a demining training school in the capital, the establishment of a regional demining office in the northern part of country, training in mine awareness education, and the collection of historical data. The allocation of U.S. funding in 2000 includes \$210,000 for the purchase of vehicles, \$11,000 to purchase radios, a \$196,000 grant to UNDP to contract aerial medical evacuation services, \$12,000 for repairs to the deminer's building in Faya in the north of the country, and \$108,000 for the purchase of spare parts for C-130 aircraft supporting demining operations.¹⁰

Mine Action

The UN Development Program has set up a national mine action center under the Haut Commissariat National au Déminage.¹¹ The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) serves as implementer of the program.¹² The demining program is described as "one of the few programs, if not the first, which has not resulted from a United Nations Peacekeeping mission," meaning that the program "started with nothing."¹³

In October 1999, at the donors conference, the UNDP and HCND presented a national mine action plan, but it has not been implemented and a new national plan for mine action for 2000-2001 was due for release in July 2000.¹⁴

A Level One Impact Survey started in Chad in November 1999, following pre-testing of survey instruments and training of local staff. Handicap International is the implementing partner for the survey. An assessment mission from the Survey Action Center visited Chad in July 1999. In June 2000, a UNICEF consultant visited Chad to undertake a needs assessment for mine awareness.

Clearance activities in Chad have been sporadic, mostly due to resource constraints. Some 100-200 Chadian military have been trained in mine clearance. One priority set by the HCND is mine clearance in a 100-kilometer radius around Faya Largeau, scheduled to begin in March 2000.¹⁵ In May 2000, the German demining organization HELP, which won a tender to carry out the demining, was due to begin operations with additional German government funding. Clearance will be conducted in conjunction with a wider Islamic Development Bank-sponsored rural development program in the same areas.¹⁶

⁹ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 8.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, "FY 00 NADR Project Status," p. 1.

¹¹ "CHAD: Mine Action Country Profile," UNDP website accessed 29 July 2000, <http://www.undp.org/erd/mineaction/>.

¹² UNDP/HCND, "Mine Action Chad: Program Overview," October 1999, p. 1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa, "IRIN-WA Weekly Roundup 5 covering the period 31 January - 4 February 2000."

¹⁶ UNDP/HCND, "Chad Mine Action: Program Overview," October 1999, p. 11.

Landmine Casualties

Reliable and comprehensive information on victims is hard to come by in Chad. Accidents that take place at great distances from a medical facility are unlikely to be officially recorded.¹⁷ But in October 1999, the HCND reported 127 mine and UXO-related casualties since September 1998.¹⁸ Of these casualties, approximately one-third resulted in death and another one-third in amputation.¹⁹ There have been fifteen reported incidents involving children. Particularly at risk are adolescent goat and sheep herders who pick up UXO they find in the fields.²⁰ UNICEF and HCND report that in Iriba region, eleven of twenty-five reported mine and UXO casualties were children.²¹ It is not known how many nomads have been killed or injured by mines or UXO; Chad has a considerable nomadic population. In addition, forty-seven vehicles were reported destroyed and a large number of domestic animals upon which local economies depend.²²

Victim Assistance

Medical care and rehabilitative services for mine victims in Chad are generally rudimentary. Lack of medical infrastructure and evacuation leads to an average of four to five days for a mine or UXO victim to reach hospital care.²³ The capital boasts a well-run prosthetics clinic managed by SECADEV, a Catholic development organization, and supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC plans to locate and transport an estimated 300 mine and UXO victims from the north of the country in a program beginning in July 2000. This initiative will later spread to the rest of the country.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Key developments since March 1999: Despite a military coup in December 1999, Côte d'Ivoire ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 30 June 2000.

Côte d'Ivoire signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. Ratification legislation was submitted to the National Assembly in June 1999 and one month later, the assembly voted in support of it, authorizing the President of the Republic to ratify.¹ While a military coup on 24 December 1999 delayed the ratification process, on 24 March 2000, the ratification document was forwarded for signature to the President.²

¹⁷ Interview with an official from the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Ndjamena, 21 March 2000.

¹⁸ UNDP/HCND, "Mine Action Chad: Program Overview," p. 2.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²³ *Ibid.*

¹ Law No. 99-431 – 6 July 1999.

² Borderau d'envoi N° 809 RE/AJC/AH/2, 24 March 2000.

The new head of state, General Robert Guéi, signed the ratification document on 5 June 2000 and it was deposited with the United Nations on 30 June 2000.

Côte d'Ivoire attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 in a delegation led by its Ambassador to South Africa, H.E. Kanga Ballou. It did not participate in any of the treaty's intersessional meetings in Geneva in 1999 or 2000. Côte d'Ivoire voted for the December 1999 UNGA resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Côte d'Ivoire is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but it attended the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II. Côte d'Ivoire is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Côte d'Ivoire has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Government officials describe the country as completely mine-free with no stockpiles of antipersonnel or antitank mines.³ There were no allegations of mine use during the period of the coup. Military training includes only basic information on landmine recognition and safety precautions.⁴ In an interview, General Bendji Joseph Mockey told the Landmine Monitor that some soldiers "don't even know what a mine is."⁵ Côte d'Ivoire provides training for African military officials every year on landmines (such as safety precautions, landmine recognition and demining) at the Zambakro military school, which is sponsored by the French government.⁶

The French military on 28 September 1999 destroyed the 120 antipersonnel mines that it had stockpiled in Côte d'Ivoire. (See LM report on France).

During the early 1990s there were fears that the west of the country might be contaminated with landmines used in the conflict with Liberia, but the ICRC has not recorded any landmine incidents in Côte d'Ivoire. The recently established Handicap International office in Abidjan also confirmed that there are no registered landmine victims in Côte d'Ivoire.⁷

DJIBOUTI

Key developments since March 1999: In 1999, the government appointed a Mine Action Taskforce to formulate an action plan that includes surveys of mine-affected zones, mine awareness, and victim assistance. The U.S. is funding mine action in Djibouti. Djibouti has not submitted its Article 7 report due by 27 August 1999. Rebel forces used antitank mines in 1999 and early 2000, resulting in 69 new mine victims. In November 1999 the French military stationed in Djibouti destroyed its stockpile of 2,444 antipersonnel landmines.

³ Interview with General Bendji Joseph Mockey, Cabinet Director, Ministry of Defense, Abidjan, 8 March 2000.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Telephone interview with Colonel Gilbert Canovas, Defense Attaché, French Embassy, Yaounde (Cameroon), 3 May 2000.

⁷ Interview with Handicap International/Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan, 13 March 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Djibouti signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 May 1998. Djibouti has not enacted domestic implementation legislation. It has not submitted its Article 7 transparency report, which was due by 27 August 1999. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials told Landmine Monitor in February 2000 that they were waiting for a progress report from the Ministry of Defense.¹

Djibouti did not participate in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, nor has it participated in any meetings of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts. Djibouti voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had done on similar UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.

In 1999, the local NGO Association de Soutien aux Victimes des Mines (ASOVIM) launched the first organized campaign against landmines in Djibouti. ASOVIM has started a letter writing campaign to government agencies and the parliament urging the swift adoption of domestic implementation legislation.

Djibouti has not ratified Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Djibouti has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It appears to have received landmines from France and Italy. The possible transit of mines through Djibouti territory is a concern. Djibouti is the most important seaport on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden and is the major port for all materials to Ethiopia, which has signed but not ratified the MBT. Neighboring Eritrea has not signed the MBT and neighboring Somaliland is not in a position to sign at this time. In 1998, Djibouti opposition groups claimed that at least one shipment of landmines was imported by Ethiopia through the port of Djibouti.² There have been no new allegations of landmines transferred through the ports of Djibouti in 1999 or 2000.

Djibouti has not begun stockpile destruction, or apparently even developed a plan. In 1998 French Foreign Legion technicians assisted Djibouti's military with the destruction of 350 kilograms of landmines and unexploded ordnance.³ Djibouti, which obtained independence from France on 27 June 1977, is home to the largest overseas French military base. On 2-4 November 1999, the French military in Djibouti destroyed their stockpile of 2,444 antipersonnel landmines at the Grand Bara, southwest of the city of Djibouti.⁴

¹ Interview with Office of Multilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djibouti, 23 February, 2000.

² "Addis Ready for War in the Air," *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, ION 842, p. 8-9.

³ *Nation* (Djibouti government weekly publication), 28 March 1998; French military sources.

⁴ News of the destruction was broadcast on Djibouti Radio and Television. The destruction of landmines by the French Army in Djibouti was also witnessed by three delegates from France's National Commission on Landmines. See also, "La France détruit ses dernières mines antipersonnel," French Ministry of Defense, press file, 20 December 1999.

Use

There is no evidence that Djibouti's army has used landmines in counterinsurgency operations since signing the MBT. Although a peace agreement was signed between the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) rebels and the government of Djibouti, a splinter FRUD faction, lead by former Prime Minister Ahmed Dini, maintained an armed insurrection in 1998 and 1999. The government of Djibouti and independent observers claim that FRUD forces employed antitank mines in this renewed conflict. At least ten accidents involving 69 individuals and 22 fatalities due to new landmines were recorded in 1999 and in the first two months of 2000. The latest incident occurred on 7 February 2000. All new use of mines during 1999 and 2000 appear to involve antitank mines planted on civilian access roads.

The government concluded a reconciliation agreement with the opposition FRUD on 7 February 2000 under which the two sides freed all prisoners and agreed to cease hostilities.⁵ There have been no new mine incidents since then.

During 1999, Eritrea accused Djibouti of siding with Ethiopia in the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. As a result Djibouti broke diplomatic relations with Eritrea. On various occasions, Djibouti claimed that Eritrea was emboldening the northern Afar militia and that the Afar militia planted mines in the border area between Eritrea and Djibouti. Landmine Monitor cannot verify these allegations. On 13 March 2000, Djibouti and Eritrea normalized diplomatic relations.⁶

Landmine Problem

Djibouti has a small landmine problem, which is the legacy of a three-year internal war during 1991-1994. Landmines were used in this war by both the rebel forces of the FRUD and by government Army troops.⁷ Djibouti military used French and Italian mines, while FRUD forces employed Italian and Russian mines.⁸ There is no indication of any large-scale use of landmines against the civilian population by either party.

No systematic mine surveys have been carried out in Djibouti and no reliable data are available on the extent of mine contamination. Certain zones in the northern Afar highlands are considered to face a higher risk than other areas.⁹ Representatives of ASOVIM toured suspected sites in the Afar Plateau and reported that many public facilities, such as schools, have been abandoned because of the threat of landmines.¹⁰ In Obock town, mines have been found in palm groves, which are now left untended. Rural roads north of Tadjourah may also be mined. The southern district of Dikhil may also contain mines.

⁵ Radio France International (RFI), various reports, Radio Television de Djibouti (RTD), various reports.

⁶ *Nation*, 13 March 2000.

⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* p. 33-34 for more details.

⁸ Information on the types of mines used in Djibouti was given by Djibouti military officials on the government appointed Mine Action Taskforce.

⁹ Information on mined zones was given by Djibouti military officials and members of the Mine Action Taskforce.

¹⁰ Discussion between Landmine Monitor and Dahir Osman, President of ASOVIM, 13 March 2000.

As part of the reconciliation agreement the two sides are said to have agreed to reveal all mined areas.

Mine Action

In 1999, the government appointed a Mine Action Taskforce composed of representatives from the military, Ministry of Health, the ICRC and WHO. The taskforce is formulating an action plan that includes surveys of mine-affected zones, mine awareness, and victim assistance.

Djibouti has not allocated any internal funds for mine action. However, the U.S. plans to contribute approximately \$1.1 million in 2000 and 2001 to fund a mine action program in Djibouti. The U.S. approved Djibouti's request for humanitarian demining assistance on December 12, 1999. U.S. military trainers and contractors will apparently be used to establish a complete demining program including training, equipment, and facilities for demining training. A survey of requirements was conducted in 2000.¹¹

The French army trained of a contingent of thirty Djibouti military deminers and in November 1998, the newly trained deminers started a limited demining exercise in the district of Obock.¹²

Landmine Casualties

A list of recorded mine incidents during 1999 follows, compiled by Landmine Monitor from news accounts and interviews. All incidents were caused by antitank mines. Landmine victim statistics are not systematically compiled in Djibouti.

<i>Date and Location</i>	<i>Number of Victims</i>
7 Feb. at Mulhole Alayou Dada	2 military victims (1 killed and 1 injured)
Mar. at Day:	5 military victims (1 killed and 4 injured)
4 Apr. at Ripta	7 civilian victims (2 killed and 5 injured)
14 Apr. near Ripta	2 civilian victims (1 killed and 1 injured)
15 Apr. at Boli	2 military victims (6 killed and 6 injured)
26 Apr. at Mdeho	13 military victims (4 killed and 9 injured)
6 May at Adaylou	8 civilian victims (2 killed and 6 injured)
20 July at Near Obock	10 civilian victims (1 killed and 9 injured)
12 Sep. at Alaili Dada	6 civilian victims (3 killed and 3 injured)
24 Sep. at Adaylou	6 civilian victims (3 killed and 3 injured)
TOTAL	69 victims (22 killed and 47 injured)

Survivor Assistance

Djibouti's northern plateau, the area most heavily contested during the civil war, and which contains most of the suspected minefields and mined routes, is mostly rough mountainous terrain that contains few easily accessible roads. Civilian victims face

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, 9 December 1999 Humanitarian Demining IWG Fact Sheet.

¹² *Nation*, 18 November 1998.

major difficulties in calling for or reaching help. Military mine victims are almost always evacuated by helicopter.

The District hospital of Obock, closest to areas with the greatest landmine threat, was completely destroyed during the 1991-1994 civil war. There are now only two hospitals in Djibouti capable of assisting victims of landmines. Both are in Djibouti City. Civilian victims are treated at the public Peltier Group Hospital. Although capable of major surgery, Peltier Hospital had gone through a number of years of deterioration. All military victims of landmines are treated at the French Military hospital of Bouffard, which has adequate, but small, surgery and intensive care facilities. Civilians are not normally treated at this hospital.

Post-operative care is not available for mine victims in Djibouti. Peltier Hospital has a small rehabilitation center for amputees and other handicapped persons. It is not equipped to provide prosthetics. No job training or psychological rehabilitation facilities exist in Djibouti.

The local office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been active in providing some assistance to mine victims. The ICRC, which has a rehabilitation facility in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, imports prosthetics for landmine amputees or sends patients to Addis Ababa to be fitted with artificial limbs. During 1999, the ICRC in Djibouti assisted twenty-four military mine victims. The majority of the soldiers were injured during the 1992-94 war, but eight were injured between 1997 and 1999. ICRC provided seventeen prostheses, five wheel chairs and two orthopedic shoes. Also in 1999, following the resurgence of mine explosions, the ICRC, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health of Djibouti, started a program of assistance for civilian mine victims. Six civilians injured during 1999 have so far been treated at the government Peltier Hospital.¹³

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Equatorial Guinea acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 16 September 1998. It has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 28 August 1999. A government official in Malabo justified the delay, telling Landmine Monitor that "landmines are not an issue for us."¹ Equatorial Guinea did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, nor any of the intersessional Standing Committees of Experts meetings in Geneva. It voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. Equatorial Guinea has not produced or exported landmines. It is not believed to possess a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. It is not a party to the CCW, nor a member of the CD. Diplomatic and U.N. sources in Malabo are unaware of any mine action activities or injuries resulting from landmines.²

¹³ Interview with Mustfa Barkhat, ICRC Djibouti, 8 May 2000.

¹ Telephone interview with government official, Malabo, 25 July 2000.

² Ibid.

GHANA

Ghana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 30 June 2000, the ninety-ninth country to do so.

Ghana participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with a delegation of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. It participated in the first meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) on the General Status and Operation of the Convention in January 2000 and also in the second meeting of the SCE on Mine Clearance in March 2000. Ghana voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

Ghana has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. There is no evidence that it has aided in the transshipment of landmines. In February 1999, Landmine Monitor was told that the Ghanaian Armed Forces do not stockpile AP mines.¹ There is no public record of the military using landmines, even for training purposes. Ghana is not mine-affected.

GUINEA

Guinea signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 8 October 1998. The treaty entered into force for Guinea on 1 April 1999. It has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 28 September 1999. A government official claimed that a "resource shortage" is responsible for the delay.¹ Guinea attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. It has not participated in any meetings of the Intersessional Standing Committees of Experts. Guinea voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. It is not a party to the CCW nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Guinea is not thought to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It is not known if Guinea has a stockpile of AP mines. Mines have not been used in Guinea, although there may be some mines and UXO in border areas from the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia.² There are currently no mine action operations in Guinea and there is no existing data on mine victims in Guinea.

¹ Interview with Adjudicator-General of the Armed Forces, Col. A.B. Donkor, Accra, 6 February 1999.

¹ Telephone interview with government official, Conakry, 26 July 2000.

² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p.36.

LESOTHO

Key developments since March 1999: The treaty entered into force for Lesotho on 1 June 1999. Lesotho has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 November 1999. Officials confirmed that the LDF does not even keep landmines for training purposes.

Mine Ban Policy

The Kingdom of Lesotho signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 2 December 1998. The treaty entered into force for Lesotho on 1 June 1999. It is not known to have passed any domestic implementing legislation. While Lesotho has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 November 1999, it is aware of this obligation and intends to submit the report prior to the Second Meeting of State Parties.¹

Lesotho attended the First Meeting of State Parties (FMSP) in Maputo in May 1999 with a delegation led by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thomas Thabane. In a statement to the plenary, Minister Thabane referred to continued use of antipersonnel mines in the region and said, "Let us therefore use this occasion not only to celebrate, but to rededicate ourselves to the commitments and objectives of the Ottawa Process. For us in Southern Africa, let us commit ourselves to the goal of making our region a mine free zone. This is an achievable goal, but it requires sustained efforts from everyone."² He went on to call on "all those governments which have publicly stated their support for an immediate and total ban, to match their words with actions by ratifying the Convention."³

Lesotho has not participated in any intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva. Lesotho was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for universalization of the treaty. Previously Lesotho supported pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996 and 1998. Lesotho is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Lesotho Red Cross is an active member of a network of anti-landmine campaigns in southern Africa.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

At the FMSP, Minister Thabane stated that "Lesotho does not use, buy or manufacture landmines, neither do we have any stockpiles of mines."⁴

During the chaos that resulted in the South African-led SADC intervention in September 1998, rebel soldiers of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) claimed that they held landmines.⁵ A journalist, Sechaba Ka'Nkosi, viewed three of the reported rebel

¹ Interview with Caleb Sello, Lesotho Defence Force, 13 March 2000. This was confirmed by Lesotho in its written statement. Fax from L. Mosala, Foreign Affairs, Lesotho to Noel Stott, South African/International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Ref. FR/UN/21, 7 July 2000, p. 1.

² Statement by Thomas Thabane, Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Lesotho, to the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Ottawa Convention, 3-7 May 1999, pp. 3-4.

³ Ibid., p. 4.

⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

⁵ "The rebels claim to have about 2,000 AK-47 rifles, limpet mines and landmines, rocket-propelled grenades, small-calibre rocket launchers, bombs, mortars and anti-aircraft launchers." See

hideouts in the mountains but was not allowed to see the weapons. While he could not confirm the claim, he told Landmine Monitor that at the time he found it convincing.⁶ An LDF representative told Landmine Monitor that the Lesotho government was investigating the veracity of these allegations, hence the delay in delivering the Article 7 report.⁷ But in a written response to Landmine Monitor, Lesotho stated that:

Incidences [sic] referred to regarding the disturbances in 1998 as described by a purported LDF member have no basis. The Lesotho Defence Force does not, and has never at anytime kept stock of landmines. What may have been stolen at the time were mere hand-grenades. LDF does not even keep any landmines for training purposes.⁸

Mine Action

A number of antitank mine incidents resulted in four deaths and eleven injuries in the early 1980s when the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) was active with the support of the (then) South African government.⁹ Lesotho told Landmine Monitor, “Indeed there were victims of limpet mines in the 1980s, but they were as a result of LLA operations launched outside Lesotho. Such weapons belonged to the LLA.”¹⁰

Today there are no reports of uncleared mines in Lesotho.¹¹ Lesotho’s Foreign Minister told the FMSP that they are “keenly aware that this scourge does not respect borders and it may not be long before it catches up with us.”¹² The government has not adopted national legislation for persons with disabilities.

LIBERIA

Liberia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 December 1999. In a written response to Landmine Monitor’s question on the reason for the accession, Liberia’s Minister of Information, Culture and Tourism, Joe Mulbah, stated:

Liberia believes that landmines pose a perpetual threat to civil society. Its use is pernicious to the people. The gruesome use of landmines has today left the world with millions of amputees and maimed children. Coming out of a seven-year civil

Sechaba Ka’Nkosi, “Inside the Camps of the Lesotho Rebels,” *Electronic Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), 2 October 1998.

⁶ Telephone interview with Sechaba Ka’Nkosi, 7 March 2000.

⁷ Confidential interview with a representative of the Lesotho Defence Force, 13 March 2000.

⁸ Statement by Lesotho to Landmine Monitor, 7 July 2000, p. 1.

⁹ See *African Contemporary Record, 1981 – 1982*, (London: African Publishing Company, 1981); “An Enemy Again,” *Lesotho Weekly*, 3 December 1982; “Landmine Victim Dies,” *Rand Daily Mail* (South Africa), 7 December 1982; and M. Morris & T. Combrinck, *Use of Explosive Devices in Sabotage and Terrorism in South Africa 1981 – 1986* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, 1986).

¹⁰ Statement by Lesotho to Landmine Monitor, 7 July 2000, p. 2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Statement by Foreign Minister Thabane to the FMSP, 3-7 May 1999, p. 3.

war in which landmines were used on a minimal scale, we saw the horrendous impact it had on our people. We pray that such devastation should never come our way as a people who have resolved never to experience war in our existence. We therefore support the global programme to eliminate landmines.¹

Liberia is due to submit its Article 7 transparency measures report by 28 November 2000. Liberia did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, nor has it participated in any intersessional meetings of the treaty. Liberia sponsored UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, but was not present for the vote on 1 December 1999. It is not a party to CCW nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Liberia is not known to have produced or exported AP mines. There is concern that Liberia may serve as a transit point for weapons shipments to rebel groups in Sierra Leone, particularly to the Revolutionary United Front.²

It is assumed that Liberia maintains a stock of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm this. In 1999 Liberia conducted a weapons destruction program.³ The exercise, which began on 25 July, involved the destruction of over 19,000 small and heavy caliber weapons, more than three million rounds of ammunition and some landmines collected by the UN and ECOMOG during the disarmament exercise in 1996-1997. A symbolic arms-burning act took place in Monrovia but the real weapons destruction occurred at an abandoned iron ore mine about forty miles northwest of the capital.⁴

There is no credible evidence of new use of AP mines in Liberia. However, it is not possible to assess if non-state actors in the north of the country possess or use landmines. Landmines were used in the nine-year civil war from 1989 to 1997. Rebel forces mined roads and ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces planted minefields around their installations. Areas such as the currently unstable province of Lofa County were affected.⁵ Mines were also used in Monrovia (in the Paynesville area), Capemount and Bong Mines. Prior to the 1997 multiparty elections, mines were found in the private residences of various warlords.⁶

¹ Statement by Joe Mulbah, Minister of Information, Culture and Tourism, Republic of Liberia, undated, faxed to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, 31 July 2000.

² Telephone interviews with diplomatic sources, Monrovia and Freetown, 20 July 2000.

³ On 4 June 1999 President Charles Taylor set up a committee to oversee the destruction of these weapons, which had been stored at the Liberian Industrial Free Zone Authority. Radio Liberia International, Monrovia, in English 0700 gmt, 4 June 1999.

⁴ *Associated Press*, 27 August 2000; "UN: Secretary-General welcomes on 18 October weapons destruction program in Liberia," M2 Presswire, 20 October 1999. The destruction process was filmed by a Norwegian film company, TV Communication; interview with TV Communication director Bjorn Roar Bye, Oslo, 11 November 1999.

⁵ A Monrovia-based lawyer interviewed by Dutch-freelance journalist Bram Posthumus in March 2000 stated that in 1997, twenty-five landmines were retrieved and destroyed in Voinjama area of Lofa County.

⁶ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Dutch freelance journalist Bram Posthumus, who assessed the landmines situation in Liberia in March 2000.

While the U.S. Department of State had previously listed Liberia as mine-affected, in 1998 it revised its assessment and declared the country mine-free.⁷ The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, an NGO concerned with human rights and humanitarian issues, has expressed its concern about the possibility of a remaining landmine problem and has been unable to verify that Liberia is now landmine-free.⁸

Some hospitals and clinics are up and running again in several parts of the country and the two prosthesis workshops in Ganta and Monrovia have been reactivated.⁹ The main JFK hospital in Monrovia has a small outpatient clinic. In general the facilities are limited due to the destruction and looting during the civil war.

MADAGASCAR

Madagascar signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 16 September 1999. The treaty entered into force for Madagascar on 1 March 2000. Madagascar's Article 7 transparency report is due by 28 August 2000. Madagascar has supported key pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions, including Resolution 54/54 B in December 1999. Madagascar did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo and has not participated in any meeting of the intersessional Standing Committees of Experts. Madagascar is not a party to CCW nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Madagascar's Minister of the Armed Forces confirmed in a letter to the UN that it had not imported any landmines since 1970.¹ The size and composition of Madagascar's current stockpile of AP mines is not known. According to the U.S. Department of State, the only use of landmines in Madagascar was in 1991 as a deterrent to opposition marches in the immediate vicinity of the Presidential Palace.² Otherwise, Madagascar is not considered mine-affected.

MALAWI

Key developments since March 1999: The Malawi Army told Landmine Monitor that it has no AP mine stockpile, only inert dummy mines for training purposes. Malawi has not submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999. There were no reported landmine incidents in Malawi.

⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, September 1998, p.A-2.

⁸ Interview with John Stewart, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Monrovia, March 2000.

⁹ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by journalist Bram Posthumus.

¹ Telephone interview with Mme Elena Rajaonarivelo, Madagascar Mission to the UN, New York, 31 March 1999.

² U.S. State Department, *Hidden Killers*, July 1993, p.121.

Mine Ban Policy

Malawi signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 August 1998. It has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999. Landmine Monitor was told this is due to a shortage of personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare the report;¹ but Malawi is aware of its obligation under the treaty.² The same reason was given for the current lack of domestic implementation legislation.³

Malawi was absent during the vote on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution in December 1999, but had voted for pro-ban resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. It attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in a delegation led by Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ziddy Kingi Medi. In a statement to the plenary Medi called on all states that have not yet signed and ratified the treaty to do so and stated, "Malawi will also cooperate with other states in the region to ensure that the region and indeed the continent of Africa and the world at large is free of landmines."⁴ Malawi has not participated in intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva due to a lack of funds.⁵

Malawi has appealed to states to join the treaty and has discouraged continued manufacture, use, and stockpiling of landmines, as well as encouraged other countries to assist in demining.⁶ Malawi has participated in various meetings examining the need to establish an effective information management computer network system.⁷

NGOs in the Malawi Campaign to Ban Landmines (MCBL) have remained active in the monitoring of implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty by holding meetings with officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence, including the Malawi Army.

Malawi is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

In May 1999, Malawi's Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated that Malawi "does not manufacture, own or stock" antipersonnel mines.⁸ The Malawi Army told Landmine Monitor that it does not have an AP mine stockpile, only inert dummy mines for training purposes.⁹ Malawi denies having acquired landmines from the U.S. as reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* and states that it acquired mine detection equipment from the U.S. to facilitate continued use of the rail traffic in the Nacala Corridor during the Mozambique civil

¹ Letter from Mr. M.D. Chibwana, Principle Foreign Service Officer for Political Affairs (UN matters), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lilongwe, 28 February 2000.

² Interview with Ernest Mungo Makawa, Treaties Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lilongwe, 12 May 2000.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Statement by Z. K. Medi to the FMSP, Maputo, 3 May 1999, pp. 4-5.

⁵ Interview with Ernest Mungo Makawa, Treaties Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lilongwe, 12 May 2000.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Interview with Brigadier N.W. Banda PSC, Army Chief of Staff and Col. H.L. Odilo, Deputy Chief of Staff, Kamuzu Barracks, Lilongwe, 20 January 2000.

⁸ Statement by Z. K. Medi to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

⁹ Interview with Brig. Banda, Army Chief of Staff, and Col. Odilo, Deputy Chief of Staff, Lilongwe, 20 January 2000.

war.¹⁰ Information on the presence of mines and any demining along the Nacala Corridor was unavailable to Landmine Monitor as the Malawi Army regards this as classified information from a foreign country, which should be handled by Mozambique.¹¹

Mine Action

Malawi officials still insist that Malawi does not have a mine problem despite some incidents along the border with Mozambique. The Nacala Corridor is economically important to Malawi and while it was heavily mined during the civil war in Mozambique, it is now said to be cleared.¹² Officials state that the country is ready to assist in demining along its border with Mozambique, as long as resources can be made available from donors.¹³ The Malawi Army has expertise and equipment to detect mines, but requires financial and logistical support.¹⁴ In the past year, there have been no reported landmine incidents in Malawi.

MALI

Key developments since March 1999: In May 1999 Mali announced that it had destroyed 5,127 antipersonnel mines, while retaining 2,000 for training purposes. Mali has not submitted its Article 7 report, due by 27 August 1999. Mali agreed to co-chair the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, but did not attend the two SCE meetings.

Mine Ban Policy

Mali signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 2 June 1998. It has not undertaken any national implementation measures. Mali has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999. In November 1999, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that report was delayed because the counselor in charge of it had been given other responsibilities.¹

Mali attended the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in Maputo in May 1999. In a statement to the plenary, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Farouk Camara, said that Mali has never engaged in the production or transfer of antipersonnel mines, nor have any been deployed on its territory.² At the FMSP, Mali agreed to co-chair the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, along with Hungary.

¹⁰ Ibid.; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 39.

¹¹ Interview with Col. H.L.Odilo, Lilongwe, 10 April 2000.

¹² Interview with Col. R. Chimowa, Spokesman, Ministry of Defense, Lilongwe, 11 May 2000.

¹³ Interview with Col. R. Chimowa, Spokesman, Ministry of Defense, Lilongwe, 11 May 2000.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹ Telephone interview with Mr. Samasékou, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mali, 14 November 1999.

² Statement by the Delegation of Mali to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999, pp. 3-4.

Mali did not, however, attend the two meetings of the SCE in December 1999 and May 2000 in Geneva.

Mali voted in favor of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999. Mali is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

In November 1998 the Association Malienne des droits de l'Homme (AMDH) established an NGO coalition, the National Commission To Ban Landmines. AMDH told Landmine Monitor that to their knowledge there is no indication of any use of AP mines by Mali's Armed Forces in 1999 or 2000.

On 25 May 1998 Mali initiated destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile and completed the process in October 1998. At the FMSP, Mali announced that 5,127 AP mines and 4,131 antitank mines without anti-handling devices mines were destroyed at a cost of CFA Fr 49,918,402 (US\$72,233).³ None of its 6,400 antitank mines with anti-handling devices were destroyed. Mali has chosen to retain 2,000 antipersonnel mines for training.⁴

At the FSMP Mali noted that it has made some modest contributions to mine clearance activities and has established an expert demining force, which has been deployed abroad. In 1997 the National Center for Orthopaedic Devices (CNAOM) was established when the Center for Re-education of the Physically Handicapped (CRHP) and the National Institute for the Re-Adaptation and Professional Training of the Physically Handicapped (INRFP-HP) merged. At the FSMP, Mali stated that it seeks to share its experience and expertise in the area of prosthetics and orthopaedics and the special reintegration of victims.⁵

MAURITANIA

Key developments since March 1999: On 21 July 2000 Mauritania became the 100th country to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty. Mauritania is now receiving demining training and assistance from the United States.

Mauritania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In February 1999, the National Assembly and the Senate passed a law authorizing the President to ratify the treaty.¹ Just as *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* went to print, on 21 July 2000, Mauritania deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations, thus becoming the 100th country to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty. On the occasion, Mauritania's Ambassador to Canada, Adberrahim Ould Hadrami said, "Mauritania is located in the most mine-affected region in the world. Mauritania's ratification of the Ottawa

³ Identified as 3,225 mines antipersonnel a pression et 1,902 mines antipersonnel a traction. Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, p. 5.

⁴ Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, p. 5.

⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

¹ *Official Journal*, N°944, 15 February 1999.

Convention demonstrates our commitment to join the international community in addressing the landmine problem in Africa and elsewhere.²

Mauritania participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, represented by Ambassador Abderrahim Ould Hadrami, the Director of International Organizations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has not attended any of the treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva. Mauritania was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, but had voted in favor of pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1997 and 1998. Mauritania is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mauritania has never produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. It is believed to have imported mines from France, Britain, Italy, Egypt, former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, and Argentina.³ Details on its stockpile of AP mines are currently unknown.

Mauritania is mine-affected from World War II and from the war in Western Sahara. Mines are found in the Adrar region, the Tiris Zemour region and the Dakhalt Nouadibou region, as well as around the military bases of F'Derik, Bir-Mogrein, and Tour Bleue in Nouadhibou.⁴

Mauritania was accepted into the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 10 December 1998. It will receive approximately \$3.185 million in bilateral demining assistance from the U.S. in 1999 and 2000.⁵ In March 2000, at Z'Reida Base, near Nouakchott, a Mauritanian army company participated in a demining training session by U.S. military personnel.⁶

There is no mine awareness program underway at present and there is no reliable assessment of the number of landmine casualties. The U.S. Department of State estimated nineteen mine casualties in 1998.⁷ In December 1999 two people were reported killed and two injured in a mine incident at Laguera, in the Nouadhibou area.⁸

MAURITIUS

Mauritius was the first African country to sign and ratify the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In a written response to Landmine Monitor's request for updated information, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that "the Government is working

² Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade press release No. 186, "Axworthy Welcomes 100th Ratification of Landmine Convention," 27 July 2000.

³ Osservatorio sul commercio delle arme report, Italy Toscana IRES.

⁴ Interview with three mine clearance specialists, 26 December 1999.

⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of African Affairs," 15 March 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 11; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: "Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining 10 December 1998."

⁶ Interview with Peter John Crittenden, U.S. liaison officer, U.S. Embassy, December 1999.

⁷ U.S. State Department, *Hidden Killers*, September 1998, p. A-2.

⁸ Interview with Dr. Anne, Surgeon, CHN, 9 April 2000.

on a Bill with a view to enforcing” the ban treaty.¹ While Mauritius has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999, Landmine Monitor was told in April 2000 that it was “in the process of sending its report.”² An earlier article in *Le Mauricien* suggested that this omission was due mainly to administrative constraints and personnel shortage.³

Mauritius participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 with a delegation led by Hon. Rajkeswur Purryag, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Minister called for universalization of the treaty and paid tribute to the ICBL, urging the meeting to “set up a suitable framework that encourages Civil Society’s further engagement.”⁴

Mauritius has not participated in any of the treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva. Mauritius voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had done on key pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.

Public awareness and sympathy on the landmines issue was heightened following media reports of new dangers posed by mines that had shifted after the flooding in neighboring Mozambique in February-March 2000.

The situation in the country remains the same, in that Mauritius has never produced, exported, or used any antipersonnel mines. A number of AP mines have been retained for training purposes in accordance with Article 3 of the treaty and are in the custody of the Mauritius Police Force, in a classified location.⁵ Details on the number and type of mines retained were not disclosed.

Mauritius is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines, but it has not ratified Amended Protocol II.

In May 1999, Mauritius pledged a contribution of US\$50,000 over a period of five years to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.⁶ As a developing country, which is not affected by a mine problem, Mauritius made such a

¹ Statement to Landmine Monitor, 27 April 2000, p. 2. Fax from Ms. P. Soogree for the Supervising Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Question for Landmine Monitor 2000,” Ref: TS/M/67/1, 27 April 2000.

² Interview with Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul, Head of Multilateral (Political) Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Port Louis, 27 March 2000.

³ “Traite sur les mines antipersonnels - Maurice n'a toujours pas soumis de rapport,” *Le Mauricien*, 3 December 1999.

⁴ Statement by Hon. Rajkeswur Purryag, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Republic of Mauritius to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999, p. 3. Shortly after the release of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the ICBL a letter congratulating the ICBL on the report, which it described as a “major contribution.” The letter noted, however, that the report gave the wrong name for the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The letter was immediately placed in the “Comments and Clarifications” section of the Landmine Monitor web site. Landmine Monitor apologizes for this error. Letter from B. Gokool for Supervising Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, to Coordination Team of the ICBL, Ref: TS/M/67/1, 13 May 1999, p. 1. Go to <http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/comments.html>

⁵ Statement to Landmine Monitor, Ref: TS/M/67/1, 27 April 2000, p. 3.

⁶ Statement by Hon. Rajkeswur Purryag to the FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999, p. 3.

gesture as a mark of solidarity toward those territories that are mine-infested, and toward victims of these indiscriminate weapons.⁷

MOZAMBIQUE

Key developments since March 1999: Mozambique hosted the First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999. It served as co-chair of the SCE on Mine Clearance. Mozambique introduced UNGA Resolution 54/54B, which was adopted in December 1999. In April 2000, work began on a national Level One Impact Survey. About five square kilometers of land was cleared in 1999, bringing the overall total to 194 square kilometers. Despite fears that the February and March 2000 floods would result in an increase in mine casualties, the number of mine casualties continued to decline, falling from 133 casualties in 1998 to 60 casualties in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Mozambique signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1999 and ratified on 25 August 1998. Mozambique is not known to have enacted domestic implementation legislation. Mozambique has yet to submit its Article 7 transparency measures report, which was due by 27 August 1999.¹

Mozambique hosted the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP), which took place in Maputo from 3-7 May 1999 and was attended by 108 governments in addition to international and non-governmental organizations.² The FMSP was opened by Mozambican President Joaquim Alberto Chissano who stated, “The choice of Mozambique bears testimony to our country’s commitment to fulfill the goals of the Convention—a commitment dating back to the process that culminated in the signing of the Convention in Ottawa.”³ Foreign Minister Leonardo Simão was elected President of the FMSP and Carlos dos Santos, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations in New York, was Secretary-General of the meeting. Nobel Peace Laureate and ICBL Ambassador Jody Williams addressed the opening plenary and formally presented the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* to the President and assembled delegates. Farida Gulamo of the Mozambican Campaign Against Landmines

⁷ Interview with Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Port Louis, 27 March 2000.

¹ The government of Canada allocated US\$10,000 in order to provide technical assistance to the government of Mozambique in compiling its first Article 7 Report. The flood emergency situation at the beginning of 2000 resulted in a major set-back in the production of the report. However, Canada was informed in May 2000 by an official of the National Demining Institute that an English version of the report had been prepared and would be forwarded to the United Nations. Email from Mines Action Team, DFAIT to Human Rights Watch (Mary Wareham), 21 July 2000.

² See ICBL, “Report on Activities: First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999,” September 1999, 121 pages.

³ Statement by Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of Mozambique, at the opening ceremony of the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

also addressed the opening plenary. From 8-9 May 1999 the International Campaign to Ban Landmines held its Second General Meeting in Maputo directly after the FMSP.⁴

Mozambique has been very active in the intersessional program of work conducted by the Standing Committees of Experts. It co-chairs the committee on mine clearance and representatives have participated in all standing committee of experts meetings in 1999 and 2000.

Mozambique introduced and secured 109 co-sponsors on the 1999 UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for the universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The resolution was adopted by the UNGA on 1 December 1999 by a vote of 139 to 1, with 20 abstentions. In a statement at the UN, the Mozambican Permanent Representative “hoped that growing awareness and action on the issue of anti-personnel mines at various levels would result in concrete actions and would relieve the suffering of innocent children, women and the elderly around the world.”⁵

Mozambique is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Destruction

Mozambique is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It has imported AP mines from a number of sources.⁶

Details regarding mine stockpiles in Mozambique have not yet been made public. This information will become available with Mozambique’s Article 7 report. It is unknown if Mozambique requires assistance in the destruction of its stocks. In a joint operation in May 2000, South African and Mozambican police destroyed an arms cache in Mozambique, which included twenty-three mines.⁷ A Christian Council of Mozambique initiative in Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, and Zambezia provinces had destroyed 60,000 weapons including landmines by July 2000.⁸

Landmine Problem

Minefields have been located in all provinces of Mozambique, but the most heavily mined regions are found along the border with Zimbabwe in the west of Manica province, in the center of the country in Zambezia and Tete provinces, and in the south in Maputo and Inhambane provinces. Few maps and records were kept of the mines laid during Mozambique’s decades-long civil war, which ended in 1992. Mines were used by both the Frelimo government and the Renamo rebels around areas including military headquarters, towns and villages, sources of water and power, pylon lines and dams, as

⁴ See ICBL, “Report on Activities: Second General Meeting of the ICBL, Maputo, Mozambique, 8-9 May 1999,” September 1999, 40 pages.

⁵ Statement by Ambassador Carlos Dos Santos, “Speakers Stress Financial Challenge Posed By Landmines as Assembly Takes Up Report Of Secretary-General On Assistance In Mine Action,” Press Release GA/9662, 18 November 1999.

⁶ For details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 45.

⁷ *South African Press Association*, 25 May 2000.

⁸ *Noticias*, 17 July 2000.

well as on roads, tracks and paths and alongside bridges and railway lines.⁹ Many of the mines in Mozambique were laid around bridges and culverts, to protect bridges from being attacked by people intent on blowing them up.¹⁰ Since the war, many of these, including the bridges on N1, the main road up the country, have simply been demarcated as mined areas, and/or cleared when the roads were repaired. On smaller upcountry grade roads, the culverts and bridges were similarly mined and even fewer of these have been cleared.

The National Demining Institute (IND) has recorded a nationwide total of 1,759 mined areas.¹¹

Impact of Flooding

The floods that inundated the coastal lagoons and floodplains of Gaza, Maputo, and Inhambane provinces in February and March 2000 caused major international concern. The major area of flooding in Gaza and Maputo provinces fell in the Accelerated Demining Program's (ADP) core area of operation, while the flooding in the Save River (between Inhambane and Sofala/Manica) is in the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and Handicap International (HI) working area. By mid-March, ADP had used satellite images (taken on 28 February and 1-4 March) to produce hardcopy maps at 1:400,000 scale.¹² These maps show the extent of the flooding as an overlay on existing National Demining Institute and ADP data. The maps were distributed to relief agencies via the Emergency Mine Action Committee (EMAC) and UN Development Program (UNDP) to use in operations in and around the flooded area.

The flooded areas largely comprised low-lying agricultural land previously under formal irrigation. The area is highly populated, with market towns such as Macarretane, Chokwe, Chibuto, and Xia-Xai.

The maps show that less than a dozen recorded mined or potentially mined sites were inundated. This is a small figure in proportion to the national figure of 1,759 mined sites, or 380 in Maputo and Gaza combined.¹³ However some significant minefields were flooded.

The major problem was not mines in the flooded area, but the movement of internally displaced people (IDPs) away from the floods and into areas to the southeast just inside Maputo province and over the Mazimechopes river. The flooding quickly displaced up to 200,000 people, mostly farmers.¹⁴ By comparison to the floodplains in

⁹ Landmines produced in the following countries have been found in Mozambique: USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, China, Italy, Belgium, France, U.K., Portugal, U.S., South Africa, Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Austria. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 45.

¹⁰ "Minas e Desminagem em Mocambique: Actas do seminário sobre o impacto socio-cultural e económico das minas e da desminagem em Mocambique, organizado pelo Arpac, IDRC e IND," February 2000.

¹¹ CND Bulletin No. 8, March 1999.

¹² Southern Mozambique Flood Affected Area Map, 1:400,000 scale, IND/ADP, Maputo, 16 March 2000.

¹³ CND Bulletin No. 8, March 1999.

¹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Statement, Maputo, 11 March 2000.

Gaza, Maputo Province contains a relatively high concentration of small minefields, and in the rural north of the province few of these are formally marked.

The main aim of the EMAC was to provide data and coordinate mine awareness activities for all the agencies working with IDPs. In the first week of April 2000 there was one mine accident involving an ADP deminer working in the emergency zone.¹⁵ But as of 12 April 2000, no other injuries or deaths were recorded by IND in or around the flood zone. The flooding claimed between 640 and 700 lives.¹⁶

Concern remains that some mines placed on or around riverbanks and bridges may have been moved by the floodwaters or buried in silt. On the basis of mapped information there appears to be little likelihood of this, and the problem remains small compared to the risks run by IDPs now trying to re-establish lives in proximity to minefields. The mines did not impact on the relief efforts but since some relief centers were in the proximity of minefields, the floods changed priorities for mine clearance.¹⁷

In response to the flooding, the Rome meeting allocated \$7.5 million for mine action over a period of 18 months. As part of the Rome package, the government requested \$806,200 for IND. This broke down as: \$450,000 for Administration and costs in IND, \$50,000 for mapping and imaging, \$200,000 for training, \$6,200 for removal/EOD equipment, and \$100,00 for aerial support services.¹⁸

Survey and Assessment

The Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC) is in the process of executing a National Level One Impact Survey funded by the government of Canada, through its development wing CIDA. The total budget is around \$1.8 million.¹⁹ This survey is being executed in a manner generally compliant with international standards and based upon the protocols and procedures as developed by the Survey Action Center (SAC).²⁰ The implementation of this effort has gone slowly due to uncertainty surrounding the operation of the CND, adaption of Impact survey protocols and supporting database to the context of Mozambique, contract and operational management issues and the April floods.

In order to ensure that the survey is conducted in a manner compliant with international initiatives and standards related to Impact Surveys, the CIDC has based much of its working procedures on field protocols developed by the Survey Action Center. Additionally, the Survey Action Center provides a part-time Quality Assurance Monitor to the project, who assesses progress in accordance with UNMAS standards for Certification and reports this progress back through the SAC to UNMAS. This monitoring and reporting process creates a link between CIDC and the other ongoing Impact Surveys, giving the team in Mozambique expanded access to subject matter expertise and lessons learned in the field of Impact Surveys.

¹⁵ Interview Lt. Col. Derek Baxter, Chief technical Advisor, ADP, Maputo, 13 April 2000.

¹⁶ CNN News Bulletins, March 2000.

¹⁷ Interview with Nico Bosman, Program Coordinator, UNOPS, Johannesburg, 6 June 2000.

¹⁸ *Noticias*, 25 April 2000.

¹⁹ Interview with Mike Wilson, Manager, CIDC National Level 1 Survey, Maputo, 12 April 2000.

²⁰ Email from Richard Kidd, Manager, Survey Action Center, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 27 July 2000.

Throughout 1999 the CIDC tried to recruit the survey teams in Mozambique but had little success. The available pool of skilled staff in Maputo was small and CIDC did not want to “poach” skilled staff from other existent and active demining units.²¹ In the end they recruited twenty-five researchers with high school education or above and ability in at least two languages and ran a thirty-five-day training course at the ADP facility at Moamba near Maputo.²² In March 2000, CIDC hired a manager on a twelve-month contract. CIDC had experienced problems with importation taxes and customs, helping to create a six-month hold-up. Then throughout March and April the CIDC survey reviewed the toponomy of Mozambique, creating a revised register of over 10,000 place names, and identified around 2000 villages to be surveyed.

The survey did not start work in March in the south due to the flooding and finally in April 2000 two survey teams were deployed (by ferry) to Nampula to begin work in the northern four provinces. By mid-May 2000 Nampula was finished and Cabo Delgado was fifty percent completed but a quarter of the two teams were sick with malaria and some key members of the survey teams had left due to the difficult conditions.²³

In Maputo, the survey moved from its temporary offices to the IND offices in late April, and began cross-referencing data from IND data and HALO Trust, a process that will also include data from ADP, Handicap International (HI), World Vision, and NPA. At the beginning of June the survey received plotting and IT equipment, four months after the equipment was ordered.

The survey was originally funded for one year, but the Canadian donors have extended the contract by one year. The project manager intends to produce a report in late 2000, which outlines the history of the survey and provides lessons learned.²⁴

Coordination of Mine Action

By March 1999 the donor community had seemingly lost faith in the National Demining Commission (CND) under Osorio Severiano.²⁵ The new National Demining Institute (IND) and its new director from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Artur Verissimo, replaced the CND in mid-1999. IND has pushed for investment in two provincial offices, one in Nampula and one in Chimoio, to coordinate with HALO and NPA, to act as conduit between Provincial government and mine action in the provinces, and to collect information for IND in Maputo.²⁶

In early March 2000, the UNDP, ADP and IND organized an Emergency Mine Action Committee (EMAC) which met with relief agencies and coordinated mine action related to the flooding. IND took a lead role in convening and chairing meetings and coordination of activities. Formal meetings were held at least twice a week to inform relief agencies and coordinate mine awareness activities for internally displaced people.

²¹ Interview with Mike Wilson, Manager, CIDC National Level 1 Survey, Maputo, 12 April 2000.

²² *Noticias* 8 November 1999.

²³ Interview with Mike Wilson, Manager, CIDC National Level 1 Survey, Maputo, 12 April 2000.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Email from Alistair Craib, Consultant to the European Union, April 1999.

²⁶ Interview with Artur Verissimo, Director, IND, Maputo, 11 April 2000.

Mine Action Funding

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, between 1993 and the end of 1998, funding for demining in Mozambique exceeded \$116 million.

The U.S. has been the largest single donor, having provided over \$20 million to mine action in Mozambique since 1993. The U.S. has provided assistance to HALO Trust, NPA, POWER, and ADP. It is the sole donor working to support the military to establish a long-term Mozambican capacity based within the military. In 1999 the U.S. provided a total of \$3 million for mine action programs, and the U.S. contribution in 2000 is expected to total \$4 million. The U.S. intends to provide dogs for the military via RONCO, make an equipment grant to IND (\$140,000), provide funding for HALO Trust, and explore the potential of funding the clearance of power lines in Sofala (Malovusi to Hatunda).²⁷

Japan is considering funding for clearance of railways and strategic infrastructure. The outcome of the clearance of Massingir in 1998 (\$1 million from Japan and \$1 million from the U.S.) was largely successful: seventeen formal defensive minefields were cleared (89,634 square meters) of 192 AP mines and 157 UXO were destroyed. Japan is interested to repeat the initiative on a different site again using Mechem as contractor. HALO Trust received a small grant of \$83,333 for equipment.

Denmark provided \$400,000 via UNDP, which in part went to cover a Chief Technical Advisor for ADP who arrived in February 2000.²⁸

*Funding for mine action*²⁹

Funding for mine action				
Donor	Program	Implementor	Year	Funds
Australia	Demining in Sofala	?	97 – 99	600,000
	Australian Army Technical Assistance to ADP	ADP	96 – 00	270,000
Austria	Demining Sofala Marromeu, Chibabava and Buzi	Local Co.	98 – 99	550,000
Canada	National Level 1 Survey (upgrading)	CND/ADP/CIDC	99 – 01	1,053,000
	Production of GIS maps at 1:50,000 (by air survey)	CND/ADP/CIDC	99 – 01	5,329,000
	3 TCOs to support database in CND / ADP	CND/ADP/CIDC	99 – 01	378,000
	HI demining in Inhambane	HI	99-01	956,000

²⁷ U.S. Department of State, "FY 00 NADR Project Status," p. 3; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 12. U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: "United States Increases Humanitarian Demining Assistance to Mozambique," 10 May 2000.

²⁸ Interview with Lt. Col. Derek Baxter, Chief technical Advisor, ADP, Maputo, 13 April 2000.

²⁹ All data gathered from interviews in Mozambique and South Africa in 1999 and 2000. Note: Figures in *italics* are estimates or totals for programs lasting over one year.

Funding for mine action				
Donor	Program	Implementor	Year	Funds
	Support for Mine Awareness in the flood zone	Various	00	500,000
Denmark	ADP Demining	ADP	99 – 00	2,000,000
	IND institutional support	IND	00	376,000
EU	ADP Demining	ADP	99 – 00	2,900,000
Finland	ADP Demining	ADP	98 – 00	1,600,000
	Provision of 2 Sisu-Patria RA140DS flails & 6 TCOs	ADP	99 – 00	2,680,000
	HI mine awareness campaign	HI	98 – 99	240,000
Germany	GTZ Integrated Humanitarian Demining for Development IHDD) survey and demining in Manica and Sofala Provinces.	GTZ Mine-Tech	99 – 00	500,000
Ireland	ADP demining in Inhambane	ADP	98 – 00	1,000,000
Italy	UNOPS project Gorogosa and Manica	?	00	450,000
Japan	ADP demining via UN VTF	ADP	00	600,000
Mozambique	Annual budget of CND	CND	Annual	500,000
Netherlands	HALO Trust demining in Nampula	HALO	00	543,530
	HI level 2 survey in Inhambane	HI	00	177,000
	NPA Phase III demining and reconstruction	NPA	00	425,130
New Zealand	2 TCOs to ADP	ADP	96 – 00	1,400,000
Norway	NPA demining	NPA	00	2,000,000
	IND administrative grant	IND	00	50,000
	HI mine awareness support to IND	HI	00	50,000
Sweden	HI demining in Inhambane	HI	99-00	628,000
	HI mine awareness support to IND	HI		275,000
Switzerland	HALO demining in Cabo Delgado	HALO	97 – 00	2,000,000
	HI mine awareness support to IND	HI	00	49,000
	Mine awareness post-floods	HI	00	67,000
	Demining in Matalane and Gorongosa	Afrovita	00	375,000
UK	HALO demining in Zambezia	HALO	98 – 01	3,420,000
UNICEF	Mine awareness post-floods	HI	00	146,000
USA	Mine Dogs for ADP	Ronco	00	450,000

Funding for mine action				
Donor	Program	Implementor	Year	Funds
	Equipment for 1st Bat. Deminers. 200 sets of kit	FADM	99 – 00	1,150,000
	Demining Equipment (response to flooding)		00	2,000,000

The United Nations also contributes, as does the UN Association-USA's "Adopt-a-Minefield" initiative.³⁰

Mine Clearance

By 1998, some 189 square kilometers of land had been cleared in Mozambique.³¹ Data from five of the major mine clearance organizations indicates that a total of five square kilometers was cleared in 1999. This is far more than the reported IND figure of two square kilometers. Statistical collection and analysis for mine clearance operations in 1999 were badly disrupted by the changeover from CND to IND and departure of the UNDP and UNV support staff. Although ADP, HALO Trust, and NPA have reported consistently, it is apparent that many commercial companies have not. The database has not been proactively maintained, and the following incomplete statistics illustrate the point.

³⁰ Email from Lt. Col. Derek Baxter, CTA, ADP, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August 2000.

³¹ CND data, See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 48.

*Mine Clearance Figures*³²

Source	CND 4th Qtr 1999	Noticias ³³ 17 January 2000	Estimated Total for 1999
AP Mines	53,624	56,176	2,552
AT Mines	302	456	154
UXO	23,977	30,432	6,455
Small Arms Ammunition	424,396		
Roads (kilometers)	7,400.14	7,733.2	333.06
Roads (square meters)	62,276,987		
Power lines (kilometers)	385.54	1,829.45	1,444
Power lines (square meters)	72,413,455		
Railroads (kilometers)	90.4		
Railroads (square meters)	22,600,000		
Areas (square meters)	38,573,125		
Total (square meters)	175,523,567	177,000,000	2,000,000
Total (hectares)	17,552.36	17,700	200

Details on individual organizations involved in mine clearance follows.

1) *Accelerated Demining Program (ADP)*:³⁴ ADP reports that it is fully funded for FY2000, which includes approximately \$2 million in new capital equipment, vehicles, radios, detectors, tools, and protection equipment.³⁵ ADP receives funding from: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.S (in kind). A major problem for ADP is finding funding for core costs, notably Mozambican salaries. A notable exception to this is Japan, a major contributor to ADP via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund. Japan has earmarked funds specifically for local salaries. Finland contributed two Sisu Patria RA 140DS flails and six technical cooperation officers for a four-year program that began in September 1999. The technical cooperation officers all have experience in UN Peacekeeping operations. In 1999, ADP cleared 1,200,000 square meters of land with a staff of 500 people and a budget of around \$4.5 million.

2) *Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)*:³⁶ This Norwegian-based NGO employs approximately 500 staff in seven demining teams of between fifty-five and 107 persons. Thirteen mine detection dogs work in a mine dog section, and there is also a monitoring team and a medical team. NPA hopes to build up to an operational capacity of

³² Note: Figures in *italics* are Landmine Monitor extrapolations.

³³ "Desminagem consome mai de 27 milhoes de dolares/ano," *Noticias*, 17 January 2000.

³⁴ Interview Lt. Col. Derek Baxter, Chief technical Advisor, ADP, Maputo, 13 April 2000.

³⁵ Email from Lt. Col. Derek Baxter, CTA, ADP, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August 2000.

³⁶ NPA 4th Quarter Report, 1999 Mozambique Demining, Maputo.

approximately 560 staff in 2000. NPA cleared around 2,200,000 square meters of land in 1999. In the last quarter (October to December) they cleared 369,414 square meters of land, 7.2 kilometers of road, 277 AP mines, eighty-three UXO, and 1,615 items of small arms ammunition. In 1998-99, NPA received \$7.8 million in funds from Norway (\$4 million), Denmark (\$1.5 million), Sweden (\$1.3 million), and the Netherlands (\$1 million).

3) *The HALO Trust*:³⁷ The British-based NGO HALO is in the process of completing a comprehensive re-survey of the four northern provinces of Mozambique, and will be publishing a full report towards the end of 2000. HALO survey teams have re-surveyed all the known suspect sites, and have interviewed local authorities in every district in the four provinces. Preliminary results are encouraging and show that a large proportion of previously reported dangerous areas are in fact safe and mine free, as evidenced by agricultural activities and housing on the areas and the total absence of any accidents to humans or livestock.

Currently HALO has 7 manual teams, 3 survey/EOD teams deployed on tasks prioritized with the provincial and district authorities. During 2000 HALO also deployed 3 mechanical clearance teams. The mechanical teams equipped with armoured Volvo front loaders are now working in Zambezia and Nampula, and it is planned to extend their work into Cabo Delgado and Naissa in 2001.

HALO expects that by 2002 operations in Niassa and Zambezia will be in the final phase of clearance and HALO is working towards establishing small mobile multi-disciplined teams that will be able to react on call out to suspect areas or items.

4) *Handicap International (HI)*: This NGO based in France employs 135 staff in five demining teams, including one specialized in Level 2 technical survey, in Inhambane province. HI carries out "proximity demining" which cleared areas of high concern for the local community including infrastructure, such as schools and wells, and land. HI hopes to add a supplementary team of sixteen deminers to work in the north of Inhambane province, where the Save river flooded in February and March 2000, and a mine detection dogs capacity is also planned. Between 1997 and 2000 HI received funding from donors including: the European Commission (\$1.2 million from 1997-1999); Région Nord pas de Calais (\$8,380 in 1998); Sweden (\$674,950 from 1998-1999); The Netherlands (\$500,000 from 1996-1999 and \$177,000 for 2000) and Canada (\$956,000 in 2000-2001).

5) *Menschen gegen Minen (MgM)*:³⁸ Germany-based NGO MgM has prepared a \$1.37 million proposal to clear 110 kilometers of railway Songo to Matambo in Tete, and 235 kilometers of road and the German government has pledged \$600,000 for Phase I budget. Phase I comprises 52 kilometers of railway bordered by minefields which zig-zag in an uncertain way somewhat parallel to the railway.

6) *Mechem*:³⁹ In 1999, South African-based commercial clearance company Mechem completed the clearance of the mined areas around Massingir dam in 100

³⁷ Email from Alan Macdonald, Africa Desk Officer, HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 25 July 2000.

³⁸ Interview with Peter Puggy Fuyane, Project Director, MgM Mozambique, Maputo, 11th April 2000. Email from Hendrik Ehlers, Director, MgM, 11 May 2000. See also, www.mgm.org.

³⁹ Interview with Mike Thusi, Program Manager, Mechem, Johannesburg, 7 June 2000.

working days over a total period approaching six months. This involved clearance of mined areas within a four kilometer radius of the dam, in which the priorities were the dam itself, the adjacent airfield, roads and access tracks and inhabited/developed areas. The three-phase program surveyed 790,000 square meters of suspected mined area and eventually cleared 89,634 square meters of land with just eighteen deminers, destroying approximately 190 AP mines and 170 UXO. In 1999, Mechem cleared 790,000 square meters at Masingir.

7) *Mine Tech*:⁴⁰ This Zimbabwe-based commercial company carried out four or five different projects in Mozambique in 1999. UNDP/CND (IND) funded its clearance of mined areas to facilitate the construction of a power line between Xai Xai and Inhambane. Mine Tech cleared 242,611 square meters under and around the power lines. The German government entity GTZ funded an Integrated Humanitarian Demining for Development project in Manica and 25,318 square meters were cleared around three villages. GTZ funded the clearance of one village minefield with integrated manual and MDD techniques supported with mechanical bush clearance, and cleared 176,280 square meters.⁴¹ MOTRACO funded Mine Tech clearance of 340,000 square meters around electrical pylons between Infulene to Komatipoort. This project and the UNDP/IND work carry over into 2000. Mine Tech carried out some community mine-awareness work and Level 2 survey work near Gorongosa, both funded by GTZ. In 1999, Mine Tech cleared a total of 784,209 square meters.

8) *RONCO Consulting Corporation*:⁴² Through a U.S. Department of State contract, RONCO is providing six mine detecting dogs and support to the ADP's Mine Detection Dog Program, including personnel training, development of management systems and provision of equipment, supplies and facilities. This task order will be completed by August 2000.

9) *Carlos Gassmann Tecnologias de Vanguarda Aplicadas Lda (CGTVA)*:⁴³ In 1999, this Portugal-based commercial company received funding from Denmark to carry out Quality Assurance and some small clearance activities.

10) *Emprensa Mocambicana de Desminagem*:⁴⁴ In 1999, this Mozambican commercial company received \$600,000 funding from Austria for demining, training, and awareness in Marromeu, Chibababva, and Buzi, in Sofala province.

11) *Afrovita*:⁴⁵ In 1999, this Mozambican commercial demining company received \$375,000 from Switzerland to work in Matalane and Gorongosa.

⁴⁰ Interview with Chris Pearce, Director, Mine Tech, Johannesburg, 6 June, 2000. Email from Michael Laban, Project Manager, Mine Tech, 6 June 2000.

⁴¹ GTZ stands for Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit Gmb. It is the implementation arm of German government overseas development aid.

⁴² RONCO Newswire, "RONCO Continues Work On State Department Demining Contract In Mozambique," Washington, March 2000.

⁴³ Interview with Mr Pretorius, Project Manager, CGTVA, Johannesburg 6 June 2000.

⁴⁴ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Alberto Manhique, Coordinator, Mozambican Campaign Against Landmines.

⁴⁵ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Alberto Manhique, Coordinator, Mozambican Campaign Against Landmines.

12) *Special Clearance Services (SCS)*:⁴⁶ This Zimbabwe-based commercial mine clearance company has operated in Mozambique since 1996. In 2000 it was taken over by Armor Holdings Ltd. and relocating to South Africa. It hopes to win contracts in Mozambique.

13) *Lince Lda*:⁴⁷ This is subsidiary company of BRZ International and has conducted mine clearance and verification work for two contracts, at Motraco and at Ressano Garcia. It has also conducted Quality Assurance work in Beira and Marraqene.

14) *Qualitas*:⁴⁸ Qualitas is a subsidiary company of BRZ which is “in the process of being accredited in Mozambique to work on QA contracts for IND.”

15) *Necochaminas*: This Mozambican demining NGO was established by former Mozambican Special Armed Forces personnel but it is not known if it has undertaken any mine clearance operations yet.

16) *International Demining*: International Demining is managed by South African businessman Frank Lipko. It is not currently accredited to the IND and is not engaged in any mine action in Mozambique but it believed to have sought work there.

17) *Africa Deminers*: This commercial company was originally called TNT. Africa Deminers is managed by South African businessman Gabriel Schroeder. It was contracted in 1999 by a road construction company to clear the new road from Maputo to Ressano Garcia on the border with South Africa. In late 1999 Africa Deminers is believed to have lost its accreditation with the IND.

18) *The Forças Armadas da Defesa de Mozambique (FADM)*. Recognizing that Mozambique needs a long term demining capacity, the United States has been providing training and equipment to the 1st Battalion of the Mozambican infantry. In 1999 the U.S. fully equipped 200 deminers. The FADM deminers have not yet deployed.

Mine Awareness

In 1994, Handicap International took over coordination of mine awareness throughout Mozambique and created the National Coordination Program of Education Activities to Prevent Mines and UXO Accidents (PEPAM). PEPAM is an HI project run in collaboration with the Mozambican Red Cross and the Ministry of Education, as well as over eighty-six national, provincial, and local partners.

Phase III of the HI’s Mine Risk Education (MRE) program was completed in 1999. MRE ran from January 1998 to December 1999 with a budget of \$2.5 million from France, Sweden, Norway, Finland, USA, Switzerland, Australia, UNDP, and UNICEF. MRE targeted at risk rural populations, students, the various mine clearance agencies and actors involved in mine awareness. MRE also fed information and feedback into the National Demining Commission, the Ministry of Education, and the Mozambican Red Cross.

⁴⁶ Interview with Noel Philp, Director DSL, London, 20 June 2000.

⁴⁷ Interview with Bill Pelsler, Director, BRZ, and Julius Krahtz, Operations Manager, BRZ, Pretoria, 7 June 2000; BRZ International Ltd, “Humanitarian Mine Clearance Profile,” BRZ302, Doc Edition:B.

⁴⁸ Interview with Bill Pelsler, Director, BRZ and Julius Krahtz, Operations Manager, BRZ, Pretoria, 7 June 2000.

HI started an emergency mine awareness campaign following the February-March 2000 floods. Five mobile teams worked in IDP's camp in Gaza and Inhambane province in order to reduce the risk of incidents following displaced mines along the rivers.

Mozambique is a case study in a project entitled "Assistance to Mine Affected Communities" by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). The PRIO study of mine affected communities is funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.⁴⁹

Landmine Casualties

Despite fears that the February and March 2000 floods would result in an increase in mine casualties, the number of landmine casualties in Mozambique continues to decline. In 1999 the decline was quite dramatic, falling from 133 casualties in 1998 to 60 casualties in 1999, according to IND. In 1999 there were 23 incidents in mine clearance operations resulting in 23 injured and five fatalities.⁵⁰ In the last quarter of 1999, one death, that of a deminer in Maputo province, and seven injuries were recorded.⁵¹

Data on mine accidents is collected under the PEPAM system housed at the IND, with technical assistance from HI which collects, verifies and analyses accident report forms.

Many of the incidents are in Maputo province, which by Mozambican standards is densely populated. In September 1999 the Mozambican Campaign Against Landmines called for better demarcation of minefields and suspected mined areas in the region of Ressano Garcia, which borders South Africa.⁵² The border areas were heavily mined during the war, and South Africa is an attractive place for Mozambicans seeking work who cross the border illegally.

⁴⁹ Ananda S. Milliard, "Community Impact in Mozambique: The Process of Identifying and Using Socio-Economic Indicators," Paper presented at "The Road Forward: Humanitarian Mine Clearance in Southern Africa," Conference hosted by SAAI, Johannesburg, 8 June 2000. See also Ananda S. Millard and Kristian Berg Harpviken, Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities Project (AMAC), PRIO, "Use of Socio-Economic Analysis in Planning and Evaluating Mine Action Programmes: The Case of Mozambique," Report for the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) submitted to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Oslo, 8 May 2000.

⁵⁰ *Noticias*, 17 January 2000.

⁵¹ Data provided to Landmine Monitor by IND, 13 April 2000.

⁵² "Campanha Mocambicana quer maior celeridade," *Noticias*, 29 September 1999.

*Landmine casualties by province for 1998 – 1999*⁵³

Landmine casualties by province for 1998 – 1999										
	1999					1998				
		All victims (dead and injured)					All victims (dead and injured)			
	Incidents	M	W	C	Total	Incidents	M	W	C	Total
Maputo	6	14	0	0	14	18	13	0	8	21
Gaza	3	2	0	1	3	6	2	0	6	8
Inhambane	7	5	1	1	7	5	2	0	5	7
Sofala	7	7	2	6	15	5	10	2	9	21
Manica	2	0	0	3	3	12	9	1	1	11
Tete	5	3	0	3	6	10	9	5	21	35
Zambezia	1	1	0	0	1	10	8	3	2	13
Nampula	3	7	0	1	8	9	4	2	3	9
C.Delgado	1	1	1	0	2	5	2	3	0	5
Niassa	1	1	0	0	1	3	2	0	1	3
Total	36	41	4	15	60	83	61	16	56	133

Landmine Survivor Assistance

1) *Handicap International (HI)*. HI has operated in Mozambique since 1986, when, at the request of the government, it established two orthopedics centers in Inhambane province. By 1992, HI had built two transit centers where patients could stay while being treated at the orthopedic centers. In total, six orthopedic centers have been established by HI in the cities of Vilanculos, Inhambane, Lichinga, Tete, Pemba, and Nampula. HI has been pursuing a policy of integrating these six centers within the Ministry of Health. HI has arranged for four of its technicians to attend a course in Lyons to upgrade to Category I in 2000.

2) *POWER*. This UK-based NGO arrived in 1995. POWER oversaw the running of four former ICRC centers and was responsible for the production of polypropylene orthopedic components at its Maputo orthopedic center. In 1997 the four POWER centers fitted 703 prostheses representing about 80 per cent of national production.⁵⁴ POWER estimates that there is a need to produce at least 3,000 prostheses per year. Current production levels, combining HI and POWER-type limbs, are less than 1,000 per year.⁵⁵ Preliminary analysis of a 1997 survey in Inhambane and Maputo provinces by researchers from Dalhousie University, Canada, suggests that only 20.7 per cent of amputees were using a prosthesis without difficulty, while 36.4 per cent of respondents had not received any rehabilitation treatment at all.⁵⁶

⁵³ Data provided to Landmine Monitor by IND, 13 April 2000.

⁵⁴ POWER Mozambique project pamphlet, undated.

⁵⁵ Interview with Max Deneu, POWER Country Manager, Maputo, 20 January 1999.

⁵⁶ Findings reproduced in POWER Mozambique project pamphlet, undated.

In late 1998 POWER renegotiated its agreement, withdrawing from direct involvement in the four centers which now fall under the Ministry of Health. POWER, however, continues to provide materials for the manufacture of limbs, both for these four centers and those of HI.

There has been investment in its staff. Two Category II prosthetists/orthotists are attending a four year course at Strathclyde University, Glasgow, Scotland to upgrade to Category I. This makes, with the three sponsored for training by HI in Lyon, five of the twenty-four Mozambican Category II prosthetists/orthotists being overseas in 2000. There are currently sixteen in 2000 providing support for the ten centers around the country.

POWER moved offices to the new Associação dos Deficientes Moçambicanos (ADEMO) center in Maputo in 1999. ADEMO now has 63,000 members. POWER's objective is to strengthen ADEMO's management and financial capacity and to jointly initiate a Council for Action on Disability, which, it is hoped will eventually replace POWER.⁵⁷

POWER also hopes to open in 2000 a new ortho-prosthetic center in Chimoio in Manica province. This will be a private, nonprofit operation managed by the Council for Action on Disability. POWER is piloting a program to train amputees to work with donkeys and carts in street cleaning.

3) *Jaipur Limb Campaign*. This UK-based NGO promotes the use of appropriate technology in prosthetics provided in developing countries. With funding from the National Lottery and the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund and in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and the Mozambican Red Cross Society (CVM) it opened in 1999 a Jaipur rural orthopedic project at Manjacaze, Gaza province. This center will fit Jaipur limbs, using staff trained in the technique in India.

It is government policy to have one ortho-prosthetic center in each of the ten provinces. The center at Vilanculos in Inhambane is to be closed during 2000 while the opening in 1999 of clinics in Gaza and Manica fulfill this policy.

4) *Landmine Survivors Network*. This U.S.-based network to support landmine survivors became registered in Mozambique in May 1999 and officially began its activities, including conducting interviews of landmine survivors in Quelimane city, Zambezia province.⁵⁸

It is the responsibility of the Ministry for Coordination of Social Action to make patients aware of the availability of prosthetic and orthotic services and to assist their travel to the centers. The Ministry has available a number of transit centers, at which patients can stay free of charge while receiving treatment, but this system is currently not running well-- mostly because of a lack of resources.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Michael Boddington, "Sustainability of Prothetic and Orthotic Programmes in the Low-income World: The Case of Mozambique," *Journal of Mine Action*, Fall 1999.

⁵⁸ www.landminesurvivors.org

⁵⁹ Michael Boddington, "Sustainability of Prothetic and Orthotic Programmes," *Journal of Mine Action*, Fall 1999.

National Disability Laws and Policy

In Mozambique, ex-military personnel with disabilities enjoy special legal status and state pensions that are not available to the rest of the disabled population. Rules and regulations recognizing the rights of persons with disabilities have existed for many years in a range of national legislation covering the education, labor, financial, transportation, military and health sectors. However, national disability organizations (which, in 1998, created a national forum to coordinate advocacy on disability rights), suggest that these rights and services exist more on paper than in practice.

The national coordinating agency for assistance to persons with disability is the Ministry of Coordination for Social Action (MICAS). With funding from Coopération Française, HI established the Institutional Support Program (PAI) to provide technical assistance to MICAS on disability matters in 1996. Three projects have been supported by PAI including the SIRT program now operating in all provinces to provide information, referrals and transportation of disabled persons to health facilities and transit centers. Under a second PAI initiative, MICAS has proposed the creation of a national disability card, which is intended to help persons with disabilities access government services.

In 1991, a national disability policy was developed by MICAS, but for political reasons failed to gain government approval. Through PAI's third project, the policy has since been redrafted and it is expected that Parliament will approve a national disability law establishing fundamental rights and principles relating to persons with physical and mental disabilities. Part of the proposed legislation foresees the creation of a National Council on Disabilities that would act as an advisory body to government and include the participation of representatives of the disabled community.⁶⁰

NAMIBIA

Key developments since March 1999: Angolan UNITA rebels and Angolan government troops have used landmines inside Namibia. The number of mine incidents in Namibia has increased dramatically since December 1999. Mine clearance operations have continued and in February 2000 the U.S. completed its training program. Namibia had not submitted its Article 7 transparency measures report which was due by 27 August 1999.

Mine Ban Treaty

Namibia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 21 September 1998. Although there is no formal national legislation passed, the treaty has become part of national law under the terms of a provision in the Namibian Constitution.

Namibia had not submitted its Article 7 transparency measures report which was due by 27 August 1999. The Namibian Campaign to Ban Landmines has been unable to

⁶⁰ Interview with Pascal Torres, PAI Project Coordinator, MINEC, Maputo, 12 January 1999.

establish whether any submission is being prepared and its inquiries have received no response from either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense.¹

The country participated in the First Meeting of States Parties held at Maputo on 3-7 May 1999 by sending an officer from their Ministry of Defense. Namibia did not attend any meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees of Experts. Namibia is not known to have made any statements regarding the Mine Ban Treaty or a ban more generally in 1999 or 2000. Namibia voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

Namibia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Namibia denies that it has produced or exported antipersonnel mines.² Lingering questions regarding PMD-6 mines either assembled or produced in Namibia have not been resolved.³

As reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, Namibian officials claim that all AP mines were destroyed by May 1998, and only a small stockpile has been retained for training purposes.⁴ At the same time, there had been reports about a substantial stockpile of AP mines, including POMZ-2 and PMD-6 AP mines stored at Grootfontein Military Base. In March 1999, in his annual report to Parliament, the country's Auditor-General, who carried out an inspection of the controversial ammunition storage at the Grootfontein Military Base, stated that "there were slack controls over some of the most dangerous arms and ammunition in the base."⁵

Use by Angolan UNITA Rebels

In late 1999 Namibia gave permission for its territory to be used by Angolan government troops as a base for attacks on UNITA positions in southeastern Angola.⁶ Angolan government forces were permitted to use Namibian military bases and other facilities to store and transfer weapons and ammunition to combat zones in the southeastern regions of Angola as well as in the northeastern parts of Namibia.

¹ Letter by Phil ya Nangoloh, NCBL Coordinator addressed to the Minister of Defense, 16 February 2000.

² Verbal denial (regarding research and production) by Defense Minister Erkki Nghimtina during a meeting with the NCBL, 12 January 1999.

³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 65-66.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ "No explosives threat, says Defense," *The Namibian*, 9 March 1999.

⁶ "Angola: New concerns as fighting rages along southern border", *IRIN*, 22 December 1999; "Sergeant killed in UNITA attack," *The Namibian*, 22 December 1999; "Civilian killings spark concern," *The Namibian*, 22 December 1999; "Unita 80 percent destroyed, says Angolan army chief," *The Namibian*, 21 December 1999; "Angolan fighting spread into Namibia," *The Independent Online*, 20 December 1999.

Angola's UNITA rebels responded to this by conducting military operations in northern Namibia including laying landmines.⁷ UNITA has been accused by the Namibian authorities of having planted AT and AP mines in the Kavango and Caprivi regions of the country.⁸

According to the police since December 1999 AP mine incidents have increased by "an alarming 12.01%."⁹ An examination of the mines in these incidents strongly pointed to UNITA's use:¹⁰

- improvised AT mine consisting of a two kilogram block of TNT explosives connected with South African manufactured military detonating cord to a pressure release fuze of Bulgarian origin;
- Chinese Type 72;
- South African Claymore-type mines with a mechanical pull-switch of Bulgarian origin;
- South African R2M2 AP mine. These mines were manufactured in 1978 and were in an immaculate condition and appeared to have been recently taken out of a crate. Several others found of 1987 origin, all kept under good storage conditions. According to Military Intelligence in South Africa these mines were traced to consignments given to UNITA before majority rule;
- TM-57 with a pressure switch of Bulgarian origin attached to South African manufactured military detonating fuze. This mine was possibly a South African recycled mine, dating to pre-Namibia independence when it is alleged the South African Defense Force removed the explosive content of captured Soviet mines, refilled them with inferior explosives and gave them to UNITA.

In February 2000 the U.S. Embassy "strongly urged" its citizens to avoid the "entire northern border of Namibia," adding that "UNITA has staged violent cross-border raids and planted landmines."¹¹ In this period the U.S. Embassy, Volunteer Services Overseas (VSO) and European missions pulled out their nationals from the Ohangwena region. Telephones in rural areas of Kavango, including at hospitals were also affected by the use of landmines. Technicians, fearful of attacks by suspected UNITA rebels and their landmines refused to service faulty phone lines. Only in April did they resume their work once the security forces provided escorts.¹²

On 11 April 2000, suspected UNITA rebels blew up electricity pylons, bringing the construction industry to a standstill in Caprivi and Kavango. Two women were injured

⁷ "Angola's UNITA Rebels Say They Will Go on Harassing Namibian Civilians," *Die Republikein* (Namibian Newspaper), 4 February 2000, distributed in English by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 February 2000.

⁸ Replying letter from the Inspector General of the Namibian Police addressed to the Director of Administration of the National Society for Human Rights, 2 March 2000.

⁹ "Report On Anti-Personnel Mine Incidents: Kavango Region, January-April 2000," Chief Inspector of Explosives, 10 April 2000.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, "Namibia - Consular Information Sheet," 19 May 2000.

¹² "Foreign Missions Remove Workers in North," Africa News Service, Windhoek, 14 February 2000.

after stepping on AP mines left by the assailants in the area.¹³ On 29 May 2000 a landmine exploded in the middle of Ntara Catholic church just after a service finished. Twenty-six-year-old Renate Nekaro stepped on the AP mine while leaving church and lost her right foot. Eight others were slightly injured. This incident brought to sixteen the number of mine victims that week in Kavango.¹⁴ In the same period an NGO worker witnessed three landmines put across a road with a tripwire to ensure that the first car driving in the morning would set off the mines.¹⁵

Not all freshly placed mines may have been laid by UNITA rebels. On 19 April 2000, a news report on the local NBC radio quoted Ambrosius Haingura, a regional counselor, as cautioning that “UNITA rebels should not be blamed for all the criminal activities in the Kavango region.”¹⁶ Haingura was reacting to a landmine incident and attacks on civilians two days previously. In May several Angolans linked to the Angolan military were put on trial in Rundu for possessing and using landmines for criminal gain.¹⁷

Use by Angolan Government Forces

There have been reports of possession and use of AP mines inside Namibia by Angolan government troops. Two members of the Angolan Armed Forces were charged with possession in May 2000. Also in May, two other members of the Angolan Armed Forces were arrested following a robbery and an AP mine incident at Ntara village.¹⁹

Use by Namibian Forces

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any allegations that Namibian forces have used mines inside Namibian territory. Nor is Landmine Monitor aware of any allegations of use of mines by Namibian forces in Angola, during their joint operations against UNITA. In January 2000 the media reported on a joint operation inside Angola and published pictures of Namibian and Angolan government soldiers said to have been injured in mine explosions near UNITA's former bush base at Jamba in southeastern Angola.¹⁸

Angolan forces, however, have used mines against UNITA. The ICBL has expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party, such as Namibia, may be violating

¹³ *The Namibian*, 12 April 2000.

¹⁴ “Landmine Explodes Inside RC Church,” Africa News Service, Windhoek, 30 May 2000; “Landmine Injures 11 People,” IRIN, 29 May 2000.

¹⁵ *The Namibian*, 30 May 2000.

¹⁶ A. Maketo, Namibian Broadcasting Company radio news report, 1900, 19 April 2000.

¹⁷ “Angolans Face Terror Charges,” IRIN, 24 May 2000; journalist Pedro Rosa Mendes obtained similar accounts from local residents of Angolan government complicity, interview 6 June 2000; *Publico*, 10 May 2000.

¹⁸ For accounts of use by Angolan troops in an operation in northern Namibia see: “Namibia: Angolans face terror charge,” IRIN, 24 May 2000; journalist Pedro Rosa Mendes obtained similar accounts from local residents, interview, 6 June 2000; *Publico* (Lisbon), 10 May 2000; National Society for Human Rights (Namibia) Press Release, “Kavango Atrocities Update I,” 23 May 2000.

¹⁹ “Two more FAA casualties,” *The Namibian*, 4 February 2000; “Namibia Wary of Insecurity After 10 Years of Peace,” *Pan African News Agency*, 25 January 2000; “Namibia: Government reiterates support for Angola,” IRIN, 24 January 2000; “SPFF Clash with UNITA rebels,” *New Era*, 14-16 January 2000, pp. 1-2.

the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another nation, such as Angola, that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not “under any circumstance... assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Moreover, Namibia could be in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty if it were to permit Angolan forces to stockpile antipersonnel mines inside Namibia, or to transit AP mines across Namibian territory, or to use AP mines on Namibian territory.

Although most of the forces fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been accused of laying landmines, Landmine Monitor is not aware of any allegations of use by Namibian troops supporting the government forces of Laurent Kabila. But, it does appear likely that Kabila’s forces have used antipersonnel mines, and possibly others foreign armies fighting on the side of the government. (See Landmine Monitor report on DRC). Again, Namibia could be in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty by virtue of engaging in joint military operations with any armed force that uses antipersonnel mines.

Namibia should make clear the nature of its support for any foreign forces that are using antipersonnel mines, and make clear its views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of its joint military operations with Angola and the DRC. As a party to the treaty, Namibia should state categorically that it will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Problem

An assessment mission from the UNMAS visited the country toward the end of 1999. UNMAS concluded, “The landmine situation in Namibia constitutes neither a humanitarian emergency nor a major obstacle for development.” It stated, “The mine problem in Namibia is finite, well known and could be solved relatively quickly given the appropriate resources and co-ordination. Therefore, Namibia could become the first, or one of the first, mine-affected countries to declare itself mine free.”²⁰

However, as noted above, there is a growing problem in the Kavango and Caprivi districts due to conflict involving Namibian, Angolan, and UNITA forces. Mines and UXO are still present in the densely populated Kaokoland, Owambo, Kavango, and Caprivi Strip districts in the northwestern, northern, and northeastern regions of the country as a result of twenty-three years of conflict between Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO) and South African troops.

Although more than 60% of the country’s population inhabits these areas, only a small fraction could be described as “affected” in terms of occasional explosions, leading to civilian casualties, as well as destruction of livestock.

Most of the mined areas are unmarked. This includes the areas where mine clearance operations were underway.²¹ Nine former military bases of the South African Defense Force (SADF) were properly marked as they were protected by antipersonnel mines. However, civilians had since removed most of fencing around such bases in order to make their own fences at home. Records, including maps of such minefields, were handed over to the incoming Namibian government in 1990 by the SADF.

²⁰ UNMAS, *Joint Assessment Mission Report: Namibia*, 6 April 2000, p. 3.

²¹ “Marking the First Anniversary of Mine Ban Treaty,” NCBL/NSHR, 28 February 1999; *The Namibian*, 2 March 1999.

Mine Action Funding

The U.S. began funding a range of mine action programs in 1995. This included “train-the-trainer” programs for mine clearance, establishment and operation of a national demining office, equipment, and mine awareness programs. Total U.S. funding through 1999 was \$8.3 million. This included \$1.053 million in fiscal year 1999 (October 1998-September 1999) for mine clearance along the power pylons in the northwestern parts of the country. An additional \$300,000 will be contributed in fiscal year 2000, and \$100,000 more in 2001, for mine clearance along the power lines.²² The sole recipient of this U.S. funding is the Namibian government. The U.S. Defense Department training program was completed in February 2000.

There is no policy, criteria, strategy, or practice governing the allocation and use of mine action funds or in-kind contributions. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the Ministry of Defense are responsible for receiving funding donated for mine action in the country. There appears to be cooperation between the two institutions. Whereas the Ministry of Defense is responsible for mine clearance, the Ministry of Information is responsible for mine awareness education.

Apart from the U.S. government and the Mine Advisory Group (MAG), a British NGO, neither the government nor any other organizations or individuals in the country are known to have made financial and other in-kind contributions to humanitarian mine action in the country. On 16 June 1999, MAG donated \$2,000 to the NCBL to monitor military mine clearance operations along the 409 power pylons in the northwestern parts of the country. Namibia does not appear to have any domestic resources for mine action.

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance operations have been underway in Namibia since 1989.²³ From March 1995 to February 2000, the U.S. carried out a “train-the-trainer” program.

The clearance around nine former military bases conducted between 1995-1998 destroyed 2,383 antipersonnel mines and 1,107 UXO.²⁴ The clearing of the berms and minefields around 409 power pylons as part of a second mine clearance program were declared as “success” by the Ministry of Defense. On 28 October 1999, the State Secretary for Defense informed a conference of the SADC Mine Action Committee that a total of 3,161 antipersonnel mines and 1,107 UXO have been destroyed since the program began in 1998.²⁵ Of these, 1,214 were destroyed from 200 of the 409 pylons.²⁶

²² U.S. State Department, “Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2001,” 15 March 2000; U.S. State Department, “FY 2000 NADR Status,” 5 May 2000; interview with Ms. Ruby Aspler, Director, American Cultural Center, U.S. Embassy Windhoek, 15 March 2000.

²³ “Mine Awareness Campaign,” speech by Lt. Col. M K Nashandi, Commander, Engineer Regiment, Oshikango, 18 September 1998.

²⁴ Defense Minister, Erkki Nghimtina, “Message on Mine Awareness Campaign,” *Information Campaign on Mines & UXOs*, 23 September 1998, p. 2.

²⁵ “Demining in Namibia’s north a great success,” *Windhoek Observer*, 29 October 1999; “Power Plus,” *The Namibian Online*, 13 December 1999; “1,214 Mines Destroyed from 200 Pylons so Far: Demeaning operation on Good Course,” *New Era*, 13-16 December 1999; “Over 1,200 Mines Destroyed in Namibia’s Etosha,” *Pan Africa News Agency*, 11 December 1999.

Namibia has hosted demonstrations and field tests of several demining technologies. MgM, a German mine clearance NGO, tested its ROTAR sifter in September 1999. Previously, the U.S. provided prototype machinery called a “berm processor” to mechanically clear landmines from berms surrounding 409 electrical pylons.

There are no procedures to ensure that land cleared of mines is transferred to those who are entitled to it. The prime beneficiaries of mine-cleared land would be the local communities. In the absence of a demographic survey it is impossible to quantify the effect of mine clearance in the country. Except in one case where the former SADF base at Omahenene was converted to be used as headquarters of a women's development project and offices of the Ministry of Agriculture, none of the other former bases have been put to specific civilian use.²⁷

Some communities are not satisfied with the mine clearance as mine explosions do occur even in areas said to have been cleared. At least two mine explosions have occurred in the Ohangwena and Omusati regions, which were declared “mine free” in 1998 by the Namibian Defense Force.²⁸ An antitank mine explosion occurred at Onengali Village, in Ohangwena Region in November 1999.²⁹ Several people were injured near Etunda in the Omusati Region in January 1999.³⁰

Landmine Casualties

The number of mine incidents in Namibia has increased dramatically since December 1999. According to the police since December 1999 AP mine incidents have increased by “an alarming 12.01%.”³¹

According to the Namibian police, two soldiers were killed while ten women and children were injured in thirteen separate mine incidents between 13 December 1999 and 2 March 2000 in the Kavango and Caprivi regions.³²

According to the Namibian Red Cross between December 1999 and mid-May 2000 landmines in northern Namibia's Kavango region have injured eighty-nine people, including Angolan soldiers and civilians.³³

On 10 April 2000, the Explosives Unit of the police released a report detailing mine incidents in the Kavango and Western Caprivi regions between January and April 2000.

²⁶ “Over 1,200 Mines Destroyed in Namibia's Etosha,” *Pan Africa News Agency*, 11 December 1999; “1,214 Mines Destroyed from 200 Pylons so Far: Demining Operation on Good Course,” *New Era*, 13-16 December 1999; “Power Plus,” *The Namibian*, 13 December 1999.

²⁷ “Omahenene Receive Close to N\$500,000,” *New Era*, 10-12 March 2000.

²⁸ “Nam edges closer to being proclaimed landmine-free,” *The Namibian*, 31 August 1998, p. 5.

²⁹ “Villagers fearful after mine blast,” *The Namibian*, 16 November 1999.

³⁰ “5 Injured,” *New Era*, 11-14 January 1999 and “Four hurt in explosion,” *The Namibian*, 11 January 1999, p. 1.

³¹ “Report On Anti-Personnel Mine Incidents: Kavango Region, January-April 2000,” Chief Inspector of Explosives, 10 April 2000.

³² Replying letter from the Inspector General of the Namibian Police addressed to the Director of Administration of the National Society for Human Rights, 2 March 2000.

³³ *The Namibian*, 29 June 2000.

According to the report, twenty-three persons were injured while three died from such mine incidents during that period.³⁴

On 29 June 2000, the Namibia Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) was informed by relatives that at least two Namibian soldiers died in the DRC when they stepped on “friendly” antipersonnel mines of unknown origin allegedly planted by Zimbabwean soldiers there.

The Office of the Chief Inspector of Explosives records show that from 1989-1999, there were 106 people killed and 254 injured in mine and UXO explosions.³⁵ The data shows 87% of all accidents were due to UXO, not mines.

According to the NDF there was no “single casualty” or injury on the part of the NDF deminers.³⁶

Victim Assistance

According to Ms. Batseba Katjiungua, Director of Social Services, Ministry of Health and Social Services, no donor funding was received to care for the over 2,000 mine victims in the country.³⁷ However, the Namibian Red Cross in June 2000 announced that it, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies were conducting an assessment of the needs of amputees.³⁸

The government has not yet adopted any national legislation regarding persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation is primarily responsible for the coordination on disability matters.

NIGER

Key developments since March 1999: Niger has not submitted its Article 7 report, which was due by 27 February 2000. Peace agreements signed in 1998 called for demining of the northern areas, but no mine clearance is believed to have taken place yet.

Niger signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 23 March 1999. The treaty entered into force for Niger on 1 September 1999. It has not undertaken any national implementation measures. Niger has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, which was due by 27 February 2000. In January 2000, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had sent the reporting form to the Strategic Studies section of

³⁴ Chief Inspector of Explosives, “Report on Anti-Personnel Mine Incidents, Kavango Region,” January-April 2000.

³⁵ UNMAS, *Joint Assessment Mission: Namibia*, 6 April 2000, p. 9. See also, “Demining in Namibia’s north a great success,” *Windhoek Observer*, 29 October 1999.

³⁶ “1,214 Mines Destroyed from 200 pylon so far De-mining operation on good course,” *New Era*, 13-16 December 1999.

³⁷ Interview with Ms. Batseba Katjiungua, Director of Social Services, Ministry of Health and Social Services, 23 February 2000.

³⁸ *The Namibian*, 29 June 2000.

the Ministry of Defense to complete and that the report would be submitted by the due date.¹

Niger participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with a delegation of officials from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. It has not attended any of the treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in 1999 and 2000. While Niger supported pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998, it was absent from the vote on the UNGA resolution in support of the treaty on 1 December 1999.

Niger is not a party to Amended Protocol II of the the Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

While Niger is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines, its armed forces are believed to stockpile AP mines. The government has not provided information on the quantity or types of mines held in storage.

While Niger's political situation stabilized somewhat in December 1999 when a new government was inaugurated, non-state actors in the north and east of the country continue to be active, including the Tuareg and Toubou rebels. Antipersonnel mines have been used in the past, allegedly by both the Niger Armed Forces and the rebels. Although there have been new victims to uncleared mines, Landmine Monitor could not establish if these were victims from mines laid in 1999 and 2000 or from mines laid before this time. According to an NGO called "Democracy 2000," the Sahara Revolutionary Armed Forces (comprising FARS and Toubou rebels) laid AP mines to protect their bases in the Aïr mountains in the north and central regions of the country and in the Ténéré area of in the Sahara desert.²

Peace agreements signed with the FARS Toubou rebellion in N'Djaména in 1998 included provisions for demining of the northern areas of Niger affected by mines, but no mine clearance is believed to have taken place yet. Niger is mine-affected not only from recent armed conflict, but also from mine-laying dating back to World War Two.

The Niger Armed Forces kept records of mine victims in 1999 but exact details are not publicly available. Democracy 2000 told Landmine Monitor that five people were maimed by AP landmines and cared for at the Gamkallé military garrison in Niamey, and that a civilian truck hit an AT mine near the Libyan border, causing the death of at least three people.³

¹ Interview with Ado El Hadj Abou, Head of the Division for United Nations and International Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 January 2000.

² Interview with Ali Sékou Maina, Program Director, Democracy 2000, Niamey, 10 March 2000.

³ Ibid.

RWANDA

Key developments since March 1999: Rwanda ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 13 June 2000. There have been allegations of Rwandan use of mines in the fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo, especially in the June 2000 battle for Kisangani. Rwanda denies any use. From 1995 to February 2000, 16,983 mines and UXO were cleared in Rwanda, and about 5,000 hectares of land. Three prefectures that were the most affected are now 90% cleared. In April 2000, the National Demining Office reported that clearance operations had been postponed since December 1999 due to lack of explosives. The U.S. military completed its demining training program in February 2000. In 1999 and 2000, there have been twelve mine casualties.

Mine Ban Policy

Rwanda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 June 2000. There is not believed to be any domestic implementation legislation in place in Rwanda. Rwanda's Article 7 transparency measures report will be due by 22 July 2001.

Rwanda was absent during the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. It was also absent from the vote on a similar resolution in 1998 but voted in support of pro-ban resolutions in 1996 and 1997.

Rwanda participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 in a delegation led by Col. Emmanuel Bem Habyarimana of the Ministry of Defense. In a statement to the plenary, Col. Habyarimana stated that "mines continue to destroy the lives of innocent people. This is the reason that my country is prepared to fight with much vigor against the existence of arms."¹ He described the National Demining Office (NDO) created in Rwanda, and said that "there over 800,000 mines throughout Rwanda, in the country side, pastures, forests, valleys. The [NDO] has destroyed 270,000 mines."² However, a recent report from the National Demining Office stated that there were about 50,000 mines in the country, and 16,983 mines had been destroyed.³

Rwanda has not participated in any of the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. Rwanda is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Rwanda is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The UN records thirty-nine types of mines being found in Rwanda from Belgium, China, former Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Italy, Pakistan, former Soviet Union, and the U.S. Italian and former Soviet mines are the most common.⁴ Rwanda has imported antipersonnel mines. Details on the size and composition of Rwanda's current stockpile of AP mines are not available.

¹ Statement by Colonel Bem Habyalimana at the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, May 1999. Unofficial translation by Landmine Monitor editing team.

² Ibid.

³ Rwanda National Demining Office, Progress Report, 2 April 2000.

⁴ For the full list, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 162.

Use

For the past two years, Rwandan military forces have been supporting the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie) opposition forces in their fight against the government of Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).⁵ There have been allegations of use of mines by Rwandan forces in the DRC, particularly in June 2000 when Rwanda and Uganda, former allies in supporting Kabila, engaged in conflict.

In early June 2000, a fierce battle between Rwandan and Ugandan armies for control of the northern DRC city of Kisangani left more than 500 people dead, most of them civilians.⁶ Observers have reported use of mines in that battle. (See Landmine Monitor report on DRC). A UN official told Landmine Monitor that Uganda and Rwanda had both used mines in the fighting over Kisangani.⁷

Ugandan Army spokesman Phinehas Katirima accused the Rwandan army of planting landmines to blow up the Tchopo bridge in Kisangani, "The fact that the wire connected to the battery that was to be used to detonate the mines ended up in the Rwandan army defences is a clear indication of the Rwandan motives.... Our positions were north of the bridge and the wires connecting the landmines to the batteries are south of the bridge where the Rwandans were. It is a shame to attempt to blow up a bridge."⁸ From this description, it is not clear if the devices were in fact landmines, or whether they were antipersonnel or antivehicle mines, or whether they were victim-activated or command-detonated mines. Antivehicle and command-detonated mines are permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty.

The UN Observer Mission in Congo (MONUC) stopped civilians from using the bridge and sent for demining experts from Kinshasa.⁹ Two days later, the bridge was reopened after it was reported cleared in "a successful demining operation carried out by RCD" according to a humanitarian source.¹⁰ Four days later a rebel RCD spokesman, Kin-Kiey Mulumba, told media, "Our main troops are going to leave the center of the city.... We shall leave behind the de-mining teams and some force at the two airports."¹¹ This raises the question of what the demining teams are staying to remove.

Outside of Kisangani, in August 1999 local people in the Bukavu area from Ngando village told Landmine Monitor that they believed Rwandan soldiers planted a mine on a path frequently used by Interahamwe militiamen.¹² A cow detonated the landmine.

⁵ See country report on Democratic Republic of Congo.

⁶ "Congolese Rebels Agree to Pullout From Battered City," *Associated Press* (Igali, Rwanda), 26 June 2000.

⁷ Telephone interview with UN official Kisangani, 28 July 2000.

⁸ Emmy Allio, "Congo Kinshasa Tchopo Bridge Mined," *New Vision* (Daily Kampala newspaper), 19 June 2000.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ "DRC: Kisangani's main bridge reopens," IRIN-CEA Update 951 for the Great Lakes, 22 June 2000.

¹¹ "Congolese Rebels Agree to Pullout From Battered City," *Associated Press*, (Igali, Rwanda), 25 June 2000.

¹² Interview with Bali Munenwa, Chibanda/Kaziba, 27 December 1999.

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 noted that Namibia and Zimbabwe had accused both Rwanda and Uganda of use of mines in the DRC. At that time Rwanda and Uganda were allies in the conflict.¹³

Rwandan military officials have repeatedly denied allegations that Rwanda used AP mines during the operation in the DRC. One official told *Landmine Monitor* that Rwandan troops do not lay mines in the DRC and that Rwanda is committed to the 8 April 2000 Lusaka Agreement.¹⁴ Article 2 of the Lusaka Agreement states that the parties involved in the DRC war shall not place any additional minefields, barriers, or protective obstacles. It also states that “provision of all data on minefields by all parties (to include detailed maps of the minefields) is one of the conditions required to enable staff planning for disengagement.”¹⁵

Prior to the Lusaka Agreement, a September 1999 cease-fire agreement for the DRC was signed by a Joint Military Commission (JMC), including Rwanda, which formally prohibits the use of AP mines. The agreement says in part, “Each party to the agreement shall give instructions to its forces [and to forces] it supports or which are on the territory under its control to prohibit all kind of reinforcement of troops, the supply of arms, ammunitions and other war materials as well as the laying of mines.”¹⁶ The agreement further states that, “Each party to the agreement shall communicate to the JMC or if not possible, by confidential mail delivered by hand to the OAU Secretariat, in a period of time not exceeding 10 days from 12 October 1999, maps of the minefields which its force have deployed as well as forms, along with documented and scaled maps, on the positions occupied by their forces or by any other force or armed group on the Congolese territory under its control.”¹⁷

It appears likely the rebel RCD forces supported by Rwanda have used antipersonnel mines. The ICBL has expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party may be violating the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another armed force that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not “under any circumstance...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”

Rwanda should make clear the nature of its support for other armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear its views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of its joint military operations with those forces. Rwanda should state categorically that it will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.

¹³ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp.194-195.

¹⁴ Interview with Col. Karenzi Karake, Kigali, 12 April 2000.

¹⁵ Plan for the Disengagement and Redeployment of Forces in Democratic Republic of Congo, (Lusaka Agreement), signed on 8 April 2000.

¹⁶ Agreement for a Ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Joint Military Commission Decisions of the Sessions, part 2.6, September 1999.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Rebel Use

Rebels and former soldiers who fled to the DRC (Zaire) in 1994 used landmines in Rwanda during the 1994 war and since.¹⁸ Isolated incidents in the northwestern region in the Rwerere, Rubavo, and Nyamyumba communes were reported in 1996 and 1997, but Landmine Monitor is not aware of reports in 1999 and 2000.

Landmine Problem

Prior to 1990, there was no landmine problem in Rwanda. The current problem is the result of conflict over the past decade between the majority Hutu ethnic group and the minority Tutsi. The most mine-affected areas are in the northeast (Umutara and Kigali), in the city of Kigali and in the northwest (Ruhengeri and Gisenyi). A recent report from the National Demining Office (NDO) stated that there were about 50,000 mines in the country.¹⁹

The NDO keeps a database and a country map on mined areas and updates this database every month, including the casualty incidences. The number of mines and UXO are recorded and the figure made known to the public through the awareness campaign.

Mine Action Funding

U.S. demining assistance to Rwanda began in 1994 with extensive military support to establish the NDO, mine awareness training, a computer-based data collection and records management system, and a train-the-trainer program.²⁰ The U.S. has provided about \$14 million to the Rwandan demining effort since 1994, mostly in the form of equipment, training, and supplies. The U.S. military completed its demining training program in February 2000. The planned allocation of U.S. funds in Fiscal Year 2000 is \$253,000, down from \$750,000 in FY 1999.²¹

In the past UNHCR and UNICEF funded a portion of the mine awareness program, but there was no funding from these bodies in 1999 or 2000. A one-year funded UNICEF program was handed over to the NDO. The NDO has started lobbying UN agencies to get them involved in mine action activities.²²

Coordination and Planning

Humanitarian mine action is carried out by the National Demining Organization, established in 1995. The NDO works under the Ministry of Defense and is supported by the government. While it draws policies from the government, it operates as an independent program and sets its own priorities. The NDO is the coordinating body of mine action nationwide, and is the only recognized body dealing with mine clearance and training. It works in close collaboration with the local administration, the Ministry of

¹⁸ See, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 163; see also, Human Rights Watch, "Rwanda," *Human Rights Watch World Report 1997*, p. 46.

¹⁹ Rwanda National Demining Office, Progress Report, 2 April 2000.

²⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of African Affairs," March 15, 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 14.

²¹ *Ibid.*, U.S. Department of State, "FY 00 NADR Project Status," p. 3.

²² Interview with Susan Page, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Kigali, 27 April 2000.

Defense and some NGOs. NDO is responsible for the implementation of plans decided by the government in consultation with local administration.

Mine Clearance

Between September 1995 and February 2000, 16,983 mines and UXO were cleared in Rwanda.²³ It is estimated that 5,000 hectares of mainly arable land have been cleared.²⁴ The government provides human resources to the NDO with allowances and salaries to 110 soldiers deployed in humanitarian mine action operations. Manual detectors and dogs are used in the demining operations.

Since December 1999, mine clearance has been limited because the NDO supply of explosives for demining ran out. In April 2000, the NDO reported that because of the lack of explosives, clearance operations have been postponed since December last year. Since then, the NDO was devoting its efforts "to carry out survey, mine awareness, marking areas and collecting reports from population."²⁵ Nevertheless, the NDO reported that 482 mines and UXO were cleared in January 2000 and 199 mines and UXO were cleared in February 2000.²⁶

Most mine clearance has taken place in Mutara, Byumba and Kigali prefectures. Several trading centers such as Muvumba have been demined for re-occupation by the local population. Power lines have been cleared. Large resettlement areas are being cleared. For example, areas are being cleared for the resettlement of 1,500 people in Kibungo and 600,000 people in Ruhengeri. The main roads from Gatuna to Kigali, from Gitarama to Kibuye, from Kigali to Gisenyi, and secondary roads have all been cleared. Several tea plantations in northeast have been cleared. Three prefectures that were the most affected--Kigali town, Kigali rural and Umutara--are now 90% cleared. People are farming and grazing their cattle without fear. Many new villages have been built.

Mine clearance in the northwestern part of the country has been delayed by insecurity in the region and also by limited financial resources. Planning has been underway to resume mine clearance operations in the northwest region of the country, specifically in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures. Demining here is seen as urgent because more than 600,000 people have to be resettled in Ruhengeri, and because this region has always been the breadbasket of the rest of the country.²⁷

Since 1995, the U.S. military has assisted in training 115 Rwandan deminers. The U.S. military completed its demining training program in February 2000. The training program carried out by the U.S. included surveying, mapping and marking, demining procedures, dog handlers, and mine awareness. One of the bigger problems faced by deminers is that of they lack appropriate means to clear vegetation (bushes) and the government has asked the U.S. to provide vegetation cutters. Two deminers were injured in the course of their work. One stepped on a TS-50 antipersonnel mine in 1996 in Tumba and the other stepped on a TS-50 antipersonnel mine in 1997 in Jali.

²³ Rwanda National Demining Office, Progress Report, 2 April 2000.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

Mine Awareness

Mine awareness is carried out through the development and distribution of messages through radio programs, posters, T-shirts, and brochures. Once the product has been developed, it is often pre-tested, mainly with pupils and adults in market places, by way of a questionnaire and face-to-face interviews to ascertain the veracity of the messages. About sixty people have been trained as mine awareness educators. NDO has signed a contract with ORINFOR (Rwanda's Information Office) worth \$103,000 for mine awareness campaign advertisement per year.²⁸ At the community level locals are encouraged to report to NDO when they see "strange objects."

The strategy is to combine demining operations with community mine awareness education campaigns to facilitate the detection of mines and sensitize communities about the dangers of these devices. The main targets of the mine awareness education programs are women and children because most domestic chores in Rwanda, such as collecting of fuel wood, fetching water and farming, are still in the domain of women and children.

Mine casualties have decreased by 80% in areas where mine awareness teams have been effective.²⁹ The significant reduction is the result of an aggressive awareness program that was conducted with the cooperation of the affected community and mine clearance programs.

Landmine Victims

In 1999 and 2000, there have been twelve mine casualties, eleven men and one woman. For the period 1990 to 1998, the NDO has recorded 550 mine fatalities.³⁰ For the same period, the Central Hospital in Kigali registered 1,759 victims who have received amputations and 692 who have received prosthetic devices.³¹ Based on analysis of casualty data, it is estimated that there are 2.345 mine victims per 10,000 people in Rwanda.

Survivor Assistance

Victim assistance is not a priority of the NDO but is carried out by NGOs including Mulindi Japan One Love Project and Handicap International.

Mulindi Japan One Love project is comprised of five Rwandans and four Japanese. Its objective is to help disabled people by providing prostheses and promoting their socio-economic integration. The Project began in 1996. It was initially funded by \$194,958 and was later sponsored with a government of Rwanda donation of \$36,206 while another local NGO provided \$2,785. In addition to this financial assistance, a partnership with a Japanese Group was established and raw materials provided for the manufacture of orthopedic equipment. Disabled people are involved in the sale and distribution of the produced equipment. The Ministry of Social Affairs identifies disabled people and sends them to get the appliances free of charge. The Demobilization Service

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ The data from the Kigali Central Hospital includes amputations and prosthetic fittings for all causes, *Service de Readaption Recueillies Aupres de Mukakabera M. Claire*.

also identifies and sends disabled and demobilized soldiers to the project. The National Security Fund organizes support for those injured in the course of their work but must pay for this service. Private individuals are required to pay a certain fee. The fund for genocide survivors has its own budget and takes care of the genocide survivors.

Institutions	Prosthesis		Orthesis	
	Served	Waiting list	Served	Waiting list
Ministry of Social Affairs	26	26	14	14
Demobilized soldiers	41	34	-	-
Funds for genocide survivors	16	-	19	1
Private	3	-	2	-

Some 85 percent of the project beneficiaries are landmine victims but many who live in remote areas are not informed of these services or cannot afford to travel to Kigali. A test mobile service has been started in Nyagatare. Nine of the eleven staff working in administration and in the workshop are disabled. The project is building a guesthouse for the disabled and non-disabled that will provide accommodation, meals, and recreational facilities.

Handicap International has been involved in landmine action in schools and hospitals in Rwanda since 1994. It provides orthopedic services to the Centre Hospitalier de Kigali, fourteen district hospitals and three independent units.³³ About 90 percent of the prosthesis provided by Handicap International go to landmine victims.

Prosthesis Services Provided by Handicap International Since 1994³⁴

Year	Prosthesis Produced	Prosthesis Repaired
1994	105	10
1995	117	20
1996	186	192
1997	168	152
1998	71	143
1999	45	75

SENEGAL

Key developments since March 1999: It appears that new mines have been laid by MFDC rebels in the Casamance Province in 1999 and 2000. Senegal denied use of antipersonnel mines by its troops in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, as reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*. In the Banjul Declaration of 26 December 1999, the Senegalese government and MFDC committed to no use of antipersonnel landmines in the future, but

³² One Love Project, 1999 Annual Report.

³³ Interview with Deo Butera, Director, Handicap International, Kigali, February 2000.

³⁴ Handicap International, 1999 Annual Report.

the government claims that rebel use continued at least into February 2000. In August 1999 a National Commission was created to oversee implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. A military mine clearance pilot project was launched on 1 July 2000. There were some fifty-nine victims of AP mines registered in 1999, a huge decline from 195 in 1998.

Mine Ban Policy

Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 September 1998. The government participated in the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999, where its delegation vigorously denied allegations in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*¹ that it was likely that the Senegalese army had used mines during its intervention in Guinea-Bissau in the conflict that began in June 1998.²

There is currently no domestic law for the implementation of the MBT. There is, however, a clause in the penal code regarding illegal possession of explosives. This clause preceded the entry into force of the MBT, but is applicable to possession of antipersonnel landmines.³

In August 1999 a National Commission was created and tasked with oversight of implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴ The commission is chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Exterior, and has representatives of the executive and legislative branches, as well as ministries directly or indirectly concerned with the issue of landmines.⁵ The commission is a permanent body that will meet twice a year and whose mandate is to report on the country's progress in complying with the MBT.⁶ One of the commission's duties will be to define the terms of a new implementation law.⁷

Senegal submitted its report to the UN as required under Article 7 of the treaty on 1 September 1999. The report covers the period 1 March-30 August 1999.⁸ Senegal has

¹ Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp.74-78.

² "Statement Made by the Senegalese Delegation Following Some Allegations Contained in the 1999 Report of ICBL, First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on A.P. Land Mines," Maputo, 5 May 1999, (Non-official translation); see also Press Release in *Le Soleil*, a Senegalese governmental daily newspaper, 10 May 1999.

³ Interview with Mr. Abdou Salam Diallo, Head of the United States Division, Dakar, 3 July, 2000. (Diallo was Counselor representing Senegal at the FMSP.)

⁴ Order no. 05403 of 5 August 1999, on the creation of the national commission in charge of the application, at the national level, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction signed in Ottawa on December 5, 1997. Order no. 07828 of 27 October 1999, abrogating and replacing order no. 05403 about the creation of the national commission in charge of the application, at the national level, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction signed in Ottawa on 5 December, 1997.

⁵ Order no. 07828 of 27 October 1999, Art. 3. These ministries include: Armed Forces, Domestic Affairs, Justice, Agriculture, Economy, Environment, Health, Family, Social Action and National Solidarity.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Art. 5

⁷ Interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Director of Study Control and of Legislation, Ministry of Armed Forces, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000.

⁸ Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted on 1 September 1999.

attended two of the ten intersessional meetings in Geneva of the Standing Committees of Experts (SCE), one on stockpile destruction and one on mine clearance technology.

Senegal acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and its Amended Protocol II, on 29 November 1999. It did not attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the amended protocol in Geneva in December 1999. Senegal is a member of the Conference on Disarmament and has supported action on the landmine issue there.

A number of NGOs have actively supported the MBT in Senegal.⁹

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Senegal does not produce antipersonnel landmines.¹⁰ It has also stated that it “does not buy, [and] does not sell” AP mines.¹¹ While there is no official transfer of landmines in the country, government officials have charged that mines have reached MFDC (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance) rebels in Casamance Province in Senegal through Guinea-Bissau.¹²

Senegal claims to have no stockpiles of landmines.¹³ Senegal’s Article 7 report states that it is retaining no mines for training purposes, as permitted under the MBT. However, a military official told Landmine Monitor that some landmines unearthed in Casamance have been deactivated and are used for training the military. Their number was not specified.¹⁴ Some observers believe that it is likely Senegal has a stockpile, at least for training purposes.¹⁵

According to Lieutenant Colonel Fall, Commander of the Légion at the Ziguinchor Gendarmerie, the MFDC rebels have AP mine stockpiles.¹⁶ Minister of Internal Affairs, General Mamadou Niang, also points out that until 1974, Guinea-Bissau laid landmines on the border of Casamance and some important arms cache hiding places still exist

⁹ Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO); Organisation Nationale des Droits de l’Homme (ONDH); Solidarité Partage; SOS Paix en Casamance; KAGAMEN and other international NGOs, such as Handicap International.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form D; interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000; interview with Abdou Salam Diallo, Dakar, 3 July 2000.

¹¹ Statement Made by the Senegalese Delegation, Maputo, 5 May 1999.

¹² Interview with Abdou Salam Diallo, Dakar, 3 July 2000; interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form B; interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000; interview with Abdou Salam Diallo, Dakar, 3 July 2000.

¹⁴ Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000.

¹⁵ RADDHO, a human rights NGO active on ban issues, has written several letters to the government over last three years seeking information about the existence of AP mine stockpiles in Senegal, to which there have been no reply. RADDHO doubts that there is no stockpile of mines, especially for military training. Interview with Alioune Tine, Executive Secretary of RADDHO, Dakar, 4 July 2000. In discussions in Maputo in May 1999 about the ICBL’s conclusion that Senegal used mines in Guinea-Bissau, no member of the Senegalese delegation made the claim that Senegal did not have AP mines.

¹⁶ Interview with Lt. Colonel Fall, Commander of the Légion at the Ziguinchor Gendarmerie, March 2000.

today; former soldiers from Guinea-Bissau still know the location of these caches, unearth the landmines and sell them for their own profit, according to Gen. Niang.¹⁷

Use by MFDC Rebels

Landmines were used in the fighting in Casamance Province throughout the 1990s.¹⁸ It appears that new mines have been laid by MFDC rebels in the province in 1999 and 2000.¹⁹ According to government officials, the mined areas are on the Cap Skirring - Ziguinchor - Kolda road and on the border between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. The landmines found during mine clearance operations or as a result of landmine incidents are from Belgium, Spain, France and Russia. Improvised devices have also been found.²⁰

The government states that new use of landmines occurred in several municipalities up to February 2000.²¹ The latest accident was on 27 February 2000 when a military vehicle struck an antitank mine in Kolda department resulting in three dead and four wounded. Another military vehicle was damaged in January 2000 on the road between Elenkine and Oussouye, in the Oussouye department.

The use of landmines is one of the issues being tackled in the current negotiations for peace in Casamance. The MFDC would participate in the work of the National Commission created to oversee the application of the Mine Ban Treaty.²² According to Colonel Ndaw, the two belligerent parties could reach an agreement regarding the issue of landmines.²³ In the Banjul Declaration of 26 December 1999, the Senegalese government and MFDC committed to no use of antipersonnel landmines in the future.

The MFDC rebels have never formally denied their use of mines.²⁴ The MFDC use AP mines "in a conventional manner," laying them in small amounts around their positions or in order to protect themselves while withdrawing. Mines are also used to protect economic assets, such as cannabis fields. Farmers linked to the MFDC have laid mines to protect their assets from theft and the army.²⁵ Livestock bandits, who steal between 300 and 400 head of cattle each week, may also lay mines in order to discourage or delay any attempt of pursuit by the army or the farmers.²⁶

Cashew production is also affected by antipersonnel landmines. The army sometimes forbids the farmers to access their fields for fear that they are mined. The MFDC is suspected of laying mines in the areas surrounding the fields or to have spread rumors that they have laid mines in order to steal the crops. Occasionally mines are laid

¹⁷ Interview with Gen. Mamadou Niang, Minister of Internal Affairs and former Ambassador in Guinea-Bissau, Dakar, 4 July 2000.

¹⁸ For details on past use, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 76-78.

¹⁹ Interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000.

²⁰ Interview with Lt. Colonel Fall, March 2000.

²¹ Interview with Colonel Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February 2000.

²² Interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February 2000.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Interview with a former member of the Senegalese army, July 2000.

²⁵ Interview with Daniel Sagna, Director of the Fishing School, Godomp, 8 July 2000; interview with a member of the Catholic Mission in Simbandi, district Sedhiou, 8 July 2000.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

to settle personal vendettas,²⁷ and a mine incident in Bignona is attributed to a dissident minority of the MFDC trying to upset the peace talks.²⁸

Senegal Army Use

The MFDC claims that the Senegalese military has mined several sectors in Casamance.²⁹ The Senegalese authorities have always categorically rejected these accusations. All the officials met by Landmine Monitor were definite: the Senegalese army has no point in laying mines on its own territory.³⁰ A Colonel stated, "Since the independence, the use of antipersonnel landmines is against the conception of the Senegalese army."³¹ General Mamadou Niang added that the use of landmines is prohibited and enjoys no exceptions.³²

One Senegalese NGO has claimed that the Senegalese army used mines in Casamance in 1997 and 1998, but used precise maps to recover them when needed.³³ However, civilians interviewed in Casamance by the Landmine Monitor did not know of the army laying mines.³⁴

Use by Senegalese forces in Guinea-Bissau

During the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, the Senegalese delegation vigorously protested Landmine Monitor's conclusion that Senegalese troops had likely used antipersonnel mines during their intervention in Guinea-Bissau in June 1998.³⁵ Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw told Landmine Monitor that laying landmines would be against the principles of the Senegalese army. He also noted that the strategic logic goes against the use of mines in that circumstance, arguing that landmines are never laid during an attack but rather in case of troops withdrawing, and the Senegalese army was attacking during the 1998 events.³⁶

Landmine Monitor welcomes the unequivocal commitment of Senegal to never use antipersonnel landmines and anticipates full and effective implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty on Senegal's part. Landmine Monitor believes that

²⁷ Interview with the population in Casamance, 8-9 July 2000.

²⁸ Interview with Commandant Kamoungué Diatta, North Front, December 1999.

²⁹ Interview with Abbot Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, Ziguinchor, March 2000.

³⁰ Interview with Mr. Abdou Salam Diallo, Dakar, 3 July 2000; interview with Col. Ousmane Sarr, Dakar, 4 July 2000.

³¹ Interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000.

³² Interview with Gen. Mamadou Niang, Minister of Internal Affairs and former Ambassador of Senegal in Guinea-Bissau, Dakar, 4 July 2000.

³³ Interview with Alioune Tine, RADDHO, Dakar, 4 July 2000.

³⁴ Interviews with local communities in Casamance, 8-9 July 2000.

³⁵ "Statement Made by the Senegalese Delegation Following Some Allegations Contained in the 1999 Report of ICBL," Maputo, 5 May 1999, (Non-official translation).

³⁶ Interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, 3 July 2000. The ICBL questioned this logic, since Guinea-Bissau forces, which Senegal was supporting, were using mines. A former high-ranking member of the Senegalese military staff told Landmine Monitor in July 2000 that use of mines could have been part of the war logic. Stressing that he was speaking hypothetically, he said the Senegalese army could have found a stockpile of landmines during its operations in Guinea-Bissau and used those mines to defend its security perimeter around the city of Bissau. Interview with a former member of the Senegalese army, July 2000.

there was compelling, though not incontrovertible, evidence that led to its conclusion that Senegal had likely used antipersonnel mines in 1998 in Guinea-Bissau, prior to becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.³⁷

Mine Action Funding

The Senegalese government is not currently funding humanitarian mine action programs. Senegal has limited resources in relation to the need.³⁸ Senegal has received no bilateral funds or in-kind contributions for mine action. The Military Engineering Department is seeking financial assistance from the European Union.

The EU is considering support for mine clearance activities, in addition to the European Fund for Development programs fostering economic development in Casamance. On 31 January 2000 the EU delegation in Dakar sent a letter to the Finance Minister in support of granting funds to mine clearance activities, but as yet it has not received a reply.³⁹

France has supported the KAGAMEN organization, which is assisting mine victims.⁴⁰ ECHO has supported Handicap International's (HI) mine awareness program in the country in 1999 with Euro 300,000. French Cooperation also granted FF 2 million for the activities of HI in Casamance.

Mine Action

HI's epidemiological survey of mine accidents in Casamance was publicly released to the press and international community in Dakar on 18 July 2000.⁴¹ HI's programs have been systematically gathering information to help identify the priorities and the needs for a mine action program in the area.⁴²

There are no guiding strategies or policies regarding mine action. The Senegalese Army's current mine clearance techniques are outmoded and accidents occur.⁴³ According to Colonel Ndaw, mine clearers usually use pitchforks and a long stick as a prodder. The Army's Engineering Department has drawn up a "Project regarding the Participation of the Military Engineering Department to the Works of Depollution and Restoration of Road Infrastructures in the Regions of Ziguinchor and Kolda. (Details of the intervention considered and Assessment of the Needs)." This project was prepared in

³⁷ Landmine Monitor notes that Senegal, while denying use on its part, acknowledged that Guinea-Bissau troops employed mines in 1998. In that respect, it should be noted that the ICBL has expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party may be violating the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another nation that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not "under any circumstance...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."

³⁸ Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, 3 July 2000; interview with Col. Ousmane Sarr, Dakar, July 4, 2000.

³⁹ Interview with Andrea Nicolaj, Counselor of the EU Delegation in Senegal, Dakar, 5 July 2000.

⁴⁰ Information gathered during the Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines in Casamance, RADDHO, Dakar, April 1998.

⁴¹ Email from Handicap International to Landmine Monitor, 1 August 2000.

⁴² Handicap International, "Presentation of the Program in Casamance," July 2000, p. 3.

⁴³ Interview with Abdou Salam Diallo, Dakar, 3 July 2000.

March 2000 and is being modified before being sent to the European Union delegation in Dakar.⁴⁴

A military mine clearance pilot project was launched on 1 July 2000; 400 men will clear the road from Ziguinchor to the border with Guinea-Bissau in the sector of Nyassia. Most of the clearance will be by hand. The bomb disposal experts have limited protective gear and a few metal detectors.⁴⁵

Marking of mined areas remains a pressing issue, as the mines are randomly laid.⁴⁶ In the absence of any organized mine clearance action in the area, HI is currently carrying out an awareness campaign which includes encouraging residents to report on mined or suspected site and to indicate where landmines are and mark them by simple means such as branches laid across the road in a significant manner or attaching a piece of cloth that can easily be seen to a stick vertically driven into the ground.⁴⁷

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

There were some fifty-nine victims of AP mines registered in 1999, a decline from 195 in 1998.⁴⁸ Treatment is provided at the hospital in Ziguinchor. The civilian victims can be sent to Dakar, depending on the seriousness of the injury. The military victims are automatically transferred to Dakar where they are taken care of in a special ward.⁴⁹

After treatment, most of the civilian victims go home. Because of a lack of national resources, these victims will receive no support for future medical needs.⁵⁰ Military victims are the only ones whose medical expenses and other support are provided for. This assistance consists of a small disablement pension paid to the victim or to the victim's family if he or she dies.⁵¹ National and international NGOs provide some support for civilian mine victims.⁵² KAGAMEN has been supporting mine victims since June 1999.

HI is currently carrying out a medical support program for the mine victims at the regional hospital in Ziguinchor. The program's objective is to improve the physical rehabilitation of the disabled in Casamance.⁵³

The national association of Senegal's physically handicapped is supporting legal proceedings in defense of the handicapped. The association hopes to get the government

⁴⁴ Interview with Col. Sarr, Dakar, 4 July, 2000.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, 3 July 2000.

⁴⁷ Interview with S. Wyseur-Gueye, Ziguinchor, 9 July 2000.

⁴⁸ Interview with Sophie Wyseur-Gueye, Ziguinchor, 9 July, 2000.

⁴⁹ Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, 3 July, 2000.

⁵⁰ Interview with the Director of the Regional Hospital of Ziguinchor, Ziguinchor, March 2000.

⁵¹ Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, 3 July 2000.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Interview with Sophie Wyseur-Gueye, Ziguinchor, 9 July, 2000; interview with Mr. Andrea Nicolaj, Counselor of the EU Delegation in Dakar, 5 July 2000; interview with Yatma Fall, President of the Association Nationale des Handicapés Moteurs de Sénégal, Dakar, 5 July 2000.

to pass a law to protect the disabled. There has been no progress on that objective since the change of government in 2000.⁵⁴

SEYCHELLES

Seychelles signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified the treaty on 2 June 2000. The Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Alan Bayette, said ratification was made after the National Assembly had immediately enacted the treaty.¹ The Seychelles sponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999. It did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. It has not attended any meeting of the Intersessional Standing Committees of Experts. The Seychelles provided its consent to be bound by CCW Amended Protocol II (landmines) on 8 June 2000. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Landmines are not a problem in the Seychelles and the country is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. The Seychellois armed forces are not thought to hold any stocks.

SOUTH AFRICA

Key developments since March 1999: South Africa served as co-chair of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. It continued to play an important role in promoting universalization and effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. South Africa is emerging as a leader in the field of mine detection and mine clearance equipment and technology.

Mine Ban Policy

South Africa was the third country to sign the Mine Ban Treaty on the 3 December 1997. The National Assembly ratified the treaty on the 5 May 1998, and the National Council of Provinces on the 11 May 1998. On the 26 June 1998, South Africa deposited its instrument of ratification.

Under its Constitution, South Africa is bound by all international agreements it signs once both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces have approved them, at which time the international agreement becomes national law.¹ South Africa reports that it is now in the process of developing enabling implementation legislation.²

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a "Landmine Coordinating Committee" in order to "formalize the earlier inter-departmental and NGO arrangement on the antipersonnel mine issue [and to ensure that] our joint efforts in co-ordination will assist

⁵⁴ Interview with Yatma Fall, Dakar, 5 July 2000.

¹ Telephone interview with Alan Bayette, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Victoria, 26 July 2000.

¹ *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 14 231(4), (Wynberg: Constitutional Assembly, 1997).

² Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, for the reporting period 1 March 1999-1 September 1999, submitted 1 September 1999.

in clarifying our objectives and factors that will be involved regarding funding and the organization of actions to be undertaken.”³ The South Africa Campaign to Ban Landmines (SACBL) is now a permanent member of this Committee.

South Africa’s Foreign Minister, together with those of Austria, Canada, Mozambique and Norway, issued a joint statement on 1 March 1999 welcoming the entry into force of the treaty. The then Foreign Minister, the late Alfred Nzo, added that the treaty, “will significantly contribute to eradicating this scourge from the African continent, thereby assisting the socio-economic advancement of its people who have been so gravely afflicted by the use of these deadly weapons.”⁴

The government sent a delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique, in May 1999. At that meeting it was made co-chair (with Canada) of the Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. As well as co-chairing those meetings, it has been an active participant in all of the various meetings of the other SCEs designed to foster the implementation of the treaty.

South Africa submitted its report on implementation measures to the UN as required under Article 7 on 1 September 1999. It has not submitted a second report to cover the period 1 September – 31 December 1999.

South Africa cosponsored and voted for the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions.

South Africa is a state party to CCW and its protocols, including Amended Protocol II. It participated in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II that was held in Geneva on 15-17 December 1999. It submitted its report as required under Article 13 prior to that Conference.

South Africa is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) but does not believe that any useful purpose would be served by negotiating a transfer ban in the CD and thus having three international treaties dealing with landmines.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

South Africa is a past producer and exporter of AP mines.⁵ Today it no longer has an antipersonnel landmine production capability.⁶ Antipersonnel landmine production stopped in 1995 and the assembly lines have been stripped.⁷ In order to prevent any

³ Letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Noel Stott, SACBL, 17 November 1997.

⁴ “Anti-Personnel Mine Convention Enters Into Force,” Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Press Release No. 46, 1 March 1999.

⁵ For information on past production and transfer, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 83-84; see also, Alex Vines, “Ethics and Other Considerations for De-mining in SADC,” paper delivered to an international conference, “Towards Cost-Effective De-mining: an Evaluation of Experiences and Techniques,” Johannesburg, April 1998; see also, Martin Rupiya, *Landmines in Zimbabwe: a Deadly Legacy*, (Harare: SAPES Books, 1998), p. 25.

⁶ Article 7 Report, submitted 1 September 1999.

⁷ Information Supplied by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Directorate, 5 May 2000.

further production all moulds of plastic components have been recovered from outside suppliers.⁸

On 19 May 1997, former Minister of Defense, Mr. Joe Modise informed the OAU's *First Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines*, in Kempton Park, Johannesburg, that the SANDF had 313,779 antipersonnel landmines of all kinds on its inventory. The total value of these mines amounted to approximately 47 million rand. The stocks included 238,746 AP mines (HE), 13,038 practice AP mines, 48,484 Jumping mines (J69); 2,059 practice Jumping mines (J69); and 11,434 foreign mines.

Destruction of these stocks was completed on 30 October 1997. The South African National Defense Force (SANDF) retained a limited number of AP mines for training of soldiers to deal with AP mine threats during peacekeeping operations, as well as for the development of effective demining equipment, demining research purposes and military/civilian education purposes.⁹

In 1997, the SANDF transferred 5,000 of its retained mines to Mechem for "research and training purposes."¹⁰ Mechem has used a total of 170 AP mines for demonstration and training purposes.¹¹ As of 1 September 1999, South Africa reported a live antipersonnel mine stockpile for training of 4,830. The South African National Defense Force has also retained 10,992 RPM2 "empty casings...for the training of members of the SANDF."¹²

According to South Africa's Article 7 report, between March 1999 and September 1999 a further total of 2,586 antipersonnel landmines were destroyed in controlled explosions by the SANDF. South Africa stated that 140 of those mines were "part of an illegal arms cache discovered in mid May 1999 in KwaZulu-Natal Province and immediately destroyed."¹³

Operation Rachel

A total of 6,351 antipersonnel mines have been destroyed under a joint South African-Mozambican program called Operation Rachel. To combat illicit weapons trafficking being used to fuel crime, the two countries signed an agreement in 1995 allowing their police forces to undertake joint operations to find and destroy weapons within Mozambique left over from the war. South Africa is paying the bulk of the costs and is providing expertise on weapons and explosives disposal and destruction, which happen on site.¹⁴

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ South African National Defense Force, "Fact Sheet: South Africa's Initiatives on Banning Anti-Personnel Landmines," 8 September 1999; see also, Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 September 1999.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 September 1999.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., Form G.

¹⁴ M. Chachiua, *Arms Management Programme: Operation Rachel 1996 – 1999*, (ISS: Halfway House, 1999) p. 40. V. Gamba, *Small Arms in Southern Africa: reflections on the extent of the problem and its management potential*, (ISS: Halfway House, 1999) p. 66.

Use

The African National Congress (ANC) is the first and only liberation movement and now ruling party in government in the world to publicly apologize and express sincere regret for civilian deaths and injuries resulting from the use of antipersonnel landmines.

Through South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) a number of individuals on both sides of the conflict have applied for amnesty from prosecution for their use of landmines against political activists and innocent civilians. Individuals who survived landmine incidents were able to tell their stories and express their feelings about what happened to them and their families and how they felt about the international ban on antipersonnel landmines. While former servicemen admitted laying mines in neighboring countries during successive conflicts,¹⁵ the former apartheid government and Defense Forces failed to take any responsibility for their use of AP mines, both within and outside of the country, and did not apologize for their use of the weapon.

Mine Action

During the FMSP Jackie Selebi, then Director-General of Foreign Affairs, announced: "To ensure that South Africa effectively manages the implementation of the Treaty obligations, a South Africa Mine Action Centre is in the process of being established under the auspices of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The objective of the Centre will be to act as a forum where compliance with international instruments on landmines will be monitored; to facilitate and identify appropriate mine action projects; and act as a clearinghouse for all mine action requests received by South Africa."¹⁶ As of July 2000, the center was still in the process of being established by the Landmines Coordinating Committee.

South Africa, in response to the problem of mines during the border wars, developed mine detection systems and a range of mine-protected vehicles that are reputed to be among the best in the world, including the Hyena, Hippo, Buffel, Casspir, Mamba and the Ribbok – a civilian farm vehicle.¹⁷

South Africa's countermine philosophy is based on these principles: (1) Mine awareness training before, during, and after clearance operations; (2) Detection of mines with best equipment available; (3) Marking of detected mines; (4) The neutralization of mines; and (5) Demining auditing and the protection of deminers.¹⁸

¹⁵ "Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission," Cape Town: Juta, 1998. In its final report the TRC found that the ANC landmine campaign in the rural areas of the Northern and eastern Transvaal in the period 1985-1987 could not be condoned as it resulted in a gross violation of human rights. The Commission however also acknowledged the ANC for abandoning its landmine campaign in light of the high civilian casualty rate.

¹⁶ Jackie Selebi, Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, Mozambique, 3 May 1999.

¹⁷ Vernon Joynt, Divisional General Manager, Mechem Consultants, "Written response to questions tabled by the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines," 22 October 1997.

¹⁸ Ronnie Kasrils, "South Africa and a Landmine Free Southern Africa," address at conference "Towards Cost Effective Demining: An evaluation of experiences and techniques," SAIIA, 22-23 April 1999.

It has never had the leading edge on humanitarian demining technology, but rather in military countermine technology.¹⁹ However, according to Ronnie Kasrils, Deputy Minister of Defense from 1994-1999, now that apartheid has come to an end, "[W]e are grateful that a democratic South Africa can redress the wrongs of the past and make a major contribution by assisting countries with mine clearance."²⁰

In 1999, a representative of the South African government attended the Bad Honeff 2 discussions in Germany; the Bad Honeff guidelines seek to place various aspects of mine action in the broader context of post-conflict reconstruction and development.

One of South Africa's pre-eminent companies in the area of mine action is Mechem Consultants, a specialized engineering division and subsidiary of the South African state-owned arms company, DENEL. Mechem has been involved in research and development for over twenty-eight years mainly in the detection of landmines, the protection against landmine explosions, and clearing of minefields. It is also linked to the past research, design and development of antipersonnel landmines for the (previous) South African government and military.

Mechem has in the past been contracted by UN agencies, government, and private electrical or road-building companies to conduct demining operations in various countries including Mozambique, Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, and Northern Iraq.

In addition to Mechem there are several other South African-based firms offering mine action services. In 1999, the Pretoria-based BRZ International, which has been linked to Saracen,²¹ conducted mine clearance work in Angola, Croatia, Northern Iraq, Kosovo and Mozambique. It has also sent assessment missions to Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.²² The regional office of Carlos Gassmann Tecnologias De Vanguarda Aplicadas Lda (CGTVA) is also located in South Africa and has worked in Mozambique during 1999. TNT De-mining is one of the newest demining companies in South Africa and focuses mainly on the training of demining personnel at all levels. The Institute for Military Engineering Excellence in Southern Africa (IMEESA) is also located on the outskirts of Pretoria and at its center provides amongst other services, training in demining, mine awareness programs, management of demining projects and surveying.

Mine Action Research & Development and Technology Transfer

South Africa is emerging as a leader in the field of mine clearance equipment and believes that it possesses leading demining technology and expertise as well as medical capability and experience to assist mine victims. Mechem's Vernon Joynt is credited with inventing armour able to withstand the Yugoslav TRMP-6 "tank-killer" mine, which had been a curse to UN peacekeepers in Bosnia.²³

¹⁹ Center for Conflict Resolution, "Demining Workshop Report," 16 March 1998.

²⁰ Ronnie Kasrils, "South Africa and a Landmine Free Southern Africa," address to the conference "Towards Cost effective Demining, An evaluation of experiences and techniques," SAIIA, 22 - 23 April 1999.

²¹ Saracen was linked to the now disbanded private military company, Executive Outcomes.

²² BRZ International Ltd, "Humanitarian Mine Clearance Profile," Doc: BRZ302, Edition B, undated.

²³ "Landmines – everybody's hidden enemy," Eurostaty Show, *Daily News*, 25 June 1996.

In February 1999, a US interagency team of humanitarian demining experts, including representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, State Department, and US European Command, visited South Africa. The purpose of this visit was to familiarize the team with South African demining research and development (R&D), and operations; and to conduct meetings on possible areas of cooperation between the two countries. This initiative was an outgrowth of the US-South Africa Bi-national Commission (BNC), which is chaired by US Vice-President Al Gore and South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki.²⁴ According to John Zavales, of the US Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, "Given South Africa's enlightened and progressive efforts at demining they can clearly make a significant contribution to Humanitarian Demining. The US trip was a useful first step in expanding cooperation in this area between the U.S. and South Africa, which hopefully will result in further combined efforts."²⁵

In 1998, Sweden acquired four South African Mamba mine protected armored personnel carriers for use in peacekeeping in the Western Sahara. The Mambas were produced by Reumech OMC to be used by Sweden's United Nations troops.²⁶ In March 1999, the US Defense Department awarded Mechem a \$494,000 contract to field test a mine sniffing electronic dog's nose, which is being developed by the Pentagon's research agency.²⁷ Mechem is to supply the Pentagon's Advanced Research Project Agency with its unique Mechem Explosive and Drug Detection System (MEDDS) and training and laboratory assistance. The system consists of concentrating explosive or drug vapors into sample tubes and presenting them to specially trained "sniffer" dogs for identification.

In January 1999, South Africa and the Japanese government met at the first session of the new SA-Japan partnership forum designed to intensify contacts between Pretoria and Tokyo. Senior officials participating in the partnership forum agreed on closer cooperation in demining in southern Africa.²⁸ In May 1999, DENEL represented the SA defense industry on a high-profile SA trade delegation visit to Libya, to pursue a market for SA's equipment for clearing landmines in Libya, where thousands of landmines planted during the Second World War pose a serious problem.²⁹ Also in 1999, the South African government exported mine protected vehicles to a private mining company for the protection of personnel in Angola.

Other key South African research and development companies include:

- RSD, a division of Dorbyl Ltd, which has produced amongst other items, the Chubby Mobile Mine Detection and Clearing System;
- Reutech Defense Industries (RDI) manufacturers of, for example, the MIDAS - handheld Mine Detector (PIMD) and the Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (VMMD2000);

²⁴ John G. Zavales, Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Department of Defense, "United States Interagency Team Visits South Africa," March 1999.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ E-mail from Hendrik Ehlers to MGM people against landmines network, 8 November 1998.

²⁷ Simon Barber, "Mechem to test Pentagon's \$25 million dog," *Business Day*, 4 March 1999.

²⁸ J. Stephen Laufer and Louise Cook, "Japanese firms still see SA as a trade base," *Business Day*, 18 January 1999.

²⁹ "DENEL to visit Libya and 'sell SA,'" *Business Day*, 24 May 1999.

- Vickers OMC (the successor to Reumech OMC) which has produced a range of Mine Protected Vehicles including the RG-31 Nyala, the Mamba, the Kobra and the Casspir;
- Armscor (marketing, sales as well as being the competent authority which conducts independent testing of all South Africa Mine Protected Vehicles); and,
- The Center for Scientific Information and Research (CSIR) which is currently researching the possibility of a multi-sensor mine-detecting suite consisting of ground penetrating radar, infrared and metal detector sensors. Focusing on the Southern African region, and in particular, on countries like Angola and Mozambique, the project aims to develop technology to detect landmines, in particular antipersonnel mines with minimum or no metal content.

Survivor Assistance

The South African Constitution forbids discrimination based on an individual's disability.³⁰ Statistics on the number of South Africans living with disabilities resulting from landmine incidents are unavailable. However, research into disability generally estimates that between five and twelve percent of South Africans are moderately to severely disabled. Few services and opportunities exist for people with disabilities to participate equally in society. "The backlog of disability services is so long and the lack of services so acute that the economic advantage of providing rehabilitation services might not become apparent for a number of years."³¹

A research project on assistive devices found that in South Africa there are little or no policies and protocols to guide service development.³² While there are a large number of Disabled Peoples Organizations (DPO) in South Africa, they are under-resourced in terms of funding and tend to be concentrated in urban areas.³³

Being involved in the wars of liberation, South Africa has built up a unique experience of the medical aspects of landmine warfare. The South African National Defense Force's Medical Services (SAMS) believes that it can make a significant contribution to the medical support of mine clearing operations and the treatment of the victims of landmines.³⁴

At least one South African Company, Tactical Medical Developments, undertakes research and develops products specifically designed for use by medical personnel in a military environment and for mine clearance operations.

³⁰ *South African Constitution*, Section 9.

³¹ Margie Schneider, *Disability Review* (Braamfontein: C A S E, 1997).

³² P. McLaren and S. Philpott, *Assessing Assistive Devices Services: a review of eight provinces in South Africa* (Braamfontein: C A S E, 1998). See also, M. Claassens and M. Schneider, *Services Provided for disabled People by National and Provincial Government Departments* (Braamfontein: C A S E, 1998).

³³ R. Morgan and D. Everrat, *Audit of NGOs of and for People With Disabilities* (Braamfontein: C A S E, 1998).

³⁴ G. M. Scharf, "The South African Medical Service's Doctrine, Expertise, Advice and Assistance on Mine Warfare and the Treatment of the Victims of Mine Warfare," Paper Presented to the United Nations' International Meeting on Mine Clearance, Geneva, July 1995.

South Africa provides a number of international humanitarian organizations, including the World Food Program, UNHCR, the OAU Refugee Contingency Fund, UNICEF, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with financial aid aimed mainly at the SADC region.

The ICRC has received a number of donations specifically for the rehabilitation of landmine survivors in the SADC region including R400,000 (\$58,224) for year 1999/2000.

SWAZILAND

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Swaziland on 1 June 1999. The United States trained forty demining instructors from August to October 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The Kingdom of Swaziland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification on the 23 December 1998. Thus, the treaty entered into force for Swaziland on 1 June 1999. In its Article 7 transparency report, Swaziland reports that “[l]egislation is presently being drawn up.”¹ Swaziland submitted the Article 7 report, which was due by 27 November 1999, on 16 February 2000. It covers the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 January 2000. Swaziland voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had on similar resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. Swaziland attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in a delegation led by its High Commissioner to Mozambique. It also participated in the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention in January 2000.

A number of NGOs in Swaziland have been involved in the movement to ban landmines, including the Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society and the Swazi affiliate of the Southern African Churches in Ministry with Uprooted People.

Swaziland is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but officials told Landmine Monitor that Swaziland intends to join Amended Protocol II (Landmines).² It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use

Swaziland has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In the Article 7 report, Swaziland confirmed that it has never possessed antipersonnel landmines, including any retained for training.³

¹ Swaziland Article 7 Report, Form A, submitted 16 February 2000.

² Telephone interview with Ismail Matse, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 January 2000.

³ Swaziland Article 7 Report, Forms B and G, 16 February 2000.

Landmine Problem

Swaziland has a limited landmine problem.⁴ A small minefield exists just east of the Lomahasha Customs point near the town of Mananga on the border with Mozambique in the northeast of the country. The minefield is approximately 10 kilometers long and 50 to 100 meters wide. In a letter to the Landmine Monitor researcher dated 12 June 2000, Army Spokesman Lt. Khanya Dlamini indicated that Swaziland intends to “demine along the border between Swaziland and Mozambique from Lomahasha Border post to Great Usuthu River South-East of Swaziland.” While the number of landmines in this area is unknown, in 1997 it was estimated to contain ten uncleared mines.⁵ In June 1999 an additional eight landmines were reported found.⁶ Lt. Dlamini told Landmine Monitor that while the number of mines is unknown, it contains POMZ mines and unexploded ordnance/booby traps; he also stated that a Level One survey has been conducted.

The extent of spillover from Mozambique border minefields needs to be investigated. Retired Director of the Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society, Thandiwe Dlamini has been approached to examine whether there are more minefields along the common border with Mozambique and if there have been any recent casualties as a result of landmine incidents in that region.¹⁰

Mine Action Funding

On 1 June 1998, the U.S. government’s Humanitarian Demining Interagency Working Group approved Swaziland for humanitarian demining assistance. In late 1998, a pre-deployment site survey was conducted in Swaziland by a U.S. team. The program start-up phase was delayed due to the need to transfer funds to relieve the suffering in Central America caused by Hurricane Mitch. The program is valued at \$1,710,000 of which \$210,000 has been transferred to the trust fund at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). It is available to the government of Swaziland to support mine action undertaken by the Swaziland forces trained by the U.S. military personnel. As of March 2000, Swaziland had not submitted a request to use the funds.¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense funds (\$828,000 in FY 1999 and \$289,000 in FY 2000) cover the expenses of U.S. personnel deployed to conduct the training and are not used to acquire

⁴ Some sources have listed Swaziland as mine free. According to the UN Country Database, Swaziland is not mine-affected. In 1993, the U.S. Department of State stated that Swaziland “has no landmine problem” but in 1998, it revised this to “affected.” U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, 1993, p. 159 and U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, 1998, p. A-2.

⁵ Thandiwe Dlamini, “Statement to the OAU Conference on the Legacy of Anti-personnel Landmines,” 19 - 21 May 1997.

⁶ “Danger: 8 More Landmines Found at Lomahasha,” *The Swazi Observer* (national newspaper), 8 June 1999.

¹⁰ Telephone Interview with Thandiwe Dlamini, retired director of the Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society, 7 March 2000.

¹¹ Email from Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, U.S. Department of State, 3 April 2000.

large items of equipment. Limited funds can be used to purchase small items of equipment (protective garments, visors, headgear) needed to conduct training.¹²

Mine Clearance and Awareness

In its Article 7 report, Swaziland reported that forty demining instructors of the Umbutfo Defence Force were trained by American soldiers from August to October 1999 and “[a]t the end of that course they went to a suspected mine area to mark it, warning members of the public about the danger zone.”¹³ Two U.S. Department of Defense personnel trained the Swazi Army Engineers in “mine clearance, mine identification, communications, medical care and basic mine awareness educational programs.”¹⁴ The team also provided training on minefield survey tools and techniques and combat lifesaver training. After a site visit to the area on the 6 April 2000, representatives of the Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society confirmed that the minefield is “properly guarded and with clear warning signs for the people living near the area. Members of the Umbutfo Defence Force stationed near the border keep the area clear of overgrowth and warn residents of the danger of the landmines by regular patrols.”¹⁵

The Article 7 report noted that a refresher course would start 1 February 2000 but this was delayed until May 2000 due to the devastating floods that struck Mozambique and northeast Swaziland in February and March 2000. Swaziland Sergeant Maphilisa Dlamini, stationed in Siteki, near the border with Mozambique indicated that the floods had moved some landmines and said that members of the military would verify the situation when they are deployed to the area in May 2000.¹⁶

The May demining training exercise was conducted by three U.S. soldiers. The Article 7 report indicated that another course would take place in which Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force instructors would train between 40 to 60 personnel.¹⁷

No demining has started yet.

Swaziland does not have a national Mine Action Center but the Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force is responsible for mine action activities. The experience of clearing the minefield is aimed at enhancing Swaziland's capacity to contribute to future peacekeeping activity.¹⁸

¹² Email from Colonel Tom Stott, Office of Humanitarian Assistance and Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy, via Helen Savva, Reference Specialist, Public Affairs Office, Information Resource Center, U.S. Embassy, Pretoria, South Africa, 16 March 2000. See also, Human Rights Watch, “Clinton’s Landmine Legacy,” *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, Vol. 12, No. 3, July 2000, p. 38.

¹³ Swaziland Article 7 Report, Form I, 16 February 2000.

¹⁴ Email from Colonel Tom Stott, via U.S. Embassy, Pretoria, South Africa, 16 March 2000.

¹⁵ Thandiwe S. Dlamini and July Ginindza, “Update on the Situation of Landmines in Swaziland,” Unpublished paper, Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society, 5 May 2000.

¹⁶ Dlamini and Ginindza, “Update on the Situation of Landmines in Swaziland,” 5 May 2000.

¹⁷ Article 7 Report, Form I, 16 February 2000.

¹⁸ Maria Raphael, Senior Program Manager, U.S. Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, “Address to the Southern Africa Development Council,” Gaborone, Botswana, 15 April 1999.

The Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross provides information on the current mine clearance operation through its weekly radio programs which reach the communities near the minefield.

Landmine Victims

Interviews by Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society with inhabitants near the Mozambique border confirm that there have been no injuries or deaths due to landmines in the last ten years.¹⁹ The death of a woman and injuries to several men prior to this period have been validated by authorities at the Good Shepherd Hospital.²⁰ The Swazi Government has not adopted national legislation for persons with disabilities.

TOGO

Key developments since March 1999: Togo ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 9 March 2000. Togo has stated that it has a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes.

Togo signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. On 29 March 1999 the National Assembly unanimously passed Law N° 99-005 authorizing ratification of the treaty. The instrument of ratification was deposited on 9 March 2000. The treaty enters into force for Togo on 1 September 2000. Its Article 7 transparency measures report will be due by 28 February 2001. While the ratification legislation did not impose any domestic implementation measures, officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that they are aware of the need to take measures to properly apply the Mine Ban Treaty.¹

Togo attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. It did not participate in any of the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva in 1999 or 2000. Togo voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

Togo is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines, but not Amended Protocol II. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

In a response to a request for updated information, Togo's Ministry of Defense confirmed that Togo does not produce or transfer antipersonnel mines, but does possess a small quantity of AP mines for training.² The National Army told Landmine Monitor that it has never used AP mines.³

¹⁹ Dlamini and Ginindza, "Update on the Situation of Landmines in Swaziland," 5 May 2000, p. 1.

²⁰ Ibid.

¹ Interview with Elom Akpalou, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lomé, 25 April 2000.

² Letter to Landmine Monitor from Assani Tidjani, General de Brigade, Ministry of National Defense, N° 314/MDN/CAB/00, 6 April 2000.

³ Ibid.

On 20 April 1999 an explosion of two devices reported to be antipersonnel mines near the private residence of the Head of State killed one person.⁴ The National Army said that the explosion was caused by grenades abandoned by terrorists.⁵

Togo is not mine-affected. According to the Ministry of Defense, the Army has mine clearance ability.⁶ Ninety-nine engineers have been trained in mine clearance in France and in Togo, sponsored by the Togolese government.⁷ In 1998 and 1999 the Army helped to mark out mined areas in Guinea-Bissau as part of the African peacekeeping force of ECOMOG.

UGANDA

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Uganda on 1 August 1999. There have been allegations of Ugandan use of mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly in the June 2000 battle for Kisangani. Uganda denies any use. There is evidence of use of antipersonnel mines in 1999 and early 2000 by Lord's Resistance Army rebels entering Uganda from Sudan. There is no organized mine clearance underway in Uganda, but mine awareness activities are better coordinated and expanding. Mine casualties dropped significantly in 1999. Uganda has not submitted its Article 7 report, due on 28 January 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Uganda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and submitted its instrument of ratification to the UN on 25 February 1999. The treaty thus entered into force for Uganda on 1 August 1999. The government has not yet put implementation legislation in place. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under Ugandan law, the treaty is merely persuasive and not binding until domestic legislation has been passed.¹ Landmine Monitor was informed that the treaty has been forwarded to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs for incorporation into domestic law, but the process is a long one, passing first through the cabinet and then to parliament for enactment.² No timetable was given for this process.³

Uganda participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, Mozambique on 3-7 May 1999. The government has not participated in any of the intersessional

⁴ Tata Hounkanli, "Lomé: Un homme tué par deux fortes explosions aux abords de Lomé II," *CROCODILE*, (Lomé), 22 April 1999.

⁵ Letter to Landmine Monitor from Assani Tidjani, Ministry of National Defense, 6 April 2000.

⁶ Interview with General Assani Tidjani, Ministry of National Defense, Lomé, 20 March 2000.

⁷ Interview with Colonel Bitenewe, Advisor, Ministry of National Defense, Lomé, 14 June 2000.

¹ Interview with Mrs. Eunice Kigenyi Irungu, Foreign Service Officer, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Kampala, 19 December 1999.

² *Ibid.*

³ Interview with Mrs. E.K. Irungu, MOFA, Kampala, 27 April 2000.

meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts of the MBT. NGOs and other agencies in the country have been actively involved in promoting ratification and effective implementation and monitoring of the treaty.⁴

Uganda's Article 7 Report to the UN was due on 28 January 2000. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for preparing the report, then providing it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵

Uganda voted for December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution 54/54 B promoting the treaty, as it had on past pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998.

The government is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but has not ratified its Amended Protocol II (1996).⁶ Uganda is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Uganda claims to have stopped production of AP mines and to have destroyed all AP mines manufactured at the government-owned National Enterprise Corporation (NEC) at Nakasongora.⁷ Brigadier Ivan Koreta, Director General, Internal Security Organization (ISO), and Lt. Katsigazi in December 1999 affirmed that the production line at NEC has been completely converted into production of dry cell batteries. An independent inspection of the facility has yet to be made, and to date, the batteries have not been introduced into the market nor is their brand name known.⁸

According to the U.S. State Department, NEC, "built with aid from China's Wabao Engineering Corporation, makes ammunition and small arms. Uganda claims it stopped production of landmines in 1995, but reports persist that the factory still produces them and provides them to consumers in the Central Africa/Great Lakes region."⁹ Landmine Monitor is unaware of any reports of continued production of AP mines.

Previous imports of AP mines were from various sources including Russia and Korea.¹⁰ Military officials say that a large quantity of AP mines and UXOs have been gathered from different army units around the country by the UPDF and transferred to Jinja Army Depot for storage pending destruction.¹¹ In January 2000, it was reported that an unidentified Ugandan official said that there are 50,000 AP mines stockpiled and that their destruction has begun.¹² The military is reportedly seeking assistance in destroying this stockpile because it lacks the capacity to do so.¹³

⁴ This includes UNICEF, URCS, IPPNW- Uganda, AVSI, UNACOH, and SCF-Norway.

⁵ Interview with Mrs. E.K. Irungu, MOFA, Kampala, 27 April 2000.

⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 90-96.

⁷ Interview with Brig. Ivan Koreta, Director General, International Security Organization (ISO), and Lt. Katsigazi, Kampala, 23 December 1999.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ "Arms Flows to Central Africa/Great Lakes," Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, November 1999, available at: www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_pm/fs_9911_armsflows.html.

¹⁰ Interview with Brig. Ivan Koreta and Lt. Katsigazi, Kampala, 23 December 1999.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *The East African*, 19 January 2000.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Government Use

The Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) has issued an order to all UPDF unit commanders prohibiting the use of AP mines.¹⁴ A Ugandan official has stated to Landmine Monitor that the UPDF is not using AP mines against the various rebel groups that operate out of Sudan (Lord's Resistance Army-LRA, Uganda National Rescue Front-UNRF, West Nile Bank Front-WNBF) or the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), which operates from the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁵ There has been no credible evidence that the government has used mines inside Uganda.¹⁶

In 1999 and 2000 the Namibian Defense Ministry and others accused Uganda of laying mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).¹⁷ There were reports of use of mines in June 2000 in the hostilities between Rwanda and Uganda over the city of Kisangani, held by the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) forces. (See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000--Democratic Republic of Congo*). A UN official told Landmine Monitor that Uganda and Rwanda had both used mines in the fighting over Kisangani.¹⁸ The RCD rebels claim that Rwandan and Ugandan troops left more than 4,000 antipersonnel landmines in the town after clashing there from 5-11 June, but state that they have found most of the mines close to a former Ugandan army base on the road to Bangoka airport.¹⁹ These accusations have not been verified.

In December 1999, military officers interviewed for this report insisted that the UPDF is under strict instructions against the use of AP mines.²⁰

It is uncertain if Congolese rebels who collaborate with UPDF use antipersonnel mines. The ICBL has expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party, such as Uganda, may be violating the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another entity, such as Congolese rebels, that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not "under any circumstance...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."

Uganda should make clear the nature of its support for other armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear its views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of its joint military operations with these armed forces. As a party to the treaty, Uganda should state categorically that it will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.

¹⁴ Interview with Brig. Ivan Koreta, and Lt. Katsigazi, Kampala, 23 December 1999.

¹⁵ Interview with Mrs. E.K. Irungu, Kampala, 19 December 1999.

¹⁶ Interviews in March and April 2000 with local people and leaders in Gulu during mine awareness workshops.

¹⁷ *The East African*, 17-23 January 2000.

¹⁸ Telephone interview with UN official in Kisangani, 28 July 2000.

¹⁹ "Rebels say more than 4,000 Mines Left in Kisangani," *AFP* (Kisangani), 21 July 2000, in *FBIS*.

²⁰ Interview with Brig. Ivan Koreta and Lt. Katsigazi, Kampala, 23 December 1999.

Rebel Use

Landmine Monitor obtained eyewitness accounts of the use of AP mines by the LRA and ADF rebels during 1999 and in January-February 2000. Landmine Monitor research in Gulu District suggests that the LRA were using AP mines to avenge attacks on their families and relatives.²¹ Local media also reported new use of mines by rebels infiltrating Gulu and Kitgum Districts in December 1999 and February 2000. In one incident, four people were injured by AP mines in Ngotoo Park, Kitgum District, as they were returning to the Lacekot Camp for IDPs after collecting food.²²

Police and UPDF sources based in Gulu also reported that during a new incursion of LRA rebels from Sudan in February 2000, unknown quantities of AP mines were brought over the border and subsequently used by the rebels. Survivors were reportedly being admitted to hospitals in Gulu and Kitgum Districts. They also reported that the rebels had brought with them new types of AP mines, which they claimed had wounded some rebels trying to lay them because they were unfamiliar with the devices.²³

In February 2000, UPDF Major-General Jeje Odongo reported that his forces had killed twenty-six LRA rebels and captured twenty-eight others with an assortment of weapons including twenty-five AT mines and AP mines during a December incursion.²⁴

On 16 January 2000, UPDF and police captured two SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Movement) commanders in Arua town in northwestern Uganda in a raid that had been prompted by finding two antipersonnel mines in an Arua township villages two weeks earlier.²⁵

On 11 June 2000, the Ugandan army reported killing six LRA rebels in the northern part of the country who were attempting to cross back into Sudan with a number of Ugandan villagers who had been abducted by the rebels. Weapons, including four antipersonnel mines, were recovered in the operation.²⁶

Mine Action Funding

A number of organizations are indirectly contributing to humanitarian mine action.²⁷ These include the Uganda Red Cross Society (URCS), UNICEF, WHO, World Vision, Save the Children-Denmark, International Service Volunteers Association (AVSI), Jesuit Refugee Service, National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda

²¹ Patricia Spittal, Canadian Network for International Surgery/ICC- Uganda, views from group discussions, (unpublished data).

²² Community-based NGOs in Gulu and Kitgum districts and local leaders stated that the LRA planted these mines.

²³ These reports have been supported by various sources from Kitgum and Gulu districts, for example, participants who have been attending mine awareness education workshops in Gulu town (March and April, 2000). See, Patricia Spittal, (unpublished data) - District & Community Leaders, Medical workers, Mass Media (December 1999 - April 2000, Gulu).

²⁴ Justin Moro and J. Oweka, "Sudan Relocates Kony Camp," *New Vision*, 3 February 2000.

²⁵ "Uganda: Northwest officials to send suspected Sudanese rebel commanders home," *The Monitor* (newspaper), as reported by *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, 22 January 2000.

²⁶ "Uganda army kills rebel guerrillas," *Reuters* (Kampala), 11 June 2000.

²⁷ "Indirect" support refers to the fact that some organizations assist mine victims and/or affected communities through their primary activities, which have not been specifically targeting mine victims.

(NUDIPU), Action Aid, and Medicines sans Frontiers. Government departments are also involved.²⁸

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), through the Canadian Network for Injury Survey (CNIS), contributed US\$66,000 to the Injury Control Center-Uganda (ICC-U) for two years in 1999 for mine awareness, first aid training, landmine situation analysis, and anthropological research on landmines in Gulu and Arua districts. The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) made a contribution of US\$5,000 for a landmine injury survey, mine awareness, training, and victim assistance (1999-2000) through AMHEC (IPPNW-Uganda). In addition the Charity Project, through MAG (UK), provided US\$3,500 to AMHEC for strengthening the Uganda Campaign to Ban Landmines (UCBL) and for its mine awareness education.

At present there is no policy, strategy, or practice concerning allocation and use of mine action funds or in-kind contributions. However, some of the NGOs and Ministry of Health have formed an informal committee on landmines, chaired by the Ministry of Health, which plans to use donated funds in a transparent and coordinated manner.

Uganda has not directly received any funding or in-kind contributions for mine action programs. There is no domestic budget for mine action.²⁹ At present it is not possible to quantify the need because the magnitude of the landmine problem is not completely known; the situation is complicated by the fact that the LRA uses mines in a random fashion and thus any specific mined areas are unknown. No survey has been carried out to assess the problem.³⁰

Mine Clearance

A special unit of the mechanized battalion of the UPDF carries out mine clearance whenever an area is suspected to have a mine problem.³¹ There is no on-going survey, marking or clearing of mines, and at present there is no national mine clearance plan or mine clearance priorities. Some important areas like roads have been cleared.³² According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Ugandan military acquired a Chubby mine clearing vehicle from South Africa in 1999.³³

²⁸ These include Gender, Labor and Social Development, Disaster Preparedness and Defense and Health. Interview with Mrs. M. A. Nadimo, Ministry of Refugees and Disaster Preparedness, Kampala, 21 December 1999.

²⁹ Interview with Mrs. M.A. Nadimo, Ministry of Refugees & Disaster Preparedness, Kampala, 21 December 1999; interview with Peter Oyaro, Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development, Kampala, 20 December 1999.

³⁰ Faxed messages from Daouda Toure, UN Resident Coordinator; interview with Lt. Katsigazi, ISO, Kampala, 5 December 1999.

³¹ Lieutenant Magara, Public Relations Officer, 4th Division, UPDF Gulu, Gulu (town), February 2000.

³² Faxed messages from Daouda Toure, UN Resident Coordinator; interview with Lt. Katsigazi, ISO, Kampala, 5 December 1999.

³³ *The East African*, 19 January 2000.

Mine Awareness

The main mine action operations in Uganda are coordinated by the Uganda Campaign to Ban Landmines (UCBL) and the Ministry of Health and mainly are programs for mine awareness and victim assistance. The cooperative effort between the UCBL and Ministry of Health has a loose mandate to coordinate the relevant organizations. The Ministry of Health coordinates first aid training, and continuing medical care and rehabilitation activities. Both the UCBL and the Ministry of Health are responsible for all affected areas in the country but do not have specific funding for coordination.³⁴

Mine awareness or risk education programs are under way in the country. Mine awareness is being undertaken by NGOs, including AMHEC, Injury Control Center Uganda (ICC-U), Uganda National Association of Community and Occupational Health (UNACOH), AVSI, URCS, the UN field office, and the ICRC, as well as the UPDF and various ministries.³⁵ These projects are in the mine-affected districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Kasese, Bundibugyo and Fort Portal. The ICC-U, IPPNW, ICRC, and AVSI fund the NGO programs, and the government funds the UPDF and Ministry of Health programs. The UN country office also funds a limited training program on mine awareness.

Mine awareness programs initially were not well coordinated and targeted, but currently activities are coordinated and targeted toward communities and displaced people most at risk. So far twenty mine awareness educators have been trained for Gulu and thirteen for Kitgum districts. Funds allowing, it is planned to have 125 trainers for Gulu District and 100 trainers for Kitgum District, by the end of August 2000, to train more groups of people as mine awareness educators at the grassroots level.

This coordinated program has also used the print and electronic media. Awareness messages have been prepared, translated into the local language (Luo) and field-tested, and have been printed on posters, ready for distribution throughout the two main affected districts. The printing was paid for by UNICEF.

The actual number of people who have received mine awareness education is not known. The coordinated programs adhere to both National and International guidelines, such as those of UNICEF. A preliminary mine awareness assessment was conducted by ICC-Uganda in July and August 1999 among communities in Gulu district prior to mine awareness activities, which indicated low levels of mine awareness and negative attitudes to mine victims. Post-program evaluation is contemplated.

Landmine Casualties

Many people have been killed and maimed by AP mines especially in northern (Kitgum, Gulu and Adjumani districts) and western Uganda (Kasese district), but there is no centralized information about the number of mine victims.³⁶ At the Gulu Orthopedic Workshop, which was rehabilitated by the Italian NGO AVSI and handed over to the

³⁴ Faxed messages from Daouda Toure, UN-Resident Coordinator; interview with Lt. Katsigazi, Kampala, 5 December 1999.

³⁵ Ministries of Health, Labor, Gender & Social Development.

³⁶ Faxed messages from Daouda Toure, UN Resident Coordinator; interview with Lt. Katsigazi, ISO, Kampala, 5 December 1999.

Ugandan Ministry of Health, 201 out of the 622 amputee patients recorded by November 1999 were landmine victims.³⁷

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 had reported a decreasing trend in mine victims in Kitgum and Gulu districts between 1996-1998.³⁸ During 1999 it appears that the number of landmine casualties has continued to decrease. A survey was carried out in the affected districts covering the period between January 1999 and April 2000. In Kitgum hospital no new mine injuries were recorded between March and December 1999.³⁹ According to Dr. J.J. Kilama, Acting Medical Superintendent at Gulu hospital, no new mine casualties were reported there between March and December 1999.⁴⁰ This was corroborated by the UN country report.

Although no new mine victims were treated in the district hospitals of Kitgum and Gulu by December 1999, Landmine Monitor received information from the local community and health staff that a few isolated mine incidents occurred during the early part of 1999 in remote areas on the border with Sudan, and the victims died before getting medical attention.⁴¹

The reduction in mine incidents may be because most of the people in the two districts have been living in protected villages;⁴² also, rebel activities have declined in the past two years. Data gathered by the Landmine Monitor from Kasese district, where ADF rebels are most active, showed a decline in casualties too: from seventeen casualties in 1997 and twenty-eight in 1998, to only one in 1999.⁴³ A few cases were reported from Kabarole and Bundibugyo districts in 1998, but none in 1999.⁴⁴

In the West Nile region (north-western Uganda) in Arua, Moyo, Adjumani and Nebbi districts the pattern is the same, with very few new mine casualties 1999 (i.e., at Arua Hospital three, Nebbi Hospital one, and none from Angal, Adjumani and Moyo Hospitals, but Moyo Hospital did report two cases involving antitank mines). Also according to records from the two military hospitals at Bombo and Mbuya, no new AP mine casualties were reported in 1999.

Casualty figures increased after 22 December 1999, when a group of about some 200 LRA rebels crossed back into Kitgum and Gulu districts in Uganda from Sudan and started terrorizing civilians, resulting in new casualties being reported and property destroyed.⁴⁵

³⁷ *The East African*, 19 January 2000.

³⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 94-95.

³⁹ Hospital records – Kitgum, 1999, reviewed in visit during survey period.

⁴⁰ Interview with Dr. J.J. Kilama, Acting Medical Superintendent, Gulu Hospital, during survey period.

⁴¹ Interviews with medical personnel, Kitgum, during survey period; Daouda Toure, UN Resident Coordinator.

⁴² Protected villages are camps for the internally displaced protected by security forces.

⁴³ Hospital records, Kagando Hospital, Kilembe Hospital, St. John's Ambulance, Kasese, reviewed in visit during survey period.

⁴⁴ Virika Hospital, Kabarole Hospital, DDHs-Kabarole, Fort Portal Orthopedic Workshop, visited during survey period.

⁴⁵ *New Vision*, 2 January 2000; *The Daily Monitor*, 4 January 2000.

One of the victims, Mika Otto⁴⁶ a teacher in Lacekot sub-county, Kitgum district, died and another victim, James Odok, 42, was hospitalized in Gulu Hospital with his right foot blown off, plus multiple wounds on his buttocks and his left foot.⁴⁷ There was another incursion of the LRA from Sudan in February 2000 according to local NGOs based in Gulu. The total number of people wounded or killed by mines is not known but is small compared to the population of the areas affected and Uganda overall.

Survivor Assistance

The rights of the disabled are protected by Uganda's Constitution and eight disability laws.⁴⁸ Funding of health care and medical treatment in Uganda for the disabled comes either directly from the government or through donations through government ministries.⁴⁹ Additionally, there is an inter-ministerial committee on disability, which involves three ministries: the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development; and the Ministry of Education and Sports; the National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda (NUDIPU) serves as the secretary of the committee. Also, a National Disability Council, which is to coordinate all disability efforts in the country, is being established through legislation that is about to be presented to the parliament.

The Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) is an association of veteran soldiers that works with the government. It has a medical rehabilitation program for soldiers who get disabled during war. The victims can obtain assistance through a program funded by the Danish International Development Association. The UPDF has a casualty unit in Mubende specifically for disabled soldiers and a smaller one in Nakasongola. The Ministry of Defense also has its own military hospitals at Mbuya, Gulu and Bombo, where the government funds services for the disabled soldiers.

Orthopedic workshops, such as those in Mulago, Mbale, Gulu, Fort Portal, and Mbarara University produce devices for the disabled, which must be paid for by the individuals who need them. While services for the disabled are quite costly, they can receive a fifty percent subsidy through NUDIPU, the Government, and other organizations.

ZIMBABWE

Key developments since March 1999: Major mine clearance operations started in March 1999. After a slow, accident-plagued beginning, by mid-July 2000 a total of 3.8 million square meters of land had been cleared. Koch Mine-Safe deminers suffered twenty casualties between February 1999-July 2000. Zimbabwe has served as co-rapporteur of the SCE on General Status and Operation of the Convention. Delays in passage of Zimbabwe's pending Mine Ban Treaty implementation bill have held up the start of AP

⁴⁶ *The Daily Monitor*, 4 January 2000.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Uganda Constitution and various acts of Parliament.

⁴⁹ Interview with Benson Ndeziboneye, NUDIPU, Kampala, 4 January 2000; interview with Peter Oyaro, Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development, Kampala, 20 December 1999.

mine stockpile destruction. There continue to be allegations of use of AP mines by Zimbabwean troops in the DRC.

Mine Ban Policy

Zimbabwe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 June 1998. It participated in the First Meeting of State Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with the Deputy Foreign Minister leading the delegation. Its statement to the Meeting, Zimbabwe reaffirmed its commitment to the AP mine ban, stating that it was “unequivocally committed both to implementing its own obligations under the convention and to cooperating with others in finding a lasting solution to the problem.”¹

At the FMSP, Zimbabwe was nominated to serve as co-rapporteur (with Belgium) of the newly created Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operations of the Convention. After the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000, it will become co-chair of this important body. It has also attended meetings on victim assistance and mine clearance.

The government submitted its first report as required under Article 7 on 11 January 2000, covering the period from August 1999-January 2000.² It reported that implementation legislation, the “Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Bill, 1999” is “awaiting clearance from the Law Officers before it is enacted to effectively incorporate the provisions of the Treaty into Zimbabwe’s domestic laws.”³ The delay in passage of this legislation, according to officials, has placed limitations on their actions to fully comply with the treaty, particularly with regard to stockpile destruction.⁴

Zimbabwe voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 54/54B supporting the MBT in December 1999. It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a noted supporter or opponent of efforts to begin negotiations on a mine export ban there.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Zimbabwe was not a significant past producer or exporter of landmines.⁵ Its Article 7 report states that it has a stockpile of 4,792 mines: 446 South African R2M2 AP

¹ Statement of the Hon. Nicholas Goche, Deputy Foreign Minister, First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

² Mine Ban Treaty, Article 7 Report, submitted 11 January 2000, covering August 1999-January 2000.

³ Article 7 Report, Form A, 11 January 2000; telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Tom Munongwa, Engineers Director, Harare, 25 April 2000. It was pointed out that the process of destroying the AP mines has awaited the passing of the Bill into law.

⁴ Interview with Lt. Col Tom Munongwa, Harare, 26 April 2000. See also Article 7 Report, Form G, which reads: “The destruction programme is subject to the enactment of the APM Prohibition Bill which is now nearing submission to Parliament, after which it will be approved by the Head of State.”

⁵ See, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 97-99.

mines inherited from the Rhodesian regime and 4,346 PMD-6 mines, from the former Eastern Bloc. There have been reports that Zimbabwe stockpiled other mine types.⁶

There is contradictory information in the report on the number of mines that the army will retain for training. Forms B (on current stockpiles) and G (on planned destruction) indicate that 700 AP mines will be retained: 500 PMD-6 and 200 R2M2). But Form D (on mines retained for training) indicates 946 mines will be kept, including all 446 of R2M2 mines.⁷

The destruction of the 3,846 AP mines was scheduled to be completed in 2000, in two phases. During the first six months, 3,000 type PMD-6 mines were scheduled to be destroyed, and during next six months the remaining 846 PMD-6 as well as the 246 R2M2s would have been destroyed.⁸ But this plan has not been implemented because the implementation legislation has not been passed.

There has been no response to attempts by NGOs to solicit an invitation to monitor the destruction.⁹

Use

There is concern regarding the involvement of Zimbabwean troops in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in support of the government of Laurent Kabila. *Landmine Monitor 1999* reported that there had been a number of unsubstantiated allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in that conflict by Zimbabwe, which the government vigorously denied.¹⁰ More recently, according to one source, there were accounts of Zimbabwean troops planting defensive minefields around Mbuji Maya when they feared that city would be captured by rebels in 1999.¹¹ *Landmine Monitor* has not seen these accounts and cannot verify them. In June 2000, the Namibia Campaign to Ban Landmines was informed by relatives that two Namibian soldiers died in the DRC when they stepped on "friendly" antipersonnel mines allegedly planted by Zimbabwean soldiers.

While there is no concrete evidence of use of AP mines by Zimbabwean forces, it is clear that antipersonnel mines have been and continue to be used in the DRC conflict, likely by DRC government forces and possibly by others aligned with them.¹² (See *Landmine Monitor* report on DRC).

The so-called SADC Allies, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, are involved in the fighting. Angola has publicly admitted to new use of AP mines in the war against UNITA

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form B, 11 January 2000. *LM Report 1999* cited a Human Rights Watch interview in 1997 with an Army official, in which the official said Zimbabwe stockpiled POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, RAP 1, RAP 2, VS-50, M969 and ZAPS antipersonnel mines. According to Andy Smith, independent mine action consultant, interviewed on 3 July 2000, the ZDF Engineer School at Pomona Barracks near Harare holds stocks of M969, R2M, VS50, PMA, PMA2 and PMNs.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Forms B, D, and G, 11 January 2000. Discrepancy on the submission verified with Ministry of Defense Official, Lt. Col T. Munongwa, 26 April 2000.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Form G, 11 January 2000.

⁹ Letters from Martin Rupiya to Permanent Secretaries of Ministries cited, 18 October 1999.

¹⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 99-100.

¹¹ Interview with U.S. intelligence specialist on DRC, London, 23 June 2000.

¹² "Regional Round Up," *De-Mining Debate*, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1-8 July 1999, p. 9.

in its own country. The ICBL has expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party, such as Zimbabwe, may be violating the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another nation, such as the DRC or Angola, that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not “under any circumstance...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”

Zimbabwe should make clear the nature of its support for foreign forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear its views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of its joint military operations with the DRC and Angola. As a party to the treaty, Zimbabwe should state categorically that it will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Problem/Survey and Assessment

Since the end of the liberation struggle in 1980, Zimbabwe has lived with a legacy of seven minefields along its borders with Zambia and Mozambique. Maps of the minefields are in the possession of the current government. A series of validation exercises have been undertaken since 1980 that have confirmed the general patterns and type of AP mines laid.¹³ The minefields and the priority that they have been given for clearance purposes are indicated below:

Table 1.

Area	Location	Length	Priority
1	Msengezi-Mukumbura-Rushinga-Ruenya	359	3
2	Stapleford Forest-Mutare-Vumba Mts.	50	4
3	Burma Valley	4	5
4	Junction Gate-Muzite Mission-Jersey	72	6
5	Malvenia-Crooks Corner-Limpopo	61	2
6	Victoria Falls to Mlibizi	220	1
7	Kariba Power Station	1	Nil ¹⁴

In 1993 the EU funded a survey of the “Cordon Sanitaire,” a series of six border minefields totaling 766 km, carried out by the then newly-formed Zimbabwean firm of Mine-Tech, which was given just three months in 1994 to survey the minefields.¹⁵ Mine Tech did not conduct a Level 1 or Level 2 survey, and did not visit or “survey” the entire length of the minefields, but did complete the work and handed over a final report on schedule.¹⁶ While it contains some significant inaccuracies, the report does present a

¹³ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 101-103.

¹⁴ Priority for the clearance of the CAPCO minefield has been relegated to the Army Engineers Squadron when they have built enough capacity, as it is located within an enclosure that does not necessarily risk the civilian population.

¹⁵ Interview with Chris Pearce, Director, Mine-Tech, Johannesburg, 6 June 2000.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

broad-brush description of the minefields, and includes maps and diagrams and broad assessment of likely problems in their clearance.

The survey found that Zimbabwe has an estimated 1.5 million AP mines, 10,000 Ploughshare mines and an unknown number of UXO in the ground. These are still assumed to be within the general area of the seven border minefields with the odd mine washed out by floods into the hinterland. (Floods from Cyclone Elaine have been particularly heavy in the Eastern Highlands bordering Mozambique, affecting minefields in areas 1-5.)

The cordon-sanitaire minefields consist of a 25m wide strip of ground laid with three rows of blast antipersonnel mines at a density of around 5,500 mines per kilometer, this minefield was fenced on both sides by a game fence of three strands of steel wire supported on thin steel posts set in concrete. Also attached to the fence was an intruder alarm system linked to control points, which fed information to patrol teams. By 1997 virtually all this fencing had been removed by local people or had disintegrated. Mines in the cordon were the South African R2M2 and the Portuguese M969.¹⁷ The Italian VS-50 was also laid. The cordon-sanitaire minefield is backed for most of its length by a second "Ploughshare" minefield containing three rows of large fragmentation mines mounted on steel pickets one meter above the ground. The fragmentation mines are laid with 30 meter-long tripwires and each mine is protected by three blast mines (see diagram). The mine density in this minefield is around 100 fragmentation mines and 300 buried blast mines per kilometer. In some areas, the minefield has been found to run into Mozambique for stretches up to 8 km in length.

In November 1999, UNMAS and UNDP's resident representative conducted an assessment mission of the problem in the country.¹⁸ In its *Joint Assessment Mission Report* issued in February 2000, it was noted that political attention is not focused on eradicating mines in Zimbabwe. Although the country possesses a credible local capacity for mine clearance, there is not a national mine clearance plan, and it lacks a body with a mandate to articulate and manage mine action. Consequently, current clearance activity is a result of ad-hoc and sometimes donor-driven initiatives without consultations with the affected people or groups otherwise associated with the mine problem. The assessment noted that the government appears to have "no intention of creating" a national mine clearance coordinating body,¹⁹ nor has the government been active in coordinating its landmine problem within the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Mine Clearance

Currently, one army engineer platoon of the Zimbabwe National Army and Koch Mine-Safe, a commercial demining company, carry out mine clearance operations in the country. In 1999, the army engineer platoon of 200 soldiers, funded by the US, cleared 6,000 AP mines in Area Six from a twenty-six kilometer tract that has since been handed

¹⁷ Both mines are classified as minimum metal mines.

¹⁸ The assessment was conducted with the full support of government over the period 18 November to 26 November 1999 and published in February 2000.

¹⁹ *UNMAS Joint Assessment Mission Report: Zimbabwe*, UN Mine Action Service and UNDP Resident Representative, Mission of 18-26 November 1999, p. 3.

over to the Victoria Falls town council.²⁰ However, officials admit that the area cleared is a small percentage of the problem and predict that at this rate of about 8,000 square meters per day when adequate logistical support is available,²¹ it would take “ten years to complete the work.”²² Already, the platoon is operating on a shoestring budget of Z\$11 million (US\$285,714).²³ The U.S. government donated \$1.743 million to mine action in Zimbabwe in 1999 and has a further allocation of US\$1.006 million for FY2000. The U.S. has also budgeted an estimated \$1 million for FY 01.²⁴ Plans to create a second demining platoon in 2000 are under consideration.²⁵

Clearance is also being carried out by Koch Mine-Safe, which won a European Development Fund supported contract to clear a top-priority, 359 kilometer-long minefield in northeastern Zimbabwe on the border with Mozambique.²⁶ The contract tender, issued in late 1997, called for the clearance of ten million square meters over the length of the minefield, to be completed within eighteen months and at a fixed price. Additionally, a contract for quality assurance of the clearance was given to a British company, Bac Tec.

Koch was to begin operations in October 1998, but due to problems in assembling teams²⁷ and logistics, they were not able to deploy personnel (three hundred staff, including their three self-supporting teams of fifty deminers each) until March 1999, already six months late. Under the Ministry of Defense contract, they are restricted to three working teams, and mechanical methods were to be allowed only if the land was checked by normal clearance methods as well and it could be ensured that environmental damage caused by mechanical clearance was minimal.

²⁰ Matthew Takaona, “Army and Private Companies clear 26,000 landmines,” *The Sunday Mail*, 12 March 2000, p.5. There is a discrepancy in the amount of kilometers of land cleared. On the one hand, during a Landmine Monitor field survey interview on December 1999, it was reported 26 km had been cleared. But in a presentation the same month on the problem by Lt. Col. Munongwa, 21 km were reported as cleared and yet the *Sunday Mail* report of 12 March 2000 quotes 20 km as having been cleared in Victoria Falls.

²¹ *UNMAS Joint Assessment Mission Report, Zimbabwe*, p. 10.

²² Lt. Col. T. Munongwa, Acting Director, Zimbabwe National Army Engineers Corps, Presentation on National Landmines Problem, Victoria Falls camp, 24 December 1999.

²³ Current rate of exchange stands at US\$1:38.

²⁴ Human Rights Watch, “Clinton’s Landmine Legacy,” *A Human Rights Watch Short Report* Vol. 12, No. 3, July 2000, p. 27.

²⁵ U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2001 – Bureau of African Affairs,” 15 March 2000.

²⁶ In 1997 Koch Munitionsbergrungs was a former East German defense contractor with experience in clearing ranges of UXO in Germany; they had no direct experience of clearing minefields or of work in Africa. All information on its work in Zimbabwe comes from Brian Mounsor and Temba Kanganga, Project Managers at Koch Mine Safe, Harare, unless otherwise stated.

²⁷ Koch had problems assembling their manual teams because initial salaries offered were low. With a small available pool of experienced deminers in Zimbabwe, ultimately Koch had to do more training than anticipated, and as a result, there is now a small flow of Koch Mine Safe -trained deminers joining other companies.

Following a number of early mine incidents, operations were halted to reassess procedures. Work recommenced in April/May 1999 and clearance moved slowly for four months. By the end of May, 0.25 percent of the ten million square meters of land had been cleared, already eight months into the contract. There were several contributing factors to the slow rate of clearance: a very high number of false signals,²⁸ the abnormally heavy summer rainfall of January and February 1999, which led to an outbreak of cholera and the closing of the site; and finally Koch had under-estimated the logistical difficulties of the operation. Also, it had not been anticipated that they would have to cut and build access roads to the minefield.

Koch's operations were roundly criticized for what appeared to be an unacceptably high accident rate. Between March and June 1999 there were twelve incidents. Over half of the accidents occurred during excavation in the minefield, but the primary cause of a third of the accidents could be blamed on inadequate supervision, poor standard operating procedures (SOPs), or lax discipline, i.e.: "management error." Notably serious injuries happened while handling mines during practice, partly because of using unsafe SOP.²⁹ A total of twenty people were injured in eighteen accidents between February 1999 and July 2000. Fourteen involved minor injuries. Two of the seriously injured died in the hospital, one from pneumonia contracted in recuperation. Following the visit of an EU consultant in May 1999 and the introduction of a manager from the Boskalis Group, safety and productivity improved greatly.

Soon after deployment in March 1999, Koch explored the potential for mechanical clearance and based on an environmental impact assessment which concluded that approximately one-third of the minefield was suitable for mechanical clearance, purchased a Veilhaben Mine Collector which went into operation in October 1999. Currently, two of Koch's teams work as manual teams, mostly on the Ploughshare minefield, and the third team follows the mine collector.

In February 2000, seventeen months through the eighteen-month contract, Koch had cleared less than one-third of their contract area (2.6 million square meters from a total of 10 million square meters). With agreement from all parties, the EU and the Ministry of Defense extended the contract to February 2001.

On average (over both the cordon sanitaire and the Ploughshare minefields) Koch's teams are lifting and destroying one mine per fifty-eight square meters. In the cordon sanitaire minefield this broad average rises to one mine per twenty square meters, and the mechanical team working in the center of the cordon sanitaire clears one mine per twelve square meters on average; spot densities can be more than twice this figure. The mechanical team currently processes 20,000 square meters of ground per day; the following team covers 12,000-12,500 square meters per day and destroys over 1,000 mines per day.

Two things characterize the current clearance program: The very high density of mines and number of mines being cleared. In June 2000, Koch Mine Safe cleared 421,000 square meters. By mid-July the team had cleared a total of 3,809,281 square

²⁸ Interview with Temba Kanganga, Deputy Project Manager of Mine Safe at "The Road forward: Humanitarian Mine Clearance in Southern Africa," South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 8 June 2000.

²⁹ Data from Andy Smith, DDIV database, 4 June 2000.

meters of land. No “missed mines” have been reported by BacTec who assess ten percent of land cleared.

Other Zimbabwean Mine Action Firms

In addition to Mine Safe there are a number of other Zimbabwe based companies offering mine action services.

Mine-Tech: Founded in 1992, Mine-Tech is based in Harare, and conducted the EU-financed study of the border minefields in 1994 and 1995. It has not cleared mines in Zimbabwe in 1999 and 2000 although it employs mostly retired Zimbabwean soldiers; it has conducted mine survey, awareness and clearance in Mozambique, Somaliland, and Bosnia.

Rom-Tech: This is a small Harare-based firm, which had been trying to develop a mine resistant vehicle, the Pookie. It has been sub-contracted by Koch to assist in clearance of the border minefields.

Special Clearance Services: Special Clearance Services has conducted mine clearance work in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In 2000 it was taken over by U.S.-based Armor Holdings and relocated to South Africa.

Security Devices: This firm, based at Msasa, Harare, has since manufactured humanitarian demining equipment, particularly an apron and visor, since 1997. The U.S. Army, Mine-Tech, MgM in Angola and HI in Mozambique use the visors.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Since independence in 1980, some 13,000 landmine incidents have been recorded, but independent research has indicated that these statistics are understated by as much as forty percent.³⁰ Despite the deterioration and removal of previously protective fencing material along the minefield, many people know the general location of the mines, which has led to a decrease in injuries. In the Victoria Falls area, for example, the provincial hospital had not dealt with any landmine injuries from April through November 1999.³¹ As noted above, in the Koch demining operations, between February 1999 and July 2000, a total of twenty people have been injured in eighteen accidents.

Landmine survivors are treated by the public health system. There are two national hospitals that are designated referral centers; eight provincial and fifty-six district hospitals. The first community based rehabilitation project was initiated by the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society in 1982 and later handed over to the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare. It has gradually expanded to offer services for people with disabilities in forty-nine of Zimbabwe’s fifty-five districts. But all medical services are currently under resourced.³² Artificial limbs are expensive and most people in the mine-affected areas

³⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 109.

³¹ Interview with Dr. Kulkarni and Sister-In-Charge, Ms. Sikosana, Victoria Falls Hospital, 4-6 December 1999.

³² Apart from the field interviews with the different hospitals located in the mine-affected areas, *Landmine Monitor* also wrote to the Permanent Secretary of the Health Ministry on 18 November 1999, seeking his comments on victim assistance, but to date there has been no reply.

cannot afford them (a prosthetic leg is about Z\$8,000/US\$210 and an arm, double that). Some NGOs and the ICRC and local Red Cross have offered subsidies to help victims.

On 28 May 2000, the National Council for the Disabled urged the government to inform landmine victims to collect their compensation, which is lying uncollected at the Council's offices. The council noted that victims from the 1970's liberation war had not collected their checks, and its Deputy Chairperson, Farai Cherera, said, "Over the last seven years, my organization has been receiving reports of landmine victims who have been dismissed from the national army. The money is there, but most people entitled to this compensation are not getting it due to ignorance."³³ She has also called upon the central statistics office to update its records on landmine victims.

³³ "Landmine Victims Not Collecting Compensation," *Zimbabwe Standard*, 28 May 2000.

SIGNATORIES**ANGOLA**

Key developments since March 1999: Both Angolan government troops and UNITA rebel forces have continued to use antipersonnel mines. Mine action funding in 2000 totals \$17.4 million. Mine action programs have continued despite the ongoing conflict. As of May 2000, some 10 square kilometers of land and 5,000 kilometers of road have been cleared, and 15,000 mines destroyed. Funding for the government's mine action office, INAROE, has dried up, and its operations are largely suspended. NGOs continue to operate, though at reduced levels due to reduced funding. The number of mine victims was up sharply in 1999 (from 103 in 1998 to 185 in 1999 in Luena alone).

Mine Ban Policy

After active participation in the Ottawa Process, Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. The government has said that because of the renewal of the war in November 1998, it has been unable to ratify the treaty. Both government troops and UNITA forces have been using antipersonnel landmines since the resumption of fighting. The ICBL has condemned both sides for use of AP mines, but is particularly appalled at the Angolan government's disregard for its international commitments.

Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not entered into force for Angola, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty..." Clearly, new use of mines defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.

At the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique on 3-7 May 1999, the Angolan government delegation arrived only on the eve of the closing day and attempted to avoid discussing its new use of landmines in Angola. Vice Minister of External Relations Toko Serrão justified the government's use of landmines by saying, "We remain committed to the noble objectives of the treaty. But we are at war right now."¹

Roberto de Almeida, the speaker of the national assembly, constitutionally number two in Angola, justified the government's position to Human Rights Watch in December 1999 saying, "It is war. We have the right to self defend ourselves. Landmines are part of that right. Once Savimbi [UNITA] is defeated we will stop using landmines."²

The country's national mine clearance organization Instituto Nacional de Remoção De Obstáculos E Engenhos Explosivos (INAROE) also gives the government's position on its web site, which states: "The Government of Angola has said that they have documented their mine laying activities, and will be fully responsible for the clearance operations when appropriate, without any additional cost and negative impact on the

¹ Inter Press Service, 19 May 1999.

² Human Rights Watch interview, Luanda, 17 December 1999.

international community funded demining projects, currently implemented through NGOs.”³

Just as this *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* was going to print, on 25 July 2000, Angola’s parliament approved ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty, with 147 votes in favour, one against and one abstention.⁴ Before the vote, Vice Minister Toko Serrão, addressed the parliament: “Formal adherence to a convention is not sufficient to guarantee the application of all the provisions referred to. The Ottawa Convention envisages different mechanisms destined for the implementation of the convention and resolution of possible disputes. Through these mechanisms, the states that are part of the convention are forced to elaborate and regularly present reports about the measures that they have taken relating to the obligations that result from the convention.”⁵

Vice-Minister Serrão finished his address by stating that: “The entry into force of this convention is considered a historic achievement in the struggle to ban the use of antipersonnel mines. However given the provisions in Law 6/90 regarding international treaties it appears to us important that the Ministry of National Defense states its position on this issue.”⁶ It is unclear precisely what additional steps are needed before Angola can formally submit its instrument of ratification to the United Nations, and thus be fully legally bound by the treaty. The incongruity of Angola apparently moving toward ratification at the same time that it admits to continued use of antipersonnel mines is cause for concern and requires close attention on the part of States Parties and others.

Angola attended three of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts of the MBT, one each on Mine Clearance, Victim Assistance, and the General Status and Operation of the Convention. It sponsored and voted in favor of the December 1999 UNGA resolution on the implementation of the MBT, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions.

Angola has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its Landmine Protocol II, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Inside Angola there has been little public discussion over the government’s policy of continued use of landmines although an exhibition and video show on the extent of the damage landmines have caused Angola and its people was shown at the Portuguese Cultural Center in Luanda in March 2000. Entitled “Ottawa Yes, No More Landmines,” the opening of the exhibition included a drama on mine awareness by the Julu theatre company.⁷

Production, Transfer and Stockpiles

Angola is not a known producer or exporter of landmines. Seventy-six different types of AP mines from twenty-two countries have been found or reported in Angola,

³ INAROOE website at: www.landmine.org/inarooe, date read 6 June 2000.

⁴ Manual da Conceicao, “Angola: Parliament ratifies Ottawa Convention on prohibition of landmines,” *Televisão Publica de Angola*, Luanda, in Portuguese 1930 GMT 25 July 2000, BBC Monitoring, 26 July 2000.

⁵ Translation from Portuguese to English provided by the ICBL Coordinator. Statement by Vice Minister of External Relations, Toko Serrão, to the National Assembly, 25 July 2000.

⁶ Translation from Portuguese to English provided by the ICBL Coordinator. Statement by Vice Minister of External Relations, Toko Serrão, to the National Assembly, 25 July 2000.

⁷ Panafrican News Agency, 1 March 2000.

eleven of which have not been confirmed by the UN.⁸ Little is known about the size or composition of Angola's current landmine stockpiles. Mine clearance NGOs claim there is no evidence of fresh imports of mines by the government. The mines government troops have are mostly from the USSR, East Germany, Cuba, China, Romania, and Hungary.⁹ According to the UK-based demining agency HALO Trust, "Even the most recently laid mines are old-fashioned and appear to have come from the '80s stock or dug out of the ground and reused. This is very promising."¹⁰

Little is known about UNITA's stocks. According to the Angolan military, they captured 15,000 tons of military equipment from UNITA in October 1999 including 2,450 antipersonnel mines and 8,742 antitank mines.¹¹ In June 2000, the Angolan military announced they had discovered a UNITA bunker in Uige province full of weapons including "large numbers of antipersonnel mines."¹² According to a document on a computer disk the government claims to have found at UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's command bunker in Andulo when they captured it in September 1999, UNITA had deemed procurement of antipersonnel mines a priority for its sanctions-busting weapons procurements in 1998 as the rebels prepared for renewed hostilities.¹³

New Use of Mines

A re-survey of eleven provinces by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and HALO Trust in 1999 indicated that both the government and UNITA have laid new mines. UNITA has tended to mine primary, secondary and tertiary roads to impede transportation. The government has been using mines for defensive purposes around strategic locations. Mine clearance operators believe the number of mines laid is significantly less than during previous conflicts. According to HALO and NPA the majority of reported mine accidents, an estimated 75 percent, involve old mines where Internally Displaced Persons traverse unfamiliar areas.

Government Use

Although the Angolan government signed the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997 it has since been responsible for laying new antipersonnel and antitank mines and minefields. In 1999 Landmine Monitor published eyewitness accounts of this gross

⁸ Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), mine action NGO, on its website at: www.angola.npaid.org/minelist_complete_angola.htm, seen on 15 May 2000.

⁹ This is according to NPA. On its website, INAROE lists the most commonly found AP mine types in Angola as from Italy, China, the former Soviet Union, Germany, and Romania. However, its director Gen. Eugénio da Silva Helder Cruz blamed the U.S., Russia, and South Africa as the countries responsible for mining Angola. "They are the ones who should give the most funds for demining. South Africa has a big responsibility." Interview, Luanda, 16 May 2000.

¹⁰ Interview with HALO Trust, Huambo, 18 May 2000.

¹¹ Human Rights Watch interview with Angolan military official, Luanda, December 1999. Some of these mines were South African manufactured claymores.

¹² Text of report on Angolan TV on 10 June, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 13 June 2000.

¹³ Document "Nota O8 DGM 0103," seen by Human Rights Watch.

disrespect of the treaty.¹⁴ Human Rights Watch has continued to obtain credible information of continued landmine warfare and has interviewed a number of eyewitnesses to new use of mines in 2000. For example, two government soldiers admitted in June 2000 that they had laid landmines along paths to ambush UNITA patrols in Moxico province along the Zambian border;¹⁵ they also admitted to laying two AP mines across the border inside Zambia.¹⁶ Norwegian People's Aid reports that FAA (Angolan Armed Forces) Engineers in April 2000 admitted to laying new mines, but claim to have maps of the areas mined.¹⁷ Government troops also used mines in Luena in 1999, prompting Daniel Tessema, Program Director for Veterans International in Luena, to state that if the government "put signs up, the mines can be easily seen. (But) they don't even map the areas."¹⁸ Angolan troops appear to have also carried AP mines in an operation in northern Namibia,¹⁹ but UNITA has more widely used mines in these border areas.²⁰

In a document produced for donors in March 2000, INAROOE admitted, "There is no doubt that limited new mines have been planted in Angola within the last six months. These mines are primarily planted as reinforcement in already mined areas around military installations and other strategic locations such as hydro-electrical power plants or access to provincial capitals."²¹ INAROOE officials have also stated that the only area in which the government has mined since December 1998 is Bie, when UNITA tried to take Kuito, and that only antitank mines were used. INAROOE also said that the FAA always demines where it mines,²² and that the mines in Bie had already been taken up. According to INAROOE the local provincial authorities monitor clearance.²³

But, clearly antipersonnel mines have been used, and have been laid outside Bie, and are not always removed by government troops after use. Moreover, in June 2000,

¹⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 113-114.

¹⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, June 2000.

¹⁶ UNITA has been blamed for the laying of these mines. The rebels have denied this and have called for an international inquiry. See, *Post* (Lusaka), 14 April, 2000.

¹⁷ NPA email to Landmine Monitor, 7 July 2000.

¹⁸ *Reuters*, 26 November 1999.

¹⁹ "Namibia: Angolans face terror charge," IRIN, 24 May 2000; journalist Pedro Rosa Mendes obtained similar accounts from local residents, interview, 6 June 2000; *Publico* (Lisbon), 10 May 2000.

²⁰ Namibian Police, "Report on Anti-Personnel Mine Incidents: Kavango Region, January - April 2000," 10 April 2000.

²¹ "Programa Nacional De Acção Humanitária Contra As Minas Em Apoio A Reabilitação E Desenvolvimento Sócio Económico Angola," INAROOE & UNDP/UNOPS, March 2000.

²² In an incident on 12 May 2000, a HALO armored land rover drove over an antitank mine in Huambo province, at Liandambi, injuring three people. Local people said the mine had been laid by the FAA in December 1998. (Interview with HALO Trust, Huambo, 18 May 2000.) Either the current military forces did not know about the mines in the area, which would indicate that all mines are not mapped and lifted, or the military did know and failed to warn HALO. NPA has noted that there are instances of areas mined in the evening and demined the following morning. But this too can result in accidents if the soldiers forget where the mines are laid or oversleep. Such an incident occurred at a military position near Malanje in late June 2000. (NPA email to Landmine Monitor, 7 July 2000.)

²³ Interview with Gen. Eugenio da Silva Helder Cruz, Director, INAROOE, Luanda, 16 May 2000.

NPA found that an area in Luena declared clear of mines and safe by the army was still mined, casting doubts about the quality of the clearance by the Angolan military.²⁴

There are also worrying reports that Angolans trained with international aid to do humanitarian demining have been used to plant fresh mines. Human Rights Watch interviewed a deminer from a folded NGO mine clearance operation who admitted that he had been conscripted into the Angolan armed forces and ordered to lay as well as clear mines.²⁵

UNITA Use

UNITA has continued to use landmines in its operations across the country. Save the Children reports that during a recent polio vaccination campaign, UNITA placed landmines on “previously cleared paths which mothers had to use to bring their children to vaccination posts. Unknown numbers of women and babies were killed and maimed in this way and many were dissuaded from vaccinating their children.”²⁶ UNITA has also used landmines to control and “effectively imprison populations” under its control by planting landmines around villages, according to Save the Children. In 1999 the rebels were reportedly paying infiltrators \$300 to plant mines in Luena.²⁷ UNITA has also increased use of antitank mines. For example, on 24 April 2000 thirty-eight people were killed on the Puri-Negage road (north Uige province) when the vehicle they were traveling in triggered an AT mine in all probability laid by UNITA.²⁸

UNITA rebels have conducted military operations in northern Namibia, including laying antipersonnel and antivehicle mines,²⁹ in response to Namibia granting permission in late 1999 for its territory to be used by Angolan government troops as a base for attacks on UNITA positions in southeastern Angola.³⁰ (See Landmine Monitor report on Namibia for more details on UNITA use in Namibia.)

Re-Mining of Cleared Land

In June 1999, NPA reported that some re-mining had occurred in Luena, Malanje, Huambo and Kuito. About 25% of the minefields previously cleared in Huambo and Kuito showed signs of re-mining. But HALO has said, “We’ve checked every single minefield we’ve cleared in six years (between 100 and 150) and none have been re-

²⁴ E-mail communication from NPA, 7 July 2000.

²⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Angola, 16 December 1999; information also provided by an NGO involved in mine clearance in Angola.

²⁶ Save the Children, *War Brought Us Here: protecting children displaced within their own countries by conflict*, (London: SCF-UK, May 2000) p. 37.

²⁷ *Reuters*, 26 November 1999.

²⁸ *Angop*, 24 April 2000. HALO Trust reports from its work in Huambo and Bie a dramatic increase in AT mines cleared from nineteen in 1998 to ninety-eight in 1999. By April 2000 they had cleared thirteen AT mines.

²⁹ “Angola’s UNITA Rebels Say They Will Go on Harassing Namibian Civilians,” *Republikein* (Namibian Newspaper), BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 February 2000.

³⁰ “Angola: New concerns as fighting rages along southern border,” *IRIN*, 22 December 1999; “Sergeant killed in UNITA attack,” *The Namibian*, 22 December 1999; “Civilian killings spark concern,” *The Namibian*, 22 December 1999; “Unita 80 percent destroyed, says Angolan army chief,” *The Namibian*, 21 December 1999; “Angolan fighting spread into Namibia,” *The Independent Online*, 20 December 1999.

mined. Cleared land has not been re-mined.”³¹ This may be the case in UNITA areas, too. When the government's military reached Bailundo in late 1999 they found no new minefields. HALO had cleared Bailundo in 1998 and UNITA, it appears, never re-mined. On the other hand, Santa Barbara has reported that UNITA re-mined one of the bridges it had cleared in 1999 for the World Food Program.³²

Landmine Problem

Long cited as one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, the early UN estimate of 10 to 15 million landmines contaminating Angolan soil is widely still cited. While no comprehensive landmine survey has been completed, estimates have been revised downward, with the 1998 U.S. State Department report stating, “The source of the original baseline data remains unknown and the actual number of landmines may never be determined, although six million appears to be a more reasonable figure.”³³

Through the end of May 2000, 2,610 mine or UXO fields had been identified, of which 517 had been cleared.³⁴ According to INAROOE Cuando Cubango, Moxico, Bie and Malanje provinces have very high density of UXOs and landmines; Bengo, Benguela and Cuanza Sul and Huambo have a high density; Lunda Sul, Cabinda, Cunene, Huila, Zaire, Uige and Cuanza Norte have a moderate density and Luanda, Namibe and Lunda Norte have a low density.³⁵ But these figures give little feel for the impact on communities.

Norwegian People's Aid has been contracted by the UN to conduct a nationwide survey of the landmine problem in the northern eleven provinces, the extent of damage, its consequences for local trade, and to map the existence of mines. By the end of 1998, NPA had completed an initial survey to identify mined or suspected mined areas in nine provinces, where about 80 percent of the population lives. By January 2000 fifteen provinces had been surveyed, thirteen by NPA and two by HALO. These surveys have not been fully comprehensive due to the war.

Mine Action Funding

Following the return to open conflict in November 1998, some donors became wary of continued funding of mine action in Angola, and some organizations carrying out mine action programs experienced reductions in funding.³⁶ It appeared some donors

³¹ Information provided by HALO Trust, 18 May 2000.

³² Email from Santa Barbara Director Norbert Rossa, 7 June 2000.

³³ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*, September 1998, p. 19. The report also notes that HALO Trust estimated the number to be 500,000 in 1997.

³⁴ “Programa Nacional De Acção Humanitária Contra As Minas Em Apoio A Reabilitação E Desenvolvimento Sócio Económico. Angola,” INAROOE & UNDP/UNOPS, March 2000. Updated figures provided by UNOPS Luanda, 21 June 2000.

³⁵ INAROOE website at: www.landmine.org/inarooe.

³⁶ The generally accepted notion that funding decreased significantly from 1998 to 1999 is incongruously not borne out by the reporting coming from donors. For the ten major donors reporting to the UNMAS Mine Action Investment Database, combined funding *increased* significantly from 1998 to 1999: from \$9 million to \$12.6 million. Two governments stopped contributing, Australia and Belgium (combined \$890,000 in 1998), but two governments also made contributions for the first time, Denmark and Ireland (combined \$1.516 million in 1999). The EU, U.S., Norway, and Canada all increased funding from 1998 to 1999; only Germany reported

were concerned because of a perception that there was large scale re-mining of previously cleared areas, making continued funding of mine clearance pointless, and because the Angola government was laying mines even though it had signed the Mine Ban Treaty. INAROOE has stated, "Donor concern about the renewed laying of landmines, as well as the Angolan government's reluctance to ratify the Ottawa Treaty, have made resource mobilization for mine action extremely difficult for all those who are trying to provide this assistance."³⁷

Five major mine action organizations (Handicap International, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Mine Clearance Planning Agency, and Norwegian People's Aid) issued a statement at the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance in March 2000 that in part said: "Donors must ensure that sanctions against governments that have violated the 1997 Landmine Convention do not affect the availability of funds for Humanitarian Mine Action.... We believe that funding for Humanitarian Mine Action should be based on the needs in affected areas, and not on the Landmines Convention status. Sanctions against the violators and encouragement of non state-parties must be designed in a way that does not further victimise the people and communities in mine and ordnance-affected areas."³⁸

Because of this situation, in 1999 and 2000 many NGOs felt pressure to cut costs while trying to remain operational. HALO Trust roughly maintained its funding flows although gaps had to be covered by an individual donation. NPA had to cut expatriate staff and suspend contracts in early 2000. MAG suspended a program with more than 300 personnel and re-entered with a smaller operation. MgM had to temporarily halt its operations during the first six months of 1999 and in May 2000 required a loan from an individual to remain operational. Care International and HMD had to suspend their operations. INAROOE has had to halt its operations altogether and lay off most of its staff. INAROOE had received funds from seven sources, the Angolan government, the U.S., the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Italy, and the EU.

Support for mine action in Angola in 1999 and 2000 came from the European Union, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States. Italy became a major donor in 1999 for the first time.³⁹ The EU, U.S., Norway and Sweden were the top donors to mine action in Angola in 1999; in 2000 it is the EU, the U.S. and Norway.

As noted in the chart below, support for mine action in 2000 has totaled \$17.4 million.

decreasing funds. The UK had not provided since 1995. Some donors to mine action in Angola have not reported to this database, including Sweden, Netherlands, Japan, and Italy. Mine Action Investment Database, accessed through UNMAS website on 28 July 2000. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/>.

³⁷ INAROOE website at: www.landmine.org/inarooe.

³⁸ Handicap International et al, "Funding for Humanitarian Mine Action must not be dependent on Landmines Convention status of mine-affected countries," March 2000.

³⁹ A number of operators have complained that Italy dictates what is cleared and does not provide funds for overhead.

ANGOLA MINE ACTION PROGRAM - Year 2000 -

Project & Implementing partners	Donors (Funding sources)	Budget (USD)	Funds available	Shortfall
Land Mine Survey & an assistance for secondment of National Database Capacity. Implemented by: NPA	NORAD (Norwegian Agency Development)	450,000	450,000	0
Manual Demining Group 1 Implemented by: NPA in Malange Province	SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency)	900,000	900,000	0
Manual Demining Group 2 Implemented by: NPA in Kuanza Norte Province	NORAD	900,000	900,000	0
Manual Demining Group 3 Implemented by: NPA in Southern Region	US Dept. of State	770,000	Negotiations in course	
Manual Demining Group 4 Implemented by: NPA in Moxico Province	US Dept. of State	500,000	500,000	
Mine Clearance Project implemented by: NPA	Italian Cooperation	240,358	240,358	0
Hoque 4(Huila)		235,904	235,904	0
Figueira (Huila)		60,282	60,282	0
Chibembo (Huila)				
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capacity Implemented by: NPA	DUTCH Government	250,000	Negotiations in course	
Mine Dog Capacity-Free Run & EVD	NORAD	600,000	600,000	0
Implemented by: NPA	SIDA	400,000	400,000	0
AARDVARK Mechanically Assisted Demining	NORAD	450,000	450,000	0
Implemented by: NPA	DUTCH Government	200,000	Negotiations in course	
HYDREMA Mechanically Assisted Demining	Danish Development Aid	790,000	Negotiations in course	79,000
Implemented by: NPA	US Dept. of State	800,000		
Manual & Mechanical Mine Clearance	European Union/ Commission of the European Community	1,200,000	1,200,000	0
Implemented by: The HALO Trust in Bié, Huambo and Benguela Provinces				
Humanitarian Mine Action Implemented by: Mine Advisory Group in Kunene Province	British Organization as “ National Lotteries Charity Board and The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund”	1,213,826	1,213,826	0
Bengo ANG001/N18	World Food	559,500	559,500	0

Project & Implementing partners	Donors (Funding sources)	Budget (USD)	Funds available 01.05.00	Shortfall
Emergency Rehabilitation, Medical Support, Development Preparation in Support of Food Security and Road Access Programs Implemented by MgM in Bengo Province	Program DUTCH Government GERMAN Government		100,000	
Kunene 00 03 EU Emergency Rehabilitation, Medical Support, Development Preparation in Support of food security and road access programs To be implemented by MgM in Kunene Province	US Dept. of State	569,778	687,000	0
Training of a Demining Brigade and Mine Clearance Activities Implemented by: INTERSOS in Huila Province (18 months)	European Union/ Commission of the European Community	1,700,000	1,700,000	0
CARE (CAMRI Project) in Kuito Province	European Union/Com. Of EC CARE U.S.	630,000 40,000	630,000 40,000	0 0
Mine Clearance Operation Implemented by: Santa Barbara Foundation in Huila Province (Hoque 3)	Italian Co-operation Santa Barbara's Funds	158,211 240,815	 399,026	0
Road Rehabilitation and Mine Clearance Project Implemented by: Santa Barbara Foundation in Huila Province	Santa Barbara's Funds	219,104	219,104	0

Project & Implementing partners	Donors (Funding sources)	Budget (USD)	Funds available 01.05.00	Shortfall
Mine Awareness and Clearance Implemented by: HMD in Lunda- Sul Province	To be defined	388,094	0	388,094
Future Mine Action Project to be Financed by European Union/Commission of the European Community (Funds currently available)	European Union/Commission of the European Community		± 1,500,000	
US-funded Demining Equipment	U.S. Dept of Sate	Neg. in course	912,000	
US-funded Mine Awareness Activities (World Vision – Africare)	U.S. Dept of Sate		1,000,000	
Mine Awareness in Kwanza Sul, Benguela, Huambo, Bie. Implemented by HIF	Italian Government	68,948	68,948	0
Balance from Italian Gov. Contrib. Through VTF(UNMAS)			181,052	
Available for selected projects (Huila or Bengo)	Italian Cooperation		250,000	0
TOTAL		14,534,820	17,417,000	1,178,094

UN agencies have also helped. World Food Program has supported mechanically-assisted demining of secondary and tertiary roads in Bengo province by MgM and bridge and road clearance in the south by Santa Barbara Foundation. WFP has also provided support to HALO Trust (supply of two mine protected vehicles) and NPA, as well as some food-for-work support for road clearing by INAROE brigades.

Because of the tight nature of funding in 1999 and 2000, foundations and individual donations have played an important role in enabling mine clearance operations to continue. These include: Anti-Landmijn Stichting, Brot fur die Wit, Comic Relief, Christian Aid, Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, Misereor, National Lottery Charities Board, Johanniter International, Action Medeor, and the German Association of the Economy. A British book publisher, a German rock band, and a British journalist have also provided bridging funds to keep a number of clearance projects operational.

Mine Clearance

Through the end of May 2000, 2,610 mine or UXO fields had been identified, of which 517 were cleared (20 percent of the total). A total area of ten million square

meters of land and some 5,000 kilometers of main roads had been cleared.⁴⁰ Some 15,000 mines have been cleared and 300,000 UXOs have been cleared since 1995.⁴¹

INAROE

In 1995, the Angolan government established its own mine action office, INAROE. By 1998, INAROE was operating with seven demining brigades. INAROE was supposed to do four things: logistics, the Escola Technico Angola Desminagem (ETAM) demining training school, quality assurance and coordination of mine action.

When the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) withdrew in January 1999, its support of INAROE was terminated, and INAROE and UNDP/UNOPS started developing a contingency plan. In March 1999, a further review of the UN Mine Action Program in Angola was conducted, with the participation of representatives of the Angolan government, INAROE, UNDP and UNOPS, and donors.⁴² The main conclusions were that INAROE should concentrate on its original mandate of coordination rather than direct involvement in clearance operations, and that its demining brigades should be handed over and managed by independent operators, such as NGOs.

INAROE had its budget cut back in 1999 following renewed fighting.⁴³ At its headquarters, the expatriate staff has been reduced from eighteen (twelve in the main program and six in the training school) to two (a UNDP/UNOPS-funded program manager and support for the data base funded by NPA).

INAROE had demining brigades in the field in Bie, Huambo, Uige, Cuando Cubango, Huila and Moxico provinces. In January 1999 all the brigade operations were suspended because UN funding dried up⁴⁴ although these forty-man brigades are theoretically still intact. Its regional offices also have only skeleton staff left and \$6 million in demining assets remain idle at the ETAM logistics base in Viana.⁴⁵ According to its director Helder Cruz many of the brigade members will find work with the NGOs.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ "Programa Nacional De Acção Humanitária Contra As Minas Em Apoio A Reabilitação E Desenvolvimento Sócio Económico. Angola," INAROE & UNDP/UNOPS, March 2000. Updated figures provided by UNOPS Luanda, 21 June 2000.

⁴¹ These UNOPS figures are contradicted by INAROE's web site, which states that 2.4 square kilometers of high priority areas and 4,429 km of road had been cleared, removing 17,000 landmines, and that 6,000 minefields have been identified since 1995.

⁴² "Programa Nacional De Acção Humanitária Contra As Minas Em Apoio A Reabilitação E Desenvolvimento Sócio Económico. Angola," INAROE & UNDP/UNOPS, March 2000.

⁴³ In 1999 UNDP sought to raise \$1.2 million for INAROE.

⁴⁴ Helder Cruz blamed UNOPS for this, saying that between 1997 and 1999 UNOPS took equipment back from the provinces, stopping his brigades from working. Interview, Luanda, 16 May 2000.

⁴⁵ Helder Cruz, "Mine Clearance in Conflict Zones," paper presented at *The Road Forward: Humanitarian Mine Clearance in Southern Africa* conference, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 7-8 June 2000.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* The handing over of responsibility for humanitarian demining to the NGOs was announced by Gen. Cruz on 22 June 2000. See, *Jornal de Angola*, 23 June 2000.

This has caused problems for the NGOs because the standards of many of the INAROE deminers has been low, raising further concerns about what purpose the ETAM school will serve.

The general view is that INAROE's brigades were not very productive at demining because of poor logistics and the quality of expatriate advisors contracted by the UN. However, it does have a future as a coordinating office for the operators in the field although coordination is currently weak, with no meeting of mine operators taking place since November 1999.⁴⁷

NPA has taken one brigade and INTERSOS has raised funds to operate another. HALO offered to employ 20-25 ex-INAROE deminers, but INAROE refused saying HALO could take all or none of their fifty-seven staff. HALO could not do this and therefore recruited from outside of INAROE.

UNDP has tried to fundraise for INAROE. In November 1999, it urged donors to provide funding for INAROE arguing that it was better to keep it operational than dismantle it and recreate it post-conflict. UNDP also argued that Angola needs a national planning and coordination entity such as INAROE for mine action. It has also stated, "For better or worse, INAROE remains the single most vocal and effective advocate for adherence to the Ottawa Convention within the Government of Angola. To dismantle it completely would be 'throwing out the baby with the bathwater.'"⁴⁸

UNDP has applied for continued funding of \$1 million for INAROE in 2000 and has submitted two separate but smaller applications for further development of the mine action data base and the refurbishment of INAROE's vehicle fleet. INAROE's Director Helder Cruz presented a demining plan for 2000, requesting \$13 million from donors at a conference organized by the UNDP in Geneva on 20 March 2000.⁴⁹

Helder Cruz hopes that although INAROE will not be an operator, it will be a coordinator and trainer of deminers through the ETAM. Cruz hopes that plans to decentralize by setting up regional and national boards to coordinate and assess priorities for mine clearance will attract donor support.⁵⁰ Some funds have been received by INAROE, but have mainly gone to NPA for taking over a brigade.

INAROE is waiting for \$4.5 million to come through from the Angolan government. In March, it presented the Minister for Social Assistance Albino Malungo with a document covering its needs/funds. It is now Malungo's responsibility to present this document to the Council of Ministers. However, the Council has not put demining or INAROE on its agenda since the document arrived in Malungo's hands. The money from the government is urgently needed to rehabilitate the training school, ETAM, which Helder Cruz describes as "the basis of all our work," and to create an independent brigade mechanism to demine areas such as the Benguela railway. INAROE did receive \$400,000 from the government, which has already been spent on payment of debts and hospital bills.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Correct as of mid-June 2000.

⁴⁸ UNDP, "Mine Action Update, Country and Global Programs," 17 November 1999.

⁴⁹ *Angola News*, no.66, March 2000.

⁵⁰ Helder Cruz, "Mine Clearance in Conflict Zones," 7-8 June 2000.

⁵¹ In the past the government has been worse, in 1997, 1998 and 1999 the government did not appear to support INAROE.

The Angolan military is also active in demining operations in conflict zones or areas recently retaken from UNITA control. For example at UNITA's former strong hold of Jamba in Cuando Cubango province, military sappers have been clearing mines but with casualties. A number of these have been hospitalized in Namibia.⁵² INAROE has also indicated its desire to also coordinate the Military Engineering Units of the Angolan Army to carry out humanitarian mine clearance.⁵³ However, incidents such as at Sangondo, Luena where the Engineering Unit missed mines and declared the area safe, resulting in civilian casualties, raises a question as to whether the military has the skills to demine to humanitarian standards.

INAROE-based GIS Landmine Database: The database continues to exist and is useful. Every minefield surveyed in Angola goes onto the database. Every time an operator completes a task or survey or discredits a task, a full report is sent to INAROE. It also maintains information on the humanitarian priority of each minefield, coded between one and five in terms of importance/desperation. Priorities do change, for example in Kuito, when IDPs moved closer into land contaminated by mines laid in the 1980s or during the 1992-1994 war. The database can generate maps on a scale of 1:1,000,000 in digital form for all of Angola and also contains geo-referenced information on minefields, mine clearance, mine awareness programs, and mine accidents.

Commercial Demining

During 1999 and 2000 there has been little commercial demining activity in the country. The only commercial firm active is the South African firm BRZ International Ltd, which operates in Angola through Saracen Angola Lda. and in a joint venture with an Angolan commercial demining company, Mamboji Lda.⁵⁴ BRZ International reports that in 1999 it conducted clearance and de-bushing work at Soyo for FINA Petroleos de Angola.⁵⁵

NGO Mine Action Initiatives

The latest conflict resulted in mine action efforts being shifted and adjusted to directly support and integrate into the overall humanitarian emergency relief efforts. This was very evident in the major war zones around provincial capitals such as Malanje, Huambo and Kuito. The priority changed from area clearance to surveying for mines and UXO, awareness building among IDPs and resident populations, elimination of mines and UXO, and finally area clearance.

⁵² South African Press Association (SAPA), 9 June 2000.

⁵³ Helder Cruz, "Mine Clearance in Conflict Zones," 7-8 June 2000.

⁵⁴ Saracen was originally linked to the private military company Executive Outcomes, which announced it had disbanded on 1 January 1999.

⁵⁵ BRZ International, "Humanitarian Mine Clearance Profile," *Document: BRZ 302; Doc Edition: B*, p. 14.

Norwegian People's Aid: NPA's demining operation remains the largest in Angola. Like HALO Trust, in January 1995, NPA obtained a government permit to clear mines. It suffered significant reduction in donor support in 1999 as it became difficult to convince donors to keep the funds flowing.⁵⁶ In 1999, its funds from Norway dropped by ten percent, from Denmark by forty percent, from the Netherlands by half, and Australia pulled out completely. Overall support has dropped to about fifty percent of its 1998 funding level. NPA has tried to maintain its total workforce of some 700 Angolans and twenty expatriate staff and avoid lay-offs.

NPA's main role is to open up roads and bridges and to facilitate IDPs settling into agricultural areas and in camps. Between June 1999 and March 2000, it cleared 3,127,349 square meters of land. In this period, 219 AP mines, fifteen AT mines, and 101,179 UXO were found and destroyed. NPA sent a survey team into Malanje city on 4 May 1999 and established a presence until November 1999 when the deminers returned. The NPA team removed eighty-nine UXO resulting from five months (January to May 1999) of UNITA shelling.⁵⁷

Highlights of NPA demining/mine action operations during 1999 are:

- doubling the area cleared in Angola through consolidation of resources in the South (Huila, Benguela and Cunene provinces);
- temporary shifting of demining programs from areas of conflict, most notably from Malanje to Ndalatando/Dondo in January 1999;
- stopping the systematic Level 1 Survey short of completing the three remaining provinces (Moxico, Lunda Norte and Cuando Cubango) and redeploying the teams nationwide to monitor and assess recent mine accidents and record information of newly reported minefields.

In 2000, its mine action program consists of six different projects. They are:

- *The Manual Demining Project:* Three manual groups, with a total of 300 manual deminers, deployed in the Malanje, Kwanza Norte⁵⁸ and Huila provinces;
- *The Mechanical Verification and Mine Clearance Project:* Two Hydrema and three Aardvark mine clearance machines for verification, area reduction and mine clearance tasks, currently in Namibe province (on the border with Huila, doing road clearance for IDPs). In Cunene NPA is working on road clearance and on some small minefields;
- *The Mine Detecting Dog Project:* Explosive vapor detecting dogs utilized for verification of air samples collected in suspected mine contaminated areas by sampling teams, and free running and UXO detecting dogs;

⁵⁶ Norwegian People's Aid website at: www.angola.npaid.org; interview with Harvad Hosknes, Luanda, 5 June 2000.

⁵⁷ Up to twenty shells per day had been coming into Malanje, and some 10 percent of these did not explode on impact. In the period May to October, the NPA survey team deactivated 114 UXOs.

⁵⁸ Kristian Berg Harpviken, "A community Study of Landmines and Humanitarian Demining: Cassua, Kwanza Norte, Angola," Landmine Memo no.7, International Peace Research Institute, March 2000.

- *The EOD/BAC Project:* EOD and battle area clearance teams deployed for the removal and disposal of UXO;
- *The Landmine Survey Project and Database Collection:* The collection, analysis, management and dissemination of mine and mine-related information for the effective coordination and organization of a coherent humanitarian mine action program; and
- *The Mine Awareness Project:* Mine awareness campaigns for the local population and communities about the danger of mines and UXOs.

NPA pulled out of Uige on 28 May 2000 because of security worries but may return. On 1 May 2000, NPA received funding to work in Moxico province,⁵⁹ where it set up an office and opened a training center. It will take on an INAROEI brigade, some seventy people from INAROEI and MAG, who will be given a refresher course and the best people selected to work with NPA.

As noted above, NPA suffered significant reductions in donor support in 1999, but lay-offs were avoided by halving the number of expatriate advisors and putting the remainder in low-cost accommodation. Recent cash flow problems were dealt with by suspending contracts temporarily (January to March 2000).⁶⁰

NPA's funders over the last two years include: Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) in 1999 and 2000 -- \$2 million; the U.S. State Department from May 2000 to May 2001 -- approximately \$2 million; USAID from October 1998 to January 2000 -- \$2.2 million; Swedish National Development Agency from January to December 2000 -- \$1.1 million; the Netherlands in 1999 --\$592,000, and in 2000 -- \$437,853; Italy in 2000 --\$536,544; and Denmark, which in 1999 supported costs of running two mechanical mine clearance machines.

Mines Advisory Group (MAG): British-based MAG's presence dates back to mid-1992 with the start of a mine awareness poster campaign. It began mine clearance operations in April 1994 in Moxico province. MAG was forced to suspend operations in Moxico in mid-1998 and withdrew most staff from that province in August 1998. At the request of INAROEI, MAG established in January 1998 an operations base in Ondjiva, Cunene province in the south of the country following an assessment mission in November 1998. This mission confirmed the need for mine action in the province. MAG recruited and trained local personnel, with the help of its National Training Team (NTT) brought from the suspended Moxico operation. MAG's first two mine action teams were deployed in April 1999, followed by two more in September 1998.

MAG is working in close partnership with other NGOs and government bodies. It has established a "Sub-committee for Demining" involving local authorities, police, the provincial governmental humanitarian agency, MINARS (Ministry of Social Affairs and Rehabilitation), the Army and NGOs to coordinate mine action and development within the province. MAG has also been working closely with AICH, a Spanish NGO involved in the rehabilitation of water wells across the province. It has cleared well access, and existing and new well sites.

⁵⁹ Angop, 16 May 2000.

⁶⁰ Interview with Harvad Hosknes, Luanda, 5 June 2000.

There is also a relationship with the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), which currently runs a mine awareness program in the province. IFRC staff pass all reports of mines and UXOs to MAG, which then deals with them and reports back to the IFRC the actions taken in response to the report. This positive action creates community confidence and leads to further information. During 1999 the program trained four mine action teams and has developed them to the point that they can deploy and manage themselves on a daily basis. In 2000 MAG will further upgrade the NTT's technical and managerial skills in preparation for handing over the ownership of the program. Due to the large number of mine and UXO tasks being reported and undertaken by the teams, MAG is reevaluating (upwards) the community need in the province in response to requests from INAROE and from the local authorities in Luena, Moxico province. MAG is looking to re-start its suspended operations based in Luena initially. MAG is seeking funding to support the mine action element of an integrated post-conflict rehabilitation project underway in the town involving medico international, VVAF and the Trauma Care Foundation.

In 1999 MAG received \$1.21 million from the Anti-Landmijn Stichting, Brot fur die Welt, Comic Relief, Christian Aid, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, Misereor and the National Lottery Charities Board. In 2000 (Jan.-Dec.) support is less, \$992,250 of which \$549,000 is from the National Lotteries Charities Board, \$54,000 from the Anti-Landmijn Stichting, \$287,000 from Brot fur die WELT and Misereor, and \$116,250 from the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund. No funds are yet secured for 2001 and MAG is very concerned, as are other agencies, that the level of funding support currently available from the international community is no way commensurate to the acute need of the affected populations.

HALO Trust: The British NGO HALO Trust began operating in Angola in late 1994. In January 1995, the government through the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Cooperation issued a permit to HALO for demining operations in Bie, Benguela and Huambo provinces.

HALO is currently operating in Huambo and Bie provinces, and in spite of the fluctuating security situation, it remained operational throughout 1999. Just prior to the onset of renewed fighting, HALO withdrew its expatriate monitoring staff, but the deminers continued working under local supervision and continued to report their progress by radio. This continued until government forces attacked Bailundo and the equipment was lost. HALO has shifted its demining efforts to support humanitarian organizations and their efforts to resettle IDPs. In the period January to November 1999, 414 AP mines, 96 AT mines, 1,254 items of UXO and 1,731 items of stray ammunition were destroyed. In 1999 HALO reduced the size of its demining teams in Kuito and Huambo and shifted that capacity to safer areas around Cubal. At the same time, it continued to demine, clearing mines around two bridges, a power transmission line and an agricultural area, all within the Huambo-Caala corridor.

At the request of the provincial government of Huambo, demining efforts were suspended between 3 March and August 1999; in November 1999, the provincial governor gave HALO his permission to operate anywhere in the province. On 18 November 1999, the government also handed over thirty-four AP mines to HALO to destroy and on 25 and 26 November sixty-seven AT mines they had cleared in the Vila

Nova area.⁶¹ Since November 1999 HALO has started work on opening up some routes to survey villages further away from Huambo, working with MSF, ICRC and ADPP. In April 2000, it started demining in Caala, clearing 164 landmines that month in Muangunja suburb in an area of 935 square meters.⁶² However, it is unable to demine in any municipalities forty kilometers beyond Huambo because of poor security. Three of its staff were killed and three injured when three of its vehicles were ambushed on Quilengues-Vhongoroi road, Huila, on 24 January 2000.⁶³ HALO asked to work in Andulo but government forces refused them permission on the grounds that they could not guarantee security.

In Kuito, HALO has been working close to Kuito and Kunje (within the perimeter) because of the security situation. Between January and November 1999, the HALO team removed nearly 1,000 UXO, seventeen AT mines and nineteen AP mines. Four teams are operational using manual and mechanical methods. At a request of the provincial government, demining activities were suspended from 3 March 1999 to 24 May 1999. In July HALO voiced its concern to the Angolan press about the increased number of mine accidents in the province.⁶⁴ HALO also initiated mine awareness efforts during 1999, making appearances at 174 different localities and reaching a total of 40,000 people during this period.

HALO currently has 300 staff (three of which are expatriates), and its funding comes mainly from the U.S. government and the EU. From 1 June 1999 through 9 September 1999, the EU gave HALO approximately \$400,000, followed by a \$1.12 million funding contract from 1 January 2000. The EU has just asked HALO for another proposal for December 2000 to May 2001, and it has submitted one for \$600,000. From 1 October 1999 to 31 December 1999, another \$120,000 came from the Dutch Anti-Landmijn Stichting, which helped bridge a funding gap.

In May 2000, the U.S. Department of Defense provided HALO with \$400,000 for six months work, permitting an expansion of fifty people, of which thirty were recruited in April. All operators in Angola have been asked by the U.S. to put in bids for funding which will total \$3-4 million. HALO has submitted a proposal for \$1.1 million. The Japanese government paid for two land rovers, with a one-time grant of \$82,412 in July 1999.⁶⁵

Care International: Care International funded Greenfield Consultants,⁶⁶ a commercial firm based in the UK, to field two clearance teams in Cuando Cubango

⁶¹ HALO was dealing with junior troops during this period and believes that this "good behavior" was a result of over-optimism that the war was over.

⁶² *Angop*, 16 May 2000.

⁶³ WFP Report No. 04 of 2000, 27 January 2000.

⁶⁴ *Angop*, 9 July 1999.

⁶⁵ *Jornal de Angola*, 15 July 1999.

⁶⁶ Greenfields was taken over by a German commercial firm in 1999 and renamed European Landmine Solutions. They claim that since 1995 they have released over 6,000 hectares of land and cleared more than 3,000 mines and 70,000 major items ordnance. When Human Rights Watch contacted ELS, Rody Skidmore on 15 May 2000 refused to even acknowledge that Care had been their client although this information is posted on the Care and INAROEE web sites.

province, and carry out mine awareness programs in Bie, Cunene, Huila and Cuando Cubango provinces. These teams were deployed in December 1995. Care terminated its mine-related work in Bie province in mid-March 1999 because of the increased fighting between the government and UNITA and because it ran out of funds. Between February 1998 and June 1999, the project had been supported with a \$1.1 million grant from the EU as well as \$15,000 from the British-based Rowan Trust and \$39,658 from TRAIID. This Care Mine Related Interventions Project (CAMRI I) had a twenty-one person mine action team working to clear and dispose of mines and explosives. This project destroyed or clearly marked more than 100 mines.⁶⁷

Care's teams have also trained almost 5,000 people in mine awareness and have assessed four campsites and surrounding agricultural land for temporary but safe resettlement of internally displaced persons. Care has requested funds in 2000 for a nine-month follow up CAMARI II project from the European Commission's DG Dev and a team from European Landmine Solutions visited Angola in June on an assessment mission.

Menschen gegen Minen (MgM): MgM, a German-based NGO, became operational in Angola in 1996 when it was awarded a contract from the World Food Program to clear roads for the internally displaced in Caxito, Bengo province. Since July 1999, it has cleared fifty-eight hectares of mined land in Libongo, Bengo province. The project for 1999 was called Bengo X and was dedicated to unfinished clearance from the Bengo VIII work and clearance of Dembos District and the village of return for people from Cambambe 2.

Due to the security situation in these areas, MgM relocated to the Libongo area and completed the clearance of a minefield that Save the Children Fund (USA) had started but had abandoned after a serious accident, which resulted in the closing of the program. Other mined areas were also cleared. During this operation MgM cleared sixty-one AP mines, nine AT mines and 900 pieces of unexploded ordnance. The bulk of the work was carried out along seventy kilometers of road, equal to fifty-six hectares; the remaining two hectares were mined fields. MgM estimates that it has opened up 3,000 hectares of farming land, which allowed some 56,000 internally displaced persons return home to Nambuanguo in early 2000.⁶⁸

MgM also hopes to operate in Dembos, in the eastern Bengo province or Cuanza Sul (depending on which map you look at). They are waiting for the go-ahead from the military. The governor appears to support the program but the military is against it. Dembos is still an area of conflict and some 28,000 IDPs are waiting to go home, presently in IDP camps just outside Caxito. There are also plans for work in Ambriz, Nambuanguo and Caxito and long-term plans for work in Moxico, Uige, and Cuando Cubango provinces.

⁶⁷ Care website at: www.care/.../land_mines/lm_landmines0903.html, "Land Mines Continue to Threaten the Life and Limbs of the People of Angola," 3 September 1999. However, data provided by Care in a 30 June 2000 e-mail to the Landmine Monitor states that thirty-two mines were found and destroyed in this project and that 3,906.5 sq.m. of land was cleared.

⁶⁸ MgM website at: www.MgM.org; interview with MgM project manager Kenneth O'Connell, Luanda, May 2000.

MgM is preparing to work in Cunene province and a base camp and workshop are ready.⁶⁹ The job is to open feeder roads to Cuando Cubango and at a later stage, into Moxico province. MgM has roughly doubled its mechanical assets over the past year, employs eighty Angolans and operates seven dogs.

In 1999, it received \$1,780,000 from donors and in 2000, \$1,246,000. The funds have come from the Dutch, German, and U.S. governments; Johanniter International; Action Medeor; and from individuals.

Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara is also a German-based mine clearance organization. Like MgM, it became operational in Angola in late 1996. In 1999 it obtained a contract with SBF and the Swedish NGO Swed Relief to clear mines from twenty-five kilometers of roads and around four bridges in Huila province. It also cleared road sections and bridge areas in the rehabilitation of a major road between Matala (Huila province) and Menongue (Cuando Cubango province). Due to the changing security situation the work has shifted to Cunene province. This specific project was funded by \$450,000. In 1999, it also received \$1.21 million from the German Association of the Economy, the German government and the Swedish government for clearance work that resulted in 10,000 square meters of farmland near Lubango being cleared during which twenty-five AP mines, thirteen AT mines and 123 UXO were cleared.

Santa Barbara continues to maintain an operational base in Xangongo and is working in Huila at Hoque, and Cunene near Xangongo on micro projects with \$350,000 in funding from the Italian government and from the German Association of the Economy. By mid-June 2000, they had cleared seventeen AP mines and nine UXOs. It uses detectors, a vegetation cutter, and a Wolf demining vehicle in its clearance operations.⁷⁰

Humanitarian Medical Development Response (HMD): HMD, an Irish/British organization, started operations in 1998 rehabilitating a hospital in Saurimo as part of a three-year \$468,000 co-funded project, with \$220,500 from an individual donor. HMD wanted to reduce the number of patients by branching into mine action (survey and mine awareness work). A second twelve-month mine clearance project by HMD ended in August 1999 after funding ran out. HMD had sent forty local deminers for training in mine clearance at the ETAM in October 1998 and then they cleared mines and UXO in the Saurimo area when they obtained reports from local people. This project was funded by a 200,000 Euro grant from the EU Food Security Program and \$187,000 from an individual donation.⁷¹

⁶⁹ MgM on 30 May 2000 announced on the MgM Deming Network that it would distribute a Spanish version of the DC Comic "Superman" in Cunene to test its suitability as a mine awareness tool. Member organizations of the ICBL e-mailed MgM on 1 June 2000 questioning the cultural suitability of this comic.

⁷⁰ Santa Barbara website at: www.stiftung-sankt-barbara.de; email from Santa Barbara manager Norbert Rossa, 6 June 2000.

⁷¹ HMD website at: www.hmdresponse.org/Programs/angola.html; interview with program manager Kate Stanley, London, 7 June 2000.

INTERSOS: An Italian NGO, provided experts from its Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU) who operated in 1997/98 as supervisors of a UNAVEM III/UNDP project clearing mined territory in Cuando Cubango with the 7th Demining Brigade of INAROE. In November 1999 an eighteen-month demining project started in Lubango, Huila province, aimed at supporting IDPs. The project is funded by the EU and the Italian government. INTERSOS is taking over an INAROE brigade to do this work.⁷²

Demira: A German NGO that worked on the Cunene river bringing water in from Namibia but finished operating in Angola in August 1999. Demira never engaged in formal mine clearance although it cleared a few mines from roads that it operated on.

Mine Awareness

Since 1995, 1.8 million people in fifteen of the country's eighteen provinces have participated in mine awareness programs. There has been a significant increase in the need for mine awareness in 1999 and 2000 due to the resumption of the war and the large number of IDPs on the move within Angola. Moving populations are often exposed to unfamiliar areas and the marking of mine sites and mine awareness programs in IDP camps can reduce accidents in such areas.

UNICEF has used the Programa de Educação e Prevenção de Accidentes de Minas (PEPAM) as its mine awareness program. UNICEF/PEPAM has worked through INAROE (capacity building and salary support), with INAROE mine awareness NGO partners (World Vision, Handicap International, CARE, MAG, Medico International, and the IFRC in Cunene province) and various other NGOs.⁷³ It also supports the Palanca Negra mine awareness theater group in Malanje. It has also been instrumental in developing a standardized mine accident registration system which has been integrated into INAROE's landmine database.

A UNICEF-sponsored school mine awareness project runs in eleven provinces and has reached 224 schools and 1,900 teachers. It also worked with CIET International on "mine smartness" surveys with CIDA/DHA support. UNICEF has also subsidized INAROE's remaining provincial coordinators (after INAROE brigades were dissolved in April 1999) through salary support, who now have a coordination function to gather accident data and monitor local mine awareness projects.

World Vision in Malanje has been the principle provider of mine awareness services to both IDPs and resident populations. They continued through 1999 despite frequent UNITA shelling. However, their financial support dwindled in 1999, so that three of their six mine awareness instructors had to leave. In the period February to September 1999 (the period of heaviest fighting) they reached 11,379 persons.⁷⁴ In September 1999, World Vision requested to expand their work outside Malanje city in

⁷² INTERSOS website at: www.intersos.org. The project has received funding for two phases, \$936,000 from EU-DG Dev followed by a second phase of \$655,000 funded jointly by EU-DG Dev and the Italian government.

⁷³ GAC in Huambo and Kuito, Clube de Jovens in Huila province, Trindade Ninho de Infância in Bengo province and Grupo Julu nationwide.

⁷⁴ This included 2,016 men, 2,551 women, and 6,812 children, over fifty per cent during relative peace and proportionately more children.

order to pave the way for relocation of IDPs, but the government police did not approve the request for security reasons.⁷⁵ World Vision, jointly with Africare, was awarded \$1 million from the U.S. Department of State for mine awareness activities in 2000.

In Huambo and Kuito, GAC (Grupo de Apoio e Criança) is the largest mine awareness NGO. GAC mine awareness work continued throughout 1999 in Huambo, except for the days of heavy shelling. They have twelve instructors (two teams of six) in Huambo and an equal number in Kuito. In November 1999 they estimated that they reached a total of 3,521 people (1,843 children, 423 youths, 738 women and 517 men).⁷⁶

Supported by UNICEF, INAROOE, GAC, and the Ministry of Education, Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo (ADPP) runs a teacher training program in Huambo, which in 1999 for the first time included a week-long module on mine awareness for all future teachers. The ICRC has also been active on the Planalto. Between January and September 1999, the ICRC conducted fifty-eight mine awareness sessions for 2,913 primary school pupils in the Planalto region.⁷⁷ UNICEF mine awareness sessions also reached 2,212 students and 142 teachers in four schools, and 1,100 people in three churches in the same region.

The IFRC runs a mine awareness program based in Benguela. The program conducts training courses for volunteer instructors and a course for twenty-five teachers in support of the Ministry of Education initiative to introduce mine awareness into the school curriculum. It is anticipated that the teachers will train 1,125 students in 2000. IFRC also works with MAG and NPA.

In 1999, NPA has continued to carry out monitoring and supervising of the mine awareness programs carried out by Medico International in Moxico province, UNICEF and the Danish Refugee Council.⁷⁸ Although NPA has reduced its operational role in mine awareness in Angola, the organization has the skills and capacity to train mine awareness instructors and design projects for other organizations. Therefore, NPA has through its partnership with other organizations played a key role in what has been by far the largest mine awareness initiative in Angola.⁷⁹

INAROOE has been involved in nominal mine awareness work. It has also facilitated landmine committees in locations affected by minefields such as Huambo's three committees in Bairro Fatima, two in Cainhe, two in Santo Antonio.⁸⁰ Handicap

⁷⁵ Information provided by IDRC in May 2000. They are funding a survey of the humanitarian impact of mine action during conflict in Angola by the Angola-Instituto de Pesquisas (AIP). AIP will also produce a study, "A Preliminary Evaluation of Mine Clearance in Angola 1992 - 1999."

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ International Committee of the Red Cross, "Fact Sheet: ICRC in Angola," 26 January 2000.

⁷⁸ Medico International on 24 March 2000 wrote to the provincial authorities it was closing its mine awareness program due to lack of funds. Medico hopes to raise funds for further work in a joint application with MAG. See, www.medico.de, and, *Angola: Annäherungen. Das gemeinwesenorientierte Rehabilitationzentrum von Luena*, (Frankfurt: Medico International, no date).

⁷⁹ NPA website at: www.angola.npaid.org.

⁸⁰ Information provided by ICRC, May 2000.

International (France) has also engaged in mine awareness work in six provinces with INAROE, supporting radio programs and working directly in IDP camps.⁸¹

Landmine Casualties

Angola has one of the highest rates of landmine injuries per capita in the world. Out of a population of about nine million, it has tens of thousands of amputees, the great majority of them injured by landmines. The government claims that there are 90,000 amputees in the country although the more widely used figure is 70,000. However, in general an estimated one in every 415 Angolans has a mine-related injury, and the proportion of child casualties ranged from 41 percent to 76 percent in the heavily mined provinces of Moxico, Huila, Bie and Huambo.

A total of 1,004 mine and UXO casualties are officially registered by INAROE for the period mid-1998 to January 2000, but the real figure is much higher.⁸² The number of AP landmine accidents registered by INAROE went up sharply in 1999: in 1998, ninety-five mine accidents were registered; in 1999 there were 486 mine accidents; from January to March 2000 there were twenty-nine mine accidents.⁸³

The situation in Luena is instructive. The number of victims in Luena was 83 in 1995, and dropped to 32 in 1996, but jumped to 103 in 1998 and rose to at least 185 in 1999 because of the renewed hostilities.⁸⁴ According to the Jesuit Refugee Service, between January and October 1999 in Luena there were 105 mine victims from sixty-eight AP accidents.⁸⁵ INAROE reports that in October 1999 there were twenty-nine mine victims from eighteen mine accidents around Luena. In November 1999 there were twenty-nine victims from fourteen mine incidents.

The situation in Luena was not helped by the local representative of the Ministry of Social Assistance declaring that a field in Sangondo suburb was fit for settlement by IDPs. On 2 March 2000 a woman lost her sight after touching a mine and two more mines and twenty-four pieces of UXOs were discovered and destroyed. A month later a woman and man were killed by a reinforced antipersonnel mine.

For over a month, a number of NGOs operating in Luena had contacted the Ministry of Social Assistance to voice their concern about the dangers of resettlement on Sangondo but were ignored. Finally they sent an open letter complaining about this situation to the Provincial Governor and copied it to the Minister of Social Assistance Albino Malungu in Luanda.⁸⁶ The crisis was only resolved when the Minister intervened and a meeting was held on 7 April at which it was agreed that the armed forces would need to clear the mines prior to continued settlement.⁸⁷

⁸¹ "Note Program Handicap International – section France Angola," 15 June 2000. This project is funded by the Italian government (see table above).

⁸² "Programa Nacional De Acção Humanitária Contra As Minas Em Apoio A Reabilitação E Desenvolvimento Sócio Económico, Angola," INAROE & UNDP/UNOPS, March 2000.

⁸³ *Ibid.* This is not only due to renewed war but also a reflection of better reporting systems at INAROE.

⁸⁴ *Reuters*, 26 November, 1999.

⁸⁵ List of victims provided by the Jesuit Refugee Service, 14 April 2000.

⁸⁶ "Assunto: Novo campo de Sangondo," Luena, 4 April 2000.

⁸⁷ Governo da Provincia do Moxico, "Conclusoes Finais," Luena, 7 April 2000.

Luena was not alone in seeing new mine victims. In and around the periphery of Malanje city, 184 mine accidents occurred in the period January-November 1999. While in Andulo, UNITA's former headquarters but under government control since October 1999, up to ten landmine incidents, mostly resulting in death or amputations, were reported every week.⁸⁸ According to INAROOE, twenty people have died and fourteen others have been seriously injured in eastern Moxico province between January and May 2000.⁸⁹

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Care and rehabilitation of FAA soldiers is the responsibility of the Serviço de Ajuda Medica-Militar (SAMM) of FAA. Civilian victim assistance in Angola consists mostly of physical rehabilitation provided by several international NGOs, but the provision of rehabilitation services outside Luanda has also been significantly affected by the renewed war in Angola.

The ICRC runs an orthopedic center at Bombo Alto, near Huambo and a new center in Kuito. The Swedish Red Cross had run an orthopedic center at Neves Bendinha, but responsibility for this center was taken over in February 1999 by the ICRC and it became fully operational in August. The ICRC reports that its orthopedic activities have been reduced because of security problems. Similarly, the transportation of amputees from other provinces to the orthopedic centers had been suspended in 1999 although this program resumed in January 2000. In 1999 the ICRC treated 1,547 patients in its three centers. Of these, 1,237 were victims of antipersonnel mines.⁹⁰ The ICRC also manufactures and supplies components for seven prosthetic centers throughout Angola for the production of 4,000 prostheses.⁹¹ The Dutch Red Cross has a center at Viana, Luanda Province.

Because of the renewed outbreak of fighting in the Planalto region in December 1998, the ICRC began a medical assistance program for civilian patients at Huambo hospital in which all patients arriving for surgical and orthopedic treatment were supported by the ICRC. In April 2000 the ICRC held a six-week seminar in war surgery in Huambo hospital.⁹²

By late 1998, Handicap International (HI) operated two orthopedic clinics outside Luanda in Benguela, Lobito. A center in Negage in Uige province was turned over to the Ministry of Health in November 1998 and continues to function to some extent. The two centers in Benguela and Lobito have not been directly affected by the war, but have experienced a deficit in patients of some ten to twenty a month due to their inability to safely reach the workshops. HI plans to start general social reintegration projects related to both workshops, but limit its activities to the urban centers until the security situation improves in surrounding areas. HI continues to work at the Viana Center outside Luanda producing feet for all the physical rehabilitation programs in Angola. Vietnam Veterans

⁸⁸ *Africa Analysis*, no.346, 5 May 2000.

⁸⁹ *Angop*, 26 May 2000.

⁹⁰ ICRC website at: www.icrc.org, "ICRC News 00/07," 2 March 2000.

⁹¹ ICRC Update No. 00/1, "Economic Security Programs in Angola," 26 January 2000.

⁹² "ICRC News 00/13," 13 April 2000.

of America Foundation, a U.S.-based NGO, provides physical and social rehabilitation to mine victims in Luena in Moxico province.⁹³ Between September 1997 and 31 March 2000 the Center produced 738 prosthetic limbs, most of them for mine victims and funded by the War Victims Fund/USAID.⁹⁴ In 2000, the Italian NGO INTERSOS obtained EU and Italian government funding for a two-phase project to rehabilitate and open a prosthetics clinic in Menongue in Cuando Cubango, aimed at servicing the whole province.⁹⁵

Angola remains a desperately poor country in which few facilities are available for the physically disabled. Most amputees are reluctant to leave the relative comfort of rehabilitation centers. Their future will consist of being cared for by their families, or attempting to earn a living in one of the few occupations open to them, such as the street trading or--for those with education--secretarial work. The majority who come from farming backgrounds are likely to remain a burden on their families for the foreseeable future. Many have been reduced to begging; amputee beggars are already a common sight in Angolan towns. Angola will have to live with the human cost of the landmine wars for many years to come.

BURUNDI

Key developments since March 1999: Based on information provided by the UNHCR and others, it appears likely that Burundi has been laying antipersonnel mines on its border with Tanzania.

Mine Ban Policy

Burundi signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. In a March 2000 written response to Landmine Monitor's request for updated information, Burundi's Ambassador to Belgium, Hon. Jonas Niyungeko stated that the issue is currently being "studied" by the Parliament as a move towards ratification.¹

Burundi participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 with a delegation led by Ambassador S.E. Nicodeme Nduhirubusa of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Cooperation. Burundi is not known to have made any official statements regarding a mine ban in 1999 or 2000. Burundi has not participated in any of intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Burundi sponsored UN General Assembly resolution 54/54B which urged rapid ratification and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, but it was absent during the vote in December 1999.

Burundi is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

⁹³ Veterans International website at: www.vvaf.org.

⁹⁴ Information provided by VVAF's program manager, Washington DC, 15 June 2000.

⁹⁵ INTERSOS website at: www.intersos.org. The funding is \$936,000 from the EU DG Dev for start up and a second sum of \$280,000 split between the EU and the Italian government.

¹ Letter from Jonas Niyungeko, Burundi Ambassador to Belgium, to Landmine Monitor, 2 March 2000.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

There is no evidence that Burundi has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines and officials claim that the mines in Burundi have been brought in by rebels or foreign armies.² Members of the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) allegedly escaped into Burundi with 40,000 antipersonnel mines and 2,000 antitank mines when they fled from the now ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front in April and May 1994.³

In July 1998, a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official then in charge of landmine policy, Ambassador Jaques Hakizimana, told an UNMAS assessment mission that implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty should not be a problem, since the government of Burundi has “never produced, imported, used or stockpiled” antipersonnel mines.⁴ But the Minister of Defense, Col. Alfred Nkurunziza, told UNMAS that “limited” stocks are kept for training purposes.⁵ New evidence that government forces have likely laid mines at the borders would indicate that Burundi has a significant operational stockpile of AP mines.

Use

In July 1998, the Minister of Defense told the UNMAS assessment mission that no mines had ever been laid by the army.⁶ It now appears that Burundi’s armed forces have been laying antipersonnel mines on the border with Tanzania at least since the beginning of 1999. This assessment is based on statements made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (responding to testimony of refugees), as well as on interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch with UN officials and humanitarian workers, and on press reports from the region. The Burundi military appears to be using mines both to prevent thousands of Burundi citizens from fleeing the civil war into Tanzania, as well as to control cross-border attacks and prevent infiltration by Hutu rebel forces based in Tanzania.

In January 1999, a UN Security Officer in Bujumbura told Human Rights Watch that new landmines had been planted along infiltration routes and that he believed the mines were planted by government soldiers.⁷ In May 1999, a local aid worker in the Musagara receiving station on the border told Human Rights Watch that most of the wounded refugees who came across the border were mine victims and that there had been an increase in victims since September 1998.⁸ A local aid worker interviewed in Kigoma reported the use of landmines near the Kibuye entry point into Tanzania and told Human Rights Watch that three refugees had died and three were injured by mines. He believed the mines were laid recently as he had not heard of any such injuries before January

² Interview, Amb. Jonathas Niyungeko, Brussels, 12 February 1999.

³ Pierre Hublet, “*Mission Report in Burundi from the 23rd January to the 1st February 1999*,” Handicap International Belgique, 1998, p. 3-4.

⁴ United Nations Mine Action Service, *Joint Assessment Mission Report*, 27 August 1998, p. 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with UN Security Officer, Bujumbura, 15 January 1999.

⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with local aid worker in Musagara, 15 May 1999.

1999.⁹ Another local aid worker in Kigoma stated that there were “a good number of landmine wounds among Burundian refugees” and indicated that refugees crossing the border had stepped on landmines.¹⁰ He also said that some Tanzanians had stepped on mines and were sent to the Kiberezi reception center for treatment.

In February 2000, a spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated, “The refugees have reported the presence of landmines as part of the reason why the numbers [of refugees] have dwindled.”¹¹

In March 2000, the UNHCR stated that it had protested to Burundi authorities about its mining of the border with Tanzania. UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said that “the main entry points to Tanzania have been heavily mined,” preventing refugees from fleeing fighting between government forces and rebels. He also said that the government maintained the landmines were a necessary defense against the rebels.¹² The mining of the border was reported by a number of newspapers.¹³

In April 2000, the UNHCR released a statement saying, “UNHCR is concerned at refugee accounts of use of mines as well as reports of civilians being caught between rebel forces and recent military reprisals in eastern Ruyigi and Makamba provinces.” The UNHCR again noted the decline in the refugee flow, and said that refugees arriving in Tanzania from Burundi cited landmines, military activity near the border, and rising rivers as reasons for the drop-off.¹⁴

In May 2000, the UNHCR said that according to the latest arrivals, there is “mining by the governmental army of routes to Tanzania.”¹⁵

It seems clear that mines have been used, and while Landmine Monitor does not have direct, incontrovertible evidence that Burundi armed forces are responsible, that is the conclusion drawn from the available evidence. There have been no allegations that other parties, such as the Hutu rebels or the Tanzanian government, might have laid the mines that are claiming new victims, and there is no evident reason why those parties would use mines in that fashion.

⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with local aid worker in Kigoma, 15 May 1999.

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with local aid worker in Kigoma, 14 May 1999.

¹¹ “Burundi Refugee flow slows, landmines pose threat,” *Reuters*, 17 February 2000, reported in *Refugees Daily*, 17 February 2000. The article is quoting Vincent Parker, UNHCR spokesperson, in Tanzania. The number of refugees crossing the border into Tanzania peaked in January 2000 at 23,000, but had dropped to 1,126 by May 2000. UNHCR Press Briefing Note, 4 May 2000; *Refugees Daily*, “Thousands Displaced but Few Leaving,” 5 May 2000.

¹² “UN says Mines Cause big drop in Refugees to Tanzania,” *Associated Press*, 24 March 2000, reported in *Refugees Daily*, 24 March 2000. See also, UNHCR Press Briefing Note, “Burundi/Tanzania: Border Area Mined,” 24 March 2000.

¹³ See for example, “Landmines In Use On Burundi-Tanzania Border?” *Guardian* (Dar es Salaam) 28 March 2000, reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 March 2000; and *Tanzania Heko Newspaper*, 13-19 April 2000, interview with Leone Ndabagaye, Head of Foreign Unit.

¹⁴ UNHCR Press Briefing Note, “Tanzania: UNHCR concern at mine accounts,” 28 April 2000. See also, “Mines, fighting, rivers reduce Burundian flight to Tanzania,” *Agence France Press*, 4 May 2000; and “Number of Refugees to Tanzania Dwindling,” *IRIN-CEA Weekly Roundup*, 5 May 2000.

¹⁵ UNHCR Country Updates, Africa Fact Sheet, May 2000, on UNHCR web site, <http://www.unhcr.ch/news/cupdates/0005afri.htm>

Landmine Monitor has asked Burundi for official comment on allegations of use of antipersonnel mines, but had not received an answer as of the end of July 2000.

Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not entered into force for Burundi, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty...." Clearly, new use of mines defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.

Landmine Problem

According to the Minister of Defense, Col. Alfred Nkurunziza, the first mine accidents reported in Burundi occurred in 1993.¹⁶ Cibitoke was the first province to be affected by mine use, but the problem subsequently spread to Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi and Makamba.¹⁷ This last province is thought to be the worst affected, due to its proximity to rebel groups operating out of Tanzania.¹⁸ Landmines buried in Burundi are of Egyptian, Italian, South African, Russian and Chinese origin.¹⁹

There have been no in-depth assessments or surveys of Burundi's landmine problem since the 1998 assessment mission. Dr. Barendegere Venerand of the Kamenge Military Hospital told Landmine Monitor that "the location of mined areas is not yet well known in Burundi but epidemiologic surveillance is being conducted now in the Ministry of Health."²⁰

Mine Action

The United Nations in Burundi conducts mine awareness for all UN staff in the country. In 1998, UNMAS reported that according to the Ministry of Defense, mine awareness training was being conducted for both the military and civilian populations in mine-affected areas.²¹ No updated information was available on any mine awareness education programs taking place in Burundi. There is currently no humanitarian mine clearance underway in Burundi.

Landmine Casualties

In a detailed response to Landmine Monitor, Dr. Venerand indicated that the first cases of AP mine victims appeared in 1995. Ten amputations were carried at the hospital in 1996 and ninety-six in 1997. The number of recent landmine casualties is not known, but 316 incidents have been recorded since 1993 which, resulted in 791 deaths, mostly civilians. The majority of the victims have come from Cibitoke, Bubanza, rural

¹⁶ Pierre Hublet, "Mission Report in Burundi from the 23rd January to the 1st February 1999," Handicap International Belgique, 1998, p. 3-4.

¹⁷ UNMAS, *Joint Assessment Mission Report*, 27 August 1998, p. 6.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Statement faxed to Landmine Monitor from Dr. Barendegere Venerand, Ministry of National Defense, Military Hospital of Kamenge, 3 May 2000.

²¹ UNMAS, *Mission Report*, p. 9.

Bujumbura, Bururi and Makamba.²² According to UN figures, between 1996 and 1998 there were 112 mine incidents, resulting in 364 casualties, about half of which were deaths. Seventy percent were antitank mine incidents.²³

Survivor Assistance

According to Dr. Venerand, victim assistance takes place in the nearest health centers, while Kamenge Military Hospital provides “specialised services in trauma.” The hospital receives “lots of cases” of mine victims. About 70 percent of admissions in surgery are wounded out of which more than 80 percent are war wounded. The hospital is preparing a survey of the “geographic location of incidents, type of activities at the moment of incident, morbidity and mortality.”²⁴ On 25 March 2000 the Ministry of Reinstallation organized a day of reflection on the re-organization of medical assistance, with the aim to reduce cost of health care for victims of the conflict.²⁵

Handicap International (HI) is providing training in physiotherapy and orthopedics. It is also supporting a number of income-generating projects for handicapped people. Its main activities are concentrated in Gitega where the national orthopedics center is located (which has a production capacity of five prostheses per month). HI also supports other small centers in Makamba, Kirundo, Muyinga, and Bujumbura which can produce only simple appliances.

CAMEROON

Key developments since March 1999: Legislation to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty was passed in July 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Cameroon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1999. In June 1999 the government submitted ratification legislation to the National Assembly and on 16 July 1999 the National Assembly passed Law 99/008 authorizing the President to ratify the treaty. The ratification document was forwarded to the Presidency of the Republic for signature. After Landmine Monitor requested an update, the Ministry of External Relations sent a reminder letter for quick ratification to the Presidency on 24 April 2000.¹ Officials told Landmine Monitor that Cameroon will ratify the treaty before the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000 since there is no obstacle to it.²

²² Statement from Dr. Venerand, Ministry of National Defense, Military Hospital of Kamenge, 3 May 2000.

²³ Cited in, Statement from Dr. Venerand, Ministry of National Defense, Military Hospital of Kamenge, 3 May 2000.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Operations in Burundi Bulletin, 16-31 March 1999.

¹ Interview with Jacques Alfred Ndoumbe Ebole, Assistant Director, United Nations Department, Ministry of External Relations for Cameroon, Yaounde, 24 April 2000.

² Telephone interview with Ferdinand Hgoh Nghoh, Second Counselor, Cameroon Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, 14 April 2000.

Cameroon participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, represented by an official from Cameroon's Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh.³ Cameroon has not participated in any intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. Cameroon is a member of the United Nations Consultative Committee on Peace and Security in Central Africa, a committee deeply concerned with small arms, including landmines.⁴ Cameroon voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

Cameroon is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been vocal on the issue of possible negotiations on a mine export ban in the CD.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Cameroon has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. There has been some concern expressed about the possibility of Cameroon being used as a transit point for shipments of landmines involving the Central African Republic or Chad, but Landmine Monitor's investigations found no evidence of such transiting and officials denied this has occurred.⁵

According to officials, Cameroon possesses a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes, and these are tightly controlled.⁶ A figure of 500 mines for training was declared during the Oslo negotiations in 1997 and Dr. Elie Mvie Meka, a Technical Advisor in the Ministry of Defense confirmed this number.⁷

The country's defense strategy does not include the use of landmines. Military training courses include only basic information on landmine recognition and safety precautions.⁸ There is no evidence of use of AP mines by Cameroon in its border dispute with Nigeria or elsewhere.⁹

Cameroon is not mine-affected. There are centers in Cameroon that take care of disabled persons. The main rehabilitation centers include the Jamot Center, the Etoug Ebe Center in Yaounde and the Sajocah in Mezam Division-Bamenda. In Cameroon, a special law for disabled persons was passed on 21 July 1983 by the National Assembly.¹⁰

³ Telephone interview with Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh, Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 14 April 2000.

⁴ Interview with Jacques Alfred Ndoumbe Eboule, Ministry of External Relations, Yaounde, 20 April 2000.

⁵ Interview with Dr. Elie Mvie Meka, Technical Advisor, Ministry of Defense, Yaounde, 20 March 2000.

⁶ Interview with Jacques Alfred Ndoumbe Eboule, Ministry of External Relations, Yaounde, 20 April 2000.

⁷ Interview with Dr. Elie Mvie Meka, Ministry of Defense, Yaounde, 20 March 2000.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The ICRC notes that there have been no mine casualties reported. Interview with Daniel Augstburgger, Regional Delegate, International Committee of the Red Cross, Yaounde, 19 March 2000.

¹⁰ Law Number 83/013, 21 July 1983.

CAPE VERDE

Cape Verde signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. According to Luis Dupret, Secretary-General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ratification papers remain waiting for approval by the National Assembly and the delay is due to other pressing business.¹ It attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. It has not participated in the intersessional meetings in Geneva. Cape Verde voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. According to Dupret, Cape Verde maintains no stockpile of landmines.²

ETHIOPIA

Key developments since March 1999: In the 1998-2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it appears that tens of thousands of new mines were laid. Each government has alleged that the other laid mines and observers have expressed concern that both sides may have used mines. Casualties are now on the rise as a result of new use of landmines.

Background

In May 1998, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war over a disputed border area. There have been many allegations that more than 100,000 landmines have been used in this war along the disputed frontier area. New use is compounding what was already a difficult landmine problem in Ethiopia and Eritrea. On 18 June 2000, the two countries signed an Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. Article 8 of the agreement obligates both parties to demine the conflict frontier zone to allow UN peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies safe access.¹

Mine Ban Policy

Ethiopia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In a statement at the signing ceremony, the government reaffirmed its commitment to the treaty, and as a mine-affected nation, urged the international community to adhere to the articles of the treaty dealing with assistance for mine clearance and mine victims.² In March 1999, and again in May 1999, the Ethiopian government stated that it had "already triggered" the

¹ Interview with Luis Dupret, Secretary-General at the Cape Verde Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 27 May 2000.

² Ibid.

¹ Ethiopian and Eritrean foreign ministers signed the agreement in Algiers, Algeria on 18 June 2000. The President of Algeria, who holds the Presidency of the OAU for the 2000 cycle, brokered the agreement.

² His Excellency, Dr. Fecadu Gadarmu, Ambassador to Canada, Statement to the Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 3 December 1997, p. 2.

procedure for ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty,³ but to date Ethiopia has not ratified the treaty.

Ethiopia attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, Mozambique, in May 1999 as an observer. Its delegation included officials of both the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry. The head of delegation stated, "Ethiopia attaches paramount importance to the convention and would continue to work and cooperate with all states and groups for the implementation of the cardinal principles of the convention."⁴

The government has not attended any of the meetings in Geneva of the five Standing Committees of Experts of the Mine Ban Treaty, established to foster implementation of the treaty.

Ethiopia voted in favor of the December 1999 UNGA resolution supporting the treaty, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.

It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. While a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Ethiopia has not been noted as a supporter or opponent of efforts to negotiate a landmine export ban in that forum.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Ethiopia does not produce landmines. At the Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony, Ethiopia indicated that it had not imported any landmines since the overthrow of the regime of Mengistu Heilemariam in 1991.⁵ The size of Ethiopia's landmine stocks is not known.⁶

Recent Use

Soon after the start of the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of planting landmines in the conflict zone and areas of Ethiopia controlled by Eritrea. Ethiopia has alleged that Eritrea planted 110,000 mines.⁷ In late May 2000, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of planting mines in border towns before losing control of them to Ethiopian troops.⁸

³ Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fax to the Ethiopian Consulate in The Hague, 17 March 1999, p. 2. Statement of Dr. Waktasu Negeri to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

⁴ Statement of Dr. Waktasu Negeri to the FMSP to the MBT, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

⁵ Dr. Gadamu, Ottawa, 3 December 1997, p. 3.

⁶ For information on mines found in Ethiopia, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 145-146.

⁷ Ethiopian Government Spokesperson, "Total Victory for Operation Sunset," *Ethiopian News Service*, Addis Ababa, www.telecom.net/~ena, 28 February 1999; Professor Addis Birhan, "Mine Eritrea's Minefields," *Wata Information Service*, www.telecom.net-et/~wata, 6 March 1999; Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 March 1999, p. 2; Statement of Dr. Waktasu Negeri to the FMSP to the MBT, Maputo, 3 May 1999; and Africa News, "30,375 Landmines Planted in Eritrea in Northern Ethiopia Demined," Embassy of Ethiopia, 25 May 1999.

⁸ "Ethiopia says Eritrea laid 7,000 mines in and around border town," *AFP*, 6 June 2000. In a February 2000 report regarding Eritrean human rights practices, the U.S. State Department said, "According to UN officials, [Eritrean] government forces laid approximately 50,000 to 60,000 landmines in the Badme area during their 8-month occupation of this disputed territory." U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "1999 Country Reports on

The Eritrean government alleged to Landmine Monitor in early 2000 that Ethiopian forces have been using landmines in the disputed territories,⁹ and that the mines are to a large extent not mapped or marked.¹⁰ The Eritrean government in late May and early June 2000 accused Ethiopia of laying mines in the towns Ethiopian forces were occupying. In particular, when Eritrean forces recaptured the town of Barentu two weeks after it had been taken by Ethiopian troops, there were press accounts stating that the Ethiopians had looted and mined the town.¹¹

In an aide-memoire dated 17 July 2000 to the OAU and UN, Eritrea said that "Ethiopia has and continues to plant new mines inside sovereign Eritrean territory, particularly in the areas which fall within the temporary security zone."¹²

Landmine Monitor has not been able to independently verify whether or not Ethiopia has used antipersonnel mines in the recent conflict. It is clear that mines were used by one or both parties to the conflict. In early June 2000, humanitarian sources told the UN Humanitarian Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) that there was much concern that both countries had mined border areas, and that "it would appear to take some time before people are confident enough to go back to their homes" in areas affected by the conflict.¹³ Landmine casualties among the civilian population are already reported to be on the rise.¹⁴

Additionally, South Mogadishu strongman Hussein Farah Aideed has claimed Ethiopian troops occupying some parts of southern Somalia have used landmines.¹⁵ In 1998 and 1999, the Ethiopian army made a number of incursions into Somalia, claiming that factions opposed to Ethiopia--Itihad and militia of the Oromo Liberation Front, aided by Eritrea--were launching attacks from bases in southern Somalia.¹⁶

Human Rights Practices -- Eritrea," 25 February 2000, p. 3. This is repeated in the State Department's Ethiopia country report. Use of mines by Ethiopia is not mentioned in either country report.

⁹ Interviews with Ato Abraham Yohannes, Embassy of Eritrea, Washington, DC, 28 January 2000 and 8 February 2000.

¹⁰ Interview with Eritrean National Demining Headquarters official, Asmara, January 2000.

¹¹ Some of these reports were unclear as to who laid the mines, and some said both sides may have mined the town. *IRIN-CEA*, "Civilians returning slowly to Mined Town," 2 June 2000; "Eritreans Assess Damage in Barentu," *BBC World (Africa)*, 2 June 2000; Ann M. Simmons, "Destruction, Danger Await Eritrean Returnees," *The Times*, 2 June 2000; Patrick Graham, "Eritreans Don't Think the War is Over," *National Post*, 4 June 2000; "Eritrean Town Looted by Retreating Ethiopian Army," *Reuters*, 2 June 2000; "Ethiopian Forces Reported Still in West Eritrea," *IRIN News Briefs*, 31 May 2000.

¹² The aide-memoire was subsequently provided the UN Security Council and circulated as UN Security Council document S/2000/726, 21 July 2000. See also, "Eritrea Complains Ethiopia Violates Peace Pact," *Reuters*, United Nations, 24 July 2000.

¹³ United Nations, IRIN News Briefs, "Ethiopia: Landmine Deaths in Irob," 8 June 2000.

¹⁴ "Landmines Kill Two Children, Injure Three Others," *Pan African News Agency*, 8 June 2000.

¹⁵ "Adid Accuses Ethiopia of Annexing Somali Territory," *AFP*, 21 March 2000.

¹⁶ "Ethiopians Pull out of Somalia," *BBC World*, 4 January 1999, www.bbc.co.uk.

The government of Ethiopia denies that it has used antipersonnel landmines in the conflict with Eritrea or anywhere else since signing the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁷

Use by Non-State Actors

Insurgents opposed to the government of Ethiopia, particularly the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) are believed to have used landmines—antivehicle and possibly antipersonnel—in Ethiopia recently. There were three incidents in 1999 of mine attacks on the Ethiopian-Djibouti Railway.¹⁸ According to press accounts, OLF took responsibility for at least one of the attacks,¹⁹ claiming that the train was transporting war material for Ethiopia and young Oromo men used by the Ethiopian army as “cannon fodder” and “mine sweepers.”²⁰ In southern Ethiopia, the Oromo Liberation Front claimed that it mined roads between Kenya and Ethiopia and some areas in northern Kenya.²¹ ONLF is also thought to have been behind a number of landmine incidents in the Somali National Region of Ethiopia, including an accident that seriously damaged the emergency medical ambulance in the region.²² Neither the OLF nor the ONLF have made statements about banning landmines.

The U.S. State Department reported in February 2000 that Eritrea has provided support for armed opposition groups attempting to overthrow the Ethiopian government. These groups, mostly based in Somalia and Kenya, used landmines inside Ethiopia in 1999, according to the U.S.²³

Landmine Problem

Landmines have been used in Ethiopia during various conflicts for decades. For thirty years, Ethiopia fought with the Eritrean People’s Liberation (EPLF) for the control of Eritrea. Until 1993, Eritrea was a province of Ethiopia, which had annexed the former UN Trusteeship of Eritrea in 1963. Landmines were used extensively both by Eritrean liberation movements and Ethiopia during that war, mainly along the border between the two countries.²⁴

¹⁷ For a recent denial, see: “Ethiopia Responds to the Times’ Special Report,” Letter to the Editor from Fisseha Adugna, Charge d’affaires, Embassy of Ethiopia, Washington, DC, *Washington Times*, 3 June 1999. Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not entered into force for Ethiopia, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty....” Clearly, new use of mines defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.

¹⁸ See, *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, Djibouti chapter.

¹⁹ “Eritrea Warns against Changing OAU Peace Plan,” *Reuters*, 31 May 2000.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ “Landmines Kill 14, Injure Four others in Kenya,” *PANA* (Nairobi), 23 March 2000.

²² Mohamoud Issa, “Landmines in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia,” In *Proceedings of the Workshop on the Menace of Landmines in the Horn of Africa*, The Institute for Practical Research and Training, Hargeisa, 23-24 November 1999.

²³ U.S. State Department, *1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia*, 25 February 2000, p. 4.

²⁴ UN Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, 22 June 1998, p. 5.

In 1977, Somalia invaded and occupied Somali-inhabited areas in eastern and northeastern Ethiopia until 1978. Both armies used mines extensively.²⁵ As a result of that war, many minefields are found along the 1,626 km long border with Somalia, but also from the war between the former military regime of Siyad Barre in Somalia and Somali opposition groups based inside Ethiopia.²⁶ Other areas with known mine contamination are: Gondar and Dessie, the northern Shewar region, along the road between Djibouti and Awash, the Somali National Region, and the western area around Walega and West Arosa.²⁷ Landmines have also been used along the border with Sudan, where insurgents opposed to the Government of Sudan have been active.²⁸

While the Ethiopian government estimates the number of uncleared landmines in Ethiopia at more than 1.4 million, the U.S. Department of State puts the number of existing mines in Ethiopia at 500,000.²⁹ Contaminated areas include Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Gamela, Oromiya, and Beni-Shangul.³⁰ Even before the most recent border war, the border area between Eritrea and Ethiopia was heavily mined.³¹

Mine Action Funding and Mine Clearance

The Ethiopian Ministry of Defense operates the Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP). The EDP Headquarters in Addis Ababa is the sole mine action entity in the country, but the war of 1998-2000 has disrupted EDP mine action work. It has conducted historical research, mine awareness education, and demining. There have been no nationwide or systemic surveys in Ethiopia, but the EDP has so far identified over 100 minefields. The German NGO Santa Barbara Foundation has signed an agreement with Ethiopia for a Level I Survey, but has not yet conducted one due to lack of funds.³²

The largest mine action donor for the country has been the United States. Between 1993-1999, EDP received \$8.8 million from the U.S. for demining programs,³³ including \$335,000 in fiscal year (FY) 1999. The estimated U.S. contribution for FY 2000 is \$2.3

²⁵ U.S. Department of State, Political Military Affairs Bureau, Office of International Security Operations, Pub No. 10098, July 1993, p.89; U.S. Department of State, "Background Notes: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia," March 1998, Office of East African Affairs, www.state.gov.

²⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, September 1998.

²⁷ UN Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, 22 June 1998, p.2; U.S. Central Command, www.centcom.mil/demining/ethiopia.

²⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 1998), pp. 39-40.

²⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, September 1998, p. A-1.

³⁰ Ibid. Map—"The Three Most Mine-affected Areas in Ethiopia."

³¹ See, UN Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, 22 June 1998.

³² Santa Barbara website at: www.stiftung-sankt-barbara.de.

³³ "FY 00 NDAR Project Status," U.S. Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Program, 5 May 2000. Numbers reflect funding for Department of Defense, Department of State, and some Agency for International Development programs, as cited in Human Rights Watch, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report* Vol. 12, No. 3(G), July 2000, p. 26.

million,³⁴ which is to be spent on mine detecting dog capability, training in explosive ordnance disposal and mine clearance, and the purchase of equipment.³⁵

In 1999 Ethiopia was certified by Germany as being eligible to receive military surplus equipment for demining operations.³⁶

The U.S. Department of Defense indicates that the EDP mine clearance program has so far cleared 37,000 AT and AP mines and 364,000 pieces of UXO.³⁷ In addition, the Ethiopian government claims that it has removed 30,375 landmines in 1999 and 40,000 landmines in 2000 in the northern conflict zone in areas that had been occupied by Eritrea since May 1998.³⁸

Mine Awareness Education

The EDP as well as non-governmental organizations, primarily Handicap International, carry out mine awareness and education activities in Ethiopia. According to UN Mine Action Service 1998 mission report, the EDP runs radio and television programs, distributes flyers and runs newspaper ads to convey messages on the danger of landmines.³⁹ There is little coordination, and a lack of community involvement in the EDP mine awareness activities.⁴⁰

Since 1997, Handicap International has run mine risk awareness programs in the Somali refugee camps in northeastern Ethiopia. As of 1999, Handicap International had trained nine educators. Approximately 100,000 refugees have also benefited from these training programs. In 1999, the European Commission granted HI \$257,000 for mine awareness education.⁴¹ At the end of 1999, an Ethiopian NGO RaDO started a mine risk education program in northern Ethiopia, with the technical assistance of UNICEF.

Landmine Casualties

Landmine casualties are not recorded systematically. Before the 1998-2000 border war, there were an estimated 4,200-4,600 amputee mine victims.⁴² Although landmine incidents were beginning to subside and were thought to be relatively low in 1998,⁴³ casualties are now on the rise as a result of new use of landmines in northern Ethiopia, with reports indicating a casualty rate of between five and seven per week. Civilians

³⁴ HRW, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," July 2000, p. 34.

³⁵ U.S. Department of State, "FY 00 NADR Project Status," p. 2, in HRW, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," July 2000, p. 34.

³⁶ United Nations Assessment Mission to Ethiopia (UNMAS), 22 June 1998, p. 6.

³⁷ USCENTCOM Demining Home Page, 11 June 2000.

³⁸ Africa News, Embassy of Ethiopia, 25 May 1999; "Ethiopia: 40,000 landmines removed from central front," Ethiopian Television, Addis Ababa, in Amharic, *BBC Monitoring*, 20 June 2000.

³⁹ UN Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, 22 June 1998, p. 7.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

⁴¹ "Multi-year Recipient Report: Ethiopia," Mine Action Investments Database, UN Mine Action Service, available at: <http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/mai/Main.asp?sScreen=RECIPIENT>, visited on 25 July 2000.

⁴² Handicap International, MAG, and Norwegian People's Aid, "Ethiopia, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects," 1998.

⁴³ UN Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, 22 June 1998.

returning to the conflict zone between Eritrea and Ethiopia are now under considerable landmine threat.⁴⁴ Ethiopian government sources claim that landmines in the northern Ethiopian conflict zone have caused the death of some 100 people in the 1998-1999 conflict period, and have forced 50,000 to abandon fertile agricultural land.⁴⁵ Local government officials in the border town of Zala Anbesa claim that seventy-seven people were killed by landmines in the area.⁴⁶

Landmine casualties continue to occur in the Somali National Region of Ethiopia, along the frontier with Kenya and along the Djibouti-Ethiopian rail line, where both cargo and passenger trains have been derailed by landmines on three occasions in 2000. These casualties are not systematically tallied. In the Somali National Region a landmine explosion destroyed one of the two functioning ambulances and seriously injuring the driver. A local doctor was also killed by a landmine accident at Qabridahari and another incident injured a nurse and a driver working on the National Polio Immunization Campaign.⁴⁷

Landmine Survivor Assistance

All mine-affected regions of Ethiopia are extremely underdeveloped with poor infrastructure and poorly equipped health care facilities. Few hospitals are capable of performing emergency surgery and most local health posts are not competent to provide emergency care to mine victims.

The Department of Rehabilitation Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs runs three prosthetic/orthotic centers in Ethiopia: Addis Ababa, Mekele and Harar. The Addis Ababa prosthetic center was established in 1961 by the Ethiopian government, while the Mekele and Harar centers were established by the ICRC in 1992 and 1982 respectively. The Addis Ababa center is one of the premier such centers in all of Africa and its products, wheel chairs, mobility devices and components are used in many African countries. In addition, it serves as a reference center, providing training and counseling internationally to other centers in mine-affected countries.

The ICRC, through a Special Fund for Disabled (SFD), supports prosthetic/orthotic centers in Ethiopia. The Italian Red Cross, in collaboration with the ICRC, assigned two permanent staff to the center in Addis Ababa to help train prosthetists and orthotists and to develop their skill in the polypropylene technique. In 1999, fourteen ICRC prosthetists/orthotists on their first missions attended a two-week instruction course, and twenty-seven others from eight countries completed a one-month course. During these training courses, eighty-two amputees received new prostheses. Since July 1998, the U.S. has supported the SFD project in Addis Ababa with \$1 million, through the ICRC, for this training.⁴⁸

In addition, to the training courses, the SFD-supported expatriates carried out follow-up technical visits to SFD-supported projects every month. In 1999, technical

⁴⁴ "Demining Underway in Northern Ethiopia," *AFP*, 22 June 2000.

⁴⁵ Landmines in Ethiopia and the War with Eritrea, *Arabicnews.com: Ethiopian Politics*, 6 June 2000.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Mohamoud Issa, "Landmines in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia," November 1999.

⁴⁸ U.S. Agency for International Development, "Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, Portfolio Synopsis," Spring 2000, in "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," HRW, p. 28.

visits lasting about two weeks were made to twenty-nine projects in seventeen countries. During these visits, the SFD staff gave further training in fitting techniques and reviewed the condition of equipment and polypropylene components. In SFD-supported projects, 4,788 polypropylene prostheses were produced in 1999. The Prosthetic/Orthotic Center in Addis Ababa supplied an increased number of ICRC projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda.⁴⁹

Since 1997, HI and RaDO have conducted a joint project to implement rehabilitation services in the main hospitals of the country (Axum, Maychew, Bahir Dar, Debre Tabor, Woldia, Nekempte, Mettu, Sodo, Hossana, Dire Dawa). These services, established in coordination with the respective regional and local health bureaus, provide basic physiotherapy treatments and walking aids to in-patients and to disabled persons.

GABON

Gabon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has not yet ratified it. The ratification legislation that needs to be submitted to the National Assembly is still being prepared at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.¹ A government official responded to a letter from Handicap International by stating, "I will relay your correspondence to our Government in Libreville and I have no doubt that it will be taken into consideration for a rapid ratification."²

Gabon attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with a delegation led by its Ambassador to the Organization of African Unity. It has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the treaty. Gabon is an active member of the United Nations consultative committee on Peace and Security in Central Africa, a committee that has addressed small arms and landmines. It is also active in the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (COPAX). During the last COPAX meeting in October 1999 in Djamena, Chad, the participating governments reaffirmed their commitment to join and respect all the international conventions related to international humanitarian law including the Mine Ban Treaty.³ Gabon was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the treaty in December 1999. It has voted for similar resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Gabon is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Gabon told Landmine Monitor that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁴ According to government sources, Gabon has a small stockpile of antipersonnel

⁴⁹ Interview with Maria Letizia Zamparelli, Studies and Planning Special Activities Service, Italian Red Cross, Rome, 24 April 2000.

¹ Interview with Charles Essonghé, First Counselor, Permanent Mission of Gabon to the United Nations, New York, 24 April 2000.

² Letter from Honorine Doussou-Naki, Ambassador of Gabon to France, to Sylvie Brigot, Handicap International, Paris, 17 February 2000.

³ Interview with Jacques Alfred Ndoumbe Eboule, Assistant Director, United Nations Department, Ministry of External Relations for Cameroon, Yaounde, 24 April 2000.

⁴ Interview with Charles Essonghé, UN Mission, New York, 24 April 2000.

mines intended for training purposes only.⁵ Information on the quantity and types of these mines is not available to the public.⁶

There are no humanitarian mine action programs in Gabon. The ICRC's Regional Bureau for Central Africa confirmed that there are no registered landmine victims in Gabon.⁷

GAMBIA

The Gambia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. The Gambia's National Assembly passed ratification legislation on 2 November 1999.¹ On 20 July 2000, an official from the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor, "The President of the Republic of The Gambia has endorsed the Instrument of Ratification."² All that remains is for the instrument of ratification to be officially deposited at the United Nations.³

The Gambia did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, and it has not participated in any of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Gambia was absent from the December 1999 vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Ministry of Defense informed Landmine Monitor that it does not manufacture or "retain any stockpiles of landmines." It further stated, "There are no instances where our Armed Forces utilized landmines." With respect to trade in mines, the response was, "There [is] no evidence of antipersonnel landmines being transferred from The Gambia. However, this could be possible, but not to the knowledge of the Gambian Government."⁴

The Gambia's security situation has almost certainly been occasionally compromised by its proximity to Senegal's southern province of Casamance, where conflict between separatists and the Senegalese armed forces has involved use of landmines (see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000-Senegal*).⁵ Senegalese diplomats suspected that Gambian territory was being used as a rearbase by rebel elements in 1992, shortly before landmines made their appearance in Casamance. However, more recently,

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Interview with Daniel Augstburger, Regional Delegate, International Red Cross Society, Yaounde, 19 March 2000.

¹ Information provided by Mines Action Team in Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, June 2000.

² Letter from Habib T. B. Jarra for the Permanent Secretary, Department of State for Defense, Office of the President, FA 174/02/(114), 20 July 2000.

³ On 28 July 2000, a government official said that the instrument of ratification "will soon be deposited." Letter from A. Drammeh for the Permanent Secretary, Department of State for Defense, Office of the President, to Elisabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, dated 28 July 2000.

⁴ Letter from Habib T.B. Jarra, 20 July 2000.

⁵ Alex Vines and Barbarcar Diagne, "Senegal: old mines, new wars," *African Topics*, no. 22, January-March 1998, p.13; Andrew Manley, "Guinea Bissau/Senegal: war, civil war and the Casamance question," Writenet/Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, pp. 14-16.

Gambian mediation efforts to end the Casamance conflict have been welcomed by Senegalese representatives.⁶

GUINEA-BISSAU

Key developments since March 1999: Mine clearance efforts have been delayed, though some limited clearance has taken place. UNICEF established a Mine Awareness Committee that has met bi-weekly since April 1999 to plan and coordinate all mine awareness activities. It was reported by the UN in July 1999 that Guinea-Bissau denied using landmines in its 1998 conflict and announced that efforts would be made to identify culpable parties and bring them to justice.

Mine Ban Policy

Guinea-Bissau signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997, but has yet to ratify. It did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in Maputo in May 1999, nor has it attended any of the intersessional meetings in Geneva of the Standing Committees of Experts. Guinea-Bissau voted for the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. In July 1999 an advisor to the Prime Minister called use of mines “a war crime.”¹

Guinea-Bissau is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Guinea-Bissau is not known to have produced or exported AP mines. It appears to have imported mines from a number of countries. On 7 February 1998, the government destroyed between 2,000 and 2,300 landmines from its stocks, in front of foreign diplomats, media and officials from the Senegalese army, but no further destruction has occurred.² There is no estimate of the size of the landmine stockpile that the Bissau military currently retains.

Use

The *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* contained an account of the fighting in Guinea-Bissau that began in June 1998. Landmine Monitor concluded that the government forces, the Senegalese troops supporting the government, and the opposition forces (Military Junta) all used landmines. According to a 1998 UNMAS assessment, the use of mines by both sides in the battle for the capital of Bissau left an estimated 2,000-3,000 mines, “in any case, 8,000 mines seem to be a maximum.”³ The UNMAS

⁶ “Senegal: Gambia to mediate?,” *West Africa* (London), no. 4180, 12-18 January 1999, p. 7.

¹ From 23-31 May 1999, Leon Terblanche, Senior Mine Action Advisor, UNDP, undertook an assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau. United Nations Development Program, “Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report,” 29 July 1999, p. 12.

² Photographs of the stockpile destruction were printed in the Senegalese media; see *Le Soleil*, 9 February 1998.

³ Major Herve Petetin, UNMAS, “Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau,” December 1998, p. 1.

assessment noted that “it is reported that Junta and government forces as well as the Senegalese contingent have established records of the different minefields.”⁴

In July 1999, a UN Development Program assessment said that “mines are reported to follow a pattern of single rows, with mines spaced one meter apart. A single strand of wire used to be in place marking the edge of the minefield. Experienced deminers indicated that they try to find this wire by prodding in one direction, and know that they are at the minefield when the wire is found.”⁵ According to UNDP mostly AP mines were found around and between former defensive positions. Some AT mines were found on possible approach routes and roads. Some POMZ mines were also found toward the eastern border but had not been used in the capital.

When the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* was released (September 1999), the Senegalese government denied using mines. The Guinea-Bissau government did not issue a denial at that time.⁶ However, in its July 1999 assessment, UNDP reported that “all forces flatly deny planting any mines. ECOMOG succeeded in having the various groups pointing out the areas they thought to be mined.”⁷ UNDP also reported that some senior Guinea-Bissau officials “feel that some occupying forces recently planted mines in Bissau. During a press conference on 12 July 1999 the Prime Minister’s advisor Iancuba N’Djai announced that efforts would be made to identify culpable parties and bring them to justice as using mines is ‘a war crime.’”⁸

Landmine Monitor stands by its report of use of mines by Guinea-Bissau troops in 1998.

Mine Clearance

The Bissau authorities estimate there could be as many as 20,000 mines in the Bissau area.⁹ The extent of the problem is known and the vast majority of the minefields are marked and mapped. However, a dispute between the authorities in Bissau and the Senegalese military has resulted in no handing over of maps for mine clearance, delaying efforts to clear the mines. Some limited clearance has taken place; 1,952 AP mines and

⁴ UNMAS, “Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau,” December 1998, p. 1.

⁵ UNDP, “Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report,” 29 July 1999, p. 7.

⁶ In a statement at the FMSP in Maputo where the report was released, Senegal said it was “astonished to come across allegations” of mine use by its troops in Guinea-Bissau and it “categorically rejects the allegations.” “Statement Made by the Senegalese Delegation Following some Allegations Contained in the 1999 Report of ICBL,” First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on A.P. Land Mines, Maputo, 5 May 1999, (Non-official translation). Guinea-Bissau did not attend the FMSP.

⁷ UNDP, “Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report,” 29 July 1999, pp. 5-6.

⁸ UNDP recommended that “Instead of trying to place blame after the fact, [it] suggested the government convene a case study with the international community, ICBL, and involved parties to examine what mechanisms were not in place or failed to work to prevent the use of mines in Guinea-Bissau with the aim of strengthening the convention.” UNDP, “Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report,” 29 July 1999, p. 13.

⁹ UNDP, “Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report,” 29 July 1999, p. 6.

143 AT mines have been lifted and destroyed.¹⁰ The non-governmental organization Humaid Demining began a mine clearance program in April 1999.¹¹

In 1999 it was apparent that there was no coordinated planning, prioritization and tasking of the clearance efforts. The UNDP has proposed that there should be a national mine action structure and has pledged \$150,000 to initiate the coordination mechanism and core team.¹² UNDP states that it will provide material support for national capacity-building and concrete demining operations.¹³ In 2000 the National Commission for Disarmament, Cantonement of Troops and Mine Clearance was given responsibility for mine clearance, with the participation of ECOMOG. The UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) is responsible for raising funds and is meant to run a mine action program, but it is scarcely operational.¹⁴ In June 2000 the UN noted that the government "has approved a project document on demining and set up a national institution for demining activities.... The preparatory assistance phase of the demining project is scheduled to begin in July."¹⁵

The Guinea-Bissau military states that it has 112 trained and experienced sappers (deminers).¹⁶ Most of these were associated with the Humaid Demining. The sappers reported that their Russian-made mine detectors were incapable of detecting C-3A, P-4B and PMN mines; they had therefore adopted prodding. Many of the newly laid mines were Spanish plastic mines impossible to detect with their current mine detectors.¹⁷ Humaid also reported 3,000 TM 46 antitank mines in the southeast and 1,900 in the south of the country but this claim cannot be substantiated.¹⁸ The UNDP noted in July 1999 that Humaid mine clearance efforts were not up to humanitarian clearance standards and that they needed training.¹⁹

A number of donors have come forward to support mine clearance in the country. Portugal pledged \$50,000 in 1999 for training deminers.²⁰ UNOGBIS has raised \$165,000.²¹ Germany donated \$25,000 in 1999,²² and the U.S. has allocated an

¹⁰ Interview with a delegation from the Genie Militaire, Bissau, March 2000.

¹¹ Humaid has a pool of demobilized staff consisting of three Chiefs of Operations (former officers), thirteen team leaders, seventy-seven deminers, and twenty-seven students. These deminers had cleared mines during the 1998-99 war and are organized into thirteen teams, each with six deminers, two nurses and two drivers.

¹² UNDP estimates it will need \$400,000 a year for running costs.

¹³ UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau," S/2000/632, 28 June 2000, p. 2.

¹⁴ Interview with Alioune Ibaba, UNOGBIS, Bissau, March 2000.

¹⁵ UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau," S/2000/632, 28 June 2000, pp. 2-3.

¹⁶ UNDP, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, p. 8.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²¹ Interview with Alioune Ibaba, UNOGBIS, Bissau, March 2000.

²² UNMAS Mine Action Investments Database.

estimated \$365,000 in 2000, and \$500,000 in 2001.²³ Canada and individuals such as the former U.S. Ambassador to Bissau, John Blakin, have also been assisting in raising funds for mine clearance.²⁴

Mine Awareness

UNICEF established a Mine Awareness Committee (COAM), which is made up of various organizations and NGOs and has met bi-weekly since April 1999 to plan and coordinate all mine awareness activities. There are three priority areas: information, training, and logistics. A variety of materials have been produced, such as marking rope, marking triangles, T-shirts, mine awareness posters and comic books, funded by Canada (\$20,400). The local radio station has also provided free airtime for awareness messages and RDP (Portuguese radio) has also broadcast mine awareness programs to Bissau.

Andes, a local NGO, was supported by Rädä Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) with a consultant in mid-1999 to train trainers for mine awareness, especially targeting teachers. During this period some forty individuals were trained.²⁵ In July 1999, Andes organized a football tournament in Bissau with a mine awareness theme that attracted some 2,500 young people.

Landmine Casualties/Survivor Assistance

Though the number is uncertain, there continue to be mine casualties. Some of these accidents involved people who had returned to their houses in Bissau, or who had begun farming activities in rice and cashew fields. In Bissau, mine marking signs have not always been respected.²⁶ One problem in particular is that red cloth is traditionally used to warn people not to enter an area because it is a private cashew orchard or a traditional ceremony is taking place in the area. A number of mine victims reported that they had believed the mine warning to have been these sort of signs.

Victims of mines, both military and civilian, are treated in hospital, but once discharged are the responsibility of their families. There are two prosthetic facilities in Bissau. One is run by the government, but is not functioning. The other is run by Andes, supported by Handicap International, which provides materials from Senegal. The UNDP reported that the ICRC plans to collect data regarding victims in the hospitals.²⁷

KENYA

Key developments since March 1999: The Oromo Liberation Front, a rebel group operating in southern Ethiopia, has been accused of planting antitank and possibly antipersonnel mines inside Kenyan territory.

²³ Human Rights Watch, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report* Vol.12, No. 3, July 2000, p. 27.

²⁴ Interview with a delegation of Genie Militaire, Bissau, March 2000.

²⁵ Twenty in Suzana and twenty in Bissau from affected suburbs. UNDP, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, p. 11.

²⁶ UNDP, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, p. 11.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

Mine Ban Policy

Kenya signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. On 3 May 1999, Kenya's Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sheldon Muchilwa, told the First Meeting of States Parties that "we have almost completed the domestic requirements for ratification of the Convention and will deposit our instrument in the very near future."¹ Three weeks later, at the regional launch of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* in Nairobi, a statement from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Bonaya Godana, was read to a public briefing, stating that Kenya's ratification was "at an advanced stage" and that the ratification instruments would be deposited with the United Nations "shortly."² In October 1999, the Minister for Foreign Affairs told participants at a workshop on ratification hosted by the Attorney-General's office and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that Kenya was formalizing the ratification procedures.³ At the same time, Attorney General Amos Wako stated that the ratification "will be done upon conclusion of the preparatory committee on the elements of crime and rules of procedure, which will be finalized next year."⁴

In June 2000, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told *Landmine Monitor* that the ratification delay is due to "the long process of getting the concerned Ministries to conclude consultations before a Cabinet paper can be presented to the Cabinet for approval, paving way for appropriate legislation to commence."⁵ The official said he was "optimistic" this process would see ratification completed in time for the Second Meeting of States Parties.

Kenyan legislators have pledged their support for swift passage of ratification legislation, including Member of Parliament Raila Odinga, who leads the National Development Party and Member of Parliament George Anyona, who leads the Kenya Social Congress, and Member of Parliament, Josephine Odira Sinyo.⁶

At the First Meeting of States Parties, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Muchilwa stated, "We in Kenya are convinced that a successful implementation of the objectives of the Convention will constitute a significant contribution to international peace and security. We therefore appeal to all states to demonstrate their commitment to the ban by working together in solidarity."⁷

¹ Statement by Hon. Sheldon Muchilwa, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

² Speech by Dr Bonaya Godana, Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. William Morogo, to the regional launch of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, Nairobi, 27 May 1999.

³ Julius Bosire, "Kenya 'to ratify landmine treaty,'" *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 24 October 1999.

⁴ The statement by the Attorney General was delivered by the Deputy Solicitor General, Julius Kandie. *The People*, 24 October 1999, p. 3.

⁵ Interview with senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi, 13 June 2000.

⁶ Statements by Raila Odinga and George Anyona to Seminar on Peace Building and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms with Special Reference to Mine Action, organized jointly by KCAL and the Jaramogi Odinga Odinga Foundation (JOOF). Notes recorded by *Landmine Monitor* researcher, who was a rapporteur at the workshop. Interview with Josephine Odira Sinyo, Nairobi, 20 December 1999.

⁷ Statement by Hon. Sheldon Muchilwa, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the FMSP, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

Kenya participated in the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance in September 1999 and the meeting on Victim Assistance in September 1999. Kenya voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had done on key pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.

Kenya is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been vocal on the issue of negotiating a mine export ban in that forum.

Many advocacy activities have been undertaken in the past year by various local and international non-governmental organizations, including by the Kenya Coalition Against Landmines, to advocate rapid ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty, and domestic legislation.⁸ Kenya's Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomed *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* as "an initiative that aims at monitoring the implementation of one of the most important international treaties in the world today."⁹

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Kenya has not produced or exported landmines. The current size and composition of Kenya's stockpile of antipersonnel mines remains unknown. According to the Attorney General, the issues of transit and transfer and the interpretation of the treaty prohibition "will be adequately dealt with at the legislating stage."¹⁰

Landmine Problem

Ethiopia's Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a rebel group operating in southern Ethiopia, has been accused of planting antitank and possibly antipersonnel mines inside Kenyan territory, in the north of the country.¹¹

In May 1999, two AT mine-related incidents were reported in Moyale district, a key transportation point along Kenya's northern border with Ethiopia.¹² On 8 May, a senior Kenyan government official was killed and two of his colleagues seriously injured when their Land Rover hit a landmine near Moyale town.¹³ On 12 May 1999, a thirteen-ton lorry hit a landmine on the Moyale-Dabel road near Oda, injuring six passengers.¹⁴ The North Eastern Provincial Police Officer told Landmine Monitor that bandits

⁸ Workshop by KCAL/Greater Horn of Africa Mine Action Network (GHAMAN), Nairobi, 28-29 April 1999; Pre-Hap Landmine Workshop, Nairobi, 28 April-2 May 1999; Nairobi; KCAL/Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Foundation (JOOF) Workshop on Peacebuilding and Conflict resolution with special reference to landmines, Nairobi, 3-4 August 1999; ICRC Kenya Workshop on ratification and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, Nyeri, 22 October 1999; Workshop by KCAL/GHAMAN, Nairobi, 12-13 November 1999.

⁹ Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered by the Deputy Minister, to the regional launch of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, Nairobi, 27 May 1999.

¹⁰ Letter from Attorney General Amos Wako to Landmine Monitor researcher, 23 December 1999.

¹¹ Interview with senior government official, Nairobi, 6 January 2000.

¹² IPPNW-Kenya, "Landmine Report from Kenya," May 1999.

¹³ "Landmine Kills Kenyan Official," *PANA* (Nairobi), 10 May 1999.

¹⁴ Landmine Monitor interviewed one survivor of this incident who said that another survivor, Maxwell Cheruitich, died weeks later from injuries related to the incident. Interview with George Mutisya Mulinge, Drilling Spares and Services Ltd., Nairobi, 7 January 2000.

suspected to be members of OLF had already planted two antivehicle mines, and were planting an antipersonnel mine, when they were disturbed by Kenyan security personnel.¹⁵ The Ethiopian Embassy in Nairobi denied involvement in the planting of the mines along the Marsabit-Moyale highway, saying that it “does not get involved in an internationally outlawed activity like planting mines targeting civilian population, institutions and infrastructure.”¹⁶

In Bute village in Nana near Moyale where the landmine incidents occurred, the mine explosions caused a lot of anxiety to the local community.¹⁷ According to a resident:

This village was saved by donkeys otherwise we could have starved to death. The road to Moyale was closed for one month and even after it was declared safe, few vehicle owners were willing to put their vehicles at risk of being blown-up by landmines. Everything we eat here comes from Moyale. We are used to bandits, the government provides us with armed security escort, but these strange explosives are very deadly, even the escort cannot protect us from them. We are very scared.¹⁸

On 22 March 2000, fourteen Kenyan civilians were killed and four injured in two separate incidents when the vehicles they were travelling in were blown up in Dugo, in Ethiopia, two kilometers north of Moyale town. In the first incident, involving a Toyota Hilux pick-up truck, fourteen died and only one passenger survived - a pregnant woman who gave birth to still born twins at the scene.¹⁹ Four Kenyan occupants of a lorry heading for Moyale were seriously injured when it ran over a second mine at the same place. Kenya’s Eastern Provincial Commissioner, Philomena Koech, told media that the victims were not Kenyan but Ethiopian and that they had already been buried in Ethiopia “where they died and belonged.”²⁰ Landmine Monitor has recorded the names and details of those involved in the incidents and confirms that the victims were Kenyan.²¹

Local police told media that the mines, believed to be detonated by remote control, were planted by militiamen of the Oromo Liberation Front, who infiltrate from Ethiopia.²²

Kenya has a historic but limited problem with UXO dating back to World War I and WW II and also from the Mau Mau insurgency in the years running up to independence. More recently, Army maneuvers involving the Kenyan, U.S., and U.K.

¹⁵ Interview with Jeremiah Matagaro, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police, Provincial Police Officer, North Eastern Province, Nairobi, 28 October 1999.

¹⁶ Said Wabera, “Tension grips Moyale as soldiers move in,” *Daily Nation*, 21 May 1999, p. 60.

¹⁷ Interview with senior government official, Nairobi, 16 December 1999.

¹⁸ Interview with Gure Mohammed, Bute, Moyale, 29 July 1999.

¹⁹ “14 killed, 5 injured as landmines blast truck,” *Daily Nation*, (Nairobi), 23 March 2000.

²⁰ Kenya Broadcasting Corporation TV, Nairobi, in English, 1800 GMT, 23 March 2000.

²¹ When there is a severe drought in Kenya, Kenyans from Gare community in Moyale and north Kenya often migrate with their livestock to southern Ethiopia in search of pasture. The lorry incident involved Kenyans from Gare community returning home. Interview with Said Wabera, Nairobi, 24 July 2000.

²² “Landmines Kill 14, Injure Four Others In Kenya,” *PANA* (Nairobi), 23 March 2000.

armed forces have led to a slight increase in the UXO problem in training ranges.²³ In Samburu district, the local community reportedly wants to sue the British government over the UXO problems in the area, while a British Embassy spokesman in Nairobi told media that they will study the issue of accepting liability for some UXO fatalities.²⁴

No in-depth assessment or survey has been made of the extent of the mine and UXO problem. In late 1999, KCAL commissioned a preliminary survey of landmines and UXOs in the northern part of Kenya.²⁵

Mine Action

Mine clearance in Kenya is the task of combat engineers of the Kenya Armed Forces, who respond when a UXO or mine is reported.²⁶ In October 1999, the Africa Demining Program (AFRIDEP), an initiative by retired Kenyan military personnel, was registered in Kenya as a commercial demining organization. According to the Programme Chairman, Dr. John M. Atunga, AFRIDEP has all the necessary equipment and technology to undertake demining activities to the highest standards.²⁷

When the mine incidents occurred in Moyale, the Kenyan Army used armoured Army lorries to run over the suspected mined areas. Military experts told Landmine Monitor that it was "not necessary to take the more advanced mine clearance equipment to Moyale because of one simple mine. Moving the equipment to and from Moyale would have been expensive. Suffice to say that the military has the capability to demine."²⁸

The military does not conduct mine awareness education. Mine awareness or risk education programmes in Kenya are so far confined to advocacy through the mass media and the workshops hosted by KCAL and other organizations. The Jesuit Refugee Service Eastern Africa (JRS) carries out landmine awareness education for refugees from neighboring countries when the need arises. When UNICEF was asked if it would engage in mine awareness for the communities in Moyale after the mine incidents, the

²³ Otsieno Namway, "Who Planted Mines in the Rift?" *The East African* (Nairobi), 24 February 2000.

²⁴ Said Wabera, "British government admits claims," *DN*, 28 September 1999. However, spokesperson Rumbold, in his faxed letter to the Landmine Monitor Researcher, states that "The British Army is only one of a number of armed forces which carry out live firing exercises on training areas in Kenya. Afterwards, we routinely sweep any areas used for UXO. We have not seen any evidence that UXO from British Army Exercises has been responsible for any injuries."

²⁵ John Kamau and Said Wabera, "Dangerous games: Preliminary Report on the state of landmines and other UXOs in Kenya," (KCAL: Nairobi), February 2000. See also John Kamau, "The Bomb Country: The Kenya we Hardly Know," *Newsline*, (Nairobi), Issue 5, 26 May-8 June 2000.

²⁶ Interview, Major (rtd) M. Thairu, Nairobi, 16 December 1999.

²⁷ Dr. John M. Atunga, AFRIDEP's Program Chair stated this in a workshop on landmines during the All Africa Peace Conference, Nairobi, 5 November 1999. The standards were not clearly defined. AFRIDEP lost the initial contract for mine clearance in Kosovo due to the delay in the registration of the organization. A new contract is being negotiated.

²⁸ Interview with Lt Col (rtd) J.A.W. Kitiku, Deputy Director, Security Research and Information Centre, Nairobi, 4 January 2000.

regional representative said that UNICEF “cannot come in at the national level unless we are invited by our local partners. So far this has not happened.”²⁹

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Kenya borders with nations currently or recently engaged in conflict where landmines have been used (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) and receives refugees, including landmine survivors, from these nations.

Victims from the recent mine incidents were treated at the Moyale District Hospital, the only government hospital in the district. The hospital has a bed capacity of 120 patients and serves people from Ethiopia as well.

There are general hospitals and dispensaries throughout the country and there are occupational therapists, counsellors and psychologists from the Ministry of Health in various hospitals. The Ministry of National Heritage, Culture and Sports sponsors the Kabete Orthopaedic Workshop, which manufactures some orthopaedic appliances and provides them at a subsidized cost. The Association of the Physically Disabled of Kenya hosts workshops on the manufacture of orthopaedic appliances. None of these organizations, however, deal specifically with landmine victims.

SÃO TOMÉ E PRINCIPE

São Tomé e Príncipe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 30 April 1998. According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the Parliament approved ratification in early 1999, but the President has not yet signed it because of other pressing business.¹ São Tomé did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, and did not participate in any of the treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva. São Tomé was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. It is believed that São Tomé has never produced or exported AP mines, and according to Luis Maria from the office of the Chief of Staff of the São Toméan Armed Forces, there are no stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in the country.² São Tomé is not mine-affected.

SIERRA LEONE

Key developments since March 1999: Despite continued fighting, Sierra Leone is not seriously mine-affected. A bill to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty is currently before the parliament. UNMAS conducted an assessment mission in February 2000 and concluded

²⁹ Interview, Lissa Kurbiel, UNICEF Regional Office, during landmines workshop at the AAPC, Nairobi, 5 November 1999.

¹ Telephone interview with Dr. Ana Paula Alvim, Department of Multilateral Issues in the Office of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, São Tomé, 3 July 2000.

² Telephone interview with Luis Maria, Office of the Chief of Staff, São Toméan Armed Forces, São Tomé, 26 March 1999.

that there had been very limited use of mines in the past. It recommended establishment of a Mine Action Office, but not a nationwide program of mine and UXO awareness education.

Background

In early May 2000, a fragile peace process in Sierra Leone collapsed after rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under the leadership of Foday Sankoh took hundreds of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) soldiers hostage and for a short while threatened the capital, Freetown. Fighting between pro-government forces and the RUF has resumed, re-igniting the civil war that began in 1991 and was supposedly ended in July 1999 with the conclusion of a peace accord in Lomé, Togo. In February 1998 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces entered the country and ejected the military government and its allies, who had staged a coup in May 1997. Antipersonnel mines are believed to have been used in this conflict in very limited numbers and the impact of the mine and UXO problem has been described by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) as “extremely limited” and consisting more of UXO and booby traps, than AP and AT mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Sierra Leone signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 June 1998. In March 2000, the Minister of Parliamentary and Political Affairs, Abu Aiah Koroma, submitted a bill to the Parliament on ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹ The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Sama Banya, told Landmine Monitor, “There is no doubt that the ratification process currently going through Parliament will soon be concluded. It is a package that will strengthen our implementation of the treaty in our country.”²

Sierra Leone voted in support of pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999. It voted for similar UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998.

Sierra Leone did not participate in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo and it has not attended the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva, but both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and government officials interviewed by Landmine Monitor stated the government’s unflinching support for the treaty.³

Sierra Leone is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

A local NGO, SHARE (Save Heritage And Rehabilitate the Environment) has been active in campaigning for the government to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty and for no mine use in Sierra Leone.⁴

¹ SHARE interview with Cecil F. King, Senior Assistant Clerk of Parliament, Freetown, 18 March 2000.

² Interview with Dr. Sama Banya, Foreign Minister, Accra, Ghana, 28 April 2000.

³ SHARE interview with Charles Tom Kamanda, Senior Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Freetown, 19 March 2000.

⁴ SHARE press release, “Where are the Landmines used in the War,” 20 November 1999; SHARE press release “Landmines to prolong suffering in Sierra Leone,” 26 November 1999; SHARE public lecture on the topic of “Landmines, the Environment & Sustainable Peace in Sierra Leone,” 26 January 2000.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Sierra Leone is not known to produce or export antipersonnel mines. It is believed to stockpile AP mines but no details are available on the size, composition, or countries of origin.⁵ The then-Chief of Defense Staff, Brigadier-General Khobe told the UNMAS assessment mission team that he abhorred the use of landmines and was committed to the destruction of remaining stockpiles.⁶ The UNMAS assessment mission team was shown a Romanian MAI 75 AP mine that ECOMOG forces claimed to have cleared.⁷

Use

On 26 January 2000, Lt. Col. T.N. Momodu, a Staff Officer to the Chief of Defense Staff, said that the first Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) casualties due to landmines were in November 1992 when a mine he said was laid by the RUF destroyed a SLA tank in Wordu, Kono.⁸ He claimed that there were “twenty recorded landmines with the RUF supplied by Liberia.” Momodu alleged that the AFRC-RUF junta “embarked on mine warfare in the wake of their rule in 1997 and employed anti-tank and anti-personnel mines as a means of deterring ECOMOG advance toward their position.”

In February 2000 UNMAS conducted a seven-day technical assessment mission in Sierra Leone.⁹ The two-person UNMAS assessment team met with representatives of the government, the warring factions, UNAMSIL, UN agencies, the ICRC, and international and local NGOs and also travelled to Kabala in the north and Kenema and Daru in the east of the country. UNMAS concluded that the warring factions “had relatively little recourse to the use of landmines,” both AP and AT.¹⁰ It noted, “Nuisance mining took place rather than the laying of protective or barrier mines per se.”¹¹ It also noted that while some weapons, such as unexploded mortar shells, hand grenades, and possibly RPGs had been handed in at disarmament sites, no landmines had been handed in.¹²

The Chief of Defense Staff “seemingly conceded” to UNMAS that a small number of landmines were used but claimed that they were all recorded and subsequently cleared between February and April 1998.¹³ ECOMOG told the UNMAS assessment mission that other parties to the conflict had used a small number of mines beginning in 1991, and

⁵ In 1995, Jeremy Harding, an editor at the *London Review of Books*, was told by a diamond industry source that the British military equipment agent, J & S Franklin Limited, had procured landmines for the Sierra Leone government. Telephone interview with Jeremy Harding, London, 31 March 1999.

⁶ UNMAS, “Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report,” 7 February 2000, p. 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ He made these remarks at a public lecture organized by SHARE on the topic of “Landmines, the Environment & Sustainable Peace in Sierra Leone” to an audience of civil society organizations, government, armed forces and the international community at the British Council in Freetown. See, SHARE, Report of a Public Lecture on the topic: Landmines, the Environment and Sustainable Peace in Sierra Leone, 26 January 2000. Circulated on icblafrika egroup by ICBL Coordinator, 23 February 2000.

⁹ See UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

that there had been further AP mine use in the 1997 invasion and retreat, particularly in the Waterloo area.¹⁴

The Civil Defense Forces (CDF) “denies having used landmines” but their representatives told UNMAS that CDF members had found 28 landmines in Tonkolili and Moyamba districts in central Sierra Leone, and that seven of these mines had been handed over to ECOMOG.¹⁵

The RUF also “denies having used landmines” and “claimed that there are no mines planted in areas under RUF control.”¹⁶ The leader of the AFRC told UNMAS that “a small number of anti-tank mines were used on the road to Lungi in 1997/8,” but claimed that these were subsequently cleared and that no antipersonnel mines had been laid by his forces.¹⁷

Since opening its office in Sierra Leone in 1999, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has attempted to verify whether Sierra Leone has a landmine problem. Its overall assessment is that most (if not all) the cases HRW has been able to investigate are a result of either booby traps or unexploded ordnance, not landmines.¹⁸ In late 1999 and early 2000, HRW interviewed two cases of combatants injured by “landmines,” however eyewitnesses say both were injured by booby traps (a grenade tied between two trees) placed by member of the ex-SLA.¹⁹ Both the ICRC and Handicap International told HRW that while they have treated patients injured by booby traps, they don’t recall ever having fitted a patient for a limb which was lost due to a landmine explosion.²⁰

Landmine Problem

While access to all areas of the country was not possible when the UNMAS assessment mission visited, the team determined that Sierra Leone has a “limited” problem with landmines and UXO. While it said information received could not be confirmed, UNMAS listed the following areas as suspected to be mine- or UXO-affected:

Kono district, Kailahun district, the northern part of Moyamba district from Moyamba town, and the southern part of Tonkolili district from Maburaka town, and in Bafodia village.... In addition, a small area of land adjacent to a disused secondary school in Kabala has been identified as highly likely to be affected by either landmines or booby traps.²¹

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.; see also, Sulaiman Momodu, “Kamajors Discover 28 Rebel Planted Landmines,” *Freetown Concord Times* (Internet Version-WWW) 26 January 2000.

¹⁶ UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, p. 6.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Email from HRW Sierra Leone to Mary Wareham, HRW, 19 February 2000.

¹⁹ In May 1999 in Mile 91, a “kamajor” lost his leg and in November 1999 in Kabala, one ex-SLA was killed and another injured. Email from HRW Sierra Leone to Mary Wareham, HRW, 19 February 2000.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, p. 7.

UNMAS reports that landmines and UXO were not having any impact on peacekeeping operations, on agencies and organizations involved in aid distribution, on returning refugees and described any socio-economic impact as “extremely limited.”²²

Mine Action

In his public lecture Lt. Col. Momodu stated that the SLA “endeavoured to keep records and maps of all landmines laid - that included anti-tank and anti-personnel which were demined by joint SLA and ECOMOG engineers.”²³ The UNMAS Assessment Mission reported that a “limited capacity exists within the armed forces and warring factions to deal safely with uncleared landmines and items of UXO.”²⁴ Under the terms of the peace agreement signed by the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in Lomé, Togo in July 1999, all warring factions are expected to hand over maps of mined areas or areas containing explosive devices.²⁵ However, at this writing no side had complied to this provision and the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation (DDR) process had all but halted after the RUF took hostage some 500 UN peacekeepers in May 2000 and the warring factions again resumed hostilities.

Nine AP landmines were handed over to DDR officials between November 1999 and May 2000, when the DDR process broke down.²⁶ These mines, all of which were destroyed in UNAMSIL supervised exercises during March and April 2000, were of Italian and Czech origin. Ten AP mines (believed to be of Chinese-origin) were captured along with hundreds of other arms and ammunition during a UNAMSIL operation to free 220 Indian peacekeepers and 11 unarmed UN military observers from their RUF captors on 15-16 July 2000 in the Kailahun District.²⁷

UNMAS recommended that UNAMSIL prioritize the establishment of a Mine Action Office, which has since been set up, including the establishment of the IMSMA database.²⁸ It recommended that this office coordinate mine action within Sierra Leone, “in particular with regard to mine and UXO survey, detection and clearance, and with respect to necessary mine awareness education for the UNAMSIL peacekeepers.”²⁹ As of 5 June 2000, there were 11,350 UNAMSIL troops in the country, including 254 military observers, under Indian command.³⁰

²² Ibid., pp. 7-8.

²³ SHARE, Report of a Public Lecture, 26 January 2000.

²⁴ UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, pp. 9.

²⁵ Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Lomé, Togo, 7 July 1999.

²⁶ One Czech AP mine was handed over in Freetown in Nov. 1999, three Italian AP mines in Hastings, one Czech AP mine in Kenema, and two Italian AP mines were handed over in Bo. HRW interview with UNAMSIL U.K. Major Mike Godard, Freetown, 26 July 2000.

²⁷ HRW interview with UNAMSIL UK Major Mike Godard, Freetown, 26 July 2000.

²⁸ UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, pp. 9.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Human Rights Watch, “Memorandum on Sierra Leone: Priorities for the International Community,” 20 June 2000.

The UNMAS Assessment Mission reported that “it does not appear that a nationwide programme of mine and UXO awareness education is warranted.”³¹

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

On 23 November 1999, Jariatu Gbla, aged fifteen, had her foot amputated at Connaught Hospital after an explosion in the village of Tonkolili in Mathibo.³² SHARE claims Gbla was the victim of a landmine while the UNMAS Assessment stated that “her injuries suggest that that the device may actually have been an unexploded hand grenade.”³³ In February 2000, a twelve-year-old boy lost an eye after an explosion at Yams Farm on the outskirts of Freetown. Media reported that “he stepped on a landmine.”³⁴ But subsequent investigations by Human Rights Watch indicated that the explosion was not due to a mine, and was more likely caused by “a bullet lodged in the tire.”³⁵

During the armed conflict, the health infrastructure of the country saw widespread destruction, including destruction of a reported 70% of the primary health care centers across the country.³⁶ UNMAS noted that surgical care could be provided to landmine and UXO survivors at Kenema Hospital in the east of the country, Connaught Hospital in Freetown, and by the ICRC, MSF-Belgium, MSF-France, and MSF-Holland.³⁷ Prostheses for amputees are manufactured and fitted by HI France and by the U.S.-based NGO Hope International, which also provides physical rehabilitation.³⁸

SUDAN

Key developments since March 1999: Both the government of Sudan, a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty, and the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Army are believed to have used antipersonnel mines in this reporting period. On 27 March 2000, the SPLM/A officially committed to the “Geneva Call,” thereby agreeing not to use antipersonnel landmines under any circumstances. Sudan’s humanitarian mine action efforts continue to be seriously disrupted by the country’s continuing civil war. In November 1999, the U.S. reported that Sudan manufactures landmines; Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm this report.

³¹ UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, pp. 10.

³² Elvis Gbanabom Hallowell, Executive Director, SHARE, in Report of a Public Lecture, 26 January 2000.

³³ UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, pp. 8.

³⁴ “12-year-old Sierra Leonean loses eye in landmine explosion,” *Agence France Presse* (Freetown), 3 February 2000.

³⁵ Telephone interview with doctor who treated the boy. Email from HRW Sierra Leone to Mary Wareham, HRW, 19 February 2000.

³⁶ UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, pp. 9.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

Government Mine Ban Policy

Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. According to a Ministry of External Relations official, a technical committee has been established to examine ratification.¹ In May 1999, a senior government official stated that ratification was “under process.”²

In a reply to Landmine Monitor dated 31 July 2000, Sudan stated its “signing of the Convention, despite its security concerns which are well known to all, stems from its deep conviction and its strong belief that humanity should get rid of such dangerous weapons which threaten the lives of innocent population.... The Government of Sudan is committed to the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Convention.”³

Sudan attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, with a delegation led by Ambassador Awad M. Hassan, Director-General of the Department of Disarmament of the Ministry of External Relations. In a statement to the plenary, Ambassador Hassan described the problem of uncleared landmines in Sudan and stated that “technical and financial assistance is needed. The resources provided by the UN are obviously not sufficient. Therefore every direct assistance to my country is appreciated and valuable.”⁴

Sudan has participated in the meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance in September 1999 and March 2000, the meeting on Victim Assistance in September 1999, the meeting on Technologies for Mine Action in December 1999 and the meeting on General Status and Operation of the Convention in May 2000.

Sudan sponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. It had supported similar UNGA resolutions on landmines in 1996, 1997 and 1998.

The Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines actively campaigns for ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty by Sudan, among other activities.⁵

Sudan is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and it is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

¹ Gabriel Rorech, State Minister of Foreign Relations, mentioned the committee in a meeting with Suzanne Askelof, Secretary General, Rädda Barnen (Save the Children-Sweden) on 5 February 2000.

² Statement by Ambassador Awad M. Hassan, Director-General, Department of Disarmament, Ministry of External Relations to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

³ Letter from Ambassador Mubarak H. Rahamtalla, Deputy Permanent Representative, Republic of Sudan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, Ref. SUGA/3-1/2, 31 July 2000.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines was established in November 1997 and is composed of nongovernmental organizations including Sudanese Development Association, Sudanese Red Crescent, Disaster Management and Refugee Studies Institute, Relief Assistance for Southern Sudan, Rädda Barnen, Oxfam U.K., and Action Disabled Development. There is cooperation with the ICRC, UNICEF, and members from government departments including the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and the National Council for Child Welfare.

SPLM/A Mine Ban Policy

The main armed opposition group is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), whose armed forces are known as the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLM/A controls a large area of southern and eastern Sudan. On 27 March 2000, at a press conference in Geneva, SPLM/A representative Edward Lino Abyei verbally committed the SPLM/A to the "Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action." The Geneva Call is a Swiss-registered non-governmental body. The deed is officially held by the President of the government of Geneva, who accepted this oral commitment from the SPLM/A. Under the deed, the SPLM/A committed itself not to use antipersonnel landmines under any circumstances. Two other non-state actors signed the deed on that date, which was the launch of the Geneva Call. On 24-25 March 2000, the SPLM/A participated in the International Conference on Non-State Actors, held in Geneva, hosted by the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines in cooperation with a number of other national ban campaigns.

Previously, in 1996, the SPLM/A "declared a unilateral moratorium on the use of landmines provided that there is a significant reciprocation on the side of GOS."⁶ The SPLM/A also created Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL-Sudan) in part to address the issue of landmines and UXO in the areas under their control.⁷

In March 1999, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A pledged not to use mines, although details on these pledges secured by Olara Otunnu, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, are not available.⁸

Production

In November 1999, the U.S. Department of State reported that, "Sudan's Military Industry Corporation, which receives technical support from a variety of eastern European and Middle East countries, manufactures ammunition, *landmines*, and small arms."⁹ Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm this report or to clarify if the alleged production includes antipersonnel mines. This is the first time known to Landmine Monitor that Sudan has been identified as a producer of either AP or AT mines. In its 31 July 2000 letter to Landmine Monitor, the government of Sudan states that "[i]t does not produce landmines." The SPLM/A has not been known to manufacture landmines. The armed forces of both the government of Sudan and SPLM/A have considerable experience in improvisation techniques and are capable of

⁶ Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL-Sudan/Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association), Nairobi-Kenya, "Landmine Information-Sudan," signed by Aleu Ayieny Aleu, Director, OSIL-Sudan, dated 8 January 1999, p. 2.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Otunnu was reported to have secured a ban on use of landmines in the south of the country by both parties to the conflict. See "Sudan's Warring Parties Agree to Stop Using Landmines," *Reuters*, Nairobi, 11 March 1999.

⁹ Emphasis added. "Arms Flows to Central Africa/Great Lakes," Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, November 1999, www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_9911_armsflows.html.

producing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which are also prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁰

Transfer

Sudan shares borders with nine African countries, almost all beset by conflict. There have been past allegations that the government transferred AP and AT landmines to rebel groups in neighboring countries, including to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, which has used AT mines on civilian roads, and to the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army.¹¹ In December 1999, Sudan and Uganda signed a reconciliation agreement under the mediation of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. The two nations agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations and to stop all support to rebel groups based in their territories.¹² Nevertheless it appears that both Sudan and Uganda continue to support rebel groups with arms.

Stockpiling

Both the government's military and the SPLA are believed to have stockpiled AP mines, but details on the size, location or types of mines are unknown. AP mines from Belgium, China, Egypt, Israel, Italy, United States and former Soviet Union have been identified in Sudan.¹³ In July 1999, an assessment of Kassala in eastern Sudan and Malakal in the Upper Nile also found AP mines from Iran and Iraq.¹⁴ No AP mine destruction is known to have taken place by either the government of Sudan or the SPLA.

Government Use

Over the past forty-four years since independence Sudan has witnessed relative peace for only the eleven years between 1972 and 1983. Nearly two million may have been killed, four million internally displaced and at least 350,000 people have fled to neighboring countries.¹⁵ The war in Sudan is primarily concentrated in the southern region, but in 1989 it reached the Nuba Mountains and in 1995 the civil war expanded to eastern Sudan. In contested areas of south Sudan, the government controls some towns while the surrounding countryside is dominated by insurgent forces and in some cases by government tribal militias. "In this type of warfare," an August 1997 UN report stated, "the government uses landmines to protect the garrison towns, and to interdict the movement of insurgent supplies and forces. The rebels also use landmines to fix government forces in the towns, and to interdict their supply lines. Both sides also

¹⁰ OSIL, "Landmine Information-Sudan," 8 January 1999, p. 2.

¹¹ Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan, (Human Rights Watch: New York, August 1998), p. 39, 40.

¹² The Uganda-Sudan Agreement was signed in Nairobi on 8 December 1999. See also PANA, 9 December 1999.

¹³ For details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 171-172.

¹⁴ The assessment was carried out by Rae MacGrath, founder of the Mines Advisory Group. No report has been made yet but Mr. McGrath made a presentation of his findings in Sharga Hall, University of Khartoum, 25 July 1999.

¹⁵ United States Council of Refugees Survey, 9 September 1999.

reportedly continue to use landmines to terrorize local populations to diminish their support for the other side.”¹⁶

The war in southern Sudan intensified in 1999, and it appears that both the government and the SPLA have continued to use antipersonnel mines. Human Rights Watch undertook a field mission to Sudan in mid-1999. Based on testimony from the local population, Human Rights Watch believes that the government has used antipersonnel mines, largely in its efforts to control the oil fields in southern Sudan.¹⁷ Witnesses to landmine explosions said that the government laid antipersonnel mines in and around Ler and Adok in Western Upper Nile, contested oil areas.¹⁸ In one witnessed incident, an antipersonnel mine triggered an attached antitank mine, killing three rebel combatants at once, outside a government barracks in Ler in early July 1999. Others have reported this government practice of attaching AT to AP land mines for greater lethality.

Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not been ratified by Sudan, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty...” Clearly, new use of mines defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.

Government officials, including the State Minister of Foreign Relations, Mr. Ali Numeri, continue to state that the government of Sudan does not use AP mines.¹⁹ This was repeated in the 31 July 2000 letter to Landmine Monitor: “It does not produce landmines, nor use it. The statistics have shown that the rebel movement is the party which has used and continues to use landmines in the southern and eastern part of the country....”

SPLA Use

In early 1999, the SPLA laid both antipersonnel and antitank mines in Chukudum in Eastern Ekuatoria, an area under SPLA control close to the Ugandan border. An SPLA officer and locals told Landmine Monitor researchers that 2,500 landmines were planted in Muleny, Natagumi and Lopitac triangle; 150 landmines were planted in the banana and orchard plantation in the valley behind Chukudum Catholic Mission up to Komiri Hill; and 1,000 were planted behind Chukudum Hospital to Nangoromitto and behind SPLA barracks. When presented with these figures, OSIL-Sudan Managing Director Aleu Ayiney Aleu stated that “only 160” landmines were planted in Chukudum by the SPLA.²⁰

¹⁶ United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Mine Clearance Policy Unit, “The Landmine Situation in Sudan: Assessment Mission Report,” August 1997, p. 7.

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch interviews with witnesses to casualties caused by government-laid land mines, Kenya-Sudan border, August 1999.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Statement by Mr. Ali Numeri, State Minister of Foreign Relations, Khartoum, 1 March 1999.

²⁰ David Nailo Mayo, Landmine Monitor interview with Aleu Ayiney Aleu, Managing Director, OSIL-Sudan at the Christian Aid Office, London, 4 April 2000. Data collected in Chudukum from eyewitness accounts, letters from residents of Chukudum, secondary sources and a standard questionnaire completed by field researchers between July 1999 and May 2000.

The area did not suffer from landmines until 1999 when area residents fell out with the town's SPLA commander. Chukudum town is now encircled with minefields, which observers state are aimed at preventing civilians from returning to the town. Civilians fled to the mountains to avoid SPLA shelling of the town and fighting between the Bor Dinka in SPLA units and armed local residents of the Didinga tribe. The Chukudum Landmines Project reports that through May 2000, thirty-seven people died and fourteen were injured by landmines.²¹

In February 2000, a shepherd was killed and nine others injured in a landmine blast when they were driving their herds in Bahr-el-Arab region, in south Darfur in southwest Sudan. According to people in the region, the SPLA was responsible for laying mines in the area in 1999. They claim some 160 mines were laid, which in 1999 killed eleven people and injured five others.²²

On 16 January 2000, the Ugandan army and police reportedly captured two SPLA commanders in Arua town in northwestern Uganda in a raid that had been prompted by finding two antipersonnel mines in an Arua township villages two weeks earlier.²³

NDA Use

In 1995, the armed opposition umbrella group, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) opened a new front in Eastern Sudan.²⁴ Both AP and AT mines have been used on this front. In March 2000, NDA forces seized Sudan's Hamashkorab district near the town of Kassala. The mayor of Kassala town, Ibrahim Mohamoud Hamid, claimed that the opposition based in Eritrea planted landmines.²⁵ Between 1996 and the first half of 1999, 122 mine incidents were recorded around Kassala, involving 327 victims including forty-two fatalities.²⁶ In May 1999 three persons were killed and eight injured by mines allegedly planted by the NDA north of Kassala town. The spokesperson for the government's armed forces in the region, Lt. General Muhammad Yasin, condemned the use of landmines and said his forces had cleared other mines with no losses.²⁷ In May 2000 an Eritrean refugee fleeing the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war was reported killed by an AP mine on the Sudan side of the border.²⁸

²¹ Data collected in Chudukum from eyewitness accounts, letters from residents of Chukudum, secondary sources and a standard questionnaire completed by field researchers between July 1999 and May 2000.

²² *Agence France-Presse*, 19 February 2000.

²³ "Uganda: Northwest officials to send suspected Sudanese rebel commanders home," *The Monitor* (newspaper), as reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 January 2000.

²⁴ The NDA, at its height, included the Beja Congress, the Democratic Unionist Party, the SPLA/M, the Sudan Alliance Forces, the Umma Party and the United Federal Defence forces.

²⁵ Mohamed Osman, "Hundreds of thousands of Eritrean refugees expected in Sudan," *Associated Press* (el-Lafa Camp, Sudan), 22 May 2000.

²⁶ Dr. Hussein El-Obeid, "Socio-economic Impact of Landmines in Kassala State Assessment," September 1999. Eighty-eight percent of incidents occurred on rural roads indicating that they were caused by AT mine use and 93 percent of the victims were civilian. In April 1999, Dr. El-Obeid left the Government of Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission in and is now an independent consultant.

²⁷ Sudan News Agency (SUNA), 10 April 2000.

²⁸ Sudanese Red Crescent; *Al-Ra'yal Alam* (Arabic-Sudanese newspaper) 24 and 31 May 2000.

According to the Beja Relief Organization (the relief wing of the armed opposition Beja Congress, a member of the NDA), truckers on the border report that all roads inside Sudan to Eritrea are heavily mined except one road to Germaika, a village on the Eritrean side of the border. There are no warning signs on the mined roads, but the Sudanese military warn truckers and directs them onto this one road. The Beja Congress claims not to have or to use landmines.²⁹

Landmine Problem/Survey and Assessment

The southern regions of Equatoria, Bahr El Ghazal, and Upper Nile, the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan in central Sudan, and the eastern region, where there has been fighting since 1995, are all mine-affected. Most roads in the southern region are mined, and areas around towns such as Yei, Juba, Torit, Kapoeta and the Ugandan border town of Kaya, are reported mined.³⁰

In the recent years, several assessment have been made of the mine problem in Sudan but no comprehensive assessment or survey is planned, similar to the Level One Impact Surveys currently underway in other countries. The former United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs Mine Clearance and Policy Unit made an assessment mission in 1997 at the request of the government of Sudan.³¹ Landmines were included in an August 1998 report by the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch, *Sudan: Global Trade, Local Conflict*.³² Also in 1998, Rädda Barnen, UNICEF, Oxfam U.K. and the Sudanese Development Association made an assessment of the landmine problem in Kassala.³³ In 1999, Dr. Hussein El-Obeid, of the government of Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) made an assessment of the mine problem in Kassala.³⁴ In July 1999, Rae McGrath made a technical assessment of the landmine situation in Kassala and Malakal with photographer John Rodsted.³⁵ Finally, in 1998 a fifth year medical student at the Medicine University of Khartoum conducted research into the socio-economic impact of mines in Sudan, which included case studies of seventy mine victims who are patients of the National Center for Protheses and Orthoses (NAPCO).

Mine Clearance

Mine action efforts in government-controlled areas are carried out by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). The Sudanese Army is responsible for mine clearance. A mine action plan has been drawn up, but implementation is hindered by lack

²⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with Ali El Safi, Beja Relief Organization, Kampala, Uganda, 17 July 2000.

³⁰ UNHHA, "The Landmine Situation in Sudan," Annex G: Areas and Roads reported mined, August 1997.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Human Rights Watch, *Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan* (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 1998).

³³ Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Kassala Assessment Mission Report," August 1998.

³⁴ Dr. Hussein El-Obeid, "Socio-economic Impact of Landmines in Kassala State Assessment," September 1999.

³⁵ No report has been made yet but Rae McGrath made a presentation of his findings in Sharga Hall, University of Khartoum, 25 July 1999.

of resources and funding.³⁶ The government of Sudan continues to call for assistance in mine clearance, both technical and financial.³⁷

The International Partner's Forum of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IPF-IGAD) has planned a mine action component for post-war rehabilitation and development programs in the Sudan.³⁸ The IPF is a group of donors that work closely with the Horn of Africa regional development organization, IGAD, which since 1994 has hosted peace negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SPLA/M.

The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, SRRA, (the relief wing of the SPLA), created OSIL-Sudan in November 1996 to deal with the problems of landmines.³⁹ OSIL-Sudan, supported by a consortium of international and non-governmental organizations, started a mine action program in September 1997.⁴⁰ In a March 2000 presentation, OSIL-Sudan's Managing Director, Aleu Ayieny Aleu, stated that OSIL now has four integrated mine action teams of 45 persons (one-third of whom are women) and expects to expand to 11 teams by April 2001.⁴¹ Between September 1997 and April 2000 OSIL reports that it has removed 1,815 antipersonnel mines, 196 antitank mines, 76,408 UXOs, and cleared 527 miles of road and 2.2 square kilometers of land.⁴² Aleu states that "we have destroyed every single mine we have found."⁴³

The UK-based NGO Mines Advisory Group provided initial training, capacity building, and equipping of OSIL teams at the end of 1998. MAG conducted a further capacity and needs assessment in April 2000, and from mid-2000 MAG will provide additional training and capacity building to OSIL. This training will include mine clearance, mine awareness, community liaison and management techniques. Two existing and four new OSIL mine clearance teams and four mine awareness teams will be trained.

³⁶ Annex I: HAC report, Sudan Mine Action Programme, July 1997, in UNDHA, "The Landmine Situation in Sudan," August 1997.

³⁷ Annex A: Request for Assistance dated 25 January 1997, in UNDHA, "The Landmine Situation in Sudan," August 1997. See also Statement by Ambassador Awad M. Hassan, Director-General, Department of Disarmament, Ministry of External Relations to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

³⁸ IGAD Partners Forum-Sudan Committee, "Planing for Peace, an Action Plan," 13 March 2000.

³⁹ Sudan Peoples [sic] Liberation Army (SPLM) [sic] General Headquarters, New Kush – Himan, "Resolution on problem posed by proliferation of anti-personnel mines in liberated parts of new Sudan," signed by CDR Salva Knr Mayardit, Deputy Chairman, NLC/NEC (SPLM) and SPLA Chief of General Staff, dated 1 November 1996.

⁴⁰ OSIL lists the following international and non-governmental NGOs as sponsors of their mine action program: Christian Aid, Dan Church Aid EZE, Trocaire, UNICEF/OLS, Mine Advisory Group UK, Swiss Basler Mission, OXFAM Quebec, ICCO and CAMEO. OSIL, "Case Study: SPLA (NSA) and Landmines- Sudan," 1 March 2000, p.7.

⁴¹ OSIL, "Case Study: SPLA (NSA) and Landmines- Sudan," 1 March 2000, p. 7.

⁴² Ibid., p. 5; UK Working Group on Landmines, Special Update 15, July 2000.

⁴³ Chege Mbitiru, "Mines endure as deadly reminder of Sudanese civil war," *Associated Press* (Yei, Sudan), 14 July 1999.

This US\$120,000 project is funded through Basel Mission with funds from the government of Switzerland.⁴⁴

Mine Awareness

In government of Sudan-controlled areas, mine awareness programs are the responsibility of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). Organizations in the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines are also active in mine awareness activities. These include the Sudanese Red Crescent Society and those grouped under the umbrella of the government-run agency, the Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA). The government of Sudan has also established the Disaster Management and Refugee Studies Institute (DIMARSI) to train trainers on mine awareness in conflict zones in Sudan.

A pilot project has been funded by Rädga Barnen (Sweden), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), OXFAM, and UNICEF aimed at training trainers in child-to-child mine awareness education in the east of Kassala. With total funding of US\$75,000, members of the Sudan Red Crescent Society provide child-to-child mine awareness training and promote ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴⁵

In southern Sudan, OSIL-Sudan with assistance from UNICEF and other humanitarian organizations conducts mine risk education activities in conflict zones in the Sudan.⁴⁶ The OSIL program focuses on children and returning refugees and targets approximately 300,000 residents in mine-risk areas.

Landmine Casualties

Landmine victim statistics are not systematically collected. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contends that 70,000 people have been killed or injured by landmines.⁴⁷ This number has not been verified. The ICRC has reported 5,000 amputees registered in their hospitals.⁴⁸ Sudan's large size and poor infrastructure place mine victims at extreme risk. Most victims die before reaching health care facilities, which may account for the relatively small number of amputees registered at the various centers.⁴⁹

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Sudan is a huge country with poor infrastructure. Mine victims are most often from rural areas many hundreds of miles from the nearest treatment center. In addition, in southern Sudan, the most affected area, there are very few facilities that can take care of the victims.

The government of Sudan provides its military personnel with medical care. Civilian medical facilities and hospitals in government-controlled areas usually lack basic equipment, staff and resources. Satellite workshops in southern Sudan government-

⁴⁴ Information provided by MAG, email to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 28 July 2000.

⁴⁵ Hajir Mussa Kheir, "Proceedings of the Workshop on the Menace of Landmines in the Horn of Africa," The Institute for Practical Research and Training, Hargeisa, 23-24 November, 1999.

⁴⁶ This is according to OSIL-Sudan/SRRA, "Landmines Information-Sudan," p. 5.

⁴⁷ Ali Numeri, State Minister of Foreign Relations, "Statement on the occasion of the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, 1 March 1999."

⁴⁸ www.icrc.org; OSIL, Case Study: SPLA (NSA) and Landmines-Sudan, 1 March, 2000.

⁴⁹ Chege Mbitiru, "Mines endure as deadly reminder of Sudanese civil war," *Associated Press* (Yei, Sudan), 14 July 1999.

controlled towns of Juba and Wau assemble the prosthetic devices, fit them and provide physical therapy for civilians. In Khartoum, there is a national prosthetics and orthopedics center run by the Ministry of Social Planning and the Sudanese Armed Forces, with the support of the ICRC. The center provides assistance to civilian and military war victims, including landmine casualties. There is also a small prosthetics workshop in Kassala run by the Sudanese Disabled Care and Rehabilitation Society.

In August 1998, the government of Sudan provided 2 million Sudanese Dinars (around US\$8,000) for mine victims, distributed by \$200 to the family of a deceased, \$120 to the family of a totally disabled person and \$100 to the family of a partially disabled victim.⁵⁰

Between January and September 1999, the ICRC manufactured 357 prostheses and 56 orthoses at the National Center for Prostheses and Orthoses in Khartoum and at the prosthetic/orthotic workshop in Lopiding hospital.⁵¹

Basic infrastructure and public services in southern Sudan are practically non-existent. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) operates four hospitals in SPLA-held southern Sudan. The hospital in Yei, which treats landmine victims, has been deliberately targeted by government planes, which bombed it twelve times in 1998, and five times in 1999, inflicting substantial damage to the operating theater and maternity ward and forced the hospital to close temporarily. NPA also runs emergency mobile units.

Medicins Sans Frontiers Holland operates a hospital in Kajo Keiji on the Sudan side of the border with Uganda that treats landmine victims. The ICRC maintains an important hospital to treat patients, including many mine victims, in Lopiding, Kenya. The facility serves those injured in southern Sudan, both combatants and civilians. It also serves Kenyans with grave medical conditions. The Sudan Evangelical Mission (SEM) has attempted to provide prosthetic support by bringing technicians from Nairobi-based Jaipur Foot Project to Southern Sudan to assess the needs of amputees.⁵²

In 1999, the SPLM demanded that NGOs working in areas under SPLA control sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the SPLM. Eleven humanitarian organizations, including MSF refused to sign the SPLM document and were forced to withdraw from SPLA areas by 1 March 2000. Five of the non-signatories have since acceded to the MoU and begun the return process.

Psychological and social support facilities for mine victims are inadequate, if available, in southern Sudan. Some counseling and social support services are available at the ICRC-supported facilities at Lochichogio and at the UNHCR refugee camp at Kakuma, Kenya managed by the Lutheran World Federation and the International Rescue Committee. The Church Ecumenical Action in South Sudan assists in rehabilitation efforts in southern Sudan focusing on self-sufficiency to improve the livelihood of the most vulnerable people.⁵³

⁵⁰ The funds come from the Zakat funds, an Islamic charity that collects money from the rich and redistributes to the needy. In Sudan this is done through the Zakat Chamber, under the umbrella of the Ministry of Social Planning.

⁵¹ ICRC, "Fact Sheet: ICRC in Sudan," 26 January 2000, www.icrc.org.

⁵² Interview with Reverend Lexson Awad, Director, Sudan Evangelical Mission, Nairobi, 8 January 1999.

⁵³ Church of Ecumenical Action in Sudan (CEAS) Annual Report, 1996.

TANZANIA

Key developments since March 1999: On 17 July 2000 the National Assembly passed a bill to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty. Among the tens of thousands of refugees arriving in Tanzania are an increasing number of mine victims.

Mine Ban Policy

The United Republic of Tanzania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. On 17 July 2000 the National Assembly passed a bill to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty. The process and timetable for completing the ratification process and formally submitting the instrument of ratification to the UN is not known.

Tanzania participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 with a delegation led by the High Commissioner to Mozambique, H.E. Lt. Gen. Martin N. Mwakalindile. Tanzania did not attend any of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty. The country has, however, been active in sub-regional meetings on small arms and light weapons, which have included landmines in their deliberations.¹ In December 1999 Tanzania voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Tanzania is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament. The Tanzania Campaign to Ban Landmines (TCBL) actively lobbies for swift ratification of the ban treaty, urges mine action assistance, and monitors treaty implementation.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Tanzania does not manufacture landmines and is not believed to transfer them. There are concerns about Tanzania being used as a transit point for arms shipments that could include landmines. Tanzania is one of just four signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty that have not publicly stated whether or not they have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor has repeatedly asked for this information. Tanzanian Armed Forces used landmines in Uganda in 1979 and in Mozambique in 1986-1988.²

Landmine Problem

To date, Tanzania has not been considered heavily affected by antipersonnel landmines. However, the west of the country has seen a significant number of mine-affected refugees fleeing from DR Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. By the end of September 1999, Tanzania was sheltering some 276,000 Burundian, 100,000 Congolese, and 20,000 Rwandan refugees.³

Tanzania's main link to the landmine problem is the refugee population in the Kigoma area, where several camps host refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. Refugees

¹ Reports from "International Conference On Improvement of Human Security, Through the Control and Management of Small Arms," held in Arusha, Tanzania, 22-26 March 2000, and "The Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa Conference on the proliferation of small arms," Nairobi, 12-15 March 2000.

² Human Rights Watch, *Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), pp. 71, 140.

³ ICRC Regional Delegation in Kenya, *Fact Sheet*, 28 January 2000, p. 3.

arriving in Tanzania have been maimed or injured by mines. (See especially *Landmine Monitor Report 2000-Burundi*).

Landmine Casualties

Data collected from Maweni hospital shows that thirty-eight refugees injured by explosions, including landmines, were treated at the hospital since 1997, including thirteen since March 1999.⁴ Landmine Monitor was also informed that there were ten cases of landmine explosions involving civilians in various areas of Kagera region in the northwest.⁵ In September 1999, a boy named Samuel Elikana was killed by a mine while grazing cattle on the border in Ngara district in the northwest. It is believed the landmine was planted by fighting parties in Burundi.⁶

Mine Action

No survey or assessment has been conducted on the mine/UXO problem in Tanzania and there are currently no mine clearance or mine awareness education programs underway. UNICEF and UNHCR are the main players in humanitarian mine action in the western part of the country. The International Committee of the Red Cross has donated basic medical and surgical materials to Kigoma Regional Hospital.⁷

No compensation is given to local people affected by landmines. Those injured are treated at Maweni hospital and provided with other assistance under the support of international bodies through the government. Some laws and policies exist in Tanzania to support people with disabilities, including those affected by landmines. Mine victims are normally taken to disabled centers.

ZAMBIA

Key developments since March 1999: Zambia has established an inter-ministerial National Task Force for the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Zambia has told the UN that it has just a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines for military training purposes only. A number of AP landmines appear to have been planted inside Zambia in 1999 and 2000 by Angolan government and UNITA rebel forces. In May-June 2000, the UN Mine Action Service conducted an assessment mission in Zambia.

Mine Ban Policy

Zambia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 December 1997 but has not yet ratified it. The government is in the process of ratification. A memorandum has been drafted which must be presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Cabinet for its

⁴ Information provided by Rev. Marco Badeleya, Maweni Regional Hospital, Kigoma, 14 April 2000.

⁵ Information provided by Sister Mary Kashaga, Ujirani Mwema, Bukoba, 8 April 2000. Data collected from 20 March-7 April, 2000.

⁶ John Onger, "Landmines Kills Herdboy in Ngara," *The African Newspaper*, 20 September 1999, p. 1.

⁷ ICRC Regional Delegation in Kenya, *Fact Sheet*, 28 January 2000, p. 3.

approval. Foreign Minister Keli Walubita has apparently not made this a priority.¹ The Canadian Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa David Kilgour met Zambia's Home Affairs Minister Peter Machungwa in Lusaka on 14 July 2000 and was told that Zambia had not ratified because of bureaucratic delays.² The Zambian Campaign to Ban Landmines has also obtained the same response.³

Zambia participated as a signatory state in the First Meeting of State Parties in Maputo in May 1999. Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister Valentine Kayope said the treaty "stands as a monument to all landmine victims and the millions who live each day in fear of these weapons.... For the Ottawa Convention to be fully effective, all countries must stop producing landmines and embrace the Convention. There is therefore an urgent need for the universalization of the Ottawa Convention.... For us in Africa...landmine use is prevalent for the simple reason that it is cheap and deadly.... The battle, therefore is to make the Ottawa Convention banning landmines fully effective not just in intention, but also in implementation."⁴

Zambia has attended all of the treaty intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts. At the March 2000 meeting on Mine Clearance in Geneva, Zambia issued a statement saying that "there is overwhelming political will to support" the treaty.⁵ Zambia in December 1999 voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The government of Zambia has established an inter-ministerial National Task Force for the implementation of the MBT. The Task Force is headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁶ It has been set up to among other things to conduct a preliminary survey of all the mine-affected areas around the country.⁷

Zambia is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Zambia is not a known producer or exporter of mines. Zambia has told the UN that it has just a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines for military training purposes only.⁸

¹ Foreign Minister Walubita in May 1998 – more than two years ago -- told the Landmine Monitor that his country would ratify the MBT "Soon. This is a priority for my government. I represent a constituency that suffers from landmines. I am therefore determined to see this enacted into Zambian law quickly." *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p.182.

² *Zambia Daily Mail*, 17 July 2000; interview with Canadian High Commissioner Dilys Buckley-Jones, Lusaka, 17 July 2000.

³ Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Lusaka, 17 July 2000.

⁴ Statement by the Zambian Delegation to the FMSP, delivered by Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister Valentine Kayope, Maputo, 3 May 1997.

⁵ "Statement by the Delegation of Zambia to Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance," Geneva, 27-29 March 2000.

⁶ The Task Force is comprised of the ministries of Community Development and Social Services, General Education, Defense, Home Affairs, Information and Broadcasting Services, Lands, Environment and Natural Resources.

⁷ "Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance," 27-29 March 2000.

⁸ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission to the Republic of Zambia, May-June 2000," draft dated 6 June 2000.

Use

A number of AP landmines appear to have been planted inside Zambia in 1999 and 2000 by Angolan government and UNITA rebel forces. Landmine Monitor interviewed Angolan soldiers who admitted to laying AP mines on Zambian soil in 2000 in order to stop UNITA rebels from obtaining access to suspected rear bases.⁹ There have also been reports that UNITA rebels have laid some landmines in Cahvuma district to depopulate the border areas in order that their activities are not witnessed and to avoid being followed by the Zambian security forces.¹⁰

Landmine Problem/Assessment

Landmines have been laid in Zambia since the 1970s and Zambia has a limited landmine problem in six of Zambia's nine provinces: Western, North-Western, Lusaka, Central, Eastern, and Southern. Deputy Foreign Minister Kayope, upon receiving a UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Assessment Team, stated that more than 2,500 kilometers of countryside are mine-affected. He also said that the extent of the problem is not fully known because the "devices were planted randomly in what is termed as 'a nuisance pattern' at various border areas."¹¹ According to the Zambian government most of the landmines planted in Zambia are TM46 AT and M14 AP landmines.¹² However, a U.S. military intelligence report states that 30 types of AP mine from ten nations have been found in Zambia.¹³

In May-June 2000, UNMAS visited Zambia for ten days to ascertain the extent of the landmine problem.¹⁴ The team had completed a draft report that concludes that although there is a mine problem in Zambia its humanitarian impact is limited and the immediate priority is to invest in mine awareness programs.¹⁵ UNMAS found that mines and UXO have hampered the progress of two development projects, the Power Rehabilitation Project in Southern Province and the Wetland/Grand Farm located north of Lusaka.¹⁶

The U.S. humanitarian demining program authorized an assessment visit to Zambia in March 2000.¹⁷

⁹ Interview with Angolan soldiers, May 2000.

¹⁰ *AFP*, 19 January 2000; *AFP*, 6 March 2000; Bivan Saluseki, "Chamuva Teachers Flee UNITA Attacks," *Africa News Service*, Lusaka, 4 February 2000. "Concern at Reported Border Raids," IRIN, Johannesburg, 19 January 2000. At least one person was injured by a suspected UNITA landmine.

¹¹ *Pan African News Agency*, "Zambia grapples with Landmines in Six Regions," Lusaka, 30 May 2000; *Post*, 31 May 2000.

¹² "Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance," 27-29 March 2000.

¹³ U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Intelligence Report, "Landmine warfare – mines and engineer munitions in southern Africa (U)," May 1993.

¹⁴ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission to the Republic of Zambia, May-June 2000," draft dated 6 June 2000.

¹⁵ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission to the Republic of Zambia, May-June 2000," draft dated 6 June 2000.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, "30 March 2000 Humanitarian Demining IWG Fact Sheet."

Fieldwork in Chiawa by the Zambian Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1998 established that landmines and UXO continued to be a problem. In the early 1980s AP mines claimed 125 civilians alone and a Japanese-sponsored water project had to be discontinued because of the mines. People in the area have lost their livestock and as the population grows, the safe land area to accommodate the population is getting smaller.¹⁸ This is not the only area where this is a problem. People in the border area between the Gwembe valley and Luangwa (several hundred kilometers) cannot do any large-scale farming for fear of landmines. Construction of schools and health centers has also been affected.¹⁹

In May 1999 an antitank mine destroyed a vehicle killing a World Bank consultant, Denis Berejena, and critically injured two people, including Sinazongwe District Council secretary Patson Chazebuka on Bottom Road in southern province; the other person injured was Walter Illi, a Kenyan national working for Interconsult. Berejena and his team were on an inspection tour of the World Bank-funded Gwembe Tonga Development Project aimed at alleviating the suffering of the people who were displaced when the Kariba dam was constructed. The road was known to have been mined during the 1970s.²⁰ The week following this incident five more landmines were cleared in Sinazongwe. This incident drew media attention to Zambia's landmine problem and forced the government to send out bomb disposal experts to comb the area.²¹ The project was then suspended pending a comprehensive demining program of the area.²² By July 2000 no comprehensive survey and clearance work had commenced and the project remained suspended.

Mine Clearance

Zambian Army Engineers have been clearing mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) on an ad hoc basis since the 1970s. Mine clearance has also been conducted by an eleven-person strong Bomb Disposal Unit under the Ministry of Home Affairs. This unit has received U.S. training.²³ The local Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) offices have cleared over 800 landmines and UXO from 1970 to date.²⁴ However, many more are still lying undetected due to financial constraints. A survey by Zambia Army personnel in Mufumbwe district in 1999 discovered eight landmines.²⁵

The government has stated that although human resources are available, "there is no appropriate equipment to undertake effective mine clearance operations.... Zambia needs modern motorized landmine/UXO clearing equipment. In addition, specialised training is required for all those involved in landmine clearance."²⁶

¹⁸ Muleya Mwanayanda, "Field notes," no date, on file at Afronet, Lusaka.

¹⁹ Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance, 27-29 March 2000.

²⁰ Nebat Muenga, Charles Mangwato, and Andrew Lungu, "Landmine Kills Man," *Times of Zambia*, 1 June 1999; *AFP*, 2 June 1999.

²¹ *Times of Zambia*, 6 and 7 June 1999.

²² *Times of Zambia*, 15 March 2000.

²³ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission to the Republic of Zambia, May-June 2000," draft dated 6 June 2000.

²⁴ Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance, 27-29 March 2000.

²⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 9 November 1999.

²⁶ Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance, 27-29 March 2000.

Several commercial demining firms such as Zimbabwe's Mine-Tech and South Africa's GRZ have sent teams to Zambia to assess the commercial viability of clearing landmines.²⁷

Mine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

The Zambia Red Cross estimates that some 10,000 people in Zambia have fallen victim to mines and UXO.²⁸ A preliminary survey by the National Task Force indicates a much more conservative estimate: since 1973 some 102 people have fallen victim to mines and UXO, including twenty-one in 1999 and three so far in 2000.²⁹

Zambia has no elaborate victim support program. The government notes, "Very little assistance is available to most landmine victims since most accidents take place in remote areas where medical facilities are not available."³⁰

There are three or four orthoprosthesis workshops in Zambia, chief of which is at the University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka. All centers have all benefited from ICRC support. The UTH facility fitted 170 prosthetic devices in 1999. The workshop is very well equipped and stocked.

In addition, Zambia has a well-organised base of disabled people's organisations, under the umbrella of the Zambian Federation for Disability (ZAFOD) which has six member organisations. The Zambian National Association for the Physically Handicapped (ZNADPH) and the Zambian National Association for Disabled Women (ZNADWO) both cater for the needs of the mobility disabled, and both have branches throughout the country. The latter has 600 members, but ZNADPH has some 12,000 members. These are self-help organisations that give important support to disabled people.

Under the Persons with Disabilities Act (No 33 of 1996) the Zambian Agency for Persons with Disabilities (ZAPWD) was established. However, it only came into operation in September 1999. It has a wide-ranging role, with powers to gather statistics, register disabled people, plan and deliver services, raise awareness and act as an advocate for disabled people. There is much to be done before it fulfils these roles.

²⁷ Landmine Monitor interviews with BRZ and Mine-Tech, Johannesburg, 6 June 2000.

²⁸ Information provided by Zambian Red Cross Society, Lusaka, 18 July 2000.

²⁹ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission to the Republic of Zambia, May-June 2000," draft dated 6 June 2000.

³⁰ Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance, 27-29 March 2000.

NON-SIGNATORIES

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The Central African Republic (C.A.R) has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor has found no evidence to indicate that the country has taken any steps over the past year to join. An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that he knew nothing about the Mine Ban Treaty and that since CAR had no landmines it was not of interest.¹

C.A.R was absent from the vote on UNGA Resolution 54/54B calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. C.A.R. did not participate in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 and it has not attended any of the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

The C.A.R. is not believed to be mine-affected. There is no evidence that the C.A.R. has ever produced or exported landmines. Government officials acknowledge that there is no practical way to control the movement of weapons, including landmines, across the C.A.R.'s territory, due to a near-complete lack of border controls. It is assumed that C.A.R. has a stockpile of AP mines, but no information is available.

When France withdrew its garrisons from Bangui and Bouar in early 1998, no stocks of landmines were left behind. Nor is the Francophone African peacekeeping force, which went in to deal with a crisis and army mutiny in early 1997 in C.A.R., believed to have used mines. The successor peacekeeping force, the U.N.-backed MINURCA, is also not believed to have used landmines.

COMOROS

Comoros has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Just prior to the military coup in April 1999, the then Comoran chief government spokesperson, Ali Msaidie, said that signature and ratification of the treaty were under consideration.¹ There has been no progress since and Comoros has been absent from all international fora at which landmines issues have been on the agenda.

The Comoros is not known to have produced or exported AP mines. Ali Msaidie told Landmine Monitor last year that Comoros did not possess landmines of any type, but it has not been possible to confirm this information. Despite a history of military coups, it appears landmines have not been used.²

In March 1999 local journalists reported that on Anjouan, landmines belonging to a construction company were stolen by supporters of one of the separatist

¹ Telephone interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Bangui, 14 July 2000.

¹ Telephone interview, Ali Msaidie, chief government spokesperson, Islamic Federal Republic of Comoros, Moroni, 1 April 1999.

² Interview, diplomatic source, Moroni, 25 July 2000.

leaders on the island from an army barracks where they had been kept for safe-keeping.³ There have been no reports that these mines have been used.⁴

CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

Key developments since March 1999: Congo-Brazzaville's parliament has reportedly ratified the Mine Ban Treaty and the army has reportedly started stockpile destruction. Much of Brazzaville has been cleared of mines and UXO since 1998.

Congo-Brazzaville is one of just seven non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty in Africa. However, in July 2000, the provisional legislature of Congo-Brazzaville was reported to have ratified the Mine Ban Treaty.¹ It is assumed that this paves the way for formal accession to the treaty. It was also reported that the Congolese army had decided to destroy its stocks of AP mines because, according to a military source, "We no longer have a great number of mines."² In December 1999, Congo-Brazzaville voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It voted for similar pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Congo-Brazzaville did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 and has not attended any of the treaty's intersessional meetings. It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Congo-Brazzaville is not known to have produced or exported AP mines. AP mines are reportedly stockpiled in the country's seven military zones; the army is currently taking steps to destroy the stocks, but no date has been fixed for completion of the destruction.³

Congo-Brazzaville used AP mines most recently in the 1997 civil war. Strategically sensitive areas around Brazzaville's airport and the city's main power station were heavily mined, reportedly with both antitank and antipersonnel mines, and other utilities had unmarked minefields laid around them.⁴ Residential quarters of Poto-Poto and Mikalou were also affected, although it is thought this was more by contagion and carelessness than by concerted deployment.⁵

There is no overall survey of the mine problem in Congo-Brazzaville, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem was at its worst in Brazzaville itself. Many mines laid

³ See, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p.188.

⁴ Interview, diplomatic source, Moroni, 25 July 2000.

¹ "Congolese army to destroy landmine stocks," *Agence France Presse* (Brazzaville), 27 July 2000.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ "Congo: finding landmines proves tougher than laying them," *Inter Press Service*, 22 August 1998.

⁵ Telephone interview, Remy Bazenguissa, Paris, 31 March 1999. Bazenguissa is a respected analyst of the various recent battles for Brazzaville and surroundings.

in 1997 have now been cleared by army engineers with French assistance.⁶ In late 1998, further clearance work was carried out around the airport, and civilian access to mined areas was carefully controlled. On 1 September 1999 the authorities detonated some landmines at the airport as a gesture to attract international airlines back to the airport, which had refused to fly to Brazzaville due to security concerns.⁷

Today landmines are no longer a major concern. A team from Human Rights Watch visited Brazzaville in July and found no evidence of renewed laying of landmines or concern about uncleared mines.⁸

There are no available records on mine-related injuries during or the after the civil wars. Repeated fighting and artillery damage has wrecked Brazzaville's medical infrastructure and has damaged national capacity for the treatment of landmine-related injuries.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Key developments since March 1999: It is clear that antipersonnel mines were still being used in the DRC in 1999 and 2000, despite an August 1999 peace agreement. But it remains impossible to verify who is responsible for laying the mines. There have been accusations that not only are government troops and opposition RCD forces using mines, but also troops from Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Chad. Similar accusations were also levelled at the plethora of foreign and local insurgent groups, which are fighting in eastern Congo against the RCD rebels and their foreign backers. Virtually all sides have denied using mines.

Uncertainties about who is responsible for use of antipersonnel mines in the DRC have continued for more than two years now. Landmine Monitor believes that it has reached the point where States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty should make detailed requests for clarification from Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe, and should make all other efforts to establish the facts regarding mine use in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In July 2000, UNMAS drew up a three-phase action plan for the DRC for the UN mission charged with implementation of the peace agreement.

Background

By 1999 it had become evident that nobody had the upper hand in what is now referred to as Africa's "First World War." Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia deployed troops on Congolese territory in mid-1998 in support of President Kabila, as an offensive by the rebel Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), with Ugandan and Rwandan support, threatened his overthrow. Other countries to become directly involved in the conflict include Burundi, Chad and Sudan. After months of tortuous negotiations, the Lusaka agreement was finally reached on 31 August 1999. This marked the start of a theoretical peace, although fighting has continued, including between past allies, Uganda

⁶ *Inter Press Service*, 22 August 1998.

⁷ *Airline Industry Communication*, 3 September 1999.

⁸ Telephone interview with Human Rights Watch consultant Stephen Ellis, 13 July 2000.

and Rwanda. The end of use of landmines and their clearance were part of the Lusaka Agreement, but fresh mines continued to be laid. A United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) through Security Council Resolution 1291 (2000) has a mandate to develop an action plan for the overall implementation of the Lusaka Agreement; this includes assessment and action on landmines and UXO.¹

Mine Ban Policy

DRC has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). It voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it did on a similar resolution in 1998. The DRC is not known to have made any policy statements, or attended any diplomatic meetings, regarding landmines in 1999 or 2000. The Acting Ambassador of DRC to Kenya, Professor Mugaruka Bin Mubibi, told Landmine Monitor that his government “has more urgent issues to tackle.”² He also produced a list of parties involved in the DRC conflict and said, “Find out from them whether they are using landmines or not.”

The DRC is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpile

DRC is not a known producer of antipersonnel mines. Information on the transfer of landmines either to or from the DRC remains unknown.³ Details on the size and composition of the DRC’s stockpile of AP mines is also unknown.

Use

While it is clear that antipersonnel and antitank mines were still being used in the DRC in 1999 and 2000, it remains impossible to verify who is responsible for laying the mines. There have been accusations that not only are the government forces of Kabila and the opposition RCD using mines, but also troops from Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Chad. The only forces deeply involved that have not been accused of use are Namibia and Angola (which, oddly, admits to use inside its own country). All sides have denied responsibility for laying mines in Congo.⁴ Uganda and Zimbabwe are states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; Rwanda ratified on 13 June 2000 and will become a formal state party on 1 December 2000.

Landmine Monitor stresses that information on mine use in the DRC remains sketchy and unreliable. The difficulties of researching and reporting events on the

¹ The Resolution requires MONUC “to deploy mine action experts to assess the scope of the mine and unexploded ordnance problems, coordinate the initiation of mine action activities, develop a mine action plan, and carry out emergency action activities as required in support of its mandate.”

² Interview, Nairobi, 4 May 2000.

³ In one anecdote told to Landmine Monitor, a refugee in Mulengeza Township exchanged a lamp for a landmine offered by a Hutu refugee. Fortunately he handed the mine over to the head of the camp. Interview with the father of the refugee, Byamungu Bebe Badesire, Nairobi, 26 March 2000.

⁴ Telephone interviews with diplomats from DRC, Chad, Namibia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, New York, 28 July 2000.

ground from a war zone are compounded by the possibilities of false accusations and disinformation from various concerned parties. Uncertainties about who is responsible for use of antipersonnel mines in the DRC have continued for more than two years now. Landmine Monitor believes that it has reached the point where States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty should make detailed requests for clarification from Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, and should make all other efforts to establish the facts regarding mine use in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

There are reliable reports of mines laid in areas surrounding the hydroelectric facilities on the Inga Dam, in and around the town of Mbuji-Mayi, and Ikela airport, and unconfirmed reports of mining around areas of Bukavu and Goma in the east.⁵

Most recently, there have been reports of use of mines in June 2000 in the hostilities between Rwanda and Uganda over the city of Kisangani, held by the RCD rebels. It has been reported that during this fighting more mines were planted around Bangoka International airport and on a section of the Kisangani-Buta road known as Km 31. There have also been reports of mines laid at Simi Simi and Bunia airport and Ikela.⁶ A number of areas have been declared off-limits because of landmines.⁷ According to municipal authorities some ten people have been killed by UXO and landmines since hostilities ceased in Kisangani.⁸ Following the fighting, the rebel RCD noted the need for demining parts of Kisangani town.⁹

With regard to who is responsible for laying the mines, a UN official told Landmine Monitor that Uganda and Rwanda had both used mines in the fighting over Kisangani.¹⁰

The RCD rebels claim that Rwandan and Ugandan troops left more than 4,000 antipersonnel landmines in the town, but state that they have found most of the mines close to a former Ugandan army base on the road to Bangoka airport.¹¹

Uganda accused Rwanda of mining the Tchopo bridge in Kisangani, though it does not seem these were munitions prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. (See Landmine Monitor Rwanda report.)¹²

Outside of Kisangani, in August 1999 local people in the Bukavu area from Ngando village told Landmine Monitor that they believed Rwandan soldiers planted a mine on a path frequently used by Interahamwe militiamen.¹³ A cow detonated the landmine.

⁵ See, "Regional Round Up," *De-Mining Debate*, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1-8 July 1999, p. 9.

⁶ Interview with BRZ International Ltd., Johannesburg, June 2000. BRZ is a South African mine clearance firm which conducted a survey in DRC in 2000 and described it as "badly contaminated."

⁷ Telephone interview with UN source in Kisanagani, 28 July 2000.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ IRIN-CEA Update 973 for the Great Lakes, 24 July 2000.

¹⁰ Telephone interview with UN official in Kisangani, 28 July 2000.

¹¹ "Rebels say more than 4,000 Mines Left in Kisangani," *AFP* (Kisangani), 21 July 2000, in *FBIS*.

¹² "Tchopo Bridge Mines," *New Vision*, 19 June 2000.

¹³ Interview with Bali Munenwa, Chibanda/Kaziba, 27 December 1999.

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 noted that Namibia and Zimbabwe had accused both Rwanda and Uganda of use of mines in the DRC; at that time Rwanda and Uganda were allies in the conflict.¹⁴

According to one source, there were accounts of Zimbabwean troops planting defensive minefields around Mbuji Maya when they feared that city would be captured by rebels in 1999.¹⁵ *Landmine Monitor* has not seen these accounts. In June 2000, the Namibia Campaign to Ban Landmines was informed by relatives that two Namibian soldiers died in the DRC when they stepped on “friendly” antipersonnel mines allegedly planted by Zimbabwean soldiers. *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* noted that there had been accusations of mine use by Zimbabwe in the Congo in 1998 as well.¹⁶

Landmine Monitor has also obtained reports of mines being laid by Chadian forces in Equatoria.¹⁷

Landmine Problem

Landmine Monitor conducted an informal survey of the mines in the eastern part of DRC, which is perhaps the most mine-affected part of the country,¹⁸ and concluded that mines have been planted in or around various places such as markets, airports, agricultural zones, hospitals, pathways, roads, and houses.¹⁹

While Kisangani suffered in recent fighting, it is not the only area affected. In April 1999, a landmine was found at Route D’uvira Avenue, not far from Kadutu market in Bukavu. Tutsi soldiers were called to remove it.²⁰

In the Kivu region, *Landmine Monitor* believes that the following areas may be mined: along the Ruzizi river on the Rwandan border (including Nguba, Mushununu, Mumosho, Buhozi and Kasile); the Ngomo hills on the Bukavu-Uvira road; around Mudaka market; Karhale; Bunyakiri, Mwenga, Shabunda; Kaziba, especially in the Bumwe and Ngando area and the Kibumb to Goma road.

Mine Action

MONUC is mandated by the UN Security Council to develop an action plan for implementing the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which includes dealing with the landmine situation. In July 2000, UNMAS drew up a three-phase action plan for MONUC: (1) to establish and assess the scope of the UXO and landmine problem, to initiate mine awareness activities, and liaison with all actors in DRC; (2) the consolidation phase, to establish regional offices, to continue to develop the emergency mine action response to facilitate safe return of IDPs and refugees and to enhance mobility of MONUC troops and humanitarian organizations in the country; and (3) when

¹⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp.194-195.

¹⁵ Interview with U.S. intelligence specialist on DRC, London, 23 June 2000.

¹⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp.194-195.

¹⁷ Interview with U.S. intelligence specialist on DRC, London, 23 June 2000.

¹⁸ This is defined as the “rebel-held,” area which includes South and north Kivu, the Uvira Region, Orientale Province (formerly Haut Zaire) as well as a section of Katanga region, extending to Kalemie, Moba and Baraka. North Shaba is also included.

¹⁹ Interview with a prominent human rights activist, Nyawera, 23 December 1999.

²⁰ Interview with Eliasa (a trader) at Walungu, 28 December 1999.

possible and before withdrawal of MONUC, develop with national authorities a medium- to long-term mine action plan. At this stage, a Level 1 Survey might become necessary.²¹

In reporting on the situation in July 2000, UNMAS notes:

“General situation as far as political, military and security aspects are concerned, currently does not allow for a smooth initiation of any mine action activities.

- Freedom of movements is not yet guaranteed, in particular for MONUC in DRC Government controlled areas as well as in rebellion controlled areas;

-Fighting is still ongoing;

-Most of mine/UXO affected areas are under military (DRC or rebellion) control;

-MONUC deployment schedule is shifting: latest schedule plans for full deployment in September/October 2000.

However, the first mine action officer should be deployed within MONUC Headquarters in August/September...²²

In June 2000, following the fighting between Uganda and Rwanda, the rebel RCD said it will demine parts of Kisangani town. The RCD first vice-president Jean-Pierre Ondekane is reported to have said, “We are doing our best by asking humanitarian agencies to come in and supplement our demining efforts so that our people are safe.”²³ Some mines have been cleared, for example, an AT mine was removed from the Mental Health Center at Kisangani General Hospital. There has also been some demining at Simi Simi and Bunia Airport.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

There are hospitals and health centers in the country, though they are poorly equipped, insufficient in number, and the situation has worsened with the war. During the emergency period, the ICRC established temporary first aid posts in the Bukavu area.²⁴

In Kisangani, mine victims are treated at the University clinic, the General Hospital, or the Simana center for the physically handicapped. In addition to being poorly equipped, these facilities do not provide specialized assistance to mine victims.

In Bukavu there is a center for the physically handicapped, but services are provided at a high cost. There are also similar centers in Goma, Mabuji Maya, Kinshasa, and Kisangani. Of all the mine victims interviewed by Landmine Monitor only two could afford to pay for orthopedic devices.²⁵

Handicap International runs a program in Kinshasa, and the Catholic Church tries to provide psychological care to the disabled.

²¹ “Update on Mine Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” UNMAS, 12 July 2000.

²² UNMAS Update, 12 July 2000.

²³ IRIN-CEA Update 973 for the Great Lakes, 24 July 2000.

²⁴ Landmine Monitor research in northeastern part of the DRC, May 2000.

²⁵ Visit to Centre Heri Kwetu, 29 December 1999.

In a limited survey, Landmine Monitor researchers identified forty-three mine and UXO victims in the eastern DRC for the period 1995-1999. Seventeen were fatalities. Of the 43, four were children under the age of sixteen, two died; of the thirty-nine adults, there were thirty men (thirteen fatalities) and nine women (two fatalities); seven of the victims required amputation of a limb.

ERITREA

Key developments since March 1999: In the 1998-2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it appears that tens of thousands of new mines were laid. Each government has alleged that the other laid mines, and observers have expressed concern that both sides may have used mines. While Landmine Monitor cannot verify use by Eritrea, there are serious, independent reports of use of antipersonnel mines by Eritrean forces.

Background

In May 1998, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war over a disputed border area. The two sides have accused each other of using landmines, and there are reports that more than 100,000 landmines have been laid. New use is compounding what was already a difficult landmine problem in Ethiopia and Eritrea. On 18 June 2000, the two countries signed an Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. Article 8 of the agreement obligates both parties to demine the conflict frontier zone to allow UN peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies safe access.¹

Mine Ban Policy

Eritrea has not signed or ratified the Mine Ban Treaty despite voting in favor of all pro-ban resolutions, including in December 1999, at the UN General Assembly. Eritrea did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in any of the treaty's intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. Eritrea is not known to have made any official statements about the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999 or 2000. Eritrea is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Eritrea is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The Eritrean government claims not to have any antipersonnel mine stocks,² though such a

¹ Ethiopian and Eritrean foreign ministers signed the agreement in Algiers, Algeria on 18 June 2000. The President of Algeria, who holds the Presidency of the OAU for the 2000 cycle, brokered the agreement.

² Eritrean Ministry of Defense, "Answers to a Questionnaire Submitted by Landmine Monitor," 16 May 2000. In its reply to the questionnaire, Eritrea states that it used mines in the past "during the armed struggle against the Ethiopian army. All the mines used were captured from the enemy. Almost all types of mines were Soviet and U.S. origin like PMN, POMZ-2, MON-100, MON-200, M16, M14 and M3, etc." It states that Eritrea has never imported AP mines.

statement is at odds with Eritrea's acknowledged use of mines in the past (leaving aside current allegations).

Use

While it is clear that antipersonnel mines were used by one or both parties to the recent conflict, Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify whether or not Eritrean forces are responsible for use of antipersonnel mines. However, there have been serious, independent reports (apart from allegations by the government of Ethiopia), as well as other credible indicators, that Eritrean forces have used antipersonnel mines.

In a February 2000 report regarding Eritrean human rights practices, the U.S. State Department said, "According to UN officials, [Eritrean] government forces laid approximately 50,000 to 60,000 landmines in the Badme area during their 8-month occupation of this disputed territory."³

In early June 2000, humanitarian sources told the UN Humanitarian Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) that there was much concern that both countries had mined border areas, and that "it would appear to take some time before people are confident enough to go back to their homes" in areas affected by the conflict.⁴

Western journalists accompanying Ethiopian forces during the final Ethiopian offensive noted the existing presence of mines, and television images of the battlefield clearly showed the presence of both antipersonnel and antitank mines.⁵ A journalist who visited the town of Zala Anbesa on 26 May 2000, the day after Ethiopian troops took it over from Eritrean forces, reported that the town had been mined and virtually destroyed by the Eritreans.⁶

For its part, Ethiopia soon after the start of the border war in May 1998 accused Eritrea of planting landmines in the conflict zone and areas of Ethiopia controlled by Eritrea, and continued to make allegations throughout the fighting. The Ethiopian government alleges that Eritrea planted more than 110,000 antipersonnel and antitank mines in the conflict zone.⁷ In late May 2000, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of planting mines in border towns before losing control of them to Ethiopian troops.⁸

³ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -- Eritrea," 25 February 2000, p. 3.

⁴ United Nations, IRIN News Briefs, "Ethiopia: Landmine Deaths in Irob," 8 June 2000.

⁵ BBC World television broadcasts in Europe viewed by Landmine Monitor researchers of the Ethiopian offensive during the period 13-17 May 2000 also clearly showed antipersonnel mines and antitank mines stockpiled at fighting positions.

⁶ "Ethiopia says Eritrea laid 7,000 mines in and around border town," *AFP*, Addis Ababa, 6 June 2000.

⁷ For example see: Ethiopian Government Spokesperson, "Total Victory for Operation Sunset," Ethiopian News Service, Addis Ababa, 28 February 1999; Professor Addis Birhan, "Mine Eritrea's Minefields," Wata Information Service, 6 March 1999; Statement of Dr. Waktasu Negeri to the FMSP, Maputo, 3 May 1999; Embassy of Ethiopia, Washington, DC, "30,375 Landmines Planted in Eritrea in Northern Ethiopia Demined," 25 May 1999; Embassy of Ethiopia, Washington, DC, "Eritrean Landmines Pose Great Danger to Ethiopian Civilians," 23 November 1999; BBC News Online, "De-Mining in the Horn," 19 July 2000.

⁸ "Ethiopia says Eritrea laid 7,000 mines in and around border town," *AFP*, Addis Ababa, 6 June 2000.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of a clear denial of use of mines on the part of the Eritrean government.⁹ A letter sent to the government on 26 June 2000 explicitly requesting confirmation or denial had not been answered as of the end of July.

Eritrean opposition groups based in Ethiopia also allege that the Eritrean military has planted antipersonnel mines in Ayuman, Afambo, and Bada.¹⁰ Authorities in Somaliland deported Eritrean and Ethiopian nationals suspected of laying mines on roads that lead from Berbera Port.¹¹ It is not possible for Landmine Monitor to assess the accuracy of such claims.

The U.S. State Department reported in February 2000 that Eritrea has provided support for armed opposition groups attempting to overthrow the Ethiopian government. These groups, mostly based in Somalia and Kenya, used landmines inside Ethiopia in 1999, according to the U.S.¹²

The Eritrean government alleged to Landmine Monitor in early 2000 that Ethiopian forces have been using landmines in the disputed territories,¹³ and that the mines are to a large extent not mapped or marked.¹⁴ The Eritrean government in late May and early June 2000 accused Ethiopia of laying mines in the towns Ethiopian forces were occupying.¹⁵ In an aide-memoire dated 17 July 2000 to the OAU and UN, Eritrea said that "Ethiopia has and continues to plant new mines inside sovereign Eritrean territory, particularly in the areas which fall within the temporary security zone."¹⁶

The government of Ethiopia denies that it has used antipersonnel landmines in the conflict with Eritrea or anywhere else since signing the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁷

⁹ In the Ministry of Defense's response to the LM questionnaire, dated 16 May 2000, the question "Is Eritrea currently using antipersonnel mines?" was left blank, while the question regarding past use was answered in the affirmative.

¹⁰ Radio Voice of Red Sea Afars, "Eritrea Still Planting Mines on Ethiopian Border," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 March 2000.

¹¹ Ayaamaha (Somali Newspaper), "Somaliland Authorities Reportedly Deport Eritreans, Ethiopians over Land Mines," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 29 March 2000.

¹² U.S. State Department, *1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia*, 25 February 2000, p. 4.

¹³ Interviews with Ato Abraham Yohannes, Embassy of Eritrea, Washington, DC, 28 January 2000 and 8 February 2000.

¹⁴ Interview with Eritrean National Demining Headquarters official, Asmara, January 2000.

¹⁵ IRIN-CEA, "Civilians returning slowly to Mined Town," 2 June 2000; "Eritreans Assess Damage in Barentu," *BBC World (Africa)*, 2 June 2000; Ann M. Simmons, "Destruction, Danger Await Eritrean Returnees," *The Times*, 2 June 2000; Patrick Graham, "Eritreans Don't Think the War is Over," *National Post*, 4 June 2000; "Eritrean Town Looted by Retreating Ethiopian Army," *Reuters*, 2 June 2000; "Ethiopian Forces Reported Still in West Eritrea," *IRIN News Briefs*, 31 May 2000.

¹⁶ The aide-memoire was subsequently provided the UN Security Council and circulated as UN Security Council document S/2000/726, 21 July 2000. See also, "Eritrea Complains Ethiopia Violates Peace Pact," *Reuters*, United Nations, 24 July 2000.

¹⁷ For a recent denial, see: "Ethiopia: 40,000 landmines removed from central front," Ethiopian Television, Addis Ababa, in Amharic, *BBC Monitoring*, 20 June 2000.

Landmine Problem

Even before the current Eritrea-Ethiopian war, Eritrea was heavily mine-affected. As of 1994, around fifty different antipersonnel and antitank mines from fourteen countries had been identified in Eritrea.¹⁸ According to information provided by the National Demining Center to the U.S., 200,000-250,000 mines and 3 million UXO are present in Eritrea.¹⁹ Older sources cite between 500,000 and 1 million landmines.²⁰ It is estimated that more than 5% of Eritrea's total land area may be mine-affected.²¹ Most of the mined areas are located in the mainly rural sections of northern, northwestern, and south provinces of the country.

Landmine accidents usually occur along old trench lines, army garrisons, farmlands, and water wells.²² Areas that had been extensively mined include approaches to villages and towns, arable and pasture areas, roads, military camps, and bridges. Landmines were used in some of the most fertile and agriculturally important parts of the country and have created major problems for agriculture, locust control, rehabilitation, reconstruction, tourism, and development efforts in the country.²³

Mine Action Funding and Mine Clearance

Soon after gaining independence, the Eritrean government embarked on a mine clearance program. Mine action in Eritrea is the responsibility of the Demining Project Office at the National Demining Headquarters in Asmara. The National Demining Headquarters has a command element, a historical research department, and a demining and training company,²⁴ and it has established project offices and camps in Karen, Asha-Golgol, and Nakfa.²⁵ Eritrea has prioritized its clearance program into the following categories: resettlement of refugees from the Sudan, transportation infrastructure to get the economy moving again, and general land use.²⁶

¹⁸ For a complete list of landmines found in Eritrea, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 197-198.

¹⁹ U.S. Central Command, "U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for Eritrea (Conditional, FY 2001 & 2002)," 23 February 2000.

²⁰ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, September 1998, p. 25; UNA-USA, "A Report on Landmine Clearance in Africa," the Eighth Annual Citizen's Inspection Tour, 25 April to 2 May 1998, p. 20.

²¹ Naizghi Ghebremedhin, "Reconstruction and Development following Armed Conflicts," *Environment and Security*, vol. 1, no. 2., 1997.

²² Eritrean Ministry of Defense, "Answers to a Questionnaire Submitted by Landmine Monitor," 16 May 2000.

²³ List compiled from interview with Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Asmara, 14 January 2000; Kurt Hanevik, "Landmine injuries in Eritrea," at <http://www.uib.no/People/mfakh/LM/Lmsocio.html>; Naizghi Ghebremedhin, "Reconstruction and Development following Armed Conflicts," *Environment and Security*, vol. 1, no. 2., 1997; Andeberhan W. Ghiorghis, "The Human and Ecological Consequences of War in Eritrea," *Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: Human and Ecological Consequences of Warfare*, Terje Tvedt (Ed.), Uppsala University (Sweden), 1993.

²⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, 1998, p. 27.

²⁵ Interviews with National Demining Headquarters official, Asmara, 23 December 1999, 7 January 2000, 10 January 2000, 14 January 2000.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

According to the National Demining Headquarters, as many as 500,000 landmines were removed between 1977 and 1994.²⁷ According to the U.S. Department of State, “between May 1991 and May 1993, there were approximately 2,000 landmine incidents, which included civilian casualties and Eritrean military personnel involved in mine clearance operations.”²⁸ However, Eritrean officials state that since 1996, there have been no incidents involving Eritrean personnel engaged in humanitarian demining.²⁹

The U.S. is the only international donor to assist Eritrea with demining. Between 1993 and June of 1998, the U.S. government provided around \$8 million to Eritrea’s mine action program, including training and equipping nearly 400 military deminers. U.S. assistance to the Eritrean demining program was suspended as of June 1998 due to the outbreak of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The program is expected to resume now that hostilities have terminated. Some \$2.3 million is budgeted for fiscal year 2000, to provide mine-detecting dogs, training in explosive ordnance disposal and mine clearance, and the purchase of equipment.³⁰

Survey and Assessment

There have been no comprehensive nation-wide surveys of landmine and UXO contamination in Eritrea. UNMAS planned an assessment mission to Eritrea in 1999, but it was not carried out due to the upsurge of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.³¹ Eritrea had been selected for a Level 1 landmines impact survey but this was also deferred due to the war.

Mine Awareness

The historical research department of the National Demining Headquarters along with the Department of Social Affairs and Eritrean War Disabled Fighter’s Association undertakes mine awareness projects.³² The mine awareness efforts are largely carried out with local funding and suffer from a lack of funds and equipment. There is a general shortage of adequate medical services in Eritrea, and that tends to limit efforts to provide emergency or rehabilitation care and planning. There are continuous mine awareness programs run by the department of social affairs and the Demining Project Office. The funding for the programs comes primarily from the Eritrean Government, but UNICEF, OXFAM, and Radda Barnen had provided some support.

²⁷ Ibid; Eritrean Ministry of Defense, “Answers to a Questionnaire Submitted by Landmine Monitor,” 16 May 2000.

²⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, September 1998, p.27.

²⁹ Interviews with National Demining Headquarters official, Asmara, 23 December 1999, 7 January 2000, 10 January 2000, 14 January 2000.

³⁰ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 2; U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for Eritrea (Conditional, FY 2001 & 2002),” 23 February, 2000; Human Rights Watch, “Clinton’s Landmine Legacy,” July 2000, pp. 33-34.

³¹ Interview with UNMAS official, The Hague, Netherlands, 17 May 2000.

³² Interviews with personnel from the Demining Project Office, Department of Social Affairs, 12 January 2000, 14 January 2000; Interviews with official of the Eritrean War Disabled Fighter’s Association, Asmara, 27 December 1999, 11 January 2000.

The mine awareness education programs involve community-based and in-school training, education to families, community elders and leaders and rehabilitation workers. More than 25,000 people throughout Eritrea are believed to have received mine awareness and prevention training from the Department of Social Affairs and the National Demining Headquarters. Those that received the training are estimated to have provided mine awareness education to more than 135,000 other people.³³

Landmine Casualties

Casualty statistics have not been systematically kept in Eritrea. The government reported 2,000 incidents between May 1991 and May 1993. Government officials claim that 50,000-80,000 people have been victims of landmines in Eritrea since 1973. About 40% of those victims are believed to be children between the ages of 0-15. UNICEF and the Department of Social Affairs believe children and adult men working as shepherders and wool collectors are the most likely victims of landmines in Eritrea.³⁴

According to the Police Department registry, 137 deaths and 367 landmine injuries were reported between 1994 and mid-1999.³⁵ The police registry is not exhaustive and may not present a true picture of landmine casualties. Many victims in rural areas may not be reported at all.

Survivor Assistance

There are few medical and rehabilitation facilities in Eritrea and the capacity for emergency and post-operative care is severely limited. There is one doctor per 20,000 persons.³⁶ Critical cases are transported to the urban centers and later to the rehabilitation clinics in Asmara and May Habar.³⁷

The treatment and rehabilitation costs for the victims are entirely covered by the Ministry of Health of the Government of Eritrea. Some financial and in-kind contributions are provided from private individuals or companies in Eritrea. The Norwegian Association of the Disabled provided aid for community-based rehabilitation projects in Eritrea in mid-1990s. There are currently no other international or non-governmental organizations that provide the needed medical and other special services to landmine victims in Eritrea.³⁸

The Department of Social Affairs, in the Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare, has an ongoing community-based rehabilitation program to assist the rehabilitation and

³³ Interview with National Demining Headquarters official, 7 January 2000. Asmara, Eritrea and Interview with Department of Social Affairs official, Asmara, 12 January 2000, 14 January 2000.

³⁴ UNICEF, "Landmine Education and Awareness Support in Eritrea – a proposal for funding," 1996.

³⁵ Eritrean Police Department, "National Accidents Report 1999," undated, provided to Landmine Monitor by National Demining Headquarters.

³⁶ Interview with personnel from the Department of Social Affairs, Asmara, 12 January 2000, 14 January 2000.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Interview with personnel from the Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (ERREC) and War Disabled Association of Eritrea, 11 January 2000.

reintegration of victims back into the society by promoting self-care and sufficiency.³⁹ This program has also been helpful in reintegration and resettlement of the victims, education, and awareness in issues related to handicap, for contribution/giving back to society and provision of special job or vocational training to the victims.

There are three prosthetic workshops in Eritrea, located in Asmara, Keren, and Assab. They produce prosthetic sockets, prosthetic knees and feet, arm and forearm and crutches. The equipment and training support for this project was provided by the Italian Government (through the World Health Organization, the Pharpe program) and Johanitar, a German organization. The Department of Social Affairs, in cooperation with the World Health Organization, is planning to build a national physical therapy center in Asmara for landmine victims and other persons with disability.⁴⁰

The Landmine Survivors Network is in the process of establishing an amputee support network in the Eritrea, Zoba Maekel, whose targeted beneficiaries are going to be landmine survivors and any persons with limb loss. The project will be conducted under the umbrella of the National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students.⁴¹

There is a new draft National Disability Policy of Eritrea that was discussed at a national conference at the end of 1999. Its implementation is expected to occur around the end of 2000. In addition to the funds the Eritrean government provides for medical treatments and health care needs of landmine victims, it also provides persons with disability continuous pension for living expenses and vocational training.

NIGERIA

Key developments since March 1999: Since a new democratic government took office in May 1999, top government and military leaders have stated that Nigeria will soon accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mine Ban Policy

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is the only country in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sixteen-member regional group that has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Since a new democratic government took office in May 1999 after more than fifteen years of military rule, there have been several indications that Nigeria will soon accede to the treaty.

In September 1999, Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams and a delegation from a Workshop on Mine Action met with the Vice President of Nigeria, Hon. Atiku Mohammed, who assured the delegation that Nigeria would join the treaty "very soon."¹ About sixty participants attended the workshop, including representatives from Nigeria's

³⁹ Ibid.; Interview with Department of Social Affairs officer, Asmara, 12 January 2000, 14 January 2000.

⁴⁰ Interview with Sue Eitel, Landmine Survivors Network, The Hague, Netherlands, 17 May 2000.

⁴¹ Ibid.

¹ "Report on Nigeria workshop on AP Mines, September 1999." Circulated to ICBL email network by ICBL Coordinator, 1 October 1999.

Armed Forces and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.² In June 2000 the Minister of Defense, retired Lt. Gen. T. Y. Danjumah, told participants at a Conference on International Humanitarian Law that “the only realistic solution is a total ban” on AP mines, and went on to state that it is “only a question of time before Nigeria becomes party to the treaty.”³ Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo, the President’s Special Envoy on Disarmament, told Landmine Monitor in June 2000 that “we will see some positive movement soon.”⁴ On 26 July 2000, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson confirmed that the process for acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty “was in progress,” but refused to give a time frame.⁵

At the end of the September 1999 workshop, NGO participants decided to establish a “Focus Group on Landmines in Nigeria” that would include in its activities advocacy for the government to join the Mine Ban Treaty. The Nigerian Red Cross Society has also acknowledged the “great need to sensitise the government and the general public about the excessive effects of antipersonnel landmines....”⁶

Nigeria did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. It participated in the September 1999 meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance. In December 1999, Nigeria voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B urging universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It had previously voted for pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996 and 1998. Nigeria is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been vocal on the issue of possible negotiations on a mine export ban in the CD.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Nigeria is not known to have produced or exported AP mines. It is believed to have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, procured in the past from the former Czechoslovakia, former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, France, and U.K.⁷ Asked about stocks, the Chief of Operations of the Nigerian Army, Major General Yellow Duke, told participants of the Conference on International Humanitarian Law to “wait until Nigeria accedes then we will be obliged to tell you about that.”⁸

² Abuja Workshop on Mine Action, organized by London-based *Africa Topics* magazine, and the Nigerian-based Centre for Civil Initiatives and the Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace Advocacy, 6-8 September 1999.

³ Opening address to the Conference on International Humanitarian Law: Mines, Arms Availability and New Weapons, organized by the ICRC Regional Office in Nigeria and the Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace Advocacy, Abuja, 14-15 June 2000.

⁴ Interview with Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo, President’s Special Envoy on Disarmament, Abuja, 15 June 2000.

⁵ Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Spokesperson for International Organisations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, 26 July 2000.

⁶ Notes taken by Landmine Monitor researcher of statement by Alhaji (Dr.) Shehu Musa, President, Nigerian Red Cross Society, to the Conference on International Humanitarian Law, Abuja, 14 June 2000.

⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 202-203.

⁸ Notes taken by Landmine Monitor researcher of statement by Major General Yellow-Duke, Chief of Operations, Nigerian Army, to Conference on International Humanitarian Law, 14 June 2000.

Landmines were used during the 1967-70 (Biafra) civil war but a senior Nigerian army officer explained that AP mines “were used sparingly because we knew that this was a war between brothers and we were conscious of the need to minimise deaths and injuries.”⁹ A retired general of the Nigerian Army claims that the Army cleared all of its AP mines after the war.¹⁰ The Biafra rebels also used a home-made device. Nigerian military officers allege that injuries to civilians after the war were caused by these devices known as “Ogonigwe.”¹¹

SOMALIA

The situation in Somalia with respect to landmines is essentially unchanged since *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*. The reader is referred to that report for historical background, description of the landmine problem, and ban policies of various factions. There are still no mine clearance, mine awareness or victim assistance programs in Somalia.

As was the case last year, there have been ongoing, albeit unclear and undetailed, reports of use of mines. In 1999, there were allegations that new landmines had been laid along the Kenyan border with Somalia as a result of two factions fighting for control of the port city of Kismayo. There were also reports of use of mines by rogue militia involved in illegal activities such as smuggling along the border. Somali warlord Hussein Mohamed Aideed has claimed that Ethiopian troops occupying some parts of southern Somalia have used landmines.¹

In May 1999 local elders in the Galgaduud and Mudug regions of central Somalia showed reporters documents to prove they had filed a detailed demining project proposal and made repeated requests for assistance with demining in central Somalia since 1993, most recently in a letter to UNDP Somalia in September 1998. The UNDP’s Nairobi-based Somali Civil Protection Program Manager was reported as stating that one reason no work had been done is that there is “no functioning administration or recognised authority to work with,” but he also complained of lack of funds for demining work.²

(See separate report on Somaliland.)

⁹ Interview with Major General Yellow-Duke, Chief of Operations, Nigerian Army, Abuja, 15 June 2000.

¹⁰ Interview with retired Major General Charles B. Ndiomu, Provost, Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, National War College, Abuja, 14 June 2000.

¹¹ Interview with retired Major General Charles B. Ndiomu, National War College, Abuja, 14 June 2000.

¹ “Adid Accuses Ethiopia of Annexing Somali Territory,” *AFP*, 21 March 2000.

² “Special report on Galgaduud and southern Mudug,” *IRIN* (Galkacyo, Somalia), 12 May 1999.

OTHER

SOMALILAND

Key developments since March 1999: Mine clearance and mine survey activities expanded significantly in Somaliland in 1999 and 2000, with donors contributing some \$6.65 million. Clearance at Burao city has allowed the 70,000 residents to begin returning. The needs remain great. In 1999 the government for the first time tried to systematically collect data on mine victims, and estimates that there have been more than 3,500 mine casualties since 1988. The parliament passed a resolution calling for a unilateral ban on landmines; the President has endorsed the resolution.

Mine Ban Policy

The self-declared Republic of Somaliland cannot become a signatory of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) until it receives international recognition as an separate state. Nevertheless, on several occasions, Somaliland affirmed its willingness to abide by the MBT.

On the occasion of the signing ceremony of the MBT in Ottawa, the President of Somaliland, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, wrote a letter to Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs indicating that Somaliland was willing to sign the MBT.¹ On 1 March 1999, on the occasion of the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Somaliland House of Representatives passed a resolution urging the government to unilaterally ban landmines. In a December 1999 meeting with the Landmine Monitor researcher and representatives of the ICBL, the President of Somaliland indicated his desire to see the parliamentary resolution become law, but to date no legislation has been drafted.²

In November 2000, at a regional workshop on the menace on landmines in the Horn of Africa organized by the Somaliland Coalition against Landmines (SCAL), the Chairman of the Guurti (Traditional Elders) in the Upper House of Parliament, affirmed his community's willingness to cooperate with international organizations on landmines.³ This was confirmed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives speaking during the opening session of the workshop.⁴

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Somaliland is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The Ministry of Defense of Somaliland claims that its national army has not purchased or

¹ Letter from Somaliland President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal to the Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, 26 November 1997.

² Meeting between Landmine Monitor and ICBL representatives Jody Williams and Steve Goose and President Egal, Washington DC, 4 December 1999.

³ SCAL is an NGO coalition formed in 1998 to work against the use of landmines and composed of the Institute for Practical Research and Training, the Somali Relief and Rehabilitation Association, the Somaliland Red Crescent Society, and the local offices of Handicap International and CARE International.

⁴ Report on the Workshop on the Menace of Landmines in the Horn of Africa, 23-24 November 1999, Hargiesia, by the Institute for Practical Research and Training, April 2000, pp.5-7.

transferred any landmines since reconstituting its National Army in 1991, but admits that large stocks of landmines have been inherited from the now disbanded army of the Somali Democratic Republic.⁵ Most of these stocks are thought to be in the hands of militia or private individuals.⁶ The government has not programmed the destruction of its landmine stocks.⁷ Somaliland does not appear to be a transit point for landmines.

After two decades of conflict, Somaliland enjoys relative peace, having resolved its last major internal conflict in 1995 and there is no indication or evidence that landmines were used in Somaliland after 1995. Moreover, Somaliland has not been and is not now engaged in armed conflict with any of its neighbors.

Landmine Problem

At least twenty-four types of AP mines from ten countries have been identified in Somaliland (Belgium, Pakistan, China, the U.S., former Czechoslovakia, former East Germany, Egypt, former Soviet Union, United Kingdom and Italy).⁸

Between 1977 and 1978, the Somali Democratic Republic went to war with neighboring Ethiopia in the frontier area between northern Somalia (now Somaliland) and Ethiopia and the corridor between the Ethiopian city of Dire-Dawa and the border. This border remains heavily mined, including along important access routes. Between 1981 and 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM), a rebel army of mostly northern Somali following, waged an armed insurrection against the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre which saw indiscriminate use of landmines against the civilian population and their homes, farmland, and water reservoirs. The then-regional capital of Hargeisa (now Somaliland's capital) was heavily mined around military bases, refugee camps, private homes and the airport. Between 1994 and 1995 fierce battles in Hargeisa and in the areas south and east of Hargeisa saw extensively mine use.

According to the Somali Mine Action Center (SMAC), there are twenty-eight mined roads in Somaliland. There have been several mine incidents on the coastal road between the port city of Berbera and neighboring Djibouti, and a section of this road just east of Berbera has at least one minefield of undetermined size. Sections of the regular Djibouti-Jidhi-Borama road are also mined and traffic has been diverted into alternate routes for the past eight years. The regular unpaved road between the largest towns of Somaliland, Burao and Hargeisa, has been abandoned, in part due to landmine threat.

There are more than eighty minefields in Somaliland, sixty-three of which have been confirmed by SMAC. The majority of minefields are found near the Ethiopian border. Somaliland is a pastoral society and the frontier area is the most important grazing area for Somaliland livestock. Each season, tens of thousands of nomads and their herds cross the border on foot in search of water and pasture and are therefore at risk

⁵ Interview with Rashid Haji Abdillahi, Somaliland Minister of Defense, Hargeisa, 20 January 2000.

⁶ Interview with Col. .Mohamed Ali Ismail (ret), Director of National Demining Agency, 26 November 1998.

⁷ Interview with Rashid Haji Abdillahi, Somaliland Minister of Defense, 20 January 1999.

⁸ Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 225.

from the mines. No systematic demining has taken place in this frontier area and there are no paved roads in the area, nor are there any hospitals or health care centers.

Mine Action Coordination

In 1997, the Somaliland government constituted a National Demining Agency (NDA) to coordinate all demining, mine awareness and victim assistance programs by the government and national and international NGOs. At about the same time, the United Nations Development Program established a Somali Mine Action Center (SMAC) managed by the Somali Civil Protection Program (SCCP) of UNDP to coordinate its landmine activities in Somaliland.

The UN Secretary-General's October 1999 annual report on Assistance in Mine Action stated that, "Improved co-ordination and institutional support would benefit the myriad of demining organisations involved in north-west Somalia. The implementation of centralised control over data collection and management activities would ease the ultimate transfer of these responsibilities to local authorities."⁹

Survey and Assessment

In 1999, CARE International completed thirty-eight Level I and Level II surveys in Awadal and Galbeed regions. HALO Trust started in September 1999 and completed in 2000 a Level I survey of the entire Awdal region which added to information gained by CARE.¹⁰ In 1999, Danish Demining Group established a base camp at Adadley, a former military camp seventy kilometers west of Hargeisa, and started Level I and Level II surveys and clearance.

SMAC is currently negotiating with donors for funding for comprehensive Level I and Level II surveys and mine clearance projects in Awadal and Togdheer regions.

Mine Action Funding

In spite of the gravity of the landmine problem, Somaliland's status as a self-declared state has made it difficult to attract funding for mine action projects. While some limited mine clearance took place between 1991 and 1993, since 1998 a number of mine clearance activities have been launched. Funding for mine action totaled only some \$546,000 in 1998, but has increased dramatically to about \$6.65 million in 1999 and early 2000. Donors include Denmark, European Commission, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, and UNDP.

Mine Tech of Zimbabwe was contracted by the UNDP/SCPP in 1998 to began a small mine action project in the mine-affected city of Burao. The project budget, funded by UNDP, was \$202,000 in 1998 and in 1999-2000 the program was expanded with a further \$400,000 funding.

CARE International received \$343,817 from the U.S. in 1998 to start a Level II survey in Somaliland contracted to Mine Tech and to support the SMAC.¹¹ The project

⁹ "Assistance in Mine Action: Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly," A/54/445, 6 October 1999.

¹⁰ Email from Richard Boulter, Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

¹¹ Somalia Mine Action Program (SOMAP), CARE International, October 1998.

started in March 1999 and has been further expanded with \$600,000 in funds from the European Commission and the U.S. Department of State.¹²

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) was awarded 4 million Kroner (approximately \$600,000) from the Danish Foreign Ministry in January 1999.¹³ After completing an initial feasibility project, the DDG received another \$1.4 million from the Danish Government to continue and expand its mine clearance project in Somaliland.

HALO Trust has been funded with \$1.25 million in 1999 and approximately \$1.3 million for 2000 by the U.S. State Department for a multi-year mine clearance program.¹⁴ A sub-grant of \$150,000 was awarded for capacity building of the National Demining Agency (NDA). In addition, the British Ministry of Defense has donated four front loaders and four bulldozers to HALO Trust for use in Somaliland.¹⁵

The Santa Barbara Foundation has received funds from the German government and private foundations to undertake a \$500,000 demining project in the Gabiley district west of Hargeisa.¹⁶

The SMAC is spending \$400,000 on mine action coordination and mine action policy formulation.¹⁷ SMAC is currently negotiating with donors for further funding of \$4.25 million for a comprehensive Level I and Level II surveys and mine clearance projects in Awadal and Togdheer regions and for clearance of missiles and bombs from around Hargeisa and Berbera.

Mine Clearance

In 1998, UNDP funded a three-month commercial demining project to begin the demining of Burao. MineTech of Zimbabwe was contracted to do a feasibility study using previously trained Somali deminers. Sixty-three Somali deminers, two mine detection dogs and expatriate technical advisors have now cleared approximately 73,000 square meters of Burao city removing 107 antipersonnel mines, fifteen antitank mines and 63 UXOs at a clearance cost of \$2.75 per square meter and a total cost of \$202,000. Under a separate contract from HABITAT, the team also cleared a 1.5 kilometers of road leading to the water reservoir of nearby Sheikh town. More than 70,000 former residents of Burao, the second largest Somaliland city, had been unable to return and live in a makeshift camp on the eastern outskirts.¹⁸

The UNDP/Somalia Civil Protection Program expanded their mine clearance program in 1999 and awarded a demining contract to the UK-based Greenfield Associates (now European Demining).¹⁹ Mine clearance in Burao has now enabled some sections to be repopulated. The reopening of important public facilities such as the

¹² www.zimtrade.co.zw/profiles/minetech/index.htm

¹³ *Berlingske Tidende*, (Copenhagen), 20 January 1999.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, "FY 00 NADR Project Status," p. 3.

¹⁵ Matthew Hovel, HALO Trust, Presentation to the Workshop on the Menace of Landmines in the Horn of Africa, Hargeisa, Somaliland, 23-24 November 1999.

¹⁶ www.stiftung-sankt-barbara.de

¹⁷ Communication from Jab Swart of the Somali Civil Protection Program (UNDP), 10 May 2000.

¹⁸ UN Assessment Mission to Northwest Somalia, June 1998.

¹⁹ www.landmine-solutions.com

airport, the bank, a few schools and a number of main streets have made it possible for the majority of people to move from a 70,000 strong makeshift town just outside of Burao town.

In 1999, DDG established a base camp at Adadley, a former military camp seventy kilometers west of Hargeisa, and started Level I and Level II surveys and clearance in addition to reconstruction of a boarding school and a health post. To date DDG has cleared UXO from two battlefields at Adadley, in addition to the road to the stone quarry at Dheenta, the Dhobato bridge, the Haleya Bridge, the Makhayada Inanta culvert and the Abdalla culvert. The DDG work cleared a total of 178,426 square meters of battle area and a total 23,156 square meters of mined areas, destroying twenty-nine AP mines, one AT mine and 15,495 UXO.

In September 1999, HALO Trust started its program with a confirmatory planning survey and deminer training. In March 2000, HALO Trust deployed five mine clearance teams, totaling sixty-two demining lanes in important grazing and cultivation areas. To date it has destroyed 653 AP mines, 94 AT mines and 535 UXO and completed a Level I survey of the entire Awdal region which added to information gained by CARE in 1999.²⁰

In 1999, CARE International completed thirty-eight Level I and Level II surveys in Awdal and Galbeed regions, trained medical personnel, and started a mine awareness project with a voluntary youth group.

Mine Awareness

Mine awareness training has not been commensurate with the need. A number of NGOs have printed Information, Education and Communication (IEC) messages in the Somali language and one occasionally sees a poster on a bulletin board, but even known minefields are not marked to warn civilians. Nomads use branches or sticks to mark suspected landmines, but these are not easily recognized.

In conjunction with its demining activity SCPP/SMAC trained thirty-five local women as civilian trainers and educators in the city of Burao.²¹ CARE International has started, in collaboration with a voluntary youth group, a mine awareness project in Somaliland. The youth group uses circus performances to promote mine awareness. CARE and Mine Tech Zimbabwe are also collaborating with the Somaliland Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SORRA) on comprehensive mine awareness campaigns throughout Somaliland. A pilot was started on 5 May 2000.²² The Danish Demining Group is also working with a local NGO on mine awareness and education. These projects are in their initial stages.²³

²⁰ Email from Richard Boulter, Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

²¹ UNDP promotional document, 1998 op. cit.

²² SORRA and Mine Tech are now running a daily advertisement campaign in the Somali language newspapers. Interview with Ahmed Mohamed Madar (SORRA) and Mohamed Abdi Galbeedi of SCAL, 5 May 2000.

²³ CARE works with the Hargeisa Voluntary Youth Committee (HAVAYOCO), while DDG works with Mine Awareness and Information Association (MISA).

Landmine Casualties

In 1992, Physicians for Human Rights conservatively estimated that there were between 1,500 and 2,000 landmine amputees in Somaliland.²⁴ Mine-related casualties have considerably subsided as people become more aware and avoid problem zones. Moreover, nomads and local communities especially in the frontier areas have often hired freelance deminers to demine areas they knew had landmines. In April 1998, doctors in Berbera Hospital indicated that on the average they were treating victims from one mine accident every month. Most of the victims in Berbera were from the heavily mined city of Burao, about two hours driving distance from Berbera.²⁵

Data on landmine accidents or casualties are not collected systematically. In a retrospective study, NDA has compiled mine victim statistics for the past ten years. The data compiled by NDA show that from 1988 to 1998 landmines caused 3,014 deaths and 576 injuries, destroyed 604 vehicles, as well as killing 5,502 camels, 2,391 cattle, 12,713 sheep and goats, and 1,2343 donkeys. NDA has a breakdown by region and district, which is available from Landmine Monitor.

This data was collected and compiled by the NDA during the first three months of 1999. It represents the first effort by the NDA to get an overview of the mine and UXO victim situation in Somaliland and it is a first step in systemizing data collection of mine and UXO related problems. The NDA recognizes that the methodology utilized has been imperfect and that the data obtained may be questionable in some respects. The survey relied on the recollection of respondents of events that happened many years ago.

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Somaliland, which even in normal times had few health care or other social service facilities, has suffered through two decades of conflict and instability and its entire infrastructure remains in ruins. The majority of health care workers, like other skilled professionals, have left to escape the insecurity and have not yet returned. In 1991, during the peak of mine incidents, there were only eight general surgeons and two orthopedic surgeons in the whole country. There is no evidence that the picture has changed at all. There are only three hospitals capable of providing surgery in Somaliland, and they are all poorly equipped.

Currently, two NGOs provide some post-operative assistance to landmine victims. The Somaliland Red Crescent Society (SRCS), with funding from the Somaliland government, and the Norwegian Red Cross provide plastic lower limb prostheses to amputees. Handicap International (HI) provides orthosis, crutches, orthopedic shoes and wheelchairs, and runs a physical therapy clinic for amputees and other handicapped individuals.²⁶ Both centers are located in Hargeisa, and except for occasional travel to other districts, their patients are confined to victims who can seek assistance in Hargeisa.

²⁴ Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), pp. 221-223.

²⁵ Meeting between doctors working for Coperazione Italiano (COOPI) and a visiting delegation lead by U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti, Hon. Lange Schermerhorn, Berbera, April 1998. Notes taken by author.

²⁶ Communication from Florence Thun, Handicap International Horn of Africa Coordinator, 11 November 1998; and Karen Perin, Handicap International, 8 May 2000.

Between 1993 and May 1999, the SRCS rehabilitation center provided prosthesis to 1,082 patients. Forty percent (382) of the patients were mine victims. On the average, the center makes plastic prosthetics for thirteen to fifteen patients each month. Handicap International, which makes low-cost wood mobility devices, also runs a wheelchair-making workshop. Notably, the Somaliland Handicapped Persons Association does some of the work on wheelchairs. Twenty percent of HI's patients were amputees, however, the number of landmine amputees is not specified. In 1999, HI/*Action North South* assisted 382 patients including twenty-two amputees. While most mine victims are now assisted at the Somaliland Red Crescent Society Handicap Center in Hargeisa, HI provided three below knee prosthesis for mine victim amputees in 1999. A total of 313 of the 531 SNM veterans disabled by war registered with the 1999 Registration and Evaluation Program in Hargeisa were mine victims.²⁷

²⁷ Dr. Mohamed Abdi "Arabayte," Chairman of the Evaluation Committee of the Registration Program, presentation to the Menace of Landmines in the Horn of Africa, Hargeisa, 23-24 November 1999.

AMERICAS

STATES PARTIES

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Antigua and Barbuda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 3 May 1999. The treaty entered into force for Antigua and Barbuda on 1 November 1999. Antigua and Barbuda's Article 7 transparency report, submitted on 29 March 2000, states that Antigua and Barbuda has "never stockpiled, transferred or employed the use of anti-personnel mines." No national implementation legislation is in place. Antigua and Barbuda participated in the First Meeting of State Parties in Maputo in May 1999. Its Ambassador to the United States, H.E. Lionel Hurst, made a statement on behalf of the fourteen CARICOM (Caribbean Community) member states. He said these states "are of the view that we too can play a significant role by contributing our moral leadership to this very necessary task of ending the scourge of landmines."¹ Ambassador Hurst also said that Antigua and Barbuda would announce at the General Assembly of the OAS in June 1999 that it would make a pledge to the OAS demining program in Central America. Antigua and Barbuda voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution in December 1999.

ARGENTINA

Key developments since March 1999: Argentina ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 21 July 1999 and it entered into force on 1 March 2000. A Working Group composed of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces has been created to oversee implementation.

Mine Ban Policy

Argentina signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. Argentina's Congress approved the treaty on 23 June 1999 under Law 25.112, promulgated it on 15 July 1999 and published it in the Official Bulletin (number 29.191) on 21 July 1999. Argentina deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on 14 September 1999. The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Argentina on 1 March 2000.

Then-President Carlos Saúl Menem submitted an interpretative statement on the Malvinas/Falklands to Congress at the same time as the ratification instrument, which was accepted without amendment. The statement says, "Argentina manifests that its territory in the Malvinas Islands is mine-affected, a fact which was communicated to the UN General Assembly in resolutions 48/7, 49/215, 50/82, and 51/149.... Argentina is

¹ Statement by Ambassador Lionel Hurst, Head of the Delegation of Antigua and Barbuda to the First Conference of the Parties to the Convention to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines, Maputo, 4 May 1999, p. 3.

impeded access to AP mines in the Malvinas in order to comply with the Mine Ban Treaty because of the illegal occupation by the United Kingdom.”¹

Argentina has not enacted domestic implementation legislation regarding the treaty. Law 25.112 does not contain provisions on violations and punishments.

Argentina’s Article 7 transparency report is due on 27 August 2000 and according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is being prepared.² On 1 March 2000, Nobel Peace Laureate Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, President of El Servicio Paz y Justicia, SERPAJ (Peace and Justice Services) sent a letter to Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini asking “whether the Argentinian government is preparing the report,” and requesting a copy of it.³

A Working Group on the treaty has been created (by resolution MD 169/00), made up of representatives of the Policy Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, the Army, the Navy and the Institute of Scientific and Technical Research of the Armed Forces (CITEFA). The Working Group is responsible for implementing treaty requirements, including Argentina’s Article 7 report, and is also mandated “to strengthen Argentina’s contribution to humanitarian demining.”⁴

Argentina voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, and has supported relevant UNGA resolutions in previous years. Argentine Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Minister Ana María Ramírez, noted at the UN General Assembly 54th session that “our country considers this legal instrument of fundamental value towards strengthening the principles of international humanitarian law.”⁵

Argentina participated in the First Meeting of State Parties held in Maputo in May 1999. Minister Pedro Villagra Delgado, Director of International Safety, Nuclear and Space Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement in support of the treaty, and noted, “We mustn’t drop our guard in the belief that the work is done. The international community must now redouble its efforts to achieve an effective and universal application of [the Mine Ban Treaty] principles and goals.”⁶

Argentina has participated in all of the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva.

Argentina is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and ratified Amended Protocol II on landmines on 21 October 1998. It participated in the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and made a statement to the plenary. Argentina submitted its Article 13 annual transparency report on 12 December 1999. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an interpretative

¹ Landmine Monitor has a copy of the interpretative statement. See also, Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 30 March 2000.

² Interviews with Secretary Santiago Villalba, Director of International Safety, Nuclear and Space Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in February and May 2000.

³ Landmine Monitor has a copy of the letter by Adolfo Pérez Esquivel.

⁴ Response by the Ministry of Defense to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 8 May 2000.

⁵ Statement by Argentine Permanent Representative to the UN Minister Ana María Ramírez to the UN General Assembly 54th session, New York, 18 November 1999.

⁶ Statement by Minister Pedro Villagra Delgado to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

statement was made by the Argentinian delegation dealing with the Malvinas issue.⁷ Argentina is a member of the Conference on Disarmament and has supported the unsuccessful attempts to address an antipersonnel mine transfer ban in that forum.

Production, Transfer, Use

Argentina is a former producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines. In the past, it manufactured three types of antipersonnel mines: the FMK-1 plastic blast mine, the MAPG pressure or trip-wire initiated mine, and the MAPPG bounding mine.⁸ Production took place at the Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares of the Ministry of Defense. Officials have declined to provide information on decommissioning or conversion of production facilities.⁹

Argentina adopted a five-year moratorium on the export, sale or transfer of antipersonnel mines on 27 March 1995. The moratorium has now been superceded by Argentina's Mine Ban Treaty obligations.¹⁰ Based on mines found in the Falklands/Malvinas, it appears that Argentina imported antipersonnel mines from Israel (Number 4), Italy (SB-33) and Spain (P4B).¹¹

It is not known if Argentina has used antipersonnel mines aside from the Falklands/Malvinas. During the confrontation between Argentina and Chile in 1978, which nearly led to war, Chile laid a large number of mines along its borders with Argentina, but it is not certain whether Argentina also used mines. Argentinian officials have repeatedly stated that Chile is solely responsible for the mined border areas. But, in July 1999 Congressmen Alfredo Bravo and Jorge Rivas made an official request for information on the number and location of antipersonnel landmines possibly planted by the Argentine Army along its border during the 1978 crisis. They have not received a response.¹²

Stockpiling

The Ministry of Defense did not provide information on the size and composition of Argentina's stockpiles or stockpile destruction plans to Landmine Monitor, stating that it is collecting this information for Argentina's Article 7 report.¹³ An official at the Directorate of Military Affairs of the Ministry of Defense stated that the government is

⁷ Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 30 March 2000.

⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD Rom.

⁹ Response by the Ministry of Defense to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 8 May 2000.

¹⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* referred to a scandal surrounding alleged sale of AP mines to Croatia in early 1995 despite the UN arms embargo. In early 1999, the former Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs and the former Army Commander-in-Chief were formally charged in the case. "New evidence of weapons sale," *El Clarin*, 3 January 1999.

¹¹ See Landmine Monitor 2000 country report on United Kingdom.

¹² Interview with Osvaldo Gazzola, Advisor, Office of Congressmen Alfredo Bravo and Jorge Rivas, 14 February 2000.

¹³ Response by the Ministry of Defense to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 8 May 2000.

not obligated to provide information to NGOs prior to the release of its Article 7 report.¹⁴ Information on stockpiles is not included in Argentina's Article 13 Annual Report to CCW Amended Protocol II.

Landmine Problem

The Argentinian Foreign Ministry has said that the only part of its territory that is mine-affected is the Malvinas Islands.¹⁵ The government maintains that mined areas along its sizeable border with Chile are only on the Chilean side. Nevertheless officials at the National Congress note that these mined areas might threaten the safety of Argentine peasants and indigenous peoples who cross back and forth on unmarked mine-affected border areas.¹⁶

According to a newspaper report, up to 14 border areas, mostly mountain passes between the two countries, are mine-affected, and not all of these passes are marked. The report indicates that there are minefields near the Aguas Calientes pass, close to Catamarca province, and in the southern border region, north of the Chilean city of Punta Arenas.¹⁷

Another newspaper report states that in the province of Jujuy there are mined areas southeast of the Licancabur volcano, close to the Jama pass; also, in Salta province, there are eight mine-affected areas around the Lullailaco volcano, in the Huaytiquina pass and around the Socompa pass. Chilean authorities only acknowledge four of these areas are mined.¹⁸

In August 1999 journalists covering a story of the recovery of three Incan infant mummies from the summit of Lullailaco volcano were warned by local peasants from the village of Tolar Grande to stay away from the salt fields of Mina La Julia and Mina La Casualidad, in Argentinian territory, because they were "full of landmines."¹⁹ Argentine authorities opened a file on the case, but still claim that the only mined-affected territory is the Malvinas Islands.

Mine Clearance

In April 1999, the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs of Argentina and Chile met in Zapallar, Chile, to discuss their common landmine problem. The Ministers stressed their intent to obtain needed resources in order to initiate mine clearance, and discussed the costs involved as well as the possibility of contracting private companies for the task.²⁰

¹⁴ Interview with Alejandra Martín, Advisor, Directorate of Military Affairs of the Ministry of Defense, 28 February 2000.

¹⁵ Landmine Monitor correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 January 1999.

¹⁶ Interview with Osvaldo Gazzola, Advisor, Office of Congressmen Alfredo Bravo and Jorge Rivas, 14 February 2000.

¹⁷ Juan Castro Olivera, "Chile keeps 14 mine fields along frontier areas," *La Nación*, 2 July 1999.

¹⁸ Antonio Oieni, "One million antipersonnel mines still buried in the highlands," *El Tribuno* (Salta newspaper), 16 August 1999.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ "Integration measures agreed," *Clarín* (Buenos Aires newspaper), 19 May 1999.

The Argentine Ambassador to the Organization of America States stated that the presence of antipersonnel mines in the Andean highlands between the two countries is Chile's responsibility, but stressed that Argentina would cooperate in clearance.²¹

On 28 June 1999 Governor Juan Carlos Romero of Salta, noting that he had been updated on bilateral discussions regarding mine clearance by the OAS ambassador, said he would consider filing a claim at the international level if an agreement on mine clearance along the border was not achieved by the two countries.²² In his response to Governor Romero, Chile's Ambassador to Argentina, Florencio Guzmán Correa is quoted as saying, "The Chilean government has expressed its political will to initiate mine clearance in areas close to the Argentine border.... The Chilean government will do so as soon as it has the financial resources needed to do the task."²³

The Argentinian and Chilean governments held talks on mine clearance during then President Menem's visit to Santiago in August 1999. The Argentine military offered the assistance of the CAECOPAZ, the Center for Joint Training for Peace Operations of Campo de Mayo, but it was rejected by their Chilean colleagues.²⁴ Nonetheless, plans are being developed for the mine clearance activities in the south, in particular out in Cabo del Hornos Island in the Wollaston Archipelago.

At the 34th Conference of American Armies, held in November 1999 in the Bolivian capital La Paz, General Ricardo Izurieta, the Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, announced that Chile would clear its minefields along the borders with Argentina, Perú, Bolivia, and Argentina.²⁵ General Izurieta said, "In the briefest timeframe we'll clear minefields along the borders with Bolivia, Perú and Argentina – within the year – as a demonstration of our concrete and frank intention to strengthen ties with all our neighbours and in particular with the Bolivian Army."²⁶

Mine Action

Argentina has not provided financial assistance, but has actively participated in international mine action programs, notably in Central American, Angola,²⁷ and Kuwait.²⁸ Armed Forces personnel have been involved in mine clearance operations in Central America since 1993. According to Argentina's Article 13 report to Amended

²¹ Antonio Oieni, "Chile is responsible for clearance of antipersonnel mines in the Andes," *El Tribuno*.

²² Statement made by Governor Juan Carlos Romero to *Reuters* on 28 June 1999 and published in "The Province analyzes a Judiciary Claim," *El Tribuno*, 29 Tuesday 1999.

²³ "Chile ratified its decision of demining the the Cordillera," *El Tribuno*, 13 October 1999.

²⁴ "Chilean military put a halt to demining program," *Clarín*, 17 August 1999.

²⁵ José Higuera, "Desminado fronterizo: La atrevida promesa de Izurieta," *El Metropolitano* (Santiago), 20 November 1999.

²⁶ "Izurieta anunció retiro de minas antipersonales en zonas fronterizas," *La Segunda* (Santiago), 18 November 1999. "Chile announces the demining of its borders," *Agence France Presse* (La Paz), 18 November 1999.

²⁷ A group of twelve Argentine military personnel, volunteers with the White Helmet Corps, participated in mine clearance operations in the area of Malange between June 1997 and June 1998. "Risky Argentine Mission in Angola" *La Nación*, 19 April 1999.

²⁸ An Army Engineers Unit participated in Kuwait under the UNIKOM mission. See Argentina's Article 13 report to CCW Amended Protocol II, Form E, 15 November 1999.

Protocol II of the CCW, in 1999 Argentine personnel working in the OAS program, through the Interamerican Defense Board, participated in the destruction of 5,000 mines in Nicaragua.²⁹ In 1999 Argentina participated once more in demining activities in Central America (Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica) under the OAS.³⁰ Argentina's participation in the regional program ended on 24 January 2000, when the last four Argentine military mine clearance instructors returned to Argentina because of budgetary constraints.³¹ The government is said to be evaluating the renewal of its assistance to mine clearance in Central America.³²

Argentina states that it has offered to contribute to demining efforts along the Peru-Ecuador border under the MOMEPA mission.³³ The Ministry of Defense has offered the services of a military expert, three instructors, and mobile training equipment for mine clearance operations in Kosovo.³⁴

The Argentine Army's Centre for Training in Humanitarian Demining has provided instruction to both national and foreign army personnel.³⁵ Moreover, the Argentine Training Centre for Peace Operations (CAECOPAZ) provides semi-annual courses on demining and humanitarian assistance. CAECOPAZ works exclusively in peacekeeping operations.³⁶

According to the Ministry of Defense, the Institute of Scientific and Technical Research of the Armed Forces (CITEFA) has the capacity for research and development of mine-detection technology using thermal imaging.³⁷

BAHAMAS

The Bahamas signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 31 July 1998. It is not believed to have enacted domestic implementation legislation. The Bahamas has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due on 27 August 1999. The Bahamas was not present at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban

²⁹ Argentina's Article 13 report to Amended Protocol II, Form E, 15 November 1999. See also statement by Argentine Permanent Representative to the UN Minister Ana María Ramírez to the UN General Assembly, New York, 18 November 1999.

³⁰ Alberto Armendáriz, "Argentina collaborates with the removal of landmines in Nicaragua," *La Nación*, 18 April 1999. See also statement by Minister Ana María Ramírez to the UN General Assembly, 18 November 1999.

³¹ Email from Juan Luis Hurtado, military member of the mission in Central America, March 2000. Interview with Alejandra Martín, Advisor to the Secretary of Military Affairs, Guillermo Tello, Ministry of Defense, Buenos Aires, March 2000.

³² Interview with Alejandra Martín, Ministry of Defense, Buenos Aires, March 2000.

³³ Argentina's Article 13 report to the Amended Protocol II CCW, Form E, 15 November 1999.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Argentina's Article 13 report to the Amended Protocol II CCW, Form F, 15 November 1999. See also statement by Minister Ana María Ramírez to the UN General Assembly, 18 November 1999.

³⁶ Response by the Ministry of Defense to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 8 May 2000.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. The Bahamas voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

In a January 2000 letter to the ICBL Coordinator, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that The Bahamas “attached much importance to the goals and objectives of the Treaty” and wished the ICBL “continued success in 2000 in promoting global awareness of the dangers and destruction associated with land mines, especially anti-personnel mines.”¹

The Bahamas has stated that it “produces no antipersonnel mines, has never used or stockpiled them, or engaged in any way in their transfer.”² The Bahamas is not mine-affected.

BARBADOS

Barbados signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 26 January 1999. The treaty entered into force for Barbados on 1 July 1999. It is not believed to have enacted domestic implementation legislation. Barbados has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due 27 December 1999. Barbados did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. It voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. Barbados has stated that it has never produced, imported, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines, and is not mine-affected.¹

BELIZE

Belize signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 February 1998 and ratified on 23 April 1998, the tenth nation to do so. Belize submitted its Article 7 transparency report on 4 November 1999.

Belize has not yet enacted domestic implementing legislation.¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed to Landmine Monitor that “to date Belize has not yet reached the stage of implementing laws for the enforcement of the aforementioned Convention of

¹ Letter from A. Missouri Sherman-Peter, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Bahamas, to Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, 18 January 2000.

² Statement made by the Honorable Janet G. Bostwick, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Treaty Signing Conference, Ottawa, Canada, December 1997. This information is confirmed in the 1999 Landmine Monitor Questionnaire completed by the High Commission for the Commonwealth of The Bahamas, Ottawa, 2 February 1999.

¹ 1999 Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, completed by the Government of Barbados, 29 January 1999. See also the UN country report: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/barbados.htm>.

¹ Belize’s Article 7 report, submitted on 4 November 1999, states that no national implementation measures have been taken

Ottawa.”² It appears other legislation has taken priority over the Mine Ban Treaty for now.³

Belize voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. It has also supported the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). It was one of nine countries that signed the “Declaration of San José” in Costa Rica on 5 April 2000, which includes an article promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Belize did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. Belize is neither a member of the Conference on Disarmament nor a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Belize has never used, produced, imported, or stockpiled antipersonnel landmines, including for training purposes.⁴ Belize is not mine-affected.

BOLIVIA

Key developments since March 1999: In December 1999, Chile began demining its border with Bolivia.

Mine Ban Policy

Bolivia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and was the first country of South America to deposit its instrument of ratification with the UN on 9 June 1998. Bolivia has not enacted national implementation legislation.¹

Bolivia participated in the First Meeting of State Parties (FMSP) in Maputo in May 1999. In her statement to the plenary, Barbara Canedo Patiño, Director General of Multilateral Issues of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called on the countries which had not signed or ratified the treaty to do so as soon as possible, protested against new deployments of AP mines, encouraged states parties to correctly implement the treaty and described her government’s support for the contribution of the ICBL and the ICRC. She went on to note, “Bolivia gives priority to the Ottawa Convention and confirms its commitment to fulfilling the terms of the Convention.”²

² Fax from Saida E. Espot, for the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Report of Monitoring on Land Mines 2000 – Belize,” Ref: FA/UN/28/2000 (40), to Landmine Monitor researcher, 15 June 2000.

³ Email from Candy Gonzalez, Vice President, Belize Institute for Environmental Law and Policy (BELPO), 23 June 2000.

⁴ Belize Article 7 report, submitted 4 November 1999.

¹ In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, submitted 8 November 1999, Bolivia states in Form A, “No se dispone de medidas de aplicación alguna.” (Translation: “There are not national implementation measures.”)

² Statement by Barbara Canedo Patiño, Director General of Multilateral Issues of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999. In Spanish, translation by Landmine Monitor researcher.

Bolivia has participated in some of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva, including the March 2000 meetings on mine clearance and victim assistance, and the January 2000 meeting on the General Status of the Convention.

Bolivia submitted its Article 7 transparency report on 8 November 1999. While the report was due by 27 August 1999, an official described the delay as due to a simple administrative hold-up and to the change in the cabinet.³ The report covers the period 1 January 1999 - 1 November 1999, was prepared by the Ministry of Defense, and was submitted in Spanish.

Bolivia voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had for similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. It has also voted in favor of the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). In a May 2000 response to Landmine Monitor, Bolivia described its “total support and commitment” to the ban on antipersonnel mines.⁴

Bolivia is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It participated as an observer in the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines, but did not make a statement. Bolivia is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Bolivia is not believed to have ever produced or transferred antipersonnel mines. In its Article 7 report, Bolivia states that it has no AP mine production facilities, and that it has no stockpiled antipersonnel mines whatsoever, including any for training. Bolivia is not known to have ever used AP mines.

Mine Clearance

While Bolivia stated in its Article 7 report that it has “no mined areas or areas that are suspected of containing AP mines,” its border with Chile was mined by Chile during the 1970s, and in 1978 in particular, during a territorial dispute. In July 1998, Bolivia’s President Hugo Bánzer asked Chile to demine the area as soon as possible, noting that the mines planted 20 years ago have harmed both the Bolivian and Chilean people. He offered Bolivia’s assistance to Chile in the removal of landmines along the border.⁵

In November 1999 Chile’s Head of the Armed Forces, General Ricardo Izurieta, announced in La Paz, Bolivia, that his country would demine the borders with Bolivia, Peru and Argentina “as soon as possible.”⁶ On 1 December 1999, the Chilean Army announced in Santiago the launch of the program to clear mined areas and specified that it would begin immediately along the border with Bolivia: around Tambo Quemado, between Chile’s First Region (Primera Región de Chile) and the Bolivian zone of

³ Telephone interview with Barbara Canedo Patiño, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 May 2000.

⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, provided by Barbara Canedo Patiño, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2000.

⁵ “Bolivia offers Chile assistance to accelerate the demining along the border,” *Agence France Presse* (La Paz), 4 July 1998.

⁶ “Chile announces the demining of its borders,” *Agence France Presse* (La Paz), 18 November 1999.

Charana, at an altitude of some 4,000 meters in the Andes.⁷ On 9 December 1999, a media report said deminers had destroyed 250 antipersonnel mines and 27 antitank mines, discovered in Portezuelo de Tambo Quemado near the Bolivian border.⁸

At the time, the Chilean Army estimated that it would take approximately three months to demine this area,⁹ but the mine clearance was still underway as of May 2000. An official told Landmine Monitor that although Bolivia considers the demining process to be very slow, Bolivia is pleased demining has started and considers it as a sign of Chilean goodwill. The official also noted that Bolivia would like Chile to ratify the treaty as soon as possible because it means a commitment to demine in a scheduled time.¹⁰

A Bolivian newspaper reported the deaths of three Bolivian peasants due to mines between 1985 and 1997, but Landmine Monitor is unaware of any mine victims since then.¹¹

BRAZIL

Key Developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Brazil on 1 October 1999. Brazil ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 4 October 1999. Brazil has not submitted its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, which was due by 29 March 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Brazil signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 30 April 1999. Brazil's National Congress promulgated it on 5 August 1999 by Decree 3.128. The treaty entered into force for Brazil on 1 October 1999, but it has yet to enact implementation legislation. Brazil has domestic legislation regarding explosives and firearms.¹

Brazil participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ambassador Ivan Cannabrava the plenary, "We are ready to proceed – in its spirit and letter – with our involvement with the Ottawa process."² He also called on all states that have not yet done so to "join our efforts by signing and ratifying the instrument." According to

⁷ "Chile begins the demining in the border with Bolivia," *Agence France Presse* (Santiago), 1 December 1999; "Army Begins To Dismantle Mine Fields," *El Mercurio*, (Chilean national newspaper), 1 December 99.

⁸ "277 Landmines Destroyed," MISNA, Tambo Quemado, Chile, 9 December 1999.

⁹ "Chile begins the demining in the border with Bolivia," *Agence France Presse* (Santiago), 1 December 1999.

¹⁰ Telephone interview with Barbara Canedo Patiño, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 May 2000.

¹¹ *El Diario*, 21 September 1997.

¹ Article 253 of the Brazilian Penal Code, prescribes punishment of 6 months to 2 years imprisonment for producing, buying, selling, carrying or possessing, without license, any substance or explosive device, toxic gas or material for its production.

² Statement by Ambassador Ivan Cannabrava, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Relations, to the First Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3 May 1999, p. 3.

Ministry for Foreign Relations officials, Brazilian diplomats assigned to Geneva have been following all intersessional meetings of the treaty.³

Brazil's Article 7 transparency report was due by 29 March 2000 but has not yet been submitted. According to officials in the Ministry for Foreign Relations, consultations are continuing between the Ministry for Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Defense in order to produce the report, including data gathering on the size and composition of Brazil's stockpiled antipersonnel mines.⁴

Brazil voted in favor of UN General Assembly resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had for similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

Brazil was one of nine governments to sign the "Declaration of San José" in Costa Rica on 5 April 2000; the declaration contains an article promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Brazilian NGOs have actively promoted the ban on antipersonnel mines and advocated for ratification of the treaty both by Brazil and throughout the region. They include Associação do Jovem Aprendiz (AJA), a Brazilian NGO which works with handicapped youth, Father Marcelo Guimarães and a youth group called "Step for Peace," and SERPAJ Brazil.

Brazil ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II on 4 October 1999. At the the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, Brazilian Ambassador Adhemar G. Bahadian said, "While we remain open-minded, we believe that care should be taken not to waste our scarce resources in an endless effort to revise the provisions of the Amended Protocol II as far as anti-personnel landmines are concerned. While some provisions can be broadened, there would be little sense in engaging in an indefinite process of amendment, when, in our view, we should be aiming at the universalization and effective implementation of the Ottawa Convention."⁵

Brazil is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a noted supporter or opponent of efforts to negotiate a ban on transfers in that forum.

Production and Transfer

Brazil is a former producer and exporter of landmines. The government states that it has not produced landmines since 1989, and has not exported landmines since 1984.⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Relations could not confirm whether Brazil has produced or imported Claymore-type mines.⁷

³ Interview with Leonardo Cleaver de Athayde, Division of Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies (DDS), Ministry of Foreign Relations, Brasília, 9 May 2000.

⁴ Interview with Minister Gilberto Fonseca G. De Moura, Chief of the Division of OAS Affairs; First Secretary Glivânia Coimbra, Chief, DDS; and Third Secretary Leonardo Cleaver de Athayde, also of the DDS, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Brasília, 14 January 2000. Brazil has also not yet submitted its annual landmine reports for the OAS or CCW Amended Protocol II.

⁵ Statement by Ambassador Adhemar Bahadian at the First Annual Conference of the State Parties to Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 15 December 1999.

⁶ Statement by Amb. Cannabrava to the First Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

⁷ Interview with Leonardo Cleaver de Athayde, DDS, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Brasília, 9 May 2000.

Stockpiling

According to officials at the Ministry of Foreign Relations, data on Brazil's AP landmine stockpile is being gathered at present. Landmine Monitor contacted the Chief of the Social Communication Center of the Brazilian Army, and the Communication Sector of the Ministry of Defense regarding stockpiled AP mines but has not yet received any information.

At the First Meeting of State Parties in May 1999, Brazil's representative stated, "The stockpiles we do have are being used by the Armed Forces for the development of techniques and training activities in demining."⁸

On 3 May 2000, *Correio Braziliense*, a national Brazilian newspaper, reported sources associated with the Brazilian Army Command as claiming that all types of landmines stockpiled by the Brazilian Army and Navy, allegedly more than 200,000, had been destroyed, and so quickly that records of stockpile destruction were still being compiled.⁹ The article also quoted an official at the Ministry of Foreign Relations as saying that "the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries are running against time in order to announce the total destruction of Brazilian landmines at the Treaty's Standing Committee of Experts Meeting to be held in Geneva, 22 May 2000." Such an announcement was not made, however. An official from the Ministry of Foreign Relations declined to comment on the article.¹⁰

In June 2000, National Assembly Deputy Nilmário Miranda met with the Minister of Defense Élcio Álvares, who wanted to respond to a written request for information the deputy had made on 27 May 2000. The Minister read a short document which said that Brazil produced an "insignificant" quantity of antipersonnel mines and that it would be nearly "irrelevant" to establish a destruction plan for existing stockpiles.¹¹

Use

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 stated that it had found no evidence that Brazil planted mines on its borders or in the Brazilian Amazon, but did report that allegations of landmine use by landholders in North Paraná to keep out the "landless" (Sem Terra) were under investigation by the Human Rights Commission of the Lower House of Deputies.¹² During the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, Brazilian Ambassador Cannabrava

⁸ Statement by Amb. Cannabrava to the First Meeting of State Parties, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

⁹ Pedro Paulo Rezende, "Brasil Destrói Minas Antipessoal," *Correio Braziliense*, 3 May 2000, p. 4. According to the sources quoted in the article, "Since 1 March 1999 [sic] when the National Congress ratified the treaty, more than 200,000 mines had been destroyed. Old mines from WWII were simply detonated in military bases in Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul and Goiás States. More recently manufactured landmines were disassembled and their explosive content retained for other uses, including civilian ones.... The task of compiling detailed information on which type of mines were destroyed or disassembled, when and where, is made more difficult by the lack of cooperation between the new Ministry of Defense and the Brazilian Army."

¹⁰ Interview with Leonardo Cleaver de Athayde, DDS, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Brasília, 9 May 2000.

¹¹ Email from Deputy Nilmário Miranda, National Assembly, 29 June 2000. Deputy Nilmário Miranda is a member of the left-of-center Partido dos Trabalhadores.

¹² See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 287.

told Landmine Monitor that this was a false accusation published in Brazilian press and that the matter had never been under consideration by the Congress.¹³ A representative of the Movimento Sem Terra (Movement of Landless Peasants) confirmed no findings or incidents involving landmines among landless peasants.¹⁴ There have since been no more media reports on this particular issue and Landmine Monitor has found no evidence of any AP mine use in Brazil.

Mine Clearance

While Brazil is not mine-affected, it has actively participated in international humanitarian mine action on a bilateral and multilateral basis. At the First Meeting of State Parties, Ambassador Canbrava said, "Having participated in mine clearance activities in African countries such as Angola, in the context of UN peace-keeping operations, Brazil is currently supplying nearly half of the demining experts to the MARMINCA programme in Central America. Brazil has also participated in demining activities of MOMEPE along the Peru-Ecuador border."¹⁵

Brazilian army experts participate in the OAS demining program in Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. According to officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, operational costs and in-kind contributions to MARMINCA are estimated to cost Brazil US\$1 million per year. There are 11 Brazilian demining experts among the 27 supervisors in MARMINCA.¹⁶

Landmine Casualties

There have been some Brazilian landmine casualties from participation in UN peacekeeping operations and mine clearance efforts. A Brazilian Navy Captain lost a leg in 1997, and an Army Captain was wounded in 1999, both on MARMINCA demining duties.¹⁷

The Ministry of Foreign Relations indicates that it does not have accurate data on provision of assistance to mine victims.¹⁸ Brazil has disability laws and a variety of rights for people with disabilities.

¹³ Landmine Monitor Core Group meeting with the Brazilian delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 4 May 1999. Brazil's views were posted shortly afterwards to the "Comments Received" section of the Landmine Monitor website at <http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/comments.html#brazil>

¹⁴ Email from Communication Service of MST, 23 June 1999.

¹⁵ Statement by Amb. Cannabrava to the First Meeting of State Parties, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

¹⁶ Interview with Minister Gilberto Fonseca G De Moura, OAS Affairs, Glivânia Coimbra, DDS, and Leonardo Cleaver de Athayde, DDS, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Brasília, 14 January 2000.

¹⁷ Interview with Leonardo Cleaver de Athayde, DDS, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Brasília, 9 May 2000.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

CANADA

Key developments since March 1999: Canada continued to exercise a lead role internationally in promoting universalization and effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It played a crucial role in the success of the First Meeting of States Parties and the intersessional work program. Canada contributed \$16.7 million to mine action programs in its FY 1999/2000. The private Canadian Landmine Foundation was established.

Mine Ban Policy

Canada was the first nation to sign the ban convention on 3 December 1997 and was one of only three countries to deposit its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary General on the same day. Its Implementation Act, passed by Parliament on 27 November 1997, entered into force on 1 March 1999, as did the Mine Ban Treaty internationally.¹ A description and analysis of the Act were provided in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.²

The Mine Ban Treaty serves as a central reference point in Canadian foreign policy, particularly with respect to its efforts to promote and institutionalize the concept of human security, which it did, for example, within the United Nations Security Council, where it is serving a two-year term ending 31 December 2000. Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy describes human security as an approach by governments that places the protection and well-being of individuals as the main criterion for international action. In virtually every official address or speaking engagement, which deals with Canada's human security agenda, Minister Axworthy refers to the Mine Ban Treaty as an example.

Government representatives frequently refer to the MBT as a model by which other issues emphasized in Canadian foreign policy may be advanced. Repeatedly, it and the contributions of civil society have been linked in official statements to human security, small arms and the role of the United Nations Security Council. Both domestically and internationally, the MBT is described as going beyond the elimination of mines, raising the profile of threats to human safety while providing a concrete example of how to advance the concept of human security.³

¹ Canada became the first country known to have charged a citizen with a violation of MBT implementation legislation. In July 1999, a raid of a private home reportedly resulted in the confiscation of a large number of weapons, including landmines. Police arrested a 47-year old Canadian man who was released on CND\$5,000 bail the following day and is scheduled to appear in court 23 August 2000. Mike McIntyre, "Weapons cache included mines, machine guns," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 25 July 1999; "Bus driver gets bail," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 27 July 1999; interviews with various sources, June 2000.

² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 221-224. Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33, *An Act to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction*; Bill C-22, Assented to 27 November 1997. For more on the provision in the Act related to joint military operations, and the related "understanding" submitted with the ratification instrument, see below in "Use" section.

³ Notes for an address by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy to a Newsmakers Breakfast, Ottawa, 3 December 1999.

The appointment of an Ambassador for Mine Action in 1998 plus the creation of a new division within the Ministry specifically to work on landmines, the Mine Action Team (ILX), were intended not only to move the treaty process forward, but also to ensure that “Canada is able to continue to provide international leadership on the landmines issue.”⁴

FMSP

Canada played a crucial role in the organization of the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) held in Maputo, Mozambique. It seconded a full-time staff person from its Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (ILX-DFAIT) to the FMSP secretariat in Mozambique for almost three months to assist with logistics and conference planning. From within Canada, staff worked to emphasize the importance of the FMSP to other states, describing the conference as a “key step” in the entrenchment of the MBT. A large contingent of Canadian officials, including Minister Axworthy, was present during the Meeting. All federal political parties and the Mines Action Canada coalition were represented on the Canadian delegation. ILX officials and staff helped to conceptualize and were vocal proponents of the Convention’s intersessional work program. They also played a key role in developing and promoting the Article 7 Transparency Report formats, as well as the decision to post them to the Internet.

At the time of the FMSP, NATO was engaged in its bombing campaign in the conflict in Serbia/Kosovo. In his address to the opening plenary Axworthy called on the international community to develop a capacity for rapid, coordinated humanitarian mine action in post-conflict situations. “The international community must be ready to respond urgently to ensure that when the time comes, they can return to their homes in safety.”⁵ He detailed the need to mobilize and coordinate available resources, to improve information gathering from refugees, and other sources and to identify demining priorities. The Minister also suggested the need for the quick assembly and dispatch of survey and assessment teams, ongoing identification of equipment and personnel available for mine action, as well as the provision of mine awareness training for refugees and those involved in their resettlement.

Transparency Reporting

Canada submitted its Article 7 Transparency Reports as required and made copies available immediately. The first report was submitted on 27 August 1999, reporting on the period 1 January 1999 to 31 July 1999 and the second was submitted on 27 April 2000, reporting on the period 1 August 1999 to 14 March 2000.⁶ Canadian officials reported fully on all of the areas required under Article 7 and, in the second report provided additional information on the use of mines retained for research and

⁴ DFAIT, press release No. 129, “Axworthy Appoints Ambassador for Mine Action,” 22 May 1998, Ottawa.

⁵ Notes for an address by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy to the FMSP, Maputo Mozambique, 3 May 1999; Press release, No. 96, “Axworthy calls for post-conflict mine action capability in areas such as Kosovo,” 3 May 1999.

⁶ The most recent Article 7 report submitted should be considered the standard.

development, as well as training (for further information, see section on Stockpiling and Destruction).

There have been problems with late submission of Article 7 Reports by other countries. Canadian officials have stressed the importance of states parties fulfilling the treaty's reporting requirements, have compiled reports detailing the reasons why states parties may be late in fulfilling this treaty obligation, and have made efforts to facilitate their submission while urging other states to do likewise.

As of 30 May 2000, Canada was one of only eight OAS member states to submit information to the OAS Register of Antipersonnel Landmines.⁷

International Promotion of the Mine Ban Treaty

Canada continues to play an important and leading role in the global campaign to ban antipersonnel mines and to eliminate their socio-economic impact. Canadians have worked to universalize the treaty, to increase funds for clearance and victim assistance and other mine action, as well as to promote the Mine Ban Treaty. The Government of Canada's Mine Action Team, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (ILX-DFAIT), was expanded with the addition of program officers and support staff. Through their efforts the issue has been raised repeatedly in regional and international fora around the world. From Kosovo to Latin America and Mozambique, Canadian delegations have raised the issue of landmines and the Mine Ban Treaty in efforts to persuade others to take these critical steps to fulfill their obligations to the treaty and to meet its objectives.

Canada has raised the MBT in statements made in the G-8, the UN Security Council, APEC, the OAS, the Commonwealth, the ASEAN Regional Forum, la Francophonie, and other international fora. While in Russia at a conference on human security and northern policy Foreign Minister Axworthy asked then acting president Vladimir Putin to put in place a timetable for signature of the MBT and destruction of Russian stockpiles.⁸

As in past years, in 1999 Canada helped to draft and was a major promoter of the UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. In December 1999 Canada voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 54/54B

The government has played a key role in the Mine Ban Treaty's intersessional program. It is a co-chair of the SCE on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, and Canadian officials have also chaired or presented to other sessions within the SCEs.

Non-State Actors

In two separate statements Minister Axworthy referred to non-state actors (NSAs) in regards to the MBT and to human security and "the need to find ways to address the challenges they [NSAs] raise. Two years after the Ottawa Convention, the role of these

⁷ OAS, Register on Antipersonnel Landmines, submitted by Peter M. Boehm, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the OAS, OES/Ser. G, CP/CSH-190/00 add. 1., 14 April 1999.

⁸ Statement by Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Russia: Human Security and Northern Policy," St. Petersburg, Russia, 2 February 2000.

non-state actors, as participants in armed conflict or in perpetuating the new war economies, is the subject of growing scrutiny from the G-8 to the UN.⁹ Canada provided C\$40,000 to the conference "Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban," 24-25 March 2000. The conference was hosted by the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines.

Naming Names

Canada was among the first and one of the most vocal countries to publicly name the states where new use of mines has been reported (especially Angola and Kosovo) since the conclusion of the MBT. Foreign Minister Axworthy has said, "This is cause for real concern.... We must use this opportunity to speak out about these acts that violate the new international norm created by the treaty. We must respond to those who challenge the validity of the treaty. We can do this by working at the regional level to bring pressure to bear on those governments to stop creating this humanitarian disaster in our neighborhoods. We must call these miscreants to account: to their own publics and to the international community."¹⁰

With respect to Angola, a treaty signatory using mines in the conflict against UNITA, Minister Axworthy has suggested that Canadian assistance for clearance and other mine action would be withheld from states that continue to use mines. "The Convention is helping: the fact is that it makes much more sense to invest in the painstaking and costly task of mine clearance in places where governments have said they will never again use these weapons."¹¹

At the United Nations, Canada said, "No longer will countries, particularly signatory countries, be able to use landmines with impunity."¹² Similar statements have been made in Helsinki, Finland and in St. Petersburg, Russia.¹³

In Geneva, in December 1999, a Canadian delegate raised the issue of mine use by Russia in its war on Chechnya. "Canada continues to have serious concerns about reports concerning the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel mines by the Russian military in the context of the ongoing conflict in Chechnya.... Many of these mines were remotely delivered against no apparent military target.... Russian forces appear to have taken few if any steps to protect civilians in that conflict from the effects of mines, for example through the posting of signs, sentries, or fences around known mined areas. Canada would welcome clarification of these issues from Russian authorities as soon as

⁹ Notes for an address by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy to A Newsmakers Breakfast, Ottawa, 3 December 1999; Statement by Lloyd Axworthy, on the acceptance of the Endicott Peabody Award, Boston Massachusetts, 22 October 1999.

¹⁰ Notes for an address by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy to the FMSP, Maputo Mozambique, 3 May 1999; Press release, No. 96, "Axworthy calls for post-conflict mine action capability in areas such as Kosovo," 3 May 1999.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Statement by Daniel Livermore, Ambassador for Mine Action, to the 54th Session of the UNGA, Item 35: Mine Action, New York, New York, 18 November 1999.

¹³ Statement by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, to the Paasikivi Society, Helsinki, Finland, 1 September 1999; Statement by Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Russia: Human Security and Northern Policy," St. Petersburg, Russia, 2 February 2000.

possible.”¹⁴ In the same statement Canada called for clarification from Pakistan authorities on allegations that Pakistan Ordnance Factories offered AP mines to a British citizen, an infringement under Article 8 of Amended Protocol II.¹⁵

Landmine Monitor

Canada helped to conceptualize the Landmine Monitor system and has been among those countries supporting the Landmine Monitor initiative since its inception in 1998. In addition to financial grants the federal government also provided logistical and in-kind support for Landmine Monitor meetings held in Canada.¹⁶ In his address to the First Meeting of States Parties, Axworthy welcomed the role of NGOs and civil society in monitoring the treaty. “We also have the power of civil society behind us -- a community committed to ensuring that the gains made in the negotiation and signing of the AP mine ban convention become real and remain respected. This community has made an incredible contribution to this effort with the publication, in record time, of Mine Monitor (sic), with its comprehensive documentation of the mine issue in over 100 countries. Canada is proud to have been an early and vigorous supporter of this effort -- we encourage others to join in funding this publication and helping it become an annual citizen's companion to our Convention.”¹⁷ At that time Axworthy described the Landmine Monitor initiative as having “established itself as a world leader in highlighting international violations of the Ottawa Convention. I believe that they have proven instrumental in holding governments accountable for mine-related actions and obligations and that their annual report provides decision-makers with essential feedback on our progress in ridding the world of landmines.”¹⁸

Regional Promotion of the Mine Ban Treaty

The realization of the Western Hemisphere as a mine free zone and other mine action activities within the Americas has been identified as a top priority for Canadian foreign policy efforts. Canada has been a strong supporter of various Organization of American States (OAS) resolutions and declarations relating to landmines. Most significant is the 1996 OAS resolution calling for a hemispheric mine free zone.

At the 30th OAS General Assembly, hosted by Canada in Windsor, Ontario, 4-6 June 2000, delegates voted unanimously on a resolution calling on all OAS member states, donors and agencies working in mine action to increase efforts to complete clearance programs in Central America as soon as possible. A second resolution calls for the OAS to continue efforts to provide assistance in combating the AP mine problem in Ecuador and Peru. Also relevant to the AP mine issue are resolutions on small arms and

¹⁴ Statement by Bob Lawson, Senior Policy Advisor/Deputy Coordinator for Mine Action, at the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II CCW, Geneva, 15 December 1999.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Press release, #109, “Axworthy announces support for global landmine watchdog,” 19 May 2000.

¹⁷ Notes for an address by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy to the FMSP, Maputo, Mozambique, 3 May 1999.

¹⁸ Ibid.

the important role of civil society within the OAS.¹⁹ The OAS has been Canada's main partner in mine action in the Americas. According to Minister Axworthy, the OAS Summit of the Americas will take place in Québec City, 20-22 April 2001.

In accepting the Endicott Peabody Award for Humanitarian Works, Minister Axworthy noted the refusal of the U.S. to sign the treaty while urging the Administration to accede to it and to “join the moral force of the United States with that of those who have already done so.”²⁰

Domestic Promotion of the Mine Ban Treaty

Within Canada, the mine issue has been repeatedly raised. Federal ministers, in various appearances and speaking engagements for clubs and business meetings, have often raised the issue of the Mine Ban Treaty as a key example of Canadian efforts to promote human security. Domestically, Canadian youth, funded through the Youth Internship Program, have continuously educated the public on landmines-related issues. Their messages consistently emphasize the need to ban landmines, to raise awareness and to encourage Canadians to contribute to the support of humanitarian mine action. By all accounts the Youth Mine Action Ambassador Programme is a success and will continue into the foreseeable future.

Role of Canadian NGOs

Canadian NGOs and civil society initiatives in mine action range from implementation of programs in the field to directing advocacy efforts toward governments. The Mines Action Canada coalition remains the largest coordinated body working with NGOs in all aspects of mine action. The coalition currently has more than forty partner organizations. The MAC Secretariat and individual members have written letters to the Canadian government and to various other heads of state or state representatives on issues relating to the MBT. Topics have included the use of Claymore mines in peacekeeping operations, joint operations, promotion of a NATO policy on no use of AP mines, funds for mine action and the universalization of the MBT.

MAC was one of five campaigns which organized a non-state actor conference in Geneva and has undertaken a variety of education and outreach projects and been represented at numerous meetings and speaking engagements. Activities such as the MAC website, a newsletter, the Appropriate Technology Competition, and Africa Refugee Day are ongoing.

Throughout 1999/2000 MAC initiated several outreach activities with cultural and community groups on the mine issue and continues to host a series of capacity building workshops for NGOs involved in mine action.²¹ The workshops are intended to share ideas and improve practices in mine action and are based on the Bad Honnef Guidelines

¹⁹ Press Release, No. 141, “Axworthy welcomes progress on democracy and human security at OAS General Assembly,” 6 June 2000.

²⁰ Statement, Lloyd Axworthy, 22 October 1999 on the acceptance of the Endicott Peabody Award, Boston, Massachusetts.

²¹ Reports on Mines Action Canada’s capacity building workshops are available at <http://www.minesactioncanada.org>.

for mine action from a development-oriented point of view. Workshops take place on a quarterly basis and have included participants from government and NGOs. Topics covered include mine awareness programs and establishing priorities for mine action based on community needs. MAC has also organized workshops and briefing sessions on Claymore mines and cluster bombs and presented papers to the Canadian government on both of these issues. Mines Action Canada, the Canadian Red Cross and the Youth Mine Action Ambassador Program organized a major exhibition called Ban landmines '99 to mark the December anniversary of the opening for signature of the Mine Ban Treaty and also held a series of public events across the country as part of Canadian Landmine Awareness Week to highlight the 1 March 2000 anniversary of entry into force of the treaty.

MAC in partnership with the Canadian Red Cross and the Mine Action Team at DFAIT implement an outreach and sustainability program focused on Canadian students and youth. The Youth Mine Action Ambassadors Program (YMAA) grew from five youth interns in the first year to eight in the second year. Working within local host NGOs (UNICEF Québec, Canadian Red Cross, MAC and Oxfam Canada) the Youth Ambassadors raise public awareness, build public support for mine action and raise funds. These goals are met through organized events in schools, colleges and universities, as well as various activities with the general public. During the second year, the Youth Ambassadors undertook presentations and events in over 130 Canadian cities and towns reaching an estimated 35,000 people directly. This included 691 school presentations, fifty-four speaking events and 268 media interviews and articles.²²

Mines Action Canada is a member of the Landmine Monitor Core Group and coordinates research in the Americas region. It is also developing the Landmine Monitor Database. The database is an information management tool that will facilitate the Landmine Monitor initiative specifically and mine action in general. Information collected and analyzed by Landmine Monitor is updated and published in the annual Landmine Monitor reports and incorporated into the database. The database is available online.²³ Mines Action Canada is a member of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) Coordinating Committee and is active in several of its working groups.

CCW and CD

While Canada has signed and ratified both the original and the amended protocols of the CCW dealing with landmines, it also has consistently promoted the MBT as the best method to advance a total ban on AP mines and promote mine action. At the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW in Geneva, December 1999 the Canadian statement reaffirmed this position. "Canada continues to believe that the only sustainable and effective solution to the AP mines problem is a total ban on their production, stockpiling, trade and use. Partial restrictions such as those contained within Amended Protocol II must be seen as an important but temporary step

²² Figures supplied by YMAAP Secretariat.

²³ Available at: <http://www.lm-online.org>.

on the path towards the total elimination of these weapons, which both in practical use and by technical design are quite obviously indiscriminate.”²⁴

On 10 December 1999, Canada submitted its Article 13 report. In its report, Canada again noted the supremacy of the MBT over Canadian obligations under the CCW.²⁵

The Canadian delegation proposed measures to the States Parties related to Articles 2 (definitions) and 14 (compliance) in the Amended Protocol II to bring them in closer alignment with the Mine Ban Treaty. Another proposal related to antivehicle (AV) mines and the need to better protect civilians against their effects. The delegate in his statement said Canada would support efforts to develop minimal detectability standards for AV mines similar to those currently in place for AP mines. “Moreover, we would also support efforts to examine restrictions and/or total prohibitions on remotely delivered AV mines which are not equipped with self-destruct and/or self-deactivation devices.”²⁶

Canada participated in the January 2000 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) but made no statements regarding AP mines. However in the January 1999 session Canada said it would not support any work in the CD that will impair or hamper the effectiveness of the Mine Ban Treaty. “If such negotiations do take place, the only standards that we will accept are those of the Mine Ban Convention. Canada will not be a party to moving international law backwards.”²⁷

Production

The last mines produced in Canada were made by SNC Industrial Technologies of Le Gardeur, Québec. Production ceased in 1992 and the production capability was removed in 1998.²⁸ In 1999 SNC-Lavalin International established its Mine Action Services Branch. For detailed information on past Canadian production and export of the C3A1/2 AP mines, prior to the MBT, see the *Landmine Monitor 1999* report.

Alternatives to AP Mines

The Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT), created in 1998, is a joint initiative of the DND and Industry Canada. CCMAT’s research facilities are based at the Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) in Medicine Hat, Alberta. Part

²⁴ Statement by Bob Lawson, Senior Policy Advisor/Deputy Coordinator for Mine Action, to the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II of the CCW, Geneva, 15 December 1999.

²⁵ Annual Report of Canada in Accordance with Article 13, paragraph 4 of Protocol II as Amended on 3 May 1996, 10 December 1999.

²⁶ Statement by Bob Lawson, Senior Policy Advisor/Deputy Coordinator for Mine Action, to the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II of the CCW, Geneva, 15 December 1999.

²⁷ Statement by Mike Moher, Canadian Ambassador to the CD, January 1999.

²⁸ Government news release, No.5, on the announcement of comprehensive, unilateral moratoria on the production, export and operational use of AP mines by Canada, 17 January 1996. Other sources indicate production halted in 1994. See, Mark Abley, *The Gazette*, Montreal, 17 November 1994; *Jane’s Military Vehicles and Logistics*, 1994-95, p.175. See also Article 7 Reports, Canada, 27 August 1999 and 27 April 2000, <http://domino.un.org/ottawa>

of CCMAT's mandate is to investigate alternatives to AP mines, "to show that viable and more humane alternatives, that do not target civilians, can be developed as a way to persuade hold-out countries to sign the Convention."²⁹ CCMAT's Project Charter outlines this aspect of the center's mandate: "while there is no single technology or device that provides for a one-for-one replacement for anti-personnel mines, there may be alternative approaches that can accomplish the anti-personnel landmine function within the constraints of the convention in some scenarios and for some threats. The Centre would study and document such alternative approaches and identify technologies necessary for their implementation."³⁰ CCMAT plans to conduct its investigation into alternatives by acquiring, modifying and/or developing computer models (see below) to assess alternatives to landmines and the development of sensor and command and control technologies as components of alternative systems.³¹ The budget is set at C\$1.5 million over 5 years.

Concern has been raised by Mines Action Canada about the use of the Canadian Landmine Fund to finance research into alternatives to landmines.³²

CCMAT's activities on alternatives coincide with NATO's research into alternatives to AP mines says Dr. Bob Suart, CCMAT's Director. He is adamant that CCMAT is looking into non-lethal alternatives only.³³ According to Suart, NATO's research into alternatives has been ongoing since 1998 under what he referred to as NATO SAS 023. "NATO is concerned that if the army gives up AP mines, what is the impact and what are the appropriate measures to make up for that loss. NATO is liable to come up with an alternative weapons system and we're not interested in that," said Suart. "We don't have the budget to develop alternative [weapons systems]. We don't have the inclination and we don't have the mandate."³⁴ Under CCMAT, operational research staff from DND are taking part in NATO meetings as part of Canada's contribution to the NATO study on alternatives to AP mines. "There have been no expenditures or assignments of CCMAT funds to develop alternatives," Suart told Landmine Monitor.³⁵

CCMAT developed an operational research study in computer modeling on the military utility of AP mine use. Carried out by the Directorate Land Strategic Concepts at DND, the study reviewed the historical use of AP mines to identify the operational gap caused by removing AP mines from military inventories. As recorded in CCMAT Management Committee Minutes dated 26 February 1999, early results of the research suggest that the operational impact of removing AP mines from combat is marginal and that there are no obvious replacement technologies.³⁶ The next step for CCMAT in the search for alternatives to AP mines is to build computer models to assess proposed alternatives.

²⁹ CCMAT Project Charter, October 1998.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Mines Action Canada, letter to ministers of foreign affairs, defense, international cooperation and industry, copied to CCMAT director, 29 January 1999.

³³ Telephone interview with Dr. Bob Suart, Director of CCMAT, 28 June 2000.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Valerie Warmington, CCMAT Work on Alternatives to AP Landmines Summary, undated.

MAC was invited to sit on the CCMAT management committee, but because of the concern vis-à-vis alternatives (particularly the possible use of funds allocated for humanitarian mine action to develop alternative weapons systems) chose to sit as an observer only and has no vote on the selection of projects.

Transfer and Transit

Canada distinguishes between the transfer and the transit of AP mines. Canada continues to maintain that while the transfer (import/export) of AP mines is prohibited under the Convention, the Convention does not address the issue of the transit of mines. "Transit is the movement from one part of a state's territory to another part of the territory of the same state. Canada has no legal obligation to prohibit the transit of mines through our territory by other states. However, Canada discourages this."³⁷ A number of States Parties, as well as the ICRC, have said that transit is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.³⁸

Stockpiling and Destruction

The destruction of Canadian stockpiles, with the exception of those retained for training in mine clearance and the testing of clearance technologies, was completed in November 1997.

Before the UN in November 1999, Canada's Ambassador for Mine Action, Daniel Livermore, placed emphasis on the destruction of stockpiled mines as one of the most important methods for eliminating landmines, thereby preventing their trade and use. "Canada commends states that have partially or completely destroyed their stockpiled mines, and we call on all signatories to the Ottawa Convention to finalize a timetable for stockpile destruction. Canada is working in partnership with Ukraine to assist in the destruction of its anti-personnel mines, and we urge other states which have the means to do so to provide similar assistance in the destruction of mine stockpiles wherever it may be needed."³⁹ Minister Axworthy has also placed emphasis on Canada's willingness to help with destruction of stockpiles and referred to Canadian assistance in destroying Ukraine's 10 million stockpiled mines.⁴⁰ (See report on Ukraine for details.)

According to public statements by the Minister of Defence, Art Eggleton, and Minister Axworthy, Canada has elected to keep a maximum of 2,000 AP mines under the treaty exception for training purposes. This is not codified in Canadian law, but appears to have taken the form of a ministerial directive.⁴¹ In Canada's second Article 7 Report

³⁷ Fax from Kristeva Zoe, Political and Multilateral Issues, DFAIT-ILX, 11 February 1999.

³⁸ This issue was discussed at the SCE on General Status of the Convention meetings in January and May 2000 in Geneva. Not only the prohibition on transfer must be considered, but also the prohibition on assisting anyone in a prohibited act.

³⁹ Statement by Daniel Livermore to the 54th Session of the UNGA, Item 35: Mine Action, 18 November 1999, New York.

⁴⁰ Press release No. 262, 1 December 1999, "Axworthy marks landmine anniversary in Ottawa"; Notes for an address by The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs to a Newsmakers Breakfast, 3 December 1999, Ottawa, Canada.

⁴¹ Telephone interview with Col. Normand Levert, Liaison Officer to the Mine Action Team (ILX), 23 February 1999; telephone interview with Lt. Col. J.P. Chabot, Directorate of Arms and

there is clear mention that the Department of National Defence (DND) retains a maximum of 2,000 mines for this purpose.⁴² These numbers will change over time as mines are used (at a projected rate of 50 per year), and more foreign mines are imported. Mines have already been imported in this way from Georgia.

Following a call by the ICBL in December 1999 for states to include in their Article 7 reports the anticipated and actual use of mines retained for training purposes, Canada added a detailed description on this to its second report. "Canada retains live AP mines to study the effect of blast on equipment, to train soldiers on procedures to defuse live AP mines and to demonstrate the effects of landmines. For example, live mines help determine whether suits, boots and shields will adequately protect personnel who clear mines. The live mines are used by the Defence department's research establishment located at Suffield, Alberta and by various military training establishments across Canada. DND represents the only source of AP mines which can be used by Canadian industry to test equipment."⁴³

During interviews for the 1999 Landmine Monitor, it was revealed that likely DND sites with stockpiled AP mines for training are the base near Dundurn, Saskatchewan, and another defense research establishment at Valcartier, Québec.⁴⁴

In its first Article 7 report, Canada reported that it had a stock of 1,781 training mines.⁴⁵ In its second Article 7 report, Canada reported that its stock of training mines was 1,668.⁴⁶ Thus, a total of 113 training mines were used between 31 July 1999 and 14 March 2000; a total of eighty-four AP mines were used for research and development and twenty-nine AP mines were used for Canadian Forces' training. Nearly all of these (106 mines) were emplaced at the Canadian Forces Base Suffield, Alberta, "for the research and development of mine detection, mine clearance equipment and mine detection procedures."⁴⁷

As of 14 March 2000, Canada's stockpile of 1,668 training mines included 962 C3A2 (Canadian), 485 M16A1/2 (U.S.), 42 PMA-1 (former Yugoslavia), 28 PMA-2 (former Yugoslavia), 30 PMA-3 (former Yugoslavia), 84 PP-MI-No.1 (Czechoslovakia), 15 VS50 (Italy), 10 VAL M69 (Italy), 8 VS MK2 (Italy), and 4 SB-33 (Italy). An additional 67 PMN-2 mines were imported from Georgia and added to Canadian stockpiles for clearance training and testing technologies.⁴⁸

In addition to its program with Ukraine, Canada sent a delegation to Honduras and Nicaragua in February of this year to provide technical assistance in the destruction of AP

Proliferation Control Policy, 23 February 1999; telephone interview with Major Perrin, April 1998; LM-MAC/Fredenburg, February 1999.

⁴² Article 7 Report, Form D, submitted 27 April 2000, for the period 1 August 1999-14 March 2000.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Telephone interview with Major Perrin, April 1998; MAC/Fredenburg, Feb 1999; MAC/Levert, Feb 1999.

⁴⁵ Article 7 Report, Form D, submitted 27 August 1999, for the period 1 January 1999-31 July 1999.

⁴⁶ Article 7 Report, Form D, submitted 27 April 2000.

⁴⁷ Ibid, Form C.

⁴⁸ Ibid, Form D.

stockpiles.⁴⁹ In December 1999 and March 2000 during the SCEs on Stockpile Destruction, General (Ret'd.) Gordon Reay chaired the session "Stockpile Destruction as an Integral Part of Mine Action" and presented on the topic. General Reay is an advisor to the Canadian Mine Action Team on stockpile destruction.

DFAIT is currently working with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to develop a stockpile destruction website/database as an in-kind contribution to UNMAS. The purpose of the proposed website/database is to enable the mine action community to share information on all matters pertaining to stockpile destruction, thereby facilitating cooperation between potential donors and recipients and more effectively disseminating best practice and standards on stockpile destruction experiences and expertise.

Canada retains stockpiles of Claymore mines. The number of Claymore mines held by Canada is unknown; this information was not reported in either of Canada's Article 7 reports submitted to date.

Use

Claymore Mines

In October 1999, Canadian Forces taking part in UN peacekeeping operations brought Claymore mines to East Timor. While there is no evidence the Claymores were used, the incident received considerable media attention in early February 2000. A Captain in the Canadian Forces was reported as saying that less than 100 Claymores were taken to East Timor.⁵⁰

A letter sent to Minister Lloyd Axworthy from Mines Action Canada, dated 18 February 2000, raised concerns about the potential for Claymore mines to be used in either of two modes: command-detonated or tripwire activated. The letter from MAC was not based on concerns that Canadian Forces may have been using Claymores in victim-activated (tripwire) mode. MAC wrote, "Although understood the use of these weapons in command-detonated mode is not prohibited under the MBT, it is unclear if modifications to them are an adequate response to concerns regarding indiscriminate nature and long-term negative impact. While modifications suggest a change in intent they may not fundamentally alter the weapon...."⁵¹

The Minister's response to MAC's letter, dated 20 June 2000, states that the C19 and the M18A1 Claymore weapons are of the same design and contain sockets or fuzewells in which a detonator is placed. The letter goes on to explain that detonators are of two varieties: command activated (through the application of an electrical current) and mechanically or victim-activated. "It is possible to attach a tripwire to this second type of detonator only. A tripwire would be incompatible with the first variety of detonator

⁴⁹ Press Release No. 134, "Axworthy and Minna announce funding for landmine projects in the Americas," 4 June 2000.

⁵⁰ Dennis Bueckert, "Canadian Forces issued mines despite campaign," *The Ottawa Citizen* newspaper, 14 February 2000. See also "Les Canadiens sont équipés de mines," *Le Journal de Québec*, 14 Février 2000.

⁵¹ Letter from Mines Action Canada to Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, 18 February 2000. The letter was accompanied by a two-page background.

(command-activated). Let me emphasize that the Canadian Armed Forces do not possess, and are not permitted to possess, victim-activated detonators for application to the C19. Canada only stocks command-activated detonators and simply does not possess the accessories required for conversion of the C19 into an antipersonnel mine.”⁵² Canadian Forces personnel have been advised through several means that the use of AP mines and the unauthorized use of Claymore mines, that is booby-trapping to facilitate victim-activation, is illegal and is punishable under Canadian law.⁵³

Joint Military Operations

Canada appended the following “understanding” on joint military operations to its ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty: “It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in the context of operations, exercises or other military activity sanctioned by the United Nations or otherwise conducted in accordance with the international law, the mere participation by the Canadian Forces, or individual Canadians, in operations, exercises or other military activity conducted in combination with the armed forces of States not party to the Convention which engage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be considered to be assistance, encouragement or inducement in accordance with the meaning of those terms in Article 1, paragraph 1(c).”⁵⁴ In addition, Canadian legislation states that participation in operations with a state not party to the MBT is allowed “if that participation does not amount to active assistance in that prohibited activity.”⁵⁵

Canadian officials have said that the intent of the understanding is mainly to ensure Canadian military personnel are able to participate fully in joint operations, for example with NATO allies, without fear of prosecution.⁵⁶

Concerns about Canada's position regarding joint military operations were reported in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*. However, since then, the NATO alliance was involved in the military conflict in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. During the conflict the U.S. maintained the right to use AP mines (though it never did), making concerns about the implications of use of AP mines by a non-State Party in a joint military operation more

⁵² Letter from Minister Lloyd Axworthy to Mines Action Canada, received 23 June 2000. MAC has received contradictory information from different sources about whether modifications can or have been made to ensure the Claymore mines in Canadian stockpiles cannot be fitted with a booby-trap or made to be victim activated.

⁵³ Article 7 reports and report to the CCW amended protocol II, 10 December 1999. However, it was reported to MAC, that on at least two different occasions, at an event in the spring of 2000 in Montreal, Quebec and another in British Columbia, representatives of the Department of National Defence have dismissed the Mine Ban Treaty said that Canada would use AP mines in a conflict, which raises concern about how well Canada's position is being communicated to the lower ranks of the Canadian Forces. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is reported to be looking into the matter.

⁵⁴ *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction*, C.N.473.1997.TREATIES-2

⁵⁵ Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33, *An Act to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction*; Bill C-22, Assented to 27 November 1997.

⁵⁶ Email communication from Bob Lawson, Senior Policy Advisor, ILX-DFAIT, received 15 March 1999.

immediate and tangible than before. In September 1999 Mines Action Canada wrote to Minister Axworthy asking him to support the ICBL's call for a "no use" policy by NATO. Although a written reply has not been received, MAC has been informed by a DFAIT official that the government's policy on joint operations remains unchanged.

Mine Action Funding

On 3 December 1997 at the signing of the MBT in Ottawa, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced the establishment of a C\$100 million (US\$67.3 million) fund over a five-year period to implement the treaty.⁵⁷ This funding evolved into the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF), which is jointly managed by four government departments: the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Department of National Defence (DND), and Industry Canada (IC).

Unless otherwise indicated projects reported here are funded during Canada's Fiscal Year (FY) 1999-2000, which ran from 1 April 1999 to 31 March 2000.

In FY 1999-2000, Canadian funding for mine action totalled C\$26 million (US\$16.7 million), a very significant increase over last year's US\$9.5 million.⁵⁸

Government Reports

Canadian government transparency on reporting how funds are expended on mine action both domestically and internationally is very good. Information is provided in annual reports to Parliament, through press releases, regular progress reports and publications, on departmental websites and a detailed financial listing is available on the UN Mine Action Investment Database.

A report on the activities and projects supported by the Canadian Landmine Fund is submitted annually to the Parliament. The Mine Action Team at the Department of Foreign Affairs takes the lead in reporting on behalf of the four departments involved in the Canadian Landmine Fund. The first annual report (1998-99) was submitted to Parliament on 3 December 1999, the second anniversary of the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty. The document, entitled "Seeds of Terror, Seeds of Hope" is available to the general public as well and is posted to the Department of Foreign Affairs "Safelane" website.⁵⁹

The report provides a good overview of the issue and international efforts to implement the treaty. It also provides a description of the numerous steps that the

⁵⁷ Speech made by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to the Opening Plenary of the Ottawa Treaty Signing Conference, 3 December 1997. For a description of the Canadian Landmine Fund see 1999 Landmine Monitor, Canada report, p.235; UN Mine Action Investment Database (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/). The exchange rate used is C\$1 = \$US0.6730. This is the official exchange rate used by the Canadian government for 1999-2000 in its reports to the UN Mine Action Investment database.

⁵⁸ FY 1999-2000 figure is based on the total of the projects detailed in this report (C\$26,021,215). FY1998-1999 figure is as reported by the government of Canada in the UN Mine Action Investment Database for the year 1998. Canada has reported US\$15.4 million for 1999 in the UN database.

⁵⁹ Available at: www.mines.gc.ca.

Government of Canada is taking as part of its commitment to the treaty, including country-by-country reports of where Canada is funding mine action. The report generally provides short descriptions of each project or program, including government and NGO partners including the sums of money contributed.⁶⁰ The projects are categorized according to various mine action sectors.

UN Mine Action Investment Database

The ILX-DFAIT Mine Action Team has made significant contributions to the development and operation of the UN Mine Action Investment Database. As more and more countries supply data it has the potential to be a valuable tool for a thorough understanding of global mine action funding. For specific donors the database can provide annual reports that include a description of the country's funding by recipient country and by regional/multilateral/thematic programming. Each program expenditure lists the country, amount in U.S. dollars, the funding source (e.g. department/agency), contribution type (monetary or in-kind), activity type (e.g. victim assistance, integrated mine action), program description, and funding channel/implementing agency. The program contributions for each country are totalled.

Government Policy on Mine Action Funding

The Canadian Landmine Fund uses the following criteria for project funding: humanitarian or developmental impact of landmines in the recipient country, the political commitment of the recipient country to the Mine Ban Treaty, recipient country's commitment to carrying out mine action, Canadian capacity, and neutrality and impartiality.⁶¹

In addition to the above criteria, projects funded by the Canadian International Development Agency must also complement CIDA's programming objective in the country in which it is to be implemented, and demonstrate an acceptable level of gender and environmental analysis.⁶² CIDA continues to work to improve its activities in humanitarian mine action (mine clearance, surveys, mine awareness and victim assistance). Changes at CIDA have brought the management of Canadian NGO projects into the Mine Action Unit, which should result in having them more closely integrated into the overall mine action programming of CIDA.

Further to these criteria the Canadian Government has also begun to draft both Progress Indicators and Guidelines to determine program or project funding and influence the overall direction of Canadian funding in mine action. The Mine Action Team of the Department of Foreign Affairs (ILX-DFAIT) has taken the lead on both of these policy areas.

On 1 May 1999 it issued a document entitled, "Measured Steps: Assessing Global Progress on Mine Action," which states that indicators are needed to measure any progress in the fight against landmines.⁶³ DFAIT suggests likely indicators for Canadian

⁶⁰ "Seeds of Terror Seeds of Hope, 1998-199 Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund," report submitted to the Canadian Parliament by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 3 December 1999, p. 26.

⁶¹ Mines Action Canada files.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ See www.mines.gc.ca/english/documents/measeng-final.htm

initiatives and proposes to use these indicators to analyse the progress made to date. Measures of progress used in the report include: banning the production, stockpiling, trade and use of antipersonnel mines; reducing mine casualties; clearing mined land; providing assistance to mine victims and their communities; developing mine awareness; and, improving mine action information and planning.⁶⁴ Since the release of the report ILX staff have consulted widely and continue to refine the indicators to be used in measuring this progress.⁶⁵

The Mine Action Team at DFAIT has drafted a set of Guidelines that would seek to provide a framework for developing, implementing and evaluating mine action programs.⁶⁶ The indicators focus on the following six areas: improving mine action information and planning; clearing mined land; delivering mine awareness education and reducing casualties; meeting the needs of landmine victims; ending the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of AP mines, and; sustaining mine action efforts.

The Canadian Mine Action Progress Indicators seek to provide the mine action community with a clearer understanding of the state of mine action on a county-by-country basis. This will enable donor governments, NGOs and international agencies to see where effective mine action is absent, assess which forms of delivery are the most/least effective, and indicate where successes can be reinforced with the application of increased mine action efforts. Parallel to this process two DFAIT consultations have also been held within Canada on the various international standards and Canadian mine action capacity.

Mine Action Programs Funded By Canadian Landmine Action Fund

Mine Clearance

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Deployment of 550 SFOR-trained Entity Armies deminers and two Bozena mini-flails. Implemented by the Canadian Engineering Division of SFOR. C\$630,000 (US\$423,990) Support to Bosnian demining NGO, Akcija Mina in partnership with Handicap International. C\$790,000 (US\$531,670); training and deployment of 24 Bosnian deminers as part of Norwegian People's Aid mine clearance project in Sarajevo Canton. C\$250,000 (US\$168,250); training and deployment of 12 mine detection dogs and their Bosnian handlers. Implemented by the Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC). C\$350,000 (US\$235,530)

Cambodia: Emergency bridge funding to the Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC) to assist the centre in addressing short-term financial requirements while it

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Copies of the draft Canadian guidelines were circulated to Canadian NGOs in March and April 2000 meetings.

⁶⁶ The Mine Action Team presented the Canadian Mine Action Guidelines and Canadian Mine Action Progress Indicators during a consultation meeting on mine action, held in Ottawa, Canada, 17 March 2000. The consultations also included presentations by key Canadian mine action organizations on: plans and priorities for the fiscal year 2000/2001, made by key Canadian mine action organizations; as well as Canadian mine action capacities.

addresses necessary reforms to its management practices. C\$400,000 (US\$269,200); provision of middle management training for CMAC personnel. C\$11,000 (US\$7403)

Ecuador: Contribution to the OAS/UPD Trust Fund for Demining Program in Ecuador and Peru. The objective is to allow the OAS to coordinate and execute operations within the program. C\$200,000 (US\$134,600); funding provided to the Government of Ecuador for demining and protective gear. C\$92,500 (US\$62,253)

Jordan: Funding to the Canadian International Demining Centre for the provision of protective demining equipment. C\$500,000 (US\$336,500)

Moldova: Provision of 10 mine clearance personal protection systems (suits) to the Moldovan Army Engineers. Protective suits are the SRS-5 model manufactured by Med-Eng Systems of Canada. C\$120,000 (US\$80,760)

Nicaragua: Funding provided to strengthen the OAS Assistance Programme for Demining specifically in the northern border region with Honduras in the area known as Operational Front #4. Canada and Norway are funding this two-year program covering operational expenses in the field, protective clothing, food, vehicle maintenance insurance and minimal administrative costs. C\$1,000,000 (US\$673,000); provision of minefield marking signs to OAS. C\$4,984 (US\$3,354)

Peru: Contribution to the OAS/UPD Trust Fund for Demining Program in Peru and Ecuador. The objective is to allow the OAS to coordinate and execute operations within the program. C\$200,000 (US\$134,600); provision of personal protective demining equipment to Government of Peru. C\$92,500 (US\$62,252)

Canada: Funding provided to the CIDC for the development of a center of excellence in explosives detection dogs.

Mine Awareness

Angola: Working through four local NGOs, UNICEF delivers mines awareness messages at the community level using theater, puppet shows, posters, wooden mine dummies, traditional songs and dances. The target groups of this project are primary and secondary school aged children of displaced communities who are congregating in the provincial capitals of Huambo, Kuito, Huila and Bengo. C\$250,000 (US\$168,250); evaluation by CIET Canada of mine awareness programming in Angola. C\$60,000 (US\$40,380)

Colombia: Support to UNICEF and the Colombian Ministry of Education for mine awareness activities. C\$100,000 (US\$67,300)

Victim Assistance

Afghanistan: Funding for the UNDP's Comprehensive Disabled Afghan Program (CDAP) directed at the orthopedic component. Covers salaries, raw materials for orthopedic devices, training sessions, and seminars on the standardisation of orthopedic technology and physiotherapy training. C\$300,000 (US\$201,900); funding to provide comprehensive rehabilitation services, particularly orthopedics and physiotherapy, to landmine victims through existing NGO, Guardians, in Kandahar. Also supports skills analysis and delivers appropriate training for staff of the clinic in Kandahar by the Royal Ottawa Rehabilitation Centre. C\$163,000 (US\$112,391)

Africa (not country specific): Support to the WHO for pilot testing of mine victim survey tools in various African states. C\$250,000 (US\$168,250)

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Contribution to Slovenia Trust Fund for victim assistance. C\$70,000 (US\$47,110)

Cambodia The goal of this World Vision Canada project is that the disabled population in Battambang, Pursat, Banteay Meanchey, and Pailin provinces become reintegrated into society with either employment skills or an established business that will enable them to be self-sufficient. C\$250,000 (US\$168,250)

Central America: Community Based Rehabilitation for Landmine Victims in Central America; A tripartite Canada-Mexico-PAHO Initiative. The overall goal of the program is to assist landmine victims in Nicaragua, El Salvador, in a context of post-conflict reconstruction and to integrate victims in the development effort of these countries. This initiative has been developed in co-operation with Mexico and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and in consultation with the Central American Republics. The program consists of: (1) rural rehabilitation services through long-term sustainable community-based rehabilitation programs, (2) prosthetic/orthotic development on a regional basis and (3) a landmine victim socio-economic reintegration program. C\$750,000 (US\$504,750)

El Salvador: The Healing Ourselves Healing The Land Project aims at training landmine victims in the development of environmentally appropriate technologies. A small enterprise loan and local alternative economic trading initiative will help support community economic development. The Sierra Club of British Columbia (The GAIA Project) collaborates with a local NGO in implementing the project. C\$125,000 (US\$84,125)

Guatemala: In collaboration with the Government of Israel, the International Centre for Community Based Rehabilitation at Queens University, Kingston, Canada implements this victim assistance project. Its goal is to facilitate the full social and economic reintegration of persons with disabilities in a post-conflict region through the implementation of community based rehabilitation. C\$200,000 (US\$134,600)

Nicaragua: The Falls Brook Centre in collaboration with local partners operates the “Creating New Energy-Building the Future,” a project offering mine awareness education to communities in the East and West Rio Coco region. The main focus of the project is to train landmine victims in solar electrification so that they can be employed as distributors, installers and system maintenance experts for the community solar systems in the villages. The project also assists landmine victims with fitted prostheses. C\$ 100,000 (US\$67,300)

Sierra Leone: Support for a victim assistance rehabilitation program implemented by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. C\$29,400 (US\$19,786)

Uganda: This Canadian Network for International Surgery project aims at developing an information database for program planning and resource allocation, to improve health worker skills in emergency care hospitals and to enhance public education on all aspects of landmine victims problems. C\$75,000 (US\$50,475)

Yemen: The main objective of this ADRA Canada project is to provide community based rehabilitation services to the severely disabled persons and to provide vocational assistance in establishing a means of income for landmine victims and/or their families. C\$150,000 (US\$100,950)

Integrated Mine Action

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Institutional support to the Mine Action Centres. This program is implemented by the UNDP and it supports core functions of the BHMIC and Entity MACs, and the secondment of DND experts to serve within these MACs. C\$930,000 (US\$625,890)

Cambodia: Funding to Geomatics Canada for a Level 1 Survey. C\$146,000 (US\$90,858)

Chad: Core funding to support Chad Mine Action Centre. C\$150,000 (US\$100,950)

Lao People's Democratic Republic: Contribution to the UNDP Trust Fund to support UXO Lao in developing a national capacity to manage a mine action program. C\$ 150,000 (US\$100,950)

Mozambique: The Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), in partnership with CUSO, Handicap International and COCAMO (Co-operation Canada-Mozambique), project supports mine awareness, victim assistance, proximity demining and post-clearance community development activities, in close collaboration with provincial authorities, development agencies and local NGOs. CIDA's financial assistance (\$330,000) is matched by the CAW. C\$333,000 (US\$224,109); a program consisting of three components that will significantly support and strengthen mine action in Mozambique:

organizing and conducting a national level one survey implemented by Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC); geospatial information gathering for the production of maps at a scale of 1:50,000 that will facilitate mine action by various demining organizations throughout Mozambique; and the provision of Canadian technical mine action specialists to the UN-supported Accelerated Demining Program to support training of survey personnel and database management. C\$1,716,000 (US\$1,154,868); emergency mine action assistance in support of UNMAS program to respond to Mozambique flooding. Funding for mine awareness activities to prevent an increase in the number of landmine accidents when the population return home. C\$500,000 (US\$336,500).

International: Core funding to UNMAS for Emergency Contingency Funding for Urgent Humanitarian Situations. Humanitarian emergency mine action situations due to natural disasters or to political crises, are impossible to plan for. Each situation is different and creates or worsens a mine contamination problem, which further exacerbates the humanitarian crisis on the ground. C\$250,000 (US\$168,250); core funding for UNMAS (unearmarked). C\$500,000 (US\$336,500); funding to the ICRC special appeal for Mine Action (1999-2003) to cover the cost of preventive action (mine awareness) and victim assistance (surgical, medical and hospital assistance and well and physical rehabilitation) in communities most affected by landmines. C\$300,000 (US\$201,900); seed money for the Canadian Landmine Foundation (for details see below). C\$550,000 (US\$370,150)

Advocacy and Prevention

Cambodia, Vietnam: Support to Landmine Survivors Network for an awareness raising trip by Queen Noor to both countries. C\$10,000 (US\$6,730)

Croatia: Funding to Strata Research to support June 1999 Zagreb Regional Landmines Conference. C\$10,000 (US\$6,730)

Georgia: Support to IPPNW for a landmines conference in Tblisi, Georgia. C\$20,000 (US\$13,460)

India: Support to the All India Women's Conference for six workshops on mine issues held from August 1999 to March 2000. C\$30,000 (US\$20,190)

International: Core funding to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. C\$200,000 (US\$134,600); support for the Landmine Monitor initiative of the ICBL. C\$200,000 (US\$134,600); support for Mines Action Canada advocacy work in support of the antipersonnel landmines ban in Canada and abroad. C\$306,000 (US\$205,938); support to York University Centre for International and Security Studies to implement the Mine Action Research Program to promote research on the univerzalization and implementation of the AP mine ban. C\$47,215 (US\$31,776)

Nigeria: Support for a workshop on mine action held in Nigeria. Implemented by African Topics Magazine and the Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace Advocacy. C\$10,000 (US\$6,730)

Russia: Support to the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) for landmine ban campaign activities in Russia and the former Soviet republics. C\$100,000 (US\$67,300)

Domestic: Funding to Cineflix for a documentary film on the landmine crisis. C\$30,000 (US\$20,190); contribution to the Survive the Peace campaign of the Canadian Red Cross. C\$9,070 (US\$6,104); funding for "Ban Landmines '99" a major public event to raise awareness of landmines issues and to mark the anniversary of the signing of the Ottawa Convention. Implemented by the Canadian Red Cross. C\$99,725 (US\$67,114); seed money for the Canadian Landmine Foundation. C\$450,000 (US\$302,850); contribution to Mines Action Canada to support the Youth Mine Action Ambassador program to increase public awareness in Canada. C\$276,725 (US\$186,237)

Research and Development

Canada: Funding for research and development activities of the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT). C\$2,529,000 (US\$1,702,152)

Information

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fact finding mission by Rebuild International to explore the possible conversion of mine production facilities. C\$59,640 (US\$40,138)

Thailand: Funding for consultants to do an assessment of Thailand's Mine Action Centre. C\$19,470 (US\$13,103)

UNMAS: Funding to UNMAS for studies pertaining to the socio-economic impact of landmines in Kosovo, Laos and Mozambique. C\$100,000 (US\$67,300); funding for training and provision of more and better information on the landmines problem for UN and NGO personnel involved in humanitarian work. C\$60,000 (US\$40,380)

Coordination

Azerbaijan: Support for the development of national mine action capacity. Implemented by UNDP. C\$100,000 (US\$67,300)

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Secondment of a Canadian expert as the UNDP Task Manager to assist in coordination of mine action efforts. One year secondment. C\$75,000 (US\$50,475); contribution to the Slovenian International Trust Fund for provision of funds for mine action institutional support. C\$200,000 (US\$134,600)

Croatia: Contribution to the Slovenian International Trust Fund for provision of funds for mine action institutional support. C\$200,000 (US\$134,600)

FSMP: Support to representatives of various states to participate in the First Meeting of States Parties. C\$ 36,740 (US\$24,727)

Mozambique: Support to the Mozambican government in its role as host of the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, May 1999. C\$20,000 (US\$13,460)

United Nations: In-kind contribution to the development and maintenance of a database on mine action investments made by donors, UN Mine Action Investment database. C\$20,000 (US\$13,460)

Other Canadian Government Funded Mine Action Programs

The majority of Canada's mine action funding has come from the C\$100 million, five year Canadian Landmine Fund announced by the Prime Minister on 3 December 1997. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has in the past also funded mine clearance programs from its humanitarian assistance or other program budgets. This has continued again this year.

Afghanistan: Funding for mine clearance and mapping activities through UNOCHA. C\$1,000,000 (US\$673,000)

Bosnia and Herzegovina: A joint health and victim assistance project implemented by Queen's University. The Community Based War Victims Rehabilitation Project is a four-year, C\$2.5 million (US\$1,682,500) initiative. Funding this year was C\$243,246 (US\$163,705).

In addition this year there were two major developments in terms of new funding for mine action programs. The first of these was the launch of the Canadian Landmine Foundation, a new private sector initiative to raise funds for mine action (for more detail see Other Funding Sources section below). The second major development has been the Government of Canada's funding of major programs in Kosovo following the Balkans conflict in 1999. The mine action elements of the Kosovo response are in addition to what is funded by the Canadian Landmine Fund.

Kosovo: Following the cessation of conflict in the Balkans the government of Canada began announcing humanitarian measures in support of rehabilitation of Kosovo specifically and the Balkans in general. This included a number of mine action activities funded through humanitarian program funding envelopes and, therefore, separately from projects and programs supported by the Canadian Landmine Fund.

Mine Clearance Programs: In-kind contribution of three Canadian Forces personnel to support database and mapping work of UNMAAC for a period of six months. C\$76,000 (US\$51,148); landmine and UXO removal operations in Kosovo

implemented by CIDC and Wolf Flats Ordnance Disposal Corporation. One four-person mine/UXO clearance team was deployed over a four-month period. C\$528,000 (US\$355,344) ; training and deploying mine action teams to focus on clearance of emergency shelter areas. Five mine/UXO clearance teams totalling twenty persons were deployed over a four-month period. Implemented by International Demining Alliance Canada Inc. (IDAC) C\$2,565,000 (US\$1,726,245); institutional support to the MACC provided three Department of National Defence staff members seconded over a four month period to enter data for the database and mapping services. C\$150,000 (US\$100,950); institutional support to MACC supported core functions of the MACC. Implemented by UNMAS. C\$500,000 (US\$336,500); demining in Kosovo, Phase II will entail the provision of a self-sufficient integrated mine/UXO clearance capability which will comprise the Canadian/CIDA contribution to the UNMIK-MACC Year 2000 Mine Action Program for Kosovo (project duration: 5 months). It consists of a project management team, a manual mine clearance team, a mine detection dog team, an explosive ordnance disposal team (EOD) and a mechanical system (mini-flail) clearance team. C\$2,800,000 (US\$1,884,400). The phase is implemented by a consortium of Canadian companies led by IDAC.

Mine Awareness Program: Support to UNICEF's Balkans Regional/Mine Awareness Program to respond to the needs of women and children including the implementation of mine awareness programs in Kosovo. C\$200,000 (US\$134,600)

Victim Assistance Program: Implemented by Queen's University this project focuses on human capacity building, institutional support, and training at the community center/health clinics level. C\$500,000 (US\$335,500); emergency shelter and related demining project implemented by CARE and Minetech over a four month period. The demining portion represents C\$300,000 (US\$201,900)

Coordination: Canada and Belgium co-funded an UNMAS assessment mission to identify priority areas for humanitarian mine action. C\$75,000 (US\$50,475); six month secondment of a lieutenant colonel to serve as a liaison between KFOR and the UNMAAC. \$65,000 (US\$43,745)

On 14 June 2000, a lead story on the front-page of a major Canadian daily newspaper alluded to problems in CIDA's contracting procedures, which resulted in a long delay in a C\$2.5 million contract tender.⁶⁷ In a follow-up article the next day, the Minister responsible for CIDA, Maria Minna, stated that the approval process slowed down when Canada considered new UN requirements for demining companies. "It took a little longer than normal," she said. "We wanted to make sure that it was done right...It's a very complex process, and the technical and safety standards are very high." The UN sent a letter of appreciation to the Editor of the *Globe and Mail* newspaper stating that Canada's mine action efforts [last year in Kosovo], as well as those of other donors, were

⁶⁷ Andrew Mitrovica, "Landmine chaos give Canada 'black eye,'" *The Globe and Mail*, (Canadian newspaper) 14 June 2000. p. 1.

[deployed] in the most effective and efficient manner possible, in difficult circumstances.”⁶⁸

In-Kind Support

Given the leadership role taken by Canada on the landmines issue it is difficult to report or to calculate the amount of in-kind contributions made. Canadian Forces personnel often contribute to mine action in countries where they are stationed as part of Canada's peacekeeping duties. Such activity may not be noted in any summary of Canadian activities. The Department of Foreign Affairs has provided support to numerous countries needing assistance either in deciding to sign or accede to the treaty, but particularly in assisting countries with depositing their ratification documents. Similar assistance is also provided for Article 7 Transparency reports. Not all of these activities may be reported in either the Mine Action Investment Database or the annual reports to Parliament.

In-kind contributions reported in the UN Mine Action Investment database for FY99-2000 are reported above. For 2000-2001 US\$1,800 has been budgeted for an in-kind donation for support of a conference in Belarus on demining and stockpile destruction.

Other Funding Sources

Canadian Landmine Foundation

Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy announced the creation of the Canadian Landmine Foundation public in a public address to the Empire Club in Toronto on 28 June 1999. The Foundation received C\$1 million (US\$680,000) to assist with its start up and first year's operating costs. In his speech Minister Axworthy stated that the Canadian Landmine Foundation was launched so that “individuals and corporations can contribute to help eradicate landmines and ease the human suffering they cause. It will encourage Canadians to maintain the lead and set the example for demining efforts across the globe.”⁶⁹ Of the initial seed money from the government \$450,000 (US\$302,850) was for start up and initial fundraising events and \$550,000 (US\$370,150) was for project funding.

Canadian foundations and charities are required to register with the federal taxation department. The Foundation received its charitable status 29 April 1999. It was formed to raise funds to eradicate landmines around the world and to end the human and economic suffering they cause. According to its interim Executive Director, Scott Fairweather, the foundation is believed to be the first private sector foundation in the world totally dedicated to this purpose. It was felt there was a need for such an organization because, “there was a concern that governments’ commitment and involvement to this issue might not last the length of time needed for the issue. That the

⁶⁸ Andrew Mitrovica, “Canada's delay in mine crisis puts many at risk, officials say,” *The Globe and Mail*, (Canadian newspaper) 15 June 2000, p. A5.

⁶⁹ Notes for an address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy to the Empire Club, Toronto, 28 June 1999.

government itself did not have the resources necessarily to deal with the issue so the Canadian Landmine Foundation formed to generate interest and funding from the private sector and other communities in Canada.”⁷⁰

One area of focus for the Foundation will be supporting mine action in the Americas. Fairweather believes the Foundation has an obligation to help “clean up our own backyard” until the Americas are mine free.⁷¹ To date this has resulted in a contribution of C\$100,000 (US\$68,000) to the Organization of American States (OAS) demining efforts in Nicaragua. This phase of the OAS program is due to be finished at the end of June 2000. Future funding for the OAS demining program in Nicaragua is possible but is dependent upon a detailed final report. In June 2000 the Foundation announced a one-time contribution of C\$13,633 (US\$9270) to support OAS work and activities in the rehabilitation of landmine victims in Central America. The funds will be added to funds raised at a charity event hosted in May by the OAS “Women of the Americas,” a non-profit organization chaired by the wife of the OAS Secretary General, Ana Milena de Gaviria.⁷²

On 6 June 2000 the Canadian Landmine Foundation launched two major initiatives. One was an “e-philanthropy” approach to raising money, called Clear Landmines.⁷³ The Foundation liked the innovative approach of raising funds through advertising on the Internet while at the same time not costing potential donors’ any money. It is a new approach, which has been successful in raising awareness and funds for issues such as hunger, peace, the rainforest and cancer.

Also launched on 6 June 2000 was Adopt-A-Minefield Canada (TM). The Foundation entered into an agreement with the United Nations Association of the USA, Inc. to raise Canadian funds for countries where the Adopt-A-Minefield program exists. Currently those are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Cambodia, Mozambique and Afghanistan.

The Foundation has signed an agreement with Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to work together on mine action in the Middle East, with details to be worked out in the months to come. The Canadian Landmine Foundation has set aside C\$100,000 (US\$68,000) for work in the region. The Foundation and MAG are negotiating terms of reference for potential project partners. Canada’s missions in Tel Aviv and Ramallah are providing assistance in these negotiations.

Canadian Landmine Action Fund

In 1998 Mines Action Canada and the Mine Action Team at DFAIT created the Canadian Landmine Action Fund as another mechanism through which Canadians can financially contribute. Funds raised through the Youth Mine Action Ambassador Program are generally donated to this fund. On 3 December 1999 the first check from this fund was presented to the Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC) to support the training and maintenance of the mine detection dog program. C\$30,000 (US\$20,190)

⁷⁰ Telephone interview with Scott Fairweather, Interim Executive Director, Canadian Landmine Foundation, 16 June 2000.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Press release 5 June 2000

⁷³ Available at: www.clearlandmines.com.

Canadian Red Cross Society

Tajikistan: The Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS) operates a large orthopedic project under a delegated project arrangement with the ICRC. The annual funding of \$790,000 (US\$537,200) comes solely from private donations to the CRCS. The orthopedic program in Tajikistan is an important institution for the country and the amputees, which it serves. A 1997 initial survey identified an estimated 3,000 amputees throughout the country. On 21 March 1999 the first prosthetic was produced. Since March 1999 there have been 366 new patients registered. There were 188 new patients fitted with prostheses.

Countermine Research and Development

Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT) operates out of the Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) in Medicine Hat, Alberta. DRES provides access to sophisticated test-and-evaluation (T&E) facilities. Testing and evaluation undertaken by CCMAT is done on behalf of Industry Canada (IC) to support the development of new technologies in mine action, particularly detection and clearance. IC's primary role with respect to mine action is to market viable technologies developed under the auspices of CCMAT.

With regard to Canadian R&D in clearance technologies and other equipment for mine action, perhaps the most significant contribution is the development of "surrogate" mines for use in the test and evaluation of equipment. Universal acceptance of these devices could reduce the need for the use and stockpiling (as allowed under Article 3 of the MBT) of live mines. The surrogate mines are formally referred to as "reproduction mines" and have been developed for four common mines -- PMA-1, PMA-2, PMA-3 and Type 72. "The reproduction mines duplicate these types in shape, size, weight, fuse principle and trigger force characteristics without the explosive content," says Dr. Bob Suart, Director of the CCMAT. "The need for these reproduction mines was determined by CCMAT, as were the requirement and the concept; the engineering was designed by an outside company. The reproduction mines were devised by CCMAT to get away from testing equipment with live mines."⁷⁴ The surrogate mines were first used in June 2000. The Frangible Synthetic Leg is also in use by CCMAT to develop and test protective gear.

Through its association with the Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES), the CCMAT is able to provide basic research to Canadian companies who in turn apply it to the design of equipment for use in mine action. Prototypes are then sent to CCMAT for testing. CCMAT facilities are used for trials of Canadian technologies and may, through the International Testing and Evaluation Program (ITEP) in Europe, be used to test equipment developed elsewhere. ITEP's role is to develop universal methodologies and standards for T&E and for mine action technologies.

A problem often stated in reference to the research and development of clearance technologies is that final products tend to be developed in a vacuum, without basic research information or consulting those working in the field. As a result, the adaptation

⁷⁴ Telephone interview with Dr. Bob Suart, Director of CCMAT, 28 June 2000.

of new technologies to environmental and other conditions unique to each mine-affected area rarely takes place. Consequently, funds and expertise are channeled into technologies that will not be of use in the field.

To address this problem, in May 1999 CCMAT proposed the Demining Technologies Information Forum (DTIF). "There's a lot of effort expended in both R&D and test and evaluation of technologies. The idea behind the Forum is to put forward ideas that might come to fruition," said Suart. "Other forums, such as ITEP are useful in testing and evaluating equipment that is at the end of the development process. DTIF and ITEP can coordinate activities in [development of clearance technologies] and provide a place where scientists in both areas can compare notes."⁷⁵ DTIF will publish findings from research on its web site and provide access to conference documents, research findings and technology required for various aspects of mine action. DTIF was founded by Canada and the European Union and ITEP was founded by the U.S. and the European Commission.

A pilot project for ITEP in which CCMAT played a key role was the performance test and evaluation of metal detectors. The British, Dutch and the U.S. were also active in the tests. The U.S. procured three copies of each known metal detector for use in the trials. At the CCMAT testing grounds all detectors were run through a series of highly controlled tests to gauge levels of accuracy based on speed and distance from the targets. Detectors were rated on their operability and ease of maintenance and field tested in Cambodia and Croatia. The results of the tests will be published jointly in October 2000 or late fall. Detector trials, under the auspices of the Mine Action Planning Afghanistan (MAPA), also took place in Afghanistan with the assistance of CCMAT staff. MAPA has not yet published the results of these tests.

An explosive for destroying mines in situ (FIXOR) and a mechanical neutralization device (PRO MAC) are two Canadian developed technologies that show promise for use in mine action. Both have been tested by CCMAT.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Canada is not a mine-affected country. However some former or active Canadian Force Bases have been used as practice or training ranges. In both Article 7 reports Canada lists the areas where defused mines have been placed for testing clearance technologies at the Canadian Forces Base Suffield, in Alberta. The locations of mined areas are given in UTM Grid References.⁷⁶

The majority of Canadians injured or killed by landmines have been members of the Canadian Forces active in overseas military operations, peacekeeping duties or mine clearance.⁷⁷ Benefits guaranteed by law to persons with disabilities include health and medical care, training, rehabilitation and counseling, employment and participation in decisions affecting themselves.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Telephone interview with Dr. Bob Suart, Director of CCMAT, 18 June 2000.

⁷⁶ Article 7 Reports, Form C, 27 August 1999 and 27 April 2000.

⁷⁷ See *Landmine Monitor 1999* p. 239 for more details.

⁷⁸ See Canadian submission to the United Nations global Survey on Disability Policy, 15 September 1996, www.independentliving.org/Library

COSTA RICA

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Costa Rica on 1 September 1999. Costa Rica has not submitted its Article 7 report, which was due 27 February 2000. The suspended mine clearance program has resumed; it is now expected to be completed in 2002, rather than 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Costa Rica signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 March 1999. The treaty entered into force for Costa Rica on 1 September 1999. Costa Rica has not enacted legislation to implement the treaty. Costa Rica has not yet submitted its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report, which was due on 27 February 2000.

Costa Rica did not attend the First Meeting of State Parties in Maputo in May 1999. Costa Rica participated in four of the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva—one each for mine clearance, technologies for mine action, victim assistance, and stockpile destruction.

Costa Rica supported the pro-ban OAS resolutions in June 1999, and voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. During debate in the UNGA First Committee, diplomat Bern Niehaus said that Costa Rica “endorsed the Ottawa Convention and appealed to all States to ratify it as soon as possible. The international community must continue to support mine-clearance activities.”¹

Costa Rica was one of nine countries that signed the “Declaration of San José” in the Costa Rican capital on 5 April 2000. Article 27 of the Declaration states, “We continue to promote adherence, ratification and compliance by all countries of the international community to the...Ottawa Convention.”²

Costa Rica is a party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but did not attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties in December 1999 in Geneva. Costa Rica is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

It is believed that Costa Rica has never produced, imported, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines, though the government has not made a definitive public statement. Costa Rica did not declare any AP mine stockpile to the OAS in April 1999 as part of the OAS Register of AP mines. Costa Rica does not have a standing military, but the

¹ Statement by Bern Niehaus, Representative of Costa Rica at the UNGA First Committee First Session, GA/DIS/3142, 13 October 1999.

² “Declaration of San José,” Article 27, San José, Costa Rica, 5 April 2000. The nine countries were Costa Rica, Panamá, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Belize, the Dominican Republic, and Brazil.

Ministry of Security performs the functions of ground security, law enforcement, counter-narcotics and national security.³

Landmine Problem

Landmines were placed along Costa Rica's northern border by forces involved in the Nicaraguan conflict.⁴ The Ministry of Security's Mine Clearance Program estimates that there are 3,491 mines along the country's northern border with Nicaragua.⁵ Mine-affected territories are found in the sectors of Los Chiles, Pocosol, Upala and La Cruz, in minefields that are dispersed between border markers No. 2 and 20.⁶ Mine-affected territories are for the most part agricultural lands used by small-scale farmers. Only a few mines have been found near villages, as happened in Upala.

According to the Chief of the Mine Clearance Program, the following mines have been found in Costa Rica: PP-Mi-Sr II, manufactured in the former Czechoslovakia, found in Los Chiles; M-14, manufactured in the U.S., found in Upala; PMD-6, manufactured in the former Soviet Union, found in the La Trocha sector.⁷

Mine Action Coordination and Funding

The OAS PADCA (Program for Assistance in Demining in Central America), the OAS Inter-American Defense Board (IABD) MARMICA program, and the Costa Rican Ministry of Security are responsible for demining operations in Costa Rica.

The Inter-American Defense Board coordinates the OAS Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA). This involves mine and UXO clearance programs in Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, with fifteen demining platoons, each comprised of approximately 25 deminers. Since July 1999, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela have contributed personnel.⁸ In 1999 the annual budget for the OAS regional program was \$6 million and in 2000 it was \$7.6 million, financed by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.S., and the U.K.⁹

Mine Clearance

As reported in *Landmine Monitor 1999*, mine clearance operations in Costa Rica were suspended in March 1998, pending acquisition of a medical evacuation helicopter.

³ CIA Factbook, Costa Rica, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/cs.html>.

⁴ International Demining Organization, 24 September 1998, Article No. 98-09-02, available at <http://www.jid.org>.

⁵ "Cronograma del Plan de Desminado" [Timetable for National Demining Plan], Ministerio de Seguridad Pública [Ministry of Security] provided to Landmine Monitor by Mr. Major Luis Carlos Calvo. Interview with Major Luis Carlos Calvo, Chief of the Mine Clearance Program, Ministry of Security, Los Chiles, 3 May 2000.

⁶ "Cronograma del Plan de Desminado" [Timetable for National Demining Plan], Ministerio de Seguridad Pública [Ministry of Security] provided to Landmine Monitor.

⁷ Interview with Major Luis Carlos Calvo, Chief of the Mine Clearance Program, Los Chiles, 3 May 2000.

⁸ Email from Jhosselin Bakhat, Organization of American States, 20 June 2000.

⁹ Ibid.; "Demining" section of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Organization of American States, <http://www.oas.org/upd/demining/demining.htm>.

The OAS reports that in 1999 contributions from the United States, Costa Rica, and others covered the cost of rental of a medical evacuation helicopter, allowing demining to resume.¹⁰

Demining is carried out with the assistance of two international supervisors, forty-one deminers, and four mine-detecting dogs.¹¹ Costa Rican personnel are assigned to the Unit of Sappers of the Costa Rican Security Forces, based in Los Chiles.

The Ministry of Security Mine Clearance Program now states mine clearance, once targeted for completion in 2000, should be completed by June 2002. Plans call for clearance in three sectors beginning in January 2000. The first sector, Los Chiles-Pocosol in Alajuela Province between border markers 2 and 12, contains approximately 1,198 landmines and demining is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2000. The second sector, Upala in Alajuela Province between border markers 13 and 14, containing approximately 318 landmines, is scheduled to be completed by June 2001. The final sector, La Cruz-Guanacaste in Guanacaste Province between border markers 14 and 20, contains approximately 1,975 landmines, and is scheduled to be completed by June 2002.¹²

According to the Chief of the Mine Clearance Program, 350 mines had been destroyed as of April 2000, at an approximate cost of \$1,000 per mine.¹³

Mine Awareness

According to the OAS, a mine risk awareness education campaign has continued in the areas of Crucitas, Jocote, Las Tiricias, San Isidro, Pocosol, Medio Queso, and La Guaría, in Alajuela Province. This program includes educational talks at schools, and distribution of educational material.¹⁴

Landmine Casualties and Victim Assistance

Information concerning landmine victims in Costa Rica is anecdotal. No casualties have been reported recently by the OAS. Costa Rica does not have a program to assist landmine victims, and neither does it have a specialized clinic to treat them. The OAS reports that a medical camp was set up in the Los Chiles area, with the assistance of the Costa Rican Social Security Office, utilizing the specialized personnel assigned to the program for evacuation and medical safety operations. At this camp, care was provided not only to sapper soldiers, but also to the population living close to mined areas.¹⁵

¹⁰ See OAS contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² “Cronograma del Plan de Desminado” [Timetable for National Demining Plan], Ministerio de Seguridad Pública [Ministry of Security] provided to Landmine Monitor.

¹³ Interview with Mr. Major Luis Carlos Calvo, Chief of the Mine Clearance Program, Los Chiles, 3 May 2000.

¹⁴ See OAS contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

DOMINICA

Dominica signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 26 March 1999. The treaty entered into force for Dominica on 1 September 1999. It is not believed to have enacted domestic implementing legislation. Dominica has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due 27 February 2000, but according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the report has been prepared and will be sent to the UN pending final approval by the Permanent Secretary.¹ Dominica was not present at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. It voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Dominica is not believed to have ever produced, stockpiled, transferred or used AP mines. It is not mine-affected.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Dominican Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 30 June 2000. It is not believed to have enacted domestic implementing legislation. The Dominican Republic was not present at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. It voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. The Dominican Republic is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines. It is not mine-affected.

ECUADOR

Key developments since March 1999: Ecuador ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 April 1999, and it entered into force for Ecuador on 1 October 1999. Ecuador destroyed 101,458 antipersonnel mines from stockpiles. Ecuador and Perú have made significant progress in mine clearance along the border. In April 1999, the “Program for Demining Assistance in Ecuador/Perú” was established by the OAS. In August 1999, UNMAS and the OAS undertook independent assessment missions to Ecuador. In September 1999, Ecuador established a National Demining Center.

Mine Ban Policy

Ecuador signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. On 30 March 1999, the National Congress approved ratification of the treaty. After a presidential decree authorizing ratification, Ecuador deposited its instrument of ratification on 29 April 1999. According to the Ministry of Foreign Relations ratification of the Ottawa Treaty

¹ Telephone interview with Mr. Ferrol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Dominica, 8 June 2000.

constitutes an important aspect of Ecuador's foreign policy.¹ The treaty entered into force for Ecuador on 1 October 1999. Ratification of international treaties automatically makes them law in Ecuador, but no specific implementation legislation has been enacted.

Ecuador's Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Francisco Carrión, led the country's delegation to the First Meeting of the State Parties in Maputo in May 1999. Ecuador has participated in the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva.

Ecuador voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had or similar UNGA resolutions in 1997 and 1998. Ambassador Mario Aleman, Ecuador's Permanent Representative to the UN, said to the General Assembly, "My country participated with tremendous interest in the Ottawa process and has begun implementing the Convention through the creation of the Ecuadorian Demining Centre, a little more than a month ago."²

Ecuador submitted its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report in Spanish on 29 March 2000. The report covers the period from April 1999 to March 2000.

Ecuador is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but has not ratified Amended Protocol II on landmines. Ecuador participated as an observer in the First Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 1999 in Geneva.

In August 1999 Ecuador was made a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production and Transfer

A military official confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Ecuador has not produced or exported AP mines.³ From information contained in Ecuador's Article 7 report, it appears Ecuador imported antipersonnel mines in the past from Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Singapore, the former Soviet Union, Spain, and the United States.⁴

Stockpiling and Destruction

In its Article 7 report, Ecuador reported a stockpile of 271,802 AP mines:

- 128,931 T-AB-1 blast AP mines from Brazil;
- 93,278 MAPP 78 F-2 blast AP mines from Chile;
- 4,655 MAPP 78 F-2 blast AP mines from Chile (instruc.);
- 70 P-4-B blast AP mines from Spain;
- 58 PMD-6M blast AP mines from the former Soviet Union;
- 200 PRB-M 35 blast AP mines from Belgium;
- 10,061 PRB-M 409 blast AP mines from Belgium;
- 25,151 VS-50 blast AP mines from Singapore;
- 3,525 MAPT 78 F-2 fragmentation AP mines from Chile;
- 17 M18A1 Claymore mines from the USA;

¹ Ministry of Foreign Relations of Ecuador, "Informe a la Nación 1998-1999, Tomo II," Quito, January 2000.

² Statement by Ambassador Mario Alemán, Ecuador's Permanent Representative to the UN, at the Plenary Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 19 November 1999.

³ Telephone interview with Colonel Roberto Tandazo, 31 March 2000.

⁴ Article 7 Report, Form B, submitted 29 March 2000.

- 5,856 MON-50 fragmentation AP mines imported from the former Soviet Union.⁵

Ecuador reports destroying 101,458 antipersonnel mines between April 1999 and March 2000, including 93,278 MAPP 78 F-2 mines; 4,655 MAPP 78 F-2 training mines; and 3,525 MAPT 78 F-2 mines.⁶ The mines were transferred to the “Brigada de Apoyo Logístico No.25 Reino de Quito” for destruction by detonation at the Army’s “El Corazón” Practice Institution in Machachi, Pichincha province.⁷ Military officials told the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in August 1999 that they planned to destroy from stockpiles in the year 2000 a total of 110,000 antipersonnel mines, 9,000 antitank mines and 4,000 assorted munitions.⁸

In its Article 7 report, Ecuador reported that it would retain 170,344 AP mines for training. This includes: 128,931 T-AB-1 mines; 25,151 VS-50 mines; 58 PMD-6M mines; 200 PRB M-35 mines; 70 P-4-B mines; 10,061 PRB M-409 mines and 5,856 MON-50 mines, and 17 M18A1 Claymore mines.⁹

On 22 May 2000, at the second Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, the ICBL stated its concern at the number of mines Ecuador had chosen to retain, noting that it was ten times the number retained by any other country, and far outside of the treaty’s requirement that the amount “shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary.” The ICBL voiced its concern again on 30 May 2000 in an information session on mines retained for training under Article 3 at the Standing Committee of Experts on General Status and Operation of the Convention. Ecuador’s representative came to the closing session of the meeting and said he wanted to clarify a “mistake in the presentation of the [Article 7] report.” He said the reported number of mines retained for training will need to be revised, and will be “in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and the exact figure will be provided prior to the Second Meeting of States Parties.”¹⁰

Use

Ecuador states that it has not used antipersonnel mines since the Cenepa border conflict with Peru in 1995.¹¹ Ecuador contends that Peru laid mines as well during the conflict, but Peru denies any use.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form G, 29 March 2000.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Forms D and F, 29 March 2000.

⁸ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Ecuador,” 15 November 1999, p. 20.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 March 2000.

¹⁰ Notes taken by Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch, 30 May 2000.

¹¹ Telephone interview with Colonel Miguel Patricio Proaño, 27 March 2000. There have been reports of use since 1995. The Latin American Association for Human Rights (ALDHU) told the UN in December 1996 that mine-laying activities were still on-going in the contested area and that an estimated 10,000 landmines had been laid since the cease-fire of February 1995. UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Ecuador,” 15 November 1999, p. 11. A former Defense Minister has said that in the last tense moments before the end of peace negotiations in October 1998, a brief “landmine war” was fought between the two countries, which consisted of use of AP mines used by both parties “against enemy patrols” in border areas. Pablo Cuvi, Interview with

Landmine Problem

According to the Latin American Association for Human Rights (ALDHU), both parties laid some 130,000 to 150,000 AP mines.¹² UNMAS reports that these figures do not contradict information received by the Ecuadorian military, who estimate the number of mines on the Ecuadorian side of the border in the Cordillera del Condór region to be in excess of 90,000.¹³

Ecuador's mine problem is along its southern border with Peru and the two southern provinces of El Oro and Loja. According to UNMAS, the most mined area is the Cordillera del Condór, where the 1995 conflict broke out, along 78 kilometers of the previously unmarked border.¹⁴ The majority of mines are believed to be located in the headwaters of the Cenepa and Coangos Rivers, in an area of approximately 80 square kilometers.¹⁵

In its Article 7 report, Ecuador reported five mine affected areas from the border dispute: Cordillera del Condór in the south-east border region; Cusumaza-Bombuiza in the east-central border region; El Oro Province in the southern border region; Loja Province in the southern border region; and, Tiwintza on the Peruvian side of the border.¹⁶ Antipersonnel mines may also have been laid in Montalvo in the east-central border region. The landmines laid are almost exclusively antipersonnel and include T-AB-1, MAPP 78 F-2, MON-50, P-4-B, PMD-6M, PRB M35, PRB M409, TS-50, VA-50 and M28A1.¹⁷

Ecuadorian military minefield records were provided to Multinational Observation Mission (MOMEP) but have not been made public. The Cordillera del Condór contains an immensely rich biological and floral ecosystem, and in relation to the rest of the country, is sparsely populated with an estimated 13,000 inhabitants on the Ecuadorian side of the border, including 7,000 Shuar and Achuar indigenous peoples and 6,000 mestizo settlers.¹⁸ It is expected that Shuar and Achuar displaced by the conflict will return now that there is peace.

According to UNMAS, there are a "limited" number of minefields in the southern provinces of El Oro and Loja, laid as barrier minefields by Ecuador in 1995. Ecuador's military claims that the minefields are well marked and fenced and "pose a limited threat" to civilian populations, but acknowledge that there has been some significant displacement of mines due to the heavy flooding resulting from El Niño. Both El Oro and Loja provinces have higher population densities than the Cordillera del Condór.¹⁹

General José Gallardo, in *Al Filo de la Paz* [On the Edge of Peace], (Dinediciones, Quito), March 2000, pp. 49-68.

¹² ALDHU Report, "Human and Environmental Security of Shuar, Achuar (Ecuador), Aguaruna, Huambisa (Peru) Populations after the War," August 1999.

¹³ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Ecuador," 15 November 1999, p. 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶ Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 March 2000.

¹⁷ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Ecuador," 15 November 1999, p. 12.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

UNMAS reports that Ecuador's forces state that they have not laid mines along the border with Colombia, but they did raise the possibility that Colombian guerrilla forces active in these areas may have laid mines there.²⁰

Mine Action Funding

UNMAS notes none of the funds for the Ecuador-Peru Bi-National Development Plan are being set aside for mine action.

The Peruvian and Ecuadorian governments sent a joint note on 18 March 1999 from their Permanent Missions to the OAS, requesting the OAS to establish a specific fund to support demining related to the demarcation of the border.²¹ In April 1999, the "Program for Demining Assistance in Ecuador/Peru" (PADEP) was established by the OAS with a Canadian government contribution of CAN\$300,000 (US\$198,000) to be divided equally between the countries and used exclusively for the purchase of equipment and materials for activities to support humanitarian demining associated with the demarcation of the border between Ecuador and Peru.

At the 30th General Assembly of the OAS held in Windsor, Canada on 4-6 June 2000, delegates voted unanimously on a resolution calling on the OAS to continue efforts to provide assistance in combating AP mines in Ecuador and Peru.²²

Several countries have contributed to the Ecuadorian mine clearance operation with both monetary and in-kind contributions including Canada, Spain, and the United States. Japan has offered financial assistance and Brazil has offered technical assistance.²³ Ecuador was included in the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 22 February 1999 and will receive approximately \$3.225 million in assistance between 1999 and 2000.

Surveys and Assessments

From 16-20 August 1999 the Organization of American States conducted a multi-disciplinary mission with the U.S. Department of State in Ecuador and Peru to evaluate the antipersonnel landmine situation in the border region of the two countries.²⁴

From 23-27 August 1999, the UN Mine Action Service organized and led a multi-disciplinary and inter-agency mission to Ecuador.²⁵

Mine Clearance

The Centro de Desminado del Ecuador, CEDESMI (Ecuadorian Mine Clearance Center) was officially established by Executive Decree 1297 on 22 September 1999. Mine clearance in Ecuador is the responsibility of the Army Engineers, specifically the 23rd Cenepa Engineer Brigade, which has a 95-man company consisting of six 15-man demining teams.²⁶ The Engineers hope to increase their demining capacity by at least another 95-man company in 2000, subject to receiving international support.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ See OAS contribution to Landmine Monitor Report 2000.

²² Press release 141, "Axworthy welcomes progress on democracy and human security at the OAS General Assembly," 6 June 2000.

²³ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Ecuador," 15 November 1999, p. 17.

²⁴ OAS contribution to Landmine Monitor Report 2000.

²⁵ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Ecuador," 15 November 1999.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 15.

The Engineers are described by UNMAS as “professional, well trained and generally well equipped” with a “good, trust based relationship with the local population.”²⁷ The UNMAS Assessment Mission report gives a detailed description of the challenges faced in mine clearance as well as techniques, equipment and other aspects.²⁸

In cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Army has developed a plan for clearance of all mines from Ecuador by the year 2008. The first priority for mine clearance was the demining of the sites for the border markers, in collaboration with Perú’s Armed Forces. Ecuador cleared 12 of 23 sites in the Cordillera del Condór, a task completed in 1999.

Now there are five phases planned for mine clearance: the Twinza memorial area in Peru; the Ecuadorian side of the cross-border ecological Peace Park; the minefields in El Oro; the minefields in Loja; and the remainder of the Cordillera del Condór.²⁹

Mine Awareness

Some limited mine awareness education has been undertaken by the military’s psychological operations branch which recently produced and distributed posters and pamphlets with mine awareness messages, using Army funds and some assistance from the U.S. military. In Loja and El Oro provinces, some mine awareness education has taken place by the military with the help of local schools. Young Ashuar and Shuar men used by the military as scouts during the conflict are conceivably the most knowledgeable of all concerning the location of mined areas and they are thought to pass this information on to their communities, alerting them about mine areas and how to avoid accidents.³⁰ According to the Director of ALDHU, Ashuar and Shuar indigenous peoples are at risk because of the levels of illiteracy and lack of knowledge of the problem.³¹

UNMAS has recommended that the military strengthen coordination and seek assistance from other crucial actors in mine awareness education including the Ministries of Health and Education, the church, NGOs, local authorities, and affected communities.³²

Landmine Casualties

There is no systematic data gathering mechanism for landmine incidents in Ecuador and exact figures are unavailable. The Ministry of Health of Ecuador does not have an official registry of landmine casualties and the National Statistics Institute (INEC) also does not have information on landmine victims in the country.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 16.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 15-16.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 16.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 18.

³¹ Telephone interview with Juan de Dios Parra, Director, Latin American Association for Human Rights (ALDHU), 24 March 2000.

³² UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Ecuador,” 15 November 1999, pp. 27-28.

The military told UNMAS that since the end of the conflict in 1995 there have been approximately 34 landmine-related accidents involving soldiers, including seven deaths.³³ Military authorities in Patuca reported five civilians injured by landmines in 1995, and the Achuar representative in Macas reported four landmine victims in 1997, including one death.³⁴ ALDHU reported eleven Shuar deaths and seven military deaths due to landmines between April 1995 and April 1999.³⁵ ALDHU's director, Juan de Dios Parra, told Landmine Monitor that nine children and four women from indigenous communities of the border areas between Ecuador and Perú injured were injured by mines in the same period.³⁶

UNMAS was told of a 1999 accident involving a civilian in an area near Mirado that had reportedly been declared "demined."³⁷ The Director of ALDHU told Landmine Monitor that the incident raises doubts over the success of the demining process and points towards a need for quality assurance and verification.³⁸

There are not believed to have been any new mine victims so far in 2000.

Victim Assistance and Disability Policies

The military in Ecuador has a well-structured and responsive health care system that provides integrated care to military landmine victims through the Instituto de Seguridad Social de las Fuerzas Armadas, ISSFA (Social Security Institute of the Armed Forces). According to UNMAS, the military hospital in Quito offers an integrated approach to rehabilitation that includes physical, psychological, professional and vocational programs and a rehabilitation center for outpatient treatment.³⁹ Military personnel receive full coverage from these services.

Civilians injured by landmines do not receive the same level of attention and are not provided with adequate services. According to UNMAS, this reflects the gaps and weaknesses of the current health system, which is particularly acute in the remote and relatively inaccessible border regions that are mine-affected.⁴⁰ Individuals who live in remote areas must rely on small medical outposts with only a basic infrastructure or travel long distances to Quito to get appropriate medical attention, a situation described by one local disability organization as "absolutely inadequate."⁴¹

³³ Ibid, p. 12.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 12.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 13.

³⁶ Telephone interview with Juan de Dios Parra, ALDHU, 24 March 2000.

³⁷ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Ecuador," 15 November 1999, p. 13.

³⁸ Telephone interview with Juan de Dios Parra, ALDHU, 24 March 2000.

³⁹ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Ecuador," 15 November 1999, p. 19.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 19.

⁴¹ Email from Carlos Alberto Soto, Director of FEDUCA (an Ecuadorian NGO that works with disabled people) to CCCM for Landmine Monitor, 7 April 2000.

EL SALVADOR

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for El Salvador on 1 July 1999. El Salvador has not submitted its Article 7 report, which was due by 27 December 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

El Salvador signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 27 January 1999. Thus, the treaty entered into force for El Salvador on 1 July 1999. El Salvador has not yet passed any legislation implementing the ban treaty. It has also not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 December 1999, even though Vice-Minister of External Relations Rene Eduardo Dominguez has said, “We consider it necessary that transparency exist with respect to complete communication with the United Nations as Depository of the Convention, with the intent of advancing Article 7 reporting.”¹

El Salvador participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. Vice-Minister Dominguez told the plenary, “Today proudly we are able to say that we are a mine-free country.”²

El Salvador voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. It has also supported the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). It was one of nine countries that signed the “Declaration of San José” in Costa Rica on 5 April 2000, which includes an article promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

El Salvador is not a party to Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use

El Salvador has never produced or exported AP mines, but imported approximately 37,000 M18A1 Claymore and M14 AP mines from the U.S.³ The guerrillas of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) made significant numbers of homemade AP mines and improvised explosive devices. Both sides used mines throughout the war.

According to the government, from March 1993 through January 1994, El Salvador’s Division of Arms and Explosives of the Civil National Police destroyed the remaining AP mines that were in the stocks of the Salvadoran armed forces. El Salvador reported the destruction of these mines to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States in April 1997.⁴ It is not known if Claymore mines were included in the

¹ Statement by Vice-Minister of External Relations Rene Eduardo Dominguez, to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 4 May 1999, p. 2. Translation into English by Landmine Monitor.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (Human Rights Watch: New York, October 1993), pp. 185-186.

⁴ Seguridad Hemisferica, Cuadro Resumen: Minas Terrestres Antipersonales, Al 1 de mayo de 1998, “El Hemisferico Occidental como Zona Libre de Minas Terrestres Antipersonales,”

destruction. A recent media report about a munitions storage site explosion listed “landmines” among the things that were hurled from the blast. Defense Minister Juan Antonio Martinez told media that the depot was stocked with weapons including “landmines,” but provided no details. These could have been antitank mines or Claymore mines.⁵

Mine Action

El Salvador is mine free, or as one official put it, “We have given a certificate where we declare that El Salvador is a mine free zone. Of course there is always a margin of error, but we haven’t had an accident.”⁶ There may still be some danger in remote areas. Mine clearance was carried out in 1993 and 1994 by former combatants from both sides of the conflict, who were trained and supervised by a Belgian company. The UN and other international donors funded this program. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for more details on the past landmine problem and clearance efforts.⁷

El Salvador currently contributes personnel to the OAS Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA), with operations in Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Costa Rica.

Landmine Casualties

No accidents involving landmines have been reported since 1994, although some accidents from UXO have occurred. From January 1994 through mid-1995, 271 people including 42 children were injured by UXO.⁸

Victim Assistance

While the initial mine clearance plan did not include assistance to mine and UXO victims as the years went by this was added. The Army has an institution for war wounded which includes a special clinic for prostheses. At first assistance was only provided to soldiers, but it has since been opened for use by all civilians.⁹

El Salvador is participating in the Joint Program for the Rehabilitation of Mine Victims in Central America conducted by the Pan-American Health Organization and initially funded by Canada.

In addition, a number of private groups have established victim assistance programs in El Salvador. A program called Promoter of the Organization of Disabled Persons in El Salvador (PODES) is operated by Medico International (a German NGO), with technical support and funding from the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (a

AG/RES. 1411 (XXVI-O/96) y AG/RES. 1496 (XXVII_O97) parrafo resolutivo 4, Organizacion de los Estados Americanos, Washington, D.C. de los Estados Ameicanos, Washington, D.C.

⁵ “Salvadoran munitions store blows up injuring 44,” *Agence France Presse* (San Salvador), 10 May 2000.

⁶ Interview with Colonel Sidney Rendón, Embassy of El Salvador in Guatemala, Guatemala City, 9 May 2000.

⁷ ICRC, *Antipersonnel Mines in Central America: Conflict and post-conflict*, January 1996, p. 13.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Interview with Colonel Sidney Rendón, Embassy of El Salvador in Guatemala, Guatemala City, 9 May 2000.

U.S. NGO). PODES has a database of 1,235 patients, produces approximately 300 orthopedic devices each year, and services a similar number. PODES employs 24 people, 18 of whom are disabled.¹⁰ The Landmine Survivors Network made an exploratory visit to El Salvador in April 2000 and will be establishing a program there starting in September 2000.¹¹ Other institutions that provide prosthetic assistance include Fundación Teletón, the Army's Centro de Rehabilitación de las Fuerzas Armadas, the Instituto Salvadoreño de Rehabilitación de Invalidos run by the Government, Don Bosco University, the Asociación de Lisiados de las Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador, and other private prosthetists.¹²

In April 2000, the Center for International Rehabilitation published a "Rehabilitation Resource Directory for Central America," which includes information on services available in El Salvador. This information was collected and provided to the Directory by a local NGO, The Cooperative Association of the Independent Group for Total Rehabilitation.

GRENADA

Grenada signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 19 August 1998. It is not believed to have enacted domestic implementation legislation. Grenada has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, which was due on 27 August 1999. Grenada did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. It voted in favor of the December 1999 UNGA resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Grenada has never produced, used, transferred or stockpiled AP mines. It is not believed to be mine-affected.

GUATEMALA

Key developments since March 1999: Mine clearance in Ixcán was completed and demined lands were handed over for the first time to the local communities in January 2000. Guatemala has not submitted its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, which was due by 27 February 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Guatemala signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 26 March 1999. Guatemala had passed domestic legislation to ban landmines as early as 1996, with Decree Number 106-97 prohibiting the production, purchase, sale,

¹⁰ Letter from Wanda Amory, PODES, to Wendy Batson, Director of Humanitarian Affairs, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 17 July 2000.

¹¹ Telephone interview with Sue Eitel, Landmine Survivors Network, 21 June 2000.

¹² Letter from Wanda Amory, PODES, to Wendy Batson, Director of Humanitarian Affairs, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 17 July 2000.

importation, exportation, transit, use or possession of AP mines or explosive artifacts or their composite parts. It is believed that this law now serves as the implementing legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty.

Guatemala has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, which was due by 27 February 2000. Director-General of Multilateral Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Arturo Duarte told Landmine Monitor in March that an office move had resulted in key files being misplaced, but he said, "We have everything in order now and we are working as fast as we can to get the report as soon as possible."¹ When asked at the end of April for an update, he said, "We are finalizing the report and it will be delivered very soon."²

Guatemala voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. It has also supported the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). It was one of nine countries that signed the "Declaration of San José" in Costa Rica on 5 April 2000, which includes an article promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Guatemala's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Dr. Gabriel Aguilera led the country's delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. In a statement to the plenary, he described the mine clearance program in Guatemala and in Central America as "a model that Central America would like to share with the rest of the world."³

Guatemala has participated in some of the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva, including the March 2000 meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance and on Victim Assistance.

Guatemala is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but has not yet ratified Amended Protocol II on landmines. Director General Duarte told Landmine Monitor that Amended Protocol II is being considered by the Legal Department, and that he personally did not think it would be ratified within a year.⁴

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

The government of Guatemala states that it did not use landmines during its long-running internal war, and there is no concrete evidence to the contrary. The guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) made relatively limited use of crude, homemade mines and improvised explosive devices during the war. The government states that it has not produced or imported AP mines, and has no stockpile.⁵ Since the conflict ended in 1996, officials state they have no reason to believe that any new mines have been planted."⁶

¹ Interview with Arturo Duarte, General Director of Multilateral Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Guatemala City, 13 March 2000.

² Telephone interview with Arturo Duarte, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2000.

³ Statement of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabriel Aguilera Preralta at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3 May 1999, p. 3.

⁴ Interview with Arturo Duarte, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 2000.

⁵ Interview with General Otto Perez Molina, the Guatemalan military's representative to the IADB, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1999.

⁶ Interview with Arturo Duarte, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 2000.

Mine Action Funding

The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) coordinates the OAS Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA). This involves mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance programs in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, with fifteen demining platoons, each comprised of approximately 25 deminers. Guatemala currently contributes personnel to PADCA.⁷ In 1999 the annual budget for the OAS regional program was \$6 million and in 2000 it was \$7.6 million, financed by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.S. and the U.K.⁸

Landmine/UXO Problem

Estimates vary as to the extent of both the landmines and UXO problem in Guatemala. General Otto Perez Molina, who represents the Guatemalan military on the IADB, says that today probably only hundreds, not thousands, of landmines still pose a threat in Guatemala.⁹ Indeed the UNHCR and the ICRC both estimate that before the end of the war, in the mid-1990s, there were no more than 1,500 landmines in Guatemala.¹⁰

The mines were laid in many regions including the Playa Grande region of Alta Verapaz province, along with the bordering region of Ixcán in Quiché province.¹¹ Other mined areas include the northern Petén province along Guatemala's border with Mexico, the Tajumulco volcano in San Marcos province, and the Atitlan volcanoes in Solola province. Mines were also used near San Mateo in Huehuetenango province, as well as in mountainous regions of Quetzaltenango, Chimaltenango and Escuintla provinces.¹²

Unexploded ordnance remains a far greater problem than landmines. In 1997, the government estimated that there were between 5,000 and 8,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance in Guatemala, in the same areas listed above.¹³

Mine/UXO Clearance

On 5 June 1997, Guatemala passed Decree 46-97, which established the Executive Coordinating Unit or "Unidad Coordinadora Ejecutiva" (UCE). In November 1997, the unit prepared a "National Plan for Demining and the Destruction of Unexploded Ordnance." It is under the auspices of this plan that the IADB is now assisting Guatemala with its demining and UXO clearing efforts."

⁷ Email from Jhosselin Bakhat, Organization of American States, 20 June 2000.

⁸ Ibid.; "Demining" section of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Organization of American States, <http://www.oas.org/upd/demining/demining.htm>

⁹ Interview with General Perez Molina, IADB, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1999.

¹⁰ UNHCR estimated that there were 1,000 to 1,500 landmines in Guatemala in the mid-1990s, according to the United Nations landmine country report on Guatemala. See <http://www.un.org/Depts/landmine/country>. The ICRC reported in 1996 that the total number of mines "is probably under 1,500." *Antipersonnel Mines in Central America*, p. 19.

¹¹ UN landmine country report for Guatemala, 3 March 1997.

¹² ICRC, *Antipersonnel Mines in Central America*, p. 18-19.

¹³ Republic of Guatemala, Legislative Commission for Peace Studies, Executive Coordination Unit, "National Plan for Demining and the Destruction of Unexploded Ordnance," November 1997.

The civilian Association of Volunteer Firefighters plays a key role in mine action, with more than 100 people engaged in activities including mine awareness education, obtaining information from the community on suspected mined areas, investigating and locating mines and other explosive artifacts. They mark the mines and UXO and the Army comes and destroys them.¹⁴ Future plans for the Association of Volunteer Firefighters include development and maintenance of a database on mine-affected areas and mine clearance, with the logistic support of the PADCA-OAS.¹⁵

The IADB began training Guatemalan personnel in demining efforts in June 1998. Hurricane Mitch, which swept Central America's Atlantic Coast in November 1998, did not delay demining activities in Guatemala.¹⁶ In December 1998, mine clearance started in Ixcán, Quiché Departments. The Association of Volunteer Firefighters located 145 explosive artifacts that the Army destroyed.¹⁷ Mine clearance in Ixcán was completed and demined lands were handed over to the community in January 2000.¹⁸

In February 2000 clearance in the Ixil Triangle started, including Nebaj, Chajúl and Cotzalm, the three regions most affected by the war. By the year 2002, the plan is to complete mine clearance in all of Quiché.¹⁹

Mine Awareness

The Association of Volunteer Firefighters conducts mine awareness education through TV, radio, and press, with support of the OAS and some logistical and financial support by the government.

In the mid-1990s, UNHCR, which was facilitating the repatriation of war refugees from Mexico back to Guatemala, embarked on a landmine and UXO awareness program which trained Guatemalan civilians among the repatriating community both in mine detection and mine awareness.

Landmine Casualties

According to the Association of Volunteer Firefighters, about 15 people have been hurt by landmines and UXO since 1994; before that there are no records.²⁰ There have been no new reported mine casualties since publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, but officials caution that they cannot be certain "because sometimes people go to hospitals but do not give the information to us."²¹

Survivor Assistance

Guatemala has yet to make any comprehensive effort to treat war wounded. There is no special program for landmine survivor assistance, except for the Army through the

¹⁴ Interview with Officer Sergio Vasquez, Public Relations Officer for Mine Clearance, Voluntary Fire Department, Guatemala City, 10 March 2000.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Organización de Estados Americanos, Junta Interamericana de Defensa, "El Programa de Asistencia al Desminado en Centroamerica," 4 February 1999.

¹⁷ Interview with Guillermo Pacheco, OAS Desminado, Guatemala City, 16 December 1999.

¹⁸ See OAS contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

¹⁹ Interview with Guillermo Pacheco, OAS Desminado, Guatemala City, 16 December 1999.

²⁰ Interview with Officer Sergio Vasquez, 10 March 2000.

²¹ Telephone interview with Officer Sergio Vasquez, 3 April 2000.

Centro de Atención al Desacapacitado del Ejercito de Guatemala (CADEJ).²² It appears that little or no treatment is currently available in Guatemala for prosthetics fitting, rehabilitation or workplace reincorporation. Partly because the overall need for such programs is considered to be far less in Guatemala than in other Central American nations, the Pan-American Health Organization is not undertaking such efforts in Guatemala. One official noted, "Everybody keeps talking about the mines and nobody is talking about the ones hurt by them."²³

In April 2000, the Center for International Rehabilitation published a "Rehabilitation Resource Directory for Central America," which includes information on services available in Guatemala. This information was collected and provided to the directory by a local NGO, Guatemalan Rehabilitation Association (AGREL).²⁴ The Center for International Rehabilitation is also designing and implementing short-term, upgrade training courses for Guatemalan professionals providing rehabilitation services, including training manuals.²⁵ Thirty-five professionals have been trained, in coordination with PAHO, in Health Information Systems.²⁶

HONDURAS

Key developments since March 1999: The Honduran mine clearance program, which was set back in late 1998 by Hurricane Mitch, is now due to be completed by the end of 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

Honduras signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 24 September 1998. Honduras has not yet passed domestic implementation legislation. Honduras submitted its first Article 7 report on 30 August 1999 in Spanish, covering the period from 1998 to 1999.

Honduras voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. It has also supported the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). It was one of nine countries that signed the "Declaration of San José" in Costa Rica on 5 April 2000, which includes an article promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Honduras attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 but did not make a statement to the plenary. It has participated in four intersessional meetings, one for each of the Standing Committees of Experts, except for Mine Clearance.

Honduras is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the CD.

²² Interview with Guillermo Pacheco, OAS Desminado, Guatemala City, 16 December 1999.

²³ Interview with Arturo Duarte, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 2000.

²⁴ Center for International Rehabilitation, "Central American Rehabilitation Resource Directory published by the Center for International Rehabilitation," Press Release, 12 April 2000.

²⁵ "Partners: Guatemala" section of the web site of Center for International Rehabilitation, <http://www.worldrehab.org/partners/guatemala.htm>.

²⁶ See UNICEF contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

Production, Transfer, Use

Honduras has never produced or exported AP mines. It had imported, stockpiled, and used AP mines in limited quantities, for training purposes only. Since the end of the Nicaraguan war in 1990 and the El Salvador war in 1992, there is no evidence that any party of any nationality has used landmines in Honduras.

Stockpiling

Honduras' Article 7 report listed a total of 9,439 stockpiled AP mines, including 2,031 M18A1 U.S. Claymore mines, 2,969 M4 mines from the U.S.,¹ 1,480 M969 mines from Portugal and 2,959 FMK1 mines from Argentina.

According to the Article 7 report, Honduras intends to retain 1,050 AP mines for training as permitted under Article 3, including 226 M18A1s, 330 M4s, 165 M969s and 329 FMK1s.

The rest of the mines will be transferred for the purpose of destruction from the center of logistic support of the Army and the first platoon of engineers to the to the third platoon of infantry. In March 2000, local media reported that a Canadian delegation made an assessment of the inventory of AP mines stockpiled with three battalions.²

Landmine Problem

An expert from the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) stated that there are probably 3,000 landmines that still pose a threat in Honduras.³ Honduran Lieutenant Arnold Ayestas Paz told Landmine Monitor that the only area that is still mine affected is Choluteca province.⁴ According to Lt. Ayestas, approximately 250 square kilometers of land are still mine-affected and awaiting mine clearance. However, the Article 7 report submitted by Honduras states that the total area that must be cleared is 98 square kilometers. It cites these locations in Choluteca: La Caguasca, Lomas Lota, Mogote, el Medio, El Variador, el Ojochal, El Roble.⁵

The mines were not planted by Hondurans, but by foreign combatants fighting over Nicaragua and El Salvador in the 1980s. Throughout the conflict between the Sandinistas and Contras, mines were planted on both sides of the Honduran-Nicaraguan border, mostly around electrical towers and bridges. There are no records of where the mines were laid.⁶ Both the Contras and the Sandinistas relied on former Soviet bloc AP mines including Czechoslovakian-made PP-Mi-1 and PP-Mi-Sr-11 and Soviet-made PMN,

¹ The U.S. has never produced an AP mine with this nomenclature. It is likely that the AP mine being referred to is the U.S. M14. Honduras is one of the few governments to report on Claymore-type mines.

² "Cumplimiento de la Convención de Ottawa: Comisión de expertos canadienses ayudará en la desactivación de los explosivos," *Tiempo Digital* (Honduras newspaper), 3 March 2000.

³ Interview with Inter-American Defense Board expert, Washington, D.C., 17 February 1999.

⁴ Interview with Lieutenant Arnold Ayestas Paz, OAS International Supervisory Official, Guatemala City, 11 May 2000.

⁵ Honduras Article 7 report, Form C, submitted 30 August 1999.

⁶ Interview with Lieutenant Arnold Ayestas Paz, 11 May 2000.

PMN-2 and PMD-6M blast mines and Soviet-made POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M fragmentation mines.⁷

Prior to the clearance, the most heavily mine-affected areas of Honduras were El Paraiso and Choluteca provinces.⁸ Mines have also been found in areas of the border with El Salvador.⁹

Mine Action Funding

The IADB coordinates the OAS Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA). This involves mine and UXO clearance programs in Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica, with fifteen demining platoons, each comprised of approximately 25 deminers. Honduras currently contributes personnel to PADCA. Since July 1999, in addition to Honduras, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Venezuela have contributed personnel.¹⁰

In 1999 the annual budget for the OAS regional program was \$6 million and in 2000 it was \$7.6 million, financed by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.S. and the U.K.¹¹

Mine Clearance

While it was hoped that mine clearance would be completed in the year 2000, delays caused by Hurricane Mitch have pushed this back until the end of the year 2001. The Army is currently clearing the last mine-affected areas. To date, 330,621 square meters of land has been cleared, and 2,231 mines and 51,364 metallic objects destroyed.¹² The Army of Honduras started mine clearance operations in September 1995 after a two-year training program conducted with the IADB. Mine clearance in Honduras is supervised by the Mission of Assistance for the Removal of Mines in Central America (MARMINCA) program of the OAS, which determines the national clearance plan with input from civilians living in mine-affected areas. Logistical support is provided by PADCA, which also provides mine awareness.¹³

Landmine Casualties

There are not believed to have been any mine casualties in this Landmine Monitor reporting period.¹⁴ In September 1995, Honduran officials estimated that over 200

⁷ *Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance*, on-line update, 18 November 1999.

⁸ For more details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 256-257. Also, U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*, December 1994, p. 99.

⁹ *Antipersonnel Mines in Central America: Conflict and post-conflict*, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, January 1996, p. 14-15.

¹⁰ Email from Jhosselin Bakhat, Organization of American States, 20 June 2000.

¹¹ *Ibid.*; "Demining" section of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Organization of American States, <http://www.oas.org/upd/demining/demining.htm>.

¹² "Results (as of 29 February 2000)," section of the Demining Assistance Program in Central America section of the OAS web site, www.oas.org

¹³ Interview with Lieutenant Arnold Ayestas Paz, 11 May 2000.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

civilians had been killed in landmine accidents since 1990.¹⁵ From March 1996 through September 1997, the IADB recorded 5 mine accidents involving civilians in Honduras.¹⁶ Honduras has yet to conduct a comprehensive assessment of casualties resulting from mines or other artifacts of war.

Survivor Assistance

Honduras has only made minimal efforts in addressing the needs of landmine survivors and providing them with adequate treatment. Lt. Ayestas said, "To my knowledge there is no kind of assistance to mine victims."¹⁷

On 11 January 1999 in Mexico City, representatives of Canada, Mexico and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Joint Program for the Rehabilitation of Mine Victims in Central America.¹⁸ The initiative includes a comprehensive effort by PAHO, which is being financed by an initial grant of 3.5 million Canadian dollars, to assess the needs of war victims and to begin to address them in Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. According to Hernan Rosenberg of PAHO, the program will unfold in each country in four stages: assessing the number of victims; assessing individual's specific prosthetics and rehabilitation needs; providing for treatment and rehabilitation; and reincorporating victims back into the workforce.¹⁹

JAMAICA

Jamaica signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 17 July 1998. It is not believed to have enacted domestic implementation legislation. It has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999. Jamaica participated in the First Meeting of State Parties held in Maputo in May 1999. In a plenary statement, Jamaica welcomed the first annual report of the Landmine Monitor and stated that "the work of NGOs like Landmine Monitor and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines...indicates the need to ensure their full involvement in the process of anti-landmine efforts worldwide."¹ Jamaica voted for the December 1999 UNGA resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Jamaica has stated that it has never

¹⁵ UN landmine country report for Honduras, September 1995.

¹⁶ OAS, Junta Interamericana de Defensa, Mision de Asistencia para Remoción de Minas en Centro America, "Cuadro Demostrativo de Los Accidentes Ocurridos al Personal Civil que Vive en Las Areas Rurales de La Republica de Honduras," September 1997.

¹⁷ Interview with Lieutenant Arnold Ayestas Paz, 11 May 2000.

¹⁸ Carta de la Mision Permanente de Mexico y la Mision Permanente de Canada al Presidente del Consejo Permanente de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, Washington, D.C., a 3 de febrero de 1999. This letter builds on the OAS resolution, AG/RES. 1568 (XXVIII-O/98), "Support for the Mine-Clearing Program in Central America," adopted on 2 June 1998.

¹⁹ Interview with Hernan Rosenberg, Pan-American Health Organization, Washington, D.C., 18 February 1999.

¹ Statement by Jamaica at the FMSP to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999, p. 4.

produced, stockpiled, used, or imported antipersonnel mines. Jamaica is not mine-affected.²

MEXICO

Key developments since March 1999: Mexico has served as co-chair of the Mine Ban Treaty's Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance.

Mine Ban Policy

A leader in the movement to ban AP mines, Mexico signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 9 June 1998, the seventeenth country to do so.

Mexico has not enacted separate implementation legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty. Once the treaty was promulgated and published in the Official Federal Gazette on 21 August 1998, it became fully enforceable domestic law.¹ In most cases, international agreements in Mexico are self-executing. In the national implementation measures section of Mexico's Article 7 transparency report, the steps described above are included. The treaty is considered as a Supreme Law in all the territory according to Article 133 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.

The first Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report was submitted on 24 September 1999, in Spanish, covering the period 1998 and 1999. Mexico submitted its second Article 7 report on 7 February 2000, covering the period 1999 and 2000. It contained no new information.

Mexico voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had for similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

Mexico attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. In a statement to the plenary, Mexican Ambassador Carmen Moreno said, "The elimination of antipersonnel landmines should be a priority for the international community at the commencement of the twenty-first century."²

Mexico has participated extensively in the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva and co-chaired the Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Integration and Mine Awareness, along with Switzerland.

Mexico is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and the original Protocol II on landmines. It has not ratified Amended Protocol II as it views it as being surpassed by the Mine Ban Treaty and too limited in comparison with the ban treaty.³ Mexico attended as an observer the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, but did not make a statement.

² Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 1999 Landmine Monitor Questionnaire received on 9 February 1999.

¹ Diario Oficial de la Federación, 21 August 1998, p. 2-9.

² Statement by Ambassador Carmen Moreno to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3 May 1999, p. 5.

³ Telephone interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Mexico City, Mexico, 23 March 1999.

While Mexico is a member of the Conference on Disarmament it does not support, and in some instances has blocked, any effort to launch negotiations on a transfer ban in this forum.⁴ Mexican officials have stated their opposition to any measures that might undermine the comprehensive ban embodied in the Mine Ban Treaty.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Mexico does not produce, transfer, stockpile or use AP mines.⁵ In a December 1999 response to Landmine Monitor, the Foreign Relations Secretariat (SRE) Director for the United Nations System, Minister Luis Alfonso De Alba, stated that Mexico is in compliance with all provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁶ When asked to provide information on any AP mines retained for training, as permitted under Article 3 of the treaty, a Mexican officer from SRE indicated that the declaration of Mexico as a landmine-free territory should be interpreted in a broad sense, including in regard to Article 3.

Landmine Monitor has found no evidence of use of AP mines in Mexico, including by non-state actors.

Mine Action

Mexico has stated that it is "mine-free" on a number of occasions, including through its Article 7 reports. There are no known mine casualties in Mexico. According to Minister Luis Alfonso De Alba, "Mexico was the main promoter of the initiative which ended with the signature of the 'Memorandum of Understanding on a Joint-Program for Rehabilitation of Victims of Landmines in Central America,' between Mexico, Canada and the Pan-American Health Organization" at the Regional Seminar on Antipersonnel Landmines in January 1999."⁷

Mexico has not contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, and is not known to have contributed bilaterally to mine clearance operations in affected nations.

Mexico's Ambassador Antonio de Icaza co-chaired with Switzerland the first meeting of the Mine Ban Treaty's Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Integration and Mine Awareness, held in Geneva in September 1999. The second meeting was held in March 2000 in Geneva.

⁴ See for example, "Mexico blocks conclave on world land-mine ban," *Reuters (Geneva)*, 12 June 1997.

⁵ See for example, "Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Mexico sobre la Producción, Exportación y Uso de Minas Terrestres Antipersonales." Misión Permanente de Mexico ante la OEA. CP02954.S, Mexico, D.F. a 7 de Febrero de 1997.

⁶ Letter from Minister Luis Alfonso De Alba, General Director for the United Nations, Mexican Foreign Relations Secretariat, to Landmine Monitor Researcher, Document Number: DNU-1205379, 9 December 1999, p. 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

NICARAGUA

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Nicaragua on 1 May 1999. National implementing legislation was signed into law on 7 December 1999. Nicaragua began destruction of its AP mine stockpile in April 1999, and had destroyed 40,000 mines as of May 2000. As of January 2000, some \$20.8 million had been committed of the estimated \$27 million needed to complete mine clearance by 2004. By the end of 1999, 1,291 square kilometers of land had been cleared and 54,107 AP mines destroyed from 524 sites. The number of mine victims reportedly has declined.

Mine Ban Policy

Nicaragua signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification at the UN on 30 November 1998. The treaty entered into force for Nicaragua on 1 May 1999. President Alemán Lacayo signed implementing legislation on 7 December 1999, with penal sanctions for violations of the law.¹

Nicaragua participated at the First Meeting of State Parties (FMSP) held in Maputo in May 1999 and was represented by Ambassador Lester Mejía Solís. Since the FMSP, Nicaragua has served as co-chair of the Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance. The government has participated actively in all the intersessional meetings of the five SCEs. Nicaragua made a presentation to the May 2000 meeting of the SCE on Stockpile Destruction. Nicaragua's Article 7 transparency measures report dated 30 September 1999 was submitted to the UN on 18 May 2000.²

In December 1999, Nicaragua sponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly resolution 54/54B, as it had done with other pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.

Nicaragua is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Use

Nicaragua no longer produces landmines. It reports having AP mines manufactured by the former Soviet Union, former Czechoslovakia, and Cuba in its inventory.³

¹ *Law for the Prohibition of Production, Purchase, Sale, Import, Export, Transit, Use and Possession of Antipersonnel Landmines*, Law No. 321, published in the Official Gazette on 12 January 2000. Article I of this law adds "installation" to the prohibition on AP mines. Article III states that the Armed Forces must destroy its stockpiles in the "period determined by the relevant authorities." Article VI states that persons who violate the Law will be charged with "exposing the public to danger," and will be charged accordingly. See "Prisión para vendedores de minas," *Confidencial*, No. 158, 5-11 September 1999, p. 5.

² The report contains information as of 30 September 1999, but does not indicate the starting date of the reporting period. The delay in submission was due to the fact that Nicaragua initially sent the report to the government of Austria, which had developed the Article 7 reporting format.

³ Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 September 1999.

According to its Article 7 Report, 286 landmines were transferred to the OAS/IADB MARMINCA program for canine training on 29 September 1998. This included 62 PMN, 65 POMZ, 66 PP-Mi-SrII, 20 PMD-6M, 48 PMN-2, 20 MON-50, and 5 PTMI-K.⁴

There have been no allegations of recent use of antipersonnel mines in Nicaragua. According to Nicaraguan Army sources, the Operational Division of the Army registered the emplacement of approximately 120,000 antipersonnel mines during conflicts in the 1980s.⁵

Stockpiling and Destruction

Nicaragua's Article 7 report and subsequent information provided to Landmine Monitor by the Nicaraguan Army and Foreign Ministry indicate the following:

- 136,813 antipersonnel mines were in stockpiles at the beginning of 1999.
- A total of 40,000 AP mines have been destroyed: 5,000 on 12 April 1999; another 5,000 on 28 August 1999; another 10,000 on 3 December 1999; another 10,000 on 25 February 2000 in an event attended by the President; and, another 10,000 mines in April 2000.
- As of the end of May 2000, there were 91,813 antipersonnel mines in Nicaragua's stockpile.
- The target date for completion of destruction is April 2002.⁶

All destruction events were conducted in the presence of observers, usually including representatives from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Congress, NGOs and the media. OAS Secretary General César Gaviria attended the August 1999 event, and the President attended the February 2000 event.

Another 30,000 mines have been destroyed since the 30 September 1999 date of the Article 7 report, but at that time the Nicaraguan stockpile included the following mines: 38,818 PMN; 37,046 PMN-2; 5,250 PP-MiSr-11; 331 OZM-4; 3,023 POMZ-2; 38,862 POMZ-2M; 3,318 MON-50; 11 MON-100; 154 MON-200; PMFH (unspecified number); and TAP-4 (unspecified number).⁷ The stockpile totals for the Cuban PMFH-1 and indigenously produced TAP-4 antipersonnel mines were not included in the Article 7 report and not reflected in the total stockpile aggregation. Nicaragua possessed 1,820 PMD-6M antipersonnel mines, but 1,800 were destroyed in April 1999 and 20 transferred to the OAS/IADB for training purposes in September 1998.

⁴ Ibid., Form D. The PP-Mi-Sr-II is an AP mine of Czechoslovak origin and the PT-Mi-K is an antitank mine of Czechoslovakian origin.

⁵ Interview with Major Sergio Ugarte, head of demining for the Nicaraguan Army, Managua, 15 January 1999.

⁶ Remarks by Cecilia Sanchez Reyes, Minister Counsellor, Nicaragua's Permanent Mission to the UN, Geneva, to the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 10 December 1999 and 22 May 2000. An Army official has said the goal is to destroy some 34,000 mines per year, with completion by December 2002. Written reply to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Colonel Spiro Bassi Aguilar, Chief, Army Corps of Engineers, 16 February 2000.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form B. Updated by the Nicaraguan Army in January 2000. The TAP-4 is a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine produced by Nicaragua.

The Article 7 report gives details on the 10,000 mines destroyed in public ceremonies during 1999, which included 4,463 PMN; 1,200 PMN-2; 1,015 PMFH-1; 1,800 PMD-6M; and 1,522 POMZ-2. Stockpile destruction was carried out at the Polígono de Tiro de Unidad Militar, at the National Sergeant School Andrés Castro in Managua. The method of destruction was open-burning/open-detonation (OB/OD).⁸

At a meeting of the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Nicaragua said that it costs approximately US\$5 to destroy each mine, and about \$30,000 per explosion.⁹

According to the Article 7 Report, Nicaragua is planning to retain 1,971 landmines for training purposes. This includes: 500 PMN; 500 PMN-2; 100 PP-Mi-Sr11; 50 OZM-4; 50 PMFH; 100 POMZ-2; 500 POMZ-2M; 100 MON-50; 11 MON-100; and 10 MON-200.¹⁰

Landmine Problem

Nicaragua's Article 7 report states that 135,643 mines were laid in the country during the conflict, including both antipersonnel and antitank mines. UNICEF notes that in addition to the mines, "a large quantity of explosive devices such as bombs, fragmentation grenades, mortars, and ammunition were also left in areas where combat took place."¹¹

Nicaragua reports that landmines laid between 1982-1989 are still in the ground in 465 fields or "groups" of mines along approximately 380 kilometers of the border, and in thirty-nine sites inside Nicaragua. The locating of suspected minefields was ongoing, taking into account the effects of Hurricane Mitch.¹² Nicaraguan civilians have informed authorities of the presence of landmines in the Departments of Matagalpa, Madriz, Jinotega, Nueva Segovia, Estelí, Chontales, Boaco, Río San Juan, Chinandega, Zelaya Norte, and Zelaya Sur.¹³ Thirty-five of Nicaragua's 143 municipalities are mine-affected, which represents approximately 37% of the national population.¹⁴

In January 2000, the Army noted that currently there is one mine on the ground for every 55 Nicaraguans, down from one for every 32 in 1993; 26.9% of Nicaragua's northern border with Honduras is mined, down from 34% in 1993; 0.9% of Nicaragua's southern border with Costa Rica is mined, down from 29% in 1993; and there is one mine in the ground for every 34 Nicaraguan children, down from one for every 20 children in 1993.¹⁵

⁸ Ibid., Form F.

⁹ Remarks by Cecilia Sanchez Reyes, Minister Counsellor, Nicaragua's Permanent Mission to the UN, Geneva, to the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 22 May 2000.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, Form D. The figures of mines retained add up to 1,921 mines, but the total recorded on Form D is 1,971. Nicaraguan officials have cited the 1,971 figure in SCE meetings.

¹¹ UNICEF, "Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects," June 2000, p. 126.

¹² Article 7 Report, Form C.

¹³ Article 7 Report, "El programa de desminado en Nicaragua," 30 September 1999, p. 1.

¹⁴ Nicaragua Army compilation based on regional command reports, provided to Landmine Monitor in April, 2000.

¹⁵ Ibid.

The Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de Nicaragua (CEEN), and the Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), two of the principal NGOs dealing with the landmine problem and mine awareness in Nicaragua, note that there can only be estimates of the number of mines planted in Nicaraguan territory. The Army's records of mines it laid do not account for the mines planted by the "Contras" or, in all likelihood, those by all Army tactical units during the conflict. Joel Zamora, Director of CEEN, said, "To be realistic, neither the Army nor the Contras know where they planted many of their mines."¹⁶ Maps will have limited value, after nearly 15 years have passed and Hurricane Mitch affected the location of minefields.

With the passage of time and population growth, previously sparsely inhabited areas are being settled. Indeed according to reports from mine awareness volunteers, communities continue to expand into areas known to be mined-affected. The old warning signs and fences have been destroyed over time, especially on account of the 1998 Hurricane Mitch, but also through vandalism and the "recycling" of barbed wire and signs for economic purposes.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has recently announced that during the period May-July 2000 it will carry out a landmine assessment mission to Nicaragua, in cooperation with the OAS.¹⁷

Mine Action Funding

The OAS Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA) involves mine and UXO clearance programs in Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. In 1999 the annual budget for the whole OAS regional demining program was \$6 million and in 2000 it was \$7.6 million, financed by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.S. and the U.K.¹⁸ Nicaragua currently contributes personnel to PADCA. Since July 1999, in addition to Nicaragua, other countries including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Venezuela have contributed personnel.¹⁹

According to the Article 7 Report, Nicaragua needs \$27 million in international assistance to complete demining and stockpile destruction. Lt. Col. Cesar Delgadillo, head of the Demining Units, calculates that the Army will require some \$30 million to carry out its work over the period 1999-2004. Virtually all of this must come from foreign donations.²⁰

According to the Nicaraguan Army's update of January 2000, so far, a total of \$20.8 million has been committed by various countries to the demining effort, including: Denmark - \$6.8 million for the period 2000-2004; Sweden - \$5 million also for 2000-

¹⁶ Interview with Joel Zamora, Director of CEEN and member of the CND, Managua, 18 January 2000.

¹⁷ UNDP, Mine Action Bulletin, May 2000.

¹⁸ Email from Jhosselin Bakhat, Organization of American States, 20 June 2000; "Demining" section of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Organization of American States, at: <http://www.oas.org/upd/demining/demining.html>.

¹⁹ Email from Jhosselin Bakhat, Organization of American States, 20 June 2000.

²⁰ "Síndrome de Estocolmo," *El Nuevo Diario*, 5 November 1999, p. 11.

2004; Canada - \$2 million for 2000-2001; Norway - \$2 million for 2000-2001; the U.S. - \$2.5 million for 2000-2002; and the UK - \$2.5 million for 2003-2004.²¹

The OAS notes that U.S. and UK funds will be used to establish a new operations front composed of 100 deminers in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region. Deminers for the new platoons were in the process of being trained. The OAS emphasized that these deminers would supplement the other two fronts that are supported by the international community, through the OAS, in the areas of Ocotal and Juigalpa.²²

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance is the responsibility of the Pequeñas Unidades de Desminado, PUD (Small Demining Units) of the Engineer Corps of the Nicaraguan Army. The Nicaraguan Army, with support from the OAS/IADB is currently undertaking mine clearance and training operations in Nicaragua.

According to the Article 7 Report, the approximately 650 Army personnel of the Programa De Desminado Nacional (PDN) destroyed 54,107 AP mines between 1993-1999 from 524 sites with 1,291 square kilometers cleared.²³ Still to be cleared were an estimated 81,536 mines in 476 sites. Priorities are the northern and southern border regions, where there are large peasant populations whose agricultural and herding activities are important for the economic development of Nicaragua. Clearance of the remaining mines will be completed by 2004 with a total cost of approximately \$27 million, about \$340 per mine.²⁴

After a request for assistance by President Alemán Lacayo after the devastation of Hurricane Mitch, UNMAS assessed the situation in Nicaragua in November 1998 and proposed the implementation of a short-term mine action assistance project. The aim of the project was to increase the national detection and clearance capacity in order to guarantee that reconstruction sites around destroyed bridges were cleared of mines.

From May until the end of July 1999, this UNMAS project resulted in more than 527 square meters around four destroyed bridges, on the northern part of the main road leading North from Managua to Honduras, to be declared free of landmines.²⁵ Under the Hurricane Mitch emergency plan, between January and August 1999, thirty bridges were demined or certified free of landmines displaced by Mitch in different regions of the country. This includes 281 landmines destroyed and 748 square meters cleared.²⁶

²¹ Ministry of Defense figures provided to Landmine Monitor. See also Article 7 Report and Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Colonel Spiro Bassi Aguilar, Chief of the Army Engineer Corps, 16 February 2000.

²² See OAS contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

²³ Article 7 Report, "El programa de desminado en Nicaragua," 30 September 1999, p. 1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁵ "Assistance in Mine Action: Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly," A/54/445, 6 October 1999.

²⁶ Article 7 Report, "El programa de desminado en Nicaragua," 30 September 1999, p. 3. The OAS reports that joint work was conducted with the government of Nicaragua in the clearance and certification of major roadways, primarily the bridges of Paso Real, Jícaro, Montecristo, Naranjita, Tapacales, Inalí, Río Pire, Pueblo Nuevo, and El Tular, along the Juigalpa-El Rama highway. A

According to an Army update in April 2000, between January and April 2000 there were 1,076 mines destroyed, with a total of 124,187 square meters cleared. There were sixty-three high-tension towers cleared in the Guasaule-Villanueva corridor in Chinandega Department; and six bridges cleared, five on the El Rama highway (Ocongua, Quinama, La Concha, Presillitas, Estero Real) and one in Chinandega.²⁷

Dogs are being used successfully in demining operations. However, questions have been raised in regard to costs: \$35,000 for each dog and \$1.5 million required for their upkeep annually.²⁸

Disturbingly, a number of civilians have taken to hiring themselves out as mine clearers to landowners interested in incorporating previously mined areas for agriculture and ranching. According to CEEN and veteran's associations, these freelancers are usually impoverished local peasants who are former Army or Contra combatants. They work lacking even the most minimal protection, utilizing rudimentary tools. Wooden sticks are used to detect mines, which are then removed using machetes.²⁹

A media report stated that at the end of 1999, as the result of border tensions with Honduras, the Nicaraguan Army had withdrawn some demining units from sensitive points, stopping the demining effort along certain border areas. The OAS representative denied this was the case claiming the suspension was due to year-end holidays and programming.³⁰

Nicaraguan NGO Concerns about Mine Action in Nicaragua

Nicaraguan NGOs continue to express concerns about implementation of victim assistance and humanitarian mine action more broadly defined. Civil society and survivor participation in the monitoring and design of humanitarian mine action remains limited, although the debate on mine action as more than mine clearing has now been taken to the communities by key NGOs.³¹ An increasing concern is the Army becoming more involved in mine awareness education and victim assistance.³² Some donors have also expressed concerns. An official at the Danish Embassy said, "The Army cannot be involved in all three components: demining, prevention and rehabilitation. The priorities of the local communities are not necessarily reflected in the priorities of the Army."³³ The EU is exploring the possibility of sponsoring an exposure visit for Army officers to

total of twenty-six bridges were cleared and certified. See OAS contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

²⁷ Nicaraguan Army data based on a compilation regional command reports, provided to Landmine Monitor, April 2000.

²⁸ "Nicaragua se librar  de 34,000 minas," *La Prensa*, Managua, 12 January 12 2000, p. 14.

²⁹ Observation based on visits and interviews in affected areas by CEI and CEEN personnel.

³⁰ "Conflicto limitrofe con Honduras afecta el ritmo del desminado fronterizo," *Enfoque*, *La Prensa*, Managua, 26 January 2000, pp. 4-5.

³¹ For example, CEEN sponsored a forum in Ocotal on 3 November 1999, "Foro Departamental de Acci n sobre Minas: En Busca de un Sistema Integral con Actividades Paralelas al Desminado." See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* p. 272-3 on concerns about the militarized nature of the content and perception of mine action.

³² Budget provisions for such action was presented by the Ministry of Defense delegation to the States Party Review Session: "Republic of Nicaragua National Humanitarian Demining Program," Geneva, 15 September 1999 (mimeo).

³³ Interview with Jacob Brix Tange, Danish Embassy, Managua, 28 March 2000.

third countries where programs are defined and executed in collaboration with the local communities.³⁴

The establishment of the National Demining Commission (CND) in November 1998 provided an opportunity to broaden participation in mine action by civil society in the country. However, more than a year later, the CND is barely in operation, and void of any decision-making capacity. The CND is presided over by the Minister of Defense, and in the past year there have been three different Ministers. Criticisms by the non-government members of the CND are similar to those made last year: continued emphasis of a mine clearance perspective; limited role for non-military government agencies and for civil society; absence of consultation with communities; an emphasis on the number of mines removed as criterion of progress as opposed to the enhancement of living conditions for mine-affected communities; and relative neglect of mine awareness and prevention. The membership of the CND includes the Army, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Red Cross, Center for Strategic Studies, War Disabled Commission, and Foreign Ministry. The Minister of Defense chairs the CND.

According to Joel Zamora of CEEN, "If in Nicaragua there was a public policy that stipulated, at least in the most-affected departments, that the Education Ministry included mine awareness as a subject over a two year period, we would have more impact. Of course we cannot compare what is spent on mine clearance with what it cost to carry out education, prevention and victim attention. We are not saying that it should be proportional. What we are suggesting is that there be more of a will in regard to these two forgotten components, which are prevention and victim assistance."³⁵ Most donors have not manifested concern in regard to the heavy emphasis on Army demining in Nicaraguan mine action, thereby reinforcing the pattern.

Mine Awareness

While the bulk of emphasis on the part of the government and OAS is on the clearance side of mine action, NGOs and other international agencies focus on mine awareness.

UNICEF is carrying out the second year of a "Child to Child Prevention In Nicaragua" project in 2000. The project is being implemented in cooperation with the Nicaraguan Red Cross and has a budget of \$99,651 for the year 2000.³⁶ Its goal is to enhance mine awareness education by using children to transmit prevention messages to other children. CEI has raised questions regarding the effectiveness of having urban children and youth teach their rural counterparts about the rural landmine problem, and the technical competency of the local leader or religious pastor that often accompanies the effort.³⁷

³⁴ Interview with Tom Dodd, Counselor for Economic Affairs, EU delegation, Managua, 17 February 2000.

³⁵ Interview with Joel Zamora, 18 January 2000.

³⁶ UNICEF, "Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects," June 2000, p. 126.

³⁷ Discussions with various officials and in forums and reports from CEI network of peace promoters who also carry out mine awareness education.

Mine awareness materials produced by DC Comics and featuring Superman and Wonder Woman continue to be supplied by the U.S. Defense Attaché and distributed by the Ministry of Education. According to the Deputy Minister, some 169,325 comic books have been distributed and 3,735 teachers have been trained.³⁸ It seems that UNICEF and Education Ministry officials believe that the effectiveness of the material will depend on how it is used, and have made no substantive objections on cultural appropriateness or the technical flaws that the ICBL, among others, has raised concerns about.

UNICEF officials in Managua have insisted that this was not their choice, but that UNICEF headquarters in New York wanted them used. Two arguments that continue to be used are that there are no other materials available, and that existing stocks of comics should be used. Ana Lucía Silva, UNICEF Human Rights Officer in Managua admitted that in mine-affected rural areas “Superman and Wonder Woman are unknown and there is not much identification with them.” She insisted however that the comics should be used because of the abundant stock.³⁹ After using the DC comics for a time, the Nicaraguan Red Cross reportedly stopped using it. According to the Public Relations Officer of the Nicaraguan Red Cross, “We were handing it out, but it has been discarded. The messages got distorted which is why we decided to withdraw it. It is now history.”⁴⁰

Landmine Casualties

There is no centralized source of information on landmine casualties in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan Red Cross estimates that some fifty people are injured every year. Approximately 90% are civilians, and over half of these are children and adolescents.

The Army reports that there were thirty-one mine casualties in 1999, including eleven dead and twenty injured, and that from January-April 2000 there were four accidents involving five victims, including two deaths and the amputation of a leg and arm in another.⁴¹ Three of the four accidents took place in the San Fernando area of Nueva Segovia, in north central Nicaragua; all involved rural laborers. The Army report concluded that the areas had not been marked, and that mine awareness was weak in the population.⁴² With the support of the ICRC, the Nicaraguan Red Cross has ambulances in each of the demining “fronts” in order to provide emergency assistance for deminers.⁴³

According to a newspaper article, the OAS is caring for 232 landmine accident survivors, of which 30% are children.⁴⁴ Over the course of the past year, the OAS undertook a survey that indicated a reduction in the number of mine-related accidents. The OAS data is corroborated by the Health Ministry’s Rehabilitation Unit. According to the Chief of the Rehabilitation Unit, admissions of landmine accident victims have

³⁸ Interview with Tulio Tablada, Vice Minister, Ministry of Education, 24 February 2000.

³⁹ Interview with Ana Lucía Silva, Human Rights Officer, UNICEF, Managua, 2 March 2000.

⁴⁰ Interview with René Baltodano, Public Relations Director, Nicaraguan Red Cross, Managua, 31 January 2000.

⁴¹ Nicaragua Army internal report provided to Landmine Monitor, “Resultados Acumulados Del Programa De Desminado Humanitario,” 28 April 2000.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Interview with René Baltodano, Public Relations Director, Nicaraguan Red Cross, Managua, 31 January 2000.

⁴⁴ “Síndrome de Estocolmo,” *El Nuevo Diario*, 5 November 1999, p. 11.

decreased even though everyone expected them to go up, particularly after the mine displacements caused by Hurricane Mitch in October 1998.⁴⁵

However, Uriel Carazo, a member of the CDN noted that there is no information on how many victims could afford to travel to Managua and remain there for extended treatment. Carazo believes that many seek treatment at local health centers or regional hospitals and then simply return to their communities and go unrecorded.⁴⁶

Victim Assistance

The Nicaraguan Ministry of Health has two units providing rehabilitation programs in Managua, located in the Aldo Chavarría and Lenin Fonseca Hospitals. Their Prostheses Center has registered 617 landmine victims currently receiving care.⁴⁷ At present there is minimal capacity for providing coverage in rural areas, although in the course of the year 2000, the north central region of the country, where most victims live, is planned to have permanent rehabilitation units.⁴⁸ There are only seven physiotherapists from the Ministry of Health working in the entire country outside of Managua, and there is no budget provision for landmine victims.⁴⁹

Victim assistance is the stated objective of a \$4 million grant agreement with Canada, with support from Mexico, and to be administered by PAHO.⁵⁰ Although a policy framework and funding have been established there is no specific governmental agency in place that deals with landmine victims. According to CEI this is as much the product of inertia and centralization of services in the capital Managua, as of the overall shortage of resources.⁵¹ Some argue against segregating landmine victims from other disabled individuals, although according to Handicap International's representative in Managua, "War victims in general still require specific targeting."⁵²

State social security pensions for disabled soldiers (mostly mine victims) range from a \$9 to \$22 monthly.⁵³ There is also the problem of minimal coordination among the various entities that provide rehabilitation services. There are only two functioning orthopedic centers in the country, but even if there were more the fact that the services and devices must be purchased combine to make these inaccessible to most victims who are overwhelmingly poor.

According to the OAS, the "Program for Care to Victims of Mines and UXO," which has existed in Nicaragua since 1997, was to be continued and strengthened in

⁴⁵ Interview with Dr. Norman Lanzas, Head of the Rehabilitation Unit, Ministry of Health, Managua, 10 February 2000.

⁴⁶ Interview with Uriel Carazo, 26 January 2000.

⁴⁷ Interview with Dr. Norman Lanzas, Head of the Rehabilitation Services Unit, Ministry of Health, 10 February 2000.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ "Supporting Landmine Survivors in Central America," A Tripartite Initiative, Government of the United Mexican States, Pan-American Health Organization and World Health Organization, Government of Canada, January 1999.

⁵¹ CEI, "El desminado en Nicaragua," 1999.

⁵² Interview with Philippe Dicquemare, HI representative, Managua, 4 February 2000.

⁵³ Interview with Uriel Carazo, 26 January 2000.

2000, with the assistance of the Swedish government, in order to ensure monitoring of the rehabilitation services provided under the program.⁵⁴ A Framework Agreement was signed between the International Rehabilitation Center and the OAS, for the implementation of a Plan of Action to develop and prepare new technologies, educational material, and physical and labor-related employment programs for the Rehabilitation Program for Victims of AP Mines.⁵⁵

PANAMA

Key developments since March 1999: Panama has not submitted its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, which was due 27 September 1999. Panama has clarified to Landmine Monitor that it does not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Panama signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, and deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN on 7 October 1998. The ratification legislation literally adopts the treaty but cannot be considered to be full implementation legislation with penalties for violations.

Panama has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 September 1999, but officials say they are preparing the report.¹

Panama voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B in December 1999, as it did on previous resolutions in 1997 and 1998. It has also supported the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). It was one of nine nations to sign the "Declaration of San José" in Costa Rica on 5 April 2000, which has an article promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Panama sent a representative to the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 but did not make a statement to the plenary.² It is not believed to have participated in any of the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva.

Panama is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines) on 3 November 1999. Panama did not participate in the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and has not submitted its Article 13 annual transparency report.

Panama is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

According to government officials, Panama has never produced, imported, or exported AP mines, and does not have a stockpile of AP mines.³ A government official

⁵⁴ See OAS contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹ Telephone interview with Janio Tuñón, Director-General, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 May 2000.

² Panama was represented by S.E. Sr. Flavio Mendez Altamirano, Director-General of International Organizations and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ Inquires were made with the following government agencies in May 2000: Interior Commerce Department of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Explosives Technical Unit of the

stated that there have been no reports of use of Panama as a transit point for AP mine shipments going elsewhere.⁴

Claymore mines were used in Panama for training of both Panamanian and U.S. military personnel in the Canal Zone.⁵ There has been no new mine use since the closing of the ranges.

A member of the National Police told Landmine Monitor of possible AP mine use in the weapons trafficking and drug labs along the Panama-Colombia border, but it was not possible to confirm this allegation.⁶

UXO Problem

While Panama is not mine-affected, it does suffer from UXO contamination as a result of U.S. training exercises and weapons testing in military ranges in the Canal Zone for 30 years, until 1997 when the ranges were closed down. One 1997 assessment by the U.S. Department of Defense on the military ranges revealed the presence of various types of munitions, including Claymore mines but no other types of AP mines.⁷ A former U.S. Army official has said that while the Army tested mines at three ranges, the testing included only component and systems tests, with no high explosive in the mines.⁸

The area of UXO-affected land in the Canal Zone is approximately 151.29 square kilometers and consists of ranges where weapons were tested and training took place.⁹ These include the Empire demolition range where explosives were used, including Claymore mines;¹⁰ the Balboa West range, and the Piña and Sherman range.¹¹

National Police and the Institutional Department for Public Security Affairs, Ministry of Government and Justice. Also, interview with Jaime Luque, Director, Inter-Institutional Department on Public Safety Affairs, Ministry of Government and Justice, Panama City, 2 May 2000. *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* p. 275 stated that there was uncertainty about whether or not Panama had a stockpile of AP mines.

⁴ Interview with Jaime Luque, Ministry of Government and Justice, 2 May 2000.

⁵ PRC Environmental Management, Inc. for Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan Agency, Department of Defense, Unexploded Ordnance Assessment of U.S. Military Ranges in Panama: Empire, Balboa West, and Piña Ranges, Final report, January 1997, Appendix A, p. A-15. Hereafter cited as "PRC, UXO Assessment, January 1997."

⁶ Interview with member of National Police, Panama City, October 1999.

⁷ PRC, UXO Assessment, January 1997, Appendix A, p. A-15.

⁸ Telephone interview with former munitions test official, March 2000.

⁹ PRC, UXO Assessment, January 1997, p. ES-1.

¹⁰ UXO in the Empire range was described by one official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as fitting the description of the M2M AP mine. See Letter from Juan Antonio Stagg, Copresidente, Comité Conjunto-DEPAT, to Colonel Hunt, Copresidente, Comité Conjunto-DEPAT, 29 May 1998. Landmine Monitor editor's translation from Spanish.

¹¹ Sherman was not used as a Firing Range, but it was used as a training camp. Useful reports on the ranges include: PRC, UXO Assessment, January 1997; U.S. Army South, Installation Condition Report, Empire Range – Military Area of Coordination, 11 July 1996; and, Range Transfer Report: Empire, Balboa West, and Piña Ranges: Actions to Protect Public Safety & the Environment, A joint effort of U.S. Army South, U.S. Air Combat Command, U.S. Technical Center for Explosive Safety, U.S. Air Force Safety Center, U.S. Southern Command Treaty Implementation, U.S. Army Environmental Center, U.S. Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board, 29 October 1998.

According to UNICEF, there are approximately 100,000 people in 15 districts located around the ranges and therefore at risk from the presence of UXO.¹² These include the communities of Nuevo Emperador, Burunga, Arraiján, Huile, Piña, Escobal, Providencia, and Bruja. The affected land has different uses including agricultural, ecological tourism, health and medicine purposes, as well as social purposes, such as housing, and income generation. Once the land is cleared, it will be used according to the plan made by the local governmental body, the Autoridad de la Región Interoceánica (ARI).¹³

In compliance with the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, the U.S. Armed Forces have affirmed they “will take all practicable measures to remove all hazards to human life, health and safety.” The U.S. claims that when it has completed the clean-up of the ranges, “some 12,119 of the 15,129 hectares will be available for Panama’s reuse.”¹⁴ In August 1999, U.S. Air Force Colonel David Hunt said that the military had removed 250 metric tons of debris in the last two years. He went on to note that it is “impossible” to remove all the UXO without tearing down the rain forests and threatening the canal’s watershed.¹⁵ On 31 December 1999, as stipulated by the 1977 treaty, the U.S. pulled out of Panama.

Mine Awareness

Since 1997, UNICEF has funded some UXO/mine awareness and education, in coordination with the Ministry of Health.¹⁶ UNICEF has a \$44,000 proposal to conduct mine awareness and education in affected areas in 2000, in partnership with the Ministries of Health, Education, Foreign Affairs and NGOs.¹⁷ A number of NGOs carry out research and advocacy on the UXO-contaminated ranges in the Canal Zone.¹⁸ At one point, the ICRC was involved in UXO awareness and education and held a few workshops.¹⁹

Mine and UXO Casualties

The Panamanian government states that at least 21 people have been killed by UXO since 1940, while the Pentagon says 7 deaths have occurred since 1984.²⁰

¹² UNICEF, “UXO Awareness Education in Panama,” proposal for June-December 2000, in UN, Portfolio of Mine-related Projects, June 2000, p. 128.

¹³ Autoridad de la Región Interoceánica ARI, Plan de Uso General del Suelo, 1996.

¹⁴ Letter from Colonel David J. Hunt, U.S. Air Force, Co-Chairman, Joint Committee, Center for Treaty Implementation, Department of Defense, U.S. Southern Command, Corozal, Panama, to Engineer Juan Antonio Stagg, JC# 152-98, 3 April 1998.

¹⁵ Andrea Stone, “Deadly Reminders of U.S. in Panama,” *USA Today*, 9 August 1999, p. 7.

¹⁶ UNICEF, “UXO Awareness Education in Panama,” proposal for June-December 2000, in United Nations, Portfolio of Mine-related Projects, June 2000, p. 128.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ These include Servicio Paz y Justicia en Panamá, Coordinadora de Derechos Humanos de Panamá, Movimiento Nacional por la Defensa de la Soberanía, all human rights NGOs, and CODIN, a women’s NGO.

¹⁹ Interview with Marta González, Director, National Permanent Commission for Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Panama City, 12 May 2000.

²⁰ Andrea Stone, “Deadly Reminders of U.S. in Panama,” *USA Today*, 9 August 1999, p. 7.

Those injured can obtain rehabilitation services at various public and private hospitals. Most of these are in Panama City, but there are 1,175 health clinics around the country, one university hospital, nine public integrated hospitals, and also private clinics.²¹

PARAGUAY

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Paraguay on 1 May 1999. Paraguay has stated for the first time that it does not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

Paraguay signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. The National Congress passed ratification legislation, Law 1339, on 6 October 1998 and Paraguay deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on 13 November 1998. The treaty entered into force for Paraguay on 1 May 1999.

In May 1999 the government stated its commitment to pass national legislation to implement the treaty.¹ Likewise, in November 1999, the government said, “Paraguay commits to adopt all the legal measures to prevent and repress into its territory any forbidden activity of the States Parts as provided by Art. 9 of the Convention.”² Yet, it has still not enacted implementation legislation.

Paraguay participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. Lilianne Lebrón-Wenger, Director-General of Multilateral Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Relations told the plenary that “Paraguay is a country free of antipersonnel mines,” and urged greater effort toward universalization of the ban treaty.³ Paraguay has not taken part in the intersessional meetings of the treaty.

In a May 2000 response to Landmine Monitor, Paraguay said that issues such as the Mine Ban Treaty are viewed as promoting peace and humanitarian actions and they therefore have significant importance for Paraguay.⁴

Paraguay voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had done on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. It has supported, by consensus, the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States.

In December 1999, the government gave Landmine Monitor a copy of Paraguay’s Article 7 report, dated 17 November 1999. However, the report has apparently never

²¹ Ministry of Health, 1999 Annual Report, 1999.

¹ Statement by Lilianne Lebrón-Wenger, Director-General of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Relations, to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999. In Spanish, translation by Landmine Monitor editors.

² Paraguay Article 7 report, dated 17 November 1999, received by Landmine Monitor in December 1999.

³ Statement by Lilianne Lebrón-Wenger to the FMSP, 3-7 May 1999.

⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 May 2000.

been officially provided to the United Nations, as required.⁵ The report, which covers the period from 1 May 1999 - 17 November 1999, was prepared by the Ministry of Defense in Spanish.

Paraguay is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Paraguay is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines. In its Article 7 report, Paraguay states that it has no antipersonnel mines whatsoever, including for training. This is the first official declaration by Paraguay that it has no stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

Paraguay is not known to have contributed to international mine action programs. However, at the First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999, Paraguay stated its commitment to mine action, and indicated its intention to provide training for deminers and survivor rehabilitation.⁶

PERU

Key developments since March 1999: In April 1999, the "Program for Demining Assistance in Ecuador/Perú" (PADEP) was established by the OAS. In August and September 1999, UNMAS and the OAS conducted independent assessments of the mine problem in Peru. An inter-ministerial Working Group on Antipersonnel Mines was formalized in September 1999 to oversee implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Perú has served as co-rapporteur of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance. Stockpile destruction is underway. More than 30,000 landmines were cleared and destroyed in 1999 and early 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Peru signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. On 19 May 1998, the Law for the National Adoption of the Ottawa Treaty (Legislative Resolution 26951) was approved and on 17 June 1998, Peru became the nineteenth nation to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty.

Peru has not yet enacted implementation legislation, though a Foreign Ministry official told Landmine Monitor that such legislation should be submitted following the elections of April and May 2000.¹ Peru has reported nearly a dozen different implementation measures already taken, such as directives to the Armed Forces and Police informing them of their obligations of the treaty, creation of a national committee

⁵ The Article 7 report was attached to a letter from Admiral Jose Ocampos Alfaro, Chief of the Armed Forces, faxed to Landmine Monitor researcher, 22 December 1999.

⁶ Statement by Lilianne Lebrón-Wenger to FMSP, 3-7 May 1999.

¹ According to another official in the Foreign Ministry, "by constitutional disposition, the Ottawa Convention is automatically part of domestic law, regardless of whether being proclaimed by an enacting law," but officials understand it is necessary to "specify crimes against the Ottawa Convention, and corresponding penalties, by means of enacting a complementary penal code law." Email from Carmen Azurin Araujo, Project Planning and Assessment Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru, 24 April 2000.

in 1999 to assist disabled people, the agreement between Ecuador and Peru to clear their common border of mines and the creation of special units of engineers for demining.²

An inter-ministerial Grupo de Trabajo sobre Minas Antipersonales (Working Group on Antipersonnel Mines) was formalized by Legislative Resolution 430-99-RREE on 17 September 1999,³ though it has been active since December 1998. The Working Group is led by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and also includes the Ministries of Energy and Mines, Interior, Health, and Education.⁴ The Working Group is responsible for overseeing implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including preparing the national implementation law.⁵

A Peruvian delegation participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. In his statement at the meeting, Ambassador Jorge Valdéz Carrillo, Perú's Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, said that the Working Group was formed to:

evaluate and recommend political, legal and administrative measures that need to be taken in [national] territory. Some of the group's recommendations have already been approved – including that the Armed Forces and Police convert production installations; clear, register and destroy mines used to protect infrastructure from potential terrorist attack; train personnel in [these tasks], and facilitate the rehabilitation of victims.⁶

Since the Maputo meeting, Peru has served as co-rapporteur along with The Netherlands of the newly created Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance. Peru has participated in all the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva. Peru has also actively supported regional initiatives to ban AP mines and promote the Mine Ban Treaty.

Peru voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had for similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. At the 54th General Assembly, Francisco Tudela, Permanent Representative of Peru at the United Nations said, “We believe that it is highly important to continue to work so as to achieve the implementation of the goals and provisions within the [Convention].”⁷

Peru submitted its Article 7 transparency report in Spanish to the UN on 2 May 2000, more than eight months after its due date. A Foreign Ministry official said the report was late because information was “dispersed throughout the country,” often “out of date” and sometimes sensitive requiring declassification by the government.⁸

² Article 7 report, Form A, submitted 2 May 2000.

³ The Working Group is chaired by Ambassador Carlos Pareja Ríos. See *El Peruano* (Official Government Gazette), Lima, 22 September 1999.

⁴ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru,” 3 December 1999, p. 21.

⁵ Email from Carmen Azurin Araujo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 April 2000.

⁶ Statement by Ambassador Jorge Valdéz Carrillo, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, at the First Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

⁷ Statement by Ambassador Francisco Tudela, Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations, at the 54th General Assembly Plenary on Agenda Item 35 (“Assistance in Mine Action”), 18 November 1999, New York.

⁸ Email from Carmen Azurin Araujo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 April 2000.

Peru ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention of Conventional Weapons on 3 July 1997. Peru has submitted its transparency report under Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, and participated in the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to the amended protocol. Peru is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a noted supporter or opponent of efforts to launch negotiations on a mine export ban in that forum.

Production

Peru states that its production of antipersonnel mines ceased in 1997, and that the process of converting the production facilities began in March 1999.⁹ A UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Assessment Mission to Peru reported that production of landmines in the country only ceased entirely in January 1999, according to officials at the Ministry of Defense.¹⁰

Peru states that the Centros de Fabricación de Armas of the War Navy was the only state institution producing in the past.¹¹ Some were produced on request from public utility companies during the internal armed conflict of the 1980s and into the mid-1990s.¹² According to Peru's Article 7 report, the War Navy produced two pressure-activated antipersonnel mines: the CICITEC and the MGP-30.¹³

According to a March 2000 report by the Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman of Peru), the utility company EDEGEL S.A. states that the War Navy also manufactured shoebox-sized, pressure-activated DEXA landmines for use on EDEGEL property. Later this mine was replaced by the MG MAP 304.¹⁴

Transfer

General Raúl O'Connor, Director of the Information Office in the Ministry of Defense, told Landmine Monitor that Peru has never exported mines.¹⁵ It appears to have imported mines from several countries, including Belgium, Spain, the United States, and Yugoslavia. (See below).

⁹ Article 7 report, Form E, submitted 2 May 2000; and, email from Carmen Azurin Araujo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 April 2000. The Article 7 report indicates that the Peruvian War Navy's production facilities for CICITEC antipersonnel landmines at the Naval Base of Callao are currently being converted.

¹⁰ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru," 3 December 1999, p. 21.

¹¹ Email from Carmen Azurin Araujo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 April 2000; and, Article 7 report, Form E, submitted 2 May 2000.

¹² Email from Carmen Azurin Araujo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 April 2000.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form H, 2 May 2000. The Article 7 report repeatedly refers to CICITEC as an AP mine, but UNMAS has indicated that CICITEC is a manufacturer of mines, particularly the MG-MAP 304. See UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru," 3 December 1999, p. 12.

¹⁴ Defensoría del Pueblo, "El problema de las minas antipersonales dentro del territorio nacional," Lima, March 2000. UNMAS states that the DEXA mine was designed by the national police and was locally manufactured. The report also states that the replacement MG-MAP 304 mines were produced by CICITEC. See UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru," 3 December 1999, p. 12.

¹⁵ Telephone interview with General Raul O'Connor, Director of the Information Office of the Ministry of Defense, 19 April 2000.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 indicated that Peru reported to the OAS in 1997 that it had no stockpile of antipersonnel mines.¹⁶ However, Peru's Article 7 report submitted 2 May 2000 states that the country has a stockpile of 334,756 antipersonnel mines.¹⁷ The composition of Peru's stockpile according to the Article 7 report is as follows: 16,564 PMB-6 mines;¹⁸ 24,861 PMB-6N mines; 5 EXPAL mines with fuse; 27 P4 A-1 EXPAL mines; 30,000 EXPAL mines without fuse; 376 M-5 mines with fuse; 68 M-35 C/ESP BS-BG mines; 25,307 M-35 C/ESP M-5 mines; 11,587 M-409 mines; 68,212 PMA-3 mines; 49,712 POMZ-2M mines; 89,506 MGP A/R (CICITEC) mines; 328 CICITEC mines without cap or fuse; 108 M-16 mines; 150 MGP-30 mines; 9,957 60510 MN mines; 328 Multi-use Magnetic mines; and 7,660 M18A1 Claymore mines. These mines are in the possession of the War Navy, National Army and National Police of Peru.

Peru reports that the War Navy destroyed 3,916 stockpiled CICITEC AP mines in 1999.¹⁹

In April 2000 a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told *Landmine Monitor* that a full stockpile destruction process was in preparation in the country, subject to international technical assistance and funding.²⁰ Peru reports that the government plans to destroy 30% of its stockpile in 2000, 30% in 2001 and 40% in 2002 using controlled detonation and incineration as methods of destruction.²¹

Peru plan to retain 9,526 AP mines for training, including 1,000 PMB-6, 1,833 A/R MGP CICITEC, 1,050 M-409, 1,100 PMA-3, 1,100 PMB-6N, 1,000 POMZ-2M, 108 M-16; 150 MGP 30, 985 AP60510, and 1,200 M18A1.²²

Use

Peru has repeatedly stated that its Armed Forces did not use antipersonnel mines during its border conflict with Ecuador.²³ The Latin American Association for Human Rights (ALDHU), however, estimated that both Ecuador and Peru laid 130,000 to 150,000 AP mines during the conflict.²⁴ At the January 1999 Mexico City Regional

¹⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 278, citing OAS, "Summary Table: Antipersonnel Landmines, as of May 1, 1998."

¹⁷ Article 7 Report, Form B, 2 May 2000.

¹⁸ The PMB designation is not one found in standard reference materials. From the description, this would appear to be a variation of the Soviet PMD-6 wooden box mine.

¹⁹ Article 7 Report, Form G, 2 May 2000.

²⁰ Email from Carmen Azurin Araujo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 April 2000. Peru's representative to the 10 December 1999 meeting of the SCE on Stockpile Destruction said that it needed help with technical aspects of destruction and asked for assistance. He also asked the OAS to certify the destruction process.

²¹ Article 7 Report, Form E, 2 May 2000.

²² *Ibid.*, Form D.

²³ "Perú did not lay such mines before, during, or after the Cenepa Conflict [with Ecuador]," Article 7 Report, Form C, 2 May 2000.

²⁴ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru," 3 December 1999, p. 11, citing ALDHU report dated August 1999.

Seminar on Landmines, representatives from both governments said that implementation of the peace agreement, including mine clearance, was more important than trying to establish who placed the mines.²⁵

Peru acknowledges using AP mines inside the country as part of its counter-insurgency campaign during the 1980s and early 1990s against the guerrilla groups Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement). According to a December 1999 UNMAS Assessment Mission Report, the Peruvian government authorized the laying of AP mines by its armed forces around high-tension electrical towers and other installations in 1989 and 1990, at the height of the internal armed conflict.²⁶ The Peruvian government acknowledges laying 87,146 AP mines in the country. A total of 15,437 AP mines were used around public infrastructure installations in the Departments of Puno and Cajamarca in the Andean highlands, as well as in Lima, including the Puente de Piedra Bridge and the nearby Port of El Callao.²⁷ A total of 71,709 CICITEC AP mines were used in the perimeter of high-tension electrical towers to protect against guerrilla sabotage attempts, including 9,149 mines around 178 EDEGEL S.A. towers and 62,560 AP mines around 1,842 ETECEN towers.²⁸ UNMAS reports mines were also used around the remote maximum-security prison at Yanamayo in the Andean highlands of Puno Department.²⁹

Landmine Problem

Peru's landmine problem affects three parts of the country. One is along the northern border with Ecuador, due to a long-standing conflict between the two countries. A second is Peru's southern border with Chile, where the Chilean military used antipersonnel landmines in the 1970s and 1980s due to tension between the countries. The third area is around public infrastructure, especially electrical installations, inside the country from attacks during Peru's internal armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s.

The border between Peru and Ecuador is mine-affected as a consequence of the 1995 border conflict, with the majority of AP landmines laid along a 78 kilometer-long contested area in the foothills of the Cordillera del Cóndor mountain range.³⁰ The Peruvian government estimates there are approximately 120,000 AP mines along the border with Ecuador: in the Río Santiago, Río Cenepa and Comainas sectors; along the north-east frontier zone; and in the Departments of Tumbes and Piura.³¹ Peru does not have maps of mined areas along the border.³² According to an article in the official government gazette, Ambassador Carlos Pareja Ríos said, "Drafts of maps are not useful, because of the features of the land. Because of heavy rains, it's almost certain that the mines have been displaced to other areas.... Thus, we are identifying the exact

²⁵ Remarks at the Regional Seminar on AP mines, Mexico City, 11-12 January 1999.

²⁶ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru," 3 December 1999, p. 8.

²⁷ Article 7 Report, Form C, 2 May 2000.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru," 3 December 1999, p. 24.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³¹ Article 7 Report, Form C, 2 May 2000.

³² *Ibid.*

location of these explosive artifacts.”³³ The most frequently encountered mines are the T-AB-1, PRB M409, P-4-B and PMD-6M.³⁴ It is also reported in the military trade press that the Chinese Type 72, Italian VS-50, and Belgian M35 and M409 AP mines are also found in Peru.³⁵

Some 184,000 people live in the border areas with Ecuador that are mine-affected.³⁶ The dense jungle areas of the Peruvian-Ecuador border in Amazonas Department are home to the Shuar and Achuar indigenous peoples on both sides of the border, and the Aguaruna and Huambisa on Peruvian territory. These people were displaced by the border conflict and their ability to return to a traditional way of life is constrained by the landmine and UXO problem, according to UNMAS.³⁷ UNMAS reports that most AP mines are in the area between the rivers Cenepa and Coangos (hence the so-called “Cenepa Conflict” of 1995) in the Department of Amazonas. The region between Cuzumaza and Bumbuiza in the Department of Loreto and the regions of Lagartococha and Güepi were previously mine-affected, but these are reported to be mine-free now. According to the Peruvian government, these regions were cleared of AP mines in order to facilitate border demarcation along the Departments of Tumbes and Piura.³⁸

In the south of the country, Peru’s border with Chile in the department of Tacna is also mine-affected. Only Chile is reported to have used AP mines along that border, during the 1970s and 1980s. According to the Ministry of Defense, the mine-affected lands in Tacna are productive agricultural lands and the mined areas under the jurisdiction of the Peruvian government are properly marked.³⁹

The third mine-affected area is inside the country, mainly around electrical installations. According to the Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman of Peru) report of March 2000, the Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines reported that three electrical energy companies in the country had mine-affected installations: EDEGEL S.A. has 176 mined electrical towers, each with an average of 40 to 50 AP mines in its perimeter; ETECEN S.A. has 165 mined electrical towers, each with an average of 40 AP mines in its perimeter; and ETEVENSA S.A. has a thermal-power generation station ringed with landmines.⁴⁰ According to UNMAS, the National Police reportedly have records of the minefields but these are “sketchy and of questionable accuracy”; UNMAS notes heavy rainfall causes mine displacements and washes away protective fences and warning signs.⁴¹

³³ Mónica Macedo Latorre, “Perú avanza en el desminado de la frontera norte,” *El Peruano* (Official Government Gazette), 26 October 1999.

³⁴ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru,” 3 December 1999, p. 11.

³⁵ *Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance*, on-line update, 18 November 1999.

³⁶ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru,” 3 December 1999, p. 13.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3, 13.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³⁹ Telephone interview with General Raúl O’Connor, Ministry of Defense, 19 April 2000.

⁴⁰ Defensoría del Pueblo, “El problema de las minas antipersonales dentro del territorio nacional,” March 2000.

⁴¹ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru,” 3 December 1999, p. 12.

Surveys and Assessments

In addition to a number of internal assessments, there have been two recent evaluations of the mine problem in Peru. A mission was conducted by the Organization of American States (OAS) from 16-20 August 1999 in order to evaluate the AP mine situation along the border. As a result of this mission, the OAS submitted working documents for consideration by both governments containing a proposal to provide coordinated international assistance in integrated action against AP mines in their respective territories.⁴² In August-September 1999, UNMAS conducted a multi-disciplinary and inter-agency assessment mission to both Ecuador and Peru.⁴³

Mine Action Funding

Following ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty in June 1998, Peru has benefited from access to international funding for demining, specifically along its border with Ecuador.⁴⁴ International contributions received to date do not deal with Peru's internal landmine problem. Peru has appealed for technical and financial assistance for its medium and long-term clearance.⁴⁵

As part of the peace agreement of 26 October 1998, Peru and Ecuador agreed to demining of the border under the supervision of the Ecuador/Peru Multinational Observation Mission, MOMEPE. MOMEPE is made up of military representatives from the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Canada, Japan, the United States, Spain, OAS and UNDP have contributed funds to support mine clearance for demarcation of the Ecuador-Peru border.⁴⁶ Peru was formally included in the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 22 February 1999 and will receive approximately \$3.225 million in assistance in 1999 and 2000.

In April 1999, the OAS set up the "Program for Demining Assistance in Ecuador/Peru" (PADEP), with a Canadian government contribution of CAN\$300,000 (U.S.\$198,000).⁴⁷ According to the OAS, the PADEP contribution, divided equally between the two countries, has been used exclusively for the purchase of equipment and materials for activities to support humanitarian demining associated with the demarcation of the border.⁴⁸

Currently, the Engineers School of Lima counts with a program of training in humanitarian demining supported by Spain and the United States.

Internationally, Peru has been co-rapporteur of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance since May 1999 and will co-chair this committee beginning in September 2000. Peru has taken a keen interest in areas including: the current review of demining standards; the criteria used to decide the assignment of international co-operation; links between mine removal and the

⁴² See *Landmine Monitor* appendix, Report of the OAS Mine Action Program, 2000.

⁴³ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Peru," 3 December 1999.

⁴⁴ Mónica Macedo Latorre, "Perú avanza en el desminado de la frontera norte", *El Peruano* (Official Government Gazette), 26 October, 1999, Especial VIII.

⁴⁵ See Statement by Amb. Francisco Tudela, Permanent Representative of Peru to the UN, 18 November 1999, p. 5.

⁴⁶ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Perú," 3 December 1999, p. 22.

⁴⁷ Report of the OAS Mine Action Program, 2000.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

consolidation of peace and of mutual trust between neighboring countries; participation by Armed Forces in demining operations and in the need for primacy of national decisions in the planning and management of action programs against mines.⁴⁹

Mine Clearance

The inter-ministerial Working Group on Antipersonnel Mines is the coordination focal point for mine action efforts in Peru. It has prepared a national action plan that addresses all aspects of the mine problem, which is currently under consideration, according to the Article 7 report.

In May 2000, Peru reported that the Army and War Navy had cleared and destroyed a total of 32,373 AP mines.⁵⁰

Demining of the Peru-Ecuador border is the responsibility of Peruvian Army Engineers who have a current mine clearance capacity of 140 men separated into ten teams of fourteen. The UNMAS Assessment Report describes in detail the mine clearance procedures, equipment and logistics in the border's tropical jungle in which it is very difficult to operate.⁵¹ The first phase involved clearance to permit placement of border markers. This was done in collaboration with the Ecuadorian military at the beginning of 1999. The operation took ninety days to complete and cost over U.S.\$3.5 million.⁵² A total of 439 TAB1, M-409 and M18A1 mines were cleared and destroyed.⁵³

The second phase is clearance of a road linking Ecuador to the Tiwinza Memorial, which is on the Peruvian side of the border. Ecuador is responsible for demining around the memorial and Peru is responsible for the access road. In May 2000, Peru reported that it had cleared and destroyed nine hundred sixty-three TAB1, M-409 and M18A1 mines while demining the road.⁵⁴ The next priorities are the provinces of Piura and Tumbes, the Cordillera del Cóndor in Amazonas province, and then Loreto province, taking eight years at an estimated cost of U.S.\$35 million.⁵⁵

Responsibility for clearance of mines around the electrical energy companies appears to rest with the companies, but the executing agent is the Ministry of the Interior, specifically the National Police. The National Police has a specialized unit, the Division de Seguridad de Activacion de Minas y Dispositivos Explosivos de Autoproteccion (DIVSAM-DEXA) dedicated to dealing with mines and improvised explosive devices, which receives funding and taskings from the electrical companies. DIVSAM-DEXA has an 84-man unit that can field ten 8-man mine clearance teams, but UNMAS reports that they are poorly equipped, with sub-standard and insufficient protection equipment.⁵⁶

⁴⁹ Statement by Amb. Franciso Tudela, Permanent Representative of Peru to the UN, 18 November 1999.

⁵⁰ Article 7 Report, Form E, 2 May 2000.

⁵¹ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Perú," 3 December 1999, p. 15.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁵³ Article 7 Report, Form E, 2 May 2000.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Perú," 3 December 1999, p. 16.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

In May 2000, Peru reported that it had cleared 6,084 MGP mines and 6,181 CICITEC and DEXA mines on the perimeter of high-tension electrical towers, as well as 18,706 MGP mines around public infrastructure in Ventanilla, Lima.⁵⁷

In February 1999, the National Penitentiary Institute of the Ministry of Justice reported that the high-security prison of Yanamayo, Puno Department, had been cleared of mines.⁵⁸

Ratification of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty by Chile, currently a signatory, is expected to lead to a mine clearance plan for this border area, including the department of Tacna.

Mine Awareness

According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official there are no mine awareness programs in the mine-affected areas, but “the population at risk does seem to know about the problem as well as the implied danger.”⁵⁹ The UNMAS Assessment Mission reported that the local population in the border area “seems to be generally aware of the landmine threat.”⁶⁰ UNMAS noted that the military had expressed an interest in initiating a mine awareness education campaign and noted that the local indigenous communities could implement effective community mine awareness programs if they are provided with some technical assistance.⁶¹

UNMAS also reported that the National Police and electrical companies have implemented some information and prevention programs in settlements close to mined towers and other such infrastructure facilities, including dissemination of illustrated pamphlets, but recommended that the existing programs need be reassessed in light of recent casualties.⁶²

Landmine Casualties

There are no official surveys that report on the number of victims of AP mines in Peru.⁶³ According to the Director of the Information Office of the Ministry Defense, there are thought to be approximately 130 AP mine victims in the country, the majority of them from the Cordillera del Cóndor border region.⁶⁴ The ICRC reported thirty-seven mine accidents on the Peru-Ecuador border from 1994 to 1999, including thirty-six military personnel and one civilian.⁶⁵

According to the UNMAS, seventy-two mine accidents have been reported around electrical installations since they were mined in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including

⁵⁷ Article 7 Report, Form E, 2 May 2000.

⁵⁸ Instituto Nacional Penitenciario [National Penitentiary Institute] of the Ministry of Justice, Document 090-99 INPE-VP, 23 February 1999.

⁵⁹ Telephone interview with Carmen Azurin Araujo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru, 21 April 2000.

⁶⁰ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Perú,” 3 December 1999, p. 18.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25-26.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁶³ Telephone interview with Elizabeth Cornejo, Official of the Ministry of Health of Peru, 16 April 2000.

⁶⁴ Telephone interview with General Raul O’Connor, Ministry of Defense, 19 April 2000.

⁶⁵ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Perú,” 3 December 1999, p. 13.

thirty-two accidents to national police, five to electrical company employees, seven to other maintenance staff and twenty-eight to the local civilian population.⁶⁶

Along the Chilean border, the ICRC reported accidents including one civilian mine accident in 1994 and one in 1998.⁶⁷ The human rights NGO APRODEH also reported an accident that occurred in August 1999 where one civilian was injured and another killed, later confirmed by the military authorities.⁶⁸

According to the Instituto Nacional de Rehabilitación, INR (National Rehabilitation Institute), 10% of the 1,218 amputees it has treated are related to accidents with explosive materials and firearms but it does not have specific information on mine victims.⁶⁹ The National Institute of Statistics and Information, INEI, does not have reports of victims that died or were injured by mines or explosive artifacts. The Ministry of Health does not provide official statistics on AP mine casualties who have been treated in hospitals and it is not possible to determine how many victims have been assisted.

Victim Assistance

While the Army and National Police guarantee and provide medical assistance, physical rehabilitation and prostheses for their own members injured by mines, in general medical attention that is available for civilians is more limited, costly and does not include provision of orthoses and prostheses.⁷⁰ The Armed Forces have programs in place that provide vocational reintegration but the National Police programs only deal with the physical and psychological aspects of victim assistance.⁷¹ For veterans of the Cenepa Conflict of 1995, Law 26511 guarantees their right to physical rehabilitation. Veterans' benefits were extended by Law 27124 (27 May 1999) to those who were killed or incapacitated in that conflict. The military and National Police have disability pensions for members, though these are inadequate for covering the medical and social costs of becoming disabled in Peru.⁷²

Along the border regions, and in the Andean highlands, basic health care and access to clean drinking water and sanitation are restricted. Civilians who are seriously injured must be transferred to Lima for treatment, where the majority of specialized health care services and well-trained professionals are concentrated.

The INR offers programs for amputees and burn victims, including physical and occupational therapy, psychological counseling and social services. According to the Director of the Congreso Nacional de Discapacitados, CONADIS (National Congress of the Disabled), the INR receives about 120 patients each year.⁷³ CONADIS is the inter-ministerial body dedicated to the protection of disabled persons.⁷⁴ CONADIS is in

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Oficio No.926-DG-INR-99, 25 November 1999.

⁷⁰ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Perú," 3 December 1999, p. 19.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Telephone interview with Colonel Walter Rios, Military Attaché of the Peruvian Embassy in Colombia, 26 March 2000.

⁷³ Telephone interview with Francisco Velásquez, Director, CONADIS, 20 April 2000.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

charge of the “Plan for the Development of the Disabled,” which according to an official at the Ministry of Health does not make reference to assistance for employment and socio-economic reintegration of the disabled.⁷⁵

According to an official at the Ministry of Health, Peruvian laws do not make special provisions or provide pensions to civilians disabled by AP mines.⁷⁶

The UNMAS Assessment team received a petition from the Association of Persons Disabled by Explosive Devices (APIDEX) which described the objectives of the association, called for better treatment from the national health service for its disabled members, and appealed to the UN for international technical support and cooperation.⁷⁷

SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

Saint Kitts and Nevis signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 2 December 1998. The treaty entered into force for Saint Kitts and Nevis on 1 June 1999. It has not yet enacted domestic implementing legislation. Saint Kitts and Nevis' Article 7 transparency report, due 27 November 1999, was submitted to the UN on 16 May 2000. The delay was due to illness and subsequent death of UN Ambassador Lee L. Moore.¹ In a letter to the Landmine Monitor, Mrs. Astona Browne, Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Saint Kitts and Nevis to the United Nations, wrote, “We applaud your organization for its initiative in raising the awareness of the global community with regards to the global landmine situation, humanitarian mine action, and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty.”² Saint Kitts and Nevis did not participate in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. Saint Kitts and Nevis voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999 in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Article 7 report confirmed that Saint Kitts and Nevis has no stockpiled AP mines and that it is mine-free.³ Saint Kitts and Nevis has never produced, transferred or used AP mines.

SAINT LUCIA

Saint Lucia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 13 April 1999. The treaty entered into force for Saint Lucia on 1 October 1999. It is not believed to have enacted domestic implementing legislation. Saint Lucia has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due on 29 March 2000. Saint Lucia did not participate in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. It

⁷⁵ Telephone interview with Elizabeth Cornejo, Official of the Ministry of Health of Peru, 16 April 2000.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Perú,” 3 December 1999, p. 19.

¹ Telephone interview with Astona Browne, Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Saint Kitts and Nevis to the UN, 30 May 2000.

² Letter from Astona Browne to Landmine Monitor, 16 May 2000.

³ Article 7 report received from Astona Browne by the Landmine Monitor, 16 May 2000.

voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999 in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Saint Lucia has never produced, transferred, used or stockpiled antipersonnel landmines. It is not mine-affected.¹

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Trinidad and Tobago signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 27 April 1998, the eleventh country to do so. On 2 May 2000, the “Anti-Personnel Mines Bill 2000” was introduced to the Senate.¹ The bill outlaws use, development, production, acquisition, and transfer of AP mines and provides for penal sanctions, including fines and imprisonment.² The bill was passed by the Senate on 9 May 2000 and sent to the House of Representatives.³

Trinidad and Tobago has not yet submitted its Article 7 report, due on 27 August 1999. Trinidad and Tobago was not present at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. It voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the treaty. Trinidad and Tobago has stated that it has never produced, imported, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel landmines and that it is not mine-affected.⁴

VENEZUELA

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Venezuela on 1 October 1999. Venezuela has not submitted its Article 7 report, due by 29 March 2000.

Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 14 April 1999. According to a Foreign Ministry official, when Venezuela ratifies an international treaty, it immediately becomes national law, and therefore Venezuela

¹ Landmine Monitor 1999 Questionnaire, completed by the office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Saint Lucia, 1 February 1999.

¹ Telephone interview with Mr. C.S. Arunachalam, Assistant Chief Parliamentary Counsel, 27 June 2000.

² A copy of the bill was forwarded to Landmine Monitor by Mr. C.S. Arunachalam, 4 July 2000. See also, Kathleen Maharaj, “T&T joins fight against landmines,” *Trinidad Express*, 4 May 2000.

³ Letter from Mr. C. S. Arunachalam to Landmine Monitor, 4 July 2000. See also, “Mines Bill scares senators,” *The Guardian*, 10 May 2000.

⁴ Response by Legal and Marine Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Trinidad and Tobago to 1999 Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, 26 February 1999. This was also confirmed in telephone interview with Mr. C.S. Arunachalam, 17 July 2000.

considers that there is no need for an implementation law.¹ Venezuela has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 29 March 2000. Venezuela voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had done on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. Venezuela did not participate in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. An official explained that Venezuela was not yet a State Party (it was in the six month waiting period between ratification and entry into force), and the government considered that it was not useful for the country to participate as an observer.²

Venezuela is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its Amended Protocol II on landmines but it participated as an observer in the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva. Venezuela is member of the Conference of Disarmament and has supported efforts to pursue an AP mine export ban there.

Venezuela states that it has never produced or transferred AP mines.³ The U.S. Department of Defense lists Venezuela as the producer of the MV-1 antipersonnel mine, which it describes as an improvised fragmentation AP mine that uses an E-1 hand grenade fuse, is made from aluminum, and is black with orange markings on the top and the bottom of the mine.⁴ According to the Colombian political and military officials, the illegal traffic of weapons in the border area between these two countries could include AP mines.⁵ Venezuela is believed to have a stockpile of AP mines, but the size, composition, and suppliers of the mines are unknown. Venezuela is not known to have used AP mines.

Venezuela is currently contributing four supervisors to the OAS Assistance Program for Demining in Central America.⁶ Venezuela is not mine-affected but there could be some mined areas on the Colombian side of the border with Venezuela from use by Colombia's rebel groups.⁷ The government states that there are no landmine casualties in Venezuela.⁸ Venezuela has a national health system with specialized services located in main urban centers, including rehabilitation services.⁹

¹ Telephone interview with Victor Manzanares, First Secretary for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Venezuela, 4 February 2000.

² Ibid.

³ Telephone interview with Gerardo Delgado, Political Attaché of the Venezuelan Embassy in Colombia, Bogotá, 12 December 1999.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, "ORDDATA II, Version 1.0," a CD-ROM distributed by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

⁵ Interview with Pedro Agustín Roa, Special Issues Unit, Disarmament Office Assistant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogotá, 10 December 1999. Interview with Major Anselmo Escobar, Human Rights Official, Fourth Brigade Colombian National Army, Medellín, 5 January 2000.

⁶ Email from Jhosslin Bakhat, Organization of American States, to Human Rights Watch, 23 June 2000.

⁷ Telephone interview with Gerardo Delgado, Venezuelan Embassy in Colombia, 15 December 1999.

⁸ Telephone interview with Victor Manzanares, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 February 2000.

⁹ Telephone interview with Gerardo Delgado, Venezuelan Embassy in Colombia, 12 December 1999.

SIGNATORIES**CHILE**

Key developments since March 1999: The Senate's Foreign Affairs Commission approved Mine Ban Treaty ratification legislation on 15 December 1999. On 26 April 1999, Chile imposed a unilateral moratorium on the production, export, and new use of antipersonnel mines. On 25 November 1999, the Army announced plans for an 11-year mine clearance program for 293 border minefields with 250,000 mines at a cost of \$250 million. The Army began mine clearance along the border with Bolivia in December 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Chile signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 but has yet to ratify it. Ratification legislation was approved by the House of Deputies on 6 October 1998, and was sent to the Senate via Official Decree 2150. The Senate's Foreign Affairs Commission approved the ratification legislation on 15 December 1999, and then sent the legislation to the Senate's Revenue Commission for review of the costs and potential funding sources for compliance with the treaty. According to Senator Carlos Ominami, President of the Revenue Commission of the Senate, the review was to be ready in June 2000.¹

A new government assumed power in Chile on 11 March 2000 and it has not made any statements regarding the landmine issue.

Chile attended the First Meeting of State Parties in Maputo in May 1999. Chile has participated in four of the ban treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva – one for each of the Standing Committees of Experts, except Technologies for Mine Action.

Chile voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had for similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. A Chilean representative said during the debate at the General Assembly's First Committee (Disarmament) that "[I]t was essential for the First Committee to restore shattered concepts in international security, including a total prohibition of anti-personnel landmines, protection of civilians in conflicts, and prohibitions on small arms."²

On 16 June 2000, at the meeting of the Grupo de Río held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Chile was one of 19 countries of the region that signed the Cartagena Declaration.

Chile is not party to CCW and did not attend the first annual meeting of states parties to Amended Protocol II in December 1999. Chile is a member of the Conference on Disarmament but has made no recent statements regarding landmines in this venue.

¹ Interview with Senator Carlos Ominami, President of the Senate's Revenue Commission, Valparaíso, 3 May 2000.

² Statement by Juan Larraín, UN General Assembly First Committee debate, GA/DIS/3140, 11 October 1999.

Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use

On 26 April 1999 in an official declaration signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mariano Fernández Amunátegui, Chile imposed a unilateral moratorium on the production, export, and use of new AP mines.³ According to the Foreign Ministry, Chile has not produced or exported AP mines since 1985.⁴ Chile has produced at least six different types of AP mines in the past.⁵ AP mines were manufactured by both the Army's Fabricaciones Militares (FAMAE) and Industrias Cardoen, a private company.⁶

The size and composition of Chile's AP mine stockpile is not clear. In February 2000, Chile's Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Mario Artaza, told the ICBL that Chile's stockpile numbered 22,000, and that the estimated cost of destruction was \$850,000.⁷ The stockpile number is surprisingly low and the destruction costs surprisingly high, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to get confirmation of either figure from other official sources.

In August 1999, in an official communiqué, reported in a newspaper article, Vice-Admiral Hernán Couyoumdjian, Chief of Staff of National Defense, stated that "the government has resolved to destroy its stockpiles, beginning the process with the destruction of one lot in the coming months, at a military training camp that is yet to be determined." The communiqué added that the AP mines situation in the country was one of the priority tasks of the Office of the Chief of Staff of National Defense.⁸ It is not known if any mine destruction has taken place.

The Army proposes destroying all AP and AT mines and replacing them by improved technologies, such as laser rays, "or smart or self-destructing mines."⁹

There is little information on the amounts and recipients of AP mines produced and transferred by Chile. However, because of the Mine Ban Treaty's transparency regime, some details are beginning to emerge. Ecuador declared in March 2000 that it stockpiles 101,458 Chilean AP mines.¹⁰

Landmine Problem

In September 1997, a Defense Ministry Official said that Chile had planted nearly one million AP and AT mines on its borders with Argentina, Bolivia, and Perú.¹¹ Other

³ Declaración Oficial del Gobierno de la República de Chile, "Moratoria Unilateral en la Producción, Exportación, Importación e instalación de Nuevas Minas Terrestres Antipersonal," Santiago, Chile, 26 April 1999.

⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Foreign Ministry of Chile, through its Ambassador to Uruguay, Augusto Bermúdez Arancibia, 2 February 1999.

⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 290 for details and types.

⁶ *Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance*, on-line update, 19 November 1999.

⁷ ICBL (Jody Williams and Liz Bernstein) meeting with Ambassador Mario Artaza, Washington, DC, 7 February 2000. See also follow-up letter from Williams to Artaza, dated 8 February 2000.

⁸ Constanza Bornhorn, "Comienza retiro de minas," *Las Últimas Noticias*, 19 August 1999.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Ecuador's Article 7 Report, Form B on Stockpiled AP mines, 29 March 2000.

¹¹ Interview published by *La Tercera* (Santiago newspaper), 8 September 1997, and reproduced in *Clarín* (Buenos Aires newspaper), 8 December 1997.

estimates have ranged between 500,000 and one million landmines.¹² In a newspaper article, Eduardo Santos, policy analyst at the Ministry of Defense, noted in November 1999 that there were at least 500,000 landmines along the borders with Argentina.¹³

According to a statement at a seminar in November 1999 by Vice-Admiral Hernán Couyoumdjian, Chilean minefields are marked throughout the country.¹⁴ However at the same seminar, Dr. Nicolás Larenas, father of a UXO victim in the north of the country, stressed that these markers are in a bad state and need to be repaired.¹⁵ Other newspaper articles have reported on the poor state of minefield markers in Chile, as well as the effects of climate and erosion that displace landmines. For example, in a ravine north of Arica, winter floods carried landmines towards the Pacific coast.¹⁶

According to a June 1999 newspaper report, a private gas company, Gas Atacama, had an unspecified accident involving landmines during construction of pipelines in the second region. According to the company, they subsequently had talks with the Army, which responded that “it did not have maps of the location of the mines and could not do anything about the matter.” Gas Atacama reportedly then hired the services of a national demining company that checked the course of the proposed pipeline route for mines.¹⁷

The landmine problem affects two leading-edge astronomical radio-telescope projects in the Atacama highlands: the Millimeter Array (MMA) project of the US National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO) and the Large Southern Array (LSA) of the European Southern Observatory (ESO), now united under the single Atacama Large Millimeter Array (ALMA) project. According to a June 1999 newspaper report, Edward Hardy, General Manager of the MMA project, requested information from the Chilean Foreign Ministry about the presence of landmines on Llanura de Chajnantor. The Foreign Ministry had previously confirmed from the Army that there were no landmines in the sector. Hardy noted that according to his conversations with Senator Carmen Frei, once Chile ratified the Ottawa Treaty, a mine clearance program in the zone would necessarily lead to a more accurate assessment of the landmine problem.¹⁸

Mine Clearance

Aside from the Army, there is no national agency that focuses on the landmine problem. The argument most often used by Chilean politicians for delay in ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty is the cost of clearing minefields in the country. The cost has been

¹² See for example, *Agence France Presse* (Arica), 18 July 1998 and *Agence France Presse* (Antofagasta), 21 June 1998.

¹³ José Higuera, “Desminado fronterizo: La atrevida promesa de Izurieta,” *El Metropolitano*, Santiago, 20 December 1999.

¹⁴ Statement by Vice-Admiral Hernán Couyoumdjian, Chief of Staff of National Defense, at the “Análisis de Riesgo y Prevención en Zonas Minadas” (Analysis of risks and prevention in mine-affected zones) Seminar held in the Chilean Senate, Valparaíso, 15 November 1999.

¹⁵ Statement by Dr. Nicolás Larenas at the Seminar held in the Chilean Senate, Valparaíso, 15 November 1999.

¹⁶ “11 Años tomará el retiro de minas,” *El Mercurio* (Santiago), 26 November 1999.

¹⁷ Jordi Berenguer, “Campos minados podrían atrasar realización del proyecto” and “64 ojos verán el universo,” *La Nación*, 7 June 1999.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

estimated at \$300 and \$400 million at various times.¹⁹ In August 1999, Vice Admiral Hernán Couyoumdjian, stated that the “political will of the Chilean government in eliminating the antipersonnel landmines laid in our frontiers and noted that advances would be made on this as needed economic resources were made available.”²⁰

On 25 November 1999, the Army released plans for a mine clearance program for 293 minefields with 250,000 mines along Chile’s borders. The estimated cost was \$250 million, and estimated time period of eleven years to complete. According to a newspaper article, “the plan would be implemented once the Congress ratified the Ottawa Treaty.”²¹

On 13 May 2000 it was reported in the press that a “Mine Clearance Programme had been approved by the Ministry of Defense but it is was not clear what percentage of mines would be cleared, taking into account topographical variations and the fact that thousands are made of plastic.”²²

The Argentinean and Chilean governments held talks on mine clearance during former Argentinean President Menem’s visit to Santiago in August 1999. Argentina offered technical assistance but the Chilean military reportedly declined that option.²³ Nonetheless, Vice Admiral Couyoumdjian announced that engineering plans were being developed for the first mine clearance activities in the south of the country. According to an official communiqué, these mine clearance activities were already financed and would be carried out in Cabo del Hornos Island in the Wollaston Archipelago.²⁴

At the 34th Conference of American Armies, held in November 1999 in the Bolivian capital La Paz, General Ricardo Izurieta, the Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, announced that Chile would clear its minefields along the borders with Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina.²⁵ General Izurieta said, “in the briefest timeframe we’ll clear minefields along the borders with Bolivia, Perú and Argentina – within the year – as a demonstration of our concrete and frank intention to strengthen ties with all our neighbours and in particular with the Bolivian Army.”²⁶

On 1 December 1999, the Chilean Army announced in Santiago the launch of the program to clear mined areas and specified that it would begin immediately along the border with Bolivia: around Tambo Quemado, between Chile’s First Region (Primera Región de Chile) and the Bolivian zone of Charana, at an altitude of some 4,000 meters

¹⁹ “Statement by the President of the Senate’s Foreign Affairs Commission,” Press Release of the Chilean Senate, 15 December 1999; Marcela Ogalde, “US\$400 millones cuesta desactivar minas antipersonales,” *La Nación*, Santiago, 18 November 1999.

²⁰ Constanza Bornhorn, “Comienza retiro de minas,” *Las Últimas Noticias*, 19 August 1999.

²¹ “11 Años tomará el retiro de minas,” *El Mercurio* (Santiago), 26 November 1999.

²² “Senado solicitó al Gobierno informe presupuestario para desminado,” *El Mercurio*, 13 May 2000.

²³ Constanza Bornhorn, “Comienza retiro de minas,” *Las Últimas Noticias*, 19 August 1999.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ José Higuera, “Desminado fronterizo: La atrevida promesa de Izurieta,” *El Metropolitano* (Santiago), 20 November 1999.

²⁶ “Izurieta anunció retiro de minas antipersonales en zonas fronterizas,” *La Segunda* (Santiago), 18 November 1999. “Chile announces the demining of its borders,” *Agence France Presse* (La Paz), 18 November 1999.

in the Andes.²⁷ On 9 December 1999, it was reported that deminers had cleared an area of 13,500 square meters in Portezuelo de Tambo Quemado near the Bolivian border, destroying 250 M-14 antipersonnel mines and 27 M-15 antitank mines. The mines were found at a distance of 15 to 150 meters from the international highway linking Arica with La Paz, Bolivia. A team from the "Azapa" 6th Engineers Regiment, based in Arica, carried out the clearance operation.²⁸ At the time, the Chilean Army estimated that it would take approximately three months to demine this area,²⁹ but the mine clearance was still underway as of May 2000.

Mine Awareness

There are no official mine awareness programs in Chile. In November 1999 the Fundación Nacional por los Derechos del Niño (FNDN) [National Foundation for Children's Rights], presided by Senator Mariano Ruiz-Esquide, held a seminar on landmines in Chile attended by landmine victims, mayors of affected communities, the Chief of Staff of National Defense, and the UNICEF representative for Chile. The FNDN subsequently held a press conference on the landmine problem. The FNDN press release called for the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, for the government to begin a mine prevention program, and for the Chief of Staff of National Defense to collaborate in the identification, marking, and reporting on Chilean minefields.³⁰

Landmine Casualties

There are casualties to landmines every year in Chile but the exact number is hard to determine. According to a newspaper report, the Chief of Staff of the Corps of Engineers of the Army stated that between 1976 and 1999 there have been twenty-six civilians injured and seven killed by landmines. This includes seven wounded and three killed Peruvian citizens engaged in drug-smuggling across the mined border areas. Fifty Chilean military personnel have been injured and five killed in the same period.³¹ Colonel Bernardo Castro Salas, Chief of Staff of the Engineers Command of the Army, stated in November 1999 that "while Army minefields were 'registered,' those laid by the

²⁷ "Chile begins the demining in the border with Bolivia," *Agence France Presse* (Santiago), 1 December 1999; "Army Begins To Dismantle Mine Fields," *El Mercurio*, (Chilean national newspaper), 1 December 99.

²⁸ "Concluyó Primera Operación de Desminado," *El Mercurio* (Santiago), 4 December 1999. Both mines are of U.S. origin. See also, "277 Landmines Destroyed," MISNA, Tambo Quemado, Chile, 9 December 1999.

²⁹ "Chile begins the demining in the border with Bolivia," *Agence France Presse* (Santiago), 1 December 1999.

³⁰ Fundación por los Derechos del Niño, "Acuerdo de Compromiso y Tareas para la Prevención y Asistencia en Comunas con Zonas Minadas," Valparaíso, 15 November 1999.

³¹ "11 Años tomará el retiro de minas," *El Mercurio*, (Santiago), 26 November 1999; "Ejército confirma intención de retirar minas antipersonales," *La Hora* (Santiago), 25 November 1999.

subversive guerrilla forces were unregistered, and to this he attributed the death of twelve persons and the wounding of seventy-six others during 1976-1999 in Chile.”³²

The national media continue to report on landmine casualties. In one case in September 1999 a Peruvian entered Chile illegally and walked into a marked minefield.³³ In November 1999 a newspaper article reported that an Army conscript from the “Azapa” 6th Engineers Regiment was seriously injured while putting minefield warning signs near the Chilean-Peruvian border, only 500 meters from the Panamerican highway to Tacna. The conscript apparently stepped on a landmine that was outside the perimeter he was marking.³⁴ On 4 May 2000 it was reported that a conscript of the “Carampangue” 5th Infantry Brigade was wounded by an AP Mine while jogging outside Fort Baquedano.³⁵

In January 2000 a landmine victim filed a legal case against the Chilean government, asking for \$500 million pesos (approximately US\$933,000) in damages. According to a newspaper article, the individual was on an international road to Argentina in the region of Antofagasta when he was seriously injured by a landmine on the side of the road, losing both hands, an eye and hearing in one ear. The lawyer who has filed the lawsuit is quoted as saying, “The case is against the government, [since] it has responsibility to safeguard citizens from landmines which have not been eradicated.”³⁶

Victim Assistance

Military personnel who are injured by landmines receive care in military hospitals. There are no specific services available from the national health service, private health institutions, or NGOs for civilian landmine victims in Chile. The Fondo Nacional de Discapacitados [National Fund for the Disabled] provides social assistance for the disabled, but there are no specific programs for landmine victims. An NGO, Andes Sur Action Team, has recently requested funding for a victim assistance program from the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation, through the Swiss Embassy in Santiago. The intended beneficiaries, the Survivor Network of Atacama Desert, are cooperating in the project.

COLOMBIA

Key developments since March 1999: Guerrilla groups have continued to use antipersonnel mines. In October 1999 UNICEF and other partners launched a mine awareness program. In November 1999, Colombia’s AP mine production facilities were destroyed. In January 2000 the President signed the ratification law, a crucial, but not final, step in the ratification process. In March 2000 Colombia ratified CCW Amended

³² “11 Años tomará el retiro de minas,” *El Mercurio* (Santiago), 26 November 1999.

³³ Mauricio Silva, “Un Muerto al Estallar Mina Antipersonal,” *El Mercurio* (Santiago), 22 September 1999.

³⁴ “Conscripto herido al estallar mina,” *El Mercurio* (Santiago), 28 November 1999.

³⁵ Narciso Donoso, “Soldado pisó explosivo,” *El Mercurio* (Santiago), 4 May 2000.

³⁶ “Víctima de mina antipersonal demanda al estado por \$500 millones,” *La Hora*, 13 January 2000.

Protocol II. The Army cleared 35 minefields, in military operations, in 1999. More than 2,000 AP mines were destroyed from stockpiles.

Mine Ban Policy

Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. On 14 January 2000 at a public ceremony during an official visit by Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango signed ratification Law 554/2000 approving the treaty.¹ As established by Colombia's Constitution, following President Pastrana's signature of the law, the Constitutional Court is required to prepare the legal instrument for ratification of the treaty. In January 2000, Landmine Monitor was told that this process was expected to take between three to six months.² The ratification law does not contain other provisions for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Colombia participated as an observer in the First Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. The head of the delegation, Ambassador Jaime Girón Duarte, told the plenary that "the use of antipersonnel mines in armed conflicts is an affront to all notions of human dignity." He went on to state that Colombia "has communicated its willingness to replace the use of antipersonnel mines protecting vital production and telecommunications sites, both military and civilian, with sensors and electrified fences."³ Colombia has not participated in the various intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva.

Colombia voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in 1997 and 1998.

On 16 June 2000, at the meeting of the Grupo de Río held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Colombia was one of nineteen countries of the region that signed the Cartagena Declaration.⁴ The Declaration's paragraph 15 states, "We call on all States that have not done so to ratify as soon as possible the Ottawa Convention, in order to achieve the elimination of antipersonnel mines... and we renew our commitment to landmine victim rehabilitation as well as mine clearance in our region, in keeping with our goal to declare the hemisphere free of antipersonnel landmines."⁵

According to an official in the Disarmament Unit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a questionnaire to gather data on the antipersonnel landmine situation in the country has already been submitted to relevant civilian and military authorities in

¹ "Convención sobre la Prohibición del empleo, almacenamiento, producción y transferencia de minas antipersonal y sobre su destrucción," *Diario Oficial* (Official Gazette of the Colombian Republic), 18 January 2000, p. 1-7.

² Interview with Graciela Uribe de Lozano, Head of the Disarmament Unit, Special Affairs Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogotá, 14 January 2000.

³ Statement by Ambassador Jaime Girón Duarte to the First Meeting of State Parties, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

⁴ The nineteen governments were: Colombia, Uruguay, Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Brazil, Honduras, Costa Rica, México, República Dominicana, El Salvador, Venezuela, Chile, Perú, Argentina, Guyana, Panamá and Paraguay.

⁵ Grupo de Río, Declaración de Cartagena, paragraph 15, 16 June 2000, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia.

preparation for the Article 7 transparency report.⁶ It is expected that the “imminent ratification of the Ottawa Treaty will force those authorities to produce this data rapidly, for the preparation and submission of the document to the UN.”⁷

Colombia on 6 March 2000 ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. A technical report has been requested from the Ministry of the Defense in order to comply with the Convention and its protocols, including Amended Protocol II regarding landmines.⁸ Colombia did not attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 1999 in Geneva.

Colombia is a member of the Conference of Disarmament. According to an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombia maintains a “favorable position” on the question of negotiating a transfer ban on landmines in that forum.⁹

Over the past year, the Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (Colombian Campaign Against Landmines), or CCCM, has made a concerted effort to press for ratification of the treaty in the National Congress, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense and has also urged support for the treaty by the various groups involved in Colombia’s internal war. CCCM has been active through a number of letters, forums, meetings and working documents, and has requested other organizations’ support as well. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Colombia has also advocated for ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty, and its law department has produced a document encouraging the government to incorporate the Mine Ban Treaty in Colombian law.¹⁰ UNICEF Colombia has also played an important role in pressing for treaty ratification and for the extension of mine awareness programs throughout Colombia.¹¹

Production

According to the General Command of Colombia’s Armed Forces, Industria Militar (INDUMIL), a government-owned facility, destroyed its antipersonnel mine production equipment on 18 November 1999.¹² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* reported that the Ministry of Defense had instructed INDUMIL to cease production of antipersonnel mines in 1996,¹³ but the General Command indicates that antipersonnel mine manufacture did

⁶ Interview with Pedro Agustín Roa, Assistant, Disarmament Unit of the Special Affairs Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogotá, 12 November 1999.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Interview with Pedro Agustín Roa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogotá, 10 December 1999.

⁹ Interview with Graciela Uribe de Lozano, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogotá, 14 January 2000.

¹⁰ Interview with Rolin Wabre, ICRC Delegate for Colombia, Bogotá, 12 April 1999. Law Department of the ICRC Delegation to Colombia, “La Convención de Ottawa sobre Minas Antipersonales,” December 1998.

¹¹ Interview with Nidya Quiróz, Peace and Development Programme Officer, UNICEF Colombia, Bogotá, 25 February 2000.

¹² Letter to CCCM for Landmine Monitor from the General Command of the Military Forces, (No. 069087/CGFM-JADEC-DCCA-SJ-420), Ministry of National Defense, signed by General Fernando Tapias S., Commandant General of the Military Forces, received 21 January 2000.

¹³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 294, citing an INDUMIL production manager. Last year’s report indicated that INDUMIL produced MN-MAP-1 and MN-MAP-2 antipersonnel mines. The Colombian Campaign has since discovered INDUMIL also produced a Claymore-type mine, the

not cease until September 1998.¹⁴ According to INDUMIL's Production Manager, there is still production of the Carga Direccional Dirigida (CDD) directional fragmentation mine (Claymore-type).¹⁵ He said these are made to be used only in command detonated mode, and are not classified as AP mines by the Colombian Army. Claymore-type mines used in command detonated mode are permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty, but prohibited if used with tripwires.

Nearly all major guerrilla groups have publicly acknowledged that they are not only users but also manufacturers of AP mines. The Colombian Armed Forces have identified and denounced the production of AP mines by Colombian guerrilla groups in several documents and declarations in the past.¹⁶ Most of these mines are homemade, using cheap and easy to find materials. The common "Minas Queiebrapatás" (Legbreaker mines) are mainly manufactured by the UC-ELN (Unión Camilista-Ejército Nacional de Liberación Nacional). There are also so-called "Kleimor" (Claymore) or "Cazabobos" (fool hunters) mines, "M-Klim" mines, Propelled Mine or Charge and the "Bomba Elena."¹⁷

According to the Colombian Army's Press Agency, in the past two years there has been an increase in the use of homemade antivehicle mines by guerrilla groups in Colombia. These antivehicle mines are manufactured with gas, oxygen, or refrigerating cylinders.¹⁸

Mines and improvised explosive devices are also made and used by non-combatants in Colombia. In several parts of the country, including Chocó, Santander and Antioquia Departments, farmers make "pig mines," for various reasons, including protection of crops from animals and theft.¹⁹ Antipersonnel landmines are also manufactured and used by coca, poppy, and marijuana growers to protect illegal drug crops, and by alkaloid processors in order to keep the Army and others away from their laboratories and stockrooms.²⁰

Transfer

Colombia maintains that it has never exported AP mines, though it has not adopted a formal moratorium on exports.²¹ In the past, it has imported AP mines from the United States and perhaps other nations.²² A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine

CDD. Colombian Campaign Against Landmines, visit to School of Engineers, Colombian Army, Bogotá, 12 June 2000.

¹⁴ Letter by the General Command of the Military Forces, 21 January 2000.

¹⁵ Interview with Engineer Sergio Rodriguez, Production Manager, INDUMIL, 5 July 2000.

¹⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 294.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 294-5.

¹⁸ Interview with Captain María del Rosario Vásquez, Human Rights Official, Press Agency of the Colombian Army, Bogotá, 25 January 2000.

¹⁹ Interview with users of "pig mines" in Chocó Department, Bogotá, November 1998.

²⁰ Interview with Captain Javier Ayala, Director of Human Rights Office, Ministry of National Defense, Bogotá, 13 December 1999.

²¹ Interview with Alvaro Arias, Director, International Issues, Ministry of National Defense, Bogotá, 20 January 2000.

²² See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 295-296.

Monitor of his growing concern over the increasing illegal traffic of light weapons, including AP mines, across Colombia's borders with Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama by land, air, and sea routes.²³ During the crisis sparked by the multiple kidnapping of civilians at the Church of La María, in Cali, Valle del Cauca, the Army said it found approximately 500 industrially manufactured foreign landmines while searching for the victims.²⁴ No additional information was released about the mines.

Stockpiling and Destruction

According to a March 1999 letter from the Office of the General Inspector of Colombia's Armed Forces, the Armed Forces have at least 18,000 AP mines in stockpile.²⁵ In January 1999 Colonel José Manuel Castro, a legal advisor in the Ministry of Defense, stated that the Colombian Armed Forces have mines in stockpile and that "the Ministry wants to search for alternatives, to destroy them as soon as possible."²⁶ According to an official in the Disarmament Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, information on the size and composition of the AP mine stockpile will be made available when Colombia ratifies the Mine Ban Treaty.²⁷

According to a letter from the General Command of the Armed Forces, on 2 July 1999 INDUMIL destroyed 2,542 AP mines from its stockpile, at the José María Córdoba Factory.²⁸

It is not possible to get accurate information on guerrilla-held stockpiles of AP mines.

Use

Landmine Monitor knows of no instances of new deployment of antipersonnel landmines by the Colombian Army since Colombia signed the ban treaty in December 1997. The Commander of Colombia's Armed Forces, General Fernando Tapias Stahelin, has stated that the Armed Forces laid approximately 20,000 AP mines throughout Colombian territory in the past.²⁹ In January 2000, he told Landmine Monitor, "Colombian Military Forces have defensive minefields, located near installations of high

²³ Interview with Pedro Agustín Roa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 January 2000.

²⁴ Interview with Captain María Vázquez, Human Rights Official, News Agency of the Colombian National Army, Bogotá, 25 January 2000.

²⁵ Letter from the General Command of the Military Forces to the Human Rights Unit of the Ministry of National Defense, numbered 2850-MDASE-DH-725, signed by Hugo Mauricio Ortiz Concha, in absence of Major General Mario Hugo Galán Rodríguez, General Inspector of the Military Forces of Colombia.

²⁶ Interview with Colonel José Manuel Castro, Consultant for Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Defense, Bogotá, 21 January 1999.

²⁷ Telephone interview with Graciela Uribe de Lozano, Head of the Disarmament Unit, Special Affairs Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 February 1999.

²⁸ Letter from the General Command of the Military Forces, 21 January 2000. Héctor Rodríguez, INDUMIL's Production Manager, told Landmine Monitor in January 1999 that INDUMIL had already destroyed its stock of mines, numbering approximately 2,220. Interview with Engineer Héctor Rodríguez, Bogotá, 18 January 1999.

²⁹ Interview with Captain Miguel Torralvo, Bogotá, 19 January 1999; and interview with Major Juan Carlos Barrios, Director of the Human Rights Office, V Division, Colombian Armed Forces, Bogotá, 24 February 1999.

risk and difficult to access.” He stated that the Armed Forces’ minefields “are correctly identified, marked and protected by military personnel, and follow international guidelines.”³⁰ According to General Stahelin, Colombia’s Armed Forces have maps of their minefields, but for security reasons this information is not available to the public.³¹ During a recent field visit to La Calera district near the capital Bogotá, the Colombia Campaign observed that Army minefields there did not have the necessary measures to prevent risk to the nearby population.³²

Colombia’s main guerrilla groups are: FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the UC-ELN – Unión Camilista-Ejército Nacional de Liberación Nacional (Camilista Union-National Liberation Army), and the EPL – Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army). There are also numerous paramilitary groups, collectively termed the AUC – Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-defense Groups of Colombia).

Two of the guerrilla groups, FARC-EP and the UC-ELN, as well as paramilitary groups, have used and are believed to still be using antipersonnel mines in the country.³³ There is no evidence that the EPL has used AP mines. The FARC-EP and the UC-ELN have both in the past acknowledged their use of AP mines.³⁴ According to a newspaper article published in Cali in May 1999, during talks with government officials FARC representatives discussed the landmines issue under the item that deals with International Humanitarian Law.³⁵ Colombia’s Armed Forces reported that 52 mines placed in San José de Sumapaz department had been discovered on 28 February 2000. The mines were found along village paths, around the school and football field, and near the radio transmission station on Granada Mountain.³⁶

Landmine Problem

Colombia is perhaps the country most affected by mines in the Americas region. Information collected by the Colombia Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM) indicates that at least 135 of Colombia’s 1,050 municipalities in twenty-three of the country’s thirty departments are mine-affected in all five regions of Colombia (Caribbean, Andean, Amazonian, Orinoquia, and Pacific regions). The 135 municipalities cover a total area of

³⁰ Letter from the General Command of the Military Forces, 21 January 2000.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Field visit to La Calera, Bogotá.

³³ Interview with Captain Javier Ayala, Director of Human Rights Office, Ministry of National Defense, Bogotá, 13 December 1999.

³⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 297-298. The July 1998 “Heaven’s Door Agreement” between the UC-ELN and representatives of Colombian civil society states, “Mines to deliberately kill or mutilate civilians will not be used,” and commits the parties to “no longer plant antipersonnel mines in high-risk areas for the civilian population.” It also commits the parties to promoting “ratification of the Ottawa Treaty for banning the use of antipersonnel landmines in the Colombian Congress.”

³⁵ “Joint Agenda Government-FARC,” *El País* (Cali), Colombia, 7 May 1999, p. 9A.

³⁶ “FARC siembran 52 Minas en San José de Sumapaz,” *El Colombiano* (Medellín), 29 February 2000, p. 7A.

145,000 square kilometers or 13% of the national territory. The department of Santander is one of the most affected, and has reported mine victims since 1990.³⁷

In updating its list from *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, the CCCM has identified the following mine affected areas:³⁸

1) Amazonian region

- Amazonas department: Santa Sofía municipality.
- Caqueta department: Florencia, Montañita, Miraflores, Puerto Rico, San Vicente del Caguán, Remolinos del Caguán, and Cartagena del Chairá municipalities.
- Guaviare department: Calamar, Miraflores, and San José del Guaviare municipalities.
- Putumayo department: Puerto Asís and Orito municipalities.
- Vaupes department: Mitú municipality.

2) Andean region

- Antioquia department: Caicedo, San Roque, San Carlos, San Francisco, Segovia, Mutatá, Turbo, Apartadó, Currulao, Zaragoza, Yondó, San Luis, Cáceres, Amalfi, Dabeiba, Tello, Bello, Yali, Puerto Triunfo, Cocorná, Granada, El Bagre, Maceo, Campamento, Carmen de Viboral, Copacabana, and Vegachi municipalities.
- Boyacá department: Pajarito, Pauna and Chiscas municipalities.
- Cauca department: Argelia, Caloto, Caldon, Corinto, El Bordo, and Patía municipalities.
- Cundinamarca department: Cabrera, Claraval, Junin, Guayabeta, Medina, San Bernardo, Viotá, and Sumapaz municipalities.
- Huila department: Suaza, Acevedo, Algeciras, and Anzoátegui municipalities.
- Nariño department: Puerres and Tuquerres municipalities.
- Norte de Santander department: Ocaña, Convención, Cucutilla, Chitaga, Cachipa, Los Patios, El Turra, Tibú, and Teorama municipalities.
- Santander department: Barrancabermeja, Bucaramanga, California, El Playón, Florida Blanca, Galán, Piedecuesta, San Vicente de Chucurí, Lebrija, Matanzas, El Carmen de Chucurí, Betulia, Suaita, Suratá, Zapatocha, and Macaravita municipalities.

3) Caribbean region

- Bolívar department: Simití, Morales, San Pablo, Santa Rosa del Sur, Rioviejo, Tiquisio, Achí, Cantagallo, Altos del Rosario, Córdoba, Montecristo, Carmen de Bolívar, San Martín de Loba, and Zambrano municipalities.

³⁷ Interview with Nidya Quiróz, UNICEF Colombia, Bogotá, 25 February 2000.

³⁸ Statistical study by CCCM, on the basis of data provided by Fundación Sueños, National Army of Colombia, Office of the National Ombudsman of Colombia, Personería Municipal de Santa Rosa del Sur, and Personería Municipal de Santa Rosa del Sur.

- Cesar department: Curumaní, La Jagua de Ibirico, La Jagua del Pilar, Pailitas, Pelaya, San Alberto, Chiriguaná, Codazzi, El Copey, and Valledupar municipalities.
- Cordoba department: Tierralta and Puertolibertador municipalities.
- Magdalena department: Ciénaga and El Banco municipalities.
- Sucre department: Toluviéjo, Guaranda and Ovejas municipalities.

4) *Orinoquia region*

- Arauca department: Fortul, Tame, Saravena, La Esmeralda, Arauca, and Arauquita municipalities.
- Casanare department: Támara and Sacama municipalities.
- Meta department: Calvario, El Castillo, Lejanías, Mapiripán, San Juanito, and La Uribe municipalities.

5) *Pacific region*

- Chocó department: Riosucio municipality.
- Valle del Cauca department: Palmira and Jamundi municipalities.

Not all the territory of each municipality is mine-affected. Most of the mine-affected lands are in rural areas inhabited by peasants who rely on small-scale subsistence agriculture and herding. Paths and walkways are often mined. Some urban centers have also been affected. There are some reports of increased mining of communal areas frequented by civilians, such as schools, football fields and bridges. In the department of Norte de Santander and Bolívar, most mine-affected areas are illegal drug plantations.³⁹ CCCM has noted that a majority of minefields in Santander and Bolívar are unmarked, the exceptions being those closer to urban centers.

The humanitarian impact of AP mines is widespread and great. The government of Bolívar Department has estimated that 60% of school absenteeism in Santa Rosa del Sur was due to the risks posed to children by AP mines near schools and towns.⁴⁰ CCCM carried out a field visit to the southern region of Bolívar Department and found that peasants in Buena Vista, near Santa Rosa del Sur, preferred not to send their children to school because of the threat of landmines.⁴¹ They estimated that at least twenty of their cows as well as other farm animals have died because of exploding mines in the past six months alone. The inhabitants of the area live in constant fear, and children suffer severe traumas associated with war, such as night terrors, incontinence and personality disorders.

Some communities are unable to produce food or earn money needed to survive; others suffer tremendous economic losses due to the mining of productive agricultural

³⁹ Field visit to communities in the Departments of Santander and Bolívar, 28 April to 12 May 2000.

⁴⁰ Lupe Mouthon Mejía, “Cuatro heridos al estallar minas en Santa Rosa del Sur,” *Vanguardia Liberal* (Bucaramanga), 1 February 2000, p. 1D.

⁴¹ CCCM interviews with peasants in Buena Vista, Santa Rosa del Sur, Bolívar Department, 3 May 2000.

lands and the death of their farm animals.⁴² Equally devastating is the psychological damage suffered by people in mine-affected communities.⁴³

These mine-affected communities urgently request help from NGOs, state institutions and international organizations to begin the processes of prevention, attention to victims and demining. Members of these communities feel they are military targets for the armed groups, and are completely abandoned by organizations and institutions that could help.⁴⁴

Mine Clearance

While Colombia's rural population would greatly benefit from mine clearance programs, there are currently no official humanitarian mine clearance programs in progress. Mine clearance is undertaken by the National Army and is primarily military, not humanitarian, in its purpose as it is usually conducted during combat situations.⁴⁵

The Colombian Army has reportedly destroyed a considerable number of antipersonnel mines belonging to the Colombian guerrillas. According to a report by the Press Agency of the Colombian Armed Forces, during 1999 the Army cleared 35 minefields and deactivated 370 AP mines. It also seized 239 mines from the guerrilla groups.⁴⁶ Another military official reported that during the last week of 1999, sixteen minefields were cleared near the villages of San Vicente, San Luis, San Carlos, and San Francisco, in Antioquia department.⁴⁷

The Department of Mechanical Engineering of the University of Los Andes in Bogotá is interested in carrying out research to develop a robot for the detection of landmines. The research project has the support of the Mars Group, the explosives unit of the National Army.⁴⁸

Mine Awareness

On 4 October 1999, the Ministry of Communications, UNICEF Colombia and the Canadian Embassy in Bogotá signed an agreement for implementing a mine awareness program in Colombia.⁴⁹ The program, which was to run for one year, has recently

⁴² Interview with Jorge Rojas, researcher on forced population displacement at CODHES, Bogotá, 8 May 2000.

⁴³ Interview with Luz Piedad Herrera, Assistant Officer of Information, UNICEF Colombia, Bogotá, 3 May 2000.

⁴⁴ CCCM interviews with members of mine-affected communities in Santander and Bolivar Departments, 28 April to 6 May 2000.

⁴⁵ Interview with Colonel José Manuel Castro, Ministry of National Defense, Bogotá, 21 January 1999.

⁴⁶ Interview with Captain María Vázquez, Human Rights Official, News Agency of the Colombian National Army, Bogotá, 25 January 2000.

⁴⁷ Interview with Major Anselmo Escobar, Human Rights Official, Fourth Brigade of the Colombian Armed Forces, Medellín, 5 January 2000.

⁴⁸ Interview with Carlos Francisco Rodríguez, Director, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Los Andes, project "Automata for mines detection," Bogotá, 13 March 2000.

⁴⁹ Press release from Canadian Embassy in Bogotá, "Canadá, el Ministerio de Comunicaciones y UNICEF firman convenio de cooperación técnica en torno a minas antipersonales," Bogotá, 4 October 1999.

received an additional \$50,000 from the Canadian Embassy in order to extend it for an additional six months.⁵⁰ Funds managed by the UNICEF Colombia Office have been invested in the production of material for the prevention of accidents and for advocacy. Three videos are being produced on the topic of landmines in Colombia, as well as a series of posters and a document about implementation of the treaty in Colombia. The Scouts of Colombia, Colombian Red Cross, and CCCM are in charge of designing, testing and fielding these prevention materials.⁵¹

Landmine Casualties

A statistical survey by CCCM has identified 736 mine victims since 1991.⁵² Accidents involving landmines were reported in 23 departments in the country. The largest number of casualties, 151, were recorded in 1997. CCCM identified 63 victims in 1999, and 35 in the first half of 2000.

Approximately 95% of mine victims were men, 3% were women and gender was not specified for the remaining 2%. A total of 83% of the victims were adults, and 7% were children (for the remaining 10% of the victims their age was not specified). Fifty-nine percent of the victims belonged to the Armed Forces, 22% were civilians, 2% were members of guerrilla groups, and 1% were police officers (the status or occupation of the remaining 16% was not specified). Approximately 90% of incidents involving landmines occurred in rural areas of the country.

CCCM believes the figures reported here significantly underestimate the actual number of AP mine victims in the country, due to lack of systematic reporting.

The Information Department of the Ministry of Health is currently in the third year of a project which aims to generate needed statistical data on various aspects related to health and violence in Colombia, so as to arrive at a comprehensive view of violence in the country.⁵³ While results are not available, the project does not include indicators on AP mines in its methodology.⁵⁴

There is no precise data available on the total number of victims among non-state actors. The data compiled by CCCM only shows that six members of guerrilla groups have been injured and two killed, as well as one member of paramilitary groups injured and six killed in the 1993-99 period.⁵⁵ This figure too is probably a significant underestimation of the real numbers of NSA mine victims in the country's long internal armed conflict.

⁵⁰ Interview with Nicholas Caughlan, First Political Secretary, Canadian Embassy, Bogotá, 21 April 2000.

⁵¹ Interview with Clara Marcela Barona, Communications Officer, UNICEF Colombia, Bogotá, 10 May 2000.

⁵² Statistical study by CCCM, on the basis of data provided by Fundación Sueños, National Army of Colombia, Office of the National Ombudsman of Colombia, Personería Municipal de San Vicente de Chucuri, and Personería Municipal de Santa Rosa del Sur. CCCM, "List of Victims of AP Mines in Colombia," 1993-1999, Bogotá, April 2000.

⁵³ Interview with Aicardo Oliveros, "Communication and Violence" Project Officer, Information Department of the Ministry of Health, Bogotá, 2 April 2000.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ CCCM, List of Victims of AP Mines in Colombia, 1993-1999, Bogotá, April 2000.

Landmines continue to claim victims in Colombia on a regular basis. On 21 December 1999, 11 people were injured and 3 were killed in a newly-laid minefield in La Jagua del Pilar, between the departments of Cesar and Guajira.⁵⁶ On 30 January 2000, in the Santa Rosa del Sur area, four peasants including an eight-month old infant girl were injured when a mina quiebrapatras ('leg-breaker' mine) exploded on a path they usually take between Buena Vista and their home.⁵⁷ A few days prior, and in the same municipality, a twenty-four-year-old peasant from Campo Llano was killed by a mine.⁵⁸ On 28 February 2000, General Euclides Sánchez Vargas, Commander of the Colombian Army's Fifth Division reported the discovery of fifty-two AP mines laid in San José de Sumapaz, Cundinamarca Department near the village school.⁵⁹ Also in the Sumapaz area, two soldiers were injured by a mine in April 2000 while searching an abandoned guerrilla camp.⁶⁰

Survivor Assistance

According to an Official at the Ministry of Health, Colombia's health care system is structured into three levels, in keeping with World Health Organization guidelines.⁶¹ The Colombia Campaign to Ban Landmines has examined information provided by the National Department of Statistics regarding the distribution of these health care systems by department. The Colombia Campaign concludes that Colombia's health care facilities are insufficient for providing adequate coverage and are also unequally distributed.

Medical, surgical and rehabilitation services for victims are usually located in the main urban centers, whereas most victims live in rural areas. In rural areas, it is sometimes nearly impossible to get immediate medical help and can sometimes take hours or even days to reach the nearest hospital. The injured person is often presumed to be the enemy, making their transit extremely dangerous.

While some major hospitals can provide quality medical assistance to mine victims, costs are high. There are relatively few doctors expert in dealing with the complex surgical demands of landmine injuries. Most victims never receive mobility devices, apart from crutches or improvised prostheses.

In Colombia, there are four institutions that manufacture prostheses and provide services for landmine and other victims of violence. The Hospital Militar de Colombia (Colombia's Military Hospital) in Bogotá is the only institution fully prepared and equipped to treat a landmine victim from the emergency room to rehabilitation, including psychological support. The hospital manufactures prostheses and has a rehabilitation

⁵⁶ Press release by the Press Agency of the Colombian Armed Forces, Bogotá, 22 December 1999.

⁵⁷ "Cuatro Heridos al Estallar Minas en Santa Rosa del Sur," *Vanguardia Liberal* (Bucaramanga), 1 February 2000, p. 1D.

⁵⁸ "Pueblo cercado por minas antipersonal," *El Espectador* (Colombian newspaper), Bogotá, 2 February 2000, p. 4A.

⁵⁹ "FARC siembran 52 minas en San José de Sumapaz," *El Colombiano* (Colombian Newspaper), Medellín, 29 February 2000, p. 7A.

⁶⁰ "Romaña se queda sin Viveres," *El Espectador* (Colombian Newspaper), Bogotá, 1 April 2000, p. 4A.

⁶¹ Interview with Aicardo Oliveros, "Communication and Violence" Project Officer, Information Department of the Ministry of Health, Bogotá, 2 April 2000.

center. It treats military but also provides services for civilians. The CIREC foundation in Bogotá has a prostheses factory which also manufactures orthopedic devices. The San Juan Bautista Orthopedic Center is located in Bucarmanga in Santander department. The Antioquia Rehabilitation Committee is in Medellín in Antioquia department.

The Sueños Foundation, dedicated to caring for children that are victims of AP mines in Colombia, has received a donation of an undetermined number of prosthesis from a French donor.⁶²

Disability Policy and Practice

Social and economic reintegration programs for landmine and war disabled remain virtually non-existent in Colombia. FOSYGA (Fund of Guarantees and Solidarity), of the Ministry of Health, is a governmental fund that provides some money to victims of political violence to cover their medical expenses. However, due to the complexity of the bureaucratic process and the documentation required to obtain funding, most landmine victims never request it.

In 1981, the President's Office decreed Law 2358, creating the National Rehabilitation System. In 1990, Law 10 reorganized the National Health System. In 1997, Law 418 established the obligation of the state to care for victims of armed political or ideological conflict. The Plan Nacional de Atención a Personas con Discapacidad, PNAPD (National Plan for People with Disabilities), coordinated by the Health Minister, has a budget of US\$3.6 million for the year 2000.⁶³ People with disabilities are generally not aware of the Plan or its benefits.

There are no specific laws for landmine victims but the Vice-President's Office, jointly with the National Planning Department and the Council Office for Social Policies, is developing a plan that could cover landmine victims, with an open view for other violence victims. Currently, the only disabled people in Colombia that receive a pension are either military personnel disabled while on duty, or insured workers that are disabled while on the job. Other victims of violence, including landmine victims, do not receive pensions.

GUYANA

Guyana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. Landmine Monitor has written to request information, including on the ratification status, but has not received a reply.¹ Guyana voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had done on previous resolutions in 1997 and 1998. It has also supported the pro-ban Organization of American States resolutions. It did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban

⁶² Interview with Wilson Ordoñez, Sueños Foundation, UNICEF Colombia, Bogotá, 27 April 2000.

⁶³ "Garantizada Atención a las Personas con Discapacidades," Ministry of Health Bulletin, Bogotá, 24 April 2000.

¹ Requests for information have been forwarded to the Government of Guyana in March 2000 and to the Permanent Representative to the United Nations in May 2000.

Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. Guyana has not participated in the treaty intersessional work program.

Guyana is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Guyana is not believed to have ever produced or exported AP mines. It is thought to possess a stockpile of AP mines, though the size, composition, and suppliers of the stockpile are not known.² Guyana is not mine-affected.³

HAITI

Haiti signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. In a 31 January 2000 letter to the ICBL Coordinator, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Haiti planned to ratify the treaty when a new parliament was in place following the legislative elections, which were held on 22 May 2000.¹ Haiti voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. Haiti has stated that it has never produced, imported, stockpiled, or used AP mines.² According to the United Nations, Haiti is not mine affected.³

SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. It is the only member of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) that has not yet ratified the ban treaty, even though it told Landmine Monitor in April 1999 that ratification would take "another three weeks."¹ In response to a letter from Mines Action Canada (MAC), Mr. George Bullen, High Commissioner of the Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States in Ottawa, wrote that he has forwarded MAC's concerns about the delay in ratification on to the Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.²

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

² Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Mine Action Database.

³ UN website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/guyana.htm>.

¹ Letter from Ministre Fritz Longchamp, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Haiti, to Elizabeth Bernstein, Coordinator of the ICBL, 31 January 2000.

² Ibid.

³ United Nations Landmine Database, Country Report on Haiti: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/haiti.htm>.

¹ Response by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tourism and Information, Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to 1999 Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, 22 April 1999.

² Letter from H.E. Mr. George R. E. Bullen, High Commissioner of the OECS, Ottawa, Canada, to Mr. Paul Hannon, Executive Director of Mines Action Canada, 28 June 2000.

has stated that it has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines and that it is not mine-affected.³

SURINAME

Key developments since March 1999: Suriname's Foreign Minister expects ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2000.

Suriname signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 but has yet to ratify it. According to Foreign Minister Erroll G. Snijders:

Suriname has already taken the necessary action to be able to ratify the Ottawa Convention....This Convention is brought to the attention of the meeting of the State Council.... After advice from the State Council, the relevant documents will have to be brought to Parliament. It is expected that the Republic of Suriname will be in a position to ratify the Ottawa Convention some time this year.¹

Suriname did not participate in the May 1999 First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and has not taken part in any of the treaty's intersessional meetings.

Suriname voted for the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had for similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. It has also supported the pro-ban Organization of American States resolutions. Suriname is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Suriname is not believed to have ever produced or exported AP mines. However, during the 1986-1992 internal conflict in Suriname, an estimated 1,000 mines were laid. The supplier of the mines used in the conflict is not known. It is also not known if Suriname currently maintains a stockpile of AP mines. At the cessation of conflict in August 1992, Suriname requested assistance from the OAS to help clear the emplaced mines. Under the OAS-sponsored program, "Operation Pur Baka", land in Suriname was surveyed and cleared and Suriname has since been declared clear of mines.² It is not known if there have been any landmine casualties in Suriname.

³ Response to Landmine Monitor 1999 Questionnaire, 22 April 1999.

¹ Letter from Erroll G. Snijders, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Suriname, to Dr. P. Hajac, ICBL Campaigner, Wroclaw, Poland, 28 February 2000.

² UN Database Country Report: Suriname.

URUGUAY

Key developments since March 1999: Stockpile destruction is underway.

Mine Ban Policy

Uruguay signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. While ratification legislation was sent to the Congress on 4 September 1998, it was not passed before the change in government on 1 March 2000.¹ According to a Foreign Ministry official, the ratification legislation needs to be reintroduced to the new Congress, and the Foreign Ministry intends to do so.² In a letter to the ICBL dated 26 June 2000, Minister of Foreign Affairs Didier Operti said, "I would like to inform you that in my recent meeting with the Members of the International Relations Committee of the Congress I strongly urged them to speed up the ratification process of the Convention. After perceiving a positive response I feel encouraged to believe that the process will be soon finished."³ He also stated, "I share the view that ratification by all signatory states is critical and that this historic movement to eradicate this indiscriminate weapon needs the strong support not only of all Governments involved but the International Community as a whole."

Uruguay did not participate in the First Meeting of State Parties held in Maputo in May 1999 and has not attended any of the intersessional meetings of the treaty.

Uruguay voted for the December 1999 UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had for similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. In a speech to the UN, Minister of Foreign Affairs Didier Operti said the Mine Ban Treaty's entry into force was "an auspicious sign" along the road toward the creation of a "culture for peace."⁴

Uruguay supported the OAS resolution on Support for the Mine Clearance Program in Central America (AG/RES.164) on 7 June 1999 and the OAS resolution on The Western Hemisphere as an Antipersonnel Landmine Free Zone (AG/RES.1644) on the same date.⁵

Uruguay ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 18 August 1998. It participated in the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, but has not yet submitted its transparency report as required under Article 13 of the protocol.

¹ The same political coalition returned to power, headed by President Jorge Batlle, and with the same Foreign Minister, Didier Operti.

² Interview with Gerardo Pratto, Department of Special Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 February 2000.

³ Letter from Didier Operti, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, 26 June 2000.

⁴ Statement by Didier Operti, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the UN General Assembly 54th Session. See: <http://www/un.int/uruguay/e54.html>.

⁵ Response dated 28 March 2000 by Ambassador Carlos Clulow, Deputy General for International Political Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor questionnaire 1999.

Production, Transfer, Use

According to the Army, Uruguay has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁶ It has imported AP mines from Belgium. It does not appear that Uruguay has used antipersonnel mines in combat operations or for border defense.

Stockpiling

In November 1997 former Defense Minister Raul Iturria revealed that the Armed Forces had a total of 2,338 antipersonnel mines (1,604 Belgian M-35 mines and 734 Belgian NR-409 mines) as well as 1,377 antitank mines.⁷ Attempts to obtain updated information have been unsuccessful.⁸ The Army has stated that Uruguay does not have Claymore mines nor does it have antitank mines fitted with antihandling devices.⁹

Regarding stockpile destruction, the Army told Landmine Monitor in February 1999 that all AP mines had been collected and stored in a depot, and that the NR-409 mines would be destroyed in 1999. Only inert mines would be used for training.¹⁰ In May 2000, Minister of Defense Luis Brezzo told Landmine Monitor, "To date some mines have been destroyed in select military sites, taking into account people's safety and environmental protection." Minister Brezzo added, "It is not possible to be more explicit at this moment, while ratification of the Treaty is in process."¹¹

Mine Action

Since 1992 the Army has contributed US\$24,000 to international humanitarian mine action. Armed Forces personnel have participated in United Nations peacekeeping and mine action programs in Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique, as well as with the Organization of American States (OAS) program in Nicaragua.¹²

The Uruguayan Institute for Development (UID) is reported to have signed a Letter of Intent with the government of Nicaragua to implement a humanitarian demining project in that country.¹³ According to retired Captain Fernando Poladura, a staff member of UID, the project would demine a hydroelectric dam that could supply electrical energy to three nearby towns as well as a large area of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast.¹⁴

UID states that it has also developed a project with the Uruguayan company Mundo Seguro S.A. and the Millennium Foundation of Cape Town, South Africa, to provide

⁶ National Army Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, February 1999.

⁷ Letter dated 19 November 1997 from Defense Minister Raul Iturria to National Deputy Gabriel Barandiaran. Landmine Monitor has a copy of the letter.

⁸ Telephone interview with the Director, Ministry of Defense, 12 May 2000. The Director claimed no knowledge of the National Army response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire of February 1999.

⁹ National Army Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, February 1999.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Letter from Luis Brezzo, Minister of Defense, to Landmine Monitor, 12 May 2000.

¹² See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 311.

¹³ Letter from Luis Brezzo, Minister of Defense, to Landmine Monitor, 12 May 2000.

¹⁴ Email from retired Captain Fernando Poladura of UID to Landmine Monitor Researcher, 8 May 2000.

demining activities and assistance to mine victims, and to foster development in mine-affected countries.¹⁵ UID has received unspecified support from the Ministry of Education of Uruguay through a resolution dated 2 November 1999, for a planned prosthesis center.¹⁶ According to a staff member, the Institute also has the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which asked Uruguayan diplomats to promote it overseas.¹⁷

Landmine Problem

Uruguay is not mine-affected. There have been a few Uruguayan landmine casualties, mostly from military and peacekeeping operations. UID's retired Captain Poladura lost his right leg while participating in mine clearance in Angola in June 1996.¹⁸

¹⁵ Promotional material of the Uruguayan Institute for Development, undated. UID's website is: <http://www.freez.com/landmines>.

¹⁶ Response by Ambassador Carlos Clulow, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 28 March 2000.

¹⁷ Email from Captain Poladura to Landmine Monitor Researcher, 8 May 2000.

¹⁸ Interview with Captain Fernando Poladura, Montevideo, 12 November 1998.

NON-SIGNATORIES**CUBA**

Key developments since March 1999: Cuba participated as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and in some of the treaty's intersessional meetings. It abstained on the 1999 UN General Assembly vote in support of the treaty, as it had in previous years.

Mine Ban Policy

Cuba and the U.S. are the only countries in the Americas region that have not yet joined the Mine Ban Treaty. Cuba's landmine policy has not changed in 1999 or 2000. In June 2000, Cuba provided Landmine Monitor with an eight-page statement, which presented its position in detail. Cuba indicated that it cannot join the treaty because:

... for the time being, it is not possible for it to fulfil the responsibilities deriving from that international legal instrument and mainly because the possession and use of antipersonnel landmines form part of the country's defense doctrine called 'People's War.' The defense concept of the Republic of Cuba is the result of the Cuban people's willingness to defend its sovereignty and independence [which is] constantly threatened by the manifest hostility of nine Administrations of the United States of America, which have planned, promoted, encouraged, supported, and carried out a vast number of aggressive and subversive actions against the Cuban people and Government.¹

Cuba noted in the statement that "on several occasions, the Cuban Government has publicly expressed that it understands and shares the humanitarian concerns caused by the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of antipersonnel landmines" and it described its "full support to the humanitarian efforts made by the international community to prevent or mitigate the effects of the indiscriminate use of this kind of weapons."²

Cuba was one of twenty countries that abstained in the December 1999 vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. It previously abstained on pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. In explaining the vote, Cuba's representative stated that while his country was against the use of mines in internal conflicts, and against any use of mines that could affect civilians, the final objective of negotiations should be to ensure maximum security to civilians, and not to limit States' right to preserve their territorial integrity. He said, "Cuba would thus abstain on the vote, because for four decades it had been subject to a policy of aggression and could not afford to renounce the use of that weapon. It was determined to create a

¹ Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor researcher, sent by email, 19 June 2000.

² Ibid.

necessary balance between humanitarian and security issues and do all possible to protect civilians from the danger of those weapons.”³

Cuba’s Ambassador to Mozambique, S.E. Sr. Evelio Dorta, participated as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. Cuba was one of 12 non-signatories at the meeting but did not make a statement to the plenary.

Cuba has participated in some of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva. In May 2000, Cuba’s Geneva UN Mission representative attended the Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) on the General Status and Operation of the Convention and the SCE on Technologies for Mine Action.

Cuba is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines but has not yet ratified Amended Protocol II. Cuba participated as an observer in the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, but did not make a statement to the plenary. In the past, Cuba has said it considers Amended Protocol II as “potentially the most effective legal instrument the international community could use to resolve the humanitarian problems caused by the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel landmines.”⁴ In June 2000, Cuba told Landmine Monitor that it is currently considering the possibility of ratifying amended Protocol II.”⁵

Cuba is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In 1997, Cuba expressed concern that negotiations on AP mines in that forum could detract from what should be the CD’s priority, nuclear disarmament.⁶

Production

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Cuba has produced at least five different kinds of landmines, including three AP mines.⁷ It is believed, in the absence of any denial or clarification from the Cuban government, that Cuba’s state-owned Union of Military Industries (Unión de las Industrias Militares, UIM) continues to produce AP mines.

Transfer

Cuban AP mines have been found in Nicaragua and Angola.⁸ However, Cuba has at least since 1996 maintained that it does not and has never exported antipersonnel mines.⁹ This was reiterated in the statement provided to Landmine Monitor in June 2000, which also stated Cuba’s “readiness to participate actively in international negotiations

³ Statement during the debate in First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 9 November 1999.

⁴ *The UN Disarmament Yearbook, 1998*, (Geneva: United Nations, 1999), p. 123.

⁵ Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000.

⁶ *The UN Disarmament Yearbook, 1997*, (Geneva: United Nations, 1998), p. 109.

⁷ PMFC-1 AP fragmentation mine, PMFH-1 AP fragmentation mine, PMM-1 AP wooden box mine. U.S. Department of Defense, ORDATA II CD-ROM. For details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 316.

⁸ *Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance*, on-line update, 18 November 1999.

⁹ Report of the UN Secretary-General, “Moratorium on the Export of Antipersonnel Landmines,” (A/51/313), 28 August 1996.

for the implementation of a regime for the comprehensive ban on exports of all kinds of mines.” It also noted, “There is not a retail network in Cuba for weapons sale, including antipersonnel landmines, to legal or natural persons.”¹⁰ While Cuba has declared no current or past export, it has not announced a formal moratorium or ban on the export of AP mines.

Based on information in the military trade press, it appears that Cuba has imported antipersonnel landmines from the former Soviet Union including the OZM-4, POMZ-2, and POMZ-2M.¹¹

Stockpile

The size and composition of the Cuban AP mine stockpile is not known.

Use

The U.S. and Cuba have laid landmines around the U.S. Guantánamo Naval Base occupying Cuba’s southeast corner. An estimated 735 acres of land were seeded with approximately 70,000 AP and AT mines at the beginning of 1961.¹² Cuba states that it laid mines after the U.S. had done so.¹³

The bulk of Cuba’s June 2000 statement to Landmine Monitor is devoted to a description of “the real reasons compelling Cuba to lay and maintain” the AP mines in the perimeter surrounding the Guantánamo Naval Base.¹⁴ Cuba describes these mines as having “an exclusively defensive nature.... They are intended to prevent violations and acts of provocation, as well as to guarantee peace and safety in the areas adjacent to the Base. These mines also serve the military purpose of preventing U.S. troops from expanding with impunity the perimeter they occupy illegally and from launching offensive actions into the Cuban territory.”¹⁵ Cuba says it will not remove its mines “until the Americans leave the base.”¹⁶

Cuban authorities state that the Cuban minefields are duly “marked, fenced and guarded” to ensure the protection of civilians, as stipulated by the CCW’s Amended Protocol II.¹⁷

¹⁰ Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000.

¹¹ *Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance*, on-line update, 18 November 1999.

¹² Roger Ricardo, *Guantanamo, the Bay of Discord: The Story of the U.S. military base in Cuba* (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1994), p. 4.

¹³ Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000.

¹⁴ In its statement to Landmine Monitor, Cuba inserted information from “Evidence Report submitted by the Revolutionary Armed Forces to the Civil and Administrative Court of Law, Provincial People’s Court, in *The People of Cuba vs. The Government of the United States of America for Human Damages*,” Ediciones Verde Olivo, Havana, Cuba, 1999.

¹⁵ Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000.

¹⁶ “Guantanamo Mine-Clearing Nearly Complete,” *Caribbean Update*, 29 July 1999.

¹⁷ Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000.

Outside of the country, Cuba is known to have used mines in Angola and to have trained Angolan forces in mine warfare. A Cuban manual was the standard text for mine warfare for Angolan troops.¹⁸

U.S. Mines in Cuba

In May 1996, the U.S. through a presidential policy statement announced that it would remove the “more than 50,000 mines...deployed on the U.S. side of the buffer zone....”¹⁹ Clearance began in September 1996 and was completed in 1999.²⁰ The U.S. Department of Defense has declared that twenty-one minefields were cleared. All AP and AT mines were removed from Guantánamo. A private company, Ronco Consulting, was contracted by the Department of Defense to conduct a minefield verification/quality assurance plan to determine the presence of any undetected landmines at Guantánamo Bay. Dogs and specially designed blast-proof tractors verified that none were missed. The U.S. military saw the clearing of the mines as “a military operation, not a humanitarian operation.”²¹

Cuba described the “alleged” removal of U.S. landmines from Guantánamo as “a measure of relative importance” since “that country has the necessary troops and means to quickly restore the deactivated minefields if it so wishes or deems it appropriate.”²²

Even though all emplaced mines have now been removed, it is not known whether the U.S. maintains a stockpile of mines at Guantánamo.

Mine Action

In 1997 Cuba informed the UN of its willingness to participate in international humanitarian mine clearing operations and to assist landmine victims.²³ To date Cuba has not contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance and is not known to be involved in any mine clearance activities. Cuba maintains that it is contributing to mine action through the hundreds of Cuban volunteer doctors who provide medical assistance and treatment in various parts of the world. At present, thousands of Cuban medical doctors are serving in 14 countries in regions including Central America, the Caribbean and Africa as part of its Comprehensive Healthcare Delivery Program.²⁴

¹⁸ Alex Vines, *Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa* (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 1997), p. 37.

¹⁹ Captain Mike Doubleday, DoD News Briefing, 20 January 1998.

²⁰ DoD News Briefing, 29 June 1999. Responding to a report that all mines had been removed, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon confirmed it, noting “they’ve been gone for probably four to six months.”

²¹ “State Guidance on U.S. Demining 2010 Initiative,” 12 December 1997, <http://www.usia.gov/current/news/latest/97121201.plt.html?products/washfile/newsitem.shtml>

²² Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000.

²³ Maria de los Angeles Florez, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cuba, Address to the Ottawa Conference on Antipersonnel Land Mines, Ottawa, December 2-4, 1997.

²⁴ Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000.

Landmine Casualties

At least 23 people have been killed in Guantánamo's minefields since 1961, including 18 U.S. servicemen and 5 Cuban asylum seekers.²⁵ There are no known casualties in 1999 or 2000. It is possible that Cuban soldiers participating in conflicts overseas have been killed or maimed by AP mines but no information is available. While there is no specific program to deal with Cuban landmine survivors, Cuba has a free and universal healthcare system described in detail in the June 2000 statement to Landmine Monitor.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Key developments since March 1999: The U.S. contributed \$81 million to mine action in FY 1999, and estimates funding of \$98 million in FY 2000. The U.S. ratified CCW Amended Protocol II in May 1999. The U.S. reserved the right to use antipersonnel mines during the NATO operation in Kosovo/Yugoslavia, but did not do so. The Pentagon spent \$21 million on its AP mines alternative program in FY 1999 and expects that to increase to \$94 million in FY 2001. The Pentagon is pursuing two "alternatives" (RADAM and BOS) that would be prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mine Ban Policy

The U.S. has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty but has committed to acceding to it in 2006 if alternatives to AP mines are identified and fielded. On 6 October 1999, President Clinton stated that "one of the biggest disappointments I've had as President, a bitter disappointment for me, is that I could not sign in good conscience the treaty banning land mines...."¹

Current U.S. AP mine policy is guided by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 64 issued on 23 June 1998. Although this document is classified, officials have used details from it in many public forums and publications. The content is also largely contained in a 15 May 1998 public letter from National Security Advisor Samuel Berger to Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat, Vermont). The letter states that "the United States will sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if we succeed in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our anti-personnel landmines and mixed anti-tank systems by then." It also states that the U.S. will end the use of AP mines outside of Korea by 2003 (not including those in mixed systems), and will "aggressively pursue the objective of having APL alternatives ready for Korea by 2006" (including those in mixed systems).² This built on the previous U.S. policy announcement in September 1997 by (1) including AP mines in mixed systems as part of the alternatives program and (2) stating for the first time that the U.S. intended to sign the treaty, albeit only if the search for alternatives

²⁵ A. Oppenheimer, "U.S. removing Guantanamo mines," *Miami Herald*, 16 January 1998; Angus Mc Swain, "US Marines Clear Mines from Cuba Base," Reuters, Miami, 10 December 1997.

¹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Event, 6 October 1999.

² Letter from National Security Advisor Samuel Berger to Senator Patrick Leahy, 15 May 1998.

were successful.³ The Pentagon has made clear that it considers the 2003 date as a “deadline,” while the 2006 date is considered an “objective dependent on the on-going search for alternatives.”⁴ The end of reliance on AP mines in mixed systems is considered to be a “goal” and the search for alternatives for them has “no deadline.”⁵

The U.S. sent Ambassador Donald Steinberg (the president’s Special Representative for Humanitarian Demining) as an unofficial observer to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty held in Maputo in May 1999. President Clinton also sent a message to the meeting, which was read aloud during the opening plenary. U.S. representatives have also participated as unofficial observers in some of the intersessional standing committees of experts meetings on mine clearance, victim assistance, and general status of the treaty, held in December 1999, March 2000, and May 2000.

The United States ratified Amended Protocol II of CCW on 24 May 1999. The U.S. participated in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II held in Geneva from 15-17 December 1999. In its Article 13 report submitted at this conference, the U.S. declared that it has taken all steps required to be in compliance with the amended protocol. This included modifying 670,000 M14 AP mines by attaching metal washers to make them detectable.⁶ These mines are designated for use in Korea.

At that meeting, as well as a subsequent meeting of governmental experts for the amended protocol on 31 May 2000 in Geneva, the U.S. introduced a series of proposals for strengthened restrictions on AP and antitank (antivehicle) landmines. For AP mines, the U.S. proposed increasing the required reliability rate for self-destruction from 90 percent up to 95 percent and for self-deactivation from 99.9 percent up to 99.99 percent. The U.S. also proposed that all antivehicle mines be detectable, and that remotely-delivered antivehicle mines have self-destruct and self-deactivation features. The U.S. also proposed adding compliance procedures.⁷

In his statement to the conference, the head of the U.S. delegation Michael Matheson of the State Department said, “In the view of the United States, the Amended Protocol is an essential part of the strategy needed to deal with the threat of indiscriminate use of landmines. This Protocol is an instrument that can attract adherence of all states, including those which are not able to accept a total prohibition on anti-personnel mines at this time.... [I]t has been our strong hope and expectation that all

³ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: “U.S. Efforts to Address the Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines,” 17 September 1997.

⁴ Interview with Dr. James A. Schear, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 10 May 2000. Also in attendance were staff members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Staff. Hereafter cited as “DoD Interviews, 10 May 2000.”

⁵ DoD Interviews, 10 May 2000.

⁶ United States of America, “National Annual Report CCW/AP.II/CONF.I/NAR.13,” 5 November 1999, p. 4.

⁷ U.S. “non-paper” titled “Possible Improvements to the Convention on Conventional Weapons,” obtained by Human Rights Watch, 27 October 1999. See also, U.S. Information Service, “U.S. Wants to Strengthen Landmine Protocol to Make Mines More Detectable,” 1 June 2000.

states can be brought to support and adhere to this Protocol, whether they are party to the Ottawa Convention or not.”⁸

Since 1997, U.S.-backed efforts at negotiating any type of international agreement on AP mines at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) have failed. Predictably, no progress occurred during the 1999 session. U.S. Representative to the CD Ambassador Robert Grey affirmed that the U.S. still seeks a “role for the Conference in negotiating a comprehensive ban on the transfer of AP landmines.”⁹

Production

The United States has not banned or placed a moratorium on the production of AP mines. The stockpile cap announced on 17 January 1997 does not preclude the production of new AP mines to replace those used in future combat operations.¹⁰ Yet, there has been no AP mine production in the U.S. since 1996,¹¹ and there are no known plans for future production.

In April 2000, Human Rights Watch wrote to twenty-seven companies identified in its 1997 report “Exposing the Source” as past producers of AP landmines and their components.¹² These companies had refused to join nineteen other U.S. companies in 1996 and 1997 in renouncing future involvement in mine production.¹³ One of these twenty-seven companies, Quantic Industries Inc. (Hollister, California), has since changed its position and declared that it has adopted “a policy of not knowingly selling any product that is intended for use in an antipersonnel mine.”¹⁴

Alternatives to AP Mines¹⁵

In May 1996, the U.S. began a search for alternatives to AP mines so that the military could completely eliminate their use “as soon as possible.” A little more than a year later, a target date of 2006 was established for fielding alternatives. However, the deputy secretary of defense, in a March 1999 memorandum setting out the program objectives for one of the alternatives programs stated that the effort should “provide a range of system activation and target discrimination capabilities.”¹⁶ It did not rule out

⁸ Statement of Michael J. Matheson to the First Annual Conference of Parties to the Amended Mines Protocol, 15 December 1999.

⁹ UN Office Geneva, Press Release, 17 February 2000.

¹⁰ DoD Interviews, 10 May 2000.

¹¹ Information obtained from search of database at <http://www4.ioc.army.mil/ac/enter.htm>

¹² For the complete list of companies that continue not to renounce AP mine production see, Human Rights Watch, “Clinton’s Landmine Legacy,” *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, vol. 12, no. 3 (G), July 2000, p. 13.

¹³ Human Rights Watch Arms Project, “Exposing the Source: U.S. Companies and the Production of AP Mines,” *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, vol. 9, no. 2 (G), April 1997. Among the companies renouncing are Motorola, Hughes Aircraft, Olin Ordnance, and Dyno Nobel.

¹⁴ Letter to Human Rights Watch from Robert Valenti, President, Quantic Industries, Inc., 1 May 2000.

¹⁵ See Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, “U.S. Programs to Develop Alternatives to Antipersonnel Mines,” April 2000.

¹⁶ Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum: Landmine Alternatives,” 23 March 1999 obtained by a Freedom of Information Act request, 16 May 2000.

target (victim) activated systems or explicitly instruct compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year¹⁷ (FY) 1999 required the secretary of defense to submit to Congress an annual report describing the progress made in identifying technologies and concepts for landmine alternatives.¹⁸ The first report was submitted by 1 April 2000. Section 248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999 requires that the Pentagon enter into two contracts with appropriate scientific organizations, to study existing and new technologies and concepts that could serve as landmine alternatives.¹⁹ The National Academy of Sciences is currently conducting one of the studies. Their report is due by the end of 2000. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory are conducting the second study. The date for the submission of their report is not known.

The Pentagon's figures for current plans through FY 2005 indicate that more than \$300 million will be spent on research and development, and more than \$500 million on procurement of mine alternatives. The funding requests contained in President Clinton's budget for research, development, test, and evaluation and procurement categories for each track of the AP landmine alternatives program are presented below.²⁰

¹⁷ U.S. Government fiscal years (FY) begin on the first day of October in the previous calendar year and end on the last day of September of the current calendar year.

¹⁸ Public Law 105-261, p. 112 STAT. 1958.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ All data extracted from DoD-wide and Army FY 2000 and FY 2001 Research and Development Descriptive Summary (RDDS) for Program Element (PE) 0604808A and PE 0602702E, February 1999, February 2000.

Funding for U.S. Landmine Alternatives Programs (in thousands of dollars)									
	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001 req.	FY 2002 est.)	FY 2003 est.)	FY 2004 est.)	FY 2005 est.)	Total	
Program									
Track 1	13,856	17,734	12,538	60,811	121,809	121,562	121,448	469,758	
Track 1	0	7,967	47,674	47,621	47,543	0	0	150,805	
Track 2	6,971	13,000	9,925	0	0	0	0	29,596 ²¹	
Track 3	0	0	23,800	26,267	26,340	43,797	50,081	170,285	
Total	20,827	38,701	93,937	134,699	195,692	165,359	171,529	820,744	

²¹ DARPA Track 2 project costs for FY 2002-2005 are not separately broken out in its budget justification documents and are not reported here. They likely amount to tens of millions of dollars.

Track 1

Track 1 consists of two separate programs, RADAM and NSD-A.

RADAM combines seven AT mines from the Remote Anti-Armor Mine System (RAAMS) with five AP mines from the Area Denial Antipersonnel Munition (ADAM) into one projectile.²² The Department of Defense is pursuing this program because the use of ADAM AP mines alone will be prohibited in 2003, but use of this new mixed system (and all other mixed systems) will still be permitted by U.S. policy.

The Pentagon has conceded that RADAM “does not technically comply” with the Mine Ban Treaty.²³ In the opinion of the USCBL, RADAM is a wasteful stopgap that, if current policy remains in effect, would be banned in 2006. The U.S. would then have to spend considerable sums to destroy RADAM or reconvert back to RAAMS.

In 1999, the Pentagon asked for \$48.25 million for RADAM, but Congress reduced the amount to \$8 million, for pre-production engineering and manufacturing development activities only.²⁴ This year, the Army has requested \$47.7 million for RADAM procurement in its FY 2001 budget request.²⁵ The total program cost for RADAM is estimated to be \$150 million for 337,000 munitions through FY 2004.²⁶ An acquisition decision for RADAM may occur as early as the first quarter of FY 2001 and deployment as early as the first quarter of 2002.²⁷

The non-self-destruct (AP mine) alternative (NSD-A) program will result in a “hand emplaced munition developed to meet the mission requirements formerly accomplished by M14 and M16 non self-destruct antipersonnel mines.”²⁸ The NSD-A system consists of a munition (apparently an existing AP mine like the M16) with a modified sensor/fuze package, a signal repeater unit, and a control unit to activate the munition once the target has been confirmed as a combatant by a U.S. soldier (“man-in-the-loop”). The Army awarded contracts totaling nearly \$70 million to Alliant Techsystems (Hopkins, Minnesota) and Textron Defense Systems Corporation (Wilmington, Massachusetts) on 3 December 1998 for prototype development of the

²² “Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternatives (APL-A)” a briefing by Major Ted Jennings, Office of the Project Manager for Mines, Countermine and Demolitions presented at the National Defense Industrial Association’s International Infantry and Small Arms Symposium and Exhibition, 21-24 June 1999, slide 19.

²³ Department of Defense, “Landmines Information Paper,” 3 March 1999, p. 8.

²⁴ These activities will be carried out at Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, a government owned facility in Texarkana, Texas operated by Day and Zimmerman (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania). RADAM will undergo testing at Yuma Proving Ground (Yuma, Arizona).

²⁵ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 2001, Procurement Programs (P-1),” February 2000, p. A-14.

²⁶ Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, “Appropriation: 2034 Procurement of Army Ammunition, FYDP Procurement Annex,” 14 February 2000, p. 26. The 337,000 RADAM systems would include 1,685,000 ADAM AP mines and 2,359,000 RAAMS antitank mines.

²⁷ Department of the Army, “RDDS, PE 0604808A: Landmine Warfare,” February 2000, p. 1069.

²⁸ “Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternatives (APL-A),” a briefing delivered by Colonel Thomas Dresen, the Project Manager for Mines, Countermine, and Demolitions to the National Defense Industrial Association’s Forty-third Annual Fuze Conference, 7 April 1999, slide 10.

NSD-A.²⁹ NSD-A underwent accelerated prototype assessment testing in October 1999 at Fort Benning, Georgia.

The Pentagon plans to eventually procure 523,000 munition systems between FY 2002 and FY 2005.³⁰ The production decision for NSD-A is scheduled for the fourth quarter of FY 2002.³¹ DoD is currently developing a justification for combining the contract for a joint award to Alliant and Textron for engineering support and qualification testing.³² Alliant and Textron announced on 22 June 2000 an agreement to jointly develop and produce NSD-A.³³

The prototype NSD-A has a feature that allows the munition to function in a target (victim) activated mode. The U.S. soldier would no longer be “in the loop.” The munition would become an indiscriminate mine, ready to explode at the footstep of a person, be it soldier or civilian. In a presentation during a public session of the National Academy of Sciences committee on landmine alternatives, Pentagon acquisition officials discussed this feature as a “battlefield override system.” This has also been referred to as a “command fire” and “command activation” feature—confusing names since the munition would no longer be command-detonated, that is, a soldier would no longer decide whether or not to explode the weapon, but it instead would be triggered by the contact of a person.³⁴

Officials from the Department of Defense have stated that this feature is an option separate from the basic man-in-the-loop operation and is merely being explored in the engineering and manufacturing development of the NSD-A. On 28 February 2000, Senator Leahy wrote a letter to the Deputy Defense Secretary to express concern about the battlefield override system. In response, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe stated that “exploring this [battlefield override] feature may provide as-of-yet-unforeseen insights in developing suitable alternatives.”³⁵ Senator Leahy wrote back that he was “perplexed” by that statement, since “it is clear to me that the feature is being included because some field commanders have never accepted the Administration’s 1997 policy to accede to the Ottawa Convention.” He further stated that his continued support for the NSD-A program is dependent on the omission of the battlefield override feature.³⁶ A final decision regarding incorporation of a target-actuated feature into the final NSD-A munition will occur prior to the final production decision.³⁷

²⁹ U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Procurement Award Notices DAAE30-99-C-1010 and DAAE30-99-C-1011, 3 December 1998.

³⁰ U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Solicitation Notice DAAE30-99-R-0108, 29 February 2000.

³¹ Department of the Army, RDDS, PE 0604808A, February 2000, p. 1069.

³² U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Solicitation Notice DAAE30-99-R-0108, 29 February 2000.

³³ Alliant Integrated Defense Company, Press Release, 22 June 2000.

³⁴ “Strategic and Tactical Landmine Usage Overview,” a briefing presented to the National Academy of Sciences Committee to Examine Alternative Technologies to Replace Anti-Personnel Landmines, 9-11 December 1999, Arlington, Virginia by Greg Bornhoft (BRTRC Technology Research Corporation), representing the U.S. Army Engineer School.

³⁵ Letter to Senator Leahy from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe, 25 April 2000.

³⁶ Letter to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe from Senator Leahy, 10 May 2000.

³⁷ DoD interviews, 10 May 2000.

Track 2

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is responsible for Track 2 of the landmine alternatives program, which was initiated in October 1997. The first research and development procurement under Track 2 was released by DARPA on 14 June 1999 for proposals for a “self-healing minefield” wherein surface laid AT mines have the ability to move to close breaches in AT minefields made by enemy forces. DARPA awarded the first contract to Alliant Techsystems on 19 April 2000 for \$5 million.³⁸ Another \$6.5 million contract was awarded to Science Applications International Corporation (San Diego, California) on 6 June 2000.³⁹ Another project being undertaken by DARPA is to use microelectronic tags to identify targets for direct and indirect fire systems, typically minimally guided munitions.⁴⁰ Apparently, these small tagging devices would act as “thistles” and attach themselves to persons entering an area sown with them.

Track 3

Track 3 of the AP landmine alternatives program, the search for alternatives to mixed mine systems, originated in PDD 64. Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre signed a directive authorizing concept exploration on 23 March 1999 and it is anticipated that the Pentagon will spend \$170 million through FY 2005. The U.S. Army released a broad agency announcement (BAA) soliciting concepts for Track 3 in August 1999. This solicitation was withdrawn on 8 September 1999 for unspecified reasons. The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in conjunction with the Communications and Electronics Command issued a BAA on 27 March 2000 to solicit submissions for component technology that may provide or enhance near, mid, and far term solutions to the Track 3 program.

The Army released another BAA on 1 February 2000 for systems and operational concepts for the Rapid Tactical Terrain Limiter (RATTLER) which apparently replaced the August 1999 solicitation. In this BAA is the statement that the “U.S. Government desires to be in a position to be considered compliant with the Ottawa Convention by 2006.”⁴¹ The Army awarded a total of \$800,000 to eight contractors for concept exploration studies for RATTLER on 4 May 2000.

Stockpiling

The U.S. has more than 12 million AP mines in its stockpile, including about 10 million self-destructing mines, more than one million non-self-destructing mines, and about one million Claymore mines. More specifically, the U.S. stockpile is believed to consist of ten types of AP mines:

³⁸ U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Procurement Award Notice DAAE30-00-C-1047, 19 April 2000.

³⁹ U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Procurement Award Notice DAAE30-00-C-1055, 6 June 2000.

⁴⁰ DARPA, RDDS, PE 0602702E, February 2000, p. 93.

⁴¹ U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Rapid Tactical Terrain Limiter (RATTLER) solicitation package DAAE30-00-BAA-0100, 1 February 2000, p. 1.

ADAM	9,516,744
Gator (USAF)	237,556
Gator (USN)	49,845
Volcano	107,160
MOPMS	9,184
PDM	16,148
GEMSS	76,071
M14	670,000
M16	553,537
M18A1 Claymore	973,932
TOTAL ⁴²	12,210,177

The U.S. announced a cap on its stockpile of AP mines on 17 January 1997. This cap, which includes AP mines contained in mixed systems, is still in effect even though the precise cap figure has never been publicly disclosed. The U.S. has declared possessing 11 million AP mines to the Organization of American States mine register, not including Claymore mines.⁴³

The U.S. has never declared the exact number of M14 and M16 non-self-destructing AP mines retained for training and research/development purposes, but this stockpile is thought to be approximately 2,000.⁴⁴ These mines are used for proficiency training in Korea and for testing mine detection and mine clearance systems at military research and development laboratories.⁴⁵ It is also possible that AP mines of foreign manufacture are retained for similar purposes.

Overseas Stocks

U.S. AP mines are stockpiled in at least ten countries: Germany, Greece, Japan, Kuwait, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (at Diego Garcia, its Indian Ocean territory). It also appears that the U.S. is planning to

⁴² See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 330. Please note that these are the number of individual AP mines, not the number of delivery systems like artillery projectiles or air-delivered munitions dispensers. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provided these figures, except for the M14 and M18A1 mines, as of 1997. The numbers today are likely to be similar. The M14 number is an approximation contained in the 1999 U.S. report required under the CCW amended Protocol II (and is 63,093 less than reported by ACDA). The Claymore number comes from a symposium paper presented by two DoD officials: Harry Hambric and William Schneck, "The AP Mine Threat: A Historical Perspective," Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 12-18 November 1996, p. 29.

⁴³ Organization of American States, "OAS Register of Anti-Personnel Land-Mines: Summary Table of Information Submitted by Member States for the Period 1997-1999," CP/CSH-168/99, rev. 1, 21 May 1999.

⁴⁴ Department of Defense, "Landmines Information Paper," 3 March 1999, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Letter from Dr. George R. Schneiter, Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to Human Rights Watch, 21 March 2000. Hereafter cited as "Schneiter Letter, 21 March 2000."

stockpile AP mines in Bahrain and Oman, which have not signed the treaty, possibly for the first time (see below). U.S. AP mines have been stored in Italy and Spain in the past, but both countries have stated that U.S. mines have been removed, presumably in 1999 or 2000.

There is no publicly available official information regarding the current on-hand balances of AP mines outside the U.S. Officials from the National Security Council and Department of Defense, citing security concerns, refused to comment on the types, locations, and quantities of U.S. AP mines that are stored outside the continental United States.⁴⁶ U.S. officials have refused to discuss the status of any bilateral arrangements or any modifications to Status of Forces Agreements that may allow the continued storage of U.S. AP mines with countries who are party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. One Department of Defense official stated that the U.S. has “not pressured or coerced” such countries.⁴⁷

While the quantities and locations of munitions are routinely changed by the military, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* estimated that the U.S. had some 200,000 AP mines in mixed systems (Gator, Volcano, MOPMS) stored overseas, in addition to 1.2 million M14 and M16 AP mines for Korea.⁴⁸ There are also artillery-delivered ADAM self-destruct AP mines stored outside the continental U.S., perhaps numbering in the hundreds of thousands. For example, 7,776 ADAM AP mines are stored in Qatar (see below). It is likely that ADAM AP mines are also stockpiled in Germany, Japan, and Norway.

U.S. AP mines are stored in at least five states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (Germany, Japan, Norway, Qatar, and the U.K. at Diego Garcia), as well as treaty signatory Greece. Some states parties have apparently determined that U.S. mine stocks fall under their jurisdiction, not the U.S.’s, and thus have required removal of the U.S. mines. At a recent meeting of Mine Ban Treaty nations, officials from Italy and Spain said that all U.S. AP mines have been withdrawn.⁴⁹ It is believed that Norway has reached an agreement for the U.S. to remove stocks by 2003 (within the treaty’s four-year deadline). Other states parties have apparently determined that U.S. mine stocks are under U.S. jurisdiction, and thus the states parties do not feel obligated to have the U.S. mines removed or destroyed. This seems to be the case with Germany, Japan, and the U.K. Just one state party, Norway, has declared the presence of U.S. stockpiles in the ban treaty’s Article 7 transparency measure reports submitted to the UN.

Revealed for the first time in 2000, the U.S. is currently stockpiling AP mines in Qatar, a party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Two hundred sixteen ADAM projectiles

⁴⁶ DoD interviews, 10 May 2000.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 333-334. Based on Air Force and other U.S. government sources from 1997 and 1998, the report cited 50,000 Gator and Volcano mines in South Korea, 49,610 Gator mines in Saudi Arabia, 33,000 Gator mines in Italy, and smaller numbers for Germany, Diego Garcia (U.K.), Japan, Turkey, Greece, and Spain.

⁴⁹ Oral remarks by Italian and Spanish delegations to the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, Switzerland, 22-23 May 2000. This has been confirmed by other Spanish officials (see LM report on Spain), but no confirmation has yet been received from Italy.

containing a total of 7,776 AP mines are currently stored at the Al Karana area in Doha, Qatar as part of U.S. Army Pre-Positioned Stocks Five (APS-5).⁵⁰

Additionally, the U.S. apparently plans to introduce and stockpile Gator and Claymore AP mines at the Al Udeid facility in Qatar. According to documents from a recently awarded contract, it appears that one hundred forty-two Air Force CBU-89 Gator mixed system units (a total of 3,124 AP mines) and one hundred forty-one M18/M18A1 Claymore AP mines will be stockpiled in war reserve ammunition stockpiles by the Air Force in Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman.⁵¹ The contract was awarded to DynCorp Technical Services (Fort Worth, Texas) on 20 April 2000. This would be the first publicly known instance of the U.S. stockpiling AP mines in Bahrain and Oman.

The U.S. retains about 1.22 million non-self-destructing M14 and M16 AP mines for use on the Korea Peninsula.⁵² It is unclear if these are exclusively stored at facilities in the Republic of Korea. The Department of Defense has stated that it does "not publicly reveal specific types of munitions inventories or where they are located."⁵³

Stockpile Destruction

The U.S. reported that it completed destruction of 3.355 million M14 and M16 non-self-destructing AP mines on 30 June 1998.⁵⁴ The Department of Defense also said that all non-self-destructing AP mines have been removed from U.S.-flagged maritime pre-positioning ships like those docked in Norway and at Diego Garcia.⁵⁵ The destruction of the non-self-destructing AP mines was conducted by open detonation at military facilities, and was carried out by the U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. The cost was approximately \$3.3 million.⁵⁶

One problem facing the U.S. when the 16,000 PDM and 9.5 million ADAM AP mines are destroyed (demilitarized) is the presence of trace amounts of depleted uranium

⁵⁰ U.S. Army Operations Support Command, Solicitation DAAA09-99-R-0118: "Maintenance and Supply/Service for Army Pre-Positioned Stocks (APS-5) Equipment in Doha, Qatar," 21 January 2000. Exhibit N, Technical Exhibit no. 11 of this solicitation is titled "Ammunition in Qatar" and shows the presence of 27 M691 ADAM projectiles (forty-eight hour self-destruct time) and 189 M731 ADAM projectiles (four hour self-destruct time). Each ADAM projectile contains 36 AP mines.

⁵¹ U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, Solicitation F44650-99-R0007: "Operation, Maintenance, And Support of Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel in Southwest Asia" 9 August 1999. Section E, Appendix 1, Enclosure 5 shows the planned on-hand balances of munitions stored at facilities in each of these countries to include 142 CBU-89 Gator units and 141 M18A1 Claymore mines.

⁵² Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Report to the Secretary of Defense on the Status of DoD's Implementation of the U.S. Policy on Anti-Personnel Landmines," May 1997, p. 11.

⁵³ Schneiter Letter, 21 March 2000.

⁵⁴ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release: "Destruction of Last Non-Self-Destructing Anti-Personnel Landmines in U.S.-Based Stockpile," 25 June 1998; Schneiter letter, 21 March 2000.

⁵⁵ DoD Interviews, 10 May 2000.

⁵⁶ DoD estimate given in March 1998. "Annual Report to Congress on Use by Armed Forces of AP Landmines," March 1998, p. iii.

in the housing of these mines.⁵⁷ Apparently, during the development of ADAM, depleted uranium was used to improve their structural strength to withstand the physical forces of being expelled from an artillery tube. It is not known whether DoD has developed procedures to demilitarize these mines and if the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved such plans. The U.S. Army is responsible for demilitarizing AP mines and is spending \$6.4 million in research and development funds between 1999 and 2001 to develop cryofracture methods--using extremely cold gas--for the disposal of AP mines.⁵⁸ The Department of Defense has estimated the total cost of destruction of ADAM and PDM mines at \$32 to 44 million.⁵⁹

U.S. Mine Stocks and the Mine Ban Treaty

U.S. ADAM, Gator, MOPMS, Volcano, GEMSS, PDM, M14, and M16 AP mines are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty because they clearly meet the definition of AP mine in the treaty.

Certain U.S. mines designated as antivehicle or antitank mines may also be prohibited under the treaty. Antivehicle mines that function as an antipersonnel mine – that can explode from an unintentional act of a person – are considered AP mines and prohibited under the treaty.⁶⁰ The U.S. possesses a large number of antivehicle mines that may, as the result of intentional or unintentional design consequences, cause them to function as an AP mine. However, it is not possible to state with certainty which mines would be prohibited and which not, both because ban treaty states parties have not clarified what is meant by “an unintentional act” and because there is insufficient data to render judgment regarding the stimuli or forces necessary to activate the kill mechanism for these various antivehicle mines.

It would seem clear that U.S. M15 and M21 antitank mines with M624 fuzes and tilt rods would be prohibited. It is unclear if M15 and M19 antitank mines that use M1, M1A1, M3, M5, and M142 firing devices as antihandling devices, as well as M21 antitank mines using M142 firing devices, would be considered compliant. Similarly, it is unclear if the 20 percent of RAAMS and M75 GEMSS antitank mines that are equipped with antihandling devices would be considered compliant.⁶¹

Even less clear is the case for U.S. antitank mines that have magnetic influence fuzes like RAAMS, Gator, Volcano, MOPMS, and GEMSS. These mines are “designed to detonate when straddled by a tank, which interrupts the mine’s magnetic field. A

⁵⁷ U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Energetics Systems Process Division, “Demilitarization Plan for Non Self-Destruct and Self-Destruct AP Landmines,” August 1998, p. 1.

⁵⁸ Department of the Army, “RDDS, PE 0605805A: Munitions Standardization Effectiveness and Safety,” February 2000, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁹ Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress on Use by Armed Forces of Anti-Personnel Landmines,” March 1998, p. iii and p. 15.

⁶⁰ This was reconfirmed by numerous States Parties at the January 2000 and May 2000 meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. See also, Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” January 2000.

⁶¹ Data extracted from Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 20-32, *Mine/Countermine Operations*, 29 May 1998, chapters 3, 4, and 5; *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 325-326.

person can walk on it and move it, but if picked up quickly or rotated, it will detonate.”⁶² Additionally, while Volcano, Gator, and MOPMS do not have an internal antihandling device, the mine “may detonate when moved, because the mine may sense a significant change from its original orientation.”⁶³ The M2/M4 Selectable Lightweight Attack Munition (SLAM) with an infrared sensor may also be in this category of mines that are questionable due to overly sensitive fuzes.

Transfer

The export of U.S. AP mines has been banned through legislation since 23 October 1992.⁶⁴ Claymore mines were exempted from this ban in 1996. This export ban has been extended several times, most recently until 2003.⁶⁵ The Clinton Administration announced in January 1997 that the U.S. “will observe a permanent ban on the export and transfer of APL.”⁶⁶ However, Congress has not codified the permanent ban into law. Prior to the export ban, the U.S. exported 4.4 million AP mines to 32 countries between 1969 and 1992.⁶⁷

Use

There has been no reported use of AP mines by U.S. armed forces since 1991 in the Gulf War. The U.S. has banned the use of non-self-destruct AP mines since May 1996, except for the defense of Korea until 2006 (or beyond if alternatives are not available). Under current policy, the government will prohibit the use of “pure” self-destructing AP mines (ADAM and PDM) globally in 2003, again except for Korea until 2006. Under current policy, the use of AP mines in mixed systems is not geographically or time restricted, but could be ended in 2006 if suitable alternatives are identified and fielded.⁶⁸

AP mines were not employed by U.S. air or ground forces in Yugoslavia during Operation Allied Force from 24 March to 10 June 1999. However, the U.S. reserved the right to use AP mines if it deemed it necessary.⁶⁹

The U.S. states that it has made the necessary amendments to its doctrine and training to comply with the requirements regarding mine use contained in Amended

⁶² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 326.

⁶³ Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 20-32, *Mine/Countermine Operations*, 29 May 1998, chapter 3.

⁶⁴ Public Law 102-484, Section 1365; 22 U.S.C., 2778 note.

⁶⁵ Conference Report on H.R. 3194, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Sec. 553.

⁶⁶ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: “U.S. Initiatives on Anti-Personnel Landmines,” 17 January 1997.

⁶⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 328.

⁶⁸ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: “U.S. Efforts to Address the Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines,” 17 September 1997.

⁶⁹ Air Force officials told Human Rights Watch in early April 1999 that war plans included possible use of AP mines. A State Department official told Human Rights Watch on 13 April 1999 that AP mines remained “an arrow in the quiver” of the United States. A number of diplomats from other NATO countries also told ICBL members in Maputo in May that the U.S. insisted on the right to use AP mines. See also, Edith Lederer, “Land Mine Coalition Demands NATO Ban Use of Mines in Yugoslavia,” *Associated Press*, United Nations, 21 May 1999.

Protocol II of CCW.⁷⁰ The U.S. Army field manual governing mine warfare was revised in June 1998 to incorporate policy and treaty-mandated changes since its last publication in 1992. Minor technical changes to it were made in June 1999.

The U.S. no longer classifies Claymores as AP mines, thus they are not part of the U.S. policy to find alternatives and ban AP mines. According to Department of Defense officials, U.S. forces are “not trained in the use of tripwires and Claymore mines.”⁷¹ However, a U.S. Army field manual indicates that tripwire fuzing for Claymore mines is authorized for and applicable in Korea.⁷² Claymore mines with M57 command detonating devices are routinely deployed in the basic combat ammunition load of U.S. forces and are likely present during operations and deployments to places such as Kosovo, Colombia, and the Persian Gulf.

The use of AP mines in minefields at the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ended in 1999. According to the Pentagon, all of the antipersonnel mines and antitank mines have been removed from the minefields and destroyed. A commercial contractor using mine-detecting dogs to insure that total clearance has been achieved is checking the former minefields.⁷³ Beginning in 1961, the U.S. used approximately 50,000 AP and AT mines along the perimeter of its facilities at Guantanamo Bay.⁷⁴

Mine Action Funding

Between FY 1993 and FY 1999 the U.S. contribution for humanitarian mine action programs totaled \$288 million, including \$63 million in Pentagon research and development programs. The total does not include funding for mine victim assistance programs because mine victim-specific funding, as opposed to more general war victim funding, is not identified by the U.S. government; it would likely amount to tens of millions of dollars more.⁷⁵

In FY 1999, U.S. mine action funding totaled \$81 million, up from \$63 million the previous year. Funding is estimated at \$98 million in FY 2000, and \$78 million in FY 2001. Under current plans, U.S. expenditures on alternatives to AP mines will exceed funding for mine action programs in FY 2001.

⁷⁰ United States of America, National Annual Report CCW/AP.II/CONF.1/NAR.13, 5 November 1999, p. 3.

⁷¹ DoD Interviews, 10 May 2000.

⁷² Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 20-32, *Mine/Countermine Operations*, 29 May 1998, Chapter 4.

⁷³ Schneider Letter, 21 March 2000; the fact that antitank mines were also to be removed was disclosed at a DoD News Briefing on 20 January 1998.

⁷⁴ DoD News Briefing, 20 January 1998.

⁷⁵ “FY 00 NADR Project Status” provided by the Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Program, 5 May 2000. Numbers reflect funding for Department of Defense, Department of State, and some Agency for International Development programs. In addition, the U.S. contributed \$2.2 million to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance between October 1994 and September 1999.

U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Funding, FY 93 – FY 1999 (in millions of U.S. Dollars)							
	<i>FY 93</i>	<i>FY 94</i>	<i>FY 95</i>	<i>FY 96</i>	<i>FY 97</i>	<i>FY 98</i>	<i>FY 99</i>
Total funding	10.191	15.931	39.252	32.768	45.475	63.449	81.287
Number of Countries	7	9	12	14	15	22	34

The current spending plans are in the table below:

U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Funding (in millions of U.S. Dollars)			
	FY 1999 (actual)	FY2000 (estimate)	FY2001 (request)
DoS Humanitarian Demining Budget (NADR) ⁷⁶	35.0	40.0	40.0
DoD Humanitarian Demining Budget (OHDACA) ⁷⁷	16.0	25.6	25.5
International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance	12.115	14.0	Not available
DoD Humanitarian Demining R&D Budget ⁷⁸	18.172	18.197	12.728
Total	81.287	97.797	78.228

Since 1993, Congress has provided funding for the U.S. humanitarian demining program to the Department of Defense and the Department of State. Inside the Executive Branch, the administrative infrastructure for U.S. efforts is centralized in the Humanitarian Demining Interagency Working Group (IWG) formed on 13 September 1993. This body is responsible for coordinating, prioritizing, and integrating U.S. humanitarian demining. The IWG is chaired by an official from the State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and co-chaired by an official from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The organization and functions of the IWG and the roles and missions of each organization are detailed in the Humanitarian Demining Strategic Plan originally written in 1994 but revised and republished in May 2000.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001," 15 March 2000.

⁷⁷ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "FY 2001 Budget Estimate: Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation," February 2000, pp. 1-17.

⁷⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, "RDDS, PE 0603920D8Z: Humanitarian Demining," February 2000.

⁷⁹ <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/pm/hdp/policy.html>

According to the Department of State, "the steps by which a mine-affected country requests U.S. assistance includes a formal request through the U.S. embassy...which reviews and endorses the request and forwards it to the IWG.... the IWG meets and determines whether to conduct a policy assessment. A policy assessment visit evaluates both the nature of the mine problem and the suitability of U.S. assistance.... Based on this assessment, the IWG may approve the establishment of a formal program for the country. A typical U.S. program involves assisting in the establishment of a mine action center, a mine awareness program, and a demining training program. As the country develops its mine clearance abilities, the IWG will periodically evaluate the development of the program. When the program reaches the point of being self-sustaining, the United States passes off its active role to the host nation, although some U.S. funding may continue to sustain demining efforts."⁸⁰

Beginning in 1998, U.S. financial assistance for humanitarian demining in mine-affected countries in Southeast Europe has been channeled through the Slovenian International Trust Fund (ITF) for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance. Most if not all of these funds thus far have been used for programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ITF works with the national and regional mine action centers to disperse funds for mine clearance projects, mine awareness education, and victim assistance efforts.⁸¹

Department of State

The Department of State is responsible for assisting a recipient country in sustaining its national demining program. Once a program is established, continued support of demining operations is the responsibility of the Department of State's Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs. Funding for the humanitarian demining programs run by the Department of State is provided by the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related programs (NADR) appropriation. NADR funding can be used to support the programs of international organizations and NGOs or can be transferred to other agencies.⁸²

On 19 August 1999, the Department of State awarded an Integrated Mine Action Support (IMAS) contract to a team of companies led by the RONCO Consulting Corporation. The not-to-exceed \$250 million over five years contract provides for one base year plus four one-year options for extension. The IMAS contract allows for RONCO and a team of seven other companies to provide mine clearance, mine detecting dogs, logistics and supply services, and other program management to countries receiving humanitarian demining assistance.⁸³ As of May 2000, approximately twenty task orders have been initiated or are in the procurement process.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: "U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program," 9 July 1999.

⁸¹ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Review of U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Assistance To Bosnia and Herzegovina Since the End of the 1992-1995 Conflict," 17 April 2000.

⁸² U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program Fact Sheet," 9 July 1999.

⁸³ U.S. Department of State, Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, 20 August 1999.

⁸⁴ Interview with the Director of the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Department of State, Washington D.C., 5 May 2000.

In addition to country programs, the State Department also has allocated \$7.93 million in FY 2000 to fund a number of “cross-cutting initiatives.” This includes \$1.4 million to the Survey Action Center, a \$300,000 grant signed on 14 April 2000 to Saybrook Productions for a mine action CD-ROM, \$150,000 to Warner Brothers for the development of mine awareness comic books, a \$100,000 grant signed on 28 February 2000 to the UNDP for a training study, \$1.1 million to UNICEF for mine awareness programs, a \$250,000 grant signed on 7 April 2000 to the United Nations Association’s Adopt-A-Minefield program, an \$18,343 grant signed on 17 February 2000 to James Madison University for a CD-ROM project, \$75,000 to the IMAS contractors for a measures of effectiveness study, \$200,000 to the IMAS contractors for information management support, and a \$4,550 grant signed on 13 April 2000 to the University of Denver’s Center for Teaching International Relations curriculum project.⁸⁵

On 2 September 1999, the Humanitarian Demining Interagency Working Group (IWG) approved in principle, as a one-time confidence and security building measure, a joint demining training exercise conducted by U.S. military personnel for Azerbaijan and Armenia.⁸⁶ Georgia was subsequently included in this initiative and the joint training exercise will be conducted at a location in Georgia between September and November 2000. The training will include a total of sixty deminers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.⁸⁷ This exercise is unique because more than one country is involved and because of their history of belligerence.

The Humanitarian Demining IWG modified existing informal policy on 9 December 1999 in response to renewed armed conflict and possible new use of mines in countries receiving U.S. humanitarian demining assistance. Of particular concern were Afghanistan and Angola. Decisions regarding continuation of assistance are to be made on a case-by-case basis and assistance will only be funneled to the people, not the government of the country, through programs operated by NGOs and international organizations. Assistance will only be allowed in areas where conflict has a low probability of recurrence, for the purpose of clearing arable land or facilitating the resettlement of displaced persons in areas thought to be mine-affected before the commencement of U.S. demining assistance. It is felt that these restrictions would neither aid belligerent parties nor commit the U.S. to assist in clearing newly mined areas.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ “FY 00 NADR Project Status” provided by the Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, 5 May 2000, pp. 5-6. Hereafter cited as “U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status.”

⁸⁶ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: “Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining, 2 September 1999.” Hereafter cited as “U.S. Department of State, 2 September 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.”

⁸⁷ Interview with the Director of the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Department of State, Washington D.C., 5 May 2000.

⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: “Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining, 9 December 1999.” Hereafter cited as “U.S. Department of State, 9 December 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.”

The U.S. also intends to establish a Quick Reaction Demining Force of forty deminers and eight mine-detecting dog teams. This group will conduct emergency demining operations when directed by the State Department's Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs. The host country for this force has not been determined but it is likely to be in a mine-affected country.⁸⁹ Funding in FY 2000 for the force may reach \$1.75 million from the State Department NADR appropriation.⁹⁰

Public-Private Partnerships for Mine Action

In January 1999 Ambassador Donald Steinberg took over as the U.S. Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining. He leads the U.S. "Demining 2010 Initiative," launched in November 1997 with the objective of identifying and clearing landmines posing threats to civilians by the year 2010.

As part of the Demining 2010 initiative, the special representative has a unique role in developing public-private initiatives for integrated mine action. In addition to advising the executive branch agencies on the implementation of humanitarian demining programs, the special representative's mandate includes fundraising for programs and initiatives. The list of programs and initiatives and recipients is quite varied.⁹¹ It includes the Survey Action Center, Adopt-A-Dog, Adopt-A-Minefield, Roots-for-Peace, DC Comics mine awareness comic books, Warner Brothers mine awareness initiative, Landmine Survivors Network, Mine Action Information Center at James Madison University, Los Angeles Unified School District (mine awareness and education module), Army Research Laboratory (landmine detection), Center for International Rehabilitation, Huntington Associates (mine action CD-ROM), and more.

Department of Defense

Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining programs are funded annually from the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. OHDACA funded programs are coordinated with the Department of State and approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency administers the funds while the regional military commanders execute the programs. By law, U.S. military personnel are prohibited from entering live minefields or removing mines as part of humanitarian demining programs.⁹²

Use of OHDACA funds is restricted under Title 10, United States Code, Section 401. These funds can only be used to support U.S. forces participating in humanitarian demining activities. According to a military planning document, "the majority of the [OHDACA] funds are used to pay costs associated with deployment of U.S. military

⁸⁹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: "Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining, 30 March 2000." Hereafter cited as "U.S. Department of State, 30 March 2000 IWG Fact Sheet."

⁹⁰ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 5.

⁹¹ For details see: Office of the Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining, "Public-Private Partnerships for Global Humanitarian Demining: Toward a Mine-Safe World," Washington D.C., January 2000.

⁹² 10 U.S. Code, Section 401.

trainers and support personnel.”⁹³ Officers from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance confirmed that as much as 80 percent of OHDACA funding is spent on personnel allowances and the logistical costs of moving personnel and equipment across the world.⁹⁴ Purchase of equipment, supplies, and services is permitted as long as it directly supports U.S. military forces participating in humanitarian demining activities. Donation of purchased equipment, supplies, and services can occur upon completion of the program.

The DoD Humanitarian Demining R&D program researches, tests, and modifies existing technology and equipment for immediate use in U.S. humanitarian demining country programs. R&D accounts for nearly 22 percent of total U.S. humanitarian mine action funding to date, not including victim assistance funding. The budget for FY 1995-1999 was \$63.6 million, including \$18.172 million in FY 1999. For FY 2000 the estimated budget is \$18.197 million and the requested budget for FY 2001 is \$12.728 million. Technologies and equipment being developed under this program include improved protective gear for deminers, minefield marking and mapping systems and survey equipment, vegetation clearing devices, in-situ neutralization devices, mine awareness and training materials, and mechanical clearance equipment for area clearance and quality assurance purposes. The program will produce a “Consumer Reports” style catalogue on the R&D findings for mine detection technologies sometime in 2000.⁹⁵

The Pentagon also plans to spend more than \$215 million between FY 99 and FY 01 on research and development of military technologies to detect and neutralize explosives, mines, and UXO. These programs are in separate areas of the budget and are not specifically related to the humanitarian mine action totals. The primary organizations conducting this research and development are the Army, DARPA, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). It is possible that the results of this military research may in the future find application in the humanitarian demining area.⁹⁶

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is also exploring technologies for airborne wide area AP landmine detection in arms control treaty compliance monitoring.⁹⁷ Budget figures for this project were not available. Research and development projects for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) projects are also not included in the above figures.

⁹³ U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001),” 13 July 1999.

⁹⁴ DoD Interviews, 10 May 2000.

⁹⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, “RDDS, PE 0603920D8Z: Humanitarian Demining,” February 2000, pp. 1-3.

⁹⁶ All data from Army and Defense-wide RDDS for PE’s 0602702E, 0602712A, 0604808A, 0603606A, 0603619A, 0603858D8Z, 0603750D8Z, 0602709A, February 2000. For details see Human Rights Watch, “Clinton’s Landmine Legacy” *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (G), p. 26.

⁹⁷ Defense Threat Reduction Agency, RDDS PE 0603711BR, February 2000.

Countries Receiving U.S. Demining Assistance

Between FY 1993 and FY 1999, the U.S. has provided about \$225 million in assistance to demining programs in thirty-four countries.⁹⁸ The top recipients of U.S. demining funds during this time are:

Bosnia	\$40.5 million (incl. Funds from Slovenia International Trust Fund)
Angola	\$22.2 million
Afghanistan	\$22.0 million
Mozambique	\$20.3 million
Cambodia	\$19.9 million
Laos	\$14.0 million
Rwanda	\$13.9 million
OAS	\$9.1 million (Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala)
Ethiopia	\$8.8 million
Namibia	\$8.3 million

The following table summarizes the country-by-country funding of Department of State and Department of Defense humanitarian demining programs.⁹⁹

Recipient	Department of State NADR Funding (in millions of U.S. dollars)			Department of Defense OHDACA Funding (in millions of U.S. dollars)	
	FY 99	FY 00 (Est.)	FY 01 (Est.)	FY 99	FY 00 (Est.)
Afghanistan	2.615	3.0	2.9	-	-
Angola	-	3.096	2.9	-	-
Armenia	-	0.3	0.6	-	0.044
Azerbaijan	-	0.5	0.6	0.14	0.048
Bosnia Herzegovina	2.305	-	-	-	0.641
Cambodia	1.5	2.58	2.6	-	-
Chad	0.732	0.633	0.6	1.0	1.16
Croatia	0.6	-	-	-	-
Djibouti	-	0.3	0.8	-	-
Ecuador	0.999	1.0	1.2	0.125	1.1
Egypt	-	-	-	0.615	0.817
Eritrea	-	1.117	1.0	-	1.2

⁹⁸ Figure extracted from "FY 00 NADR Status" country programs with funds for demining research and development and "cross cutting initiatives" removed.

⁹⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001," 15 March 2000 and NADR Country Funding for Humanitarian Demining Assistance at <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/pm/hdp/budget.html> and "Demining Program Financing History" provided by the Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, 5 May 2000; Office of the Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, "Information Paper," 8 April 1999. Hereafter cited as "SOLIC, Information Paper."

Recipient	Department of State NADR Funding (in millions of U.S. dollars)			Department of Defense OHDACA Funding (in millions of U.S. dollars)	
	FY 99	FY 00 (Est.)	FY 01 (Est.)	FY 99	FY 00 (Est.)
Estonia	.335	-	0.3	-	1.9
Ethiopia	.335	1.117	1.0	-	1.2
Georgia	-	0.997	0.9	-	0.065
Guinea Bissau	-	0.3	0.5	-	0.065
Jordan	1.9	1.511	1.5	0.74	0.63
Kosovo	0.5	-	-	0.5	4.95
Laos	1.8	1.486	1.5	0.70	0.40
Lebanon	0.53	0.857	0.8	0.065	0.84
Mauritania	0.534	.501	0.4	0.45	1.7
Moldova	-	0.3	-	0.071	0.043
Mozambique	1.9	3.5	2.0	1.1	0.465
Namibia	1.053	0.3	0.1	-	0.007
OAS/IADB (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua)	2.241	1.437	1.5	0.35	-
Oman	-	0.3	0.5	1.4	-
Peru	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.125	1.1
Rwanda	0.750	0.246	0.250	-	0.007
Somalia	1.15	1.3	1.6	-	-
Swaziland	-	-	-	0.828	0.289
Thailand	1.049	1.22	1.3	0.7	1.8
Vietnam	1.096	1.0	0.8	-	-
Yemen	1.462	1.236	1.4	0.527	0.581
Zambia	-	0.3	0.5	-	-
Zimbabwe	0.743	0.250	1.0	1.0	0.756
Total	27.129	31.684	32.25	10.436	21.808

- *Afghanistan* Funding supports mine awareness education, mine clearance, surveys, minefield marking, and training coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) and continued operation of the UN's Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA).¹⁰⁰ The U.S. committed \$1.5M in FY 99 funds to the HALO Trust to conduct demining operations in Vardak Province.¹⁰¹ In FY 00, the NADR funding includes: \$1.1M to the HALO Trust (grant signed 9 March 2000); \$1.3M for UNOCHA mine clearance; \$0.5M for UNOCHA equipment.¹⁰²

- *Albania* During the summer and fall of 1999, the Humanitarian Demining IWG conducted a policy assessment of the situation in Albania to ascertain efforts undertaken

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of South Asia," 15 March 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 17.

¹⁰¹ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 17.

¹⁰² U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p.1.

by the Albanian Government and possible areas of U.S. assistance.¹⁰³ It is possible that mine action funding for Albania will be channeled through the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance.

- *Algeria* A request for humanitarian demining assistance from the Government of Algeria was received on 6 December 1999. The request is currently being reviewed by the Humanitarian Demining IWG.¹⁰⁴

- *Angola* Assistance supports UN Demining Program in providing training, equipment, and mine awareness education. Victim assistance programs also funded.¹⁰⁵ Recently, the U.S. agreed to assist the UN by providing nearly \$2 million to purchase “demining equipment such as communications gear, mine detectors, protective suits, computers, explosives, mine probes, vehicles, and trauma kits.”¹⁰⁶ In FY 00, the NADR funding allocation includes: \$0.399M to the HALO Trust (grant signed 11 April 2000); \$0.697M to the German NGO MgM (grant signed 18 April 2000); \$1.964M to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) (grant signed 1 May 2000).¹⁰⁷

- *Armenia* Armenia requested humanitarian demining assistance in late 1999, noting that there are landmines along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border (excluding occupied territory). Armenia also has agreed to participate in demining training as part of the Beecroft initiative. On 9 December 1999, the U.S. Humanitarian Demining IWG authorized an assessment visit to Armenia in 2000.¹⁰⁸

- *Azerbaijan* Azerbaijan was formally approved into the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 12 December 1999. An assessment of requirements will be conducted in early 2000.¹⁰⁹ Training of deminers will take place as part of the Beecroft initiative. The entire amount of FY 00 NADR funds is proposed for a grant to the UNDP.¹¹⁰

- *Bosnia Herzegovina* Beginning in 1998, all U.S. financial assistance for humanitarian demining in mine-affected countries in Southeast Europe has been channeled through the Slovenian International Trust Fund (ITF) for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance. The ITF works with the national and regional mine action centers to disperse funds for mine clearance projects, mine awareness education, and victim

¹⁰³ U.S. Department of State, 2 September 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: “Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining 9 December 1999.” Hereafter cited as “U.S. Department of State, 9 December 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.”

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” April 1999, p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ Speech by Pat Patierno, Director, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 7 April 2000.

¹⁰⁷ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Department of State, 9 December 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 1.

assistance efforts.¹¹¹ Prior to the establishment of the ITF, the U.S. had spent over \$26M in funds on a wide range of mine action activities including the training and equipping of 450 military deminers, produced mine awareness comic books and other activities in conjunction with UNICEF and the World Bank.¹¹² The Department of Defense officially completed its demining training program in February 2000.¹¹³

- *Cambodia* U.S. funding is given in the form of grants to international NGOs or channeled through the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC). From FY 1993-1998, U.S. funding for mine action in Cambodia totaled nearly \$17M. Prior to the suspension of OHDACA funding in July 1997, DoD personnel equipped and trained 1,221 CMAC deminers and another 537 military engineers through the UNDP Trust Fund. Victim assistance programs by the VVAF and other NGO are also funded by USAID through the War Victims Fund.¹¹⁴ For FY 00, NADR funding allocation is planned to include: \$0.250M grant to CARE; \$1.2M grant to the HALO Trust; \$0.2M grant to the Mines Advisory Group; \$0.12M to Handicap International; \$0.78M donation to CMAC.¹¹⁵

- *Chad* Prior to 1 October 1999, the U.S. had provided \$1.9M in assistance to Chad to support and sustain the training of approximately 200 military engineer personnel as deminers. Additionally, U.S. funding supports the operation of a national mine action center, establishment of a regional demining office in the northern part of country, mine awareness education, and the collection of historical data.¹¹⁶ U.S. military trainers will re-qualify Chadian demining personnel in 2000.¹¹⁷ FY 00 NADR funding allocation includes: an IMAS task order for the provision of commodities and equipment; \$0.210 for the purchase of vehicles; \$0.011M to purchase radios; \$0.196M grant to UNDP to contract aerial medical evacuation services; \$0.012M for repairs to the deminer's building in Faya; \$0.108M for the purchase of spare parts for C-130 aircraft supporting demining operations (handled as a U.S. foreign military sales case).¹¹⁸

- *Croatia* Following an assessment mission in January 2000, the U.S. announced that it will provide an additional \$360,000 to support ongoing demining efforts in Croatia, in cooperation with the Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) and the Slovenian

¹¹¹ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Review of U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Assistance To Bosnia and Herzegovina Since the End of the 1992-1995 Conflict," 17 April 2000.

¹¹² SOLIC Information Paper; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 21.

¹¹³ Descriptive summaries of Department of Defense demining programs provided by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, 10 May 2000. Hereafter cited as "DoD Descriptive Summaries."

¹¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 18; U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs," 15 March 2000; SOLIC Information Paper.

¹¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 1.

¹¹⁶ SOLIC Information Paper; "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 8.

¹¹⁷ DoD Descriptive Summaries.

¹¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 1.

International Trust Fund. The new grant apparently will fund the procurement of MRV3 demining flail machines manufactured by the Croatian firm of Doking D.O.O. Ltd. The terms of the grant also include demining approximately sixty hectares of land in 2000. The U.S. provided \$1.7M in humanitarian demining assistance in FY 99.¹¹⁹

- *Djibouti* The Humanitarian Demining IWG approved Djibouti's request for humanitarian demining assistance on 12 December 1999. U.S. military trainers and the IMAS contractor will apparently be used to establish a complete demining program including training, equipment, and facilities for demining training. A survey of requirements will be conducted sometime in 2000.¹²⁰

- *Ecuador* Ecuador was included in the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 22 February 1999. The first U.S. training program was conducted late in 1999 and another is scheduled to occur between April and June 2000. The same training is provided to deminers in Peru.¹²¹ The U.S. has committed to providing long-term demining training and possibly a mine detection dog program in Ecuador. Near-term objectives include the establishment of a national demining office.¹²²

- *Egypt* Egypt requested U.S. assistance to supplement its national demining program in 1997. Egypt was accepted into the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 2 September 1998. The U.S. initially intended to conduct train-the-trainer programs and establish a national demining center. It is unclear whether a formal memorandum of understanding has been developed to assure that the intended use for donated equipment, supplies, and services is solely for humanitarian demining purposes. While not a requirement of the U.S. program, the U.S. is requesting that Egypt establish a civilian-led national demining organization. This is a necessity in order to receive assistance from the international donor community. There is concern whether the NGO presented by the Egyptian Government as part of this structure is actually independent of the government or if it existed prior to the government's announcement.¹²³ Apparently, no additional funding has been approved to provide long-term support in Egypt. The Humanitarian Demining IWG has refused to allocate any NADR funds to Egypt in light of the \$1.3 billion of Foreign Military Financing funds Egypt receives from the U.S. and the apparent reluctance on the part of the Egyptian government to support its own demining effort with this assistance. In the FY 2001 State Department Budget request, Egypt is eligible to receive Excess Defense Article (EDA) under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. The supporting State Department budget justification materials note that

¹¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "State Department Grants Humanitarian Demining Assistance to Croatia," 28 January 2000.

¹²⁰ U.S. Department of State, 9 December 1999 IWG Fact Sheet

¹²¹ DoD Descriptive Summaries.

¹²² U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs," 15 March 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 27; U.S. Department of State, 18 March 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹²³ Interview with Ayman Sorour, Executive Director of the Landmine Struggle Center, Cairo, 10 April 2000.

in FY 2001 EDA funds will be used to supply spare parts to outdated U.S. M-60 tanks that will be specially outfitted for use in Egypt's ongoing demining efforts. It is also possible that USAID funding will be used to support some aspects of the Egyptian national demining program such as victim assistance programs.¹²⁴

- *Eritrea* From 1993 to 1998, the U.S. provided approximately \$8.0M in funds for training and equipping of nearly 400 military deminers and a wide array of mine action activities. On 22 June 1998 most elements of the U.S. humanitarian demining program in Eritrea were temporarily suspended due to the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. While continued U.S. assistance is predicated on the conclusion and implementation of a peace accord, planning is ongoing for the immediate resumption of the program.¹²⁵ Upon resumption of this program, the \$1.117M in NADR funds programmed for FY 00 would be spent deploying a mine detecting dog capability, training in explosive ordnance disposal and mine clearance, and the purchase of equipment.¹²⁶

- *Estonia* Estonia was accepted into the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 1 June 1998. U.S. assistance includes providing modern protective clothing and demining equipment, the establishment of a mine action center, and a mine awareness campaign.¹²⁷ U.S. military personnel provided training in Estonia between April and June 2000. Another training mission is scheduled to occur in FY 01.¹²⁸

- *Ethiopia* Since 1993, the U.S. provided approximately \$8.0M for training and equipping of military deminers and a wide array of mine action activities. On 22 June 1998 elements of the U.S. program were temporarily suspended due to the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Future U.S. demining assistance is predicated on the conclusion and implementation of a peace accord.¹²⁹ Upon resumption of this program,

¹²⁴ U.S. Central Command, "U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001)," 13 July 1999; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 28; U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs," 15 March 2000; SOLIC Information Paper; Interviews conducted in Cairo 9-11 April 2000.

¹²⁵ U.S. Central Command, "U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for Eritrea (Conditional, FY 2001 & 2002)," 23 February 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 9; U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of African Affairs," 15 March 2000; SOLIC Information Paper.

¹²⁶ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 2.

¹²⁷ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 22; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: "Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining, 1 June 1998." Hereafter cited as "U.S. Department of State, 1 June 1998 IWG Fact Sheet."

¹²⁸ DoD Descriptive Summaries.

¹²⁹ U.S. Central Command, "U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for Ethiopia (Conditional, FY2001 & 2002)," 24 February 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 10; U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget

the \$1.117M in NADR funds programmed for FY 00 would be spent deploying a mine detecting dog capability, training in explosive ordnance disposal and mine clearance, and the purchase of equipment.¹³⁰

- *Georgia* In 1999, the Government of Georgia requested U.S. humanitarian demining assistance to “clear protective minefields surrounding two ex-Soviet military bases in Georgia so that the areas may be returned to civilian use.”¹³¹ The Humanitarian Demining IWG is currently considering this request. Georgia will host the joint training exercise resulting from the Beecroft Initiative in September to November 2000.¹³² The \$0.997M in FY 00 NADR funds may possibly be granted to HALO Abkhazia.¹³³

- *Guinea Bissau* The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) submitted a request for U.S. humanitarian demining equipment for its regional peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) in Guinea-Bissau.¹³⁴ The Humanitarian Demining IWG did not approve this request. While the U.S. is studying the feasibility of using emergency demining funds for deploying contractor mine-detecting dogs, the Humanitarian Demining IWG is apparently deferring a decision pending the completion of a study of the landmine problem in Guinea Bissau.¹³⁵

- *Jordan* U.S. military cooperation for humanitarian demining with Jordan began in 1997. The U.S. has assisted in establishing the national demining coordination office, conducted training of Jordanian military engineers, and provided equipment including mechanical clearance mini-flails. Additionally, the U.S. has provided computer based planning, management, and training tools. The Royal Jordanian Armed Forces maintains a force of 380 combat engineers dedicated to demining. Future funds for humanitarian demining will be used to fund on-going programs to remove landmines in the Jordan River Valley, along the Jordan-Syrian border, and in the Rift Valley with emphasis on providing heavy engineering equipment and bulldozers, mine detecting dogs, and experimental mechanical mine removal systems.¹³⁶ The FY 00 NADR funds are planned to be used to provide demining equipment (\$0.411M), demining technologies (\$0.943M), and vehicles (\$0.155M).¹³⁷

Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of African Affairs,” 15 March 2000; SOLIC Information Paper.

¹³⁰ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 2.

¹³¹ U.S. Department of State, 2 September 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹³² Interview with the Director of the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Department of State, Washington D.C., 5 May 2000.

¹³³ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 2.

¹³⁴ U.S. Department of State, 18 March 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹³⁵ DoD Interviews, 10 May 2000; U.S. Department of State, 30 March 2000 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹³⁶ U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (FY 2001 & 2002),” 12 April 2000; U.S. Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” April 1999, p. 29; U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,” 15 March 2000; SOLIC Information Paper.

¹³⁷ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 2.

- *Kosovo* In response to the crisis in the spring of 1999 and the laying of new mines in the area, the U.S. funded, through UNICEF, a mine awareness campaign in the refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia.¹³⁸ Additionally, on June 11, the State Department modified an existing contract with RONCO to clear mines and unexploded ordnance in Kosovo. The contract provided short-term emergency demining assistance at a total cost of approximately \$1.6 million, funded from the Support for Eastern Europe Democracy account.¹³⁹ The status of plans to fund a similar contract for 2000 and 2001 at an estimated cost of \$3.5 million per year is unknown. According to the U.S. European Command, “KFOR continues to perform only ‘mission-essential’ demining, with the exact definition of ‘mission-essential’ determined on the ground.”¹⁴⁰

- *Laos* Laos began receiving U.S. assistance in 1994 and the total amount of aid reached \$11.4M through 30 September 1998. Training by U.S. military personnel has occurred with personnel from the Lao national coordinating agency for demining and UXO clearance. U.S. funds are also used in victim assistance programs in Laos. The FY 00 NADR funds will apparently be channeled through the IMAS contract to purchase equipment (\$0.726M) and vehicles (\$0.760M).¹⁴¹ In the past, the U.S. has provided funds for mine awareness education and some historical data regarding bombing patterns.¹⁴² According to a Department of Defense official all “render safe” procedures that can be released have, or are in the process of, been released to deminers operating in Laos.¹⁴³

- *Lebanon* U.S. funding of demining programs in Lebanon was initiated in 1998. U.S. military personnel have conducted train-the-trainer programs with military engineers in-country and twenty-two Lebanese military personnel have attended a one-time advanced humanitarian demining training at Fort Leonard Wood. Other U.S. military personnel have assisted establishing the national demining center and developing a mine awareness campaign. Further funds will be used to finance other on-going programs to remove mines throughout Lebanon.¹⁴⁴ Spending plans for FY 00 NADR funds include: \$0.4M for mechanical equipment through the IMAS contract; \$0.057 for unspecified services; \$0.2M for ambulances; \$0.11M for World Rehabilitation Fund mine awareness programs; \$0.09M for support to the national demining office.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁸ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: “Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining, 17 June 1999.” Hereafter cited as “U.S. Department of State, 17 June 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.”

¹³⁹ U.S. Information Service, “Ambassador Steinberg Outlines U.S. Humanitarian Demining Efforts in Kosovo,” 21 June 1999.

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Department of State, 2 September 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁴¹ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 3.

¹⁴² U.S. Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” April 1999, p. 19; U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” 15 March 2000; SOLIC Information Paper.

¹⁴³ DoD Interviews, 10 May 2000.

¹⁴⁴ U.S. Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” April 1999, p. 30; U.S. Department of State “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,” 10 March 2000; SOLIC Information Paper.

¹⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 3.

- *Macedonia*, The Humanitarian Demining IWG is conducting a policy assessment regarding the landmine situation in Macedonia and possible areas of U.S. assistance.¹⁴⁶
- *Mauritania* Mauritania was accepted into the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 10 December 1998. Initially, U.S. efforts were directed at surveying mine affected regions. Other objectives of the program include developing an indigenous demining capability and a mine awareness program. Training of Mauritanian military deminers is expected to begin in 2000.¹⁴⁷ In FY 00, \$0.460M in NADR funds will be spent through the IMAS contract to procure vehicles.¹⁴⁸
- *Moldova* The Humanitarian Demining IWG approved Moldova for humanitarian demining assistance on 2 September 1999. According to the U.S. assessment of the landmine problem in Moldova, "the problem is limited to one minefield. The National Army of Moldova previously cleared the other six minefields from the 1992 internal conflict with the Transnistrian separatist region. The remaining minefield was emplaced in a haphazard manner, and mine clearance operations caused unacceptable casualties."¹⁴⁹ Department of Defense assistance goes solely toward the procurement of demining and support equipment.¹⁵⁰
- *Mongolia* The U.S. Government received a request for humanitarian demining assistance in early 1999 and the Demining IWG approved the dispatch of an assessment team. The extent of the landmine problem in Mongolia is unknown but it is possible that UXO are more of a concern.¹⁵¹
- *Mozambique* U.S. assistance to Mozambique has totaled nearly \$27 million since its inception in 1993 and has included the full spectrum of mine action activities permitted under U.S. law. This has included extensive USAID funded mine clearance projects and victim assistance efforts. The U.S. military has conducted extensive train-the-trainer activities, provided computer and communications equipment, and assisted the establishment and operation of the National Demining Commission. Department of Defense's role and funding will be curtailed as the program was "handed off" to the Department of State in April 1999. The U.S. provided \$2.0 million in additional demining equipment on 11 May 2000 in response to recent natural disasters in mine-

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Department of State, 2 September 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁴⁷ U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of African Affairs," 15 March 2000; "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 11; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: "Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining 10 December 1998." Hereafter cited as "U.S. Department of State, 10 December 1998 IWG Fact Sheet."

¹⁴⁸ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 3.

¹⁴⁹ U.S. Department of State, 2 September 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁵⁰ DoD Interviews, 10 May 2000.

¹⁵¹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: "Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining, 18 March 1999." Hereafter cited as "U.S. Department of State, 18 March 1999 IWG Fact Sheet."

affected regions of Mozambique. The planned allocation of FY 00 NADR includes: \$2.9M for operational demining through the IMAS contract; \$0.118M for vehicles and equipment through the IMAS contract; a \$0.343M grant to the HALO Trust for demining in the northern part of the country; \$0.2M to refurbish the Buquisso demining camp.¹⁵²

- *Namibia* From 1995 to 1998 over \$3.6M in U.S. military assistance was used in train-the-trainer programs, establishment and operation of a national demining office, the purchase of equipment, and mine awareness education programs. The U.S. also provided prototype machinery called a “berm processor” to mechanically clear landmines from berms surrounding 409 electrical pylons. The DoD training program was completed in February 2000 and the entire program has been transferred to Department of State management. Future U.S. funded efforts will sustain the technical expertise and logistical support to the national program, completing the berm project, and accomplishing minefield clearance quality assurance via a commercial contract.¹⁵³ The \$0.3M in FY 00 has been dedicated to an IMAS contract task order to perform the pylon quality assurance project.¹⁵⁴

- *Organization of American States/Inter-American Defense Board (OAS/IADB) (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua)* Beginning in 1993, nearly \$6.5M of U.S. assistance has been provided for demining in Central America through the OAS/IADB through 30 September 1998. The OAS has been coordinating a regional demining effort in Central America since that time. U.S. funds are used for training, equipment procurement, and mine awareness. U.S. funding also supports the multinational mine clearance organization named MARMINCA. U.S. military personnel have trained over 1,000 deminers for MARMINCA. The OAS requested and the U.S. demining IWG has agreed to support a mine-detecting dog program for Central America. The four recipient governments, with the full support of donors, have set 2002 as a target to make their states “mine safe.”¹⁵⁵ The projected allocation of FY 00 NADR funding includes: \$1.237M for a mine detection dog contract; \$0.166M for communications equipment; \$0.2M for victims assistance and mine awareness projects.¹⁵⁶

- *Oman* The Humanitarian Demining IWG provisionally approved Oman's request for humanitarian demining assistance on 9 December 2000. A survey will be conducted sometime in 2000 to establish the training and equipment requirements needed to bring

¹⁵² U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 3.

¹⁵³ U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of African Affairs,” 15 March 2000; U.S. Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” April 1999, p. 13; SOLIC Information Paper; U.S. Department of State, 17 June 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁵⁴ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs,” 15 March 2000; U.S. Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” April 1999, pp. 23-26; U.S. Department of State, 18 March 1999 IWG Fact Sheet; U.S. Department of State, 1 June 1998 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 4.

Oman's current demining units up to international standards. U.S. training of Omani deminers is scheduled to occur in February 2001. It is also possible that the U.S. will provide a mine-detecting dog capability as part of the overall country program.¹⁵⁷ A decision whether to formally include Oman in the U.S. program was deferred until sometime in 2000.¹⁵⁸

- *Peru* Peru was formally included in the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 22 February 1999. A survey of requirements followed this decision along with the purchase of some equipment. The first U.S. training program was conducted late in 1999 and another is scheduled to occur between April and June 2000. The same training is provided to deminers in Ecuador.¹⁵⁹ The establishment of a national demining center and demining operations to clear mine-affected border regions are near-term priorities of the program.¹⁶⁰

- *Rwanda* U.S. demining assistance to Rwanda began in 1994 with extensive military support to establish a national demining office, basic mine awareness training, the establishment of a computer based data collection and records management system, and a train-the-trainer program.¹⁶¹ According to the Department of State, "the country program is proceeding with one region of the country (the northeast) complete and the second region (the northwest) now sufficiently secure to conduct demining operations. The extent of the problem in the northwest is not yet known. USAID plans use some portion of its development assistance operations to fund mine action activities in the near future."¹⁶² The Department of Defense completed its demining training program in February 2000.¹⁶³ The planned allocation of FY 00 NADR funds includes: \$0.001M for the local purchase of auto parts; an IMAS contract task order for unspecified equipment, commodities and services.¹⁶⁴

- *Somalia* A U.S. delegation visited northwestern Somalia in late April 1999 and found that the unrecognized republic of "Somaliland" suffers from a severe landmine/UXO problem. The U.S. is providing funding for a HALO Trust project that will clear landmines in western Somaliland and the city of Burao. Additionally, the U.S. has provided \$0.343M to fund a CARE effort to conduct Level One and Level Two survey projects and to provide mine awareness training. While making progress,

¹⁵⁷ DoD Descriptive Summaries.

¹⁵⁸ U.S. Department of State, 9 December 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁵⁹ DoD Descriptive Summaries.

¹⁶⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs," 15 March 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 27; U.S. Department of State, 18 March 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of African Affairs," 15 March 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 14; SOLIC Information Paper.

¹⁶² U.S. Department of State, 17 June 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁶³ DoD Descriptive Summaries.

¹⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 3.

CARE's project may be forced to suspend its operations due to the European Union's unexplained failure to provide its share of funding for the project.¹⁶⁵ The planned allocation of FY 00 NADR funds includes \$1.3M for HALO Trust activities (grant signed 27 March 2000) and an unspecified \$0.1M reimbursement for the HALO Trust project.¹⁶⁶

- *Swaziland* The Humanitarian Demining IWG approved Swaziland for humanitarian demining assistance on 1 June 1998. Swaziland has a single minefield, 10 kilometer long and 50-100 meters wide, along part of its border with Mozambique. The focus of the U.S. program has been on training military demining personnel, providing equipment and equipment operator training.¹⁶⁷

- *Thailand* Thailand was approved for humanitarian demining assistance in November 1999. Funding will establish a national mine action center, a demining school, and mine awareness program. Additionally, funding will be used to purchase demining equipment, protective clothing, and vehicles. According to State Department budget justification materials, "FY 2001 funds will complete the planned three-year cycle to fully train the Thai demining trainers and equip six demining platoons with trucks, computers, and demining gear, building the capacity Thailand needs to address the landmine problem along its borders with Cambodia and Burma."¹⁶⁸ The second round of Department of Defense train-the-trainer programs was conducted between April and June 2000.¹⁶⁹ The planned allocation of FY 00 NADR funds includes: \$0.1M for Level Two Survey activities; \$0.5M for an unspecified mine detecting dog program; \$0.5M for equipment and vehicles; \$0.07 for facilities refurbishment; \$0.05 for an unspecified regional initiative.¹⁷⁰

- *Vietnam* The U.S. demining program is in a nascent stage. U.S. personnel have traveled to Vietnam on an assessment mission and engaged in discussions regarding the types of assistance that can be provided as part of a bilateral demining assistance program.¹⁷¹ The U.S. announced on 20 June 2000 that an agreement had been reached with Vietnam to provide demining equipment.

¹⁶⁵ U.S. Department of State, 17 June 1999 IWG Fact Sheet; U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of African Affairs," 15 March 2000.

¹⁶⁶ U.S. Department of State FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 3.

¹⁶⁷ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 15; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: "Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining 1 June 1998."

¹⁶⁸ U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 120; U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs," 15 March 2000.

¹⁶⁹ DoD Descriptive Summaries.

¹⁷⁰ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 4.

¹⁷¹ U.S. Department of State, 17 June 1999 IWG Fact Sheet.

- *Yemen* The U.S. program in Yemen was initiated in October 1997 and approximately \$4.0M has been allocated prior to 1 October 1998. U.S. Central Command deployed a twenty five member humanitarian demining training team on 20 March 1999 to conduct train-the-trainer operations with Yemeni military engineers. Other U.S. funded activities include establishment of a central demining office in Sa'naa and a regional demining office in Aden, and the provision of equipment.¹⁷² The planned allocation of FY 00 NADR funds includes: \$0.813M for vehicles and equipment; \$0.015 for computers; \$0.046 for office support; \$0.36M for unspecified "sustainment" activities.¹⁷³
- *Zambia* The Humanitarian Demining IWG authorized an assessment visits to Zambia in March 2000.¹⁷⁴
- *Zimbabwe* Zimbabwe was approved for inclusion in the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 5 February 1998. Prior to 1 October 1998, Zimbabwe received \$2.3M in U.S. assistance. U.S. military personnel trained Zimbabwe soldiers in August and September 1999 on techniques for minefield survey, mine clearance, and advanced medical training. While a national demining center and a mine awareness campaign have been initiated, the focus of the U.S. program seems to be on the provision of heavy equipment and the training necessary to operate and maintain this equipment in demining operations. Apparently, the U.S. and the European Union explored the possibility of jointly demonstrating new demining equipment at Victoria Falls, one of the Government of Zimbabwe's highest priorities.¹⁷⁵

Survivor Assistance

The primary vehicle for U.S. government funding for landmine survivor assistance is the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund (WVF) administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The WVF provides prosthetic assistance for victims who have lost limbs as a result of landmines and other war-related injuries. Since 1989, the WVF has provided \$60 million in support for victims of war in sixteen countries. The approximate FY 2000 budget is \$12 million.¹⁷⁶ Expenditures for landmine victims are not separated out from those for war victims overall, thus it is not possible to give a precise value to U.S. spending on mine victim assistance programs.

The WVF is dedicated to improving the mobility, health, and social integration of adults and children who have sustained physical disabilities as a direct or indirect result

¹⁷² U.S. Central Command, "Humanitarian Demining Country Plan For The Republic of Yemen," 19 July 1999; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 31; U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs," 15 March 2000; SOLIC Information Paper.

¹⁷³ U.S. Department of State, FY 00 NADR Project Status, p. 4.

¹⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State, 30 March 2000 IWG Fact Sheet.

¹⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 – Bureau of African Affairs," 15 March 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 16; SOLIC Information Paper; U.S. Department of State, 2 September 1998 IWG Fact Sheet; U.S. European Command Press Release, 28 July 1999.

¹⁷⁶ <http://www.info.usaid.gov/press/releases/fs991101.html>

of war or civil strife. These programs focus on medical care and physical rehabilitation. This includes the expanding of cost-effective, quality prosthetic services and setting up well equipped, self-sustainable local medical facilities. Related services, such as gaining access to education and employment opportunities are also funded to promote the economic and social rehabilitation of the victims. These programs can be funded in a variety of ways. Country-based projects meeting criteria are mostly funded through grants to organizations that work closely with host governments and that are registered with USAID. Funds are normally negotiated and managed directly from USAID's overseas missions. Specific WVF projects include:¹⁷⁷

- *Angola* \$3.033 million has been given to the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation since September 1996 for the "Angolan Regional Rehabilitation Project." This money funded the construction of a rehabilitation center that provides orthopedic devices to disabled Angolans as well as funding the training of thirty-three Angolans as orthopedic technicians, physiotherapists, and administrators. The clinic has fitted 360 Angolans with prostheses, the majority of whom are landmine victims.
- *Cambodia* \$500,000 will be allocated between 1998-2001 to Handicap International for the purpose of establishing the Disability Action Council in Cambodia. This body has coordinated, promoted, and monitored services for disabled Cambodians, as well as implemented a communication network between itself, government agencies, international organizations, and NGOs.
- *Cambodia* \$7.778 million will be allocated between 1996-2001 to the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation for the "Cambodia Prosthetics and Rehabilitation Program." The program has treated more than 8,000 patients with prostheses and wheelchairs, and has provided socioeconomic assistance and employment training to Cambodians with disabilities. A Cambodian staff has been trained and the planning of satellite workshops in eastern Cambodia is underway.
- *Central America* For the period 2000-2002, \$500,000 will be allocated to the Pan American Health Organization in support of the "Central American Tripartite Land Mine Initiative." The purpose of this initiative is to improve the physical, social, and economic development of persons disabled by landmines in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
- *Ethiopia* Since July 1998, \$1 million has been given to the International Committee of the Red Cross for the "Special Fund for the Disabled's Polypropylene Prosthetic Training Centre" to train African technicians in the production and use of prosthetic components. Thousands of components have since been made in Addis Ababa.

¹⁷⁷ All subsequent descriptive summaries of WVF programs taken from United States Agency for International Development, "Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, Portfolio Synopsis," Spring 2000.

- *Laos* \$2.118 million has been granted to “The Consortium” (World Education, World Learning, Save the Children/USA) for the War Victims Assistance Project. These funds have provided medical equipment and renovations for six hospitals as well as the training of three hundred medical staff. Seventy-nine landmine victims have been treated. The funds have also gone towards landmine education programs under which 43,000 students are currently studying.
- *Lebanon* \$1.390 million has been allocated to the World Rehabilitation Fund since June 1998 for the “Preventing Land Mine Injuries and Managing the Social Burden of Land Mines in Lebanon” project. The project has initiated a survey to identify minefields and victims. It has also increased involvement from NGO and community-based organizations in addressing the needs of landmine victims as well as provided training and the necessary technology for these organizations.
- *Liberia* \$1.474 million has been allocated to UNICEF since September 1994 for the “Physical Rehabilitation of War Victims Project.” Rehabilitation centers were established in five counties with trained staff. And orthopedic workshop was completed, equipped, and staffed by trained technicians. Seventy-five prostheses are now produced manually each year and over 800 disabled Liberians have been assisted.
- *Mozambique* Since November 1995, \$2.755 million has been provided to Prosthetic and Orthotic Worldwide Education and Relief for their Prosthetics Assistance Project. This project has trained local people in the production of prosthetic and orthotic devices for war victims. Thousands have since been produced under an organized management system.
- *Sierra Leone* \$60,764 allocated since November 1999 to the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation for supporting the “Emergency Assistance for P & O in Sierra Leone: Training and Components Provision” project. The funds are allocated for a technical specialist on a short-term basis to provide prosthetic assistance to war victims and to train four nationals as prosthetic technicians. Enough prosthetic limbs have been produced for one hundred amputees and need for further assistance is being assessed.
- *Sri Lanka* \$1.175 million has been given since October 1991 to the Friend-in-Need Society for their “Citizens Participation Project” to rehabilitate war victims and integrate them into mainstream society. More than 1,200 prosthetic limbs have been produced and three technicians trained.
- *Tanzania* \$300,000 allocated since September 1998 to the World Health Organization for “The Tanzanian Training Center for Orthopedic Technologists.” This grant supports prosthetics training courses for qualified African applicants.
- *Vietnam* \$900,508 allocated since September 1992 to the Health Volunteers Overseas organization for its Vietnam Rehabilitation Project. This project has promoted the professional development of healthcare providers by introducing new physical therapy curriculums, conducting workshops, and facilitating national acceptance of the

Vietnamese Nursing Association. A new discussion forum was also formed for organizations working on related issues.

Since February 1998, \$100,000 has been granted to the Prosthetic Outreach Foundation for the "Outreach Prosthetic Services and Prosthetic Component Development" program. A national prosthetic manufacturing center was opened and more than 9,000 prostheses have been delivered to patients.

Beginning in September 1998, \$1,435,510 has been given to Viet-Nam Assistance for the Handicapped (VNAH) for the "Can Tho and Thu Duc Prosthetic and Rehabilitation Project." This project promotes disability access to public buildings, including the Hanoi international airport. It has also provided 2,000 new prostheses.

Since March 1998, \$1 million has been granted to the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation for the "Thermoplastic Orthotics Rehabilitation Program for Vietnam" to promote extensive and sustainable production of thermoplastic orthoses to help rehabilitate the disabled. A new orthotics workshop was constructed and equipped, a monitoring unit was trained, new services were provided and more than 3,000 orthoses were provided for children.

Since August 1998, \$801,000 has been provided to World Vision for the "Prosthetics and Orthotics Rehabilitation Project" to upgrade the indigenous health care system to meet the needs of handicapped individuals. High quality prosthetic production rates and outreach services to beneficiaries have increased since several rehabilitation centers were handed over to the Vietnamese Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs.

A small number of private organizations fund victim assistance programs in mine-affected countries. For example, the Prosthetics Outreach Foundation conducts programs in Vietnam that are entirely funded from private sources. Another private organization, PeaceTrees Vietnam, a project of the Earthstewards Network, has funded mine clearance and mine awareness in Vietnam's Quang Tri province since 1996 with \$595,000 in privately raised monies.

Most private organizations are using a mix of private and public funds in their programs. The biggest source of public funds is USAID through the WVF. Examples of such victims assistance programs in Vietnam include Catholic Relief Services, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped, and World Vision. Some organizations in the U.S. raise funds and then pool resources at an international level to support programs that may or may not be administered from the original U.S. group. Jesuit Relief Services-USA and CARE are examples of organizations that provide this type of assistance.

OTHER

FALKLANDS/MALVINAS

The Falklands/Malvinas are administered by the United Kingdom but claimed by Argentina, and have been a disputed territory between those two countries since the nineteenth century. The landmine problem in the Falklands/Malvinas stems from the 1982 conflict between the two countries, during which both parties to the conflict laid thousands of antipersonnel and antitank mines, including remotely-delivered antipersonnel and antitank mines.

Both Argentina and the United Kingdom are now States Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Since the islands are under the authority of the United Kingdom, the UK is obliged under Article 5 of the treaty to clear the island territory of AP mines by 1 March 2009, ten years after the treaty entered into force. (See also Argentina and UK country reports).

Landmine Problem

The November 1999 UK estimate of the landmine problem, described in the Hansard Parliamentary record is that:

[A]round 16,600 mines remain in the Falkland Islands. The Argentine armed forces laid 127 minefields on the Falklands in 1982. [UK] Ministry of Defense estimates that 18,000 mines of all types were laid, including 14,000 anti-personnel mines. British forces carried out some clearance immediately after the conflict, lifting about 1,400 mines, but stopped after several injuries to those involved. The remaining 101 minefields are marked and fenced, and therefore not an immediate hazard. The garrison conduct a public campaign to warn of the dangers. They make regular patrols and destroy mines which become exposed on the surface of the ground. The Argentines have given us their minefield records.¹

In July 1999, Retired Argentine Colonel Manuel Dorrego, who was in charge of laying mines after the Argentine army took control of the islands, told media that after Argentina surrendered he personally handed over to British troops records of the locations of minefields which included coordinates, distances and density (mines per square meter) as well as types of mines laid.² He stated, "We thought that we were going to stay in the islands, and that after a while, we would have had to remove the landmines ourselves. We never had doubts about keeping records."³

Retired Brigadier General Carlos Roberto Matalón, Chief of the 10th Company of Engineers of the Argentine Army, noted in a letter published in *La Nación* in May 1999 that his Company had laid 12,000 mines during the war and that he, along with Colonel

¹ Hansard (Official UK Parliamentary record), 30 November 1999, col. 160W.

² "Mine removal in the islands would cost over US\$ 100 million," *La Nación*, 21 July 1999, p.8.

³ Ibid.

Dorrego, handed a complete record of the locations of the minefields to British Mayor MacDonald.⁴

The UK's first and second Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency reports state that there are "117 minefields containing either anti-personnel, anti-vehicle mines or a combination of both."⁵ When the first Article 7 report was deposited three items were also submitted: Stanley Minefield Record Map revised 12/06/90; Stanley Minefield and Area Situation; and Camp Minefield Situation map dated 01/02/94.⁶

A former British army officer involved in the last minefield clearance in the Falklands/Malvinas in 1986, gave a more comprehensive listing of the types of mines found there to Landmine Monitor, which is contained in Table I.

Table I: Mines remaining in the Falklands/Malvinas

<i>Mine type</i>	<i>Country of origin</i>
No.4 AP Blast Mine	Israel
SB-33 AP Blast Mine	Italy
FMK-1 AP Blast Mine	Argentina
P4B AP Blast Mine	Spain
FMK-3 AT Blast Mine	Argentina
No.6 AT Blast Mine (copy of Russian TM-46)	Israel
M1A1 (1944) AT Mine	US
SB-81 AT Blast Mine	Italy
C-3-B AT Blast Mine	Spain
<i>Submunition</i>	
BL-755 AT and AP Cluster Bomblet	UK

The main problem areas for landmines are located in and around the parts of the islands which saw conflict including Port Howard, Port Fitzroy, Fox Bay, Darwin, Goose Green, and especially around Port Stanley. The beach at Yorke Bay is reported to be totally inaccessible.⁷

Mined areas are reportedly very clearly fenced off. Access is denied to peat cutting areas, for example the main peat cutting area on Stanley Common. Peat is used as the main fuel for cooking and heating.

Mine Clearance

Argentina's former President Carlos Saúl Menem submitted a statement on the Falklands/Malvinas to the National Assembly at the same time as the MBT ratification instrument, which was accepted without amendment. It states that "Argentina is impeded access to AP mines in the Malvinas in order to comply with the Mine Ban Treaty because

⁴ "Minefields," Letters from Readers, *La Nación*, 21 May 1999, p.50.

⁵ UK Article 7 Reports, Form I, submitted 26 August 1999 and 17 April 2000.

⁶ UK Article 7 Report, Form C, submitted 26 August 1999.

⁷ Alejandra Conti, "Malvinas: there are minefields," *La Nación*, 17 June 1999, p. 4.

of the illegal occupation by the United Kingdom.”⁸ A similar statement was made by Fernando Petrella, Argentine Permanent Representative to the UN, in a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan dated 16 December 1999.⁹

Argentina has offered assistance to mine clearance operations on the islands. Alternate Permanent Representative to the UN, Minister Ana María Ramírez, said in a statement to the UN General Assembly in November 1999 that the offer of Argentina “was accepted by the British government and currently both Foreign Affairs Ministries are interchanging ideas regarding the characteristics that would be involved in a bilateral agreement to carry out a feasibility study, [which is] necessary prior to mine removal tasks.”¹⁰

Earlier in the year, at the First Meeting of State Parties held in Maputo in May 1999, Argentine Minister Pedro Villagra Delgado, Director of International Safety, Nuclear and Space Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that “my government and the UK government agreed, through the Argentine-British Action Agenda signed in London on 29 October 1998, to work together on evaluating the feasibility and cost of removing landmines that are still planted in the Malvinas Islands. We hope to promptly conclude a memorandum of understanding on how to carry out this evaluation.”¹¹

In May 1999 former Argentine Minister Foreign Affairs, Hon. Guido di Tella, and UK Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Robin Cook, held a meeting in London where the mines issue was not formally on the agenda but it was intensely discussed, with members of the Legislative Council of the Falklands present for the first time.¹² Media reported that private clearance companies from the U.S. and Europe had offered their services for mine clearance in the islands but that the UK military wanted to do the mine clearance themselves. On the other hand, Argentina made an offer to help finance the work but only if it is not carried out by the UK military. General Charles Guthrie of the United Kingdom told media that both countries were working on a landmine clearance feasibility study.¹³

On 14 July 1999, both governments restated their commitment to cooperate on mine clearance in a Joint Statement by former Foreign Affairs Minister di Tella of Argentina and Foreign Affairs Minister Cook of the UK. A paragraph of the Joint Statement said, “As agreed in October 1998 by the president of the Argentine Republic and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the two governments will continue to work together to evaluate the feasibility and the cost of the removal of the landmines still present in the Malvinas Islands.” The Joint Agreement was sent to the Secretary General

⁸ Landmine Monitor has a copy of the interpretative statement. See also Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 30 March 2000.

⁹ Landmine Monitor has a copy of the letter.

¹⁰ Statement by Argentine Alternate Permanent Representative to the UN Minister Ana María Ramírez to the UN General Assembly 54th session, New York, 18 November 1999.

¹¹ Statement by Minister Pedro Villagra Delgado to the First Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999. See also the UK government’s Hansard (UK Parliamentary record), 30 November 1999, col. 160W.

¹² “Progress intended in mine clearance in Malvinas,” *La Nación*, 24 May 1999, p. 11.

¹³ *La Nación*, 24 May 1999.

of the United Nations, to be distributed as an official document in the next ordinary session of the General Assembly.¹⁴

The Joint Statement also noted, "We are fully committed to the Mine Ban Treaty, which requires us to clear all anti-personnel mines from the Falklands Islands within 10 years of entry, unless we can show good reasons why an extension should be granted. Such reasons may include humanitarian, environmental and technical considerations. Mine clearance in the Falkland Islands is both difficult and dangerous and we shall be keeping these points in mind."¹⁵

In March 2000, Geoff Hoon, UK Secretary of State for Defense visited Buenos Aires for an official visit. According to reports in the Argentine media, the conditions for Argentine assistance in the clearance of landmines in the islands were allegedly discussed and the UK agreed to the offer of Argentine economic assistance.¹⁶ Newspaper reports quoted high-ranking officials at the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs as saying that there was a possibility of reaching an agreement on joint mine clearance operations of the islands through an international bidding process called by both the Argentine and UK governments.¹⁷

Mine Awareness

According to the UK's April 2000 Article 7 Report, warning measures include the following:

- The minefields are surrounded with a three strand fence and there are signs, marked "Danger Mines" at regular intervals around the perimeter, in addition to the NATO standard mine warning triangles;
- Local schools are given mines and unexploded ordnance briefings at least once a year until the children leave school aged 16;
- As a force protection measure, all inbound passengers on the Royal Air Force flight receive an Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit briefing in the Arrivals Lounge at the Falkland Islands principal airfield (Mount Pleasant Airfield);
- The JSEOD unit liaises closely with the Falkland Islands government to ensure passengers arriving on cruise ships and civilian charter aircraft are aware of the dangers of mines.¹⁸

The 1998 Hidden Killers report by the U.S. Department of State listed a total of fourteen casualties to landmines in the Falklands/Malvinas.¹⁹ It is not known when the last casualty occurred.

¹⁴ "The Statement," *La Nación*, 15 July 1999, p. 3.

¹⁵ Hansard (UK Parliamentary record), 30 November 1999, col. 160W.

¹⁶ Andrea Centeno, "London Trusts e la Rua," *La Nación*, 10 March 2000, p. 3.

¹⁷ Andrea Centeno, "London will propose removal of mines from Malvinas," *La Nación*, 9 March 2000, p. 14; Andrea Centeno, "London Trusts De la Rúa," *La Nación*, 10 March 2000, p. 3.

¹⁸ UK Article 7 Report, Form I, submitted 17 April 2000.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: the Global Landmine Crisis*, September 1998, p. A-4.

ASIA-PACIFIC

STATES PARTIES

AUSTRALIA

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Australia on 1 July 1999. Australia destroyed its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in five days at the end of September 1999. Australia expects to spend a new high of US\$8 million on mine action programs in its 1999/2000 budget year.

Mine Ban Policy

Australia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. The Parliament passed ratification and implementation legislation (“Anti-personnel Mines Convention Act 1998”) on 10 December 1998. Australia officially deposited its ratification with the UN on 14 January 1999. The Mine Ban Treaty thus entered into force for Australia on 1 July 1999.

In addition to the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Act 1998, other implementation measures include: (1) a training booklet for the Australian National Defence Force that “aims to provide Commanders and staff with an interpretation of revised policy on landmines, booby traps and improvised explosive devices and their application to military operations;”¹ and (2) an information document produced by the Department Of Defence “conveying to the Defence organisation its obligations under the Ottawa Convention.”²

Australia participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. In a statement to the plenary, the head of the Australian delegation said, “The Ottawa Convention has established a persuasive norm against landmines, a norm whose influence we see in the impressive number of countries that have signed and ratified the Convention, as well as in the tone of the debate on landmines issues in international fora.” But he also noted that “the task remains immense and we must ensure that there is no slackening of international political resolve until it is complete.”³

Australia’s work in support of universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty has a particular emphasis on its own region. According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, “In late 1999, Australian Diplomatic Missions in the South Pacific undertook a series of representations to governments of those states that have not signed and ratified the convention. The Australian government has undertaken to report on the outcome of these consultations and to follow-up with each state prior to the second meeting of States

¹ Training Information Bulletin (TIB), no. 86, “The Ottawa Convention: A Commander’s Guide,” Article 7 report submitted 23 December 1999.

² Defgram, No. 196/99 entitled “Ottawa Landmines Convention—Defence implications and obligations.” A Defgram is a publication disseminated within the Defence Organisation. Article 7 Report submitted to on 23 December 1999.

³ John J. Griffin, Assistant Secretary, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australian National Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Landmine Ban Convention,” Maputo, 3-7 May 2000.

Parties to the Convention.”⁴ Recently Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer raised the issue of U.S. accession to the Mine Ban Treaty in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.⁵

Australia has been an active and important participant in the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty and is a regular participant in the New York-based Mine Action Support Group (MASG). At the March 2000 meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance, Australia presented a non-paper on civil and military cooperation for building national capacities for demining. At the December 1999 meeting of the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Australia made a presentation on its destruction program.

Australia submitted its first Article 7 transparency report on 23 December 1999. The report covers the period from 1 June 1999 to 27 December 1999. On 18 April 2000 Australia submitted its second Article 7 report covering the calendar year 1999; it is identical to the first Article 7 report.

As it had done in previous years, Australia voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

In February 2000, Australia appointed the Hon. Senator Kay Patterson, Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as its Special Representative on Demining, succeeding the Hon. Kathy Sullivan.⁶

CCW and CD

Australia ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II on 22 August 1997. Australia submitted its report under Article 13 of Amended Protocol II in November 1999 and participated in the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties. In a statement to the plenary, Australian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN and to the Conference on Disarmament Leslie Luck stated that:

The Australian Government is committed to the attainment of a truly universal ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines. This is our priority.... Realistically, however, this goal is unlikely to be achieved in the short or even medium term. Until that time, the restrictions imposed by Amended Protocol II will play an important role in reducing the indiscriminate and inhumane effect of landmines on civilian populations.⁷

⁴ Email from Philippa King, Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations, Geneva, to HRW/Landmine Monitor, 20 June 2000.

⁵ Foreign Minister Downer speech at the Australian Network event, the Assessment of the Call for Posters, 29 May 2000. This was reported in Australian Network, *Memorandum 47*, 31 May 2000.

⁶ Letter from the Hon. Kay Patterson, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, received 21 June 2000.

⁷ Statement by Australian Ambassador to UN & Conference on Disarmament Leslie Luck to First Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 15 December 1999.

In March 2000 a representative of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade described the government's continued support for negotiation of a transfer ban through the Conference on Disarmament:

Australia believes that a landmine transfers ban would complement the goals of the Ottawa Convention. Such a ban would engage key producers and users of landmines not yet in a position to adhere to the Convention in efforts to further strengthen the global regime against landmines. Australia believes that the Conference on Disarmament... is the most appropriate forum in which to pursue a transfers ban. Australia, however, is prepared to consider alternative options should the CD-route prove unfeasible.⁸

NGO Activities

The Australian Network of the ICBL has participated in most of the treaty intersessional meetings. Activities undertaken by the campaign in the past year include community participation in the Australian government's Destroy a Minefield initiative, managed by AustCare, a Call for Posters competition, and activities around the annual refugee week in October.

The Australian Network has written to the Australian embassies of non-signatory states of the region. On 3 March 2000, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) and several Australian NGOs and Sri Lankan community groups started collecting signatures for a petition urging the Australian Government to energetically lobby the Sri Lanka Government to sign the Mine Ban Treaty and for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to observe the terms of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁹

ICBL Issues of Concern

An ongoing issue of concern shared by the ICBL and Australia relates to antivehicle mines with antihandling devices. Australia's then-Special Representative on Demining the Hon. Kathy Sullivan in a February 2000 letter to the ICBL Coordinator stated, "It is also Australia's understanding that anti-vehicle mines which are configured to explode from an unintentional or innocent act should be treated as anti-personnel landmines for the purposes of the Treaty."¹⁰ This understanding is shared by the ICBL.

The ICBL has expressed concern about States Parties potentially engaging in joint military operations with non-States Parties that use antipersonnel mines. In this regard, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* expressed concern about and reported in detail on Australia's National Declaration that was deposited with its instrument of ratification at the UN, as well as Part 2, clause 7(3) of the Anti-personnel Mine Convention Bill.¹¹

⁸ Email from Paul Stephens, Executive Officer, Conventional & Nuclear Disarmament Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to Australia Network, 29 March 2000.

⁹ Kosala Jayasingh, "Australian action against landmines in Sri Lanka," *Daily News*, 8 March 2000.

¹⁰ Letter from the Hon. Kathy Sullivan, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, 10 February 2000. The letter echoed a statement made by the Australian delegate to the January 2000 meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

¹¹ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 348-350.

Questions were raised regarding the consistency of the Declaration and clause with the Mine Ban Treaty's Article 1 prohibition on assisting anyone in any way to engage in any activity prohibited by the treaty.

Production and Transfer

The Australian government states that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It imported AP mines from the United States in the past.¹²

Stockpiling and Destruction

Australia destroyed its entire stockpile of 128,161 AP mines in a period of five days from 27 September to 1 October 1999.¹³ The destruction of the stockpile just three months after entry into force, and nearly four years before the treaty deadline, was described as "a pro-active move on the part of the Australian Government and the Department of Defence."¹⁴

The destruction took place in the desert at the Lake Hart Demolition Area, in Woomera, South Australia using a demolition method devised by Defence that involved the preparation of pits laid alternately with mines and ammonium nitrate mixed with diesel fuel. A total of 90,371 NM M14 mines and 37,790 NM M14E1 mines, weighing approximately 27 tons, were destroyed with their fuzes. This particular method was chosen because of the "efficient and cost effective nature of the destruction."¹⁵ The cost of destruction was approximately US\$146,000.¹⁶ The destruction was covered by national news media and the Coordinator of the Australian Network was brought to the destruction site to witness the process.

Colonel Paul Power of the Australian Defence Force, who oversaw the destruction process, presented the Australian case study at the first intersessional meeting on stockpile destruction in Geneva on 9 December 1999. Australia wanted to provide information on its stockpile destruction to other States Parties, especially those in the region, that may require assistance in developing their own destruction techniques. One result of the December 1999 intersessional meeting is that Australian Defence Force personnel have traveled to Peru to discuss destruction options.

Australia has decided to keep 10,000 AP mines, (4,500 NM M16 and 5,500 NM M14) for training and research purposes. According to the Article 7 report, these mines are held in ammunition depots throughout Australia and training is conducted by the School of Military Engineering in Sydney. Australia took the decision to retain these mines after the Department of Defence conducted a "training needs analysis" that determined that:

¹² Ibid., pp. 350-351 for more details.

¹³ "Australia destroys its Stockpile of Anti-Personnel Landmines," Media Release by Defence Affairs Organisation, Department of Defence, DPAO 293/99, 28 September 1999. Up until this point, Australian officials had refused to release details on the exact number, types, origins or location of stockpiled AP mines and had given no indication of the timetable for destruction.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., Annex A.

¹⁶ Ibid., "Response to Specific Questions," annex.

Defence trains over 600 personnel per year in demining techniques and our training methods require that each student destroys at least one mine during training. Retention of this stock will provide a 10-year training reserve for Defence and will thereby provide adequate time to source training stocks of foreign mines that better suit Australia's training requirements. Alternatively, if such procurement is not possible, Defence will need to resort to a replica device to meet its research and training requirements. No such device has yet been developed. Depending on the availability of alternative training devices, additional APL may be destroyed during the period 2001-2003.¹⁷

Use

Australia halted operational use of AP mines on 15 April 1996, though it retains for operational use a stockpile of command-detonated Claymore mines.¹⁸ Use of command-detonated Claymore mines is allowed under the treaty, but not use of Claymores with tripwires. In September 1999, the Australian Defence Force confirmed that it had brought command-detonated Claymore mines to East Timor as part of its peacekeeping mission.¹⁹ This clarification came after media witnessed the unloading of Australia's supplies at the airport in Dili saw wooden boxes clearly marked "anti-personnel mines."²⁰

Mine Action Funding

The Australian Government, through its international development agency AusAID, has contributed or spent approximately US\$30 million on humanitarian mine action from fiscal year 1995/1996 through 1999/2000, including a new high of about \$8 million in 1999/2000.²¹ In addition, Australia has already committed about \$18 million for the period 2000/2001 through 2004/2005. The total of \$48 million represents over three-quarters of Australia's commitment to provide approximately \$60 million (Australian \$100 million) to mine action by 2005.²²

¹⁷ Ibid., Annex A.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Paul Daley, "Landmines report 'false' – Australia," *The Age* (Melbourne daily newspaper), 22 September 1999.

²⁰ Yenny Zannuba, "Australian peacekeepers fly in – peacefully," *The Age*, 21 September 1999.

²¹ Email from Penny Bond, AusAID, to HRW/Landmine Monitor, 16 June 2000.

²² This commitment was reiterated at the First Meeting of States Parties. Statement by John Griffin, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3-7 May 2000.

AusAID Assistance for Mine Action Programs: Year by Year (US dollars)

Contributed		Committed	
1995-1996	\$4.5 million	2000-2001	\$6.5 million
1996-1997	\$4.5 million	2001-2002	\$3.2 million
1997-1998	\$5.9 million	2002-2003	\$2.7 million
1998-1999	\$7 million	2003-2004	\$2.7 million
1999-2000	\$8 million	2004-2005	\$2.7 million
<i>Subtotal:</i>	<i>\$29.9 million</i>	<i>Subtotal:</i>	<i>\$17.8million</i>

Total: 1996-2005, U.S. \$47.7 million

(Australia's fiscal year is from 1 July to 30 June)

AusAID's Humanitarian and Emergencies Section coordinates all demining policy and programming within the Australian aid program. This includes contributions to mine action programs globally, in particular through NGOs, as well as contributions to UN agencies. Funding is directed, roughly in descending order of magnitude, to core grants (Cambodian Mine Action Center, Mozambique Accelerated Demining Program, UN Development Program, and UN Mine Action Service), mine clearance (NGOs and UNDP), integrated programs (including surveys), mine victims, equipment and technical assistance (including seminars and conferences) and mine awareness. Core grant contributions cut across all aspects of humanitarian mine action and it is difficult to separate the categories.

There is a clear geographic priority for funding, with the bulk allocated for projects/action in Australia's immediate region, particularly Cambodia (which has received more than half of Australia's mine action funding) and Laos. Significant support has also been provided to countries outside of the region, in descending order: Mozambique, Angola, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. Funds will soon be available for Thailand.

Summary of Expenditure & Commitments January 1996 to December 2005²³							
Mine Action Programs in Millions of Dollars							
COUNTRY	Mine Clearance	Mine Awareness	Mine Victims	Integrated Programs	Core Grant	Equipment, Technical Assistance, Seminars & Conferences	TOTAL (Aus.\$ Million)
CAMBODIA	2.57	0.87	2.15	10.81	25.50	2.80	44.69
LAOS	2.30	1.73	0.29	2.74	4.80	0.51	12.37
THAILAND	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.49	0.00	0.49
MOZAMBIQUE	8.01	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.50	1.18	9.76
ANGOLA	0.96	1.16	0.58	0.50	0.30	0.00	3.50
AFGHANISTAN	1.00	0.05	0.00	0.50	0.90	0.00	2.45
SRI LANKA	0.00	0.06	0.00	3.35	0.00	0.00	3.41
GLOBAL	0.00	0.00	2.00	0.28	1.25	0.33	3.86
TOTAL	14.84	3.87	5.09	18.18	33.74	4.82	80.53

²³ The dates are both calendar and fiscal years as this represents the period of the Government's 10 year commitment. AusAID: program information as at June 2000. Email from Penny Bond, AusAID, to Stephen Goose, Human Rights Watch, 13 July 2000.

Other recent funding commitments include the Australian government's "Destroy a Minefield" initiative launched in November 1999 by the Foreign Minister. Approximately \$411,000, including \$127,200 from sales tax revenue from the Elton John CD "Candle in the Wind" in memory of Princess Diana has been committed to "Destroy a Minefield." The government will provide one dollar for every two dollars raised by the Australian public for mine clearance in Cambodia.²⁴ In April 2000, the Australian Government announced a \$100,000 contribution to the ICBL's Landmine Monitor.²⁵ The Australian Network of the ICBL has received funding assistance from the government to enable participation by campaigners in international meetings, for the cost of advocacy-related meetings both domestic and international, and for an art and photography exhibition by Australian artist George Gittoes.

A proportion of Australian mine action funding includes in kind contributions, either in personnel costs or equipment. The Australian Defence Force provides on a rotating basis two military personnel to work as technical advisers to the U.N.'s Accelerated Demining Program in Mozambique. Australian civilians, and until recently soldiers, provide training and organizational support to Cambodia's mine action program.²⁶

One Australian company, Minelab, has donated a small amount of equipment for use in humanitarian mine clearance. It is envisaged that Australian businesses and corporations will make contributions to mine clearance under the "Destroy a Minefield" initiative.

AusAID is currently developing a policy framework for expenditure of mine action funds. At an April 2000 national gathering of the Australian Network of the ICBL, AusAID presented a summary of the government's humanitarian mine action strategy.²⁷ This came after a period of consultation with NGOs, interested individuals (including commercial deminers), multilateral organizations and Australian diplomatic, posts between September and November 1999. There are also guidelines available to NGOs for writing proposals, submitting progress reports and acquitting funds.

In April 1999, following reports of corruption in the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), Australia, CMAC's largest donor, temporarily suspended its AusAID funding of approximately \$1.7 million a year. In November 1999 CMAC received a bridging payment of \$254,400. On 5 April 2000, Australia disbursed \$920,000 to a donor trust fund managed by the UNDP, which oversees CMAC's finances, saying the agency had made substantial progress in reforms to address concerns raised during 1999.²⁸ In early June 2000, the Australian Foreign Minister visited Cambodia to view the CMAC mine clearance program and that of other humanitarian agencies.²⁹

²⁴ Email from AusAID to Australian Network, 17 March 2000.

²⁵ Letter from the Hon. Senator Kay Patterson to Landmine Monitor, 3 April 2000.

²⁶ Australia's national annual report under CCW Amended Protocol II, Article 13, Form E, submitted November 1999.

²⁷ 1999-2000 AusAID MINE ACTION FUNDING ROUND.

²⁸ "Australian Funding Keeps Cambodian Demining Agency Afloat," *Associated Press* (Phnom Penh), 6 April 2000.

²⁹ "Cambodia's landmine myths exploded," *The Australian*, 3 June 2000.

Research and Development

In December 1997, Australia announced that its government-funded Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) would spend Australian \$4 million over the next five years on “further research into mine detection and neutralization.”³⁰ In its CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, Australia said, “Within the Australian Department of Defence, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and the Combined Arms Training Centre are developing new methods of clearing mines. Completion of this research will take a number of years. At this stage, Australia is not in a position to provide details, but will do so as soon as methods and technologies are refined.”³¹

In July 1999, the DSTO co-hosted, along with the U.S.-based Mine Warfare Association (MINWARA) and the U.S.-based Wilson Institute for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance, an “International Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem.” From 26-30 March 2001, MINWARA and the Wilson Institute will be holding a “Second Australian-American Joint Conference on the Technologies of Mines and Mine Countermeasures” in Sydney, Australia but involvement by the DSTO is unknown.³²

Since 1996, the University of Western Australia has undertaken research on mine and UXO clearance problems in several countries.³³ At the second SCE on Technologies in May 2000, Professor Trevelyan of the University of Western Australia presented a paper on opportunities for improving the mine action process. This research has been funded principally by the U.S. Department of Defense and by private donations since 1997.

Adelaide-based company Minelab Electronics, together with Canada’s Computer Devices Corporation, has developed the “Improved Landmine Detection System” vehicle.³⁴

Landmine Casualties

While Australia is mine-free, there have been a number of civilian and military casualties to landmines from overseas work, but no detailed data is available. Comprehensive national disability laws exist including the Disability Discrimination Act 1992.

³⁰ Statement by Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Ministerial Treaty Signing Conference for the Mine Ban Treaty, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.

³¹ Australia’s national annual report for CCW Amended Protocol II, Article 13, submitted November 1999.

³² Mine Warfare Association website <www.demine.org> accessed on 10 June 2000.

³³ Assoc. Prof. James Trevelyan, “The University of Western Australia Demining Research Project 1999-2000,” <http://www.mech.uwa.edu.au/jpt/demining/>.

³⁴ “Australia Helps Make World’s 1st Landmine Detection Vehicle,” *Asia Pulse Ltd*, 8 July 1999.

CAMBODIA

Key developments since March 1999:

At least 1,012 people were hurt or killed by landmines in 1999, a decrease of 41% from the previous year. There were 417 mine casualties reported in the first five months of 2000. As areas formerly held by the Khmer Rouge became accessible, whole villages of disabled people were being discovered. In 1999, about 11.9 square kilometers of land were cleared. The Land Use Planning Unit was established in May 1999. Nearly 500,000 people received mine awareness education in 1999, the most ever in a single year. A scandal over financial mismanagement resulted in the Cambodian Mine Action Center making some important reforms.

Cambodia ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 28 July 1999. It entered into force for Cambodia on 1 January 2000. Treaty implementation legislation took effect 28 May 1999; the new law created the National Demining Regulatory Authority to coordinate activities related to the mine problem. Cambodia has served as co-chair of the Standing Committee of Experts on Technologies for Mine Clearance. More than 5,000 stockpiled mines were collected and destroyed. No new mines were reported laid.

Mine Ban Policy

Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and deposited its ratification document at the United Nations on 28 July 1999. The treaty entered into force in Cambodia on 1 January 2000. Cambodia's transparency report required by Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty was due on 28 June 2000.

"The Law to Prohibit the Use of Anti-Personnel Mines" is the domestic legislation of the Royal Government of Cambodia to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. The law was adopted by the National Assembly on 28 April 1999, and entered into force when King Norodom Sihanouk signed it on 28 May 1999. The law bans the production, use, possession, transfer, trade, sale, import and export of antipersonnel mines. It provides for criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment for offences committed by civilians, or members of the police and the armed forces. It also provides for the destruction of existing antipersonnel mine stockpiles and the creation of the National Demining Regulatory Authority to coordinate activities related to the mine problem.

The Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) has produced a video and television spots explaining the law. These have been aired on national television. Mine Awareness teams from CMAC and at least one NGO have played the video in village settings to educate people on the implications of the law. Songs, traditional chants, plays and village discussions have also been used. In some places the village people are aware of the law and are afraid to either keep or sell mines. In other places, the storing of mines so they can be traded across the border is observed. To date, there are no known instances of trial or punishment for breaking the antipersonnel mine ban law.

Cambodia voted in favor of the December 1999 UNGA resolution promoting the Mine Ban Treaty. At the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Deputy Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations Sun Suon, said, "As one of the victim countries of landmines, Cambodia supports all initiatives leading to the total ban of the production, use, stockpiling, export or transfer of landmines and to their

destruction forever. It is in this spirit Cambodia was one of the first countries to sign the Ottawa Convention in 1997. This year...it became one of the States Parties.... Now we realize that the emphasis should be placed on the full and speedy implementation of the Ottawa Convention in the worldwide context.”¹

Cambodia participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Mozambique. The Cambodian Representative made a statement in which he expressed his Government’s deep concern about landmines, inside and outside the country, it’s concrete commitment to eradication of landmines around the world, and recalled CMAC’s official focal position within the eradication process inside Cambodia.² At the meeting, Cambodia agreed to serve as the co-chair of one of the five newly created Intersessional Standing Committees of Experts (SCEs) – the SCE on Technologies for Mine Clearance.

Aside from the Technologies SCE, the government has also actively participated in most of the other SCE meetings, on Victim Assistance, Mine Clearance, and Stockpile Destruction, and in the second the SCE meeting on General Status of the Convention in May 2000. Representatives of the Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines attended the Victim Assistance SCE meetings and addressed the September 1999 meeting. The tenor of their message was that the credibility of the treaty depends on its credibility in the eyes of the victims.³

Cambodia is a state party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It participated in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999. Cambodia submitted its report required under Article 13 of the amended protocol. At the conference Head of Delegation Ieng Mouly said, “Mine action depends largely on support in terms of funding, human resources and technologies. Many developed nations hold the keys to resources. Many mine affected countries belong to the developing world; it is essential therefore to support mine action with good co-operation. This co-operation reflects also the spirit of international solidarity.”⁴

Cambodia has no stated position on negotiating a ban on mine transfers in the Conference on Disarmament. However, the government is against anything that dilutes the Mine Ban Treaty and will continue to promote all aspects associated with this treaty.⁵

Production

While the government of Cambodia has never mass-produced mines,⁶ various armed forces have manufactured homemade mines (Improvised Explosive Devices).

¹ H.E. Sun Suon, Deputy Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the UN, Statement to the UN General Assembly, New York, 18 November 1999.

² H.E. Ieng Mouly, (then) Chairman of the Governing Council of the Cambodian Mine Action Center, Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3 May 1999.

³ Tun Channareth and Denise Coghlan, address to ICSE, Geneva, 15 September 1999.

⁴ H.E. Ieng Mouly, Statement to the First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 15 December 1999.

⁵ Interview with Ieng Mouly, Phnom Penh, 1 February 1999.

⁶ The government manufactured just one type of mine, the KN-10 Claymore-type mine, in the early 1970s. *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 389.

However, there is no evidence of production of even homemade mines by any Cambodian group since February 1999.

Transfer

Since the early 1970s, many landmines have crossed the borders of Cambodia, though it is difficult to know which mines were imported by the Cambodian government, by opposition forces, and which were simply brought to Cambodia by foreign armies.⁷ The Cambodian government is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines in the past.

Since October 1994, Cambodia has maintained a formal position against the import or export of antipersonnel landmines.⁸ In an interview on 17 February 1999, the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and Chief of Joint Staff Lt. Gen. Pol Saroeun stated that the government was no longer importing landmines, and that he was unaware of any such trading in Cambodia.⁹ Informal surveys in February 1999 and April 2000 of a local market notorious for the sale of weapons found that antipersonnel landmines were no longer available.¹⁰

However, Landmine Monitor researchers have been told of three cases of people storing mines for possible cross border trade.¹¹ In one instance, a demining agency found some villagers reluctant to surrender mines for destruction because they can sell them across the Thai border for 20 Baht each (about US\$.50).¹²

It is claimed that antipersonnel landmines are clandestinely traded by groups or individuals through Thailand to the Burma border, and also sold to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, but no evidence of such transfers was found in 1999 and 2000.

Stockpiling and destruction

On 17 February 1999 RCAF Deputy Commander in Chief Lieutenant General Pol Saroeun formally stated that the RCAF no longer had stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines. The RCAF reported that between 1994 and 1998, it destroyed 71,991 antipersonnel mines, as well as 3,585 antitank mines, and 2,302 improvised explosive devices.¹³ These landmines were destroyed by explosion, individually and in groups, as they were found.¹⁴

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 pointed out that the relatively small number of AP mines destroyed--and reported by the military to be the entire stockpile--stands in stark

⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 390-394. *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* reported that thirty-six different types of antipersonnel mines from about a dozen countries had been found in Cambodia. A June 1999 Ministry of Interior report on mines found in the national police stockpiles indicated the most common were Type 72, POMZ-2 and OZM-4 antipersonnel mines, as well as TM-62 antitank mines. "Mines in Police Stockpiles in Provinces," Ministry of Interior, June 1999.

⁸ Norodom Sihanouk, Declaration of King of Cambodia, Beijing, 2 October 1994.

⁹ Interview with Lt. Gen. Pol Saroeun, Phnom Penh, 17 February 1999.

¹⁰ Market survey conducted by Kim Phirum, February 1999 and April 2000.

¹¹ Interview, Cambodian Red Cross, Banteay Meanchey, 21 January 2000.

¹² Interview, Halo Trust, Banteay Meanchey, 21 January 2000.

¹³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 391, for year-by-year destruction totals.

¹⁴ Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, Report about demining in Cambodia, 15 February 1999.

contrast to previous estimates of Cambodia's stockpile of more than one million mines.¹⁵ RCAF has continued to maintain that its entire stock has been destroyed.¹⁶ However, throughout 1999 and 2000 significant numbers of antipersonnel mines held at provincial military and police facilities have continued to be turned in and destroyed. Mines held by villagers, and even the Khmer Rouge, have also been destroyed.

Article 10 of the domestic mine ban law states, "Whoever possesses any types of mines, be it ministry or institution, shall report to the Cambodian Mine Action Center, specifying the types, numbers of mines and other detailed information related to the mines in their possession no later than 90 days after the entry into force of this law." Article 11 of the law states, "The Cambodian Mine Action Center must destroy all the mines as stipulated in Article 10 within one year after the entry into force of this law and send a report to the Royal Government."

The law also established the National Demining Regulatory Authority to coordinate activities related to the mine problem, including the registering and destruction of stockpiles. In 1999, the Regulatory Authority wrote to all relevant ministries and provincial authorities asking that all stockpiles of antipersonnel mines held by police, soldiers and village authorities, be handed over so that the mines could be registered and destroyed.

The Regulatory Authority and CMAC reported that a total of 5,118 antipersonnel mines were handed over and destroyed in 1999, and another 250 in January 2000. Mr. Sen Samnang of the Authority visited the sites and witnessed destruction. The Regulatory Authority also reported 1,390 antipersonnel mines destroyed in 1998 that were not included in the RCAF totals for that year.¹⁷

Landmine Monitor obtained from the Regulatory Authority a detailed list of the places that had turned in mines.¹⁸ It included police stations, military garrisons, military courts, "Secretariat of Espionage Research," Army Stockpiles in Battambang province, and other locations. The largest number of mines were turned in by "Police Headquarters for Rubber Plantations, Kampong Cham province," with 845 on 18 June 1999 and another 845 on 18 July 1999.

CMAC reported 789 antipersonnel mines destroyed in Siem Reap, possibly removed from minefields or handed in by villagers.¹⁹ CMAC also reported that in January 2000 it was called by Khmer Rouge military leaders, at the urging of villagers, to

¹⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 391. See also, Human Rights Watch, *Cambodia at War*, 1995, p. 100.

¹⁶ This was noted by Ieng Mouly, Director of the National Demining Regulatory Authority, at a meeting of the Cambodia Coordination Demining Commission on 7 April 2000. He said obtaining information about stores of any weapons held by the Defense Ministry was very difficult. RCAF has not been responsive to inquiries regarding stocks from either Landmine Monitor or the National Demining Regulatory Authority in 2000.

¹⁷ Information provided by Regulatory Authority, 4 January 2000; CMAC Report to Landmine Monitor meeting, Banteay Meanchey, 21 January 2000; CMAC PMU Siem Reap report, Cambodian Demining Commission meeting, 7 April 2000; "Mines in Police Stockpiles in Provinces," Ministry of Interior, June 1999.

¹⁸ Information provided by Regulatory Authority, 4 January 2000. See also, "Mines in Police Stockpiles in Provinces," Ministry of Interior, June 1999.

¹⁹ CMAC PMU Siem Reap report, Cambodia Demining Commission meeting, 7 April 2000.

destroy 250 mines held in a former storage house of the Khmer Rouge in Bung Beng Village, Banteay Meanchey.²⁰

Landmine Monitor researchers were shown a very large abandoned cache of weapons, including mines, in Anlong Veng province near the Thai border. Many farmers report finding small “stockpiles” as they dig gardens.²¹

The Cambodia Mine Action Center has retained less than one thousand antipersonnel landmines for training. These are kept in the regional headquarters and the training center in Kampong Chhnang. CMAC usually uses copies of landmines for training purposes.²²

Use

While many mine incidents occur in Cambodia, it is almost certain they occur because of mines laid in the ground in the past. There is no concrete evidence that new mines were laid in 1999 or 2000 by any of the armed groups that now make up the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.

Rumors persist that individuals still use mines to protect or mark off their plots of land.²³ Domestic squabbles are sometimes settled with the use of weapons including mines. An antipersonnel mine was responsible for the death of six people in a private house in Tuol Kok, Phnom Penh in November 1999.²⁴ This indicates that antipersonnel mines are still hidden in private homes.

Non-State Actors

The remaining Khmer Rouge officially rejoined the nation on 25 December 1999, so officially there are no longer guerrilla groups in Cambodia.

Mine Action Funding

Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) provided a comprehensive report of their funding sources and expenditures from 1993 through 1999. A very large proportion of CMAC funds is channeled through the UNDP Trust Fund.²⁵

During 1999 CMAC received US\$8,594,941, of which \$7,989,086 came from the UNDP Trust Fund.

Aside from the Trust Fund, other contributors to CMAC in 1999 included the UNHCR (\$336,000), the German Rhino Project (\$132,214), the Japan Brush Cutter Project (\$24,623), and the Royal Cambodian Government (\$66,238). “Adopt A Minefield” is a program initiated by the non-governmental United Nations Association-

²⁰ CMAC Report to Landmine Monitor meeting, Banteay Meanchey, 21 January 2000.

²¹ Landmine Monitor field visits to Anlong Veng and Trapeng Prasat, February 2000.

²² Interview with CMAC Director General Sam Sotha, Phnom Penh, 16 February 1999.

²³ Interview, Cambodian Red Cross, 21 January 2000.

²⁴ *Phnom Penh Post*, November 1999, p. 14.

²⁵ Financial Report, 12th Steering Committee Meeting, CMAC Trust Fund, Phnom Penh, 25 April 2000.

USA. A UNDP memo dated 18 April 2000 indicates \$196,015 is available to CMAC for "Adopt A Minefield" programs in Cambodia.²⁶

CMAC received a total of \$53.7 million through the UNDP Trust Fund during the period December 1993 to 10 April 2000 (not including in-kind donations or equipment). The major donors included: Australia (\$10.45 million); Netherlands (\$9.36 million); Sweden (\$8.02 million); and Japan (\$7.8 million). Others contributing included UK, Denmark, Canada, Norway, Belgium, Finland, U.S., New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, and the Holy See.

However, the above list does not give an accurate reflection of total contributions by individual governments to mine action in Cambodia. Many governments contribute not just through the UNDP Trust Fund, but also through bilateral programs, non-governmental organizations, in-kind donations, and supply of equipment. The United States, for example, has given only \$910,000 to the trust fund, but calculates that it has contributed an additional \$19 million to mine action in Cambodia from 1993-1999.

In terms of in-kind donations and equipment, in 1999 Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) contributed technical advisers and a truck to CMAC, and a training assistant to the Cambodian School of Prosthetics and Orthotics. The U.S. Embassy contributed trucks to CMAC, MAG and Halo Trust in 1999. On 11 May 2000 the Japanese government gave a \$3 million in-kind to CMAC for mine clearance.²⁷

Halo Trust's operations in Cambodia in 1999 cost about \$4 million. Its donors included the governments of the United Kingdom, Finland, Japan, Ireland, and U.S., as well as the European Commission DGIB and ECHO, UNHCR, UNDP, Swedish Red Cross, Concern Worldwide (Ireland), Community Aid Abroad (Australia), Association to Aid Refugees-Japan, Fondation Pro Victimis, and Nagano Olympic Committee-Japan.²⁸

The Mines Advisory Group's operations in Cambodia in 1999 cost about \$3.9 million. Its donors included the governments of the United Kingdom (DFID), Australia (AusAID, in partnership with World Vision), United States (USAID), and Austria, as well as UNHCR, UNICEF, Fin Church Aid, EZE, Church World Service, Lutheran World Service, Anti-Landmijn Stichting, and Caritas/Austria.²⁹

Norwegian People's Aid's operations in Cambodia in 1999 cost about \$3.6 million for resettlement, rehabilitation and community integration in Beng Trakun, Seng, O Bei Choun and Poipet Communes of Banteay Meanchey.³⁰ Funding is mainly from the Norwegian government.

Handicap International spent \$2.197 million for its victim assistance programs in Cambodia in 1999. Funders included Echo, NORAD/NPA, UNICEF, FAO, Belgian Ag Framephone, Belgian Co-operation, Luxembourg Co-operation, Terre des Hommes, the Finnish government, and private donors. Programs funded included National Support to Cambodian Victims of Anti-Personnel Mines and People with Disability (\$710,815); Economic and Social Rehabilitation 8 provinces (PRES) (\$294,760); CRC Database (\$291,377); Physical Rehabilitation Programme, Phnom Penh & 11 provinces

²⁶ UNDP Memo, Claude Grahame to Dominique McAdam, Phnom Penh, 18 April 2000.

²⁷ *Cambodia Daily*, 12 May 2000, p. 7.

²⁸ Halo Trust, "Socio-Economic Land Use Report," October 1999.

²⁹ MAG Briefing Paper, December 1999.

³⁰ NPA Report to Landmine Monitor, 17 December 1999.

(\$289,644); Regional Rehabilitation Centre for Spinal Injured Persons (\$250,000); Capacity Building of Disabled People in Community (\$185,665); and Use of Demined Land in Favor of Vulnerable People (\$174,370).

Jesuit Service Cambodia (JS/JRS) spent \$815,272 in 1999 on different aspects of mine action, including farming assistance, housing, wells, hearing aids, wheelchairs, income generating possibilities and advocacy for survivors, building schools, roads, health posts, non-formal education in mine affected communities, vocational training for disabled, wheelchair production and furniture production by disabled. Additional funds were spent for other rural development activities. These funds came from private donors of Jesuit Service and two Catholic fund raising agencies.

Maryknoll reported spending \$110,000 on skills training program for disabled. This was funded largely by Misereor, a Catholic funding agency in Germany. Another German foundation funded Maryknoll's large program for the blind.

Landmine problem

After 30 years of conflict Cambodia is among the most mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affected countries in the world. In 1999 and 2000, as areas formerly held by the Khmer Rouge became accessible, whole villages of disabled people were being discovered, as well as small groups of families living in extreme misery in areas surrounded by mines. Surveys and mine incidents particularly in the northwest of the country show that mine contamination is a grave restriction not only to economic development but also to a sense of freedom and security. The eradication of mines in Cambodia is still a priority for development.

According to the CMAC database, 644 square kilometers of land is mined, and another 1,400 square kilometers is suspected to be mined.³¹ About 155 square kilometers of land has been cleared thus far. The great majority of mined areas are located in the provinces along the Thai-Cambodia border where most of the fighting occurred since 1979. The eastern provinces are mostly affected by UXOs as a result of the Vietnam War, though there are also some mined areas. A 1998 U.S. State Department report estimated the number of mines in Cambodia at 4-6 million,³² but nobody knows the real number.

CMAC does not have an exact figure of the number of families affected by landmines. However, most of the rural communities living along the Thai-Cambodian border are affected by mines in various ways. Statistics from the CRC/HI Database reveal that most mine incidents in 1999 occurred in Battambang (31% of total incidents), Banteay Meanchey (20% of total incidents), Oddar Meanchey, Siem Reap, Preah Vihear, Pailin and Pursat. The population in these provinces is 3,795,674, about 33% of the total population.³³

Census enumeration could not be held due to conflict in whole districts of Anlong Veng in Oddar Meanchey, Samlot in Battambang and Veal Veng in Pursat and O'Bei Choan village of O Chrov district in Banteay Meanchey. The estimated population of

³¹ CMAC Database, 3 May 2000.

³² U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, September 1998, p. 64.

³³ General Population Census of Cambodia, 1998, p. 28. Battambang has a population of 791,589 and Banteay Meanchey 577,300.

these excluded areas is 45,000. These are very heavily mine infested areas and the population estimate is probably very conservative.

The main target beneficiaries of humanitarian mine clearance are returning refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). These newly settled villagers living on marginal land close to old military positions struggle to develop their communities because of the threat of landmines.³⁴ In 1998 according to the World Food Program, there were still over 110,000 internally displaced people, waiting to resettle or just returned to their village of origin. In many cases these villages are either mined or very close to suspected areas. There were also 37,000 refugees living in Thai refugee camps who returned to heavily mine infested areas in Samlot, Samrong and Anlong Veng in 1999.³⁵

Surveys and Assessment

There has never been a systematic Level One Survey of the mine problem in Cambodia, but a great deal of suspected and confirmed areas are registered in the Cambodia Mine Action Center Database. CMAC has collected and verified reports of suspected areas, and recorded them in the database since 1992. The information recorded in the CMAC Database as of May 2000 is as follows:

- Reported (suspected) mine areas: 543 locations covering 1,234 square kilometers
- Verified mine areas: 790 locations covering 533 square kilometers
- Marked mined areas: 417 locations covering 119 square kilometers³⁶

Surveys are ongoing commune by commune on the request of the people who live in the suspected areas, the NGOs who are working there, and the local authorities. These suspected areas are then classified as reported, verified, marked, or cleared.

The most recent surveys were finished in April 2000, in Preah Vihear province and three districts of Oddar Meanchey province.³⁷ The Preah Vihear survey showed an increase of 138% (an additional 18,378 hectares) of mined land compared to older data. In 1999, two provinces and one town in the southern part of the country were surveyed (Takeo, Keb, and Kampot). The survey of Kampot and Keb showed an increase of 86% (8 square kilometers) of mined land compared to older data.

The Canadian government (through CIDA) has agreed to fund a Level One Survey costing \$2 million in the areas of the country not yet surveyed. Geo-Spatial, a Canadian company, has been awarded the contract. They will take the original CMAC survey team, recruit and expand and begin a one-year work plan in August 2000. The training will take place at the Kampong Chhang Training Centre. Planned surveys will take place in Kompong Chhnang, followed by Pursat, Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap, Anlong Veng, Kompong Thom and later in the rest of the country.³⁸

³⁴ Halo Trust report, 1999.

³⁵ UNHCR statistics, Phnom Penh, May 1999.

³⁶ Interview with PMU Demining Unit, CMAC, Siem Reap. For details see CMAC Database, 3 May 2000.

³⁷ CMAC Database, 3 May 2000.

³⁸ Interview with CMAC, Mr. Mao Vanna, 3 May 2000.

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance has been carried out in Cambodia by the national demining organization CMAC, two humanitarian demining NGOs based in the United Kingdom (MAG and Halo Trust), the military, villagers, and some commercial firms. About 155 square kilometers of land has been cleared thus far. In 1999, 11.86 square kilometers of land were cleared, and 8,006 antipersonnel mines, 70 antitank mines, and 91,131 UXO were found and destroyed.

AREA CLEARED OF MINES 1993-1999³⁹

Entity	Square Meters Cleared
Villagers	69,780,000
CMAC	53,875,460
Cofras	11,510,000
Halo	8,416,927
Army	3,940,000
MAG	3,735,374
UNTAC	2,110,000
CMM	190,000
Unknown	1,180,000
TOTAL	154,737,761

CMAC is operating in Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap, Battambang, Kampot, Kompong Speu, Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham, and Preah Vihear. From 1993-1999, it cleared 53.88 square kilometers of land, including 9.51 square kilometers in 1999.

Halo Trust is operating in Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey, and Banteay Meanchey. From 1993-1999, it cleared 8.42 square kilometers of land, including 1.99 square kilometers in 1999. Halo Trust reports that an expansion of personnel and machines, especially mechanical bush cutters (twelve were operational at the end of 1999), has resulted in a 100% increase in clearance rates during the first half of 1999 over the same period in 1998.⁴⁰ In 1998 and 1999 Halo introduced the One Man One Lane (OMOL) demining procedure to all of its operational teams in Cambodia.

MAG is operating 22 Mine Action Teams in Battambang, Preah Vihear, Pursat, Kompong Thom, and Kompong Speu. These multi-skilled Teams conduct data gathering, community liaison, survey, marking mine clearance, EOD and emergency tasks in response to identified community needs. From 1993-1999, it cleared 3.74 million square meters of land, including 350,000 square meters in 1999. Since Spring 2000, MAG has deployed two Tempest Mini-Flail Systems in Battambang. The Tempest is a remote-controlled mini-flail device, the size of a small car. These machines are produced by the Demining Technology Workshop (DTW) in Phnom Penh, a charity initially set up by Warwick University, UK and sponsored by DfID. DTW employs, like MAG, disabled

³⁹ CMAC Statistical Profile 1998; Information obtained from CMAC, MAG, and Halo Trust, January 2000.

⁴⁰ Halo Trust, Socio-Economic Land Use Report 1992-99, p.120.

Khmer staff. The Tempest is armored for minefield deployment and is designed to thresh an clear undergrowth safely, thus dramatically speeding up the mine clearance process. MAG believes that the Tempest will likely achieve a 75% increase in productivity. MAG is also conducting a 12-month trial of the 'Survivable Demining Tractor' also known as the 'Pearson' tractor, developed by Pearson Engineering, with MAG input. MAG is trialing the armoured tractor with 17 attachments that can be utilized to increase the productivity of demining operations, including brush-cutting, roller and tree extractor. PRior to clearance, MAG works closely with LUPU and establishes land ownership and hand-over procedures. MAG is currently planning to create an impact evaluation unit. - This unit will, among other activities, monitor the impact of MAG's work, including the use of land post-clearance.

MAG works Teams in several former Khmer Rouge-controlled areas, around Pailin, Kompong Speu and Preah Vihear. Following the defections and recent improvements in security, refugees and IDPs have been returning to their homes in these areas. MAG's mobile Mine Action Teams and the flexibility of its donors have enabled rapid responses to the beginnings of emergencies in these areas.⁴¹

CMAC reported in 1998 that in addition to clearance by CMAC, Halo and MAG, a total of 69.78 square kilometers of land has been cleared by village people, 11.5 square kilometers by COFRAS, 3.94 by the Army, 2.11 square kilometers by UNTAC, .19 square kilometers by CMAC CMM, and 1.18 square kilometers by unknown (likely commercial firms).

"Adopt a Minefield" is a program initiated by the non-governmental United Nations Association-USA. It has already funded clearance of two 35,000 square meter minefields in Battambang (at a cost of \$37,100 each), and another six are planned. CMAC has examined potential additional sites in Battambang and, according to the Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines, acted responsibly in suspending some sites in which there was a possibility of land grabbing.⁴² The Cambodian Campaign has a list of 17 "probable" new sites.

"Destroy a Minefield" is a program sponsored by the Australian government aid agency (AusAID), with funds being sought from the Australian public. Initial plans call for one mined area in Ta Peng village in Siem Reap to be demined by Halo Trust. From 1 December 1999, MAG has cleared one area in Boeung Sankae, Battambang under the Destroy a Minefield program.

Coordination and Planning of Mine Action

CMAC is the national demining agency. It implements mine clearance and mine awareness programs on its own, and is also responsible for the coordination of all mine and UXO clearance activities of all non-governmental organizations and others operating in Cambodia.⁴³ CMAC expenditures in 1999 were \$8,939,406. That included: Salaries

⁴¹ Information on MAG activities provided via email by Tim Carstairs, MAG Communications Director, 28 July 2000.

⁴² UNDP Memo, Claude Grahame to Dominique McAdam, UNDP Phnom Penh , 18 April 2000.

⁴³ Law to Prohibit the Use of Anti-Personnel Mines, Article 5.

\$5,255,485; Equipment \$910,109; Equipment Maintenance \$1,015,136; Transportation \$719,061; Accommodation \$315,837; Support \$573,136; Administration \$159,733.

Accusations of Corruption and Mismanagement

Accusations about corruption, nepotism and poor financial management in many Cambodian organizations, including CMAC, received much publicity in the national and international media in 1999. CMAC donors suspended funding and called for a proper audit of the entire funds received and demanded new accountability for the use of funds. A fifty-point list of requirements before funding would be continued was given to CMAC. The audit, though critical of management practices, indicated that the disbursement of funds could be accounted for to within a small proportion of the total funds. This small percentage was mainly related to funds allocated to CMAC by the Royal Government of Cambodia.

In response to criticisms of the amount of money allocated for expatriate technical advisers, conscious effort is being directed toward the reduction and restructuring of international technical support to CMAC.

The past problems of CMAC and UNDP have been well documented. Financial audits, management audits, and recommendations have been widely distributed to donors. Sun System accounting procedures have been put in place. A wide consultation on suggestions for reform was set in place.

Nevertheless the media publicity damaged the image of CMAC and lowered staff morale. Concern over whether the agency would close and whether they would have a pay packet and a job the next month was spoken of by many staff. Relationships between UNDP and CMAC were strained and some instances of public recriminations appeared in the media. The consequent and probably understandable stop-start approach to funding hindered planning.

Australia is the biggest cash donor to CMAC. In May 2000, Australian Ambassador Malcolm Lederer told Landmine Monitor that Australia wants CMAC to continue as an organization. He noted that CMAC has gone a long way to meet the criteria for reform set by donors. He said Australia has faith in CMAC and believes it has the possibility to perform its mine clearance activities even better. Even though initially Australia was a very harsh critic of the failings in CMAC, it was also one of the first to restore funding and to give additional funding in 2000.⁴⁴

Reforms

The "CMAC White Paper 2000" outlines CMAC's reform vision. The new director general of CMAC Khem Sophoan in the presentation of this strategy said, "We have a plan that will make CMAC more productive, more responsive to the needs of Cambodia and will increase the impact of our work. We have a plan that is consistent with the commitments for reform that we have already made."⁴⁵ CMAC is to become a *service provider* of humanitarian mine action under the Royal Decree. There is to be clear

⁴⁴ Telephone interview with Australian Ambassador Malcolm Lederer, 8 May 2000.

⁴⁵ CMAC White Paper 2000, December 1999, p.18.

separation between CMAC as an operational organization and the CMAC Governing Council, whose functions would include regulation;

The major changes seen to date in coordination and planning are:

- The separation and physical relocation of the Regulatory Authority with a staff separate from the CMAC Operational Staff.
- The ongoing meetings of Cambodian Demining Coordination Committee which includes all mine clearance agencies, some agencies working in the development of demined communities, the Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Royal Cambodian Army Forces, some donors and UNICEF.
- Invitation to the Land Use Planning Unit in Battambang to present their proposed form of operation.
- A renewal of the technical committee to advise on technical aspects of mine clearance.

Land Use Planning Unit and Provincial Sub-Committee

The Land Use Planning Unit (LUPU) was established in May 1999 in response to a national workshop on Land Use Planning and Management held in Battambang on 23-24 June 1998.⁴⁶ The participants of the workshop included representatives from the Ministry of Interior, Defense, Rural Development, demining agencies, NGOs, IOs, UN agencies, district authorities, military commanders, governor and department offices of Banteay Meanchey and Battambang provinces. The participants in the workshop agreed there should be an institution established that has the task of land use planning and management for development.

In Battambang a Provincial Sub-Committee (PSC) was established to manage the task of land use planning after mine clearance and to strengthen the management structures, particularly at the district level, as they relate to mined land. LUPU is the support unit to the PSC and reports directly to the PSC. The main tasks of the PSC as related to land use planning in mined areas are to ensure effective land use and management in mined areas, review demining plans, and solve conflicts arising in land use management.

The PSC consists of managerial staff from government departments and the district chiefs. LUPU promotes coordination and discussion with the district authorities, demining agencies, development agencies and the PSC. LUPU tasks include: identify mined land, prioritize mined land for clearance, develop future plans for demining, prepare development plans for mined areas, prepare documents related to beneficiaries of demined land, organize land allocation process after demining, identify and address problems with use of land and land disputes.

Of the 12 districts in Battambang, 9 have landmines; in each of these nine districts a District Working Group (DWG) and a District LUPU has been established. The District LUPU reports to the DWG and Provincial LUPU. Many information sessions and training workshops have been conducted in the districts. Workshops were conducted in each of the districts to identify the priorities for demining. Many field visits were made to assess minefields, collect beneficiary names and obtain approval from village, commune and district authorities for demining.

⁴⁶ LUPU Report to Landmine Monitor, March 2000.

Achievements to date include a workshop to finalize minefield selection for 2000 and approve development of a plan for 2000; establishment of a mapping system containing the minefields to be demined in 2000; some aerial photography and topographic information. Currently LUPU is collating a database of more than 2000 beneficiaries.

LUPU has received funding from CAREERE/UNOPS, World Vision, UNHCR and LWS. However, due to the extensive structure, the operation costs are still in excess of the funding. LWS has provided funding for one of the LUPU staff to travel to Germany and study Land Use Planning for Rural Development at the Food and Agriculture Development Center. A volunteer is helping to develop the capacity of the staff, particularly in the areas of the Geographic Information System (GIS), data collection, database creation and mapping.

Use of demined land, reconstruction and development of cleared areas

The NGO Statement to the 2000 Consultative Group Meeting on Cambodia recommends that the government urgently address the issue of land titling in a way that the needs of the poor for land prevail over the wants of the powerful and the rich. This, the statement declares, is crucial to peaceful development in mine affected areas.⁴⁷

The Land Reform Group reveals that the poorest half of Cambodia's population shares less than a quarter of cultivated land. One family in six has no land and one rural family in thirty is involved in land disputes, mostly with the military and public officials.⁴⁸ This puts disputes over what happens to demined land in perspective. The most highly publicized dispute of this nature in 1999 was an area of land in Kampot which came under the control of a former Khmer Rouge commander accused of killing foreign tourists.

In 1999 and 2000 studies were done by Halo Trust on the use of cleared land in Cambodia that show by far the biggest proportion of land is used for purposes that benefit the poor. An extensive study done in the areas cleared by Halo Trust from 1993-1999 in Banteay Meanchey, Pursat, Siem Reap and Oddar Meanchey showed that 99% of all the land cleared by HALO was used for humanitarian purposes.⁴⁹ The land cleared totaled 7.3 square kilometers and the primary uses were agriculture (44%), Resettlement (19%), and Roads/Bridges (10%). Over 318,696 Cambodians have directly or indirectly benefited from this land clearance and a further 155,840 benefit every day through roads or bridges built on Halo-cleared land.

There is only one instance of Halo-cleared land being used for an unintended purpose. In Trapeang Pol village, Samrong commune, Samrong district, Oddar Meanchey province, Halo was asked to clear the area so that land could be handed over for more housing and for use as vegetable plots. On completion of clearance, government military reclaimed the land and have subsequently used it to house their own families. Local

⁴⁷ NGO Statement to the 2000 Consultative Group Meeting on Cambodia, p. 47.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴⁹ Halo Trust/AAR, Socio-Economic Land Use Report, October 1999.

people have so far been too afraid to lodge a complaint about this action.⁵⁰ The director of CMAC in Siem Reap also said that there were some cases in which, after the handover of the mine-cleared land to villagers, some powerful people pressured them to sell their land for another purpose.⁵¹

A socio-economic assessment done by CMAC itself in 1999 of 9,977,573 square meters of land cleared by CMAC reported the use of the land as follows: 50% for agriculture, 12% for settlement, 3% for roads, 21% for other and 14% as contentious (and not yet distributed).⁵²

Agencies working in development and reconstruction of mine affected communities include: CARE, Church World Service, Jesuit Service, Lutheran World Service, Norwegian People's Aid, and World Vision. Oxfam Great Britain does not implement directly but supports partner organizations to conduct their programs. Oxfam is involved in the NGO/IO Land Law Working Group providing input into the revision of the Land Law, research into landlessness and landlessness mitigation, and land-related advocacy issues.⁵³

Mine awareness education

The main providers of mine awareness/mine risk education are CMAC, MAG and World Vision MATT team. Since 1993 more than 1.6 million people have received mine awareness education in 4,707 villages and 136 schools. Jesuit Service provides education that involves advocacy against mines; Church World Service, the NGO Forum and UNICEF have helped fund advocacy work in 1999. There is a working group led by CMAC on mine awareness where the agencies involved collaborate and coordinate their activities at both regional and national levels. Communities to be provided with mine risk education are selected according to the mine incident rate per population or upon request from the community itself.

Since 1993, MAG has undertaken mine awareness educational activities with around one million people. During 1999, MAG mine awareness and data gathering staff numbered 42 MAG staff, 12 Trainers of Teachers from three Provincial Departments of Education and 4 textbook writers from the Ministry of Education. MAG Child Mine Risk Education teams trained 3,916 schoolteachers from 1993 to September 1999. The Child Mine Risk Education Program, conducted in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, is aimed at ensuring the sustainability of mine risk education within the primary education system. This program will be handed over through the year 2000. Future community mine awareness activities will be integrated within Mine Action Teams - combined multi-disciplinary teams able to undertake community liaison, survey, marking, clearance, and awareness education work.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Halo Trust/AAR, Socio-Economic Land Use Report, October 1999. In a 28 July 2000 email to Landmine Monitor, a HALO official noted that "this is the solitary example from 120 separate cleared areas."

⁵¹ The Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines has other examples of misuse of cleared lands.

⁵² CMAC, Socio-Economic Assessment on Cleared Mine Fields, 27 April 2000.

⁵³ Moira O'Leary, Oxfam, letter to Landmine Monitor, 13 December 1999.

⁵⁴ Information provided to Landmine Monitor via email by Tim Carstairs, MAG Communications Director, 28 July 2000.

Mine marking is a crucial form of mine awareness. CMAC has two kinds of teams involved in marking mined areas. Thirteen Mine Marking Teams mark verified mined areas of high priority. Another 13 community Mine Marking Teams mark priority areas and do small scale clearance of minefields in remote villages. In addition, CMAC has produced local printed materials, videos, radio broadcasts, plays, songs, and posters in efforts to make people aware of the danger of mines. In 1999 CMAC trained 54 mine awareness educators.

UNICEF is conducting an assessment in 2000 of the level of mine awareness in Cambodia. Criteria for classifying people as “mine aware” include knowledge, attitude change, and practices.

*Number of People Receiving Mine Awareness Education*⁵⁵

1994:	59,817
1995:	121,678
1996:	216,649
1997:	281,916
1998:	423,434
1999:	497,198
Total:	1,600,692

Landmine Casualties⁵⁶

The number of mine casualties in Cambodia continued to drop in 1999. At least 1,012 people were injured by landmines and UXO in Cambodia during 1999. Of these 229 died, 311 needed limb amputations, 71 were blinded, and 34 were made deaf. The 1999 total is a decrease of 703 casualties, or 41%, compared to 1998. The 1999 total is only one-third the number of mines casualties recorded in 1996. Latest statistics show an even greater decrease. In the year from June 1999 to May 2000, there were 797 casualties.

It is important to note that the national database and consequently the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* had formerly reported 1,249 casualties for 1998. The number now quoted, 1,715, is the result of new data gathered. It is very possible that the 1999 figure will likewise be revised upward as new information is received.

⁵⁵ Interview with Tan Sung Hao, CMAC Department of Mine Awareness Education.

⁵⁶ The following information comes from the Cambodia Mine Incident Database, Monthly Report, March 2000; and, Cambodian Red Cross and Handicap International, “Cambodia Mine Incident Database Project, Casualty Trend, 1998-2000: Reported mine/UXO casualties by Month, Reporting Period: January 1998-May 2000,” dated 13 June 2000.

Mine/UXO Casualties in Cambodia 1996-2000

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recorded landmine/UXO casualties</i>	<i>Monthly Average</i>	<i>Every Day</i>
1996	3,046	254 people	8 people
1997	1,711	143 people	5 people
1998	1,715	143 people	5 people
1999	1,012	84 people	3 people
2000	(5mths) 417	83 people	3 people

Most new mine incidents occurred in the provinces of Battambang (31%) followed by Banteay Meanchey (19%), Oddar Meanchey(9%), Krong Pailin(7%), Siem Reap(7%), Preah Vihear(7%) and Pursat (5%). A month-by-month, province-by-province breakdown of casualties is available. Of the 1,012 injured in 1999, 91% were civilians.

The cessation of hostilities is a very significant factor in the decrease of accidents. The most dramatic decrease in reported casualties occurred in Oddar Meanchey, home of the last Khmer Rouge fighters. In 1998, 253 casualties were recorded there, in 1999 the number was 76. At a national level, the total number of victims in May 1998 was 188 (110 civilian), in May 1999 was 111 (100 civilians), and May 2000 was 75 (67 civilians).

While the overall number of mine casualties is dropping, the percentage of incidents involving children is increasing: from 16% in 1998, to 26% in 1999, to 30% in the first five months of 2000.

From June 1999 to May 2000, civilian mine incidents occurred while farming (26%), travelling (25%), collecting wood and food (23%), tampering (14%) and fishing/herding (5%).

During this period, of the 797 casualties, 33% were children (under 18), 60% were men and 7% were women.

The first five months of 1999 coincided with the repatriation and resettlement of the last wave of refugees for the Thai border camps. Generally speaking, most of the exceptions to the trend of decreasing casualties in 1999 can be attributed to resettlement and land clearance activities during the first half of the year in the area most affected by repatriation.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of mine victims alive today in Cambodia. However, records show that at least 40,312 people were injured by mines through the end of 1999. Records also indicate that 13,709 of those injured died between January 1979 and December 1999, thus there may be approximately 25,000 mine victims in Cambodia today. The Disability Action Council, in May 2000, will use pilot studies to try to assess the number of disabled people in Cambodia, and the cause of their disability.⁵⁷

Survivor Assistance⁵⁸

A study of disabled people in mine infested areas of Battambang, Oddar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap and areas surrounding Kampong Speu revealed that of

⁵⁷ Disability Action Council, "Disability Data Base Study," 1999.

⁵⁸ Information in this section was provided by the named organizations for the purposes of the Landmine Monitor.

1,663 survivors: 71% did not have a house that sheltered them; 7% had no house at all; 45% had to travel more than five minutes to get water for drinking and washing; 89% reported food insecurity; 32% had no land for housing or gardening; 28% received a government pension; 50% had a "job"(including rice farming); and the children of at least 46% did not go to school⁵⁹.

Most support for landmine survivors is provided by non-governmental organizations. The government provides a small pension to soldiers who become landmine victims. The pension ranges from 30,000 to 180,000 riels per month (approximately U.S. \$8 to \$47).

Health

The national budget for health for 1999 was \$21.1 million.⁶⁰ Poor citizens are to receive free medical consultation in public hospitals, infirmaries and maternities.⁶¹ However, Medicam reports that the poorest Cambodians spent 28% of household income on health and 45% of Cambodians borrow money to pay for health care.⁶² Most Cambodian disabled are among the very poorest in a very poor country. Health costs for landmine injuries can completely bankrupt the family.

The Cambodian government has developed a health plan with operational districts, which consist of referral hospitals and health centers. These health centers are planned to be within ten kilometers or two hours walk of the population they serve. In the year 2000 surgical facilities are available at the provincial level for landmine injuries. A special hospital run by the NGO Emergency provides free professional surgical and post-operative care services to victims in the Battambang area. Medecins Sans Frontieres assists a hospital in Oddar Meanchey. In many areas, poverty of both the health care staff and of the patients is the problem, not the lack of facilities. However in the newly opened areas, where many landmine victims are located, health infrastructure has still to be developed. Equal access to quality health care at provincial centers according to the government plan is the main goal of the Cambodia Health Sector Reform, but it still has to be realized.

Prosthetics

Five international organizations have taken responsibility for the production and distribution of prosthetics in Cambodia. They include the American Red Cross, Cambodia Trust, Veterans International, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Handicap International. There are some fifteen workshops, located throughout Cambodia. In 1999 the total number of prosthesis produced was 6,215, an average of 518 per month. The Foot Factory is a private business with technical assistance from HI, which uses local materials to produce vulcanized rubber, solid ankle, and cushioned-heel prosthetic feet. The ICRC-funded and operated Components Factory supplies prostheses and orthotics parts to the majority of the workshops in Cambodia.

⁵⁹ Data gathering in Jesuit Service Disabled Outreach as of 31 March 2000.

⁶⁰ Ministry of Finance Report, 5 April 2000.

⁶¹ *Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia*, Article 72.

⁶² Medicam Statement Human Rights Supplement, Cambodia Daily, April 2000.

The National School of Prosthetics and Orthotics (NSPO) is located in Phnom Penh, sponsored by American Friends Service Cambodia, American Red Cross, Cambodia Trust and Veterans International, and operated by Cambodia Trust. The National School of Prosthetics and Orthotics has the capacity to train 12 students per year in a three-year curriculum course. The course has international accreditation and is developing a role in the region, as two students from the Laos joined the program last year. A Regional Rehabilitation Center for Spinal Injured Persons is sponsored by Handicap International in Battambang.

The total number of prostheses produced in 1999 include: the American Red Cross (589), Cambodia Trust (1,230), Handicap International (1,635), Veterans International (1,208), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (1,553).

Wheelchairs

Production of wheelchairs is done by three organizations in Cambodia. Assessment of wheelchair users, training in wheelchair use and follow-up is also done by these agencies. A national plan for wheelchair distribution was attempted and is partially successful. ICRC, ARC, HI, CT and various NGOs and individuals purchase and distribute wheelchairs to the handicapped. There is a policy amongst wheelchair producers and distributors that wheelchairs made in Cambodia, for Cambodian conditions, by Cambodians are the most suitable. Import of wheelchairs from other countries is discouraged. To date very few users are able to afford the \$75 to pay for a wheelchair, however many users have made small donations towards the cost of wheelchair production in Cambodia.

Organizations producing wheelchairs in Cambodia, and total number of wheelchairs made in 1999, include: Jesuit Service Cambodia (908), Veterans International (351), and Association to Aid Refugees-Japan (300).

Vocational Training and Socio-Economic Integration for the Disabled

As the number of disabled in Cambodia is so large, vocational training centers which discriminate in favor of the disabled have been essential. Organizations that conduct vocational and skills training centers include: Association to Aid Refugees-Japan, Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Social, Jesuit Service Cambodia, Maryknoll, United Committee of Cambodia, Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor and Veterans Affairs, partnered by World Vision.

In addition to centers, some organizations including International Labour Organization, Cambodia Disabled Peoples Organization, Veterans International, World Vision, Thean Thor, Maryknoll, and Jesuit Service have short courses in different locations or in the village to teach animal raising, community agriculture and other income generating skills. The National Center for Disabled Persons, Rehab Craft, Maryknoll, Veterans International, and Jesuit Service provide outlets for craft production or employment opportunities which discriminate in favor of landmine victims and other disabled.

Disabled children who have missed the opportunity to begin primary classes at the normal entry age may study at Lavalla school run by the Manst Mission. Deaf and blind children can study at Krousa Thmey centers. UNICEF has funded the Disability Action Council with \$101,320 for a study on disabled children and education. Simple things like

wheelchair access to school and the provision of wheelchairs and tricycles so handicapped children can travel to school are needed in many parts of Cambodia.

Community Services

Many organizations listed by the Disability Action Council help survivors and other disabled through self-help groups, community-based assistance, referral systems, counseling, and outreach. These include Action for Disability, Cambodian People's Disabled Organisation, American Friends Services Committee, Handicap International (PRES and CABDIC), Operation Enfants de Battambang, Servants, Maryknoll, Veterans International, Jesuit Service, Help Age, Social Services of Cambodia, National Center for Disabled Persons, American Red Cross, and Thean Thor. Creative ways of helping towards the empowerment of survivors are being implemented.

Disability Policy and Practice

Cambodia does not yet have separate disability laws, but disability issues are addressed in Cambodian laws. Article 74 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia says that the state shall help persons with disabilities and their families. Draft legislation of a proposed disability law has been prepared. This draft legislation is a basic tool for the promotion and development of measures to enable individuals and organizations to strengthen management capabilities to develop and initiate activities on disability prevention and social problem solving. The law should also contribute to developing a policy framework and guidelines for inclusion and integration of people with disabilities into mainstream development of programs (including education, vocational training, and employment) while recognizing some specialized services are still needed for specific categories of disabilities. The draft law aims to ensure the protection of the rights of all people with disabilities and prohibition of abuse and neglect of these persons and discrimination against them.

The Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor and Vocational Training, and Youth Rehabilitation (MOSALVY) has been assigned to undertake the main responsibility for disability and rehabilitation. Unfortunately, it is a poorly supported and financed ministry lacking major resources to address critical issues in the disability and rehabilitation sector. The Ministry of Veterans and Women's Affairs is responsible for the pensions for disabled veterans. Currently, the disabilities and rehabilitation sector has in place the Disability Action Council (DAC), which is a national coordinating body. The DAC plays a role in coordinating, facilitating, negotiating, and networking between individuals, organizations, and institutions working for the well-being of people with disabilities. A fundamental issue has been the limited representation by people with disabilities, including women, to take their place and role in society.

FIJI**Mine Ban Policy**

Fiji signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 10 June 1998. Fiji has not yet enacted domestic implementation legislation. It submitted its Article 7 transparency report on 12 November 1999. Fiji voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had in previous years. Fiji was not present at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. It is neither a member of the Conference on Disarmament nor a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

In March 2000, ICBL Ambassador and Cambodian mine survivor Tun Channereth travelled to Nadi, at the invitation of the UNICEF regional office, and advocated in support of Pacific nation accession, ratification, and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty at two meetings of parliamentarians from the Pacific region.¹ He met and spoke with many Fijian parliamentarians and politicians, school children, local media and NGOs.

Fiji's Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Boladuadua, told the ICBL delegation that he would look into preparation of domestic legislation and would consider putting the landmine issue on the agenda of the Heads of State Meeting of the Pacific Forum later in 2000.

Production, Stockpile, Transfer, and Use

It is believed that Fiji has never produced, transferred, or used AP mines. Fiji declared no stockpile of AP mines, including for training, in its Article 7 transparency report. Landmines have not been used in the recent coup nor are they believed to have been used in previous coups.

Landmine Casualties

In September 1999 three Fijian peacekeepers were slightly injured when a landmine exploded beneath their UN armored personnel carrier in south Lebanon.²

JAPAN

Key developments since March 1999: Japan's funding for mine action programs increased more than 60% to a total of \$13.1 million in 1999. Stockpile destruction is underway. Japan has served as the co-rapporteur for the Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance.

¹ UNICEF, *Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channereth, ICBL Ambassador*, March 22-31, 2000, p. 7.

² "3 Lebanon peacekeepers hurt," Associated Press (Tyre, Lebanon), 25 September 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Japan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 30 September 1998. The ratification law also constituted domestic implementation legislation, and took effect 1 March 1999.

The Japanese delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999 was led by Keizo Takemi, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He stated, "It is an extraordinary success that the Convention entered into effect only one year and a few months after its opening for signature, and that it can already boast more than 130 signatories and more than 70 ratifiers. The States Parties should utilize each and every opportunity to urge other states to become party to the Convention."¹

At the meeting Japan was named, along with Nicaragua, as the co-rapporteur of the Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance. Japan will become co-chair of that committee at the time of the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000. Japan has been an active participant in all of the intersessional meetings.

On 27 August 1999, Japan submitted, on time, its report to the UN as required by Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty. On 28 April 2000, Japan submitted its second report, covering the period from 1 April to 31 December 1999.

On 1 December 1999, Japan voted in favor of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution (54/54B) in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in 1997 and 1998.

Japan ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 10 June 1997. Japan attended the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva from 15 to 17 December 1999. In accordance with Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, Japan submitted its annual report on 15 October 1999.

Japan is a member of the Conference on Disarmament and has supported efforts to begin negotiations on a landmine export ban in that forum, but such efforts failed in 1998 and 1999, and appear doomed in 2000.

Japan's commitment to the mine ban had been led by the interest shown by former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, who died on 14 May 1999. (For details on development of Japan's ban policy see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 355-357.) On 12 January 2000, during an official visit to Cambodia, the former Prime Minister visited a demining project site. He also attended the official ceremony of the commencement of the antipersonnel landmine destruction program held on 17 January 2000 at Shiga Prefecture, Japan.

NGOs remained active in promoting a mine ban in 1999 and 2000. The Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) activities included research for *Landmine Monitor 2000*, hosting of symposiums and workshops, participation in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, and publication of the "Landmine Monitor Executive Summary 1999" in Japanese. Association for Aid and Relief-Japan continued to serve on the

¹ Statement by Mr. Keizo Takemi, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, before the Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention against Anti-personnel Landmines, 3 May 1999.

Coordination Committee of the ICBL and in November 1999 and January 2000 hosted visits by Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams, who met Prime Minister Obuchi.

Production, Trade, Use

In the past Japan produced four types of antipersonnel mines, designated Types 63, 67, 80, and 87. The Type 87 is a scatterable mine with three variants. Production was halted in 1997, and Japan reported that manufacturing facilities had been decommissioned by 31 March 1999.² Japan has never exported antipersonnel mines. Japan imported M3 mines from the U.S.³ Japan has not used antipersonnel since the establishment of the Defense Force in 1954.

Stockpiling and Destruction

As of 31 December 1999, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) held 998,866 stockpiled antipersonnel mines.⁴ Japan intends to destroy all the mines, except 15,000 retained for training and research purposes, by 28 February 2003 in compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty.⁵

This is among the highest number of mines retained by any state party. Japan has said that the mines will be utilized over a ten year period for “training and education for safer and more effective mine detection and mine clearance. Also, if it becomes necessary to develop some equipment for mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction, Japan may test such equipment to ensure their proper functioning.”⁶ Japan reported that it had “consumed” 1,148 of the retained mines between 31 March and 31 December 1999, leaving 13,852.⁷

In addition to the 1,148 mines used for training purposes, another seventy-five mines (Type 63) were destroyed “on a trial basis” prior to 17 January 2000. On 17 January an official ceremony was held to begin the destruction process; in attendance were Prime Minister Obuchi and about 200 other observers.⁸ Plans call for destruction of approximately 220,000 mines between 17 January 2000 and the end of March 2001, an additional 380,000 mines by the end of March 2002, and the final 385,014 by the end of February 2003.⁹

The JDA’s four-year plan of destruction of antipersonnel mines is summarized in the following table.

² Report required by Article 7 of the Convention, Form E, submitted 27 August 1999.

³ Presentation by Mr. Hisao Yamaguchi to the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, 9 December 1999.

⁴ Report required by Article 7 of the Convention, Form B, submitted 28 April 2000. Japan’s first report, submitted 27 August 1999, listed 1,000,089 mines.

⁵ Article 7 reports, Forms D and F, submitted 27 August 1999 and 28 April 2000.

⁶ Presentation by Mr. Hisao Yamaguchi to the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, 9 December 1999. See also, written note to ICBL from Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 May 2000.

⁷ Article 7 report, Form D, submitted 28 April 2000.

⁸ Presentation by Mr. Hisao Yamaguchi to the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 23 May 2000.

⁹ Article 7 report, Forms F and G, submitted 28 April 2000.

Number of Antipersonnel Mines to be destroyed by type¹⁰

	<i>Stock as of March 99</i>	<i>To be destroyed by March 2001</i>	<i>To be destroyed by March 2003</i>	<i>To be retained for training</i>
Type 63	28,879	9,232	16,670	2,977
Type 67	586,463	151,544	431,916	3,003
Type 80	326,445	52,812	270,619	3,014
Type87 Scatterable	8,375	2,772	2,600	3,003
Type M3	49,927	6,000	40,924	3,003
Total	1,000,089	222,360	762,729	15,000

The amount allocated for the destruction of 222,360 antipersonnel mines by March 2001 is 419,951,000 yen (about U.S. \$3.5 million).¹¹ The average cost of destruction per antipersonnel mine, therefore, is 1,889 yen (about \$16). Costs for destroying another 380,000 antipersonnel mines by March 2002 are budgeted at approximately 800 million yen (about \$6.7 million). This is some 2,105 yen per mine (about \$17.50).¹²

During 1999, the JDA selected three private companies to carry out the first phase of destruction to March 2001: Asahi Chemical Industry Co. Ltd. (Aebano Workshop, Shin Asahi Town, Shiga); Hokkaido NOF Co. Ltd. (Bibai City, Hokkaido); and, Nippon Koki Co. Ltd. (Saigo, Fukushima). Asahi Chemical will destroy 166,776 antipersonnel mines and 151,544 fuses under a \$1.7 million contract. Hokkaido NOF will destroy 52,812 mines and 68,044 fuses under a \$1.5 million contract. Nippon Koki will destroy 2,772 mines and 2,772 fuses under a \$223,000 contract.¹³

The Japanese government has stated that destruction methods will include explosion and burning, cutting or crushing after disassembling.¹⁴ Destruction methods will vary depending upon the type of antipersonnel mine, but all explosions will be conducted in secured facilities and not in open-air fields.¹⁵ The JDA has required all three companies to observe and comply with relevant laws and regulations, such as the

¹⁰ Information provided by Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Public Information Division, Secretariat of Minister of State for Defense.

¹¹ This is included in the Fiscal Year 1999 budget. The Japanese fiscal year begins in April and ends in March of the following year. The exchange rate is that used by the government of Japan for 1999: US\$1 = 120 yen.

¹² These are funds in the FY 2000 budget. Statement by Kozo Oikawa, Director, Bureau of Equipment, Japan Defense Agency, on the occasion of the Official Ceremony of the Commencement of the Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines Destruction Program held on 17 January 2000.

¹³ Information provided by Public Relations Division, Secretariat of Minister of State for Defense, 17 August 1999. Detailed information about types, quantities and costs of destruction of mines for each company is available.

¹⁴ Article 7 report, Form F, submitted 27 August 1999.

¹⁵ Presentations by Mr. Hisao Yamaguchi to the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 9 December 1999 and 23 May 2000. See also, Asahi Chemical Industry Press Release, 25 October 1999.

Explosives Control Act, Air Pollution Control Act, and Fire Service Law. Companies must receive permission from local authorities to explode mines within their jurisdiction. The JDA will send officials to confirm destruction of antipersonnel mines and relevant local authorities will conduct on-the-spot inspections in conformity with the Explosives Control Law. The JDA has also requested the companies to observe relevant environmental regulations. The dates for destruction will be coordinated between JDA and respective companies. Destruction may be open to the public, and information regarding destruction is to be disclosed by the companies.¹⁶

U.S. Antipersonnel Mines in Japan

Japan did not report in either of its Article 7 submissions the presence of U.S. antipersonnel mines in Japan. The U.S. is believed to have some 150,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines stored in Japan, and perhaps some portion of the 1.2 million non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines that the U.S. is retaining for use in Korea.¹⁷ Japan has said that it does not have “jurisdictional authority,” so “it continues to be feasible for the U.S. forces to retain any antipersonnel mines withheld and stockpiled in the U.S. bases in Japan.”¹⁸ Japan has also said with regard to U.S. transiting of mines across Japanese territory, that “because we approve the possession of landmines by the U.S. forces stationed in Japan, it would not be necessary to request a prior notification, and thus the government has no intention of doing so.”¹⁹

Mine Action Funding

In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 18 November 1999, Ryuichiro Yamazaki, Alternate Representative of Japan to the United Nations, said that the position of Japan on the issue of assistance in mine action is based on three principles: (1) “Ownership,” or promoting the efforts of mine-affected countries themselves; (2) “Partnership,” or promoting coordination of the activities of agencies of the United Nations, regional organizations, national governments, and NGOs; and (3) “Human Security,” or promoting the survival, well-being, and dignity of all people.²⁰

At the ban treaty signing conference in December 1997, Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi announced that Japan would contribute 10 billion yen (about \$83 million) to mine action programs over the five-year period 1998-2002 in order to achieve the goal of “Zero Victims.”²¹ In 1998, Japan’s financial contribution amounted to 1 billion yen (\$8.3 million). In 1999, it rose significantly to 1,577,470,000 yen (\$13.1 million), and

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ See, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 333. Letter and Fact Sheet from U.S. Department of Air Force, 11th Wing, to Human Rights Watch, 26 May 1998, provided in response to Freedom of Information Act request. Additional information supplied to HRW on confidential basis, 1999.

¹⁸ Statement of Akio Suda, Deputy Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, 25 September 1998, p. 2. For more detail, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 360.

¹⁹ Statement by Nobutaka Machimura, Parliamentary Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998, p. 9.

²⁰ Press release by the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, 18 November 1999.

²¹ Ibid.

increase of 63%.²² The increase can be attributed to one major project in Cambodia where demining equipment was purchased.

Overall in 1999, Japan contributed to mine action programs in seventeen countries, as well as to the United Nations, Organization of the American States and International Committee of Red Cross. The 1999 contributions were devoted 89% to demining (up 9% from 1998), 9% to mine awareness, and 2% to victim assistance. International organizations received 60%, bilateral programs 30% (all to Cambodia), and non-governmental organizations 10%. The contributions to NGOs included approximately \$60,000 to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines for its *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

The Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines has encouraged Japan to restructure its assistance to allow long-term financial commitment, with a greater emphasis on funding victim assistance and non-governmental organizations. The JCBL believes that Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA), from which funding for mine action is made, is primarily geared toward development and humanitarian assistance to governmental, inter-governmental and international organizations who tend to implement demining activities, rather than victim assistance or mine awareness activities that are more often implemented by private, non-profit organizations. JCBL believes that the emphasis on international organizations provides geographic diversity, but has made it difficult to directly monitor implementation and assess further needs on the ground. JCBL also believes that Japan tends to fund items that can be disbursed within a single year, such as purchase of demining equipment, rather than multiple years.

²² Unless otherwise indicated, information regarding Japan's financial contributions toward mine action was provided by Aid Policy Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1999 and 17 March 2000.

Japan's Financial Contributions to Mine Action in 1999 (by country/region)

Contributions Made – U.S. \$ in thousands							
Country/ Region	Directly to International Organizations	Through International Organizations	on Bilat. Basis	To NGOs	Total		
	U.S.\$	U.S.\$	Name	U.S.\$	U.S.\$	U.S.\$	%
Cambodia						5,664	42.91
Demining	-	900	UNDP/ CMAC	3,920	244 ^(b)	5,064	
Mine Awar.	-	600	UNMAS/ UNICEF	-	-	600	
Laos						200	1.52
Mine Awar.	-	200	UNMAS/ UNICEF	-	-	200	
Thailand						476	3.61
Demining	-	400	UNMAS/ UNDP	-	-	400	
VA	-	-		-	76	76	
Georgia						79	0.60
Demining	-	-		-	79	79	
Bosnia Herzegovina						108	0.82
Demining	-	-		-	70	70	
Victim Assistance	-	-	-	-	24	24	
Mine Awareness	-	14 ^(c)	UNICEF	-	-	14	
Macedonia						58	0.44
Mine Awareness	-	-		-	58	58	
Yugoslavia						100	0.76
Victim Assistance	-	-		-	100	100	
Kosovo						1,783	13.51
Demining	-	1,500	UNHCR	-	250 ^(d)	1,750	
Mine Awareness	-	-			33 ^(d)	33	
Azerbaijan						500	3.79
Demining	-	500	UNMAS	-	-	500	

Mozambique							683	5.17
Demining	-	600	UNDP/ CND	-	83	683		
Angola							82	0.62
Demining	-	-		-	82	82		
Chad							400	3.03
Demining	-	400	UNMAS/ UNDP			400		
Victim Assistance	-	-				0		
Yemen							500	3.79
Demining	-	500	UNMAS/ UNDP	-	-	500		
Afghanistan							1,411	10.69
Demining	-	1,300	UNOCH A	-	80	1,380		
Victim Assistance	-	-		-	31	31		
Nicaragua							300	2.27
Demining	-	250	UNMAS/ UNDP			250		
Mine Awareness	-	50	UNMAS/ UNICEF			50		
Guatemala							200	1.52
Mine Awareness	-	200	UNMAS/ UNICEF			200		
Peru/ Ecuador							610	4.62
Demining	-	610	UNDP	-	-	610		
Organization of the American States							45	0.34
Demining	35 ^(e)			-	-	35		
Victim Assistance	10 ^(e)			-	-	10		
Grand Total							13,199	100.00

Description of Japanese Government's Contributions to Mine Action

COUNTRY/REGION	Assistance through International Organization(s)	Assistance on Bilat. Basis	Assistance toward NGOs
CAMBODIA	(1) CMAC Demining Activities through UNDP/CMAC Trust Funds; (2) Mine awareness activities of UNMAS/UNICEF through Demining Trust Fund	(1) Demining related equipment to CMAC and deployment of experts to strengthen CMAC's information system; (2) Deployment of an expert in social welfare administration to the Ministry of Social Welfare	(1) Vehicles and other equipment to demining activities of Halo Trust; (2) Transport cost, given to CMAC, of a log removal machine for testing purposes
LAOS	Mine awareness activities of UNMAS/UNICEF through Demining Trust Fund.		
THAILAND	Establishment of Thailand Mine Action Center, mine survey, mine database, and other related activities of UNMAS/UNDP through Demining Trust Fund		Rehabilitation of a local hospital for mine affected patients
GEORGIA			Demining vehicles and equipment to Halo Trust
BOSNIA HERCEGOVINA	Mine awareness activities of UNICEF		(1) AAR's reintegration activities of mine victims (equipment for vocational skills training); (2) Vehicles used in demining activities of a local NGO through Handicap International
MACEDONIA			Mine awareness activities of AAR

Description of Japanese Government's Contributions to Mine Action

COUNTRY/REGION	Assistance through International Organization(s)	Assistance on Bilat. Basis	Assistance toward NGOs
YUGOSLAVIA			Orthopedic equipment to AAR.
KOSOVO	Demining related activities of UNHCR		Mine awareness activities of AAR
AZERBAIJAN	Activities of UNMAS		
MOZAMBIQUE	Demining activities of UNDP and Comissão Nacional de Desminagem		Vehicles (for medical use) used in demining activities of Halo Trust
ANGOLA			Vehicles used in demining activities of Halo Trust
CHAD	Establishment of Chad Mine Action Center, mine survey, mine database, and other related activities of UNMAS/UNDP through Demining Trust Fund		
YEMEN	Victims assistance and mine awareness activities of UNMAS/UNDP		
AFGHANISTAN	Demining activities of UNOCHA		(1) Vehicles for demining activities of Halo Trust; (2) Medical and orthopedic equipment for activities of a local NGO, Guardians

Description of Japanese Government's Contributions to Mine Action

COUNTRY/REGION	Assistance through International Organization(s)	Assistance on Bilat. Basis	Assistance toward NGOs
NICARAGUA	(1) UNMAS/UNDP activities in demining of mines relocated due to the hurricane; (2) Mine awareness activities of UNMAS/UNICEF		
GUATEMALA	Mine awareness activities of UNMAS/UNICEF		
PERU/ECUADOR	Demining activities of UNDP on the border between Peru and Ecuador		

Notes on the tables:

a) The above tables do not include the following financial contributions to cover necessary costs incurred by the following activities on the part of the government of Japan: (1) Dispatch of project formation missions; (2) Dispatch of technical/management experts; and (3) Acceptance of trainees to Japan.

b) This figure includes transport cost for equipment granted to CMAC.

c) In March 1999, the government of Japan contributed \$1.2 million to UNICEF, out of which \$14,000 was estimated to be allocated to mine awareness activities.

d) Contributions made to NGOs in Kosovo included \$250,000 for demining and \$33,000 for mine awareness activities.

e) Japan contributed to the Organization of the American States (OAS) for its demining activities and medical assistance to mine victims in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica: \$35,000 for demining and \$10,000 for victim assistance.

NGO Mine Action Activities

Association for Aid and Relief-Japan (AAR) has been implementing various projects around the globe. It initiated a project in Cambodia with the objective of enhancing social and economic self-reliance of physically challenged people. AAR also initiated a demining project in Afghanistan (October 1999), and demining and mine awareness projects in Kosovo in collaboration with Halo Trust. AAR's demining project in Cambodia was phased out in September 1999.

The Japanese Red Cross Society has been supporting a victim assistance program in Cambodia. Humanitarian Orthotic/Prosthetic Endeavour (HOPE) implemented a project in the area of victim assistance in partnership with a Japanese NGO, Phnom Penh no Kai, and two British NGOs, Cambodian Trust and POWER. HOPE has been sending physical rehabilitation prostheses and assistive devices to Cambodia and Laos.

Japan Alliance for Humanitarian Demining Support (JAHDS), a consortium comprised of over sixty industrial and charity groups, has been operational since March 1998. JAHDS has been providing support to Cambodia and Kosovo by supplying mine detectors and other demining equipment. Japan Demining Action has been implementing a mine and UXO awareness project in Cambodia.

MALAYSIA

Key developments since March 1999: Malaysia ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 22 April 1999 and it took effect 1 October 1999. Implementation legislation is being considered by the Parliament. Malaysia has served as the co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction. Malaysia has developed plans for, but has not yet begun, destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile.

Mine Ban Treaty

Malaysia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. On 13 April 1999 the Foreign Minister signed the ratification instrument, and it was officially deposited with

the UN Secretary-General on 22 April 1999. The Mine Ban Treaty thus entered into force for Malaysia on 1 October 1999.¹

Malaysia participated in the First Meeting of State Parties (FMSP) to the ban treaty in Mozambique in May 1999. Deputy Foreign Minister Datuk Dr. Leo Michael Toyad called for sustaining the “political will and momentum” generated by the treaty, including through “close collaboration” with NGOs and “consideration of all aspects of the anti-personnel mine problem.”²

At the FMSP, Malaysia assumed the duties of co-rapporteur for the new Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts (ISCE) on Stockpile Destruction.³ It performed this role at the committee’s meetings in December 1999 and May 2000 in Geneva.⁴ Malaysia has also participated in the meetings of the ISCEs on Victim Assistance and on the General Status of the Convention.

Malaysia voted affirmatively on the UN General Assembly’s 1999 resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Malaysia submitted its first transparency report required by the treaty’s Article 7 on 1 March 2000,⁵ one month ahead of schedule.

Implementing legislation is in draft form and still needs to be presented for final reading and approval by the new parliament.⁶ Earlier parliamentary debate showed bipartisan support, with both administration and opposition members speaking against landmines.⁷ The bill was drafted by the Ministry of Defense, and is said to be patterned after the treaty and other national legislation such as Canada’s, with some variation as to penalties, domestic obligations and inter-agency responsibilities. The implementing legislation is expected to result in some budgetary outlay for treaty compliance measures.⁸

The implementing legislation will also result in a new set of directives, including new military doctrine.⁹ These new directives, especially for the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF), will be shaped not only by the legislation but also by a study with recommendations on treaty compliance. This study will be made by a board of officers

¹ Interview with Hussein Haniff, Under Secretary (Multilateral Political Affairs), in the presence of Raja Reza Raja Zaib Shah, Assistant Secretary, Policy Planning Division, and Ho May Yong, Principal Assistant Secretary (Commonwealth & Disarmament), all of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at Wisma Putra, Kuala Lumpur, 2 December 1999

² Statement by the Honourable Datuk Dr. Leo Michael Toyad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia to the First Meeting of the State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 4 May 1999.

³ Interview with Hussein Haniff, 2 December 1999.

⁴ Interview with Cdr. Razali Bin Md. Ali, RMN, Principal Assistant Secretary (Policy) 4, Defence Policy Division, Ministry of Defence, at Wisma Pertahanan, Kuala Lumpur, 19 January 2000.

⁵ Malaysia Report under the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7, 1 March 2000.

⁶ Cdr. Razali Bin Md. Ali, email, 15 May 2000.

⁷ “Both sides speak against landmines,” *The Star* (Kuala Lumpur), 21 April 2000.

⁸ Interview with Hussein Haniff, 2 December 1999.

⁹ Interviews with Cdr. Razali, 19 January 2000, and Hussein Haniff, 2 December 1999. The draft bill is still a classified document.

already formed with the Army as “process owner.” The study is to be kept within MAF in the meantime.¹⁰

As of January 2000, coordination on Mine Ban Treaty compliance is being done by an ad hoc inter-agency committee with the Ministry of Defense, particularly its Defense Policy Division, as the focal point. Other agencies involved are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly its Multilateral Political Affairs Division; the MAF Headquarters and especially the Army; the Ministry of Home Affairs and, under it, the Police; and the Attorney-General’s Chambers, only for legal and legislative aspects.¹¹

This ad hoc arrangement will most likely be regularized after the passage of implementing legislation. The shape of any new arrangement would depend on the study and recommendations of the board of officers. The defense establishment is conscious of possible NGO participation in an appropriate way, but there are also reservations about this due to the military sensitivity of some matters.¹²

Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II on mines. Malaysia did not attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties of Amended Protocol II in December 1999. With regard to negotiations on a ban on mine transfers in the Conference on Disarmament, an official has said Malaysia “would like this to be taken up.”¹³ Malaysia became a member of the CD in 1999.

Malaysian officials have underscored the importance of acting regionally, particularly in Southeast Asia, noting that in the “integration-sensitive” Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the landmines issue can be a gauge for trust-building, which is a level higher than confidence-building.¹⁴ Malaysia can be said to be taking the lead within ASEAN in addressing the landmine agenda.

Use, Production, and Transfer

Government officials state that there has been no use of antipersonnel mines since the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the government concluded negotiations in December 1989. They also state that Malaysia has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.¹⁵ It imported four types of AP mines from Yugoslavia, as well as Claymore mines from the UK and US.¹⁶

Some in the Malaysian defense establishment advocate seeking “high-tech” mines or alternatives that are “better and humane.”¹⁷

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Interviews with Hussein Haniff and with Cdr. Razali.

¹² Interview with Cdr. Razali. At the May 2000 meeting of the SCE on General Status of the Convention, the Malaysian delegation said that a board of officials had been formed to oversee all mine-related issues, headed by a senior military official, which would meet for the first time in June 2000. It is unclear if this is the formalization of the ad hoc committee.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, interview with Cdr. Razali and Major Mustaffa, 8 February 1999, p. 415.

¹⁶ Ibid. Also, Malaysia Article 7 report, 1 March 2000.

¹⁷ Interview with Cdr. Razali, 19 January 2000.

When asked by Landmine Monitor about the issue of another country transiting mines across Malaysian territory, an official responded that a general policy and practice has been to require foreign vessels to declare what they are bringing in – “no declaration, no visit.”¹⁸ But this can also be “quite catchy,” dealing with the rights of one party and the freedom of the other party, especially in passage through international sea lanes like the Straits of Malacca. This has to be tackled on a case-to-case basis, sometimes involving accommodations like a “partial declaration.”¹⁹

Stockpiling and Destruction

According to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, Malaysia has 94,263 antipersonnel mines in stockpile, with 82,252 ground-blast type and 12,011 “airburst” (bounding) type. The bounding mines are Yugoslav-made PROM-1. The ground-blast are Yugoslav-made PAM-2, PAM-3 and PAM-3 without UPMAH fuzes.²⁰

The foregoing figures do not include Claymore mines, which are not prohibited by the treaty when used in command-detonated mode. Malaysian officials have indicated that all Claymores that are retained will be command-detonated and that steps, including modifications, will be made to ensure that is so.²¹

There has been planning for, but as yet no actual destruction of antipersonnel mines. Malaysia is awaiting the implementing legislation and the recommendations of the board of officers before beginning destruction. The locations of destruction sites have been decided: Asahan Range, Malacca; Kota Belud Range, Sabah; and Sempadi Range, Sarawak. The method of destruction would be demolition using electrical method, and to be done by the Army and the Police.²²

Malaysia has announced that it will not keep any live antipersonnel mines for training purposes.²³ It will use only non-explosive practice mines (smoke mines) for training. Malaysia’s non-explosive training mines number 46,008.²⁴ The destruction of AP mines in its stockpile may also be used for training purposes.²⁵

Non-State Actors

Malaysia no longer has a non-state actor (NSA) problem, especially after its agreement with the CPM and its Malayan People’s Army to terminate hostilities on 2 December 1989.²⁶ This and other related agreements contained provisions on destruction

¹⁸ Interviews with Cdr. Razali and Hussein Haniff.

¹⁹ Interview with Cdr. Razali.

²⁰ Malaysia Article 7 report, 1 March 2000. Though listed in the report as “PAM” mines, these are usually designated “PMA” mines.

²¹ Interview with Cdr. Razali.

²² Malaysia Article 7 report, 1 March 2000, and interview with Cdr. Razali, 19 January 2000.

²³ Malaysia Article 7 report, 1 March 2000. The Malaysian representative at the ISCE on General Status of the Convention announced this in Geneva, 30 May 2000.

²⁴ Cdr. Razali Bin Md. Ali, email, 27 April 2000. Also, oral statement to ISCE on General Status, 30 May 2000.

²⁵ Ibid.; Razali email, 15 May 2000.

²⁶ Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Communist Party of Malaya to Terminate Hostilities, signed on 2 December 1989 in Haadyai, Thailand, which is Appendix “D” of General Dato’ Kitti Ratanachaya, *The Communist Party of Malaya, Malaysia and Thailand: Truce*

of firearms, ammunition and explosives and on location and destruction of booby-traps to be done by the CPM.²⁷ These agreements as well as the experience of their implementation could be studied further as a possible model for post-conflict mine clearance by NSAs. As Hussein Haniff put it, “without their cooperation, there is no way (for their mines to be cleared).”²⁸

Most of the so-called booby-traps were actually AP mines albeit of the crude, improvised type that would expire after some exposure to the jungle elements. After 1991, with the mines expiring, it was deemed no longer cost-effective to conduct the joint mine clearing special operation (“Operasi Bersih”).²⁹

Landmine Problem

It is believed that virtually all of the landmines laid in the vicinity of the Malaysian-Thai border from the 1950s to 1980s have been cleared or rendered ineffectual by the elements.³⁰ In its Article 7 report, Malaysia declared itself mine free.

Mine Action

Malaysia has not received any funding or in-kind contributions for mine action. It has made no financial contributions, but has sent peacekeeping forces that undertook mine clearing operations in countries like Cambodia and Bosnia.

Malaysia has pointed to the need for greater international and technical support for research in mine detection and clearance.

At the First Meeting of States Parties, Deputy Minister Toyad cited the need for “greater efforts to enhance research” and for “more active cooperation among states” in mine detection and clearance. He called on “countries with financial capability, technology and equipment, to come forward in providing financial, technical and humanitarian assistance to mine-affected countries as well as to landmine victims.” He also underscored the importance of “effective and comprehensive public education on mine awareness” to significantly reduce casualties.³¹

Talks Ending the Armed Struggle of the Communist Party of Malaya (Bangkok: Duangkaew Publishing House, 1996), p. 292.

²⁷ See, especially, paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 of the Administrative Arrangement between the Government of Malaysia and the Communist Party of Malaya Pursuant to the Agreement to Terminate Hostilities, signed on 2 December 1989 in Haadyai, Thailand, which is Appendix “G” of Kitti, *The Communist Party of Malaya*, pp. 302-311.

²⁸ Interview with Hussein Haniff.

²⁹ Interview with Cdr. Razali. According to him, a final report on the operation may be found in the Army Operations Center at Wisma Pertahanan.

³⁰ This assessment comes from Malaysian NGO colleagues, particularly Dr. Gopala Gopinath, a retired colonel in the Air Force medical corps, who now also does work with the Malaysian Red Crescent Society and the Malaysian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and Sanen Marshall, formerly of Just World Trust and now with the British Council, during the Landmine Monitor researcher’s conversations with them on 2-3 December 1999.

³¹ Malaysia FMSP Statement.

Landmine Casualties

There have been no reports of civilian victims of landmines. In the last known incident, an army major was killed by a bounding mine in Bosnia in 1994 as part of the peacekeeping force.³²

NEW ZEALAND

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for New Zealand on 1 July 1999. New Zealand has continued its international advocacy in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, and its financial and in kind contributions to mine action programs.

Mine Ban Policy

New Zealand signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, enacted implementation legislation (the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act 1998) on 9 December 1998, and deposited its instrument of ratification on 27 January 1999. The treaty entered into force for New Zealand on 1 July 1999. Its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report was submitted on 27 December 1999.

New Zealand participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo. Its delegation was led by HE René Wilson, New Zealand High Commissioner to South Africa and Mozambique, and also included the Convenor of the New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines (CALM). In his plenary statement, Wilson expressed disappointment over the reports of the laying of new mines in Kosovo and Angola and said that “New Zealand will continue to work strenuously to make this Treaty universal.”¹ He stated, “Demining must also remain a priority. The increase in resources that have been put into this area in recent years is encouraging. New Zealand will continue, as a matter of priority, its efforts in the area of demining.”

Representatives from the New Zealand UN mission in Geneva have attended some of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, but have not been notably active or vocal participants.

In November 1999, New Zealand Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Trevor Hughes told the 54th session of the UN General Assembly, “The laying of new mines in Angola this year as hostilities resumed is particularly deplorable. New Zealand has had a long standing involvement in mine action efforts in Angola, and it was disheartening to see UN mine action efforts reduced and shut down after so much work.”²

In December 1999, New Zealand voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

³² See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 417.

¹ Statement by HE René Wilson, New Zealand High Commissioner to South Africa and Mozambique, to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 4 May 1999.

² Statement by New Zealand Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Trevor Hughes to the UN General Assembly, Fifty-Fourth Session, Item 35: Assistance in Mine Action, 18 November 1999.

A new government took office in December 1999 and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hon. Mr. Phil Goff, made a detailed response to Landmine Monitor's request for updated information.³ He said, "New Zealand welcomes the Landmine Monitor Report and considers that it is a useful tool for encouraging transparency and the universalisation of the Ottawa Convention."⁴

Goff described New Zealand's activities in support of the ban on AP mines including raising accession to the treaty in high level bilateral meetings with non-signatory governments, "Recently these have included Finland, Russia, China, and Israel."⁵

At a meeting on 26 January 2000, CALM representatives and senior staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) met to discuss the ways in which both groups could work to encourage submission of outstanding Article 7 transparency reports, and also to encourage and assist signatory and non-signatory states in the region to fully join the Mine Ban Treaty. There was a shared concern that some antivehicle mines with antihandling devices held by some States Parties may not be legal under the Mine Ban Treaty.⁶

New Zealand ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 8 January 1998. New Zealand's Disarmament Ambassador, based in Geneva, attended the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amend Protocol II, but did not make a statement. New Zealand has submitted its Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report.

At a January 2000 meeting with CALM, the Acting Director of the International Security and Arms Control division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated emphatically that the government was not interested in any effort on AP mines in the Conference on Disarmament and noted that the government would oppose it being added to the agenda.⁷

ICBL Issues of Concern

The ICBL has expressed concern about the possibility of ban treaty non-signatories, notably the United States, transiting antipersonnel mines through the national territory, waters, or airspace of States Parties. Foreign Minister Goff told Landmine Monitor that:

Under the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act 1998, "transfer" is defined as including both importation into, and exportation from, New Zealand. Under the Customs and Excise Act 1996, importation and exportation are defined in terms of entry to or exit from New Zealand territory, including New Zealand territorial waters. Therefore, any transit of anti-personal mines

³ Letter from Hon. Phil Goff, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 13 April 2000.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Meeting with Lucy Duncan, Acting Director, and Simon Rae, Policy Officer, International Security and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 26 January 2000.

⁷ Ibid.

through New Zealand territory would constitute a transfer, and would be prohibited under s7(1)(d) of the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act.⁸

The ICBL has also expressed concern about the possibility of ban treaty non-signatories using antipersonnel mines in joint military operations with State Parties. Foreign Minister Goff wrote that:

As a party to the Convention, New Zealand does not support the use of anti-personnel mines for any purpose, and indeed continues to promote universal adherence to the Convention. In practice, there may be instances where New Zealand's armed forces participate in combined military operations with States not party to the Convention. However, there would be absolutely no question of New Zealand's armed forces engaging in prohibited conduct, since they are bound by the obligations of the Convention and the prohibitions under the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act. Section 6 of the Act makes it clear that the Act binds the Crown, and s8(d) puts the matter beyond doubt:

(d) A member of the armed forces may, in the course of his or her duties, participate in operations, exercises, or other military activities with armed forces of a state not a party to the Convention that engages in conduct prohibited by section 7 (1), *if that participation does not amount to active assistance in the prohibited conduct.*⁹

In further comment on the question of the treaty prohibition on “assist” with respect to joint military operations, Foreign Minister Goff wrote:

As noted above, s8(d) of the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act prohibits members of the New Zealand armed forces from actively assisting in any conduct prohibited by the Convention, when engaged in combined military activities with States not party to the Convention. In light of the range of hypothetical situations that may arise, it is not possible to assess questions of interoperability except on a case-by-case basis. As a general proposition, however, it is New Zealand's view that making military use of munitions laid by a State not party to the Convention, or assisting another State in any way to lay such munitions, would constitute a breach of the Convention; merely being part of a coalition in which other States used APMs, however, would not.¹⁰

Production, Transfer, Use

New Zealand has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, but has in the past imported AP mines from the United States and perhaps other nations.¹¹ At the First

⁸ Letter from Hon. Phil Goff, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 13 April 2000.

⁹ Ibid. Emphasis added.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 371-372.

Annual Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999, a Pakistani representative said that New Zealand had attempted to buy antipersonnel mines from Pakistan.¹² In response to allegations that it had tried to illegally sell antipersonnel mines, the state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) said:

The POF does not export anti-personnel mines (APMs) to any part of the world.... The items shown at Serial No. 12 and 13 in our quotation are not APMs but devices that can only be exploded by the installer/defender. These are not victim-actuated mines.... It may be relevant to mention here that for the same category of items we have received queries from a company based in Australia for export to New Zealand which is a party to the Ottawa Convention on landmines.”¹³

Serial No. 12 is the P5A3 Claymore-type mine and Serial No. 13 is the P7 MK2 bounding mine;¹⁴ the latter is clearly prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. CALM representatives subsequently met with MFAT officials who stated that the New Zealand Defence Forces had placed an order with an Australian company for Pakistan-supplied demolition charges, but not the antipersonnel mines cited by POF.¹⁵ According to the officials, the demolition charges (designated Charge Demolition No. 1 and 6-inch Beehive Mk-6) are designed so that the explosive thrust goes downwards and are used to destroy landmines, but cannot be considered landmines.

New Zealand has a history of mine use dating back to World War II and the Korean War, but prohibited operational use in 1996.

Stockpiling

New Zealand destroyed all of its mines, both antipersonnel and antitank, when it declared the unilateral ban on use in 1996. The exact number destroyed is unknown. New Zealand has not retained any antipersonnel mines for training or research purposes, as allowed under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁶ Captain Martin Donoghue of the New Zealand Army said no mines are being kept for training because of the risk of serious injury to trainees. It was considered to be far more preferable to purchase sets of replica mines containing no explosive. A contract was arranged with a local company for the production of practice mines that emit a puff of smoke and a small report when

¹² Pakistani Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan said this in a meeting with the ICBL in Geneva, 16 December 1999.

¹³ Letter from Azhar Nawaz Khan, Director Exports, Pakistan Ordnance Factories Export Division, to Mr. Steve Boulton, LWF for Dispatches, their reference No. 4105/14/G/EXPORTS, dated December 1999, faxed on 2 December 1999, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴ Pakistan Ordnance Factories Export Division “Quotation for Sudan,” their reference No. 4105/14/C/Exports dated 11 November 1999.

¹⁵ Meeting with Lucy Duncan, Acting Director, and Simon Rae, Policy Officer, International Security and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 26 January 2000.

¹⁶ New Zealand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, Form D, submitted 27 December 1999.

triggered.¹⁷ New Zealand has a small stockpile of command-detonated Claymore mines, which are permitted by the treaty.

Mine Action

In February 2000, during his first visit to New Zealand, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan complimented New Zealand on its work on humanitarian demining and on its advocacy in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁸

CALM has noted New Zealand's departure in June 1999 from participation in the mine clearance program in Angola as perhaps the most disappointing aspect of New Zealand's international contribution to mine action in the past year. Two New Zealand Army engineers at the UN demining school near Luanda returned home in June 1999 and were not replaced. New Zealand soldiers have been involved with the school since it was set up in 1995. A senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official commented that the mine clearance training capability the New Zealand engineers had helped to build would not be lost with their departure: "They would have been pulled out eventually in any case, leaving a pool of indigenous skills in their wake, but growing safety concerns with Angola's slide back into civil war prompted an earlier withdrawal."¹⁹

New Zealand continues to contribute funds to humanitarian mine action programs in Cambodia, Laos, and Mozambique, as well as through the UN.

¹⁷ Telephone interview with Captain Martin Donoghue, New Zealand Army, 11 May 2000.

¹⁸ Statement by Kofi Annan, Secretary General of United Nations, to UN Association of New Zealand and NZ Institute of International Affairs, Victoria University, Wellington, 23 February 2000.

¹⁹ Mathew Dearnaley, "NZ quits scheme to clear Angola of mines," *New Zealand Herald*, p. B1, 17 May 1999.

1998/1999 - US\$450,000²⁰	
<i>Cambodia</i>	
CMAC Trust Fund	\$93,300
Rehabilitation Craft NGO (Survivor training/employment)	\$62,500
Cambodia School of Prosthetics	\$10,100
<i>Laos</i>	
Laos UXO Programme	\$81,000
New Laos UXO Warehouse	\$18,500
<i>Mozambique</i>	
Mozambique Accelerated Demining Program	\$50,000
Contribution to Mozambique Govt, to assist in hosting FMSP	\$10,000
<i>International</i>	
UN Trust Fund for Mine Clearance	\$125,000
1999/2000 - \$398,000²¹	
<i>Cambodia</i>	
CMAC Trust Fund	\$17,500
Rehabilitation Craft NGO (Survivor training/employment)	\$57,500
Cambodia School of Prosthetics	\$32,000
<i>Laos</i>	
Laos UXO Program	\$66,200
<i>Mozambique</i>	
Mozambique Accelerated Demining Programme	\$50,000
Mozambique ADP emergency flood relief efforts	\$50,000
<i>International</i>	
UN Trust Fund for Mine Clearance	\$125,000

The New Zealand contribution to the UN Trust Fund for Mine Clearance is untagged and therefore goes into the fund's core budget, with the UN Mine Action Service ultimately deciding how the funds are spent. Funds donated to the CMAC Trust Fund, the Mozambique Accelerated Demining Programme and the Laos UXO Programme are intended to cover the in-country costs of the New Zealand Defense Force advisers seconded to those organizations.

²⁰ Funding details provided in Letter from Hon. Phil Goff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 13 April 2000. Conversion done by Landmine Monitor NZ\$1=US\$0.50.

²¹ Letter from Hon. Phil Goff, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 13 April 2000.

Funding for mine action projects comes from New Zealand's Overseas Development Aid (NZODA) program, which is administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. In-kind contributions are made by the provision of advisers from the New Zealand Defence Force. Officials from both organizations work closely together to ensure a coordinated approach.²²

The letter to Landmine Monitor from Foreign Minister Goff has a lengthy description of the several sets of criteria that are taken into account by the government when deciding which mine action project to support. Among these are principles developed by the United Nations, especially that priority should be given to those who are most vulnerable, to mine action conducted under civilian auspices, and to affected countries whose authorities cease further use of antipersonnel landmines, and take steps to cease the trade, manufacture and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines.²³

Most NZODA mine action assistance forms a part of a wider package of humanitarian aid in relevant bilateral and multilateral programs. It is recognized that mine action is crucial not only in a humanitarian sense but also as a precondition for enabling the development of rural areas.²⁴

The government has also provided funds for the New Zealand branch of the Cambodia Trust (Aotearoa New Zealand), which in turn supports the Cambodia School of Prosthetics and Orthotics. The head of Aotearoa New Zealand told Landmine Monitor that by 2001 Cambodia should be self-sufficient in fully trained prosthetists. The School this year has also been training people from Laos (five), Sri Lanka (two) and the Solomon Islands (one). Funding for the School has now been underwritten by the Nippon Foundation at least until the year 2004. Future plans under consideration include funding one of the three Cambodia Trust field clinics in Cambodia, or the adoption of a village badly affected by landmines.²⁵

Foreign Minister Goff has noted that "resources that are allocated to national mine action programmes are intended to reinforce New Zealand's in-kind contributions to UN mine action programmes, which aim to develop indigenous capacities for mine action. Funding to individual projects has specific objectives, e.g. the re-employment of landmine survivors."²⁶

New Zealand's in-kind contributions to humanitarian assistance for 1999 and 2000 include: two NZDF personnel serving as technical advisers with CMAC in Cambodia and a contribution of \$108,000; two New Zealanders working in the Accelerated Demining Programme in Mozambique administered by UNDP and a \$121,000 contribution; two personnel (a logistics/procurement adviser and a national technical adviser) assisting the Laos UXO program and a \$108,000 contribution.

Moreover, in May 1999, Lt. Col. John Flanagan was seconded by the New Zealand Defence Force to head the Kosovo Mine Action Center for an initial period of six

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Email from Russell Marshall, Chairman Cambodia Trust Aotearoa New Zealand, to Neil Mander, CALM, 2 May 2000. At the beginning of 1999, the School was certified as of international standing by the International Society of Prosthetists and Orthotists, one of only three NGO-operated schools in the world to be so registered.

²⁶ Letter from Hon. Phil Goff, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 13 April 2000.

months. He was then granted leave without pay for a further term of one year to continue in this position. The total contribution for Kosovo in this period was \$14,500.

New Zealand has provided two personnel on secondment to the UN Headquarters in New York, working in relevant demining sections of the UN Secretariat. At present, there is one adviser in the Mine Action Service in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.²⁷

Research work into mine detection continues at the Engineering School of the University of Auckland.

Mine Victims

New Zealand is mine-free but New Zealand civilians and military have been killed and injured by landmines during their work overseas. In a related casualty, Nicholas Speight, a New Zealander working with Greenfields Consulting on the UN mine clearance program in northern Iraq, was killed when he was shot by an unknown assailant in the city of Irbil.²⁸ Speight had been training locals in mine clearance.

NIUE

Niue signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and was the ninth country to ratify on 15 April 1998. Niue was the first nation in the Pacific to submit its Article 7 transparency report on 2 September 1999. Niue has not enacted domestic implementing legislation and did not report on national implementation measures referred to in Article 9 in its transparency report.

In response to Landmine Monitor's request for information, a government official said that *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* illustrates "the deepest concern of the Government of Niue and its people over the horrified and unhumane way in which millions of victims were killed by these deadly war weapons."¹

Niue is not a member of the United Nations and therefore has not participated in any of the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines. Niue was not present at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty, most likely due to resource constraints.

Niue has no military force as its defense is the responsibility of New Zealand. It is believed that Niue has never produced, transferred, or used AP mines. Niue declared no stockpile of AP mines in its Article 7 transparency report. It is not believed to provide assistance to humanitarian mine action.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Waiel Faleh, "New Zealander Killed in Iraq," Associated Press (Baghdad), 26 April 1999.

¹ Fax from Crossley Tatui, Deputy Secretary to Government, to Neil Mander, Convenor of NZ Campaign Against Landmines, 20 May 2000.

THE PHILIPPINES

Key developments since March 1999: The Philippines deposited its instrument of ratification on 15 February 2000. Increased hostilities in 2000 have included the use of antipersonnel mines or improvised explosive devices by three rebel groups: Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf, and New People's Army.

Government Mine Ban Policy

The Philippines signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. On 10 January 2000 the Philippine Senate ratified the Mine Ban Treaty. In his sponsorship speech, Senator Francisco Tatad, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the treaty is a milestone in the disarmament process: "With the signing of the Convention, the landmine issue which was considered primarily a disarmament issue was transformed into a humanitarian concern and a human rights issue." He added that "small countries like the Philippines could make a difference in international affairs and the success of the Ottawa Process was a humbling experience for big powers such as the U.S. which bitterly opposed it."¹

The instrument of ratification was deposited with the Secretary-General of the UN on 15 February 2000. The treaty will enter into force for the Philippines on 1 August 2000.

The Philippines attended the First Meeting of State Parties held in Maputo in May 1999 as a signatory state. The Philippines participated in Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings on mine clearance in September 1999, on mine action technologies in May 2000 and on general status of the convention in May 2000 in Geneva. The Philippines voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had for similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

The Philippines is a party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It attended and submitted its Article 13 transparency report to the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the amended protocol in December 1999 in Geneva. The Philippines is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Rebel Groups' Mine Ban Policies

Although landmine use by both rebel and government forces was effectively banned under cease-fire and human rights agreements among the parties, many of these agreements were rescinded in 1999 and 2000 due to the breakdown of negotiations and resumption of fighting. The first half of 2000 thus witnessed increased rebel activity, including landmine use by three rebel groups: Abu Sayyaf, New People's Army (NPA), and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Two other groups, the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas (RPM-P) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), continue to observe pledges not to use mines.

¹ Senator Francisco Tatad's Sponsorship Speech, "Let's Take Out All The Landmines Now," 10 November 1999.

Abu Sayyaf

The Abu Sayyaf (Bearer of the Sword) is a radical Islamic armed group that claims it is waging a jihad against the government. It openly engages in kidnappings and bombings and embraces the use of landmines.

NPA

The New People's Army is the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines-National Democratic Front (CPP-NDF). Prior agreements between the government and CPP-NDF specifically provided the right of both parties not to be subjected to indiscriminate bombings and the use of landmines. The NPA used antipersonnel mines regularly in the past. Peace negotiations with the CPP-NDF were suspended in a dispute over the Senate ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States. The suspension spurred renewed clashes between government troops and the NPA. The NPA raided police and military camps, kidnapped high-ranking military officials, and ambushed military convoys with the aid of mines.

MILF

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front withdrew from peace talks in April 2000 after government troops assaulted a main rebel camp. The MILF has subsequently made use of antipersonnel mines in its clashes with government troops.

The MILF formally agreed in 1997 to stop the use of antipersonnel mines. The MILF's 1997 policy on landmine use was reiterated in the Geneva conference on Non-State Actors on 24-25 March 2000, just prior to the outbreak of hostilities. MILF representative Atty. Lanang Ali announced that "except in strictly 'defensive and discriminate' use of landmines for the defense, preservation or survival of the MILF and the Bangsamoro people, with due regards to the safety and right of innocent people to live a full life, and not to kill, injure or harm those who do not fight, the MILF has adopted internal regulations prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines."² It also noted that it had strictly observed the provision in the November 1997 Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities, which identified the use of landmines among the prohibited hostile acts.³

The MILF "prohibition" was clearly only a partial restriction: "If needed for defense (self preservation), the MILF/BIAF [Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the MILF armed wing], will use antipersonnel mines, but discriminately, only when the need of it arises or as the situation dictates, and upon order of the concerned MILF Commander on the ground during actual combat. MILF/BIAF APMs and ATMs, foreign and home-made, are command-detonated, tripwire, pressured triggered, or any of it (sic)."⁴

² "MILF Official Declaration on the International Campaign to Ban Antipersonnel Mines," signed by MILF Central Committee Vice-Chairman for Political Affairs Ghazali Jaafar, 13 March 2000, Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao, Mindanao.

³ Ibid.

⁴ "MILF Views on Landmine Use," signed by MILF Central Committee Vice-Chairman for Political Affairs Ghazali Jaafar, on 13 March 2000, Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao, Mindanao.

Stating that its use of APMs is strictly in accordance with Islamic rules and disciplines, the MILF prohibited the following:

- the indiscriminate use of APMs even during armed conflict
- the participation of minors, women, and unauthorized members or civilians in the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of APMs;
- the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of APMs near population centers, places of worship, schools, business establishments, residential areas, farm and farm-to-market roads, and even areas inhabited by working animals;
- the use, etc., of AP mines without order or clearance from the MILF Commander on the ground during actual combat when the enemy attacks the MILF camp;
- the use, etc., of APMs outside MILF camps, except when needed for the defense of MILF camps and upon clearance from the Chief of Staff of the BIAF.⁵

The MILF ordered the strict monitoring of APMs with location maps and visible signs indicating “Mined Areas – Keep OUT.”⁶

On 27 March 2000, the MILF signed and deposited a Deed of Commitment for adherence to a total ban on antipersonnel mines with Geneva Call, a Swiss-registered non-governmental and nonpartisan body. Under the “Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action,” the MILF committed itself not to use antipersonnel landmines under any circumstances. This commitment has not been kept.

RPM-P/RPA-ABB

The Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas (RPM-P) and its armed wing, the Revolutionary Proletarian Party-Alex Boncayao Briagade (RPA-ABB), both splinter groups from the CPP, in meetings with the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, pledged to renounce the use of landmines.⁷ Stating that the use of AP mines has proven to be extremely prejudicial to the lives and safety of civilians, and destructive to properties and the environment, the RPM-P/RPA-ABB declared its opposition to the use and production of AP mines and gave full support to the global campaign to ban mines. On 27 March 2000, the RPM-P/RPA-ABB also signed and deposited the Deed of Commitment for adherence to a total ban on antipersonnel mines with Geneva Call.

MNLF

The peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front continued to hold as of May 2000.

⁵ “MILF Internal Regulations on the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines,” signed by Ghazali Jaafar.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ This pledge was made public in the conference, “Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: A Pioneering Conference,” hosted by the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, in cooperation with the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines and a number of other national mine ban campaigns, Geneva, 24-25 March 2000. A full report of the conference is available from the Swiss CBL, ereusse@worldcom.ch.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

The Philippines does not produce antipersonnel mines, though it may have been a minor producer in the past.⁸ It has never exported mines. It imported Claymore-type mines from the U.S. in the past. The government states that it destroyed its entire stockpile of mines in 1997.

Rebel groups fabricate improvised explosive devices and homemade mines. (See below, and see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 421-422). It is not possible to assess the holdings of the various rebel groups. There have been reports of attempts by rebel groups to acquire mines from other sources. Citing a guerrilla source, a newspaper reported in February 1999 that the MILF was awaiting an arms shipment from Afghanistan. Among other items, the shipment allegedly contained landmines.⁹ A report the following month indicated that the clandestine shipment already slipped into the country on 15 March 1999. The arms shipment was allegedly funded by Saudi dissident Osama Bin Laden. However, MILF political affairs chief Ghazali Jaafar denied having received any shipment and insisted that they manufacture their own weapons.¹⁰

Use

There is no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the fighting in 1999 and 2000.

The AFP's summary of landmine incidents from January to June 2000 lists six incidents attributed to the MILF, with landmines found or exploded in Maguindanao and Cotabato provinces, resulting the death of two soldiers and injuries to fourteen soldiers and three civilians. Two incidents are attributed to the Abu Sayyaf, both during the Basilan hostage crisis, resulting in injuries to two soldiers, including one who lost both legs.¹¹ Another incident on 26 June, in which twelve soldiers died, is attributed to the NPA.¹²

A highly reliable source in the MNLF has also admitted that to defend and preserve the MILF in the recent AFP offensives, the MILF has planted victim-activated

⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 421.

⁹ Nonoy E. Lacson, "MILF awaits arms shipment from Afghanistan," *Tempo ONLINE*, 22 February 1999. The report said the arms would be delivered aboard a foreign vessel named M/V Alkeen Perdaba to Surabaya in Indonesia. From there, the shipment would be escorted by MILF division commanders to Tawau district in Sabah, Malaysia. The arms would then be transferred and distributed to dozens of pumpboats and delivered to ten remote coastal areas in Sarangani and Davao del Sur. The military identified these areas as Tinoto, Maasim, Mindupok, Maitum, Malapatan and Colan, all in Sarangani province; Tibungko and Toril in Davao City; Sta. Cruz in Davao del Sur; and at the Matimus Point. MILF chair Hashim Salamat reportedly ordered fifty mujahideens to guard each of the designated unloading site in Central Mindanao to ensure that the arms will reach their destinations.

¹⁰ "Secret arms shipment slips into Mindanao," *Tempo ONLINE*, March 20, 1999.

¹¹ Memorandum for the Secretary of National Defense, Subject: Landmine-Related Incidents, from the AFP Chief of Staff, signed by Maj. Gen. Antonio C. Santos, OJ3 (received by the DND on 28 July 2000).

¹² Letter from Secretary of National Defense Orlando S. Mercado to Coordinator, ICBL, 30 June 2000.

antipersonnel mines in certain “no man’s land” zones in the defense perimeter of its main camp in Central Mindanao. The Philippine Campaign has pointed out that such victim-activated mines are not “discriminate” because they can victimize non-combatants who might stray into the area.¹³

Landmine victim Corporal Jurelyn Gargoles of the Sixth Infantry Battalion described the heavy fortification of an MILF satellite camp in Langkong, Matanog, Maguindanao. On 13 May 2000 the AFP launched offensives against the camp. It took them six hours to penetrate because of the landmines used as perimeter defense of the camps. Sgt. Gargoles described the mines as very difficult to detect. There were no signs of freshly disturbed earth or visible parts of a planted mine. The landmines had already blended well with the surroundings, an indication that the mines had been there for quite sometime. Corporal Gargoles recalled that they were under fire and his first reaction was to take cover behind a tree. When he did so, Corporal Gargoles activated a homemade mine tied at the base of the tree. The explosion severely damaged his right femur and he sustained shrapnel wounds around his body.¹⁴

In the Sipadan island kidnapping incident in May 2000, the Abu Sayyaf group allegedly used landmines to slow down the rescue operations conducted by AFP troops. The Abu Sayyaf, composed mostly of young Muslims, operates in Basilan, Sulu, and the Zamboanga peninsula. The Abu Sayyaf kidnapped nineteen foreigners and two Filipinos in a beach resort in Sipadan Island, Malaysia on 23 April 2000 and brought them to Talipao, Jolo, Sulu. Some villagers in Barangay Bilaan, Talipao reportedly fled their homes after witnessing members of the Abu Sayyaf planting and even test-blasting landmines.¹⁵

Following a military offensive launched against the Abu Sayyaf’s main camp on 25 April 2000, landmines were discovered planted as perimeter defense. The Abu Sayyaf reportedly claimed that government troops suffered casualties due to landmines. The AFP, on its part, said that bad weather conditions and landmines hampered their pursuit operations.¹⁶ Sergeant Armando Villanueva of the First Scout Ranger Regiment described how they discovered the newly planted homemade mines. They noticed freshly dug earth while maneuvering towards the camp of the Abu Sayyaf in Punoh Mahajid, Sumisip, Basilan. A thorough examination of the area revealed some of the homemade landmines. Since it was very dangerous to demine the area, they were left with no option but to only mark it with sticks. They tied a piece of white cloth to the tip of the stick as a warning sign to other troops. Sergeant Villanueva stepped on a landmine that day, and lost both his legs.¹⁷

¹³ Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Preliminary Report and Statement on the Recent Landmine Incidents in the Mindanao Conflict: Coming to a Higher Level of Attention and Engagement,” 30 June 2000.

¹⁴ Interview with Corporal Jurelyn Gargoles, Heroes Ward, AFP Medical Center, 1 June 2000.

¹⁵ Noralyn Mustafa et. al., “Foreigners threatened with beheading if...,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 29 April 2000, p.1, 16.

¹⁶ Chandler E. Ramas III, “AFP closes in on Abu’s main camp,” *Philippine Post*, 24 April 2000, p.1, A14.

¹⁷ Interview with Sergeant Armando Villanueva, Heroes Ward, Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center, 1 June 2000.

The New People's Army is reported to have used homemade landmines, especially antivehicle mines, recently. On 27 June 2000, the NPA reportedly used an antivehicle mine against a military truck to set off the ambush which killed an Army brigade commander and twelve soldiers in Isabela province in northern Philippines.¹⁸ Another NPA-staged ambush on 4 July in Oriental Mindoro, Southern Tagalog region, used a landmine that exploded a police van. The rebels then open fired on the van and a second accompanying vehicle, leading the death of eight policemen.¹⁹

Three months earlier, in a staged ambush against local police in Sablayan town, Occidental Mindoro, Southern Luzon on 12 April 2000, two policemen were killed while three others were seriously wounded in the ambush that included the use of mines. "The troops were in the area to find the NPA stronghold and retrieve landmines that the NPA planted in some isolated areas of Sablayan and Calintaan towns," Occidental Mindoro Police Deputy Winston Ebersole said in an interview by journalists.²⁰

In an interview with the Philippine Campaign, Ka Dorie, a former NPA rebel in Northern Mindanao admitted that they used landmines in their operations, especially in planned ambushes. Materials used were commercially available. Detonators, she said in the local language, "are easily improvised."²¹ According to Ka Dorie, landmine use by the NPA in Northern Mindanao, Southern Philippines declined in recent years since the death of their landmine "expert" in an encounter.

Sometime in 1998, the Fourth Infantry Division in Cagayan de Oro City filed a complaint at the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)-Butuan City against the NPA for their use of "homemade" mines. The complaint, which documented cases of victims of landmines in the Infantry Division's area of operations in the northern and other parts of Eastern Mindanao, has not been acted on to date.²²

Mine Clearance

The AFP reported the recovery of landmines and landmine paraphernalia from encounters with Moro rebels in Basilan and Cotabato, as follows: six 12-ounce bottles of homemade landmines; homemade landmines made of nineteen sticks of super dyne explosives, four blasting caps and four pieces of BA 30 batteries; and an improvised pressure release-type antitank landmine.²³

¹⁸ Villamor Visaya, Jr., "Colonel, 12 soldiers die in ambush," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 26 June 2000, p.1.

¹⁹ Joel Jabal, "NPA rebels kill 8 cops in Mindoro ambush," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 6 July 2000.

²⁰ Joel Jabal, "Mindoro NPAs strike, kill 2 cops," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 14 April 2000, p.15.

²¹ Interview with Encicita Lopez, aka Ka Dorie, a former regular member of the New People's Army for 18 years, Cagayan de Oro City, 3 January 2000.

²² Interview with Maj. Johnny Macanas, 4ID spokesman and Assistant Chief of Staff, G7 Civil-Military Operations, Fourth Infantry Division, Camp Edilberto Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City, 4 January 2000.

²³ Memorandum for the Secretary of National Defense, Subject: Landmine-Related Incidents, from the AFP Chief of Staff, signed by Maj. Gen. Antonio C. Santos, OJ3 (received by the DND on 28 July 2000).

The military conducted clearing operations immediately after the MILF rebels pulled out of their Talayan town hall siege last January 2000. Bomb experts were dispatched to remove landmines allegedly planted by the rebels along portions of the highway linking Cotabato and General Santos City. Metal detectors were used in the demining operations.

The Philippine Army Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in a Letter Directive dated 5 November 1999 prescribes guidelines and procedures for the granting of Special Promotions to Enlisted Personnel (EP) and cash rewards for the recovery of enemy combat equipment. A provision in the directive specifically grants cash rewards of P1,000 (equivalent to \$25) for every landmine recovered in a combat operation. A bigger reward is given for high-powered weapons. The directive took effect on 1 January 2000.²⁴

Mine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

There are no comprehensive statistics on landmine victims. Except for battle/special reports submitted to the J3 (Operations Division of the AFP) and occasional newspaper reports, no other data sources on landmine victims are available. Military hospital records do not give information on the nature or cause of a surgical case.²⁵

The AFP report on landmine incidents from 1 January to 23 June 2000 identifies twenty-one casualties: two military personnel killed, sixteen military personnel injured, and three civilians injured.²⁶ In a letter to the ICBL dated 30 June 2000, the Secretary of National Defense Orlando S. Mercado indicated that an additional twelve soldiers died on 26 June after the NPA used a landmine against them.²⁷

As of March 2000, the MILF claimed that there had been no civilian casualties or victims of landmines blamed on to the MILF/BIAF “due to strict precautionary measures, secrecy and proper monitoring undertaken by BIAF commanders, considering that the MILF is a mass-based resistance.”²⁸ However, the major offensives on MILF camps in the succeeding months revealed landmines planted in camp perimeters. Three civilians and fourteen soldiers were injured, and two soldiers died, in the six landmine incidents from April to June 2000 attributed to the MILF.²⁹

In an interview, the NPA’s Ka Dorie admitted that civilians were not spared from the landmines NPA planted. She vividly recalled an incident in Misamis Oriental wherein a woman and her two children accidentally stepped on an improvised landmine while

²⁴ “Special Promotion, Cash Rewards for Recovered Enemy Combat Equipment,” Headquarters Philippine Army Directive dated 5 November 1999.

²⁵ Phone interview with Maj. Edwin Bautista (MC) PA, Executive Officer Camp Evangelista Station Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, 3 January 2000.

²⁶ Memorandum for the Secretary of National Defense, Subject: Landmine-Related Incidents, from the AFP Chief of Staff, signed by Maj. Gen. Antonio C. Santos, OJ3 (received by the DND on 28 July 2000).

²⁷ Letter from Secretary of National Defense Orlando S. Mercado to Coordinator, ICBL, 30 June 2000.

²⁸ “MILF Views on Landmine Use,” signed by MILF Central Committee Vice-Chairman for Political Affairs Ghazali Jaafar, on 13 March 2000, Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao, Mindanao.

²⁹ Memorandum for the Secretary of National Defense, Subject: Landmine-Related Incidents, 28 July 2000.

they were gathering *kamote* (sweet potatoes). They died instantly. The NPA unit in the area deeply regretted the incident but denied responsibility for what happened.³⁰

Military station hospitals do not have the facilities and funds to make their own prosthetics and implants. They have to refer their patients to the AFP Medical Center (AFPMC) in Quezon City.³¹

Wounded AFP personnel, according to Operation Officer of the AFP-MC Major Majubaldo Malupeng, will receive Disability Benefits from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The amount depends on the category of the injuries. They will also receive funds from the Mutual Benefits Association, Inc., an insurance company of the AFP. President Estrada also gave the wounded soldiers in the recent fighting in Mindanao 20,000 pesos each and promised educational plans for their children. They were also promised scholarships for computer training in the event that they can no longer serve as combatants.³²

SAMOA

Samoa signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 23 July 1998. Samoa's Article 7 transparency report was due on 27 August 1999, but has not been submitted yet. Samoa is not believed to have enacted domestic implementing legislation. Samoa did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, and has not participated in intersessional meetings.

Samoa voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 54/54B in support of the ban treaty in December 1999. It also supported the 1996, 1997 and 1998 UNGA landmine resolutions.

It is believed that Samoa has never produced, transferred stockpiled, or used AP mines. It is not believed to provide assistance to humanitarian mine action programs.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

The Solomon Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 26 January 1999. The treaty entered into force for the Solomon Islands on 1 July 1999. It has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, which was due by 27 December 1999.

The Solomon Islands voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had on previous UNGA landmine resolutions. The Solomon Islands did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty, most likely due to resource constraints.

³⁰ Interview with Enercita Lopez, aka Ka Dorie, Cagayan de Oro City, 3 January 2000.

³¹ Phone interview with Maj. Edwin Bautista (MC) PA, Executive Officer Camp Evangelista Station Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, 3 January 2000.

³² Interview with Major Majubaldo Malupeng, Operations Officer, AFP Medical Center, 1 June 2000.

The Solomon Islands has no defense force and is believed to have never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used AP mines. The Solomon Islands is not known to provide assistance to humanitarian mine action.

There is a problem with UXO left over from World War II, especially on Guadalcanal, but it is unknown if this includes landmines. Recent media reports indicated that the WW II weapons once buried in ammunition dumps around the island of Guadalcanal, have been “dug up and pressed into service in a new conflict – the fighting between Isatabu militants who want to push migrant Malaitans off Guadalcanal, the nation's main island.”¹ Isatabu rebel leader Andrew Tee told media that his troops have no need to buy ammunition from outside the Solomon Islands because “[w]e get our arms from the American rubbish, what they left.”

THAILAND

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Thailand on 1 May 1999. Thailand created a National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action in February 2000. Thailand has prepared a Master Plan for Humanitarian Mine Action for 2000-2004, and has commissioned a Level One Survey. In May 1999 Thailand destroyed 10,000 antipersonnel mines; it has developed a plan for destruction of all stockpiled AP mines.

Mine Ban Treaty

On 3 December 1997 Thailand signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It deposited its instrument of ratification at the UN on 27 November 1998, making Thailand the first in Southeast Asia to ratify. The treaty entered into force for Thailand on 1 May 1999.

The formal, national proclamation on entry into force of the ban treaty for Thailand, required to begin implementation, was approved by the Cabinet, received Royal signature, and became official when published in the Government Gazette on 6 July 1999.¹ Thailand has not enacted a specific implementation law for the ban treaty, but it had domestic laws, even prior to the treaty, making it illegal for civilians to possess landmines.²

Thailand has been active in the international arena in support of a mine ban. Thailand participated in the First Meeting of State Parties in Maputo in May 1999 where the Deputy Foreign Minister, M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, led the Thai delegation. The Minister stated that Thailand would “endeavor to rid all Thailand's border areas of landmines in three years.... We will seek to address the problems of landmines in a comprehensive manner, as it should be, which means mine clearance, the promotion of

¹ “Back In Service: Rebels in Solomon Islands are using U.S. weapons left over from WWII,” *Associated Press* (Ngalibiu, Solomon Islands), reprinted in *Dallas Morning News*, 15 June 2000.

¹ Royal Thai Government Gazette, dated 6 July 1999, on the Entry into Force of the Ottawa Convention.

² Act on the Export Control of Armaments and Materials of B.E. 2495 (1952); Act on Firearms, ammunition, explosive articles and fireworks of B.E. 2490 (1947); Decree on the Export Control of Armaments and Materials of B.E. 2535 (1992). Cited in Thailand's Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, 10 November 1999.

mine awareness, the rehabilitation of victims and the rehabilitation of previously mined areas. We will engage in bilateral efforts with neighboring countries to demine common border areas... We are faced with the challenge of persuading non-signatory states to sign the Ottawa Convention or at the very least, to abide by the spirit thereof.”³

Thailand has participated extensively in the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings in Geneva, with high level representation from Bangkok in many instances.

Thailand proposed the inclusion of language on antipersonnel mines in the ASEAN Statement on Disarmament in the October 1999 meeting of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and referred to the ban treaty in its Opening Statement at that meeting.⁴

During the UN General Assembly session in November 1999, Thailand’s Ambassador stated that Thailand “strongly supports the goal of ‘zero victims’, and all international efforts to resolve the landmine threat once and for all.”⁵

Thailand voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had in past years.

On 10 November 1999, Thailand submitted its first transparency report to the United Nations as required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty, covering the period 1 May 1999 to 31 October 1999. It subsequently submitted its second report on 2 May 2000, covering the period 1 November 1999 to 31 January 2000.

On 8 February 2000, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai signed Order 15/2543 appointing a new “National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action,” chaired by the Prime Minister. (See below for more detail).

Three NGO members of the Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines have been appointed as Advisors to the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC), which was established 18 January 1999 to serve as the focal point of contact to deal with all matters concerning antipersonnel landmines.

Thailand is not a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Landmine Protocol II. The government’s position is that since they have already joined the ban treaty, it shows that Thailand is serious about coping with the landmine problem.⁶

Thailand has applied for membership to the Conference on Disarmament, but now participates as an observer.⁷ Thailand has not made a statement on its position on negotiating a ban on mine transfers in the CD.

³ H.E. Deputy Minister M.R. Sukumbhand Paribatra, “Statement of the Head of Delegation of Thailand to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention,” Maputo, Mozambique, 3 May 1999.

⁴ Apirath Vienravi, Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations at the General Debate of the First Committee, 54th session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 20 October 1999.

⁵ H.E. Asda Jayanama, Permanent Representative of Thailand to the UN, fifty-fourth Session of UNGA, 18 November 1999.

⁶ Landmine Monitor email communication with Apirat Sugondhabhirom, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Thailand to the UN Office in Geneva, 7 March 2000.

⁷ Ibid.

Production and Transfer

The Royal Thai Government states that it has never produced antipersonnel landmines, although a number of different sources have identified Thailand as a past producer.⁸ Some armed rebel groups residing along the Thai-Burma border continue to produce, stockpile and use antipersonnel mines.⁹

It is not believed that Thailand has ever exported antipersonnel landmines. In the past, Thailand imported antipersonnel mines from the United States, China, apparently the former Yugoslavia, and perhaps other nations.¹⁰

Stockpiling and Destruction

Thailand has reported to the UN that as of 31 January 2000, it had a stockpile of antipersonnel mines numbering 411,625.¹¹ The primary types are U.S. M14 (197,126), U.S. M16 (77,868), U.S. M18/M18A1 Claymore (39,761), and U.S. M26 (35,554). Thailand is one of the few ban treaty States Parties to include Claymore mines in its reporting.

The Royal Thai Army (RTA) stockpiles mines at Fort Bhanurangsri in Ratchaburi province and other RTA Centers. The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) and the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) also hold stockpiles of mines.¹²

The list of detailed types of mines held in stockpiles as reported to the UN includes:

TYPE	QUANTITY
M14 (K121)	184,369
M14 (K221)	8,392
APM 14	3,219
APERS NM14	1,146
M16 (K092)	75,279
APERS M16	2,589
M18A1 (K143)	33,179
APERS M18A1	4,178
APM 18A1	2,356
APERS M18	48
M26 (K090)	35,334
APERS M26	220
Unidentified	34,668

⁸ For details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 376.

⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000--Burma/Myanmar*. Also, Landmine Monitor interviews with villagers, NGO workers and displaced migrants living in Thailand near the Burma border, January 1999 through March 2000.

¹⁰ Based on types of mines listed in Thailand's Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, Form B, Stockpiled anti-personnel mines, submitted 10 November 1999.

¹¹ *Ibid.* The report does not give an overall total, or totals for individual mine types. The Form B submission is 33 pages long, and apparently organized by various stock locations rather than mine type. Landmine Monitor has compiled the numbers from Form B.

¹² Telephone interview with Lt. Gen. Vasu Chanarat, Director General of TMAC, 16 February 1999 and Thailand's Article 7 report, 10 November 1999.

TYPE	QUANTITY
	(Bouncing Fragmentation Mines)
MA-5A-153B	7,800
Type 66 (China)	1,200
Type 69 (China)	1,679
APERS 69	7,504
Type 72 (China)	5,006
Type PMN (China)	19
Unidentified (China)	418
APERS PAM2 (Yugo?)	2,927
APERS (?)	60
M2 (K090)	32
APERS M2	3

The RTA, the RTN and the RTAF and the Ministry of Interior have prepared a plan to destroy stockpiled AP mines, considering timing and quantity of mines to be destroyed. Authorization to destroy mines rests with the Minister of Defense. There is no implementation legislation regarding destruction.¹³ The estimated cost of destruction is \$90,000 over the three-year period 2000-2002.¹⁴

Mine Demolition Ranges designated as destruction sites are: (1) Mount Puka Artillery Center, Ratchaburi province; (2) 6th Division Ordnance Department, RTA in Ubon Ratchathani province; (3) Third Division Ordnance Department in Nakhorn Ratchasima province; and, (4) RTA and the Special Combat-Training Camp at Park Chong, Nakhorn Ratchasima province.¹⁵ Safety and environmental considerations have been included in the proposed Methods for Proceeding with Demolition of AP mines.¹⁶

Ten thousand landmines were destroyed on 1 May 1999 at the RTA camp in Lop Buri province on the occasion of the entering-into-force of the ban treaty in Thailand. Mines destroyed were M14 (7,334), M16 (1,000), M26 (1,260), and M18A1 Claymore mines (406).¹⁷ A large group of landmine victims, Thailand ban campaigners, Landmine Monitor researchers and the diplomatic corps were invited to witness this first destruction of stockpiled mines.

An additional 113 mines were destroyed in the period from 1 November 1999 to 31 January 2000, including PMD 6M (56), PMN (49), TM 46 (6), and Type 72 (2) mines.¹⁸

¹³ Landmine Monitor, communications from TMAC, 10 May 2000, and from a government official, Department of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 December 1999. Landmine Monitor researchers have had access to a Summary of the Plan.

¹⁴ Thailand Mine Action Center/JOC 107, The Master Plan Summary on Humanitarian Mine Action of Thailand in 5-year Periods, No. 1 2000-2004, (TMAC, Bangkok, 2000), pp. 6-8.

¹⁵ Thailand's Article 7 report, Form F, 10 November 1999.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., Form G. Thailand is one of the few States Parties to have destroyed Claymore mines.

¹⁸ Ibid.

Thailand, at the request of the co-chairs, made a formal presentation at the meeting of the SCE on Stockpile Destruction in Geneva on 23 May 2000. Col. Talerngpan Chiewvej of TMAC described Thailand's initial destruction and methodology. He indicated financial assistance was needed, as well as technical assistance on environmental aspects. With such assistance, he said Thailand hoped to destroy its stockpile within two years.¹⁹

Thailand has reported that it intends to retain 15,604 mines for training and research, under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.²⁰ This is one of the largest number of mines to be retained by any State Party. It must be noted, however, that the total includes 6,117 M18A1 Claymore mines, which most countries are not including in Article 7 reporting. Claymore mines are not banned by the treaty as long as they are used in a command-detonated mode (without a tripwire). Other mines to be retained include 7,972 M14, 601 M16, 391 M26, 120 each of Type 66, 69, 72, and MA5A, 19 PMN, 9 M2, and 15 unidentified Chinese mines.

At the 30 May 2000 SCE Meeting on General Status of the Convention, the Thai representative stated that there are ongoing consultations between TMAC and the armed forces branches on the possibility of reducing the number of mines retained, and that Thailand hoped in the near future to report a decreased number.²¹

Use

The Thai military no longer uses antipersonnel mines. For information on past use by Thailand and other armed forces inside Thailand, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.²² Along the northwestern Thai-Burma border it appears new mines are being laid, apparently by Myanmar troops and perhaps by refugees from Burma seeking shelter in Thailand.²³ TMAC sources have noted that the border with Burma is "vulnerable to the risk of more mines being laid, some of which could spill into Thai territory since the border remains unclear."²⁴

Landmine Problem

According to the government, about 400,000 people in at least 148 Thai villages in 48 districts are affected by antipersonnel mines.²⁵ Mine-affected land includes mainly agricultural lands, village lands, and parts of national forests.

As noted in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, a survey conducted by the RTA and the RTN in 1998 concluded that in all border areas 796 square kilometers are mined.²⁶

¹⁹ Notes taken at the meeting by Human Rights Watch.

²⁰ Thailand's Article 7 reports, Form D, 10 November 1999 and 2 May 2000.

²¹ Notes taken at the meeting by Human Rights Watch. At the 23 May 2000 Stockpile SCE, Thailand said it was unsure of the proper number to retain, and welcomed technical advice.

²² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 377-378.

²³ Members of Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines, discussions with NGO workers and displaced ethnic migrants housed in camps along the Thai-Burma border, Mae Sot, Tak province, January 1999 through January 2000. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2000-- Burma/Myanmar*.

²⁴ Saritdet Marukatat, "Burma row leaves border vulnerable," *Bangkok Post*, 19 January 2000.

²⁵ Thailand Mine Action Center/JOC 107, *The Master Plan Summary on Humanitarian Mine Action of Thailand in 5-year Periods, No. 1 2000-2004*, (TMAC, Bangkok, 2000), p. 20; telephone interview with Lt. Gen. Vasu Chanarath, Director of TMAC, 8 March 2000.

Of these mined areas, 532 square kilometers are on the Thai-Cambodian border, 124 square kilometers are on the Thai-Lao border, 53 square kilometers on the Thai-Burma border, and 87 square kilometers on the Thai-Malaysian border. The nineteen provinces in the northern, northeastern, southern and western parts of Thailand affected by landmines are Sa Kaew, Buriram, Surin, Sisaket, Ubon Ratchathani, Chanthaburi, Trat, Tak, Mae Hong Son, Chiang Rai, Phayao, Nan, Utharadit, Phitsanulok, Narathiwat, Songkla, Nakorn Srithammarat, Yala, and Chumphon.²⁷

A 1998 report by the U.S. State Department estimates the number of mines in Thailand at 100,000,²⁸ but the Thai government has not made an estimate.

Mine Action Funding

Thailand has called “on all donor countries and international organizations, as well as non-government organizations, to provide necessary support and assistance, as called for in Article 6 of the Convention, to translate our political commitments into concrete action.”²⁹ Both United Nations organizations and individual governments have been approached to provide financial assistance for mine action programs in Thailand.

Thailand does not have sufficient funds and resources to meet its mine action needs, which it has estimated to cost nearly \$13.8 million from 2000-2004. The biggest expenditures would be survey and clearance operations (\$7.2 million) and equipment (\$3.9 million).³⁰

Delayed availability of the government funding allocation to TMAC, requested as part of the Ministry of Defense budget, has held up progress on mine action.³¹ The total domestic budget for year 2000 was determined by a working group of TMAC and approved by the Committee on Dealing with Anti-Personnel Mines. The TMAC request for Thai government resources in the fiscal year 2000 is approximately 60 million Baht (U.S.\$1.5 million), of which 45 million Baht is to be used for survey and clearance operations.³²

²⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Document given to Humanitarian Demining Team Leaders on 18 August 1998, No. 1.3, p. 1; Thailand Mine Action Center, “Summary of National Plan of Action for Humanitarian Demining of Anti-Personnel Landmines in Thailand, for the Five Year Period 1 May 1999 – May 2004,” [in Thai language] undated, p. 4-12. These statistics were also used in the Deputy Minister’s Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3 May 2000.

²⁷ Thailand Mine Action Center/JOC 107, *The Master Plan Summary on Humanitarian Mine Action of Thailand in 5-year Periods, No. 1 2000-2004*, (TMAC, Bangkok, 2000); Thailand’s Article 7 report, Form C, Location of mines areas, 10 November 1999 (which also lists Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi, and Prachuabkirikan as affected by booby-traps).

²⁸ U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p. A-2.

²⁹ Apirath Vienravi, Statement at the General Debate of the First Committee, 54th session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 20 October 1999.

³⁰ Thailand Mine Action Center/JOC 107, *The Master Plan Summary on Humanitarian Mine Action of Thailand in 5-year Periods, No. 1 2000-2004*, (TMAC, Bangkok, 2000), p. 8.

³¹ Saritdet Marukatat, “Funding hurts demining effort,” *Bangkok Post*, 18 January 2000, p. 10; “Mine clearing agency hit by lack of funds,” *The Nation*, 10 February 2000, p. 5.

³² TMAC, Master Plan Summary, pp. 27-29. The fiscal year runs from October 1999-September 2000.

Supreme Command allocated 1.6 million Baht to start mine action operations in Sa Keaw province in March 2000.³³ In June 2000, the Royal Thai Government Cabinet decided to provide an additional special budget for TMAC operations in FY 2000 of 16.4 million Baht.³⁴

Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek during a visit to Thailand in January 2000 announced that Norway would contribute U.S.\$400,000 (16 million Baht) to the Thailand Mine Action Center for a Level One Survey.³⁵ An additional grant of U.S.\$30,000 (equivalent to 1.11 million Baht a year for three years) was made to help destroy all stockpiled landmines.³⁶ The United Kingdom agreed to assist in funding the Level One Survey with a grant of 300,000 pounds (U.S.\$400,000 or 16 million Baht).³⁷

The United States has provided \$3 million for the establishment of TMAC infrastructure, including three training centers: Humanitarian Demining Center at Ratchaburi, Mine Awareness Training Center at Lop Buri and Mine Detection Dog Center at Pak Chong.³⁸ On 18 January 2000, the U.S. provided 150 2½-ton trucks worth \$6.2 million to TMAC.³⁹

Japan provided \$400,000 through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund For Mine Action in Thailand in April 1999.⁴⁰ The UN Development Program is preparing a proposal to assist TMAC's Mine Action program.⁴¹

Coordination of Mine Action

Coordination of mine action was restructured in February 2000 with the Office of the Prime Minister's Order No. 15/2543. The Committee on Dealing with Anti-Personnel Mines, established on 17 August 1998, was renamed as the National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action. It is chaired by the Prime Minister instead of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense. The 26 members of the Committee are all government officials serving in official capacity. The National Committee is authorized to stipulate policy, supervise operations, conduct public relations both national and international, give recommendations to the government, consider appointing

³³ Information provided by Dave McCracken, Mine Action Technical Advisor, TMAC, 20 July 2000.

³⁴ This was announced by the Director of TMAC at a meeting of advisers on 15 June 2000.

³⁵ TMAC, Master Plan Summary, p. 2. See also, Vorapun Srivoranart and Sa-nguan Khumrunroj, "Norway calls for better regional security ties," *The Nation*, 7 January 2000.

³⁶ Ibid. See also, "Arms-destroying fund pledged," *Bangkok Post*, 7 January 2000.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 2. Information provided by Dave McCracken, TMAC, 20 July 2000. See also, Vorapun Srivoranart, "US financial demining programme launched," *The Nation*, 17 August 1999; CNN Web Board, 9 February 2000. www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/southeast/02/09/thailand.landmines.ap/index.html

³⁹ Ibid., p. 2. See also, Embassy of the United States in Thailand, "US Government donates \$7 Million in Trucks for Demining Efforts in Thailand," 18 January 2000; Landmine Monitor/Thailand interview with Dave McCracken, TMAC, Bangkok, 18 January 2000.

⁴⁰ Information provided by Dave McCracken, TMAC, 20 July 2000.

⁴¹ TMAC, Master Plan Summary, p. 2.

subcommittees to work on relevant matters and to coordinate with government agencies concerned.⁴² The TMAC serves as its operational core.

The Thailand Mine Action Center was established on 18 January 1999 with responsibility for the coordination of mine action operations. It is located in Thung Si Gun (Don Muang) area, north of Bangkok. TMAC reports to the Prime Minister through the Supreme Command Headquarters (Ministry of Defense) and the National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action. TMAC is headed by Director, Lt. Gen. Dr. Vasu Chanarat. Three NGO members of the Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines have been appointed as Advisors to TMAC. The U.S. government supports a Mine Action Technical Advisor to TMAC and instructional staff to the three training centers. Other civilian advisors are from concerned ministries: Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Public Health, as well as the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation.

TMAC serves as a focal point of contact to deal with all matters concerning antipersonnel landmines, including demining training, area demining, mine awareness, victim assistance, stockpile destruction, and coordination of domestic and international assistance on landmine management.⁴³

TMAC is responsible for preparing and coordinating implementation of a national mine clearance plan. Thailand has completed an initial "Master Plan on Humanitarian Mine Action of Thailand" for the five-year period 2000-2004. Seven "Humanitarian Mine Action Units" (HMAUs) of ninety-nine persons each will be established, with each unit responsible for a designated geographic area. Their duties will include public relations, mine awareness, gathering of information, technical survey, and searching for and eliminating mines.⁴⁴

Surveys and Assessment

The Thailand Mine Action Center has commissioned a Level One Survey of mine affected areas in 19 provinces. It began on 1 June 2000 with initial set up of the program (procurement of equipment, recruitment, training, testing, etc.). The actual survey is expected to begin in September 2000.⁴⁵ The UN Mine Action Service, the Global Landmine Survey, Norwegian People's Aid, and TMAC are responsible for the survey.⁴⁶

⁴² Thailand Mine Action Center, "Office of the Prime Minister's Order No.151/2541 on the Appointment of the Committee on Dealing with Anti-Personnel Mines" in the Summary of National Plan, [in Thai language], p. 1-3, and Prime Minister's Order 15/2543 on Establishing the National Committee on Humanitarian Mine Action.

⁴³ TMAC, "Scope of Responsibility of TMAC" in *The First Year of TMAC-Establishment of TMAC, 18 January 1999, One Year of TMAC, 18 Jan 2000*, p.10.

⁴⁴ Thailand Mine Action Center/JOC 107, *The Master Plan Summary on Humanitarian Mine Action of Thailand in 5-year Periods, No. 1 2000-2004*, (TMAC, Bangkok, 2000); TMAC, Summary of National Plan [in Thai language], pp. 2-3.

⁴⁵ Information provided by Guy Rhodes, Norwegian People's Aid, to TCBL, received 26 June 2000.

⁴⁶ Interview with Survey Action Center team (Richard Kidd of Global Landmine Survey, James Prudhomme of UNMAS and Guy Rhodes from Norwegian People's Aid) Bangkok, 27 January 2000.

Initial Level One Survey operations have been conducted by HMAU #1 Mine Awareness Teams in Sa Keaw province. Level Two Technical Survey operations are underway on the first minefield in Sa Keaw.⁴⁷

Mine Clearance

Previously the Royal Thai Army cleared about 2,500-3,000 mines per year along the border. RTA units engaged in civil support and border security missions along the all four borders conducted these operations. Landmine Monitor researchers have no access to information on these operations or on the total area cleared.

U.S. technical support for the Humanitarian Mine Action “train the trainer” program has been initiated in Thailand for RTA staff to develop a Thai capacity to support humanitarian mine action operations. U.S. and Thai instructors have trained humanitarian demining trainers and other demining personnel during four sessions in September 1999 through June 2000 at Ratchaburi. Three Mine Awareness courses have been conducted in Lop Buri between September 1999 and May 2000. The first Mine Detection Dog Handlers course started June 2000 at Pak Chong Military Dog Center.⁴⁸

The first HMAU has become operational in Sa Keaw province, where it has been responding to local requests to remove mines and unexploded ordnance from villages in Sa Keaw province. These rapid response humanitarian actions operations have removed dangerous ordnance from high population areas, totaling 63 mines, 83 UXO and one booby-trap.⁴⁹

The HMAU started mine awareness operations on 1 April 2000, followed by Level Two Technical Survey Operations 1 May, and mine/UXO clearance operations 6 July 2000 at Ban Ya Khao village.⁵⁰

Mine Awareness Education

The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), an international training center located on the campus of the Asian Institute of Technology, is working in partnership with TMAC specifically on Mine Awareness education for the public sector and communities in mined areas.⁵¹ A National Seminar on “Mine Action in Thailand” was held on 17 December 1999 in Bangkok with H.R.H. Princess Galayani receiving reports from working groups on Mine Awareness Strategies. Senior public officials and invited NGOs participated. The ADPC has held meetings with governmental organizations and NGOs on mine awareness education to be included in the curriculum of primary schools along the border areas.

Handicap International Thailand has a program of Mine Risk Education in select villages and refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border, conducted in coordination with its activities of assistance, through orthopedic fitting and physical and social rehabilitation, to people with disabilities, particularly landmine victims. In addition HI

⁴⁷ Information provided by Dave McCracken, TMAC, 20 July 2000.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, P.O. Box 4 Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Tel (662) 524 5354, Fax: (662) 5245360, E-mail: adpc@ait.ac.th.

has a community based Mine Risk Education program in six mine-affected villages of Chanthaburi Province, along the Thai-Cambodia border.⁵²

The Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines (TCBL), a coalition of NGOs, continued to organize programs of Mine Awareness Education in the heavily mined province of Sa Keaw and among schools and universities. In April 1999, to celebrate the Entry-into-Force of the Mine Ban Treaty in Thailand (1 May 1999), TCBL organized a five-day Bicycle Rally in which sixteen landmine survivors, several TCBL members and other friends cycled the 250-kilometer distance from Sa Keaw, a Thai-Cambodian border province, to TMAC, located in northern Bangkok. The program was funded by the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives in Thailand and was well covered by the local and international media.⁵³ A second Ban Landmines Bicycle Rally from Sa Keaw to Surin, a northeastern border province, was organized by the "Network of Landmine Victims 1999, Sa Keaw," TCBL and the Bicycle for Health Club from 26 April-1 May 2000.

Landmine Casualties

TMAC has published a list of mine victims, including fifty-six fatalities, covering the period 1969-1999. Only recently have efforts been made to compile records across the country for the total number of landmine casualties, both military and civilian. TMAC reports in twenty-two provinces, over a thirty-year period, a total of 1,849 mine deaths and injuries, including 502 injured in the area occupied by the Third Army.⁵⁴ TMAC has also requested official reports from the Ministry of Health. The initial reports available of military and civilian casualties appear to be incomplete.

The Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines has recorded names, addresses, ages, types and dates of injury of about 700 landmine victims in a few provinces.⁵⁵ TCBL regularly receives reports of new casualties.

Recently the national press has begun reporting injuries and deaths due to landmines, leading to greater public awareness of the problems of mines and problems for victims.⁵⁶ Much publicity was given to an elephant working in a forest near the western border in Tak province that stepped on a landmine and required a prosthetic leg.⁵⁷

⁵² Landmine Monitor discussion with Duangkamol Wattanasuk, Country Director, Handicap International Thailand, Bangkok, 19 January 2000.

⁵³ Rita Patiyasevi, "Bicycle rally against landmines on Sunday," *The Nation*, 22 April 1999; "Long ride seeks an end to maiming," *Bangkok Post*, 28 April 1999; "Six days on a bicycle for peace and an end to landmines!," *Udomsarn Weekly*, 29 April 1999.

⁵⁴ TMAC, Master Plan Summary, pp. 21-22.

⁵⁵ Mine survivor leaders, Mr. Ophas Thepnok from HI at Prasat Hospital in Surin and Mr. Supan Kota from Sakaeo province, organized the data and presented it to Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai at Parliament House on 18 December 1997.

⁵⁶ Reports covering two weeks in January-February: "Ranger loses leg to mine," *The Nation*, 19 January 2000, p. A6; Chaiwat Pumpuang, "Landmine kills four Thai soldiers in Suan Phung," *The Nation*, 21 January 2000, p. A6; "Landmine blast injures Thai soldiers," *The Nation*, 1 February 2000, p. A6; "Border patrol – Five soldiers hurt by landmine," *Bangkok Post*, 2 February 2000, p. 3; "Landmine blast injures four soldiers," *The Nation*, 4 February 2000, p. A2.

⁵⁷ "Elephant hurt in blast," *The Nation*, 20 August 1999; "Hurt Elephant may need an artificial foot," *The Nation*, 21 August 1999; "Elephantine Problem," *The Sunday Nation*, 22 August 1999;

Survivor Assistance

There has not been much progress in the implementation of landmine awareness and victim assistance programs. TMAC's initial efforts have focused on planning for clearance, demining and destruction of landmines. An in-depth survey of survivors was conducted by the Royal Thai Navy on behalf of TMAC during June-July 1999 in Sa Keaw province. On the occasion of the Queen's Birthday on 12 August 1999, some victims and their children were invited to Sa Keaw provincial hall to receive subsidies as well as scholarships. Funds were solicited by TMAC in this initial effort to start its Mine Victim Assistance project.⁵⁸

Handicap International Thailand provide prosthetic and orthotic devices and community-based rehabilitation programs for disabled, including mine survivors, along the Thai-Burma border. Main target groups include amputees and disabled living in refugee camps and surrounding Thai villages. In addition, HI Thailand is about to start a community-based rehabilitation program in selected mine-affected villages of Tak province, in cooperation with the Provincial Public Health Office, which will provide a facilitator, and with the Royal Thai Government implementing agency, the Social Welfare Department.

The mobile unit of the Prosthetics Foundation under the Royal Patronage of the Princess Mother, while providing artificial limbs to the disabled all over the country, has collected and processed specific data on "landmine victims/survivors." Previously, information was not collected from patients on how they were injured. Dr. Therdchai Jivacate, head of the Mobile Artificial Legs Production Unit, founder of the Prosthetics Foundation and lecturer in rehabilitation medicine at Chiang Mai University, was recognized as one of three Outstanding Thais in 1999.⁵⁹ Dr. Therdchai and his team were again honored with the award of Outstanding Inventors of Thailand BE 2543 for "Effective and Efficient Distribution of Prosthetic Limbs," which emphasized the newly designed prosthetic legs for use in wet paddy fields, issued in pairs with a more cosmetic limb.⁶⁰

Following the April 1999 Bicycle Rally, a "Network of Landmine Victims 1999, Sakaeo," based in Taphraya, Khok Soong, Aranyaprathet, and Khlong Haad districts of Sakaeo province, was established to help the communities gain self-reliance through socio-economic projects. TCBL facilitated community formation. The first attempts focused on preparing proposals to obtain funds for small economic projects and scholarships for children of victims, under a program designed for the "less-fortunate" by the Social Investment Fund (SIF) of the Government Savings Bank. A total of seven

"Motala's jumbo operation," *The Sunday Nation*, 29 August 1999; "Motala-Waiting for death," *Matichon* (Thai language paper), 30 August 1999; "Vets encouraged by Motala's initial recovery," *The Nation*, 31 August 1999; "New limb offers for Motala," *Bangkok Post*, 7 September 1999; "Setback for Motala," *Bangkok Post*, 10 September 1999.

⁵⁸ TMAC, "Establishment and Operation Plan for Mine Victim Assistance Project in Thailand," July 1999.

⁵⁹ "Recognizing Their Good Deeds," *The Nation*, 27 February 1999; Vasana Chinvarakorn, "The 'artificial leg' doctor," *Bangkok Post*, 2 March 1999.

⁶⁰ Committee on National Research, National Research Council of Thailand, "Announcement of Winners of the Award of Outstanding Inventors for B.E. 2543," Bangkok, 21 November 1999.

proposals by the “Network of Landmine Victims 1999, Sakaeo,” covering 166 mine victims and their families from seven groups/communities were approved and implemented as of 16 December 1999 for an amount of 2,300,000 Baht, equivalent to \$58,000.

TCBL also continues to conduct surveys of affected communities and individual mine victims along the Cambodian border in order to update and enlarge the information on mine victims. New projects are in progress in Chanthaburi, Trad, Surin, Sisaket, and Buriram provinces.

Medical and rehabilitation services in Thailand are available in both state and privately owned hospitals and health care units, functioning at the provincial, district, and community levels. While facilities offering first aid are located at all district and village levels, patients who have severe injuries and are in need of surgical care are referred to a higher level and to a better equipped institution. Psychological and social support are normally not provided.

Regarding rehabilitation facilities, mainly provincial hospitals with adequate equipment, personnel, and space provide this service since there are a number of patients with paralytic and/or diabetic problems having similar needs there. The Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Medical Rehabilitation Center, Nonthaburi, offers courses for persons working with handicap individuals, families, and communities.

Several border provincial hospitals have prosthetic and assistance devices available. There are also some government provisions for vocational or skills training for landmine survivors but most of the interviewees, especially those with family members dependent on them, do not take up the training. Projects for financial support are under the responsibility of the Social Welfare Department, but most of the survivors have not been provided such assistance due to the budget constraints of the county.

Some of the important centers supporting medical rehabilitation service and specialized doctors include:

- Mae Sot District Hospital, Tak province, 310 beds.
- Aranyaprathet District Hospital, Sakaeo province, 120 beds.
- Prasat District Hospital, Surin Province, 60 beds.
- Surin Provincial Hospital, Surin Province, 652 beds.
- Mae Hong Son/ Sri Sangwan Hospital, Mae Hong Son province, 120 beds.
- Phra Pokklao Provincial Hospital, Muang, Chanthaburi province, 777 beds.
- Khlong Yai Sub-district Health Care Office, Pong Namron District, Chanthaburi province.
- Somdejprachataksin Provincial Hospital, Muang, Tak province, 330 beds.
- The Prosthetics Foundation under the Royal Patronage of the Queen Mother, Chiang Mai University Hospital, Muang, Chiang Mai province.

Disability Policy and Practice

A national disability law, titled “Laws on Rehabilitation of Thai Disabled Persons, 1991,” has been implemented since 1994. Landmine survivors are considered for eligibility under the description of handicapped persons as given in this law. However, many victims are rejected as not fulfilling the strict Thai legal description of a

“handicapped person.” The law states that handicapped and disabled “persons who register...are entitled to receive services pertaining to welfare, development and rehabilitation.”⁶¹ Medical rehabilitation services and expenses to be covered are stipulated: “Vocational counseling and advice as well as vocational training suitable to their physical condition and existing ability to perform the occupation.” Due to the economic downturn and the tight national budget, many funding conditions of this law have not yet been realized. Implementation has been inconsistent among provinces, districts and tambons.

The 1997 People’s Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand prohibits unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of physical or health condition.⁶² It also states that “disabled or handicapped shall have the rights to receive public conveniences and other aids, as provided by law.”⁶³

The National Education Act of B.E. 2542 (1999) includes sections pertaining to disabled persons’ rights and opportunities to receive basic education specially provided. Implementation of the Act is just beginning. It states, “Education for the disabled shall be free of charge at birth or at first diagnosis. These persons have the right to access the facilities, media, services, and other forms of educational aid in conformity with the criteria and procedures stipulated in the ministerial regulations.”⁶⁴ Several draft laws are under consideration and await approval, including sections on upgrading the living quality and rights of disabled persons.

⁶¹ Laws on Rehabilitation of Thai Disabled Persons, 1991, Article 15 Sections 1 and 3, Article 17 Sections 1 and 2, Article 18.

⁶² *People’s Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand* of B.E. 2541 (1997), Article 30, Clause 3.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Article 55.

⁶⁴ Section 2, Article 10, National Education Act of B.E. 2542 (1999).

SIGNATORIES**BANGLADESH****Mine Ban Policy**

Bangladesh signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 7 May 1998. It remains the only South Asian country to have signed. It has not yet ratified the treaty. Bangladesh showed little interest in the Ottawa process, and came to the Oslo negotiations and Ottawa treaty signing ceremonies in December 1997 only as an observer. Thus, it surprised many when Bangladesh signed five months later. In early 1998 Bangladesh undertook an in-depth examination of the utility of antipersonnel mines, but some observers believe that ultimately it was a political decision to overrule the military.¹

Bangladesh attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the ban treaty in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. At the Hague Appeal for Peace conference in the Netherlands in May 1999, Bangladesh's Prime Minister told the ICBL's Jody Williams that she strongly supported rapid ratification of the ban treaty.² Bangladesh military officials attended the ICRC's regional seminar on landmines, held in Sri Lanka in August 1999. Bangladesh voted for the pro-ban treaty UNGA resolution in December 1999, as it had in 1997 and 1998. In March 2000, a leader of the main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, told Landmine Monitor, "If the present government does not ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, we will do it on a priority basis if voted to power in future."³ Bangladesh has not participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional work program of Standing Committees of Experts.

Bangladesh has not signed the Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, though it attended the First Annual Conference for States Parties to Protocol II in December 1999. Bangladesh is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a strong proponent or opponent of mine negotiations in that forum.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

According to officials, Bangladesh has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁴ The government acknowledges that there is a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but a foreign ministry official told Landmine Monitor that "stockpiling of antipersonnel

¹ Dipankar Banerjee, "South Asian Regional Survey," 1999, p. 24. Banerjee based this on observations from the South Asian Regional Landmines Workshop, held in Dhaka, 7-8 December 1998, attended by senior Bangladesh government officials, including two serving Brigadiers. For more on the military utility review, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 382.

² Landmine Monitor telephone interview with Jody Williams, Alexandria, VA, 7 June 2000.

³ Interview with Mr. Mir Nasir Uddin, Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Chittagong, 7 March 2000.

⁴ Interview with Col. Mohammed Wali Ullah, Sector Commander of Bangladesh Rifles (border security force), Chittagong, 30 November 1999.

mines in Bangladesh is very negligible in comparison to the neighboring countries.”⁵ The number, types, and suppliers of the mines are unknown. The military maintains that it has never employed antipersonnel mines.⁶ The Shanti Bahini and other opposition groups that have fought with the Bangladesh Army also state that they have not used antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices in the past.⁷ Armed rebel groups from India and Burma are said to be hiding inside Bangladesh, but there is no evidence of stockpiling or use of antipersonnel mines by these groups within Bangladesh territory.⁸

Landmine Problem

There are mines along the border with Burma, planted by the Burmese Army in order to stop cross-border guerrilla activities. According to a Bangladesh military officer, the Burmese Army has laid mines up to 300 feet inside Bangladesh, including on agricultural land.⁹ The Burmese Army has also reportedly planted mines in response to border incidents.¹⁰ A Bangladesh military officer told Landmine Monitor that the Burmese Na Sa Ka (special security forces for the Arakan province) have used mines to funnel the trafficking in smuggled goods past their outposts so that they can extort a share of this trafficking.¹¹

Mined lands include the Ukhia and Ramu sub-districts of the Cox's Bazar district and the Naikongchari, Alikadam and Thansi sub-districts of the Banderban district. As these areas are mostly hilly, human habitation is not so dense. Perhaps some 200,000 people, most belonging to the Ukhia, Ramu, and Naikongchari sub-districts, who depend on occupations connected with hilly areas are affected by the presence of mines in those areas.¹² Mined areas are not marked or fenced.

⁵ Interview with Mrs. Saida Muna Tasneem, Assistant Secretary, United Nations Human Rights wing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dhaka, 22 January 2000.

⁶ Interview with Col. Mohamed Wali Ullah, Bangladesh Rifles, Chittagong, 30 November 1999.

⁷ Interviews with ex-militant of the Shanti Bahini ethnic rebel group, Chittagong, 17 February and 8 March 2000. Interviews with Marxist and Maoist militants, Chittagong, 18 February 2000, and Dhaka, 20 February 2000.

⁸ See, for example, *The Daily Janakantha*, 28 March 2000; *The Chinta*, 15 October 1999, and, Tofail Ahmed, “Cox's Bazar is new and safe route for arms trafficking,” *The Daily Janakantha*, 16 January 2000.

⁹ Interview with Lt. Col. Mirza, Battalion Commander, Bangladesh Rifles, Cox's Bazar, 18 December 1999.

¹⁰ See, for example, “Innumerable high explosive mines on vast area of Naikongchari,” *The Daily Saikat*, Cox's Bazar, 3 August 1999; “One Na Sa Ka Captain and two others killed in landmine explosion on 4 Oct. 1996 near Bangladesh-Burma border at Fansi village,” *The Newsletter* (monthly), Arakan, Burma, November 1996.

¹¹ Interview with Col. Mohammed Wali Ullah, Chittagong, 30 November 1999. Similar information was provided in interviews with border area community leaders, Ukhia and Gundum, 1 and 2 January 2000.

¹² Interview with community leaders of Ukhia District, 7 December 1999. Also, Non-violence International (Southeast Asia Office) interview with Anis Ahmed, Reuters, Dacca, 15 December 1999.

Mine Clearance

The Bangladesh Army has several battalions with mine clearing capabilities. Bangladesh soldiers have cleared mines in Kuwait, Cambodia, and on peacekeeping operations, as well as inside Bangladesh. Two Bangladeshi battalions are engaged in mine clearance in Kuwait under the supervision of Kuwaiti Engineering Corps.¹³

According to a Bangladesh Rifles source, from June 1994 to October 1996, sixty-three antipersonnel mines were cleared in the Chakdala, Fultali, Rejupara, Ashartali, and Lembu Chari areas.¹⁴ In 1997, the Bangladesh Rifles cleared a five-kilometer-long area from Ghumdum to Tambru in Naikongchari sub-district.¹⁵ A journalist reports that another four mines were recovered from paddy land in Chakdala on 20 June 1998.¹⁶

Bangladesh has repeatedly requested Burmese authorities to survey and assess the border minefields. Burma has generally not responded positively, though on 17 July 1999 Burmese Foreign Minister Aung, while visiting Bangladesh, said that his country was "ready to cooperate with Bangladesh experts."¹⁷ To date no action has been taken. Burmese authorities have claimed that they cleared mines along the border from October 1997 to January 1998, though there continue to be victims.

Bangladesh has neither received nor given any mine action funding.

Mine Awareness

The government has provided no mine awareness education. Two NGOs, the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Center for Trauma Victims and Human Concern, as well as local journalists, have warned people about the existence of mines. But this awareness education remains limited to only a section of educated people, and does not reach the majority of the population living in suspected mined areas.

Landmine Casualties

Of the 120 million people of Bangladesh only a small portion are affected by landmines. From the death of two youths in 1993 until May 2000, the death toll by landmine blasts numbers at least fifty-three, according to data compiled from a variety of sources.¹⁸ At least 125 more have been injured by mines. Of the fifty-three deaths, ten occurred from 1993-1996, seventeen in 1997, thirteen in 1998, one in 1999, and the year could not be ascertained for twelve deaths. The victims include both Bangladesh nationals and Burmese Rohingya ethnic minorities. Most of the mine victims are woodcutters. They also include some farmers, two traders, one ex-police constable and a Bangladesh Rifles soldier. Except for one tribal woman and one child, all victims have

¹³ Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, "Landmines and the Destruction of the Environment of Kuwait," 1999, p. 120.

¹⁴ Interview with Col. Mohamed Wali Ullah, Chittagong, 30 November 1999.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Interviews with reporter Mr. Nazrul Islam Bakshi, Cox's Bazar, 7 December 1999 and 14 February 2000.

¹⁷ "Dhaka Yangon official talks inconclusive," *The Daily Independent*, 18 July 1999.

¹⁸ Sources include Border Security Force, NSA of Arakan, local NGOs, media, hospitals, interviews with community leaders.

been males aged between 14 and 40.¹⁹ It is likely that many more landmine incidents have gone unreported and unrecorded. Numerous elephants and other wild animals have also fallen victim to mines.

Survivor Assistance

There is very little in the way of assistance to mine survivors and the relatives of victims. One maimed survivor received an artificial leg free of cost from the organization Jaipur Foot. An organization run by Human Concern and the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Center for Trauma Victims, based at Cox's Bazar, supplied artificial legs to three survivors. It appears that one survivor from the Bangladesh Rifles got treatment from the government. But assistance remains scarce and is not a part of national policy or humanitarian programs.

There are four hospitals near mine-affected areas: Cox's Bazar government hospital, Naikongchari government hospital, Rabita hospital and Memorial Christian hospital. Staff members from all except Cox's Bazar told Landmine Monitor that they have provided treatment to some mine victims. Government hospitals most of the time run short of surgeons and surgical equipment and supplies. Rabita hospital often refers complicated cases to other hospitals.²⁰ Memorial Christian hospital is said to have a good orthopedic department with necessary equipment and technicians. Psychological care of victims appears non-existent at both government and private hospitals.

Hospital personnel state that victims of explosives and firearms are reluctant to come to hospitals in Bangladesh, as they fear police inquiries each time such accidents are reported. Thus mine victims may not go to a hospital, but instead seek the help of other medical personnel.²¹

Recently the government declared that ten percent of the total population is disabled, physically or mentally. To assist them, the government has formed a trust fund with one hundred million in Bangladeshi Taka (about \$2 million). It is unclear if mine survivors are included. In addition, adoption of a disability law is underway, with cabinet approval on 8 May 2000.²²

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

Mine Ban Policy

Brunei Darussalam signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has yet to ratify. Brunei's support for a total mine ban has been lukewarm. It participated in the Ottawa Process meetings and treaty negotiations only as an observer. Yet it signed the treaty and has voted in favor of all pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions since 1996, including the December 1999 resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. It did not

¹⁹ Landmine Monitor researcher data collection from Bangladesh Rifles, newspapers, local NGOs, and local community leaders.

²⁰ Interview with Dr. Rahim Ullah, Director and Surgeon of Rabita Hospital, 10 January 2000.

²¹ Interviews with Dr. Safique-ul-Islam and Dr. Abul Quasem, Cox's Bazar Government Hospital, 18-19 December 1999, and Dr. Rahim Ullah, Rabita Hospital, 10 February 2000.

²² Telephone interview with the Secretary General of the National Forum of Organizations Working with the Disabled, Dakha, 9 May 2000.

attend the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique in May 1999. It has not participated in any of the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. It is not known to have made any official statements regarding a ban in 1999 or 2000.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense officials have not been responsive to requests for information for the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*. In one letter, an official simply said that last year's report "does not require any update."¹ In the only other response, an official said that "there is not much development on this subject."²

Brunei's signing of the ban treaty has been described as largely a "political decision" on the part of its monarch, His Majesty Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah.³ The Ministry of Defense has made it clear that, although Brunei supports a ban, the military at this time wants to retain the option of using antipersonnel mines and believes the current security environment is not ideal for ratification.⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* indicated that there had not been discussions among the relevant agencies about moving forward on ratification, and that situation has apparently not changed.

Brunei has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Brunei states that it has never been a landmine producer, exporter, or user.⁵ Brunei has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. It is doubtful the number of mines is very large, considering that Brunei's armed forces number only approximately 5,000 personnel. According to the Ministry of Defense, antipersonnel mines are stockpiled largely for training purposes.⁶

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Brunei is not mine-affected. There have been no reported incidents of injuries or deaths resulting from landmines. Brunei has not participated in or contributed to any humanitarian mine action programs.

¹ Letter from Datin Tan Bee Yong, Director, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor researcher, 17 November 1999.

² Letter from Yahya HJ Idris, Deputy Director, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor researcher, 4 November 1999.

³ Interview with Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Dato Mohd Alimin Abdul Wahab at the Bolkiah Garrison, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 11 February 1999.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

COOK ISLANDS

The Cook Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and although it has yet to ratify, there appears strong intention to do so. In a 15 February 2000 letter to Landmine Monitor, an official with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration said that the Cook Islands intends to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty "in the near future" but "given our country's limited resources, the process of ratification...has admittedly been slow."¹ He added, "The process of preparing our domestic implementing legislation has begun."

In a separate letter sent to the ICBL Coordinator, the Foreign Ministry official stated, "The Cook Islands intends to honour its legal obligations by ratifying the Landmines Treaty in the near future and notes the importance of having domestic implementing legislation that will ensure that our Government's signature of this important Treaty is more than a statement of good intent."²

The official also "noted your offer of assistance and would therefore greatly appreciate of your advising of assistance that your organisation, ICBL, may be able to provide to our Government."³ Human Rights Watch, Chair of the ICBL's Treaty Working Group, replied to this letter and forwarded the ICRC's "Ratification Packet" and also sent the Cook Islands letter to the Governments of Canada and New Zealand, as well as to the ICRC's legal division, with a request for further assistance.⁴ The UNICEF regional office in Nadi, Fiji, has also provided the Cook Islands with information on ratification.⁵

The Cook Islands is not a member of the United Nations and therefore has not participated in any of the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines. The Cook Islands did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo nor any of the intersessional meetings of the FMSP, most likely due to resource constraints.

It is believed that the Cook Islands has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines, nor does it contribute to humanitarian mine action programs. Its larger neighbor, New Zealand, is responsible for its foreign affairs and defense.

¹ Letter from Edwin Pittman, Secretary, Office of International Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, Cook Islands, to Landmine Researcher, 15 February 2000.

² Fax from Edwin Pittman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, 15 February 2000.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Fax from Mary Wareham, Senior Advocate, Arms Division, Human Rights Watch, to Edwin Pittman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 March 2000.

⁵ UNICEF, *Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channareth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador*, 22-31 March 2000, p. 7.

INDONESIA

Key developments since March 1999: There is no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines by any side in the 1999 violence and fighting in East Timor, or in on-going conflicts elsewhere in Indonesia.

Mine Ban Policy

Indonesia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but it has yet to ratify. At the First Meeting of States Parties in Mozambique in May 1999, Indonesian Ambassador Sjaiful Amanullah said, "The entry into force of the Convention on 1 March 1999 has truly been a historic landmark.... This demonstrates the shared commitment of the majority of the international community to achieve a rapid and comprehensive solution to the disastrous consequences of anti-personnel landmines.... Indonesia hopes that eventually all major countries which traditionally produce, use and export, as well as mine-infested countries will join as parties in order to ensure its universal adherence and effective implementations."¹

At that time, Ambassador Amanullah also said that Indonesia "looks forward to an appropriate time to finalize the process of its ratification."² In April 2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Hasan Kleib said that ratification had not moved forward because the Mine Ban Treaty was not considered a priority for the Indonesian Parliament, given that Indonesia does not have a landmine problem.³

Indonesia has voted for every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, including the December 1999 resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Interestingly, Indonesia has participated in Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings on Stockpile Destruction (December 1999 and May 2000) and on Victim Assistance (September 1999).

Indonesia has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). However, Indonesia did participate in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II (Landmines), in December 1999 in Geneva. It did not make a statement to the conference.

Indonesia is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a strong supporter or opponent of efforts to negotiate a transfer ban in the CD.

The Indonesia Campaign to Ban Landmines, in cooperation with the Australia Network of the ICBL, held a Regional Conference for South and East Asia on Public Education on Landmine Issues on 26-28 March 1999. The Indonesian Campaign also translated the Mine Ban Treaty into the Indonesian language and distributed it to members of Parliament, sent letters to Parliament urging ratification, and distributed posters throughout much of the country.

¹ Statement by H.E. Ambassador Sjaiful Amanullah at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, May 1999.

² Ibid.

³ Interview with Hasan Kleib, Chief of Section for Disarmament, International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 April 2000.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

According to Indonesian officials, Indonesia has never produced antipersonnel mines.⁴ There is no evidence or allegation to the contrary. Indonesia is not believed to have ever exported antipersonnel landmines. In the past Indonesia imported AP mines in limited number from foreign countries, including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the United States.⁵

Indonesia stockpiles antipersonnel mines, apparently only in a limited number. The number, types, and location are still military secrets. Major General Ferry Tinggogoy told Landmine Monitor that antipersonnel mines are stockpiled and used only in military training programs for engineers, not for operational purposes. Thus, he said, these stocks will not be destroyed.⁶

Use

Although Major General Tinggogoy told Landmine Monitor last year that the Army had never laid antipersonnel mines to defend its borders, nor in internal combat,⁷ in interviews in April and July 2000 he said that Indonesia used mines in East Timor in the 1970s and in West Papua during the conflict with the Netherlands in 1961-1962.⁸ He said that AP mines had not been used since 1975.⁹

The General's admission is surprising in that Landmine Monitor interviews in 1999 with Indonesian soldiers, rebel fighters, and political opponents did not result in any allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in any of Indonesia's internal conflicts.¹⁰ Xanana Gusmao, the noted East Timor leader, stated in an interview that neither Indonesian soldiers nor East Timor fighters ever used antipersonnel landmines.¹¹ Mujikar, formerly with the Marine Corps, was involved in combat operations in West Papua 1962-1964 and in East Timor 1976-1978, and said that antipersonnel landmines were never used by government or rebel forces.¹² Branco Gregory was imprisoned for 20 years due to his struggle for the independence of East Timor. He said that there was no use of antipersonnel mines by either side and that he was unaware of any Timor mine victims.¹³

Yet, Mr. Made Sujana, the Chief of Administration at a complex for East Timor veterans located in Bekasi, said he suffered an antipersonnel mine accident in East Timor in 1978 and his left foot had to be amputated. He said about 30 people among the 400

⁴ Interview with Major General Ferry Tinggogoy, Member of Parliament, 26 April 2000.

⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 410, for more detail. Also, interview with Gen. Tinggogoy, 26 April 2000; telephone interview by LM/HRW, 25 July 2000.

⁶ Interview with Major General Ferry Tinggogoy, 26 April 2000; telephone interview by LM/HRW, 25 July 2000.

⁷ Interview with Maj. Gen. Tinggogoy, Jakarta, 23 February 1999.

⁸ Interview with Maj. Gen. Tinggogoy, 26 April 2000; telephone interview by LM/HRW, 25 July 2000.

⁹ Telephone interview with Maj. Gen. Tinggogoy by LM/HRW, 25 July 2000. The General said that while there had been no use of factory mines since 1975, soldiers would have made and used improvised explosive devices in the field.

¹⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 410-411.

¹¹ Interview with Xanana Gusmao, 17 February 1999.

¹² Interview with Mujikar, 15 February 1999.

¹³ Interview with Branco Gregory, Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, 19 December 1999.

veteran families living in the complex had amputations due to landmine explosions. He also said that many members of Battalion 503 from East Java stepped on landmines during the war in East Timor in the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁴

There is no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines in East Timor during the fighting in 1999 (See separate *Landmine Monitor 2000* report on East Timor).

Research by the Indonesian Campaign to Ban Landmines into the conflicts in Aceh and Ambon, as well as the Indonesia-Malaysia border in Borneo and the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border, did not produce any allegations of use of landmines.¹⁵

Mine Action Funding

Indonesia is not mine-affected. Indonesia has contributed \$40,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, with funds earmarked for the demining effort in Cambodia.¹⁶

Note: See separate *Landmine Monitor 2000* report on East Timor.

MALDIVES

Maldives signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 October 1998, and was the second country in the region to do so, following Bangladesh. It has not yet ratified. Maldives did not participate in the Ottawa process. It did not attend any of the major diplomatic meetings on landmines in 1999 or 2000. Maldives did not send a representative to the International Committee of the Red Cross' South Asia Regional Seminar on Landmines, held in Sri Lanka 18-20 August 1999. It has voted in favor of all pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions since 1996, including the December 1999 resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not a signatory of the Landmines Protocol of the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Maldives does not use, produce, trade or stockpile antipersonnel mines. It is not mine-affected. The island country has no Army, but maintains a security unit, the

¹⁴ Interview with Made Sujana, Chief of Administration of Komplek Seroja, Bekasi, 26 March 2000.

¹⁵ Aceh province has seen separatist conflicts since 1989. But there has not been any indication of landmine use in this area. From January 1999-March 2000 Mr. Munawarman, coordinator of Kontras (Commission for Involuntary Disappearances and Torture), investigated human rights abuses by the military in Aceh. He did not find any allegations of antipersonnel landmine use (Interview, 11 April 2000). Pia Makasar, Coordinator of Tapak (Advocacy Team for Ambon Case Settlement) said that during the conflict from January-July 1999 she never heard reports of any victims of antipersonnel landmines (Interview, 20 April 2000). Colonel Adnan, military attaché at the Malaysian Embassy said that he had never heard reports of landmine use on the shared border in Borneo. (Interview 17 April 2000). Colonel Yaura Sasa, military attaché at the Papua New Guinea embassy said that neither Papua nor Indonesia planted antipersonnel landmines on their shared border. (Interview 17 April 2000).

¹⁶ "Assistance in Mine Clearance: Report of the Secretary-General," UN General Assembly A/53/496, 14 October 1998, p. 29.

National Security Service, manned by about 2,000 personnel for army, police, and maritime duties.¹

MARSHALL ISLANDS

The Marshall Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. When UNICEF discussed ratification of the treaty with the President of the Marshall Islands, H.E. Kessai Note, he offered his “full support” for the treaty.¹

While the Marshall Islands voted for the 1996 and 1997 pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines, it abstained on the vote on the 1998 and 1999 resolutions – the only ban treaty signatory to do so. One possible reason for this abstention and for the lack of ratification could be the close economic, political and military dependence between the Marshall Islands and non-signatory, the United States, as defined by the Compact of Free Association.

The Marshall Islands did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo and it did not attend any of the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty, most likely due to resource constraints.

It is believed that the Marshall Islands has not ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines, nor have they contributed any humanitarian aid to mine victims.

There are considerable quantities of UXO left over from World War II when Japanese and American forces fought over many of the islands.

VANUATU

Vanuatu signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. At a recent regional meeting of parliamentarians, Vanuatu’s Government Speaker, the Hon. Paul Ren Tari, promised to follow-up and find out the status of ratification.¹

While Vanuatu voted in favor of the 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines it was absent from the 1998 and 1999 resolution votes. Vanuatu was not present at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo and has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty.

It is still believed that Vanuatu has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines. It is not known if Vanuatu has provided any assistance to humanitarian mine action. Vanuatu is not believed to be mine-affected although there are still major dumps of military equipment left over from World War II.

¹ <http://www.ipcs.org/projects/mil-dta/mil-mal.htm>.

¹ UNICEF, *Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channareth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador, March 22-31, 2000*, p. 10.

¹ Hon. Paul Ren Tari, Vanuatu’s Government Speaker, made this promise after meeting with Tun Channereth, ICBL Ambassador. UNICEF, *Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channareth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador, 22-31 March 2000*, p. 9.

NON-SIGNATORIES**AFGHANISTAN**

Key developments since March 1999: Landmine casualties continued to decline. An estimated five to ten people were injured or killed by mines every day in 1999, compared to an estimated ten to twelve people in 1998 and an estimated twenty to twenty-four people in 1993. In 1999, 110 square kilometers of land were cleared of mines and UXO, which constitutes 24% of the total of 465 square kilometers cleared since 1990. In 1999, 21,871 antipersonnel mines, 1,114 antitank mines, and 254,967 UXO were destroyed. Donors contributed US\$22 million to mine action in 1999. A total of 979,640 people received mine awareness education in 1999, and about 6 million since 1990. The opposition Northern Alliance continued to use antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

At least in part because of its unusual international political status and situation, Afghanistan is not a party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, or Taliban authority, now controls over 90% of country, but Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations is still occupied by the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, known as the Islamic State of Afghanistan or Northern Alliance, which was ousted by the Taliban in September 1996. Northern Alliance forces are currently engaged in continued fighting with Taliban forces in the north of Afghanistan.

In October 1998, the supreme leader of the Taliban, Mullah Muhammed Omer, issued a lengthy, detailed statement from Kandahar proclaiming a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines.¹ In 1999 and 2000, the Taliban has reaffirmed its support for the ban on landmines on a number of occasions. On 1 March 2000, the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL) and member organizations organized an event in Kabul to commemorate the anniversary of the entry into force of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Several high-ranking officials of the Taliban participated as well as UN officials and representatives of international agencies and NGOs.

The head of the Taliban's Office of Disaster Response, which includes a Department of Mine Clearance, Mohammed Yousef, used the occasion to confirm the October 1998 declaration condemning the use, production, trafficking, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines.² He said "if someone uses a mine in a Taliban-controlled area they will be punished according to Islamic Shariat" and went on to state that the Taliban had not used landmines since the 1998 policy declaration. The deputy head of the Ministry of Information and Culture, Abdul Rhman Hotak, said that "prevention of the use of this weapon which kills without discrimination is necessary and its use is irrational." He called on all countries of the world to join the ban on landmines. Both officials closed by describing the Taliban's strong support for mine clearance.

For its part, the Rabbani government declared its support for an immediate and comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines in a statement to the UN Human Rights

¹ For text, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 433-434.

² Transcript provided by the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines.

Commission in March 1996. However, the Northern Alliance forces admit to continued use of mines since that time. The Rabbani government was absent from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, just as it had been absent on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

Production

There is no evidence of antipersonnel mine production in Afghanistan, past or current, by any government, warring faction or private enterprise.

Transfer

Large numbers of mines from many sources were sent to Afghanistan during the many years of fighting. With regard to recent practice, Taliban authorities have by their 1998 statement denounced import and export of landmines, and Landmine Monitor has no evidence to the contrary. *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* reported that the Northern Alliance acknowledged still using and importing antipersonnel mines.³ Taliban has often accused Iran of supplying mines to the opposition forces. In a 5 July 2000 letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Taliban's Foreign Minister asked the UN to stop the flow of landmines from "hostile" countries to resistance commander Ahmad Shah Masood.⁴

Landmine Monitor has received unconfirmed reports of small-scale smuggling of landmines left over from the conflict by private dealers to sources in Pakistan and Sri Lanka but the quantity and value of such trade cannot be estimated.

Stockpiling

It is obvious that both sides to the current conflict have stockpiled landmines but because the conflict continues it is difficult to obtain details on the numbers, types, or country of origin of stockpiled mines. Landmine Monitor is not aware of any systematic destruction of AP mine stockpiles by either party to the conflict.

In September 1999, Taliban authorities asked the United Nations Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan for assistance to undertake the clearance of the "most dangerous museum of the unexploded ordnance in the world" in Zendajan, Herat province. Over 465 different UXO including aircraft bombs and other types of ammunition were safely destroyed by a special bomb disposal team of a demining organization in November 1999.⁵

Use

Landmine Monitor has not been able to obtain any firsthand evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines because the areas in which the fighting is taking place are inaccessible and there are no mine action NGOs operating there.

³ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 435.

⁴ "Afghan Taliban accuse opposition of using landmines," *Agence France-Presse*, Kabul, 5 July 2000.

⁵ UNOCHA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, Richard Daniel Kelly, Programme Manager, email Response to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), regarding draft Landmine Monitor report, 19 July 2000.

The Taliban and the Northern Alliance continue to accuse each other of on-going use of antipersonnel mines.⁶ The Northern Alliance admits to use,⁷ and in November 1999 the Associated Press reported that “U.N. landmine officials said most of the new mines are being laid by the opposition.”⁸ The NGO Save the Children’s Northern Regional Office in Taloquen (Takhar Province) reported in August 1999 that landmines had been planted from Kunduz to Takhar provinces, through Imam Sahib and Archi districts. They also reported new mine casualties, noting that health centers in Kunduz and Takhar had cared for many landmine casualties in 1999.⁹ In 1999, the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines sent a letter to the leader of the Northern Alliance urging him to take the necessary action to ensure that his followers refrain from importing and using of landmines in the territories.¹⁰

Mine Action Funding

The humanitarian mine action program in Afghanistan is funded by various donor countries that channel funds through the UN Coordination Office for Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan (UNOCHA). The program is coordinated by the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA). MAPA’s activities includes surveys of mined areas, mine clearance and mine awareness education, implemented by various national and international NGOs working in Afghanistan. Funding for NGOs engaged in mine action accounts for about 63% of all NGO activity in Afghanistan.¹¹

Funding for MAPA has totaled U.S. \$153 million from 1991 through 1999. The total budget for 1999 was U.S. \$21.9 million. This was a significant decrease from the 1998 total of U.S. \$27 million, but still represented a higher total than any other year besides 1998. By comparison, funding in 1995 totaled \$15.6 million, in 1996 \$17.8 million, and in 1997 \$20.2 million.

Countries that have contributed to the program since 1991 are shown in Table I. The biggest donors in 1999 were the U.S. (\$3.0 million), European Community (\$2.6 million), Sweden (\$2.5 million) and Germany (\$2.5 million). The biggest donors since 1991 are the European Community (\$17.1 million), Sweden (\$16.9 million), U.S. (\$15.9 million), UK (\$13.1 million), Japan (\$11.6 million), and Norway (\$11.2 million).

Funding for MAPA has generally been sufficient in 1999, but several times in the past it has faced severe shortages that affected field operations.

None of the above figures include funding for victim assistance programs; MAPA does not have a victim assistance component in its structure.

⁶ See, for example, “Afghan Taliban accuse opposition of using landmines,” *Agence France-Presse*, Kabul, 5 July 2000; “Taleban calls for action on landmines,” BBC World Service, 14:29 GMT, 5 July 2000.

⁷ Ibid. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 436.

⁸ “Land mines prevent delivery of food to Afghani refugees,” *Associated Press*, Kabul, 27 November 1999.

⁹ Letter from Save the Children/USA to Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines, 17 August 1999. See also ACBL Newsletter, *BAN*, no. 19, August 1999.

¹⁰ Letter from ACBL to Burhanuddin Rabbani, dated 21 June 1999. Reprinted in ACBL Newsletter, *BAN*, vol. 4, no. 20, October 1999.

¹¹ Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), *Directory*, 1999.

Table I. Details of funds received by MAPA from 1991 through 1999 in U.S.\$¹²

Country	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
Contributions B/F from last year	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,817,433	3,890,841	8,708,274
Australia	0	658,868	138,279	274,800	306,000	293,600	748,380	335,550	0	2,755,477
Austria	0	180,000	0	315,725	159,982	203,030	16,667	10,000	1,27,992	1,013,396
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	273,224	0	273,224
Canada	0	0	562,559	716,874	355,540	737,419	777,940	705,937	659,659	4,515,928
CEC	0	0	0	0	2,785,321	5,077,730	3,624,437	3,027,613	2,634,534	17,149,635
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	10,000	0	0	0	0	10,000
Denmark	0	400,000	0	202,823	900,000	900,000	598,802	729,639	0	3,731,264
Finland	235,294	227,635	175,991	756,559	242,825	423,191	380,952	0	512,540	2,954,987
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	167,000	0	100,000	267,000
Germany	0	0	0	0	374,232	2,388,041	2,000,000	2,373,000	2,500,000	9,635,273
Greece	0	16,365	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16,365
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100,000	100,000
Japan	5,000,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	0	2,000,000	0	1,000,000	300,268	1,300,000	11,602,268
Korea	0	0	75,000	0	0	0	0	50,000	0	125,000
Netherlands	0	586,281	780,457	341,591	789,345	1,363,527	2,530,993	1,482,945	1,454,525	9,329,664
Norway	765,004	1,126,877	1,819,103	631,606	562,375	886,163	1,508,107	2,398,649	1,477,044	11,174,928
Sweden	894,457	872,600	1,148,494	1,894,524	2,218,743	2,535,812	2,500,000	2,278,481	2,510,488	16,853,599
Switzerland	0	0	709,220	0	344,828	344,828	0	135,135	0	1,534,011
UK	904,350	954,350	1,494,000	1,085,840	1,970,728	1,183,088	1,209,678	3,346,000	979,800	13,127,834
U.S.	123,000	1,105,023	1,500,000	3,227,405	2,564,089	1,308,507	2,000,000	1,073,442	3,021,000	15,922,466
Direct/ in-kind	0	2,955,000	6,972,428	7,521,244	0	115,328	1,111,111	3,121,990	315,147	22,112,248
Total	7,922,106	11,082,999	17,375,531	16,967,991	15,584,008	17,760,264	20,174,057	26,984,087	21,931,072	153,830,424

¹² MAPA, monthly report for December 1999. Note: MAPA does not have a Victim Assistance component in its structure. Therefore funds received for Victim Assistance by other NGOs and aid agencies are not included here.

Landmine Problem

A total of about 717 square kilometers of land remains contaminated by mines and UXO. This includes 337 square kilometers of affected land classified as high priority.¹³ A major socio-economic impact study conducted by the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) under the auspices of the Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan (MAPA), and published in December 1999, revealed that affected land consisted of 61% grazing land, 26% agricultural land, 7% roads, 4% residential areas, and 1% irrigation systems.¹⁴ The survey was conducted in eighteen out of Afghanistan's twenty-nine provinces and covered a total number of 3,656 minefields and 20,645 villages. It indicated about 1,600 villages were affected by mines and UXO.

Refugees and internally displaced persons are still reluctant to return home, in part due to fear of mines. A total of 12,216 families were repatriated in 1999, including 72,098 individuals.¹⁵

See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for a list of fifty antipersonnel mines found in Afghanistan and their countries of origin.¹⁶ Two more antipersonnel mines have since been added to the list: the YM-1 mine from Iran and the RAP-2 mine from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

Mine Clearance

From 1990 to April 2000, a total of 465 square kilometers of contaminated area has been cleared in Afghanistan. That includes 207 square kilometers of mined land and 258 square kilometers of mostly unexploded ordnance (UXO) from battlefields.¹⁷ In the same period, 205,842 antipersonnel mines, 9,199 antitank mines and 1,054,738 UXO were cleared.¹⁸

In 1999, 110 square kilometers of land were cleared, including 34 square kilometers of mined land and 76 square kilometers of mostly UXO from battlefields.¹⁹ In 1999, 21,871 AP mines, 1,114 AT mines and 254,967 UXO were cleared.²⁰

In February 2000, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) stated that fourteen national and international NGOs employed approximately 5,000

¹³ UNOCHA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, Richard Daniel Kelly, Programme Manager, email Response to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), regarding draft Landmine Monitor report, 19 July 2000.

¹⁴ United Nations Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, *Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in Afghanistan*, Study and Report by Mine Clearance Planning Agency, December 1999. The information in the report is as of 31 December 1998.

¹⁵ UNHCR Peshawar Report, December 1999. Fewer refugees from Pakistan repatriated in 1999 than 1998.

¹⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 436.

¹⁷ UN MAPA Monthly Report, April 2000. The precise totals are 207,200,317 square meters of mined land and 257,839,994 square meters of battlefields.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ MAPA Monthly Report, December 1999. The precise totals are 34,173,911 square meters of mined land and 75,680,090 square meters of battlefields.

²⁰ Ibid.

people to implement mine action projects in Afghanistan.²¹ This is a significant increase over the 3,900 employees reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*. The majority of employees are Afghan, but there are also a number of Pakistanis and a few international workers.

A list of eight organizations directly involved in mine clearance follows. The other six are mine action implementing partners who work in other types of mine action-related assistance: META, AMMA, SCF/US, HI, ARI, BBC.

Organizations directly involved in mine clearance.²²

Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC). ATC is Afghanistan's oldest Mine/UXO clearance NGO, established in 1989 by its present director Kefayatullah Eblagh. It has 1,299 employees. Its 1999 budget was \$4,792,386. In year 2000, in accordance with policy changes of the EU in relation to funding of NGOs, the EU has agreed to the provision of about two million Euro per annum to ATC through UNOCHA. ATC has cleared approximately 40% of overall MAPA Program Operation. In 1999, ATC cleared 6.6 square kilometers of mined land and 24 square kilometers of mostly UXO from battlefields, and destroyed 9,028 mines and 62,712 UXO.

Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA). DAFA has 689 employees. Its 1999 budget was \$3,326,497. In 1999 DAFA cleared 2.9 square kilometers of mined land and 0.06 square kilometers of mostly UXO from battlefields, and destroyed 2,807 mines and 44,196 UXO.

Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA). MCPA has 297 employees. Its 1999 budget was \$2,331,000. In 1999 MCPA cleared 0.3 square kilometers of mined land and 0.2 square kilometers of mostly UXO from battlefield and destroyed 19 AP mines and 645 UXO.

Mine Detection Dog Center (MDC). MDC has 707 employees. Its 1999 budget was \$5,531,000. In 1999 MDC cleared 16.9 square kilometers of mined land, and destroyed 1,171 mines and 2,102 UXO.

Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). OMAR has 431 employees. Its 1999 budget was \$2,321,500. In 1999 OMAR cleared 3.5 square kilometers of mined land, and destroyed 2,193 mines and 2,525 UXO.

HALO Trust. HALO has 1,210 employees. It conducts clearance independent of MAPA. Its 1998 budget was \$2,000,000, but figures for 1999 were not available (UNOCHA provided \$1,375,600). In 1999 HALO cleared 3.6 square kilometers of

²¹ MAPA, Richard Daniel Kelly, Programme Manager, Response to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

²² Staff data from MAPA Monthly Report October 1999. Funding data from ACBAR Directory 1998-1999, February 2000. Clearance data from MAPA Monthly Report December 1999 and MAPA e-mail to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

mined land and 52 square kilometers of mostly UXO from battlefields, and destroyed 7,001 mines and 143,428 UXO.

Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA). AREA has 731 employees, of which 114 are engaged in mine action. Its 1999 budget for landmines was \$115,928 (36 percent of AREA's total budget). In 1999, AREA cleared 0.3 square kilometers of mined land, and destroyed 79 AP mines.²³

Danish Demining Group (DDG). This Danish mine clearance NGO established an office in Pakistan to undertake mine clearance activities in Afghanistan. Due to differences with the Governor of Kandahar on recruitment policy, DDG moved out and shifted its main operational office to Kabul. The agency has so far established two mine clearance teams with a staff capacity of 60 persons.

Apart from Kabul-based HALO, all the mine clearance organizations were based in Pakistan, but in the course of 1999 and 2000 they have moved or are moving their base of operations to Kabul while maintaining liaison offices in Pakistan for logistical purposes. The move to Afghanistan should be completed by September 2000 and reflects the better operating environment within the country.

While there is no MAPA "standard" for demining team composition, most of the demining agencies have a similar structure in which each demining team consists of thirty people plus support staff. MAPA has clear criteria for employment in demining. Most importantly, all employees (such as deminers, surveyors, dog handlers) must pass independently conducted courses before they are licensed. A few organizations have a policy of hiring local staff while others recruit staff who work outside of their own province.

Work in the field is monitored and evaluated by the Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META), funded and reporting to MAPA. META is based in Jalalabad. META has sixty-six employees who are undertaking monitoring and training of the mine action staff. In 1999 META had a budget of \$625,800.²⁴

From 1990 until April 2000, a total of 40,658 students (employees of mine clearance agencies) were trained through 1,139 courses on mine recognition, revision, team leaders in battle areas and clearance courses.²⁵ In 1999 alone, 4,270 were trained in 186 courses.

Coordination and Planning

The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) is coordinated by the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA). Tasks are given to the mine action agencies by a coordinated plan of action by MAPA who may act in regards to a regular

²³ AREA is the only mine clearance organization that recruits deminers from the mine-affected community and is community based. See Kristian Berg Harpviken, Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC), PRIO, "Towards Community Based De-Mining? AREA's project in Nangrahar province, Afghanistan," *Landmines Memo no. 3*, Peshawar, 24 May 1999.

²⁴ MAPA Response to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

²⁵ Mine Technical Training MAPA Report, December 1999.

work plan or on ad hoc basis if communities or organizations request it on an emergency basis. In 1999 and 2000 mine action is divided into five regions:

- **Central region:** Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Bamiyan, Wardak, Logar, and Ghazni provinces
- **Northern region:** Baghlan, Samangan, Balkh, Jozjan, Faryab, Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces.
- **Southern region:** Urozgan, Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand, and Nimroz provinces
- **Western region:** Badghis, Ghor, Herat, Farah provinces
- **Eastern region:** Nengerhar, Kunar, Laghaman, Paktia, Paktika provinces

MAPA has offices in each region with both expatriate and national regional coordinators looking after the program and reporting to the main office of MAPA in UNOCHA Islamabad. MAPA maintains the MAPA mine action management information system, a database containing a wide range of information and data including records of mined areas, cleared areas and data on landmine incidents and injuries. MAPA prioritizes both the area needing clearance and the area needing marking into high and low priority categories.

Mine Awareness

There is a continued need for mine awareness education programs. Some challenges include the very low literacy rate, the location of the majority of the population in remote and sometimes isolated areas and inadequate education facilities, especially in rural areas.

From 1990 to April 2000, some six million people received mine awareness education, including 979,640 in 1999.²⁶ While these numbers are impressive, MCPA reported that only 0.64% of mine victims it surveyed had received mine awareness education prior to their injury.²⁷

Mine awareness organizations use a curriculum that has been developed over the last ten years. In 1999, MAPA conducted two workshops to review and streamline the curriculum. Mine action organizations undertake mine awareness activities in communities where they work. Demining is done in the mornings while mine awareness is carried out in the afternoons. They use wooden models in real size and shape so the audience can grasp the actual volume and danger of the devices also demonstrated by videos and printed material.

Organizations involved in mine awareness include:²⁸

²⁶ MAPA Monthly Report, December 1999; and MCPA Monthly Report April, 2000, p. 2.

²⁷ MAPA, *Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in Afghanistan*, December 1999, p. 25.

²⁸ Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section came from UNOCHA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, Richard Daniel Kelly, Programme Manager, e-mail Response to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

Afghan Mine Awareness Agency (AMAA). AMAA established mine awareness programs in communities in Herat province in 1998.²⁹ AMAA sends its master trainers to live in a village for one month and train a selected couple. Christian Aid UK and UNOCHA have financially supported AMAA in 1998/99 but the NGO has not been able to secure funding for its activities during the second half of 1999 and year 2000.

Handicap International (HI). In April 1996 HI started a mine awareness program in the Kandahar province to complement its orthotic and prosthetic activities. The guiding principle of was to develop a community-based mine awareness project (CBMAP) aimed at the empowerment of Afghan communities and ensuring sustainability. Most recently the project has expanded to Farah province in May 2000. CBMAP trainers (Nomaindas) are recruited from the community in which they live and in turn it is their responsibility to recruit, train, equip and supervise volunteer trainers from the surrounding communities, to continue training the population. By the end of May 2000, a total of thirty Nomaindas were deployed in thirty districts of Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, and Farah provinces and 949 volunteer Mine Committees were operational. Since the inception of the project a total of 833,551 villagers and nomads have been directly and/or indirectly trained by CBMAP.

Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS). The ARCS was again funded by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) for its mine awareness activities in 1999. Training was concentrated in Kabul and Wardak provinces.

Ansar Relief Institute (ARI). In Iran, twenty-three instructors provided mine awareness training to Afghans at refugee centers in the country and at border crossing points. In 1999, the ARI project was carried out in close consultation with the Iranian Bureau of Aliens and Foreign International Affairs (BAFIA), UNHCR and UNDP Tehran. ARI trained 125,000 people, achieving its target for the year. Compulsory mine awareness training was given to returning Afghan refugees through the UNHCR encashment process (returnees hand in their refugee registration booklets in return for money and other items). It was supported by the distribution of materials such as mine awareness silk screens, posters and notebooks.

British Broadcasting Corporation, Afghan Education Projects (BBC/AEP). BBC/AEP receives funding from UNOCHA (US\$95,000) for the dissemination of mine awareness messages through its highly successful radio drama series "New Home, New Life" and in the illustrated magazine that accompanies the program. The series, which is made in the Pakistani city, Peshawar, is broadcast on the Pashto and Persian services of the BBC World Service. The primary themes are to disseminate awareness and avoidance messages and improve community relationships with the mine action agencies. There is extensive consultation with MAPA to ensure the message and materials are culturally

²⁹ For a detailed analysis of AMAA see Kristian Berg Harpviken, Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC), PRIO, "Community Based Mine Awareness: AMAA's project in Herat province, Afghanistan," *Landmines Memo no. 4*, Peshawar, 24 May 1999.

appropriate and technically correct. BBC/AEP reinforcement programs are broadcast on the Pashto and Persian services of BBC World Services. The reinforcement output is accommodated in two special programs, entitled Village Voice and Refugee File (*Sada-e-Abadi* and *Khpara Khawara*). The BBC/AEP also published a monthly cartoon magazine based on "New Home, New Life" to reinforce its soap opera.

Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). OMAR achieved its 1999 target of training 570,000 people with a funding of US\$456,500. OMAR distributed mine awareness notebooks, posters, silk-screens, identification books and storybooks. The materials were designed to assist people who have received training to subsequently provide information and education messages to friends and family members. Activities have been carried out in Badakhshan, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Logar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Urozgan, Zabul, Nimroz and at UNHCR encashment centers at border crossing points. The community-based mine awareness project developed in 1997/98 by OMAR focused on the establishment of volunteer councils to disseminate messages in their respective communities. The project has established 117 volunteer councils in Kabul, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Badakhshan, Ghazni, Logar and Herat provinces. These have trained 142,000 people. OMAR received funding from UNOCHA, the ICRC, the Netherlands Organisation for International Development and Cooperation (NOVIB), and the German government (all coordinated by the MACA).

Save the Children USA (SCF-US). In early 1996, SCF-US commenced its Landmine Education Project (LEP) in Kabul, following fierce fighting that left Kabul heavily contaminated with both mines and UXO. SCF also works in the surrounding districts of Paghman, Khaki Jabar and Sarobi. SCF-US has 26 facilitators, 236 community volunteers and 73 health promoters who all carry out mine awareness education. The project operation was undertaken in hospitals, clinics, mosques and Kuchi settlements following the political changes in Kabul and a ban on girls attending schools, which had been the original forum for the program.

SCF's activities were suspended at the beginning of 1999, due to negotiation with the Ministry of Planning to allow SCF to resume its activities. Official permission was given in February 1999 to SCF to resume activities in sub-districts of Paghman, Khaki Jabar and Sarobi. In 1999, SCF reached 64,000 people, mainly children, with its landmine awareness sessions. Sessions were run through a combination of direct implementation and indirect by training community. The LEP teams continue to use the child-focused material and methodology. This includes activity cards, board games, a memory game, landmine/UXO pictures and LEP passports. SCF also trained 398 community volunteers (239 male and 159 female) bringing the total number of committees trained by SCF to 680.

SCF continued throughout 1999 to document the landmine and UXO accidents in Kabul city. Staff were tasked to visit hospitals, clinics and other places to gather accident information. SCF also encouraged local community leaders to report mine/UXO incidents through the local government to higher authorities. This information is collated by RMAC and the MACA and used for planning purposes. As part of its ongoing activities SCF constructed four new safe playgrounds throughout Kabul city in 1999.

This part of SCF's project aims to provide children with an alternative to playing in areas contaminated with mines and UXO. The total UNOCHA funding for the SCF/US LEP in 1999 was US\$247,584.

Comprehensive Disabled Afghan Program (CDAP). CDAP plans to train its field workers in mine awareness in the year 2000, through class lectures. UNDP, Norway, Sweden, Holland and Canada provide about US\$2.2 million to CDAP.³⁰

Mine Awareness by Other NGOs. In addition to activities undertaken by the specialist mine awareness agencies, other NGOs included mine awareness training in their operations as they carried out mine-related programs such as demining and survey. The Monitoring, Training and Evaluation Agency (META) of the MAPA also gave some awareness instruction.

Although all Afghan mine action organizations are members of the **Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL)**, advocacy in support of the ban is sometimes not fully included in mine awareness education to some communities.³¹ The principle arguments that underline the demand for a ban on landmines find strong support in local culture and religion; once activated, this understanding can increase the legitimacy of demining operations, and decrease the legitimacy of future landmine use in the country.³² In 1999, the ACBL published bi-monthly newsletters and booklets in local languages that it distributed for free to member organizations and NGOs working in Afghanistan to pass them on to people in their contact and reach. A booklet entitled "Stories of Mine Victims in Afghanistan" was published in November 1999.³³

Landmine Casualties

The number of landmine casualties in Afghanistan continues to decline. It is estimated that in 1999, five to ten people were injured or killed by mines every day.³⁴ In 1998, there were an estimated ten to twelve casualties each day,³⁵ in 1993 an estimated twenty to twenty-four casualties each day.³⁶

Data on mine casualties is not systematic but joint plans are underway for comprehensive collection by the World Health Organization, ICRC, and MAPA. Some problems with data collection include the ongoing fighting and the isolated and remote

³⁰ Interview with Hayatullah Wahdat, Information and Communications Officer, CDAP, Peshawar, 21 December 1999.

³¹ Kristian Berg Harpviken, Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC), PRIO, "Community Based Mine Awareness: AMAA's project in Heart province, Afghanistan," *Landmines Memo no. 4*, Peshawar, 24 May 1999.

³² MCPA is researching the use of landmines under principles of Islam. A parallel work that emphasizes the Christian ethics of war is Kristian Berg Harpviken & Mona Fixdal, "Landmines: Just Means of War?" *Security Dialogue*, vol. 28, no. 3., September 1997.

³³ *Frontier Post*, 16 November 1999.

³⁴ MAPA Response to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

³⁵ MCPA, "Socio-Economic Impact Study," Interim Report, October 1998.

³⁶ MAPA, *Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines...*, December 1999, p. 20.

areas where some incidents occur. Almost 50% of landmine victims are still believed to die due to lack of medical facilities at an early stage of the injury.³⁷

MAPA recorded 1,771 landmine casualties (including injuries and deaths) in the thirteen months from January 1999 through January 2000.³⁸ The Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines conducted a sixteen-month survey of landmine victims from January 1999 through April 2000. It recorded 2,004 mine casualties (1,831 wounded and 173 deaths). Thus, similar results were found: MAPA data gives an average of 136 mine casualties per month, while the ACBL survey gives an average of 125 mine casualties per month, both in the 4 to 5 per day range. However, these figures would not represent total casualties in the nation, since some go unreported.

The ACBL survey was an intentionally simple sampling survey with two types of questionnaires. It was sent to six provinces (Badakhshan, Balkh, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz). Of the 173 deaths recorded: 110 were males aged between 15-60 years, 38 were males under 15 years, 22 were females aged between 15-60 years and 3 were females under 15 years. Of the 1,831 wounded: 1,349 were males aged between 15-60 years, 295 were males under 15 years, 105 were females under 15 years, 82 were females aged between 15-60 years. The survey showed that 694 people lost one leg, 85 lost both legs, 187 lost one hand, 76 lost both hands, and 87 were blinded.

Since 1991, more than 400,000 people have been killed or maimed by landmines in Afghanistan.³⁹ According to the Comprehensive Disabled Afghans' Programme (CDAP), as many as 800,000 people, or 4% of Afghanistan's population, are disabled, including some 210,000 landmine-disabled.⁴⁰

In December 1999, MCPA estimated that 12% of mine victims are above the age of 40 years, 50% are between the ages of 18 and 40 years and 36% are children under age of 18 years.⁴¹ The same survey estimated that 96% of casualties were male and 4% female.

In the month of December 1999, four deminers died and twenty-one were injured due to mines. In January 2000, there was one recorded death of a deminer due to mines.⁴² According to a news account, since 1990, 30 deminers have been killed and 534 have been injured.⁴³

Survivor Assistance

About thirty organizations and NGOs provide services and assistance to landmine survivors in Afghanistan, including medical care, surgical operations, orthopedic care, physical rehabilitation, technical training and employment opportunities.

³⁷ MAPA Response to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

³⁸ MAPA Report, January 2000.

³⁹ MAPA, *Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines...*, December 1999, p. 20. Data from UNIDATA, UNDP/OPS, UNHCR 1990/1991 Afghanistan Wardak and Bamayan province socio-economic profiles, Islamabad.

⁴⁰ Comprehensive Disabled Afghan Program, "CDAP in Brief," 24 November 1999. Also, Peter Coleridge, manager of Comprehensive Disabled Afghans' Programme, quoted in Tahir Ikram, "UN steps up appeals to help Afghan mine survivors," *Reuters* (Islamabad), 28 April 2000.

⁴¹ MAPA, *Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines...*, December 1999, p. 21.

⁴² UNOCHA Report, January 2000.

⁴³ Dexter Filkins, "Where War's Legacy Is Just a Step Away," *Los Angeles Times*, 18 July 2000, p. 1.

The main organizations providing services and assistance are:

Comprehensive Disabled Afghan Program (CDAP) operates a community based rehabilitation program for Afghan disabled, including landmine victims, in sixty-six districts of Afghanistan. 113 physiotherapists and 400 staff members serve a community of 30,000 disabled (one-third of whom are female beneficiaries served by female staff). Local Taliban commanders have cooperated with the program and have encouraged CDAP to employ female physiotherapists and other field staff. Over the past four years, CDAP has serviced an estimated 92,000 disabled but it claims that this is “just a fraction of the total number of people’ requiring assistance.”⁴⁴ CDAP offers micro-credit of up to \$120 to disabled people to start small businesses and also provides physiotherapy to the victims. CDAP’s implementing partners include Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) in Ghazni, Wardak and Logar provinces in south and in Badakhshan, Takhar and Balkh provinces in the north; Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA) in Herat and Farah provinces; and Guardians in Kandahar province. Other organizations supported by or working in collaboration with CDAP include: Afghan Association for Blind (AAB), HIFA, SERVE, IAM and Radda Barnen as well as the Afghan Ministry of the Disabled. In April 2000, CDAP called on the international community to contribute another U.S. \$1 million to the program, which has an annual budget of US\$1.6 million.⁴⁵

International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC provides assistance directly and through the Afghan Red Crescent (ARC) in districts and villages. ICRC also has medical and physical rehabilitation centers. In 1999, 86% of the prostheses produced by ICRC in Afghanistan were for mine victims (3,929 out of 4,565).⁴⁶

Afghan Amputees Bicyclists for Rehabilitation (AABRAR). Based in Ningerhar, a city in the eastern of the country, AABRAR provides social rehabilitation and assistance to landmine survivors. It teaches amputees to ride bicycles and to encourage them to hold cycle races and volleyball tournaments.

Guardians. Guardians works with the disabled, including mine victims, in Kandahar and the south west of the country, with funding and Japan and assistance from CDAP and Handicap International. It provides orthopedic and physiotherapy services to disabled, including mine survivors.

Other organizations involved in assistance to mine victims include the World Health Organization, Afghan Disabled Society, Handicap International, Save the Children Fund (U.S.), Sandy Gall Afghanistan and Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA).

⁴⁴ Peter Coleridge, manager of Comprehensive Disabled Afghans' Programme, quoted in Tahir Ikram, “UN steps up appeals to help Afghan mine survivors,” *Reuters* (Islamabad), 28 April 2000.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ See ICRC Contribution to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

In terms of availability of services to mine victims, the ACBL Survey found that between 1999 and April 2000, 1,950 mine survivors received assistance in a variety of facilities in the provinces surveyed.

Note to Readers: A much longer, more detailed country report on Afghanistan is available on request. Also, please contact MAPA or MCPA direct for the report: Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in Afghanistan, Study and Report by MCPA, December 1999.

BHUTAN

Bhutan has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty or Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It did not participate in the Ottawa Process. It did not attend any of the major diplomatic meetings on landmines in 1999 or 2000. It has, however, voted in favor of all pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions since 1996, including the December 1999 resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Bhutan also sent a representative to the International Committee of the Red Cross' South Asia Regional Seminar on Landmines, held in Sri Lanka 18-20 August 1999.

Bhutan does not use, produce, trade, or stockpile antipersonnel mines. Its territory is mine-free.

BURMA (MYANMAR)¹

Key developments since March 1999: Government forces and at least ten ethnic armed groups continue to lay antipersonnel landmines in significant numbers. Landmine Monitor estimates there were approximately 1,500 new mine victims in 1999. The Committee Representing the People's Parliament endorsed the Mine Ban Treaty in January 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

The military government of Myanmar is known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The SPDC has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty and did not participate in the Ottawa Process. It abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. The representative of the SPDC explained by stating, "A sweeping ban on landmines is unnecessary and unjustified. The problem is the indiscriminate use of mines, as well as the transfer of them."²

¹ The military junta now controlling the government of the country changed the name from Burma to Myanmar. Many ethnic groups within the country still prefer to use the name Burma. In this report, Myanmar is used when referring to the policies and practices of the State Peace and Development Council, and Burma is used otherwise.

² Explanation of Abstention of vote by the Representative of Myanmar during the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/C.1/54/L.2 (no date).

The SPDC has stated that it supports a ban on transfer of antipersonnel landmines, and believes that the Conference on Disarmament (of which it is a member) is the appropriate forum to negotiate this issue.³ Myanmar is not a signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but in December 1999 it sent observers to the First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in Geneva. Myanmar has not participated in any other mine ban fora in 1999 or 2000.

Shortly after the release of the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, the SPDC criticized the report for being based on sources residing mostly outside of the country. It denied that Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) have laid mines inside Thailand, that Tatmadaw mine use has been directed against the civilian population, and that civilians have been used as “human mine sweepers.”⁴

In January 2000 the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament endorsed the Mine Ban Treaty. It stated that it would “recommend to the People’s Parliament, when it is convened, as a matter of immediate national concern, accession to the Convention.”⁵

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling--Government

Myanmar is a producer of antipersonnel mines. The Myanmar Defense Products Industries (Kahpasa) produce at least two mines, designated as MM1 and MM2. These mines are modeled after the Chinese Type 59 stake-mounted fragmentation mine and the Chinese Type 58 blast mine.⁶ Ethnic militia members have told Landmine Monitor researchers that the government produces three other types of antipersonnel mines, designated MM3, MM4, and MM5, but no conclusive evidence is available.⁷

Although the SPDC has declared its support for a ban on AP mine transfers, it has yet to institute a formal moratorium or ban. There is no evidence that the government has exported antipersonnel mines to other countries, but there have been allegations that Tatmadaw units have provided mines to ethnic combatants.⁸

Several types of antipersonnel mines from other countries continue to be found in the field indicating past, if not current, importation. These include Chinese, Israeli, Italian, Russian, U.S., and other unidentified AP mines.⁹

³ Diplomatic Handbook, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yangon, pp. 313-314. Interview with unnamed Foreign Affairs personnel, August and October 1999.

⁴ Letter to the Landmine Monitor from Ambassador Tin Winn, Embassy of the Union of Myanmar, Washington DC, 16 July 1999; <http://www.icbl.org/lm/comments.html> While welcoming comment from the SPDC, Landmine Monitor researchers have repeatedly asked the SPDC for assistance and information on the range of landmine issues within the country, and received none. In attempting to develop dialogue on the issue, Landmine Monitor researchers delivered an advance draft of this 2000 report for comment and suggestion. No response has been received.

⁵ CRPP, Endorsement of the Committee Representing the Peoples Parliament of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, January 2000.

⁶ Interview with David McCracken, Technical Advisor for Mine Action, Thai Mine Action Center, October 1999. The Type 59 copy has been modified with a weather cap. Another source indicates the mines are produced by the Kahpasa at factories in Pyay and Ma-gway. Andrew Selth, *Transforming the Tatmadaw* (Canberra: Strategic Defence Studies Centre), pp. 30-35.

⁷ Interviews with ethnic militia members in Burma, December 1999.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Unnamed source, Ministry of Defense, Rangoon, February 2000.

Neither the SPDC, nor the Ministry of Defense, will release any statistics regarding the size and type of mines in stockpile.

Use—Government

Mine warfare has continued since the release of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*. While the government does not deny that it uses antipersonnel mines, it insists it does not do so in an indiscriminate fashion.¹⁰

The rebel Shan State Army (SSA) alleges that sections of the border with Thailand, southern Shan State and the banks of the Salween River have been mined by the SPDC.¹¹ They also allege that Lahu mercenaries hired by the SPDC have mined paths used by the SSA. Landmine Monitor researchers have seen mines of Burmese manufacture removed by the SSA.

In Dweh Loh township of Karen State, it was alleged in April 2000 that SPDC units torched villages from which the inhabitants had fled, and then laid mines in the remains and on paths and in fields adjacent to the villages.¹² In the area northeast of the capital, SPDC troops are said to have laid mines in retaliation to mine laying by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). It is alleged that the SPDC lays mines on KNLA supply lines, escape routes to the Thai border used by refugees, and around villages and fields that Karen people have fled or been forcibly relocated.¹³

In the Tenasserim Division, beginning late November 1999, the Tatmadaw has used landmines to consolidate its control of areas on the border with Thailand from Amalakee southward.¹⁴ This operation has placed a mixture of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines between military posts along the border where persons, including those seeking to flee Burma as refugees, could conceivably cross: along stream beds, on paths and roads, and at passes.

There continue to be reports of Tatmadaw units deliberately laying mines in Thailand, including reports from Thai military based on the border.¹⁵ Thai authorities provided Landmine Monitor with what appear to be Tatmadaw documents related to mine laying inside Thailand.¹⁶ Thai military border officers have been killed and

¹⁰ Letter to the Landmine Monitor from Ambassador Tin Winn, Embassy of the Union of Myanmar, Washington DC, 16 July 1999.

¹¹ Press briefing at Bright Shan Mountain Camp by Col. Yod Serk, Military Commander, Shan State Army, December 1999.

¹² Karen Human Rights Group, "Papun and Nyaunglebin Districts: Villagers Flee as SPDC Troops Resume Burning and Landmining of Villages," 25 April 2000.

¹³ Letter from former military advisor to the ethnic resistance, sent to Landmine Monitor, 11 November 1999. See also, Karen Human Rights Group, "Beyond all Endurance: The Breakup of Karen Villages in Southeastern Pa'an District," 20 December 1999, pp. 22-27.

¹⁴ Interview with People's Defense Forces, Foreign Affairs and Military Liaison officers, Songklaburi, Thailand, December 1999; interview with Thai Border Police Officer, March 2000.

¹⁵ Interview with Thai military based on the border, September 1999.

¹⁶ KNLA troops overran one forward Tatmadaw base in March 2000, apparently obtaining landmines and documents related to mine laying operations in Thailand by the Tatmadaw. These documents subsequently made their way to Thai authorities, copies of which were made available to Landmine Monitor. The authenticity of the documents cannot be completely verified.

wounded by Burmese-made mines apparently placed during 1999 and early 2000 while on patrol along the border.¹⁷ They have cleared mines in several locations.

The Tatmadaw uses two methods of laying mines: “registered” and “lost.” Registered mines are laid as a defensive perimeter around military camps, or along supply lines, at certain times. The locations of these mines are recorded, and when the operation is finished these mines are removed. Lost mines are never recovered. Neither registered nor lost mines are fenced or marked in any way. The general location, numbers and types of lost mines are usually recorded on Tatmadaw maps or records (e.g. five AP mines on hill 270). This allows Tatmadaw units to know if an area was previously mined, but it does not give the exact locations of the mines.¹⁸

In addition, it is believed SPDC military engineers actively maintain minefields along the border with Bangladesh, replacing old or exploded mines with new mines.¹⁹ Originally laid in 1993, the minefields, which run nearly the entire length of the border, now serve to prevent cross-border economic activities like woodcutting and smuggling,²⁰ to deter further flight by refugees from the interior of Burma,²¹ and to interdict cross-border movement by armed ethnic militias.²² Some mines have been placed on the Bangladesh side due to poor demarcation and thick vegetation. Victims of AP mine incidents include both Burmese and Bangladeshi citizens.²³ The government of Bangladesh has repeatedly requested Myanmar remove these mines.²⁴

Regular Tatmadaw officers have told Landmine Monitor researchers that they received no formal instruction in mine laying. Usually, mines are laid by specialized “BE” military engineering units. Other soldiers only lay mines when the engineers are “not available,” and do so under the direction and instruction of their commanding officer.²⁵

Ethnic Armed Groups

Thirty armed organizations, most associated with an ethnicity within the country, have been involved in armed struggle against the SPDC (see chart below). In 1999,

¹⁷ “Thai Soldiers wounded by Junta's Landmines,” *Bangkok Post*, 18 November 1999; “Landmines: Burma row leaves border vulnerable,” *Bangkok Post*, 19 January 2000; “Ranger loses leg to mine,” *The Nation*, 19 January 2000; “Landmine Kills 4 Soldiers at Suan Phung,” *The Nation*, 21 January 2000; “Landmine blast injures Thai soldiers,” *The Nation*, 1 February 2000; “Border patrol—Five soldiers hurt by landmine,” *Bangkok Post*, 2 February 2000; “Landmine blast injures four soldiers,” *The Nation*, 4 February 2000.

¹⁸ Interviews with former Tatmadaw officers, August and December 1999. Sometimes different terms, such as “reclaimed” or “neglected,” were used instead of “lost” mines.

¹⁹ Chakma villager from Walidong in Burma interviewed by Arakan armed opposition in Bangladesh, as told to Landmine Monitor/Bangladesh researcher.

²⁰ Interviews with villagers living near the Burma border, Bangladesh, November 1999.

²¹ Interview with Bangladesh government officials, October 1999; interviews with humanitarian agencies working at the Bangladesh-Burma border, August 1999.

²² Interview with Bangladesh government officer, October 1999.

²³ Mohammad Nurul Islam, “Where landmines take a heavy toll,” *The Independent*, 28 May 1999, p. 14.

²⁴ Interview with Bangladesh government official, August 1999.

²⁵ Interviews with former Tatmadaw officers, August and December 1999.

about a dozen armed groups were actively engaged in some level of military activity (often quite limited) against the Tatmadaw in Arakan, Chin, Shan, Karenni, and Karen States, as well as in the Bago and Tenneserim Divisions.²⁶

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling—Armed Ethnic Groups

All of the armed groups are believed to be capable of building blast mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Some groups can also manufacture Claymore-type mines.²⁷ Materials for mine production are readily available. Many of the mines require batteries for operation, limiting the mine's life to that of the battery, usually said to be one year. A new mine design by the Karen National Liberation Army does not require a battery and has a longer field life.²⁸

The armed ethnic groups do not receive mines from foreign governments. However, the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia have left ample quantities of landmines on the regional black market. In 1999 the black market price for a U.S.- or Vietnamese-made M14 antipersonnel mine was about US\$5, and a Claymore mine was about US\$11.²⁹ Other types of AP mines are available, including the Chinese-made Type 72. As mentioned above, there have also been allegations that Tatmadaw units have provided mines to ethnic combatants.³⁰

One knowledgeable source has said that two stockpiles of landmines in the hands of ethnic military forces are estimated to number in the thousands, mostly of indigenous construction.³¹

Use—Ethnic Armed Groups

At least ten of the ethnic militias are mine users. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is likely to be the largest mine user, followed by the Karenni Army (KA). The All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), Peoples Defense Forces (PDF), Myiek-Dawei United Front (MDUF), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Shan State Army (SSA), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, God's Army, and the Chin National Army (CNA) are also believed to use mines.³²

²⁶ Based on numerous interviews with ethnic militias, military officers, refugees, aid workers, governmental authorities and other observers.

²⁷ For more details on production, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 448. Until the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of Khun Sa capitulated to the government in early 1996, the MTA had the most sophisticated mine production capacity of any ethnic group, with factories at Ho Mong with lathes, milling equipment, and a foundry. They produced a stake mounted fragmentation mine similar to the Kahpasa-produced MM2 mine. The facilities came under government control and 2,000 MTA mines were reportedly destroyed. Landmine Monitor correspondence with William Ashton, military analyst and freelance author, 7 May 2000, and notes from Ashton field trip, November-December 1999.

²⁸ Photographic evidence given to Landmine Monitor by unnamed expatriate working among Christian ethnic communities on the Thai-Burma frontier.

²⁹ Interviews with ethnic combatants, November and December 1999.

³⁰ Interviews with ethnic militia members in Burma, December 1999.

³¹ Interview with former military advisor to the ethnic resistance, February 1999.

³² Based on numerous interviews with ethnic militias, military officers, refugees, aid workers, governmental authorities and other observers.

Like government-laid mines, mines laid by the KNLA, KA and others also produce civilian casualties. Ethnic militias involved in mine warfare acknowledge use of AP mines and/or Claymore mines for perimeter defense of their mobile camps at night, but claim they remove all mines during daylight. Command-detonated Claymore mines (usually U.S.-made M-18s) are also used during offensive operations, such as ambush.³³

Mines have been used predominantly in conflicts between government troops and ethnic armed groups, but have also been used in conflicts between various armed ethnic organizations as well, both in competition for “business interests” as well as over territorial disputes.

Active mine laying is occurring in Karen and Karenni states where the Karen National Liberation Army and the Karenni Army are attempting to maintain control or harass Tatmadaw troops, especially in the area to the northeast of Hpa-an, where mine laying by both the KNLA and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army is considered heavy.³⁴

A former military advisor stated that the KNLA lay mines near SPDC camps, on the flanks of key passes for the KNLA, along KNLA supply routes and refugee escape routes. The KNLA lays a combination of their own mines and purchased ones.³⁵

God's Army has planted mines in their area of operation along the Thai-Burma border opposite Ye according to a communiqué they released in late January 2000.³⁶

At least one militia is suggesting that it might cease antipersonnel mine warfare. In March 2000 the SSA issued a statement claiming it was “against the producing, stockpiling or using of these mines.”³⁷ Earlier, at a press briefing in December 1999, the SSA said that they have a military policy of “no offensive mine use,” stating that it is “dangerous for [Shan] villagers.”³⁸

The KA is rumored to be cutting back on its mine use. The Rohingya Army of the RSO and the Chin National Army allege that they lay no “lost” mines. They also admit use of command-detonated mines.³⁹ The People's Defense Force (PDF), made up of former Tatmadaw soldiers and officers and operating in lower Karen State, admits to AP mine use for night perimeter defense of mobile camps.⁴⁰

³³ Interview with ethnic militia officer, December 1999; press briefing at Bright Shan Mountain Camp by Col. Yod Serk, military commander, Shan State Army, December 1999.

³⁴ Karen Human Rights Group, “Beyond all endurance: The Breakup of Karen Villages in Southeastern Pa'an District,” 20 December 1999, pp. 22-27.

³⁵ Letter from former military advisor to the ethnic resistance, sent to Landmine Monitor, 11 November 1999.

³⁶ Emergency Press Release of God's Army People. Undated. Copy of document given to the Landmine Monitor, February 2000.

³⁷ “Opinion of Standing Executive Committee of RCSS and Shan State Army-South on Anti-Personnel Landmines,” undated, received in email to Landmine Monitor researcher in March 2000, circulated by ICBL on 3 April 2000.

³⁸ Press briefing at Bright Shan Mountain Camp, December 1999.

³⁹ Interviews with ethnic militia members, June 1999.

⁴⁰ Interview with PDF officers, Sangklaburi, Thailand, December 1999.

<i>Political Organization</i>	<i>Armed Wing</i>	<i>Cease-fire?</i>	<i>AP Mine User?</i>	<i>Producer ?</i>	<i>Stockpile?</i>	<i>Mines in territory?</i>
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ARAKAN STATE

1	Arakan Liberation Party	Arakan Liberation Army	No	?	?	?	Yes
2	Arakan Army of Arakan Land (a.k.a. NUPA)	Arakan Army	No	Likely	Likely	Likely	Yes
29	Rohingya Solidarity Organization	Rohingya Army	No	Yes	?	Yes	Yes
3	Democratic Party Arakan (former NUFA)	Arakan Peoples Army	No	?	?	?	Yes
4	Arakan Rohingya National Organization	Rohingya National Army	No	Command Detonated	No	Yes	Yes

CHIN STATE

5	Chin National Front	Chin National Army	No	Command Detonated	Claim No	Yes	Yes
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KACHIN STATE

8	Kachin Independence Organization	Kachin Independency Army	Yes	Not currently	Former	Likely	Yes
9	(former KIA 4th Brigade)	Kachin Democratic Army	Yes	?	?	?	Yes
13	(former CPB 101)	New Democratic Army	Yes	?	?	?	Yes

SHAN STATE

26	Restoration Council of Shan State (alliance SURA, former MTA)	Shan State Army	Partial	Command Detonated	Claim No	Yes	Yes
10	United Wa Organization	United Wa State Army	Yes	Likely	Former	?	Yes
11	Shan State Nationalities Peoples Liberation Organization	Shan State Nationalities Peoples Liberation Organization	Yes	?	?	?	Yes

<i>Political Organization</i>	<i>Armed Wing</i>	<i>Cease-fire?</i>	<i>AP Mine User?</i>	<i>Producer ?</i>	<i>Stockpile?</i>	<i>Mines in territory?</i>
12 Palaung Peoples Liberation Organization	Palaung State Liberation Army	Yes	?	?	?	Yes
14 Wa National Organization	Wa National Army	No	?	?	?	Yes
15 (former CPB 815)	National Democratic Alliance Army	Yes	?	?	?	Yes

KARENNI STATE

16 (former CPB ally)	Karenni National Peoples Liberation Forces	Yes	Likely	Likely	Likely	Yes
17 Karenni National Progressive Party	Karenni Army	Broken	Yes	Yes	Likely	Yes
18 Karenni National Democratic Front	Karenni National Democratic Army	Yes	Likely	Likely	Likely	Yes

KAREN STATE

19 Karen National Union	Karen National Liberation Army	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
20 Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army	No	Yes	Likely	Yes	Yes
21 All Burma Students Democratic Front	All Burma Students Democratic Front	No	Likely	Likely	Yes	
22 All Burma Muslim Union	All Burma Muslim Union	No	?	?	?	Yes
27 Peoples Defense Forces	Peoples Defense Forces	No	Command Detonated	Claim No	Yes	Yes
23 Peoples Liberation Front	Peoples Liberation Front	No	?	?	?	Yes

<i>Political Organization</i>	<i>Armed Wing</i>	<i>Cease-fire?</i>	<i>AP Mine User?</i>	<i>Producer ?</i>	<i>Stockpile?</i>	<i>Mines in territory?</i>
MON STATE						
24 New Mon State Party	Mon National Liberation Army	Yes	Former	Former	Yes	Yes
PEGU DIVISION						
19 Karen National Union	Karen National Liberation Army	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SAGAING DIVISION						
6 Kuki National Front	Kuki National Army	No	?	?	?	Likely
7 National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)	National Socialist Council of Nagaland	?	?	Likely	Likely	Likely
30 Zomi National Front	Zomi National Army	No	?	?	?	Likely
TENASSERIM DIVISION						
25 Myeik-Dawei United Front	Myeik-Dawei United Front	No	Command Detonated	?	Yes	Yes
19 Karen National Union	Karen National Liberation Army	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
21 All Burma Students Democratic Front	All Burma Students Democratic Front	No	Command Detonated	Yes	Yes	
28 [KNU break-away]	God's Army	No	Yes	?	Yes	Yes

Notes:

Cease-fire: Has negotiated cease-fire agreement with SLORC or SPDC.

AP Mine User: Is currently practicing mine warfare, either defensively or offensively.

Producer: Manufacture IEDs that have the characteristic of an antipersonnel landmine, or alter other munitions to serve as antipersonnel landmines.

Stockpile: Maintain a store of mines, or components, for use in warfare.

Mines in Territory: Mines now in the ground in their province or division of activity. Could be laid by themselves, allies or adversaries.

There are a variety of small self-proclaimed armed groups that are dysfunctional or not currently active that are not included.

Revolutionary political organizations, which do not maintain an armed wing, are not included.

Some of the armed ethnic organizations are primarily involved in the narcotics trade for self-perpetuation rather than any real political activity. (10, 13, 15) Several armed groups are quite small, and work only in alliance with other groups. (22,23)

Landmine Problem

Ten out of fourteen states and divisions in Burma are mine-affected, with a heavy concentration in eastern Burma. Mines are found widely in Karen, and Karenni states and the Tenasserim Division. The northwest frontier in Arakan State and a few areas of the western edge of Chin State and southern portions of Shan State are mined. There are also reports of landmines in Mon and Kachin States and the Bago Division.

There are landmines planted along the majority of Burma's border with Thailand and there is in essence a massive boundary minefield that runs virtually the entire length of Burma's border with Bangladesh, beginning a few miles from the termination of the water border along the Naf river, up to the Tri-Border junction with India. One officer interviewed specified that landmines can be found beginning at border post 31 running right up to the border with India.⁴¹ The mines were laid in 1993 after a massive departure by a quarter of a million Rohingya people in 1991 and 1992.⁴² There are also mines in a few scattered and remote areas along the borders with China and India.

There are no reliable estimates of the number of mines planted in Burma, or the amount of land affected.

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

There are no humanitarian mine clearance operations in Burma. Some ethnic armed groups have lifted mines in their areas.

The Myanmar Red Cross has stated that it is not considering mobilizing a landmine awareness program, or surveying mine victim needs. The Myanmar Red Cross believes "the problem is going away" since "the government has signed peace agreements with all but one armed group," and therefore they should not waste scarce resources on this issue.⁴³

Atrocity Demining

In a particularly ugly practice, Tatmadaw units operating in theaters of conflict near Myanmar's border with Thailand have repeatedly been accused of forcing the local population to walk in front of Tatmadaw soldiers in areas suspected of mine contamination.⁴⁴ There have been new reports of this "human minesweeping" in late 1999 and early 2000: in Karen State in the Doooplaya District,⁴⁵ south of the Karen State

⁴¹ Interview with Bangladesh Rifles (border forces) commander, Chittagong, 30 November 1999.

⁴² International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), "Burma: Repression, Discrimination and Ethnic Cleansing in Arakan," Report of International Mission of Inquiry, April 2000, p. 24.

⁴³ Interview with Dr. Kyaw Win, President of the Myanmar Red Cross Society, Rangoon, October 1999.

⁴⁴ For more detail, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 452.

⁴⁵ Karen Human Rights Group, "Starving Them Out, Forced Relocations, Killings and the Systematic Starvation of Villagers in Doooplaya District," March 2000, p. 34; William Barnes, "Karen flee army roundups of 'human minesweepers,'" *South China Morning Post*, 2 September 1999.

capital Hpa-an,⁴⁶ during military assaults on Shan State Army positions near Tachilek in Shan State,⁴⁷ and during the operations against God's Army camps in the Tenasserim Division.⁴⁸ Danish doctors interviewing Burmese refugees in Thailand in 1998 and 1999 received numerous reports of human mine-sweeping.⁴⁹

Landmine Casualties

Landmine Monitor estimates that conflict in Burma produced approximately 1,500 mine victims in 1999 alone. This estimate is based on a compilation of statistics from the Karen State from 1998 suggesting that this single state produces nearly one *civilian* landmine amputee per day,⁵⁰ as well as statistics given by the government's National Rehabilitation Center in Rangoon and by Handicap International on the Burma-Thai border, and the number of prosthetic components given to the military by the ICRC (until recently). It assumes there are two military casualties for every one civilian victim, since mines are used mostly in theaters of conflict where the civilian population has either been forcibly removed or has fled, and that 30 percent of the victims die prior to any medical care.

The U.S. State Department estimated 1,500 victims per year in Burma in a 1994 report.⁵¹ This could mean that the number of mine victims in Burma has been holding steady, at a very high level, for many years.

A recent report by a group of Danish doctors who interviewed 120 refugees from Burma at refugee camps in Thailand in both 1998 and 1999 found that 30% of the subjects they interviewed knew of a person who had suffered a landmine incident. In 40% of these cases, the interviewee's relationship to the person was family member. Victims reported through this study were between 8-55 years of age, and 90% were male. 30% of the time the victim is reported to have died from the injuries. Survivors lost a limb in 87% of the cases. In about half the cases, the activity that the victims were involved in was field work; the other half were reported to occur during service as a military porter or as forced labor to detonate mines by walking in front of troops (human mine-sweeping).⁵²

Despite the fact that military mine victims can be seen in border areas of the country, the Ministry of Defense maintains that there are no military victims of

⁴⁶ Karen Human Rights Group, "Beyond all endurance," 20 December 1999, pp. 22-27.

⁴⁷ Shan Human Rights Foundation, *Monthly Report*, January 2000, pp. 1, 4.

⁴⁸ Interview with refugee living in border camp across from Tenasserim Division of Myanmar, 17 April 2000.

⁴⁹ Hans Draminsky Peterson, et al., "Results of Medical Examination of Refugees from Burma," *Danish Medical Bulletin*, Vol. 45, No. 3, 3 June 1998, pp. 313-316; and Hans Draminsky Peterson, et al., "Human Rights Violations in Burma/Myanmar in 1999," Report of Fact-finding Mission in December 1999, Danish Medical Group, Danchurch Aid and Amnesty International (Denmark), 14 March 2000.

⁵⁰ 1,198 medical records from Township Medical officers in districts within Hpa-an District.

⁵¹ U.S. Department of State, "Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis," December 1994, p. 18.

⁵² Hans Draminsky Peterson, et al., *Danish Medical Bulletin*, 3 June 1998, pp. 313-316; and Hans Draminsky Peterson, et al., Report of Fact-finding Mission in December 1999, Danish Medical Group, Danchurch Aid and Amnesty International (Denmark), 14 March 2000.

landmines.⁵³ There is no centralized agency collecting statistics on landmine survivors within Burma.

One news article looking at mine incidents on the Burma-Bangladesh border states that in the past six years there have been 170 victims, of which 50 have died. Victims included both Burmese and Bangladeshi citizens.⁵⁴ A list assembled by the Bangladesh Rifles indicates one hundred deaths were attributable to mines up to 1999.

There are other victims of mines: more than twenty elephants have died due to mines along the Bangladesh border, with still more on the Thai border. In Bangladesh the elephants have now changed their migration routes causing them to become a problem in nearby Bangladeshi agricultural areas that they had previously avoided.⁵⁵ One event that brought mine laying along the Thai/Burma border into the headlines this year was when an elephant triggered a mine. She survived and received a prosthetic leg.⁵⁶ There is a major black market in cattle in the region, and many cattle are killed by mines as traders cross the border with them. Also, villagers living near the border region have lost many cattle to mines.⁵⁷

Survivor Assistance

Several medical practitioners believe that 50% of all people wounded by landmines die before receiving medical treatment, and at least one close observer of the situation in Karen State believes that figure is conservative.⁵⁸ Access to first aid and surgical care is dependent on the victim's physical distance from health care facilities and the prevailing security situation in the area at the time of the accident. Mine victims have reported travelling hours or even days in order to receive care. Medical care received prior to surgery is primitive and depends on whether a medic is on hand.⁵⁹

The medical system in Myanmar has been devastated by neglect. Medical practitioners in public hospitals receive a monthly salary of US\$5.⁶⁰ Unless a victim can pay for care at public or private health facilities, no care is available. In two cases told to Landmine Monitor researchers, victims of Tatmadaw-laid mines were intercepted by soldiers before they could reach a hospital and turned back with the warning that they should not reveal the cause of their injury.⁶¹

⁵³ Interview with health workers, Rangoon, 25 April 2000.

⁵⁴ Mohammad Nurul Islam, "Where landmines take a heavy toll," *The Independent*, 28 May 1999, p. 14.

⁵⁵ Interview with Buddhist monk doing development work in border communities, Chittagong, 4 December 1999.

⁵⁶ Somsak Suksai, "Elephants face risks in mine-strewn area," *Bangkok Post*, 10 September 1999. Sakchai Lalit, "Thai Elephant Steps on Landmine," AP Online, 24 August 1999; "Motala's jumbo operation," *The Sunday Nation*, 29 August 1999; "Vets encouraged by Motala's initial recovery," *The Nation*, 31 August 1999; "New limb offers for Motala," *Bangkok Post*, 7 September 1999.

⁵⁷ Interview with Arakan insurgent, Chittagong, 3 December 1999.

⁵⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 453.

⁵⁹ Landmine Monitor 1999 Burma (Myanmar) report

⁶⁰ Interview with WHO official in Yangon, January 2000. Also, "Human Development in Myanmar," United Nations Working Group, July 1998, p.14.

⁶¹ Interviews with displaced persons living in Thailand, December 1999.

The Myanmar Ministry of Health provides prosthetic devices through the National Rehabilitation Centre (NRC). The NRC receives no funding from the government for outreach to the nation. All patients must reach the Centre on their own. There has been no systematic distribution of information through Myanmar's health care system about the NRC, and the Director concedes many health practitioners in the country may not even be aware of the Centre's existence. The NRC has two branches, one in Rangoon, and a second in Mandalay, each with a maximum capacity of about thirty in-patients per month. The two NRC facilities, and the Ministry of Defense hospital in Mingaladon near Rangoon, are the only facilities in the country currently providing artificial legs. An additional ICRC constructed facility in the Maymyo military hospital is currently not functional. The majority of the Centre's patients arrive under a joint ICRC-NRC program from Shan, Karen and Karenni States and the Bago Division.

The NRC provides limited statistics on its patients. Between 1990-1998 it fitted almost 1,400 patients with artificial limbs, of which more than 70% were victims of landmines.⁶² Between April-September 1999, the NRC provided services for 157 landmine victims.⁶³

No information is available from the government on victim assistance through hospitals under the management of the Ministry of Defense, but ICRC statistics indicate military hospitals may be providing more than twice as many prosthetics as the civilian system.⁶⁴

There is one vocational rehabilitation center in Rangoon run by the Ministry of Health. A second facility for the vocational rehabilitation of amputees is being constructed in Rangoon by an international NGO.

An independent, ethnic-based, mobile medical organization named the Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT) operates in ethnic resistance areas of Mon, Karen, Karenni and Shan States. These medics offer a variety of primary and emergency services. They have received training in amputation from a U.S.-based medical organization, and held a special workshop in Thailand in mid-July 1999 on Trauma & Landmines. All medics have been trained in emergency amputation surgery. Surgeries are performed on sterilized plastic sheets on the floor of huts in the nearest village. Landmine Monitor researchers were asked for bone saws, as the backpack medics complained their saws were now dull.⁶⁵

⁶² National Rehabilitation Centre statistics and Landmine Monitor interview with Dr. Ye Hliang, Director, NRC, August 1999.

⁶³ National Rehabilitation Centre statistics provided to the Association for Aid and Relief-Japan, December 1999.

⁶⁴ The ICRC was providing components for prosthetics to hospitals under the Ministry of Defense in Rangoon and Maymyo. ICRC, "Tables and Graphs 1979-1998," dated 8 June 1999. Currently they are awaiting a new proposal to undertake support for the Ministry of Defense hospitals. If figures provided by the ICRC and the NRC are compared, then Ministry of Defense hospitals are providing 2.5 times the prosthetics distributed through the civilian system.

⁶⁵ Interviews with BPHWT medics at training program on Trauma & Landmines in Mae Sot, Thailand, July 1999.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Key Developments since March 1999: China completed clearance of its border with Vietnam in September 1999. For the first time, China announced that it had destroyed 1.7 million older antipersonnel mines in recent years. China is apparently converting its non-detectable antipersonnel mines by adding metal. Though China again abstained on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution in December 1999, it attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It has been one of the governments most insistent on the military necessity of continued use of antipersonnel mines. China has criticized the treaty as being based solely on humanitarian concerns while neglecting security requirements.¹ China was one of only ten governments that abstained on UN General Assembly Resolution 51/45, passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It was also among the small number of states to abstain on pro-ban treaty UNGA resolutions in 1997, 1998, and 1999.

In response to the Landmine Monitor request, China sent a letter describing its landmine policy:

China has always attached great importance to accidental injury to civilians caused by landmines. It supports proper and rational restrictions placed on the use and transfer of landmines. At the same time, the Chinese government holds that, in addressing the problem of landmines, especially that of anti-personnel landmines (APLs), due regard should be given to both humanitarian concerns and legitimate self-defense needs of sovereign countries. All countries are entitled to safeguard the security of their nation, territory, and people by legitimate military means, including the use of APLs, according to the purposes and principles of the UN charter. As a developing country with long land borders, China has to reserve the right to use APLs for self-defense on its own territory pending an alternative to replace APLs and the presence of security and defense capability.²

Yet China has also stated its support for "the ultimate objective of comprehensive prohibition" of antipersonnel mines.³ At the First Annual Conference for Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in

¹ Telephone interview with a Chinese official, Tokyo, 26 February 1999.

² Letter from Mr. Wang Xiaolin, Third Secretary, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, to Association for Aid and Relief (AAR)-Japan, 10 April 2000. Nearly identical language can be found in China's first annual report required by Article 13 of the Amended Protocol II to the CCW, submitted in October 1999.

³ *White Paper: China's National Defense*, Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China, 27 July 1998. The full statement is, "It is in favor of imposing proper and rational restrictions on the use and transfer of APLs in a bid to achieve the ultimate objective of comprehensive prohibition of such landmines through a phased approach."

December 1999, China stated that Protocol II and the Mine Ban Treaty “have made their respective contributions to reducing the civilian casualties” and “are not mutually exclusive, but rather reinforcing and complementary to each other.”⁴

China was one of very few governments that did not participate in any of the Ottawa Process diplomatic conferences, though China sent observers to the ban treaty signing conference in December 1997 in Ottawa.⁵ China was also one of just twelve non-signatory states to send an observer delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, held from 3-6 May 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique.⁶ China has not participated in any of the treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. It is notable that the government responded to the request for information from Landmine Monitor, and provided comment on last year’s report.⁷

On 4 November 1998, China ratified Amended Protocol II, and indicated it would exercise the optional nine-year deferral period for compliance with key restrictions.⁸ At the First Annual Conference for Amended Protocol II, China stated, “Amended Protocol II has provided the most appropriate ways and means to address the landmine issue.” China also regretted the lack of universality of Protocol II and said it is imperative to promote universality.⁹ The Chinese delegation was headed by Mr. Sha Zukang, Director-General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, indicating the importance China attaches to landmines and Protocol II.

In October 1999, China submitted the report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, detailing steps China has taken to implement the protocol. Information is provided, often in more detail than ever before, on dissemination of information about the protocol to civilians and the armed forces (including a special manual for the military), mine clearance efforts, post-clearance rehabilitation measures, stockpile destruction and modification, other mine-related legislation, and international assistance to mine action.¹⁰

⁴ Statement by H.E. Ambassador Sha Zukang at the first Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II annexed to the CCW, 15 December 1999.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Statement by H.E. Ambassador Shao Guanfu, Head of Chinese Observer Delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 4 May 1999.

⁷ Letter from Mr. Wang Xiaolin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 2000. China’s response to last year’s report: “It is obvious that you attached importance to reflecting China’s policy and position on the issue of landmines in your report. For that purpose, you must have done a lot of work and consulted relevant sources. We are grateful for your efforts in this regard. We appreciate the responsible attitude you adopted by quoting the exact statements made by Chinese officials in various occasions and the relevant section from the White Paper on China’s National Defense. Meanwhile, we also noted that Landmine Monitor 1999 quoted some remarks of assessment or speculation by agencies from other countries or individuals on China’s production, transfer, stockpiling and use of antipersonnel landmines (APLs). It is our view that such an approach is not appropriate.”

⁸ Declarations and Reservations on CCW Protocol II entry into force 3 December 1998, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part_boo/xxvi_boo/xxvi_2.html.

⁹ Statement by Amb. Sha Zukang at the first annual conference for Amended Protocol II, 15 December 1999.

¹⁰ People’s Republic of China, Report to the First Annual Conference of Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II annexed to the CCW, submitted October 1999.

China is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and has supported the CD as an appropriate forum to deal with the landmine issue. It has indicated its willingness to negotiate a transfer ban in the CD.¹¹

Production

China is known as one of the world's largest producers of AP mines. China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and Chinese State Arsenals have been producing about twenty-two types of AP mines, six of which are based on Soviet designs and the rest of Chinese origin. (See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for additional details).

It is unknown if China plans to begin production of new antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II, such as scatterable mines that have self-destruct and self-deactivating mechanisms meeting the new technical requirements of the Protocol. China should no longer be producing its most common mine, the Type 72, to be compliant with Amended Protocol II, unless it adds enough metallic content to meet the new standards (eight grams of metallic content).¹² Also under the terms of the protocol, China can no longer export the mine, and will have to stop using it after 2007, unless metal is added.

Transfer

In the past China was one of the world's largest exporters of AP mines. The Type 72 may be the most frequently encountered mine in the world. On 22 April 1996, the Chinese government announced a moratorium on the export of mines not in conformity with the Amended Protocol II, and stated it would exercise the utmost restraint and strict control on the export of all AP mines.¹³ Indeed, Chinese officials have said that China has not exported any antipersonnel mines since 1995,¹⁴ and there is no concrete evidence to the contrary. Still, Chinese officials have stressed that China's moratorium applies only to non-detectable mines and remotely-delivered mines not in accordance with Protocol II.¹⁵

China has supported discussions on a mine transfer ban in the Conference on Disarmament.¹⁶

Stockpiling

China is believed to have the largest antipersonnel landmine stockpile in the world. While the Chinese government will not provide any information on stockpiles, several experts contacted by Landmine Monitor have concluded that a plausible estimate of the

¹¹ Telephone interview with a Chinese official, Tokyo, 25 February 1999. See also, "Sino-U.S. Presidential Joint Statement," Beijing, 27 June 1998.

¹² See Technical Annex, 2(a) of Amended Protocol II.

¹³ CCW/CONF.I/SR.11

¹⁴ See Human Rights Watch, *The Mine Ban Treaty and Members of APEC*, October 1998.

¹⁵ Telephone interviews with officials from Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and two Chinese embassies, Tokyo, 24, 25, and 26 February 1999.

¹⁶ See, "Sino-U.S. Presidential Joint Statement," Beijing, 27 June 1998. See also, *White Paper: China's National Defense*, 1998.

Chinese AP mine stockpile is some 110 million, including perhaps 100 million Type 72 alone.¹⁷ In response to this figure in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, a Chinese official stated that it was “exaggerated.”¹⁸

Under Amended Protocol II, China will be prohibited from using the non-detectable Type 72 in its present form after 2007. The Chinese government will have to either destroy them or add eight grams of metal to them so that they will be protocol compliant. A U.S. official told an ICBL delegation in December 1999 that China would be converting its non-detectable mines by adding metal.¹⁹ China’s report required under Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, submitted in October 1999, states that “the competent departments of China began to work out programs...so as to transform and dispose of all the APLs that are not in conformity with the Protocol.”²⁰ China’s Article 13 report also reveals for the first time, “In recent years, China has destroyed over 1.7 million old-type APLs of GLD110, GLD120, GLD130 and GLD150, etc...(sic).”²¹

Use

China has used antipersonnel landmines along its borders with Russia, India, and especially Vietnam, planting an estimated 10 million mines along those borders over the years.²²

Landmine Problem

The government states that “China is not a country seriously affected by mines” and that the Sino-Vietnamese border “is the only area affected by mines over the years.”²³ Moreover, after major clearance operations from 1992-1999, China maintains that now, “The mine threat on the Chinese side along the Sino-Vietnamese border has been basically removed.”²⁴

Before the clearance operations, landmines posed a threat to civilians in the border areas with Vietnam, where there existed over 560 minefields with a total area of over 300 square kilometers.²⁵

There are also mines laid along China’s borders India and Russia, but the danger to civilians is reportedly relatively minimal due to the sparsely populated, mountainous terrain.²⁶

¹⁷ Based on interviews with governmental officials involved in Protocol II discussions with China.

¹⁸ Landmine Monitor discussion with Peoples’ Republic of China Delegation, Maputo, Mozambique, 4 May 1999.

¹⁹ ICBL meeting with U.S. delegation to CCW Amended Protocol II annual conference, Geneva, 13 December 1999.

²⁰ China, Report to the First Annual Conference on Amended Protocol II, October 1999.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Humanitarian Demining Website, U.S. Department of Defense, at <http://www.demining.brtrc.com/maps/china>.

²³ Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence, People’s Republic of China, *Postwar Demining Operations in China (1992-1999)*, December 1999, p. 1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

²⁶ Humanitarian Demining Website, U.S. Department of Defense.

Mine Action Funding/Training

China began support for international humanitarian mine clearance efforts in 1998. In November 1998, China donated \$100,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, earmarked for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also in 1998, China contributed to the Trust Fund some equipment for mine detection and clearance, earmarked for mine clearance operations by 2001 in Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Namibia.²⁷

China is sponsoring two international mine clearance training courses in China. The first training course was held in Nanjing from 11-30 October 1999, with trainees from Cambodia, Namibia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second course will be held from 16 May to 4 June 2000, with trainees from Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Rwanda. During the courses, Chinese army experts provide technical training, using mine clearance equipment to be donated by China.²⁸

The course was to be co-sponsored by the UN Mine Action Service, but UN officials asked to be disassociated from the training. UN sources have told Landmine Monitor that the training was inconsistent with UN mine action policy and the UN International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations. They noted that the course provided training in military post-conflict landmine recovery operations, as a component of mine warfare operations, and concluded that this type of operation should not be compared to and was not relevant to humanitarian demining operations, though appropriate and extremely effective for China's needs.²⁹

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance in China has been systematically conducted by the People's Liberation Army as a military activity. According to the Ministry of National Defense, China completed its clearance of the Sino-Vietnamese border in September 1999. Operations were carried out in two phases: from January 1992-July 1994 to clear important trade ports and passes, and from July 1997-September 1999 to clear all remaining minefields except those in disputed sections.³⁰

The mine clearance was carried out by more than two thousand officers and soldiers. They cleared 1.88 million landmines, 32,000 UXO, and destroyed more than 700 tons of discarded ammunition and explosive devices. More than twenty types of mines from different countries were found. A total area of some 300 square kilometers

²⁷ China, Report to the First Annual Conference on Amended Protocol II, October 1999.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, interview and correspondence with UN officials, April and June 2000.

³⁰ Ministry of National Defence, *Postwar Demining Operations in China*, December, 1999, p. 4. China's Protocol II Article 13 report says operations were carried out from "the beginning of 1992 to the end of 1994 and from November 1997 to August 1999." There are press accounts referring to ceremonies to note the end of the clearance operations dated 11 August 1999. See for example, *Beijing Xinhua*, "PRC Clears Last Landmines on Border with Vietnam," 11 August 1999.

was cleared, and more than 290 border trade passes and ports were reopened. About 60,000 hectares of farmland, pasture, and mountain forests were restored.³¹

For some minefields, totaling some 20-30 square kilometers, China decided to mark and “seal” the areas instead of clearing. It said that these minefields were located near water sources or in primeval forests, and these steps were taken in order to protect the natural resources and prevent civilian injuries.³²

The Army has said that three deminers were killed and more than twenty injured and disabled during these mine clearance operations.³³

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In response to a Landmine Monitor request for information on victim assistance, China stated: “China attached importance to assistance to mine victims and has made tremendous efforts in this area. However, we have been engaged only in actual assistance work so far instead of making them known to other countries. We are yet to conduct a comprehensive compiling of the statistics in this regard. The departments concerned in the Chinese government are trying to gather relevant information. Once available, the information will be publicized in due time.”³⁴

A document dated 20 December 1999 from the Disabled Association of Guangxi Fang Cheng Gang City in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region provides information on mine victims:

Fang Cheng Gang City, situated in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of our country, is a local city in the border area adjoining Vietnam in land and ocean. Its population is 750,000, among which about 40,000 are disabled persons, representing 5% of the entire population of the city.... Especially in 1978, before and after the self-defense and counterattack battle occurred in the Chinese-Vietnamese border, many civilians of our city stepped on mines and became disabled. Most of the victims are farmers in the countryside suffering from poverty. In addition, due to the dull development of the local economy, it is extremely difficult for the local government to help them obtain prosthesis. Therefore, most of the victims still do not have any means to get prosthesis and live difficult lives.³⁵

The document gives information regarding 149 mine-injured disabled persons, 42 in Fang Cheng District, 15 in Shangsi county, 77 in Gang Kous district, and 15 in Dog Xing city, including information such as name, address, gender, age, nationality, educational background, year of injury, occupation, cause of disability, type of injury and prosthesis. It appears 80% were male, more than three-quarters listed “farmer” as occupation, and nearly half the accidents occurred from 1978-1985. Of the 149, only thirteen had a prosthesis, of which five were broken.

³¹ *Postwar Demining Operations*, p. 4. China’s Article 13 report states “over 2.2 million mines and explosive devices” were removed.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³³ Daily News of Liberation Army, 10 August 1999.

³⁴ Letter from Mr. Wang Xiaolin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 2000.

³⁵ Disabled Association of Fang Cheng Gang City, “Explanation of the below-knee disabled persons in the Guangxi Fang Cheng Gang City,” 20 December 1999.

Disability Laws and Policy

The “law of the People's Republic of China on the protection of disabled persons” was promulgated on December 28, 1990. This legislation protects the rights of equality and participation of people with disabilities. It clearly stipulates government responsibilities and legal guidelines for rehabilitation, education, and employment.³⁶

The China Disabled Persons' Federation is a government-approved organization which represents the interests of people with various categories of disability. It protects their rights and provides services for them from a national level to a township level (through its local branches).³⁷

The Regulations on the Education of Persons with Disabilities were approved for implementation in 1994. The Regulations define the responsibilities of the government, institutions, society, schools, and families in education of disabled persons.

In 1993, the State Council Coordination Committee on Disability was established. It is headed by a state leader and composed of leaders of 34 government agencies, institutions and representatives of disabled persons organizations. The coordination committees on disability were also established at local levels. The major responsibilities of the coordination committee are: coordinating the formulation and implementation of the guidelines, policies, laws and regulations, programs and plans on disability; solving problems related to the work of disabled persons and organizing the UN activities in China concerning disability issues.³⁸

Health System and Social Welfare

The health expenditure per capita was estimated to be US\$ 20 (PPP) in 1997.³⁹ In December 1997, there were 315,033 health establishments, including 67,911 hospitals.⁴⁰ In the years 1994-98, there were 290 hospital beds per 100,000 inhabitants⁴¹ There were 157 physicians per 100,000 inhabitants in 1994.⁴²

Beside the state, large enterprises also provided social services for their employees. However a program of comprehensive social security reforms was being devised, in recognition of the increasing level of expenditure required to provide for an aging population and the rising rate of unemployment. A medical insurance system was to cover all urban employees by the year 2000. Western and traditional medical care, for which a fee is charged, is available in the cities and, to a lesser extent, in rural areas.

³⁶ “Law of the People's Republic of China, 17th meeting of the Standing Committee, 28 December 1990,” <http://www.gladnet.org>.

³⁷ *Asian and Pacific decade of Disabled Persons 1993-2002: the starting point*, UN, New York, 1993.

³⁸ The Development of the Undertakings of Disabled Persons in China, China Disabled persons' Federation document.

³⁹ “*Health Report 2000*, Annex Table 8 Selected national health accounts indicators for all Member States”, last update 21 June 2000, WHO, 23 June 2000, <http://www.who.ch>.

⁴⁰ *The Europa World Year Book 1999*, p 932, Vol. 1, Fortieth edition, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1999.

⁴¹ *World Development Indicators 2000*, p 90.

⁴² *l'état du monde 2000*, p 300.

There is no special care for disabled persons in the Chinese medical system and they do not receive pensions. Disabled ex-servicemen are guaranteed preferential treatment and pension by law, depending on their degree of disability.⁴³

In 1993 there was a total of 7,154 community based rehabilitation services, including day-care centers for children with disabilities. In addition, the State has set up in Beijing the China Rehabilitation Research Center which combines medical treatment with research and training, and rehabilitation departments in hospitals.⁴⁴

Tibet

Tibet can claim the dubious distinction of being home to the world's highest minefields. The landmine problem dates from China's military intervention in 1959, and from the attacks on India by China launched from Tibet in 1962. Mines remain near the lines established by China during its military push into the present areas of India in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.⁴⁶ These are extremely remote, almost uninhabited, high mountain regions; some are on permanent glaciers. Maintenance by China of minefields bordering Arunachal Pradesh has been reported, but no new mine laying.⁴⁷

Casualties among the local Indian population in Arunachal Pradesh have been reported to the Landmine Monitor, but none among Tibetan refugees.⁴⁸ Possibilities for immediate and continuing medical care for victims are unknown. Most of this border is extremely rugged mountains with few roads. Landmines in these remote border areas have been reported to claim the lives of Tibetan gazelle, Tibetan wild ass, blue sheep, alpine musk deer and the snow leopard.⁴⁹

INDIA

Key developments since March 1999: India ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 2 September 1999, exercising the nine-year deferral period. India is making its stockpile of M14 antipersonnel mines detectable. India states it has cleared 8,000 mines planted by intruders during the 1999 conflict in the Kargil area of Kashmir. Officials report 835 civilian casualties to mines and IEDs in the state of Jammu and Kashmir alone in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

India has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. While expressing support for the eventual elimination of antipersonnel mines, India has been critical of the Ottawa Process and the Mine Ban Treaty itself.

⁴³ "Law of the People's Republic of China, 17th meeting of the Standing Committee, 28 December 1990," <http://www.gladnet.org>.

⁴⁴ *Asian and Pacific decade of Disabled Persons 1993-2002: the starting point*, UN, NY, 1993.

⁴⁶ Interview with retired Maj. Gen. D. Banerjee, Institute for Peace & Conflict Studies (New Delhi), Oslo, March 1999.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Interview with Dr. Pema Dorjee, Chief Medical Officer of Men Tsee Khang Clinic, Jalpaiguri, West Bengal, 17 June 1999.

⁴⁹ Grant Peck, "Animals and Landmines," Associated Press, Bangkok, 7 May 2000.

While India voted in favor of the 1996 UN General Assembly Resolution urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines, it has been among the small number of states to abstain on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolutions in 1997, 1998, and 1999. India did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 1999 and has not participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts process, even though a large number of non-signatories have done so.

India's position on a ban has changed little in recent years. Ambassador Savitri Kunadi articulated the Indian government's approach to AP mine elimination in December 1999:

India remains committed to the objective of a non-discriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel mines through a phased process that addresses the legitimate defence requirements of States, while at the same time ameliorating the humanitarian crises that have resulted from an irresponsible transfer and indiscriminate use of landmines.... The process of complete elimination of APLs will be facilitated by the availability of appropriate non-lethal alternative technologies.... We had proposed and remain prepared for a complete prohibition of the use of landmines...in non-international armed conflicts, i.e. internal conflicts.... In fact, we believe that use of anti-personnel landmines should only be permitted for the long-term defense of borders, perimeters and peripheries of States.... We...favor an outright ban on transfers rather than attempts to restrict transfers.... [W]e could in fact start by addressing a ban on transfers in the Conference on Disarmament.... India has always observed a unilateral moratorium on export of landmines. India calls upon all States to do so.¹

Ambassador Kunadi also stated, "We believe that increased transparency and regular exchange of information would be useful in enhancing confidence."² But India has refused to provide even basic details to Landmine Monitor on its production or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines.

India ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 2 September 1999. In doing so, it decided to exercise the option to defer implementation of key provisions of the protocol for nine years. India views Protocol II as the best international instrument to address the global mine problem.

Production

India has produced two types of antipersonnel landmines, both copies of U.S. mines: the M16A1 bounding fragmentation mine, and the APNM M14 pressure initiated blast mine. The M14 has less metallic content than required by Amended Protocol II. Thus, to be in compliance with the protocol, India must cease production of this mine,

¹ Statement by Ambassador Savitri Kunadi, Permanent Representative of India, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations (Geneva), to the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II to the CCW, 15 December 1999.

² Ibid.

and continued use is conditional upon making it detectable. In its report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, India said that “production agencies have been instructed to cease production of landmines incompatible with the Amended Protocol II.”³

It appears India will be producing new mines that meet Protocol II standards. The Article 13 report states, “India is taking the necessary steps to render existing stocks *as well as new designs* [emphasis added] fully compliant with the relevant provisions of Amended Protocol II.... Further, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has designed devices equipped with self-destruction and self-deactivation features. Devices that have fulfilled the required design parameters are undergoing user trials.”⁴

Various armed groups in India have manufactured improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Transfer

According to the government, “India has never exported landmines and has formally announced [a] moratorium, of unlimited duration, prohibiting the export of landmines.”⁵ The comprehensive moratorium was announced on 3 May 1996. India has called for a global ban on transfers, and suggested the Conference on Disarmament as the best forum.⁶ There is no evidence of Indian exports of AP mines. Information is not available on any Indian import of mines.

Insurgent groups have obtained mines mostly through the global clandestine arms trade. However, it appears the militants in Kashmir have obtained and used mines manufactured by the Pakistan Ordnance Factory. During interviews with senior Border Security Force officials and Army officials in Kashmir, a Landmine Monitor researcher was shown, and took photographs of, recovered mines, both antipersonnel and antitank, that had the seal of the Pakistan Ordnance Factory on them.⁷

Stockpiling

India’s antipersonnel mine stockpile may number as many as four to five million, according to some non-Indian governmental sources, although confirmed details are not available.⁸ The great majority of mines in the stockpile are believed to be the Indian APNM M14 mines. India’s Article 13 report states that India will make the M14 mines detectable and therefore compliant with Amended Protocol II: “This includes a simple

³ India’s National Annual Report in accordance with Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, 1 December 1999.

⁴ Ibid. This was echoed by Ambassador Kunadi: “Self-destruction and self-deactivation devices fulfilling the required design parameter are undergoing user trials.” Statement to the First Annual Conference of Amended Protocol II, 15 December 1999.

⁵ Statement by Ambassador Kunadi to the First Annual Conference of Amended Protocol II, 15 December 1999.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Interviews with senior Border Security Force officials and Army officials in Kashmir, BSF Camp and Army Headquarters in Sri Nagar, 6-9 January 2000.

⁸ Estimate provided by government officials involved in discussions with the Indian government during the CCW negotiations.

and cost-effective technique to render mines detectable by strapping a 8mg metal strip on M14 mines in accordance with the provisions of the Amended Protocol. The Director General of Quality Assurance in the Ministry of Defence has been tasked with ensuring the detectability of existing stocks. The entire stock of antipersonnel landmines would be rendered detectable within the stipulated time period.”⁹ India will have nine years to complete the process.

Use

India has charged that “during the intrusions in India’s Kargil areas [in June-July 1999] large scale and indiscriminate laying of anti-personnel landmines, including both metallic and plastic APLs and special snow type devices, was resorted to by the retreating intruders.”¹⁰ The Indian government indicated that a total of 8,804 mines had been recovered, and that fifty-two Army personnel were injured due to landmines (See Pakistan report for additional details).¹¹

There were some allegations of use of mines by Indian forces, but these were denied by India and no evidence has been found.¹² One news story that focused on use of mines by “Pakistani-backed intruders” ended with the following: “But India uses landmines, too. ‘We also use anti-infiltration mines,’ said an Indian army official, who asked not to be identified.”¹³

India has called for a complete prohibition of the use of landmines except in international armed conflicts, and has also said that use of antipersonnel landmines should only be permitted for the long-term defense of borders. In December 1999 Ambassador Kunadi said, “For its part, India has never used and remains committed not to use landmines in armed conflicts not of an international character, ” and that “the restraint characterizing the use of landmines by Indian forces has been widely acknowledged.”¹⁴

India states, “There is no peacetime deployment of landmines by the armed forces.”¹⁵ According to the Army, no mines are laid for border protection or to prevent armed infiltration, such as in Jammu and Kashmir. The minefields are to be laid only

⁹ Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ “Mines Used by Pak Intruders,” statistics provided by Ministry of Defense, Government of India, data as of July 1999. One press account alleged use of 5,000 mines. *Times of India*, 24 July 1999.

¹² Amb. Inam-ul-Haque, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the UN in New York, told the ICBL that “according to some accounts, India had planted mines up to a depth of 5 to 10 km on its side of the border.” Letter to Stephen Goose, Chair, ICBL Treaty Working Group, 19 October 1999. In an interview on 5 October 1999, India’s UN Ambassador Kamallesh Sharma denied any Indian use of mines. The Taliban in Afghanistan has also accused India of providing “technical assistance” to opposition forces using Indian M14 and M16 mines inside Afghanistan. Pakistan TV: Indians Laying Mines in Afghanistan, FBIS Transcribed Text, 4 August 1999. There is no independent evidence to support this claim.

¹³ “Indian Army on Eternal Landmine Alert in Kashmir,” *Reuters*, Poonch, India, 9 July 1999.

¹⁴ Statement by Amb. Kunadi to the First Annual Conference Amended Protocol II, 15 December 1999.

¹⁵ Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

when hostilities are imminent, and are to be used only by the Army. The police and paramilitary forces are not authorized to hold mines.¹⁶

Armed groups in India have used a wide variety and type of both regular mines as well as improvised explosive devices, and such attacks continue to this day.¹⁷

The following chart shows the number of mines and IEDs recovered in Kashmir from militant forces by Indian security forces, according to the Jammu & Kashmir Police. It appears to show that the use of antipersonnel mines by militants has been on the decline, while the use of IEDs has been on the rise.

Mines and Improvised Explosive Devices Recovered in Kashmir, 1990-1999

Year	Antipersonnel Mines	Antitank Mines	IEDs
1990	723	27	-
1991	123	13	8
1992	212	14	86
1993	570	22	136
1994	989	17	126
1995	529	101	811
1996	517	35	245
1997	373	35	1020
1998	471	70	514
1999	261	44	466
TOTAL	44,768	382	3,422

(Source: Jammu & Kashmir Police)

The People's War Group in Central India (Andhra Pradesh state) has also been using mines and IEDs. On 7 March 2000 Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Minister Madhav Reddy was killed in a landmine blast.¹⁸ According to the state government of Andhra Pradesh, from 1987 to 1999 there were 113 landmine and IED incidents, resulting in 63 civilians killed and 65 injured, as well as 178 policemen killed and 224 injured.¹⁹

Landmine Problem

The Indian Government states that there is no problem with uncleared mines in India: "India is not a mine afflicted country."²⁰ Still, there have for years been reports

¹⁶ Landmine Monitor 1999 interview with former military officials.

¹⁷ For extensive details on the armed groups and mine use, see, Mallika Joseph and Suba Chandran, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (New Delhi), "Use of Mines and IEDs by Non State Actors in South Asia," May 2000. This paper was prepared for Landmine Monitor.

¹⁸ "AP Minister's cremation today," *The Hindu*, News Update at 1800 hours (IST) on 8 March 2000.

¹⁹ The state government, including the Director General of Police, Ministry of Home Affairs, provided this information. A year-by-year breakdown of incidents and casualties is available.

²⁰ Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

indicating that there are uncleared mines along the India/Pakistan border in Kashmir and along the India/China border. It appears that there are still mines in Kashmir laid in the 1965 and 1971 conflicts, still claiming victims. Retired Lt. Colonel Man Singh of the Indian Army, who fought in both wars, stated that “antipersonnel mines planted in 1965 in Poonch, Nawgoan, Uri, and Kyan Bol in forward areas are still not taken away. When snow melts, due to shifting of the antipersonnel mines, there are still antipersonnel mine casualties.”²¹

There also appear to be landmines remaining from the India-China conflict in 1962, including in Ladakh and Arunahal Pradesh. The mines are in extremely remote, almost uninhabited, high mountain regions, but some mine casualties among the local population in Arunachal Pradesh have been reported.²²

Mine Action Funding

While not making financial contributions, India has provided significant assistance internationally in the fields of mine clearance and victim assistance (see below).

Mine Clearance

The Indian armed forces have very extensive mine clearance capabilities. Its large engineering corps would be able to field hundreds of mine clearance teams. Following the fighting in Kargil in the summer of 1999, India reports that the “Corps of Engineers of the Army have taken steps to clear the area of all mines,” and that members of the Indian forces suffered injuries during the clearance operations.²³

Beginning with the Congo mission in 1963, India has been extensively involved in the UN mine clearance and rehabilitation programs, in places including Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia. Currently they are involved in the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. Their services have included “establishing mine clearance and mine survey teams, actual mine clearance tasks, developing of databases on landmines, area fencing duties, sensitizing local populations to the threat of landmines, setting up specialized clinics providing prosthetic aids as well as conducting workshops on prosthetic devices.”²⁴

Mine Awareness

The Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines (IIPDEP) believes that there is a need for mine awareness programs in India. As a public education and awareness campaign, it has arranged three National Conferences and eighteen Regional Seminars and Photo Exhibitions in state capitals and major cities.

²¹ Interviews with Singh and other former Indian military officials who attended the Workshops on Banning Landmines in three border villages in the Jammu region, 21-23 January 2000.

²² Interviews with delegates from Arunachal Pradesh who attended the Regional Seminar & Photo Exhibition in Shillong state capital of Meghalaya in North East India on 4 March 2000.

²³ Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

²⁴ Ibid.

Landmine Casualties

There are regular press accounts of landmine incidents and casualties in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere due to insurgent activities. The Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines has appointed twelve field workers, who are visiting border villages in the Jammu region and collecting information about mine victims.

Following are some statistics provided by Indian government sources on mine casualties in certain regions. In the state of Jammu and Kashmir, from 1990-1999 a total of 889 civilians were killed and 7,798 injured by mines and IEDs. From 1994-1999, there were 1,461 mine and IED casualties in Kashmir valley, and 561 in Andhra Pradesh from 1989-1999.

Civilian Casualties due to Mines and IEDs in State of Jammu and Kashmir

Year	Civilians Killed	Civilians Injured
1990	12	185
1991	41	551
1992	98	683
1993	79	719
1994	120	1196
1995	153	1021
1996	106	1153
1997	85	756
1998	103	786
1999	92	743
Total	889	7,798

(Source: Jammu and Kashmir Police)

Mine & IED Incidents and Casualties in Kashmir Valley²⁵

Year	Incidents	Army		Civilians		Others ²⁶	
		Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured
1994	59	18	45	13	44	04	13
1995	169	54	168	35	91	10	53
1996	128	11	66	27	41	09	48
1997	60	14	66	17	96	08	36
1998	70	05	29	21	76	09	25
1999	103	26	85	35	62	12	89
Total	589	128	459	148	410	52	264

(Source: State Government of Jammu and Kashmir)

²⁵ Statistics provided pertain only to the Kashmir valley and not the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir.

²⁶ Includes other police and paramilitary forces operating in the region.

Mine & IED Incidents and Casualties in Andhra Pradesh

Year	Incidents	Policemen		Civilians		Militants	
		Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured
1989	3	7	1	14	6	0	0
1990	3	1	8	0	0	0	0
1991	13	27	31	11	3	4	0
1992	24	44	38	5	20	22	0
1993	14	27	28	8	3	0	0
1994	24	14	25	5	5	3	0
1995	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	8	12	11	1	3	0	0
1997	7	21	20	6	10	0	0
1998	10	15	56	10	15	0	0
1999	5	10	6	3	0	2	0
Total	112	178	224	63	65	31	0

(Source: State Government of Andhra Pradesh)

Survivor Assistance

The government reports, “The Army’s Artificial Limb Centre at Pune plays an important role in the rehabilitation of victims of landmines in the broader framework of policies for the reintegration of such victims, which includes assistance for self-employment.... Indian medical agencies have developed prosthetics for mine victims. The most commonly used device is an artificial limb popularly known as the ‘Jaipur foot.’ India’s assistance to mine victims under international programmes has also included assisting mine victims with the Jaipur foot. New advances in this field are being constantly examined, including development of artificial limbs using new materials derived from polypropylene technologies. The Indian corporate sector has also assisted in this process.”²⁷

The Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines reports that in its field work, it appeared that landmine victims were given proper medical treatment and that every victim encountered was fitted with a prosthetic by the government or the military.

KIRIBATI

Kiribati has not yet acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Kiribati is now a member of the United Nations having been formally accepted on 14 September 1999, but it was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

A representative of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade noted that Kiribati is “sympathetic to the Ottawa Treaty and its objectives” and “possesses no

²⁷ Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

anti-personnel mines.” Kiribati “wishes to evaluate the requirements that membership would have on scarce personnel resources and the effect of any financial obligations before acceding.”¹

At two recent regional meetings of parliamentarians in Fiji, members of parliament from Kiribati promised to work for Kiribati’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.² In October 2000, Kiribati will host the next meeting of the South Pacific Forum.

It is believed that Kiribati has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines, nor has it contributed to any humanitarian mine action programs.

Kiribati was the scene of heavy fighting in the Pacific during World War II and considerable quantities of military wreckage and unexploded ordnance affect Tarawa and other islands. Landmines are not believed to be among the unexploded ordnance. Much of Tarawa’s unexploded ordnance has been removed to make way for a new port development.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mine Ban Policy

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Although the North Korean government has been largely silent on the landmine issue, it is clear that the government has no intention of acceding to the treaty at this time, believing that antipersonnel mines are needed for their national defense. The DPRK was one of just ten nations to abstain on the 1996 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It has been absent for the votes on the UNGA resolutions in 1997, 1998, and 1999 in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. The DPRK did not participate in any of the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, or the treaty negotiations.

In one of the few public statements on the ban, Mr. Kim Sam Jong told the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 1998 that his government fully supported the “humanitarian purposes and the nature of that Convention,” but could not accede to it “for security reasons” under the present circumstances on the Korean peninsula. He also said that if antipersonnel landmines are to be banned in Korea a “durable peace and stability should be ensured by replacing the present armistice system with a new peace mechanism.”¹

¹ Fax from Grahame Morton, International Security and Arms Control Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand, 30 March 1999.

² UNICEF, *Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channareth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador*, 22-31 March 2000, p. 3 and p. 6.

¹ Statement of Mr. Kim Sam Jong, Counselor, Permanent Mission of DPRK to the UN in New York, 4 December 1998, found in Official Records of the UN General Assembly, Fifty-Third session, 79th plenary meeting (A/53/PV79), pp. 8-9.

North Korea has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its Landmine Protocol. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has said that it does not take any position on the negotiations of a ban on mine transfers in the CD.²

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

The DPRK produces a Model 15 antipersonnel mine (a copy of the Soviet POMZ-2 fragmentation stake mine), and perhaps a copy of the Soviet wooden PMD-6. It appears that North Korea's mine production is neither extensive nor sophisticated.³

The DPRK is not known to have exported AP mines to other countries; its mines have not been found in other countries.⁴ It is assumed that North Korea has imported antipersonnel mines from the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China (PRC), and Eastern European countries in the past. No current information is available on the size or composition of North Korea's stockpile.

A DPRK representative has said that "we use landmines in the area along the military demarcation line, solely for defensive purposes."⁵ While it is not certain how many antipersonnel mines have been planted in the northern sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), separating the North from the South, American analysts estimate the number "to be in the hundreds of thousands."⁶

Landmine Problem and Casualties

A North Korean official has said that, apart from the border area with South Korea, there are no minefields in the DPRK, either left over from the Korean War or otherwise, and that there are no mine problems on the borders with China or Russia.⁷ Although difficult to confirm, that appears to be a reasonable claim, based on testimony of refugees.⁸

Occasional injuries – to both soldiers and civilians -- due to mines in or near the DMZ are likely, just as they are happening in the South. The DPRK has claimed that "there are no instances of civilian casualties caused by those mines" in the area.⁹ In a rare landmine incident, a U.S. military patrol somehow crossed into the northern sector of the DMZ on 7 December 1979, and stepped on North Korean mines, killing one and wounding four soldiers.¹⁰

² Telephone interview with Mr. Ri Thae Gun, Counselor, Permanent Mission of the DPRK to the UN in Geneva, 1 March 1999.

³ See, Eddie Banks, *Brassey's Essential Guide to Anti-Personnel Landmines* (London: Brassey's, 1997), p. 164; *Jane's Mines & Mine Clearance, 1996-1997*, p.372, and Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering Mine Database 96.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Statement of Mr. Kim Sam Jong, UN General Assembly, 4 December 1998.

⁶ Bill Gertz, "In Korea's Misnamed DMZ, U.S. Defenders Rely on Mines," *Washington Times*, 23 January 1998.

⁷ Telephone interview with a North Korean official, Tokyo, 26 February 1999.

⁸ Interview, with Buddhist priest Bup Ryun, Chief Executive of Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement, Tokyo, 21 February 1999.

⁹ Statement of Mr. Kim Sam Jong, UN General Assembly, 4 December 1998.

¹⁰ "Serious Incidents in the DMZ, 1967-1995," Korean War Project website, <http://www.koreanwar.org>.

Mine Action

There is no information about any mine clearance, mine awareness, or victim assistance programs in the North. The DPRK has not contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for mine clearance. However, DPRK has shown some interest in mine clearance by sending a representative to the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance meeting, held in Geneva, 27-29 March 2000.¹¹

A request for information for Landmine Monitor was submitted through the DPRK Mission to the UN in New York in November 1999. There had been no response as of June 2000.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Key developments since March 1999: In April 1999 the ROK began a multi-year program to remove mines from around some military bases. The ROK reports that it has made all of its non-self-destructing mines detectable. The ROK produced 1,363 new antipersonnel mines in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. While acknowledging the humanitarian consequences of antipersonnel mines, the ROK is one of the governments that has been most vocal in insisting on the legitimacy and military necessity of continued use of antipersonnel landmines. South Korea was one of just ten governments to abstain on UN General Assembly Resolution 51/45, passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. ROK has also been among the few to abstain on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolutions in 1997, 1998 and 1999.

The South Korean government told Landmine Monitor in March 2000 that it “could consider joining the Ottawa Convention if the security situation on the Korean Peninsula improved substantially, or if suitable alternatives to antipersonnel landmines became available.... The ROK government agrees, in principle and from the humanitarian point of view, with the movement to ban completely the use of antipersonnel landmines (APLs). However, the ROK cannot fully subscribe to the total ban on APLs.... [I]n a country under a constant threat of war like Korea, the landmine issue is not a matter of humanitarianism, but that of survival. Therefore, we cannot regard APLs issue the same way as other countries do.”¹ Asked if it would join the treaty if North Korea did so, the ROK replied, “We will consider this issue positively.”² South

¹¹ ICBL, Intersessional Update #5 (7 April 2000); See also www.gichd.ch.

¹ Response of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations (NY) to Landmine Monitor researcher's questionnaire, 21 March 2000. It should be noted that many military experts and retired officers, including a former commander of joint U.S.-ROK forces, have publicly stated that antipersonnel mines can be removed without jeopardizing the defense of the ROK. (See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for more detail).

² Ibid.

Korea has sent representatives to many of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional work program Standing Committee of Experts meetings.

South Korea did not participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. It has attended the treaty's intersessional meetings on mine clearance, technologies, victim assistance, and stockpile destruction.

While not yet a party to the CCW and amended Protocol II, South Korea has expressed its intent to accede in 2000.³ The government states that it "is preparing national legislation necessary for the implementation of the Protocol," and that it "has made necessary steps to meet the requirements concerning the use of mines set out in the Protocol, including making dumb mines detectable."⁴ The ROK participated in the first Annual Conference for Protocol II States Parties in December 1999.⁵ South Korea is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, and has expressed a willingness to join efforts to negotiate an AP mine transfer ban in the CD.⁶

Production

South Korea has produced at least two antipersonnel mines, which are copies or variations of the U.S. M18A1 Claymore mine. The Korean designations are KM18A1 and K440. Both are directional fragmentation mines, the K440 slightly larger. They are usually used in a command detonated mode, but can also be used with tripwires.⁷ According to the ROK Ministry of National Defense, a total of 10,721 KM18A1s were produced from 1995-1997 and 1,363 in 1999, but "during the last three or four years, the K440 was not produced."⁸

According to *Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 1999-2000*, South Korea also produces a licensed copy of the U.S. M16A2 bounding antipersonnel mine. The source lists the mine as "in production" and the manufacturer is listed as the Korea Explosives Company Ltd.

Transfer

There is no evidence that the ROK government exported antipersonnel mines in the past. On 28 September 1995, the government announced a formal one-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, which was extended in 1996. In 1997, the government decided to extend the moratorium for an indefinite period.⁹

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ See, Statement by the delegation of the Republic of Korea at the First Annual Conference of the States Parties to the Amended Protocol II to the CCW, 15 December 1999.

⁶ Statement of ROK Mission to the UN (NY) at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 15 October 1999.

⁷ See, *Jane's Mines & Mine Clearance 1999-2000*, and Eddie Banks, *Brassey's Essential Guide to Antipersonnel Landmines* (London: Brassey's, 1997), pp.200-201.

⁸ Response of ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000.

⁹ Ibid.

The ROK government states that it did not import any AP mines in 1999.¹⁰ It imported 40,324 AP mines from the United States from 1969 to 1992, including 31,572 ADAM mines which are fired from artillery, 1,035 non-detectable M14 mines, and more than 7,000 Claymore mines.¹¹

Stockpiling

The number and types of antipersonnel landmines in the South Korean stockpile are military secrets. However, in a meeting with the ICBL in February 1998, Vice Minister of Defense Lee Jung-Rin said that South Korea has twice the amount of landmines in stock that it has already deployed in the ground.¹² This would imply that South Korea probably holds at least two million antipersonnel mines in stock. The ROK states that it has already made its dumb (non-self-destructing) mines detectable, as required under Amended Protocol II.¹³

In addition, the U.S. is stockpiling in South Korea approximately 1.2 million M14 and M16 dumb mines and some 50,000 Gator, Volcano, and MOPMS "smart" (self-destructing) mines, all to be used in any future resumption of war in Korea.¹⁴

Use

Landmines were used extensively by all combatant armies during the Korean War, and the U.S. and ROK have laid large numbers of mines since then. A Defense Ministry report to the National Assembly in September 1999 reportedly said that over 1.12 million mines were laid across the country: 1.05 million antipersonnel and antitank mines "around the civilian control line and the demilitarized zone," and another 75,000 antipersonnel mines in "rear areas."¹⁵ When asked by Landmine Monitor, "How many landmines are buried in the ground in your country," the South Korean government responded that "an estimated one million mines are buried in the DMZ."¹⁶ This figure of one million mines planted in the DMZ by U.S. and ROK forces has been cited by others over the years. However, a report by a retired U.S. general states that in addition to the DMZ, "about one million dumb AP mines already are emplaced in the six-mile-deep military control zone immediately south of the two-and-a-half-mile band of the DMZ."¹⁷

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables; U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales of Antipersonnel Mines FY 1983-1993, as of 11 August 1993.

¹² "Anti-Landmine Crusader Williams Receives Cold Shoulder From Korea," *Korea Herald*, 4 February 1998.

¹³ Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000. See also, Statement by ROK at the First Annual Conference on Amended Protocol II, 15 December 1999.

¹⁴ See *Landmine Monitor 1999*, p. 333. The U.S. may also have a significant number of ADAM self-destructing mines stockpiled.

¹⁵ "Over 1.12 Million Landmines Laid Throughout ROK," *Seoul Yonhap*, 28 September 1999.

¹⁶ Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000.

¹⁷ Lt. Gen. (ret.) Robert G. Gard, Jr., *Alternatives to Antipersonnel Landmines*, VVAF Monograph, Spring 1999, p.20. Gard cites the source as "In Korea's Misnamed DMZ," *Washington Times*, 23 January 1998. Another press account cites one million in the military control zone, and an

The ROK and U.S. military have also planted significant numbers of antipersonnel mines around important military facilities in the South, some of which have created problems in recent years (see below).¹⁸

If there is war on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. is planning to lay more than one million additional “dumb” mines in South Korea -- not in the existing DMZ, but throughout the twenty mile area between the DMZ and Seoul. In addition, numerous self-destructing mines would be scattered by aircraft and artillery.¹⁹

Landmine Problem

As noted in a U.S. State Department report, “The Republic of Korea still has a problem with landmines from World War II and from the Korean Conflict.” The report says that uncleared mines are located “along the inter-Korean border and in areas in which Korean War battles occurred.”²⁰ According to the ROK government, there were forty-seven mine accidents from 1992-1999.²¹

The 151-mile Demilitarized Zone may be the most heavily mined area in the world. One South Korean legislator, a former army general, Mr. Im Bok-Jin warned that the DMZ will likely remain a “belt of death” even after Korea is reunified because of the huge number of difficult-to-detect buried mines. He also stated that the mines were not adequately mapped.²²

In recent years, South Koreans have experienced problems due to flooding or landslides from heavy rains that wash landmines out of minefields or storage sites into areas frequented by civilians. In April 1999, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly said that only fifty-nine out of 321 landmines washed away by rainstorms in 1998 had been recovered.²³ According to Rep. Seo Chung-Won, since the 1980s a total of 1,430 mines have been washed away from fifteen military bases and only ten percent have been recovered.²⁴ In August 1999, military authorities warned visitors to the North Han River region to be on the lookout for mines spread around by recent rains and flooding; at least three M-14 antipersonnel mines were retrieved in a civilian area in Yonchon.²⁵

Two other legislators of the National Assembly revealed in 1999 another aspect of the landmine problem in South Korea. According to Rep. Kim Sang-Hyun and Rep. Ahn Dong-Sung, only 570 of the 3,400 landmines buried to protect five Army bases were

unknown number in the DMZ. Susan Feeney, “Deadly Zone,” *Dallas Morning News*, 24 November 1997.

¹⁸ *Joongang Daily News*, 18 January 1999, claims U.S. troops have laid tens of thousands of mines around important military installations. See also, Bae, Myong-Oh, *National Politics*, Issue 56, March 1998. According to one source, about 100,000 AP mines have been planted around military bases. *Sisa Journal*, 18 March 1999.

¹⁹ See *Landmine Monitor 1999*, p. 336.

²⁰ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, July 1993, p. 113.

²¹ Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000.

²² John Larkin, *South China Morning Post*, 30 October 1998.

²³ “Air Force Removing Thousands of Landmines,” *Korea Herald*, 2 April 1999. A subsequent article said that 170 of 329 had been found, citing a military official. “Military Warns of Mines, Shells Spread by Flooding,” *Korea Herald*, 7 August 1999.

²⁴ “Military Units Fail to Recover Landmines,” *Chosun Ilbo*, 5 October 1999.

²⁵ “Military Warns of Mines, Shells Spread by Flooding,” *Korea Herald*, 7 August 1999.

removed when the units were relocated. The locations are Uijongbu, Kachang, Kwangchun, Ahuhung, and Hadong.²⁶

The Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) has identified the following landmine problem areas: Cholwon-kun, Eunhyun-myon, Koyang-city, Paengnyong-do, Paju-city, Pyongtaek-city, Sangnam-city, Tongduchun-city, Uijungbu-city, Yanggu-kun, and Yonchun-kun.²⁷

Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness, Mine Action Funding

In April 1999, the ROK Air Force started removing thousands of landmines laid in and around four of the Air Force's air defense sites in the outskirts of Seoul. Officials indicated the clearance was being undertaken for fear that mines might be washed away in heavy monsoon rains and endanger civilians. This was reported to be the first phase of a clearance effort lasting several years that will remove landmines from ten air defense sites -- seven in the Seoul area and one each in Pusan, Kangwon and North Cholla province.²⁸

In September 1999, the Defense Ministry said it will clear mines every year through 2003 in the five rear areas of Mount Sumo (south Kyongsang province), Mount Homyong (Kyonggi province), Kachang (Taegu), and Kwangchong and Anhung (both in south Chungchong province).²⁹

The South Korean government has participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings on mine clearance and victim assistance.³⁰

There are no government-sponsored mine awareness programs. Since its formation in 1997, the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines has produced a brochure and a picture book, and has conducted workshops and a media campaign to increase the general public's understanding of the issue.³¹

The ROK government has contributed \$430,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, including \$55,000 in 1999 for mine action programs in Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.³²

Landmine Casualties

The Korean War probably resulted in many thousands of landmine casualties (soldiers and civilians), but the South Korean government states that data is not available for the period of 1950-1991.³³ Though rarely discussed, there continue to be new mine casualties. According to the official records of the South Korean government, there were ninety-one mine victims between 1992 and 1999, including thirty-four civilians.³⁴ The

²⁶ "Military Units Fail to Recover Landmines," *Chosun Ilbo*, 5 October 1999.

²⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 480-482.

²⁸ "Air Force Removing Thousands of Landmines," *Korea Herald*, 2 April 1999.

²⁹ "Over 1.12 Million Landmines Laid Throughout ROK," *Seoul Yonhap*, 28 September 1999.

³⁰ See <http://www.gjchd.ch/docs/minebantreaty/mineclearance>

³¹ The picture book, titled "Unfinished War – Antipersonnel Landmines," was published in 1999 by Korea Church Women United, a member of the KCBL.

³² Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

government says that there was one incident in 1999, when a civilian was maimed by an AP mine in Chungyang-kun, Choongchungnam-do.³⁵ The government states that there are only sixty-two landmine victims alive in South Korea.³⁶

The actual victim figure is likely higher since the official number apparently includes only those who lodged claims with the South Korean government. As a result of lawsuits, the government had to make compensations totaling \$213,000 to five landmine victims from 1992 to 1997.³⁷ The Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines has talked to many mine survivors who did not make legal claims because they were reluctant to create trouble with military authorities. Recognizing the shortage of reliable data, the KCBL estimates that, dating back to the end of the war, there have been more than 1,000 civilian mine victims, and 2,000-3,000 military mine victims in South Korea.³⁸

Survivor Assistance

The government states that it “makes reparations to the surviving victims of landmines through the State Compensation Act. The victims are categorized into seven scales according to the severity of their wound. The Act stipulates various kinds of preferential policy treatment for the victims, such as tax cuts, employment advantages for their children and assistance in purchasing homes. For soldiers wounded while on duty, medical services are provided by the Veteran’s Hospital.”³⁹ The Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines indicates that as of October 1999, the national health insurance system covers victims’ expenses in fitting artificial legs.

The KCBL states that it contributed \$20,000 for survivor assistance in 1999, including artificial legs and the medical expenses of an eight-year-old girl. According to KCBL, Church Women United of Korea will give 100,000 won (\$90) per month to nineteen victims from April to October 2000.⁴⁰

LAOS

Key developments since March 1999: A total of 622 hectares of land were cleared in 1999, with an additional 255 hectares January-March 2000. Almost 90,000 UXO and mines were destroyed in 1999, with about 25,000 more January-March 2000. There were 102 new UXO/mine victims in 1999, and 68 in the first five months of 2000. Almost 180,000 people received UXO/mine awareness education in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos) has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Laos did not participate in the Ottawa Process. Laos has been absent from every vote on pro-ban resolutions in the UN General Assembly since 1996, including the

³⁵ Ibid. The antipersonnel mine was washed away from a military storage site due to flooding.

³⁶ Ibid. This probably does not include survivors injured during the war.

³⁷ Ministry of National Defense, “The Present Condition of State Reparation,” 9 July 1998.

³⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 480.

³⁹ Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000.

⁴⁰ KCBL draft report to Landmine Monitor, May 2000.

December 1999 resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Laos is not known to have made any public statements regarding a mine ban in 1999 or 2000. Laos did, however, attend the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance meetings in September 1999 and March 2000 in Geneva. Laos acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 3 January 1983, but has not ratified the Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Laos is not thought to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Laos is believed to maintain a stockpile of mines, but no details are available. There are no allegations of recent use of antipersonnel mines by Laotian armed forces.

Landmine/UXO Problem

The primary threat to civilians in Laos is unexploded ordnance (UXO), not antipersonnel mines, though both are present. To the civilian population, there is little or no difference between the two. The massive problem with unexploded ordnance is the result of extensive U.S. bombing during the Indochina War, especially during the period from 1964 to 1973. Bomblets (or “bombies as they are known to the Lao people) from U.S. cluster bomb units became *de facto* antipersonnel mines when they did not explode on impact as designed. It is often said that there are millions of unexploded bombies, and in 1996 the UN estimated that 500,000 tons of UXO were still present in Laos.¹ However, UXO Lao, the national coordinating body, has expressed concern that the real number of UXO in Laos remains unknown and that the very rough hypotheses put forth cannot be substantiated.²

Handicap International (HI), which in 1997 released the results of an extensive national survey of villages, found that over 3,800 villages, with a population of 1.3 million people, had been affected by UXO and mines. HI stated, “More than 1,000 villages reported the presence of landmines in the past with 214 villages currently reporting landmine contamination.”³ For extensive additional details from the HI study, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*. The UXO problem continues to be so serious in Laos that it remains a daunting obstacle to development by adding hazards, time and expenses to virtually any new economic activity.⁴

UXO Lao notes that in Laos casualty rates are not the predominant issue, nor the best way to assess the problem: “The Lao government, UNDP and the NGOs working in the programme increasingly understand that land denial and barrier to development are more pressing.... The effects UXO has on food production, infrastructure development, water and sanitation, school and hospital extensions, etc. are profound.”⁵

¹ Jim Monan, *Curse of the Bombies: A Case Study of Saravan Province, Laos* (Hong Kong: Oxfam Hong Kong, 1998), p. 14.

² UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

³ Handicap International, *Living with UXO: Final Report National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR*, 1997, p. 7.

⁴ Kieko Matteson and Robert Perkinson, “The Remnants of War: The deadly legacy of America’s air war in Laos,” *Boston Review*, undated, circulated on icblmedia@egroups.com, 30 March 2000. Can be found at <http://bostonreview.mit.edu:80/BR25.1/matteson.html>.

⁵ UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

Mine/UXO Coordination

In February 1996 the government established a national office, simply called UXO Lao, with the following tasks: (1) create a national capacity for UXO activities; (2) implement a national UXO strategy and demining projects; and (3) coordinate UXO clearance, awareness and survey projects throughout the country.⁶ With a staff of more than 1,000 people, UXO Lao is one of the country's largest employers.⁷ The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is the executing agency responsible for the implementation of the Lao national UXO program.

UXO and mine clearance has been carried out with both technical and financial assistance from international agencies that are implementing partners (IPs) in the development of the UXO Lao program. UXO Lao has assigned particular provinces to these IPs who work alongside the Lao staff in the field and local offices. In every province with clearance activities, UXO Lao has a Provincial HQ that employs all the field staff, and is managed by Lao staff, with the IP's assistance.

Mine/UXO Clearance

See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for a description of mine/UXO clearance programs from 1996 to early 1999.

UXO Lao reports that in 1999, 89,093 UXO and mines were removed from the ground and destroyed. A total of 622 hectares of land were cleared. More than 951,000 people benefited from the clearance operations.⁸ UXO Lao also reports that from January-March 2000, a total of 255 hectares of land were cleared, benefiting 51,140 persons. A total of 25,163 mines and UXO were destroyed.⁹

Those IPs conducting mine/UXO clearance activities in Laos in 1999 and 2000 include:

Mines Advisory Group (MAG), a UK based NGO, has been working in Xieng Khouang province since 1994 and in Saravane province since 1997. MAG's operations were initially encouraged, supported, and facilitated by the Mennonite Central Committee. MAG has trained and employed well over 200 Lao nationals, men and women, to address the massive problem of UXO contamination. Following a phased approach, MAG is now in the process of handing over employment responsibility for the staff to UXO LAO. At the end of 1999, MAG's staff in Saravane were transferred to the national body. In May 2000, staff working in Xieng Khouang were transferred. Other assets will be transferred through December 2000. In the one-year period between September 98 and August 99, over 19,000 items of UXO were found, unearthened and

⁶ Statement by H.E. Mr. Aloukèo Kittikhoun, Ambassador of Lao PDR to the United Nations, to the UN General Assembly, New York, 17 November 1998.

⁷ A figure of 1,015 is cited in Daniel Lovering, "Laos Faces decades of unexploded bombs," *Globe*, Paksong, Laos, 11 June 2000. See also "Laos sees new lease of life," *Issues*, 7 March 2000.

⁸ UXO Lao, "Progress Summary Report, 1 January-31 December 1999." Also, UXO Lao letter to *Landmine Monitor*, 15 June 2000. The total included just 2,176 mines and 86,917 UXO.

⁹ UXO Lao, "Progress Summary Report, March 2000."

destroyed in Saravane. In Xieng Khouang, MAG destroyed over 21,000 items through the period November 1998 to October 1999.¹⁰

MAG continues to provide management training for national staff, and is concentrating this year on further technical training, quality assurance and support. MAG now directly employs 28 national staff, in addition to the supervisory role it currently carries out with regard to the UXO LAO technical staff that have recently been transferred. In coordination with UXO LAO - with funds provided by the Danish Government - MAG is to continue clearance & awareness in six of Xieng Khouang's seven districts during 2000.¹¹

Handicap International, an NGO based in France, is providing technical assistance to UXO Lao clearance operations in Savannakhet Province, particularly in the four most affected districts on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Its main objective is to provide capacity building for the establishment, coordination and management of a provincial UXO clearance program. During 1999, five technical advisors provided training to ninety Lao deminers and supervised the clearance operations. The teams cleared a total of 128 hectares, including schools and agricultural land. Mobile roving teams visited 292 villages to destroy a total of 12,000 UXOs, among them 6,000 bombies.¹² The European Union funds HI.¹³

Norwegian People's Aid, an NGO, has been operating in Sekong province since late 1997 and in Attapeu since 1998 providing on-the-job training to the UXO Lao staff. Its aim is to further develop the capacity of the provincial Lao staff so they can manage and implement all facets of the program. NPA has supported UXO Lao with a financial management position since 1998 and is currently focusing on developing a mid-management training program for national EOD staff. It receives financial assistance from the Norwegian government.¹⁴

World Vision Australia, an NGO, started operating in Khammouane province in 1999 with the support of the Australian Aid agency (AusAID) providing technical advice and capacity-building to manage the programs at provincial levels.

Gerbera, a German commercial company (supported by the German government through a bilateral agreement with Laos) has been working in the provinces of Houaphan since 1996 and Luang Phrabang since 1998 providing clearance and awareness.

The government of Belgium has provided in-kind contributions of qualified Explosive Ordnance Demolition military staff to support UXO Lao's provincial staff in Champassak province since 1998.¹⁵

In addition to UXO Lao and its implementing partners, the following agencies also conduct UXO/mine related activities:

¹⁰ Information on MAG's activities in Laos provided to Landmine Monitor via email from Tim Carstairs, MAG Communications Director, 28 July 2000

¹¹ Handicap International Laos, "Annual Report," 1999; with additional information provided by UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

¹² Handicap International Activity Report 1999.

¹³ UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Milsearch, a commercial company, is undertaking surveys and clearance for private companies in eight provinces. Interests are in oil exploration, mining, hydraulic construction sites, village relocation and road and bridge building.¹⁶

The exploration company **Hunt Oil** has also carried out surveys in four provinces with assistance from the British firm CGG-Exploration Logistics.¹⁷

Lao Armed Forces also undertake clearance operations.¹⁸

(See Table below of Expected Clearance Projects and Donor Mechanisms for 2000-2002).

Some foreign UXO clearance personnel in Laos have complained that the United States has been reluctant to share its "render safe procedures."¹⁹ However, UXO Lao reports, "All requested safe procedures have been provided by the U.S. government during 2000 and distributed to the field staff and NGO technical advisors."²⁰

Training Lao Nationals

UXO Lao trains Lao staff at a training center in Ban Ylai. Until January 1999, the center was in Nam Souang. Financial and technical assistance has been provided by the United Nations, U.S. military personnel, other governments and NGOs.²¹ All candidates for training are selected from the provinces and districts that they will return to work in. Criteria for selection includes basic education but also the knowledge of a local minority language. Around 1,000 Lao nationals have graduated from the center with skills in UXO clearance, community awareness, paramedical techniques and team leadership.²²

Mine/UXO Awareness

UXO Lao has a Community Awareness (CA) section to provide UXO risk awareness education. UXO Lao reports that in 1999 a total of 178,846 persons were provided UXO awareness information, from a total of 746 villages.²³ Between 1996 and 1998, 953 villages were visited and more than 233,000 people educated. UXO Lao also reports that from January-March 2000, UXO awareness was provided to a total of 41,650 people.²⁴ UXO Lao currently has 18 CA teams operating with a total of 108 staff.²⁵

Besides clearance, MAG is also carrying out UXO awareness programs through a community awareness team travelling from village to village conducting workshops, demonstrations and puppet shows to help inhabitants develop safer UXO skills. Gerbera

¹⁶ Information from Milsearch, 1998.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Handicap International, *Living with UXO*, 1997.

¹⁹ Kieko Matteson and Robert Perkinson, "The Remnants of War: The deadly legacy of America's air war in Laos."

²⁰ UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

²¹ Ibid., U.S. military technical assistance ended in September 1999.

²² UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

²³ UXO Lao, "Progress Summary Report, 1 January-31 December 1999."

²⁴ UXO Lao, "Progress Summary Report, March 2000."

²⁵ UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

is also carrying out awareness as well as clearance programs. A U.S. NGO, Consortium, has developed and piloted a draft UXO in-school curriculum and teacher training package in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, USAID and UNICEF. In addition, Consortium has also used child-to-child approaches in creative arts workshops and children performed puppet shows. UNICEF is implementing a mass media campaign targeting the nine most affected provinces using national radio and television, in addition to traditional media. The Mennonite Central Committee is also involved in UXO awareness activities include.

UXO Lao's Action Plan for Year 2000

UXO Lao has set a summary of targets for 2000, in addition to those of routine programs and capacity building tasks:

- Community awareness teams to visit 759 villages, briefing more than 190,000 people.
- Land clearance teams to clear 1,005 hectares of high priority agricultural and development land.
- Roving clearance teams to carry out 857 village visits, destroying more than 100,000 UXO.
- Training and equipping an additional 158 deminers, 17 medics, 20 surveyors and additional provincial support staff.
- Expansion by four new district-structured organizations. (Achieved).
- Complete the transfer of all national field staff from implementing partner to UXO Lao contracts. (Achieved).
- Put into place mechanisms ready to take over the responsibility for running costs, equipment, and support functions from the implementing partners MAG and Gerbera.
- Introduce advanced EOD courses at the national training center (delayed from 1999).
- Conduct a study into "Reimbursable" demining.²⁶

Mine Action Funding

In 1995 the Lao government established a Trust Fund to finance a nationwide program of UXO/mine clearance and awareness. UXO Lao reports that the following governments have contributed either to the Trust Fund or bilaterally:²⁷ Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States, as well as the European Union. The UN Development Program, UNICEF, and UNV have also contributed to the program.²⁸

The United States has been the largest donor. From 1994-1999, the U.S. provided \$13.95 million in assistance for UXO/mine clearance, (28% of total contributions). The total in 1999 was \$3.3 million, including funds provided by the Defense Department,

²⁶ Lao National UXO Program, UXO Lao, *Work Plan 2000*, Vientiane, Lao PDR, March 2000. Also, UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

²⁷ UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

²⁸ UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

State Department, and Agency for International Development. U.S. funds are also used in victim assistance programs in Laos.²⁹ UXO Lao has stated that while the U.S. government has been one of the most consistent donors to UXO Lao, “There are some Lao sensitivities about accepting some U.S. aid. There have been some components of U.S. assistance that the Lao government has chosen not to accept.”³⁰

In 2000, UXO Lao has budgeted \$12.2 million for UXO clearance and awareness activities for the national program (nine provinces, Training Centre and National Office) -- \$6.3 million Trust Fund and Bilateral; \$5.9 million Implementing Partner.³¹

²⁹ U.S. Department of State, “FY 2000 NADR Project Status.” UXO Lao indicates the U.S. provided \$2.5 million in 1999 in clearance equipment and training support. UXO Lao communication to Handicap International. 15 June 2000.

³⁰ UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

³¹ UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

UXO Lao provides the following table of projects and expected funds for 2000-2002.³²

Province	Donor and Mechanism	Budget per Year	Funds Available	Shortfall
Xieng Khouang (MAG)	Denmark Trust Fund	2000: 1,165,312 2001: 600,000 2002: 600,000	1,165,312	0 600,000 600,000
Houaphan (Gerbera)	Germany bilateral fund	2000: 470,000 2001: 500,000 2003: 500,000	470,000	0 500,000 500,000
Luang Phrabang (Gerbera)	Germany Bilateral fund	2000: 470,000 2001: 500,000 2002: 500,000	470,000	0 0 330,831
Khammouane (World Vision Australia)	Australia Bilateral fund	2000: 450,391 2001: 424,420 2002: 400,000	450,391 424,420 400,000	0 650,000 600,000
Savannakhet (Handicap International)	European Union Bilateral fund	2000: 843,634 2001: 650,000 2002: 600,000	843,634	415,969 600,000 600,000
Saravane (MAG)	UK Bilateral fund	2000: 1,133,969 2001: 600,000 2002: 600,000	718,000	0 215,000 250,000
Sekong (Norwegian People's Aid)	Norway Bilateral (pledge)	2000: 425,000 2001: 425,000 2002: 250,000	425,000 210,000	
Attapeu (Norwegian People's Aid)	Norway Bilateral (pledge)	2000: 425,000 2001: 425,000 2002: 250,000	425,000 210,000	
Campassak (Belgium Military)	Belgium bilateral fund	2000: 500,000 2001: 500,000 2002: 500,000	500,000 500,000 500,000	

Mine/UXO Casualties

For 1999, UXO Lao reported 63 UXO/mine accidents resulting in 102 victims (26 deaths and 76 injuries). Among the victims, 60 were children and 84 were male.³³ For the first five months of 2000, there were 39 reported accidents causing 68 victims (26 deaths and 42 injuries). The victims included 25 children and 56 males.³⁴ It should be noted that it is not possible to know with certainty the exact number of casualties, as many villages do not report them.

Handicap International's survey concluded that from 1973-1996, there were 1,171 people who suffered landmine accidents, and another 9,473 who suffered UXO accidents

³² Lao National UXO Program, UXO Lao, *Work Plan 2000*, pp. 28-30, Vientiane, Lao PDR, March 2000.

³³ UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

³⁴ UXO Lao, "Summary Report of UXO Accidents, 1 January-31 May 2000" and UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

(a total of 10,644 victims).³⁵ A report released in early 2000 had similar findings, stating that since 1973 UXO have killed or maimed 11,928 Lao people.³⁶

The HI report also noted that one-third of all recorded UXO accidents occurred in the first four years following the war (1973-1976), with an average of three accidents per day. In the following ten years (1977 to 1986), the annual casualty rate declined to an average of one accident per day. From 1987 to 1996, the annual casualty rate remained constant, averaging about 240 accidents per year.³⁷

Survivor Assistance

Prostheses, orthoses, wheelchairs, and other assistive devices are provided by the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE) which is a partnership between the Ministry of Public Health, POWER, the International Limb Project, World Vision, the Cambodian School for Prosthetics and Orthotics and the Association (CSPO) for Aid and Relief (AAR). COPE grew out of the work of POWER, which established in Laos in 1995, conducted a complete survey of amputees and other disabled, and of facilities available to serve them. In early 1996 it drew together the other partners in COPE which started operation at the beginning of 1998. The work of COPE is governed by a National Plan of Action, prepared by all of the partners. The plan has recently been extensively revised (NPA-FR) given the achievement of most of the early objectives.

As a result of the COPE Program, five orthoprosthesis centers have been, or are being, completely renovated and upgraded (Vientiane, Luang Phrabang, Phonsavane, Savannakhet and Pakse) and new equipment has been installed throughout. Existing staff have undergone training and twelve students have been sent for training to CSPO. In addition, significant awareness-raising work has been undertaken throughout the country. Whilst refurbishment and training has been in progress, production has been lowered, and only about 400 prosthetic devices were fitted in 1999.

The NPA-FR contains a wide-ranging program for all mobility disabled in the Lao PDR, including UXO victims. The program includes upgrade training for orthopaedic surgeons, training for physiotherapists and occupational therapists, vocational training for disabled people, quality control mechanisms for each center, a sports development element, and strengthening of the Lao Disabled People's Association.³⁸ The Lao Disabled Peoples Association is an adjunct of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. Its constitution has yet to be approved by the Ministry, but it is active and has recruited 300 members in Vientiane Municipality, Vientiane Province, and Bolikhamxay Province. The National Committee for Disabled Persons (NCDP) was established in 1995.

There is no standard follow-up for amputees receiving prostheses from the six centers functioning in Laos.³⁹ On the other hand, the COPE program serves a wide range

³⁵ Handicap International, *Living with UXO*, p. 28.

³⁶ Kieko Matteson and Robert Perkinson, "The Remnants of War: The deadly legacy of America's air war in Laos."

³⁷ HI, *Living with UXO*, p. 25.

³⁸ Information on the COPE program provided to Landmine Monitor via email by Mike Boddington, POWER, 31 July 2000.

³⁹ Amy Talbott, Landmine Survivors Network, "Landmine/UXO victim assistance in the Lao PDR—General overview," Vientiane, February 1998.

of areas, provides upper-limb prostheses and has regular, six-monthly follow-up evaluations.

HI is training eleven local physiotherapists in Vientiane Hospital.⁴⁰ The Ministry of Health does not officially recognize physiotherapy, nor do individual doctors or the population at large. Such recognition would be a big step for NGOs wishing to help victims as it would enable them to approach more easily victims and the whole of the population affected by mines.⁴¹

The World Rehabilitation Fund works to establish an integrated approach to physical and psychological rehabilitation, and to provide alternative livelihoods for mine victims. Civilian victims of mines and UXO do not receive socio-economic assistance from the government, although military victims receive some assistance. The COPE program refunds all travel and accommodation costs for all persons attending any of its five centers, and all devices are provided free of any charge.

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

While the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) would appear to have made no progress towards accession to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, parliamentarians have at least agreed to find out the government's current position.¹ In addition, a New Zealand government official commented to Landmine Monitor that the "FSM supports the Ottawa Convention in principle and would like to sign. The FSM regards its special compact with the U.S. as requiring it to act in concert with the U.S. on the issue."²

The Federation was one of 20 countries that abstained from voting on the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. The FSM also abstained on earlier resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998. One possible reason could be that the Federation is linked through its Compact of Free Association with the U.S., which gives full authority and responsibility to the U.S. government for the Federation's security and defense matters.

The Federation did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo nor did it attend any intersessional meetings of the treaty.

In *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, a representative of the Federation indicated that "The FSM does not use, produce or stockpile anti-personnel mines. The FSM National Police has informed me that it is unaware of the existence of landmines in the FSM."³ The FSM is not thought to have contributed to any humanitarian mine action programs.

⁴⁰ Handicap International Activity Report 1999.

⁴¹ Handicap International Internal Report, Brussels, Belgium, March 2000.

¹ At a meeting with ICBL Ambassador Tun Channareth, FSM parliamentarians including FSM's Federal Government Vice Speaker, the Hon. Claude H. Philip, promised to find out FSM's position on the treaty from the President's office. UNICEF, *Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channareth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador*, March 22-31, 2000, p. 9.

² Fax from Grahame Morton, International Security and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Neil Mander, Convenor of NZ Campaign Against Landmines, 30 March 1999.

³ Letter from M.J. Mace, Assistant Attorney General, Federated States of Micronesia to Neil Mander, Convenor NZ Campaign Against Landmines, 11 December 1998.

MONGOLIA

Key developments since March 1999: Officials have acknowledged that Mongolia maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Officials have also stated that no antipersonnel mines have been deployed by Mongolian forces.

Background

Mongolia is a landlocked country located between Russia and China, traditionally aligned with and dependent on the former Soviet Union. The USSR withdrew its troops stationed in Mongolia, as well as its technical and financial assistance, between 1989 and 1992. Since then, the foreign and defense policy of Mongolia has profoundly changed: "Maintaining friendly relations with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China shall be a priority of Mongolia's foreign policy activity. It shall not adopt the line of either country but shall maintain in principle a balanced relationship with both of them and shall promote all-round good neighborly co-operation."¹

Mine Ban Policy

Mongolia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In his statement to the UN General Assembly on 5 November 1999, Prime Minister Rinchnnyamyn Amarjargal stated that the government of Mongolia "fully shares the aspirations to ban anti-personnel landmines and welcomes the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention."² The Ministry of External Relations has said that Mongolia "remains committed to the ultimate goal of banning anti-personnel landmines as a most injurious and indiscriminate type of weapons. However, due to national security considerations Mongolia, at this stage, is not in a position to sign the Landmine Ban Convention and accede to the Amended Protocol II to the CCW [Convention on Conventional Weapons]. The length of Mongolia's border (8,158 km), the size of its population (2.3 million) and the financial constraints it is now facing made it choose a phased approach towards the landmine ban."³

In a letter to Landmine Monitor researchers dated 21 April 2000, Minister of External Relations Ms. Nyamosor Tuya said, "Mongolia stands for the prohibition of anti-personnel mines – a most indiscriminate and inhumane type of weapon – and supports the international community's efforts and initiatives being undertaken in this respect.... At this stage Mongolia, however, has adopted a phased approach towards the prohibition of anti-personnel landmines. As we have a vast territory, long borders and scarce population, joining the 1997 Ottawa Convention on banning anti-personnel landmines at present without obtaining other means of protection, would directly affect our national security interests. Nevertheless, being supportive of the noble objective of

¹ Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations, *Concept of Mongolia's Foreign Policy*, 1994. www.undp.org/missions/mongolia/fpguide.htm.

² Mongolian Prime Minister Amarjargal, Statement to the Fifty-Fourth Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 5 November 1999.

³ Fax communication from Mr. D. Zorigt, Deputy Director, Department of Policy Planning and Co-ordination, Ministry of External Relations, to Landmine Monitor, 28 October 1999.

banning landmines, we are seeking ways and means to accede as early as possible to the above convention.”⁴

Mongolia was one of just eighteen countries that abstained in the vote on the 1997 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, but voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolutions in 1998 and December 1999.⁵

Mongolia did not send a representative as an observer to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Mozambique in May 1999. Mongolia has not participated in any of the ban treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings in Geneva, though many non-signatories have done so.

In meetings with Landmine Monitor researchers, representatives of the Ministry of External Relations stated that they had reviewed the Mongolia country report in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, and believed that the commitment of Mongolia to an eventual total ban on landmines was not sufficiently emphasized.⁶

Mongolia is a state party to the original Protocol II on landmines of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW); however, it has not yet ratified the 1996 Amended Protocol II. Mongolia participated as an observer in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999. The Mongolian representative at that conference told the ICBL that Mongolia was actively looking at ratification of the amended protocol.⁷ However, an official in the Ministry of External Relations subsequently said that no major change regarding accession to Amended Protocol II should be expected, at least in the very short term.⁸

Mongolia is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but its position on negotiating a ban on antipersonnel mine transfers in that forum is not known.

Production and Transfer

Officials from both government and military institutions state that Mongolia has never produced or exported landmines.⁹ One Mongolian diplomat has said that Mongolia

⁴ Letter to Landmine Monitor researcher from External Relations Minister, Ms. N. Tuya, 21 April 2000.

⁵ Mongolian officials have stated that the December 1999 UNGA vote does not indicate any change in their position regarding accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Interview with Mr. R. Mounkhov, Officer, International Organization Department, Ministry of External Relations, Ulaanbaatar, 13 March 2000. Also, Letter to Landmine Monitor Researcher from Ms. N. Tuya, External Relations Minister, 21 April 2000.

⁶ Interview with Mr. D. Zorig, Deputy Director, Department of Policy Planning and Coordination, Ministry of External Relations, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 28 October 1999; interview with Mr. R. Mounkhov, Officer, International Organization Department, Ministry of External Relations, 13 March 2000.

⁷ ICBL meeting with Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, First Secretary to the Permanent Mission of Mongolia in Geneva, 17 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose, Human Rights Watch.

⁸ Telephone interview with Mr. R. Mounkhov, Ministry of External Relations, 24 April 2000.

⁹ Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Bayar Batzorig, Chief, Foreign Relations Department, Ministry of Defense, Ulaanbaatar, 9 November 1999; telephone interview with Ms. S. Oyun, Member of Parliament, 17 April 2000. She said that budget documents submitted to Parliament have never mentioned “landmines.”

imported most of its antipersonnel mines in the 1960s and 1970s from the USSR; he asserted that Mongolia has not imported any antipersonnel mines in at least ten years.¹⁰

Stockpiling

The *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* stated that it was unknown if Mongolia had a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.¹¹ Mongolian military and diplomatic officials have now confirmed the existence of an antipersonnel mine stockpile, though the government has not revealed the number or types of mines.¹² Indeed, there seem to be contradictory indications regarding the size and purpose of the AP mine stockpile. Several officials have said that Mongolia possesses antipersonnel mines only for training purposes.¹³ This would appear to be at odds with the Mongolian position as expressed in various official statements stressing the need for antipersonnel mines for national security considerations and border defense.¹⁴

The retention of mines for training only would imply a very small stockpile, while an operational stockpile for protection of borders would imply a very large stockpile for Mongolia. Possession of stockpiles of mines for training has sometimes been incorrectly understood by Mongolian officials as an impediment to the accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁵

It is also known that Soviet troops stockpiled landmines at their Army bases on Mongolian territory.¹⁶

Use

Mongolian officials maintain that Mongolian armed forces have not used antipersonnel mines in the past. They state that all mines have been and are kept in

¹⁰ ICBL meeting with Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, Mission of Mongolia in Geneva, 17 December 1999.

¹¹ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 491.

¹² ICBL meeting with Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, Mission of Mongolia in Geneva, 17 December 1999. Interviews with Lieutenant-Colonel Batzorig, Ministry of Defense, Ulaanbaatar, 9 November 1999; with R. Mounkhou, Ministry of External Relations, Ulaanbaatar, 13 March 2000; with Mr. Sanduijav, Advisor, Ministry of Defense, Ulaanbaatar, 24 March 2000.

¹³ Interviews with Lieutenant-Colonel Batzorig, Ministry of Defense, 9 November 1999; With R. Mounkhou, Ministry of External Relations, 13 March 2000; with Mr. Sanduijav, Ministry of Defense, Ulaanbaatar, 24 March 2000.

¹⁴ See, for example, the Prime Minister's statement to the UN, 5 November 1999, at footnote 2. Also, the need for mines for border defense was stated by Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, Mission of Mongolia in Geneva, in meeting with ICBL, 17 December 1999.

¹⁵ Interview with Mr. Sanduijav, Ministry of Defense, 24 March 2000. He stressed the need for Mongolian Armed Forces to keep mines for such a purpose. The Mine Ban Treaty (Article 3) permits retention of AP mines for demining training and research purposes.

¹⁶ "The Earth Wound," documentary commissioned by the Ministry of Environment in 1996, shows Soviet landmines at former Soviet Army bases in Mongolia. Interviews with Mr. Ts. B. Adyasuren, Counselor, Ministry of Environment, Ulaanbaatar, 3 March 2000, and Mr. Shagrdarsuren, journalist, Ulaanbaatar, 6 March 2000. Both participated in the documentary research survey.

stockpiles, and that none have been deployed on the border areas.¹⁷ One official noted that with more than 80% of the land used for pasture by nomads, Mongolia has considered the risk of casualties too great.¹⁸

Landmine/UXO Problem

Both civil and military institutions insist that there is not a landmine problem in the country. The Ministry of Defense said that it has no data on damage or casualties caused by landmines.¹⁹ Independent officials, including NGO and UN agency representatives, were unable to recall any reports that would have indicated an antipersonnel mine-related problem.²⁰

There have been some reports of problems arising from alleged Japanese use of mines in Mongolia during World War II, and alleged Soviet use in the early 1970s to deter Chinese invasion, but these have not been confirmed.²¹

Officials acknowledge that there is a problem with unexploded ordnance (UXO) left in and around former Soviet military bases.²² A 1996 study and documentary prepared by the Ministries of Defense and Environment concluded that there are no confirmed minefields in Mongolia, including along its borders, but there are unexploded ordnance and landmines at abandoned Soviet bases.²³ The documentary, intended to assess damage caused to the environment in areas around former Soviet Army bases, clearly shows the presence of unexploded ordnance and other debris lying everywhere on

¹⁷ ICBL meeting with Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, Mission of Mongolia in Geneva, 17 December 1999.

¹⁸ Interview with Mr. Sanduijav, Advisor, Ministry of Defense, 24 March 2000.

¹⁹ Letter to Landmine Monitor researcher from General Ts. Dashzeveg, Headquarters of Mongolian Armed Forces, 14 April 2000.

²⁰ Interviews with Ms. S. Enkhtuya, Program Associate, United Nations Development Program, Ulaanbaatar, 19 November 1999; Ms. Gabriela De Vita, UNICEF, Ulaanbaatar, 6 November 1999; Ms. Lynn W. Roche, Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America, Ulaanbaatar, 10 November 1999; Marc Laporte, Save the Children – UK, Ulaanbaatar, 11 November 1999; Mr. Chris Johnstone, Canadian Honorary Consul to Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, 11 November 1999; Mr. D. Tumurtogoo, Academician, Rector of the Mongolian State Pedagogical University, Ulaanbaatar, 21 February 2000.

²¹ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, December 1994, p. 19, said, “A slight problem with landmines in Mongolia exists in the east and north-eastern areas of the country. These regions were heavily mined by the Japanese during World War II, and many of the mines remain active.... There are occasional human fatalities.” Yet, the follow-up report, *Hidden Killers*, September 1998, p. A-2, listed Mongolia as not mine-affected. Lt. Col. Batzorig told Landmine Monitor that the Soviet Army placed antitank mines on the border with China, and removed them when it withdrew from Mongolia in 1992. Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Batzorig, Ministry of Defense, 9 November 1999.

²² From July 1966 to December 1992, the Soviet Army had bases covering 414,000 square hectares of land in 15 provinces and in 4 districts of Ulaanbaatar. Map of Soviet installations in Mongolia, obtained by Landmine Monitor.

²³ “The Earth Wound,” documentary commissioned by the Ministry of Environment in 1996. Interviews with Mr. Ts. B. Adyasuren, Counselor, Ministry of Environment, 3 March 2000, and Mr. Shagrdarsuren, journalist, 6 March 2000. Both participated in the documentary research survey which was carried out in Baganuur, Choir, Mandalgov and various parts of Dornod province.

the sites. It also shows rows of landmines that were abandoned, especially TM 57 antitank mines.²⁴

Landmine/UXO Survey, Clearance, Awareness, Casualties

A Mongolian defense official told Landmine Monitor that in the early 1990s a Soviet team carried out a mission to ensure that all former Soviet military sites had been adequately cleared.²⁵ He also said that in the winter of 1998 NATO representatives visited some sites and concluded that there was not a landmine problem in Mongolia.²⁶ However, the U.S. Embassy told Landmine Monitor that it was unaware of any such NATO mission.²⁷

In May 1999 a team of experts from the United States traveled to Mongolia to conclude an agreement to undertake a survey of areas suspected to be contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance left by Soviets troops. The team left Mongolia, however, just days after arriving, apparently as the result of a misunderstanding between Mongolian civil and military authorities. It appears that the U.S. team arrived without a specific mandate to conclude an agreement on clearing unexploded devices in the absence of an acknowledged landmine problem. Thus, no agreement was concluded and no survey was carried out. There is no documentation filed in the U.S. Embassy on the results of this mission nor is a particular follow-up envisaged.²⁸

There are no ongoing efforts to clear the areas affected by UXO. There are no programs, governmental or non-governmental, to enhance awareness of the UXO problem.

Unexploded ordnance has caused injuries, including three civilians in 1998.²⁹ There is no procedure for reporting casualties caused by UXO. An official stated that casualties are not systematically reported and registered by the engineering department of the Ministry of Defense.³⁰

²⁴ It is not known if these mines are still active.

²⁵ Interview with Mr. Sanduijav, Ministry of Defense, 24 March 2000.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Letter from Mr. Mark W. Willis, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the United States, Ulaanbaatar, 14 April 2000.

²⁸ Interview with Mark W. Willis, Deputy Chief of Mission and Lynn W. Roche, Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States, Ulaanbaatar, 10 November 1999.

²⁹ Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Batzorig, Ministry of Defense, 9 November 1999. US Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, December 1994, p. 19, said, "There are occasional human fatalities" from landmines laid by Japan in World War II in the east and north-eastern areas of the country. The report also stated, "In the area where these incidents occur, few adequate medical facilities are available."

³⁰ Interview with Mr. Sanduijav, Ministry of Defense, 24 March 2000.

NAURU

Nauru has not yet signed the Mine Ban Treaty but there appears strong intention to do so. In a letter to Landmine Monitor, the Assistant Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs wrote that Nauru is currently in the process of acceding to the treaty with the intention of ratification in the “near future.”¹

Nauru is now a member of the United Nations, having been formally accepted on 14 September 1999, but it was absent from the vote on UNGA Resolution 54/54B in support of the ban treaty in December 1999. Nauru did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo nor did it attend any intersessional meetings of the treaty.

It is believed that Nauru has never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used AP mines and it does not contribute to humanitarian mine action assistance programs.

NEPAL

Key developments since March 1999: There has been a significant increase in the use of homemade mines by Maoist rebels, and some reports of their use of factory-made mines. The Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines reports that people in ten districts consider themselves mine-affected. It remains unclear if the government maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Nepal has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty, though the government appears to support a ban. The Foreign Ministry is currently conducting a study on the desirability and implications of joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Nepal has voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, including the resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. Nepal participated in all the Ottawa Process meetings, the negotiations, and the treaty signing ceremony, though only as an observer. Nepal was one of twelve observer states at the First Meeting of States Parties to the ban treaty in Mozambique in May 1999. Nepal participated in the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance meeting in September 1999 and the SCE on Stockpile Destruction in December 1999, both in Geneva. Nepal also sent representatives to the International Committee of the Red Cross’ South Asia Regional Seminar on Landmines, held in Sri Lanka 18-20 August 1999.

It would appear that Nepal’s failure to join the treaty thus far is related to regional political concerns. A foreign ministry official has said, “Regarding the signing of the convention...Nepal is observing the developments of our SAARC region in this regard.”¹ Nepal may also be reluctant to join due to increased hostilities by the Maoist insurgency.

¹ Fax from Chitra Jeremiah, Assistant Director, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Nauru to Neil Mander, New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines, 11 May 2000.

¹ Statement by Jabindra Aryal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited in Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Report on Second National Conference,” 4 July 1999, p. 6. SAARC is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

In January 2000, Nepal's Prime Minister (who also serves as Defense Minister) told Landmine Monitor that he believed the use of antipersonnel mines "should be prohibited. Nepal is steadfast on it." He also said, "I have directed the Foreign Ministry to accelerate the study regarding the signing of the treaty."²

The Home Minister has said, "There should be a complete ban on landmines," but added, "Deep study should be made prior to signing the ban treaty and ratifying it."³

Nepal has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Use

In the past year Maoist rebels have significantly increased their violent activity, and there have been increasingly numerous reports of use of homemade mines, also known as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).⁴ For example, a January 2000 press account stated that "mines planted by the Maoist insurgents killed six police personnel," and noted that "an inspection team of Royal Nepalese Army visiting the districts has guessed that those mines were planted during the rainy season."⁵

According to some media reports and to Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) interviews with local communities, the Maoists are also now using factory-made mines. The NCBL notes that 31 of 56 people interviewed (including one Army Lieutenant, a Deputy Superintendent of Police, one Police Inspector, and five police personnel) said that mines planted in Rolpa and Salyan districts were factory-made.⁶

There have also been some reports, including from one parliamentarian, of use of mines by Nepalese police for protection around police posts, but these reports could not be confirmed.⁷

One news report indicated possible use by the Royal Nepalese Army: "Six people, five of them minors, were killed while two others were injured in Dhading when a mine possibly left behind by the Royal Army went off."⁸

² Interview with Right Hon. Prime Minister and Defense Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, Panchkhal, Kavre, 16 January 2000.

³ Interview with Home Minister Hon. Purna Bahadur Khadka, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Singh Durbar, Kathmandu, 21 December 1999.

⁴ It appears that some reports of use of "mines" are likely to refer instead to use of bombs or other explosives that do not fit the definition of antipersonnel mine (that is, explode from the contact of a person).

⁵ *Kantipur Daily*, Kathmandu, 30 January 2000, p. 1.

⁶ The NCBL conducted its interviews in Rolpa and Salyan districts from 30 November 1999 to 10 January 2000. There is frequent speculation that the mines come from India. See, *Mahanagar Daily*, 22 February 2000. A high-ranking Nepalese officer denied this and insisted that no outside government was supporting the Maoists. Landmine Monitor/India personal discussion with Lt. Col. Bijendra Gautam, Director of Military Training, Royal Nepalese Army, at landmine seminar in Wadduwa, Sri Lanka, 18-20 August 1999.

⁷ See, *Nepal Samachar Patra Daily*, 5 April 2000, p. 1. Interview with Hon. Prakash Jwala, Parliamentary Building, Singh Durbar, Kathmandu, 20 December 1999. NCBL also heard this in interviews with local communities.

⁸ *Kathmandu Post Daily*, 30 January 2000. This does not appear to be a description of an antipersonnel mine incident.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

There is no evidence that Nepal has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It is unclear if Nepal has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. In the past, the government has said that it does not possess antipersonnel mines. But, in 1998 a parliamentarian "asked the government to remove the mines stockpiled at the Swoyambhu area."⁹ More recently, a Canadian official in Nepal said that the Royal Nepalese Army has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes.¹⁰ An Army officer told Landmine Monitor that when the police confiscate factory-made mines from the rebels, they hand the mines over to the army.¹¹ A former parliamentarian also said that the police turn mines over to the army, because the police don't know how to deactivate them.¹² Interestingly, Nepal sent a representative to the ban treaty Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction meeting in December 1999. The government has not responded to requests for clarification of the issue.

Landmine Problem, Casualties, Survivor Assistance

Increased use of homemade mines by the Maoist insurgency has led to increased risk to civilians. The Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines believes that the country should now be considered mine-affected. The NCBL reports that residents in ten districts have described themselves as mine-affected. The NCBL has a list of 172 potentially affected villages in those ten districts.¹³

Both police personnel and civilians have been injured and killed by rebel mines and IEDs in the past year. There are no official government statistics on such casualties. A hospital official told Landmine Monitor that information about police or army casualties could not be provided without government permission.¹⁴

Nepalese soldiers have fallen victim to landmines while participating in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, and peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavian

⁹ Hon. Surendra Prasad Pandey, member of National Assembly, in "An Interaction Program on Role of Parliamentarians on Ban Landmines," NCBL executive summary, Kathmandu, 8 August 1998.

¹⁰ Chris Cooter, First Secretary (Political), meeting with P. S. Chitrakar, Canadian Cooperation Office, Kathmandu.

¹¹ Interview with Lieutenant of Royal Nepalese Army, Rolpa, 11 December 1999.

¹² Telephone interview with former Parliamentarian Jagrit Prasad Vetwal, 24 December 1999.

¹³ NCBL interviews from 28 November 1999 to 20 January 2000 with residents of the ten districts. The list of the villages includes 43 in Rukum district, 33 in Rolpa, 24 in Kavre, 17 in Dolakha, 12 in Salyan, 11 in Dhading, 9 in Kalikot, 8 in Ramechhap, 8 in Sindhupalchok, and 7 in Sindhuli.

¹⁴ Interview with Dr. Kashiram Kunwar, Deputy Director, Birendra Police Hospital, Maharajgunj, Kathmandu, 21 April 2000.

territories.¹⁵ Other Nepalese soldiers have apparently been maimed and killed by landmines while serving in foreign armies, such as India and UK.¹⁶

Generally, civilians injured by mines or IEDs are treated in Bheri Zonal Hospital, Bir Hospital and Tribhuvan University Teaching Hospital. Police personnel are treated in Birendra Police Hospital. When a civilian is injured, the police inform the Chief District Officer, who relays the message to the Home Ministry, and the Home Ministry in turn informs the Health Ministry. The wounded get treatment at the hospitals only at the recommendation of the Health Ministry. Sometimes part of the cost of treatment is borne by Home Ministry and Health Ministry.¹⁷

PAKISTAN

Key developments since March 1999:

Pakistan-backed militants, and allegedly Pakistan Army troops, made extensive use of antipersonnel mines in the conflict in the Kargil area of Kashmir in mid-1999. It appears the militants in Kashmir obtained and used antipersonnel mines manufactured by the state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF). POF also offered antipersonnel mines for sale to a journalist posing as a representative of a private company in Sudan.

Pakistan ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 9 March 1999, exercising the nine-year deferral period. Landmine Monitor now estimates Pakistan's stockpile of AP mines to be at least 6 million, much larger than previously reported. Pakistan has begun the process of making all of its AP mines detectable. Pakistan is producing new mines in compliance with Amended Protocol II. The Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines conducted a survey in the Bajaur area, identifying 405 mine victims. The PCBL believes there may be thousands of mine victims in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Mine Ban Policy

Pakistan has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Pakistan has been one of the stronger defenders internationally of the continued possession and use of antipersonnel landmines, indicating that it recognizes the humanitarian concerns, but believes that security concerns are paramount. Still, Pakistan has expressed its support for "the objective of the complete elimination of APLs [antipersonnel landmines] everywhere."¹

¹⁵ Mr. Devandra Subedi, Deputy Superintendent of Police Headquarters, in "National Conference on Landmines and Human Rights," Kathmandu, 25 November 1997; South Africa Campaign to Ban Landmines and Human Rights Watch, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Global Campaign Against Antipersonnel Landmines," August 1998, p. 45.

¹⁶ Hon. Padma Ratna Tuladhar, House of Representatives, in "Role of Parliamentarians on Ban Landmines," Kathmandu, 8 August 1998; Mr. Rishikesh Shah, in "National Conference on Landmines and Human Rights, Kathmandu, 25 November 1997.

¹⁷ Interview with Arjuan Pathak, Management Section, Bir Hospital, Kathmandu, 21 April 2000.

¹ Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 5.

The government has said, “While Pakistan remains fully committed to the cause of eventual elimination of APLs, defence requirements do not allow it to join the Ottawa Treaty at present.”² A ban is not possible “till such time as an alternative becomes available to meet its security requirements, which like all other sovereign states, Pakistan alone will determine.”³

The Pakistan Armed Forces believes that antipersonnel mines are needed both for potential future conflict with India and for the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan was one of only ten nations to abstain on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 (10 December 1996) urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It was also among the small number of states to abstain on pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolutions in 1997, 1998, and 1999.

Pakistan did not attend as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique. It has participated in one of the ban treaty intersessional meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts on mine clearance, held in Geneva in March 2000. Pakistan also sent representatives to the International Committee of the Red Cross’ South Asia Regional Seminar on Landmines, held in Sri Lanka 18-20 August 1999.

Pakistan favors a consensus-driven approach and considers Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the desirable processes.

Pakistan ratified Amended Protocol II of the CCW on 9 March 1999. In ratifying, it indicated it would exercise the option to defer implementation of key provisions for a nine-year period. At the First Annual Conference of states parties to the amended protocol, held in Geneva in December 1999, Pakistan said the protocol’s “membership represents a global partnership of those who have been able to assume obligations to completely prohibit anti-personnel landmines and others who seek to balance their military and security compulsions with critical humanitarian considerations.”⁴ It also said that the protocol represented “an evolving process which if fully supported, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, will indeed facilitate the objective of a universally accepted ban on APLs.”⁵

At the same meeting, Pakistan called on nations to “[e]xplore in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva further measures which would advance the goal of the ultimate prohibition of APLs. Pakistan was the first country to propose the appointment of a Special Co-ordinator for this purpose. We can continue to support negotiations in the CD for a universal instrument banning transfers.”⁶

² Letter from Ambassador Inam ul Haque, Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Pakistan Mission to the United Nations, New York, to Stephen Goose, Chair, ICBL Treaty Working Group, 15 November 1999.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 1.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

⁶ Ibid., p. 5.

Production

Pakistan is a producer of antipersonnel mines. State-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), founded in 1951, has produced six types of AP mines. (See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for details).

Pakistan has said that it imposed a moratorium on production during the time Amended Protocol II was under negotiation, “so that production goals could be harmonized with an new provisions emerging from the negotiation. Since then limited production has occurred only in response to a real and finite demand from the armed forces.”⁷ Pakistan also noted that it “had to eliminate an entire indigenous programme of self-neutralising mines” because such mines were permissible under the old protocol but not the new.⁸

In its first annual report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, Pakistan states that it has taken “[c]omprehensive measures at the production level to make detectable APLs in future,” that “[m]arking features have been incorporated in future productions of APLs,” and that “[s]pecifications for RDMs [remotely delivered mines] have since been implemented.”⁹

In December 1999, a Pakistani diplomat told the ICBL that all AP mines produced since 1 January 1997 were detectable. He also said new production was required because of the deteriorating condition of many mines in the stockpile. He indicated that new production would include both hand-laid mines (with sufficient metal content for Protocol II) and remotely-delivered mines with self-destruct and self-deactivation features.¹⁰

Transfer

Pakistan made significant exports of antipersonnel mines in the past, with Pakistani mines being found in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland, Sri Lanka and other locations.

Pakistan announced on 13 March 1997 that it would observe a comprehensive moratorium of unlimited duration on the export of antipersonnel landmines. Subsequently, Pakistan strengthened this with a regulation: “As part of its export control policy, the Government has issued an SRO (Statutory Regulatory Order) on 25 February 1999, totally banning the export of land mines.”¹¹ Pakistan claims that it has not exported any antipersonnel mines since 1991.¹²

In early November 1999, Azeem Zaki, an attaché at Pakistan’s High Commission in London offered antipersonnel mines for sale to a British television journalist posing as

⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

⁹ Pakistan National Annual Report submitted in accordance with Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, 25 October 1999, p. 5.

¹⁰ ICBL meeting with Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan, Director Arms Control and Strategic Affairs, Geneva, 16 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose.

¹¹ Protocol II Annual Report, 25 October 1999, p. 6.

¹² Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 4.

a representative of a private company operating in Sudan.¹³ The offer was filmed and aired on the UK Channel Four *Dispatches* program on 9 December 1999. The state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories also offered the mines for sale in a faxed quotation dated 11 November 1999. It lists prices of \$2,450 for 100 P-7 MK2 bounding antipersonnel mines and \$9,300 for 150 P5A3 Claymore-type mines.¹⁴

As described in one press account:

“The [*Dispatches*] programme makers secretly filmed the Pakistani diplomat agreeing to sell landmines to the reporter, posing as a British arms dealer, during a meeting at an hotel in Knightsbridge, Central London.... Representing a fictitious company, Charles Stevens Associates, the *Dispatches* reporter was told that, despite the ban on exporting anti-personnel landmines, Pakistan Ordnance Factories, a state-owned business, was still producing them ‘for their own need’ and arrangements could be made to export them. At one point, it is alleged that Mr. Zaki was ready to arrange the export of anti-personnel landmines to Sudan.... To back up the conversations at the hotel, Pakistan Ordnance Factories sent a list of weapons that could be made available, including a P7 mark 2 anti-personnel mine, described as a ‘jumping/bounding type’ that created a ‘better fragmentation effect’.”¹⁵

The ICBL stated, “Such a sale would appear to violate the Landmine Protocol, Pakistan’s domestic law banning mine transfers, and the UK’s domestic law prohibiting sale, or even the offer of a sale, of mines in the UK.”¹⁶ The government of Canada expressed its concerns noting that if true, this would be “in direct violation of their [Pakistan’s] obligations under the Amended Protocol II to the CCW.... Canada would welcome clarification of these issues from Pakistani authorities.”¹⁷

In reaction, Pakistani officials stated, “Under existing procedures it is not possible to effect any international transfer without the express authority of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs.”¹⁸ While noting that an investigation was underway, a diplomat insisted that no sale was offered, just discussed, and that the munitions in question were command-detonated devices, not antipersonnel mines, thus eligible to be exported.¹⁹ Another Pakistani diplomat told the ICBL that “quite a few heads will roll” as a result of the incident, not only Zaki but also POF personnel. He said that the attaché

¹³ A good summary of this incident is UK Working Group on Landmines, “Pakistan and the sales of anti-personnel mines in the UK,” 9 December 1999.

¹⁴ Landmine Monitor has a copy of the faxed offer. In a letter dated 1 December 1999, POF stated that the items were not antipersonnel mines, but command-detonated mines, that it was a routine response to a query, and that export of the items is subject to issuance of permits by the government.

¹⁵ Michael Evans, “Pakistani ‘in deal for landmines,’” *The Times* (London), 7 December 1999.

¹⁶ ICBL Statement to the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 15 December 1999.

¹⁷ Statement of the Canadian Delegation at the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 15 December 1999.

¹⁸ Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 4.

¹⁹ Oral statement by Pakistani representative to the Annual Conference on Protocol II, Geneva, 16 December 1999. See also *The News International* (national English daily), 2 January 2000.

was a low-level functionary and stressed that the sale would never have been successfully completed. He also said that while the jumping mine could be command-detonated, that feature could easily be changed, so that the mine was a “dangerous thing to be exported” and would be removed from the export list. He stated that the mine had not been exported in the past.²⁰

It also appears the militants in Kashmir have obtained and used mines manufactured by the Pakistan Ordnance Factories. During interviews with senior Border Security Force officials and Army officials in Kashmir, a Landmine Monitor researcher was shown and took photographs of recovered mines, both antipersonnel and antitank, that had the seal of the Pakistan Ordnance Factory on them.²¹ This too would appear to be a violation of Article 8 of Amended Protocol II, which prohibits transfers to any recipient other than a state or state agency authorized to receive such transfers.

There are some allegations that antipersonnel mines, including PMN and PMN-2 mines, are shipped illegally by arms dealers from Afghanistan into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, and possibly to Kashmir militants as well.²²

Stockpiling

In response to the requirement in Amended Protocol II, Pakistan said it “accepted to convert our entire stock of APLs to detectable mines. This process is well underway.”²³ Non-detectable mines in Pakistani stocks include the P2 Mk2 and P4 Mk1 mines. Pakistan has said the conversion will be completed within the nine-year deferral period (up to the year 2007).

In *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, lacking any official information, it was guessed that there are hundreds of thousands of landmines stockpiled in Pakistan.²⁴ However, in a meeting with ICBL representatives in December 1999, a Pakistani diplomat stated that Pakistan had since 1997 already converted 2.5 million antipersonnel mines to detectable status. He further indicated that at one point in time this represented about one-third of the total Pakistani stockpile, but now constituted more than one-third. He noted that the stockpile number is secret, but is also fluid and could increase in the future. These comments lead to a Landmine Monitor estimate of at least six million antipersonnel mines in Pakistan’s stockpile.²⁵

²⁰ ICBL meeting with Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan, Director Arms Control and Strategic Affairs, Geneva, 16 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose.

²¹ Interviews by Landmine Monitor/India researcher with senior Border Security Force officials and Army officials in Kashmir, BSF Camp and Army Headquarters in Sri Nagar, 6-9 January 2000.

²² Interviews by Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines with local communities in the Bajaur Agency, July-November 1999.

²³ Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 3. See also, Protocol II report, 25 October 1999, p.5, which also states, “Devices have been developed which will be incorporated to make the antipersonnel mine detectable.”

²⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 497, cited in Banerjee, p. 23.

²⁵ ICBL meeting with Brig. Feroz Khan, Director Arms Control and Strategic Affairs, Geneva, 16 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose.

Various irregular armed groups, non-state actors, and tribesmen have traditionally possessed a wide variety of arms and explosives in the country. Many such groups are likely to have independent stocks of mines and high quality modern explosives capable of being made into Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).²⁶

Use

The Pakistani Army used landmines during its three wars with India in 1947, 1965 and 1971. Pakistan has also laid antipersonnel mines in front of its defended localities in Jammu and Kashmir.²⁷ It has plans to lay mines on the border with India in times of war.²⁸

Armed insurgent groups (often called militants) supported by Pakistan, and possibly regular Pakistan Army personnel, used antipersonnel mines in the conflict from May-July 1999 in the Kargil region of Kashmir.²⁹ India has charged that “during the intrusions in India’s Kargil areas large scale and indiscriminate laying of anti-personnel landmines, including both metallic and plastic APLs and special snow type devices, was resorted to by the retreating intruders.”³⁰ Two types of plastic mines were used: P2Mk2 in areas not covered by snow and P4Mk2 in areas covered by snow. A total of 8,804 mines had been recovered as of August 1999.³¹

India has said that the forces were mainly regular Pakistani army troops, backed by rebels, but Pakistan has insisted that it is only providing moral and diplomatic support to the militants.³²

Asked by Landmine Monitor to confirm or deny allegations of use by Pakistani troops in 1999 in Kashmir, the government in a letter did not reply specifically to the allegation, but instead responded that “Pakistan’s record with respect to the regulated use of landmines is second to none.” It also noted that it fully abides by the provisions of Amended Protocol II.³³

²⁶ Dipankar Banerjee, then-Co-director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, “South Asian Regional Survey,” prepared for *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 23. Banerjee based this on observations from the South Asian Regional Landmines Workshop, held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 7-8 December 1998, which included active duty and retired military officers from Pakistan.

²⁷ U.S. State Department, *Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines*, July 1993, p. 137, states “there are significant minefields along [Pakistan’s] disputed border with India in Kashmir.

²⁸ Banerjee, p. 22.

²⁹ Ghulam Hasnain, “Under Cover of Night: The presence of Pakistani soldiers deep in enemy territory disproves Islamabad’s claims of innocence,” *Time*, 12 July 1999, p. 20-21. Pakistan’s claim has been that the intruders fighting at Kargil were freedom fighters and the Pakistan Army had nothing to do with it.

³⁰ India’s Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

³¹ “Mines Used By Pak Intruders,” statistics provided by Ministry of Defence, Government of India, data as of July 1999.

³² See, for example, “India Accepts Pakistan Talk Offer as battle rages in Kashmir,” *Agence France-Presse*, Srinagar, India, 8 June 1999; “Militants Kill 19 in Kashmir attacks,” *Reuters*, Jammu, India, 20 July 1999.

³³ Letter from Mr. Shahbaz, Director General (Disarmament), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, to Stephen Goose, Landmine Monitor/HRW, 12 July 2000. Landmine Monitor’s letter of

Since the end of the mid-1999 conflict, there continue to be frequent reports of use of landmines by Pakistan-supported militants in Kashmir. The Indian government claimed to have seized 200 mines from militants in Kashmir in the first four months of 2000.³⁴

Tribesmen continue to use landmines and IEDs, mostly in personal and inter-tribal disputes, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Kurram Agency, and District Dir.

Landmine Problem

According to its 1999 Annual Report to the CCW, “there is no problem of uncleared mines in the areas under the jurisdiction of the government of Pakistan. However, in certain areas adjoining Afghanistan, there have been instances of the presence of uncleared mines which were deployed during the period of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its spill over to our borders.”³⁵

While the government reports no problem with uncleared landmines, Pakistan is mine-affected in the tribal belt. No assessment or detailed survey has been made of the extent of the problem of landmines. However, the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL) has carried out a study in the Mamoond Tehsil (sub-district) of the Bajaur Agency, believed to be one of the most mine-affected areas in the country.³⁶ The PCBL reports the presence of mines in agricultural lands, roads, pathways, near schools and other places posing threats to the communities. Of the 405 mine incidents recorded by PCBL, nearly half (196) took place in agricultural fields.

Mine Action Funding

Pakistan's contribution to mine action has been in-kind services; it has played a very active role in UN and peacekeeping mine clearance operations internationally. In 1989, through ‘Operation Salam’, demining training camps for Afghans were established at Risalpur and Quetta in Pakistan under UN auspices. From 1989-1995 a total of 17,055 mine clearance personnel were trained at these camps. Part of Operation Salam’s agenda was also to impart mine awareness to Afghan refugees to identify mines and undertake due precautions.³⁷

inquiry was addressed to the Foreign Minister, dated 26 June 2000, and stated, “We anticipate that Pakistan will be identified in this report as a government that has used antipersonnel mines since March 1999. This relates, in particular, to use of mines in the conflict with India in Kashmir. Landmine Monitor welcomes any comment on this, including a confirmation or denial....”

³⁴ “Indian forces say 250 Kashmir militants eliminated in last four months,” BBC Monitoring of Doordarshan television, New Delhi, 6 May 2000.

³⁵ Protocol II Article 13 report, 25 October 1999, pp. 4-5.

³⁶ The PCBL conducted interviews at different intervals in 1999 and 2000, but most were conducted from July to November 1999. Details of the PCBL study are contained in the full draft version of the Pakistan country report for Landmine Monitor prepared by the PCBL. It is available to the public.

³⁷ Protocol II Article 13 report, 25 October 1999, pp. 8-12.

Pakistani soldiers were also part of the UN demining operations in Cambodia in 1992-93, in Kuwait in 1991, in Angola from 1995-1998, in eastern Slovenia and Western Sahara.³⁸

In December 1999, Pakistan stated, "We will continue to offer in-kind contributions to global demining efforts,"³⁹ but it is not known if any operations are currently underway.

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

While actively involved internationally, the Army is not carrying out mine clearance or training operations in Pakistan. Pakistan's Protocol II Article 13 report details the methods of clearance and the types of detectors employed by the Pakistani Army.⁴⁰

According to the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines, some of the local people have purchased mine detectors to try to protect themselves from mines. Local "clearance" methods often mean throwing stones or firing bullets at mines.

There are no mine awareness programs in place. The PCBL found tampering with mines, especially by children, to be common. The PCBL is developing a mine awareness and risk avoidance education program in the Bajaur Agency.

Landmine Casualties

The Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines' survey in the Bajaur area identified 405 landmine victims. Of that total 261 (64%) were the breadwinners of their families, 144 (36 %) were females, and 109 (27%) were age eighteen or younger. A staggering 41% of the victims died from their injuries, largely due to lack of or inadequate first aid and medical facilities. Most of the incidents (260 or 64%) occurred from 1995-1998, with 33 recorded in 1999 and 14 thus far in 2000. The most common activity when mine incidents occurred was working in a field (26%); the second most common was walking to work (25%).

PCBL believes that there may be thousands of landmine victims in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Since the landmine-affected areas are far away from the major cities of Pakistan, even first aid facilities are not available for landmine victims, let alone advanced facilities. Generally victims are rushed to hospitals in the big cities. There are no psychological, social and rehabilitation facilities provided by the government or any national or international organization. Prosthetic and assistance device facilities are available in Pakistan but it is beyond the ability of most victims to afford them.

The PCBL study in the Bajaur area noted inadequate and inefficient medical infrastructure, lack of first aid facilities, complete absence of emergency medical care, lack of emergency evacuation capability, severe transportation constraints, and the

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 4.

⁴⁰ Protocol II Article 13 report, 25 October 1999, p. 7.

inability of victims to pay for treatment or medicines. There is no government or NGO program for longer-term rehabilitation in the area.

PALAU

Legislation to accede to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty has been introduced in Palau's House of Representatives. At a recent regional meeting of parliamentarians in Fiji, a member of parliament from Palau promised to work in support of Palau's accession to the treaty and also indicated she would raise the landmines issue at a meeting in Palau of Pacific legislators in July 2000.¹

Palau was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the ban treaty in December 1999 as it was on all previous landmines resolutions. It did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, and has not participated in any intersessional meetings. One possible reason for this abstention and for the lack of accession could be the close economic, political and military dependence between the Marshall Islands and non-signatory, the United States, as defined by the Compact of Free Association.

It is believed that Palau has never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel landmines. It is not believed to provide any assistance to humanitarian mine action.

While the islands of Palau were the scene of fighting in the latter stages of World War II, Palau is not believed to be mine-affected.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Papua New Guinea (PNG) has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty despite some indications of support. The Director of the Multilateral, Legal and Treaties Branch in the Department of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that, "Papua New Guinea supports the aim of this treaty, thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs is already in the process of formalising documents for Papua New Guinea accession to the signing and ratification of this treaty."¹

After listening to a presentation by ICBL Ambassador Tun Channereth and Sok Eng of the Cambodian Campaign to Ban Landmines at a regional meeting of parliamentarians, Papua New Guinea's Chief Justice, Sir Richard Amet, said that he would advocate in support of the ban on AP mines in his country, and that he would write to the Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister to get their support.²

¹ UNICEF, *Report on the Pacific Visit of Tun Channereth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador*, March 22-31, 2000, p. 4 and p. 10.

¹ Letter from Joseph K Assaigo, Director Multilateral, Legal and Treaties Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, Papua New Guinea, to Neil Mander, Convenor, New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines, 2 June 2000.

² UNICEF, *Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channereth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador*, March 22-31, 2000, p. 6.

Papua New Guinea sent a representative to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. It voted for UNGA Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had on similar resolutions in the past. It is believed that Papua New Guinea does not use, produce, transfer or stockpile AP mines. A small number of command-detonated Claymore mines purchased from Australia twenty-one years ago are believed to be used for training only.

Papua New Guinea is not known to have contributed to humanitarian mine action programs. It has a slight problem with UXO dating from World War II. While it is possible that the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) may have manufactured and used improvised explosive devices during the armed insurgency of the past decade, the island of Bougainville is not believed to be mine or UXO-affected.

SINGAPORE

Key developments since March 1999: Singapore was one of 12 non-signatories to attend the First Meeting of States Parties, and one of 17 non-signatories to vote in favor of the December 1999 UNGA resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mine Ban Policy

Singapore has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Permanent Secretary for the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor in May 2000, "There has been no change to Singapore's position on the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT)... Singapore will continue to support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines."¹ Singapore described its ban position in November 1999 at the UN:

"Singapore firmly believes that the legitimate security concerns and the right of self-defence of any state cannot be disregarded. Therefore, a blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines might be counter-productive since some countries need to use anti-personnel landmines for their defence and security."²

Singapore was one of 12 non-signatories that participated as observers in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, but its representative from the Ministry of Defense did not make a statement. Singapore has not participated in any of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Singapore was one of 17 non-signatories that voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the treaty in December 1999. It also voted in favor of similar pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

Apart from a Radio Singapore International program in April 1999 and an article in the March 2000 magazine *BIG-O* entitled "Where Singapore Stands on Landmines," there has been little coverage of the landmine issue domestically.³ The magazine article

¹ Letter from Shamala Kandiah, for the Permanent Secretary, Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor researcher, 4 May 2000.

² Statement by Major Kenny Lim, Singapore, "Singapore's Explanation of Vote after the First Committee Vote," 8 November 1999, provided as an attachment to the letter from Shamala Kandiah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

³ Radio Singapore International, 1 April 1999; "Where Singapore Stands on Landmines," *BIG-O* (national monthly magazine), March 2000.

repeated major sections of the Singapore country report of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* without comment. A proposal to hold a public workshop on landmines in Singapore in 1999 did not proceed as the academic institutions and NGOs approached were unwilling to host such a forum.

Singapore is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Singapore was identified last year by *Landmine Monitor* as one of 16 countries in the world still producing antipersonnel mines. In May 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, "Chartered Industries of Singapore (now reorganised as part of ST Kinetic) is the only company in Singapore that produces APLs, for our own defense purposes only."⁴ The Ministry also noted that Singapore is not pursuing alternatives to landmines.

The government will not reveal the types or quantities of mines being produced by Chartered Industries of Singapore. The military trade press notes that Singapore has produced copies of several Italian antipersonnel mines.⁵

In May 1996, Singapore declared a two-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines without self-neutralizing or self-destructing mechanisms. The moratorium was extended for an "indefinite" period and expanded to cover all antipersonnel mines in February 1998.⁶

Information regarding the size or content of Singapore's stockpile of antipersonnel mines is not available. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, "For security reasons, we can not discuss the details concerning the stockpiling or destruction of landmines."⁷

There is no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines by Singapore's Armed Forces.⁸

Mine Action

It appears that proposals for contributing to international humanitarian mine action programs have not been implemented and are still under consideration.⁹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states it is "not aware of any Singapore government organisation that has contributed to humanitarian mine action programmes," but it is "considering the most useful way in which a small country like ours can make an effective contribution to such efforts."¹⁰ Singapore Army Engineers have not been employed in humanitarian demining activities outside Singapore.¹¹ According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "We are

⁴ Letter from Shamala Kandiah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 503-504. It cites annual Jane's publications listing the Valmara 69, VS-50 (Singapore designation SPM-1) and TS-50. But, Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, on-line update, 18 November 1999, no longer lists the TS-50.

⁶ Letter from Shamala Kandiah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ In an 11 February 1999 letter to *Landmine Monitor*, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declares that no mines have been laid in Singapore.

⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 506 for details.

¹⁰ Letter from Shamala Kandiah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

¹¹ Telephone interview, Major Kenny Lim, Singapore Ministry of Defence, 12 March 2000.

looking into R&D on sensor technology to improve the reliability and efficiency of mine detection.”¹²

The Singapore Volunteers Overseas Program is investigating the possibility of sending a number of volunteers to Cambodia for one year to work with landmine survivors.¹³

SRI LANKA

Key developments since March 1999: Both sides are using antipersonnel mines in the escalated fighting. The UN Mine Action Project began in July 1999 and was expanded in early 2000, but had to be suspended in April 2000 due to the conflict. A total of 214,541 square meters of land had been cleared. It appears there were at least several hundred civilian mine casualties in 1999.

Background

The Sri Lankan government has been engaged in an armed conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since 1983. The LTTE and the government have used antipersonnel landmines extensively over the years, and the northern and eastern provinces are heavily contaminated with landmines. In April 2000, the fighting escalated greatly as the LTTE made significant inroads into areas that were under governmental control. At the time of this writing, heavy fighting between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces continues in the Jaffna peninsula.

Mine Ban Policy

Sri Lanka has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, citing security considerations due to the ongoing conflict with the LTTE. Sri Lanka was one of twelve non-signatories that participated as an observer in the First Meeting of State Parties in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. Its official statement said, “Sri Lanka is not yet a signatory to the Ottawa Convention on antipersonnel mines. However, Sri Lanka shares the views of the other member countries on this issue.... If not for the current security situation... Sri Lanka would have been among the first group of member countries who have ratified the convention.... Sri Lanka, in principle, welcomes a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines on humanitarian grounds. However, such a ban should encompass the use of antipersonnel mines both by the security forces as well as by the terrorist groups.” Sri Lanka also called on other nations to help “to bring LTTE atrocities to an end so that Sri Lanka will be able to participate in future meetings on the convention not as an observer but as an active signatory.”¹

On 1 March 2000, the Deputy Foreign Minister told Parliament that Sri Lanka could not accede to the Mine Ban Treaty because of: (1) the indiscriminate and unfettered

¹² Letter from Shamala Kandiah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

¹³ Interview with Lee Mui Ngah, Assistant Director, Singapore Volunteers Overseas Programme, Singapore, 13 March 2000.

¹ Statement of Sri Lanka, to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, undated, but 4 May 1999.

use of mines by the LTTE; (2) the need to deploy antipersonnel landmines for defensive purposes; and (3) the need to find alternatives before giving up the use of antipersonnel landmines.²

Sri Lanka has voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolutions supporting a comprehensive ban since 1996, including the pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolution in December 1999, indicating it voted in favor because of the humanitarian objectives.³

Sri Lanka has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and did not attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in December 1999. Although a member of the Conference on Disarmament, its position on negotiating a ban on mine transfers at that forum is unclear.

The LTTE has not made any statements regarding a ban on antipersonnel mines. An effort made in 1998 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to obtain a commitment from the LTTE to refrain from using antipersonnel landmines was not successful.⁴

Non-governmental organizations--local, national, and international--are engaged in advocating for a ban. The Sri Lanka Campaign to Ban Landmines has been urging the Sri Lankan government as well as the LTTE to discontinue the use of antipersonnel landmines, and has also been appealing to the government to become a party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In August 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross organized in Sri Lanka a South Asian Regional Seminar on Landmines to which the governments of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka sent representatives.

The Australian Campaign to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines in Sri Lanka⁵ launched a photo exhibition and petition campaign on 3 March 2000 urging a ban on the use of antipersonnel landmines in Sri Lanka.⁶

Use

It is clear that both sides are continuing to use antipersonnel mines in the current round of conflict that has escalated greatly since April 2000.⁷

The Sri Lanka government's position is that it uses antipersonnel landmines purely as a defensive weapon.⁸ The government maintains that "we have taken all possible action to minimize the threat of antipersonnel mines to civilian life. Land mines are not

² Hansard (Official parliamentary record), 1 March 2000, Vol.128, No.3, col. 457, 458.

³ "UN General Assembly would convene 2001 conference on illicit arms trade," M2 Presswire, 9 November 1999, citing comment of Sri Lanka on the resolution during First Committee consideration.

⁴ Press Release, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, SRSR-CAC/PR/5, 12 May 1998.

⁵ This campaign includes Sinhalese and Tamil communities living in Australia; the Australian Council for Overseas Aid; and the Victorian section of the Australian Network of the ICBL.

⁶ "News Fax," Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 3 March 2000.

⁷ One recent report stated, "Ground troops had to negotiate a very large number of antipersonnel mines planted by the LTTE which resulted in troops having to spend a considerable time before assaulting the bunker line," *Daily Mirror*, 11 July 2000, p. 1.

⁸ Hansard (Official parliamentary record), 1 March 2000, Vol.128, No.3, col. 458.

used by the security forces as an offensive weapon. In the context of the current situation the security forces have been compelled to use land mines to defend security establishments.”⁹

The UN, which has a mine action project in the Jaffna peninsula (presently suspended), has indicated that it has found three main types of antipersonnel mines likely used by the government forces: Chinese Type 72a, Pakistani P4, and Italian VS-50. Evidence of command-detonated Claymore directional fragmentation mines has also surfaced.¹⁰

According to the UN, the Sri Lankan security forces have laid barrier minefields to prevent the LTTE from reoccupying Jaffna; these are large mined areas laid to a specific pattern and usually marked. Security forces have also laid minefields to defend specific points; again laid to a pattern and normally marked.¹¹

The LTTE regard antipersonnel landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as an essential and effective part of their arsenal. The LTTE are considered among the most skilled in the world in the use of improvised explosives. The IEDs have devastating effect; a common one is a buried explosives-laden petrol can with a tripwire.

The most frequently used mine is the “Jony” mine locally produced by the LTTE. The UN reports that LTTE defensive minefields have been laid with a rudimentary pattern and not marked. The LTTE have also laid nuisance minefields to prevent access to facilities, shelter, wells, and food. These mines have been laid in small numbers and have never been marked. All nuisance mines discovered have been laid by the LTTE and it is this type of landmine use that has created the greatest threat to returning displaced people.¹²

The UN Development Program reported in February 1999 that both sides to the conflict agreed not to lay mines in land cleared by the Mine Action project in the Jaffna peninsula.¹³ It is uncertain at best that this has occurred.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Sri Lanka is not known to have produced antipersonnel mines. It is believed that Sri Lankan security forces have imported all of their antipersonnel landmines. As noted above, most mines appear to be of Pakistani, Chinese, and Italian origin or design. The fact that virtually no country today is exporting antipersonnel mines could lead to the commencement of domestic production by Sri Lanka, but there is no evidence that this is happening at present. Sri Lanka will not reveal any details about the number or types of antipersonnel mines it has stockpiled.

In addition to making IEDs, the LTTE produce in significant numbers the Jony mine, a small wooden box with 3-400 grams of TNT or C4 that explodes from pressure. The LTTE also make a Claymore-type mine.¹⁴

⁹ Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, 4 May 1999.

¹⁰ Edward Chalmers, Mine Action Coordinator, UNDP/UNOPS Mine Action Project, Jaffna, e-mail communication to Landmine Monitor researcher for Sri Lanka, 31 March 2000. See also, UNDP, “Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna,” undated, but February 1999.

¹¹ Chalmers, UNDP/UNOPS, email, 31 March 2000.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ UNDP, “Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna,” undated, but February 1999, p. 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

Landmine Problem

Antipersonnel landmines are largely confined to the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka, which are seriously affected. The UN Mine Action Project in Jaffna states that there is an extremely high level of contamination both in urban and rural areas of the Jaffna peninsula.¹⁵ The UN Development Program has also said, "The greater proportion of mines in Jaffna are the antipersonnel type and they can be found virtually anywhere from marked minefields, to agricultural land, to houses and gardens.... It is estimated that there are around 50 to 75 square kilometres of suspect or contaminated land."¹⁶ Accurate figures will be available only upon the conclusion of the community (Level 1) survey being conducted by the UN Mine Action Project, which is presently suspended. Affected areas include urban areas, roads, water sources and fertile agricultural land.

Numbers of mines are difficult to calculate due to the continual use of mines in the ongoing conflict. The U.S. State Department estimated in 1998 that about 25,000 landmines were deployed,¹⁷ and the Sri Lankan government cited an estimate of 20,000 to 25,000 in May 1999.¹⁸ But the figure could be higher today due to the escalation of the conflict since the latter part of 1999.

Mine Clearance

The UN Mine Action Project which began in July 1999 in the areas controlled by the Sri Lankan security forces in the Jaffna peninsula was expanded at the beginning of 2000. However, due to the escalation of the conflict in the Jaffna peninsula, this project was suspended and the staff started to leave the area on 28 April 2000.¹⁹

The expanded project consisted of a mine awareness program, Level 1 survey (identifying suspected areas), Level 2 survey (marking areas), emergency clearance of priority areas, explosive ordnance disposal, and compilation of a mine action database. The project was developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Funding was provided by UNDP and the governments of Australia and the Netherlands. The project was expected to cost around \$3.5 million over two years.²⁰ Funding up to the time the project was suspended totaled about \$1.8 million.²¹

¹⁵ Chalmers, 31 March 2000.

¹⁶ UNDP, "Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna," undated, but February 1999, p. 4. One subsequent press account reported, "The UNDP said although initial information indicated 10 to 12 percent of the 1,068 square kilometer Jaffna peninsula was mined, the actual mined area was about two percent." "Dogs sniff for mines in UN project in Sri Lanka," Reuters, Colombo, 5 August 1999.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers*, September 1998, p. A-2.

¹⁸ Statement of Sri Lankan Representative to the First Meeting of States Parties, 4 May 1999.

¹⁹ United Nations Office of the Resident Co-ordinator, Colombo, Sri Lanka, *Press Release*, 28 April 2000.

²⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 511, cites several press accounts.

²¹ This figure was provided by UNDP. One press account stated, "UNDP officials said the cost of the project has risen to almost \$4 million against initial expectations of \$2 million." "Dogs sniff for mines in UN project in Sri Lanka," Reuters, Colombo, 5 August 1999.

The Level 1 survey was approximately 35-40 percent complete; over 300 individual minefields had been identified.²² Total area identified as suspect at the end of April 2000 was 20,242,485 square meters.²³ Eleven surveyors recruited from the local community were involved in the Level 1 survey. The Level 2 survey and the mine clearing operation were contracted to the Zimbabwean company Minetech. Twenty-six Minetech personnel were involved, including three survey/clearance teams. There were also four mine detection dogs.²⁴

By the end of April 2000, they had cleared 214,541 square meters of land and destroyed over 1,023 antipersonnel landmines.²⁵ A manual deminer could clear up to 200 square meters per day depending on vegetation and soil conditions.²⁶

In addition to mine clearance, unexploded munitions were also destroyed when they were perceived as a danger to the public. A special team had been created to deal with this situation. It was estimated that 5-10% of all fired munitions had failed to explode. The end of 1999 had destroyed at least forty-two UXO items.

At the time of suspension of the Mine Action Project, one deminer had been involved in an accident, which resulted in minor injuries. A medical support team provided emergency medical cover to mine clearance, UXO disposal, and Level 2 survey teams.

Mine Awareness

UNICEF had begun a mine awareness program in Jaffna in 1998. When the UN project became operational in July 1999, UNICEF handed over its mine awareness activities in Jaffna. This program has also been suspended. UNICEF now supports awareness programs outside Jaffna including locations under the control of the LTTE.²⁷

The UN Mine Action Program used existing structures in sectors such as health, education, and agricultural to make presentations tailored to specific audiences taking into account the local cultural attitudes. School children were a major focus group. Ninety-three schools across the peninsula participated in a training program for teachers through which 27,770 school children were reached. Further, twenty-three schools from six divisions participated in a drama competition.²⁸

In the health sector, public health inspectors and midwives in certain areas provided information about mines and UXOs. In the agricultural sector, thirty persons working in agricultural instruction and at Agricultural Productive Centers were trained to educate farming communities about the dangers of mines.²⁹

²² Chalmers, 31 March 2000.

²³ Matthew Todd, IT/Database Specialist, JRRP, UNDP/UNOPS, email to Landmine Monitor researcher for Sri Lanka, 7 July 2000.

²⁴ Chalmers, 31 March 2000.

²⁵ Matthew Todd, UNDP/UNOPS, email to Landmine Monitor researcher for Sri Lanka, 7 July 2000.

²⁶ Chalmers 31 March 2000.

²⁷ Minutes of the Technical Meeting on Landmines held on 30 March 2000 at the UNHCR office, Colombo.

²⁸ Chalmers, 31 March 2000.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

Making use of the media, a mine awareness page appeared monthly in a local newspaper, *The Sanjewa*. In addition, 60-second radio spots giving preventive steps were broadcast over the local Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation station beginning in December 1999.³⁰ These too will be affected by the suspension of the mine awareness program.

Community-focused programs included “market mornings” where dancers who are mine victims themselves, and a “talking mine,” provided an animated forum through which information was conveyed. Other educational material included the distribution of 1,500 wall-size calendars and 5,000 pocket calendars in the year 2000.³¹

Staff attached to CARE International, *Action Contre la Faim*, UNHCR and Save the Children Fund UK, received support from the awareness program.³²

The Sri Lankan government has stated that it is implementing awareness programs in affected regions, and that in areas outside the Jaffna Peninsula, service personnel and police conduct these programs.³³

Landmine Casualties

The Sri Lanka Campaign to Ban Landmines estimates a total civilian casualty figure of at least 2,000, based on hospital records and information provided by the Jaipur Foot Program, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The UN Mine Action Project gave the total number of landmine and UXO victims in Jaffna in 1999 as thirty-four.³⁴ However, the Sri Lanka Jaipur Foot Program, with headquarters in Colombo and branches in other parts of the country including Jaffna, provided the following information regarding landmine victims for the year 1999: 163 civilians in Jaffna (Northern Province); 48 civilians in Batticaloa (Eastern Province); and, 386 war-related in Colombo, the majority of which are mine victims, both civilian and military.³⁵

The government stated in June 1999 that approximately 4,000 members of the armed forces had suffered mine injuries.³⁶ The government also said in May 1999 that over the last two years a monthly average of thirty security personnel and fifteen civilians were killed or injured by antipersonnel mines, and “almost all of these are by mines laid by the LTTE.”³⁷ That totals 540 mine casualties per year for the last two years.

The LTTE provide no information on landmine casualties. Humanitarian workers have indicated that over 1,500 landmine victims are presently awaiting prostheses in the areas outside government control, and a substantial number of these could well be LTTE cadres.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Letter from Sri Lanka High Commission in Australia to the ACFOA, Sri Lanka Peace Project, Deakin, Australia, dated 16 June 1999.

³⁴ Chalmers, 31 March 2000.

³⁵ Telephone interview with Mr. Cyril Siriwardene, Secretary, Jaipur Foot Center, Colombo Head Office, 25 January 2000.

³⁶ Letter from Sri Lanka High Commission in Australia to the ACFOA, dated 16 June 1999.

³⁷ Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, 4 May 1999.

Survivor Assistance

The UNDP notes that hospitals are poorly equipped and unable to acquire basic drugs such as anesthetics. Because of the conflict, there is no reliable road or air link between Jaffna and the main city of Colombo. There is the possibility of air evacuations by military aircraft, but it cannot be counted on. "The alternative is to enhance local capacity by importing expertise and providing dedicated drug supplies to enable casualties to be treated in Jaffna. The professional competence of local medics is reasonably high, but there are serious shortcomings in management practices."³⁸

Medical assistance to victims is primarily provided by the government through the University Hospital Centers and other hospitals. Foreign organizations also help in the medical and rehabilitation process. Medecins Sans Frontieres (France) is involved with the University Hospital center in Jaffna, and three other government hospitals in the northern and eastern regions. Medecins Sans Frontieres (Holland) helps a government hospital in an area controlled by the LTTE.

The Jaipur Foot Centre, which is the best known organization providing prostheses, states that all victims who come to them are provided with prostheses. It is reported that an NGO that is operating in the areas controlled by the LTTE is involved in producing prostheses for landmine victims, and that it is encountering problems sourcing material.

There are no social and economic integration programs specifically targeted at antipersonnel mine victims. There are, however, various general rehabilitation projects underway in the country, including in Jaffna, implemented by a variety of organizations both local and foreign. The Jaipur Foot Center states that it provides interest-free loans of up to SLR5000 (about U.S.\$70) to victims of antipersonnel mines (though not confined to this category) who are able to show a feasible self-employment project. They state that they are able to fund only two to three applications per month due to financial constraints.³⁹ The now suspended UNDP Jaffna Rehabilitation and Resettlement Program was involved in self-employment and skills development projects, and implemented a micro-credit project.

The government has a general program for the disabled, which provides a small monthly allowance. There are no specific disability laws available to landmine victims. However, disabled persons of the government forces including landmine victims receive special assistance and pension benefits.

TONGA

The Kingdom of Tonga did not participate in the Ottawa Process and has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. While it is now a member of the United Nations having been formally accepted on 14 September 1999, Tonga was absent from the vote on UNGA resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

It is believed that Tonga has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines and does not contribute to humanitarian mine action programs.

³⁸ UNDP, "Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna," undated, but February 1999, pp. 4.

³⁹ Telephone interview with Mr. Cyril Siriwardene, Secretary, Jaipur Foot Centre, Colombo Head Office, 25 January 2000.

TUVALU

Tuvalu, formerly known as the Ellice Islands, has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In a recent letter to the ICBL Coordinator, Tuvalu's Attorney General noted that the government has heard and read about the Mine Ban Treaty but:

In the absence of any anti-personnel mines in Tuvalu, we have not taken an active role and interest in the convention. However we have traditionally been supportive of any global efforts to prohibit and eliminate any inhumane practices. Accordingly we would have no difficulty in subscribing to the objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty and would appreciate your assistance in furnishing us with all relevant information on the Treaty, in particular with a copy of the text of the Treaty. The only consideration that may hinder our immediate accession to the Treaty may be if there are substantial financial obligations that will be imposed on us as a result of becoming a party to the convention.¹

The ICBL Coordinator responded by sending a copy of the Mine Ban Treaty as well as the ICRC's "Ratification Packet" and forwarded the letter to Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs who provided Tuvalu with information on the financial obligations required under the ban treaty.²

A member of Tuvalu's parliament promised to look into the ratification during a regional meeting of parliamentarians in March 2000.³

Tuvalu is not a member of the United Nations and therefore has not participated in any of the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.

Tuvalu has no defense force and it is believed that it has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines. It is not known to provide any assistance to humanitarian mine action programs.

The islands of Tuvalu are affected by UXO dating from heavy fighting during World War II.

VIETNAM

Key developments since March 1999: Five internationally funded landmine/UXO programs are underway, with several new projects started in 1999 and 2000. Vietnamese officials have confirmed continuing production of antipersonnel mines, but have also said Vietnam "will never export" mines.

¹ Letter from Feleti P. Teo, Attorney-General, Government of Tuvalu to Elizabeth Bernstein, Coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 31 March 2000.

² Letter from Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator to Feleti P. Teo, Attorney-General, Government of Tuvalu, 11 April 2000.

³ Hon. Telke P. Lauti promised ICBL Ambassador Tun Channereth that he would find out the status of ratification. UNICEF, *Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channereth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador*, 22-31 March 2000, p. 9.

Mine Ban Policy

Vietnam has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and appears to have no intention of doing so in the near future. However, the past several years have seen an apparent thawing in Vietnam's policy and attitudes towards landmines, to the point where one official could tell an international forum in early 1999 that Vietnam's acceptance of the treaty is "a matter of time, not of principle."¹

Queen Noor of Jordan visited Vietnam in October 1999 and spoke to high-ranking government officials in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.² Chuck Searcy of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAFA), who coordinated the queen's visit, said, "Three years ago, this level of discussion in the government would have been unthinkable.... This is a window of opportunity for more cooperation. I hope the door will soon be open much wider."³

Until recently, the People's Army of Vietnam exercised complete control over mine policy. That position is now in flux, as various government ministries are involved in different aspects of landmine use, clearance, and survivor assistance. Improved relations with neighboring countries have weakened the greatest military justifications for Vietnamese mine use. Efforts are underway to create a government steering committee on landmines or a national mine action center that would carry out a cohesive national policy.⁴

An internal Ministry of Foreign Affairs document provided to Landmine Monitor states that Vietnam did not sign the Mine Ban Treaty for reasons including the policies of other countries and because "mines are a type of defensive weapon that we still need."⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs views the Ottawa process as "an important effort aimed at preventing the use of mines. But it is still not a comprehensive way to deal with all angles of this multifaceted problem." The government "supports working to restrict the use of antipersonnel mines and condemns the indiscriminate use of mines to massacre civilians." However, the ban treaty "does not yet adequately consider the various defensive security needs of different countries." At present, Vietnam prefers to let other non-signatories take the lead in "reducing the pressure" to sign the treaty, while "simultaneously making use of technical assistance and funding for clearing mines and assisting mine victims."⁶ Although Vietnam has not acceded to the treaty, it continues to examine and consider it closely.⁷

Vietnam did not participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. It has attended at least one of the ban treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva – on mine clearance in September 1999.

¹ Don Tuan Phong of the People's Aid Coordinating Committee (PACCOM), speaking at the Forum on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 26-29 January 1999.

² "Queen Noor sees war legacy first hand," *Viet Nam News*, 18 October 1999.

³ Interview with Chuck Searcy, VVAFA, Hanoi, 3 January 2000.

⁴ Interviews with members of a Vietnamese government study tour to mine action centers in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, 14 April 2000.

⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), "Van de Min sat thuong" (The Question of Antipersonnel Mines), internal document provided to Landmine Monitor-Vietnam, 2 March 2000.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*; Oxfam Hong Kong interviews with members of the government mine action study tour group, 21 April 2000.

Vietnam was one of 20 nations to abstain on the vote on the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Vietnam signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1981, although it has never ratified. Vietnam did not attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in Geneva in December 1999. Vietnam is a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Given the sensitivity of the issue, the NGOs who make up the Landmines Working Group in Hanoi have chosen to focus largely on demining, mine education, and victim assistance, rather than mine ban advocacy.⁸

Production

A Ministry of Defense official confirmed in March 2000 that Vietnam continues to produce mines, a policy that comes under the purview of the ministry's Institute for the Study of Weapons Production. No further details were available.⁹ The only mine confirmed by external sources to have been produced in the 1990s is the "apple mine," actually a recycled version of the BLU-24 bomblet dropped by the U.S. during the Vietnam War.¹⁰ Vietnam produced many types of antipersonnel mines in the past, mostly copies of U.S., Chinese, and Soviet mines.¹¹

Transfer

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Vietnam never has exported and never will export mines."¹² This statement may be technically correct if "export" excludes Vietnam's extensive and well documented mine use in Cambodia during its 1979-1990 occupation. There is no evidence that Vietnam has transferred mines to Cambodia since the early 1990s at the latest.¹³ The MOFA statement that it "never will export mines" is the most explicit policy statement on this subject of which Landmine Monitor is aware.

Ministry of Trade guidelines formally prohibit the import or export of all types of "weapons, ammunition, explosives, [and] military technical equipment."¹⁴ Despite these prohibitions, there is an active illegal trade in war-era explosives, with smuggling to China, Cambodia, and elsewhere. Ethnic groups in Burma report finding Vietnamese-made copies of U.S. M-14 mines on the Thai-Burma border. These mines are trafficked

⁸ Landmine Working Group, Joint Goals Statement, March 1998. Active members of the group include Catholic Relief Services, Handicap International, Oxfam Hong Kong, PeaceTrees Vietnam, Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped, and VVAF.

⁹ Interview with Bui Minh Tam, Hanoi, 15 March 2000.

¹⁰ Stephen D. Biddle, "Landmines in Asia," paper presented at the Phnom Penh Landmines Conference, 1995.

¹¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 513-514. See also, Human Rights Watch, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (Human Rights Watch: New York, 1993), p. 54, 102.

¹² MOFA, "Van de Min sat thuong."

¹³ *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy*, pp. 103-4; Paul Davies, *War of the Mines* (Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 13-19, 44.

¹⁴ *Viet Nam News*, 7 January 2000.

by private Thai middlemen to the border from Cambodia or from Vietnam itself.¹⁵ There are also unconfirmed reports of Vietnamese-made mines found in Angola.¹⁶

Stockpiling and Destruction

The size and content of Vietnam's stockpile of antipersonnel is not known. The Ministry of Defense Mine Technology Center is in charge of destroying stocks of "tens of thousands" of pre-1975 U.S. and Vietnamese mines that are no longer safe to keep. In 2000, the army plans to destroy 2,000 tons alone.¹⁷ Usable mines and other explosives are presumably kept or "recycled."

Use

There is no evidence of any new use of mines in Vietnam. The army last laid mines in significant numbers during border conflicts with Cambodia and China in the late 1970s and during Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia from 1979 to 1990.

Vietnam reserves the right to use mines "for defensive purposes" due to the "specific circumstances" of national security. "Mines continue to be a low-cost and effective defensive weapon...that must not be lacking to carry out the right of legitimate self-defense."¹⁸ Vietnam's current improved relations with its neighbors would appear to make renewed use improbable for the foreseeable future.

The Landmine/UXO Problem

Vietnam remains heavily contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). According to the Ministry of Defense, antipersonnel mines account for only 2-3% of the debris, and only in limited areas. UXO makes up 97-98% of the total, scattered throughout "all 61 provinces and major cities."¹⁹ For this reason, the figure of 3.5 million mines (as distinct from UXO) remaining in Vietnam, cited by the U.S. State Department and United Nations, vastly understates the true extent of the problem.²⁰ Among the UXO, U.S. 40mm M-79 grenades and BLU 26/36 cluster bombs or "bombies" are held to be the most deadly and are responsible for a significant number, if not the majority, of recent casualties.²¹ The Vietnamese term for landmines, *bom-min*, specifically includes these types of UXO as well.

Vietnamese government sources claim that "at least 5%" of Vietnamese territory has been affected by mines and UXO, or a total of 16,478 km² (5,932 square miles).²²

¹⁵ Communication from Landmine Monitor-Burma researcher, 15 February 2000.

¹⁶ Interview with Roger Hess, UXB International, 30 March 2000.

¹⁷ Interview with Bui Minh Tam, 15 March 2000; Oxfam Hong Kong interview, 20 April 2000.

¹⁸ MOFA, "Van de Min sat thuong."

¹⁹ Le Huy Hoang, Bui Minh Tam and Le Van Trung, "Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges," paper presented at the International Forum on Demining and Victim Assistance, Phnom Penh, 26-28 October 1998. (Unclear whether this refers to total tonnage or total numbers.)

²⁰ U.S. State Department, *Hidden Killers*, September 1998, p. A-3, citing UN database.

²¹ Communication from Roger Hess, UXB International, 7 March 2000; similar information presented in *Vi Cuoc song Binh yen* ("For a Peaceful Life"; English version released as *Deadly Debris*), a documentary film produced by Nguyen Luong Duc and Vu Le My, Hanoi, 1999.

²² Hoang, Tam and Trung, "Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges."

Bui Minh Tam, director of the Mine Technology Center in Hanoi, estimates that 350,000 tons of *bom-min* remain hidden in Vietnam, more than 2% of the wartime total.²³

Quang Tri province, which surrounds the former DMZ, is often assumed to be the most affected region in the country.²⁴ This is not necessarily the case, as no comprehensive survey has yet been carried out. Quang Tri is certainly badly affected, but other provinces are as well, particularly in border areas.

Large numbers of mines remain in northern and southern provinces from the border conflicts with China and Cambodia in the late 1970s and 1980s. The Vietnamese army is believed to possess reasonably complete records of the location of known minefields, but this information is not publicly available. Many U.S. Army records also remain classified or difficult to access as well. None of these records include UXO and remote-delivered mines, which according to American veterans were used heavily around the former Khe Sanh combat base and DMZ.²⁵ Certain areas that were heavily bombed, for example Cu Chi district outside Ho Chi Minh City or the road between Hanoi and the port of Haiphong, contain much higher concentrations of UXO than elsewhere. But bombs and shells can turn up anywhere.

UXO contamination is particularly high around military bases, near the former DMZ, and along roads that suffered heavy U.S. bombardment. The most heavily affected provinces in the south are reportedly Bien Hoa, Dong Nai and Binh Phuoc, all lying north or east of Ho Chi Minh City.²⁶ During construction of a bridge in north-central Quang Binh province in March 2000, army engineers uncovered 700 small fragmentation bombs and “thousands” of other UXO in a single site near the start of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The captain of the army demining unit at the site told reporters that the area has “the largest density of UXO in Vietnam.”²⁷

Surveys and Assessment

No nationwide survey has been conducted. Vietnamese officials are aware of the necessity of clearer information before larger-scale clearance can take place. Quang Tri province’s proposal for a new “Mines Awareness Program,” actually a comprehensive pilot mine action strategy, calls for a Level I survey to be conducted in at least one

²³ Cited in *Vi Cuoc song Binh yen*; identical data presented in “Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges.”

²⁴ Quang Tri military authorities estimate over 225 million total mines and UXO remaining in the province, while the UN database estimates more than 58,000 mines and UXO. Quang Tri People’s Committee, “General Introduction About Quang Tri Province,” March 2000. The editor of the document concedes that “it is not sure the figures in the statistics are accurate,” but this is the most recent data.

²⁵ Interviews with U.S. veterans, tour guides and provincial officials, Quang Tri, 12-13 January 2000.

²⁶ Interviews with Bui Minh Tam, Director, Ministry of Defense Mine Technology Center, Hanoi, 15 March 2000, and Chuck Searcy, VVAF, 3 January 2000.

²⁷ *Thanh Nien* (Youth) daily newspaper, 27 March 2000, p.5; Huw Watkin, “Help Needed to Clear Bombed Road Route,” *South China Morning Post*, 24 March 2000; “Unexploded Bombs Found in Xuan Son Ferry Area,” *Lao Dong* (Labor) daily newspaper, 22 March 2000, p.1.

district.²⁸ The Ministry of Defense Mine Technology Center has expressed interest in conducting a national survey, but it has no budget to carry it out and is unable as a military institute to receive foreign funding.²⁹

Mine Action Funding

Nationally, the Ministry of Defense estimates that complete clearance would take at least ten years, at a cost ranging anywhere from \$4-15 billion.³⁰ The Vietnamese Government claims to have spent “hundreds of billions of dong each year” (approximately \$10-50 million) on military demining since the end of the war.³¹ At present, there is no line-item allocation in the national budget for mine and UXO clearance, although certain government officials are working to change this. Ministry of Defense officials claim to be limited by a lack of funding.³²

A central government policy governing use of mine action funds is still in the process of formation; at present, funds are available for “socio-economic development” only.³³ When mines or UXO are discovered during construction projects, the construction company covers the cost of clearance. In order to open new economic zones along the Chinese border, the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) has a “small” budget for demining in six northern provinces.³⁴ Vietnam’s fledgling local NGO (or semi-GO) sector has not yet been active in landmine work. Nor has Vietnam provided funds for mine action in Cambodia, despite its extensive past involvement in mine laying there.

Since 1997, and in a few cases earlier, international NGOs and bilateral donors working in Vietnam have provided assistance to demining efforts and mine/UXO victims. Official policy “encourages making use of all sources of foreign funding in order to help in [mine clearance].... Naturally, because of economic conditions, the budget for this work is still limited.”³⁵ Vu Xuan Hong, director of the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO), says, “Vietnam is able to receive certain [types of] assistance like equipment, funding to demine ourselves, technical training, and assistance to victims.”³⁶ However, mine and UXO action must be carried out “according to our internal strengths.”³⁷

VUFO and its sub-department, the People’s Aid Coordinating Committee (PACCOM), are the contact agencies in the government for NGOs interested in landmine and UXO work. Bilateral aid is handled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

²⁸ Quang Tri People’s Committee, Proposal for a Mines Awareness Program, March 2000; UXB International, Mobile Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team Proposal.

²⁹ Interview with Bui Minh Tam, 15 March 2000.

³⁰ Cited in *Vi Cuoc song Binh yen*; Hoang, Tam and Trung, “Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges.”

³¹ Hoang, Tam and Trung, “Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges.”

³² Interview with Bui Minh Tam, 15 March 2000; “Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges.”

³³ Oxfam Hong Kong telephone interview with Vu Xuan Hong (Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations), Hanoi, 27 April 1999.

³⁴ Interview with Bui Minh Tam, 15 March 2000.

³⁵ PACCOM, “Bao cao mot so Van de lien quan den Bom min va Vat lieu chua no” (Report on Some Questions Concerning Landmines and Unexploded Materials), October 1999.

³⁶ Oxfam Hong Kong telephone interview, 27 April 1999.

³⁷ PACCOM, “Bao cao mot so Van de...”

Ministry of Defense,³⁸ with the frequent involvement of MPI. All NGO and bilateral donor projects must be approved by the central government, in what can be a time-consuming and difficult process.

Four internationally funded mine/UXO programs are currently underway in central Vietnam's Quang Tri province, as well as one in neighboring Thua Thien-Hue. In all cases, projects are carried out in cooperation with the provincial government, or People's Committee, with the support of national-level authorities. Quang Tri's in-kind contributions, while not officially listed in project budgets, have been substantial. The first assistance to Quang Tri, including metal detectors and other technical equipment, was provided from 1994-98 by members of the Landmine Working Group in Hanoi. Working group members have also published books and pamphlets for public education.

The Berlin-based NGO, SODI (Solidaritaetsdienst), has carried out demining and resettlement projects in Quang Tri since 1996, predominantly funded by the German Foreign Ministry. SODI works in cooperation with a professional clearance company from the former East Germany, GERBERA, on a nonprofit basis. Total funding from 1996-99 has been \$850,000; an expansion is planned.³⁹

PeaceTrees Vietnam, a project of the US-based Earthstewards Network that "plants trees where mines used to be," also began work in Quang Tri in 1996. A Landmines Education Center outside the provincial capital of Dong Ha opened in September 1998. Total funding has been \$595,000 through the end of 1999. PeaceTrees's UXO clearance is carried out in cooperation with UXB International, an American clearance company. In December 1999, PeaceTrees Vietnam received a \$1.5 million grant from the Freeman Foundation over a three-year period to clear an area of thirteen hectares around the education center.⁴⁰

The British NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Quang Tri Province in December 1998 and has been operational since January 1999, with funding of \$1million provided by the Danish Government (Danida). These funds covered a period of January 1999 - July 2000. MAG, in cooperation with the Provincial Peoples' Committee, is preparing a 3 year proposal for expansion of an estimated \$4 million. There has been confirmed funding of \$1.5 million from the Freeman Foundation.⁴¹ MAG's program includes demining as well as environmental rehabilitation activities.

A small German NGO, Potsdam Kommunikation e.V., received its first funding of \$77,000 in 1999 for surveying and UXO removal in Thua Thien-Hue province. As with SODI, the project operates in partnership with GERBERA. In 2000, the German Foreign Ministry granted an additional DM 450,000 (\$225,000) to the project.⁴²

³⁸ Oxfam Hong Kong, *Landmines Advocacy Strategy 1999*.

³⁹ Interviews with provincial and district-level officials, Quang Tri, 12-14 January 2000; *Viet Nam News*, 2 February 1999.

⁴⁰ Figures provided to *Landmine Monitor* by Imbert Matthee (PeaceTrees Managing Director), 7 March 2000.

⁴¹ Information provided by Nick Proudman, MAG Program Manager, Quang Tri, 12 January 2000 and Tim Carstairs, MAG Communications Director, 28 July 2000.

⁴² Communication to *Landmine Monitor* from Lutz Vogt (Potsdam Kommunikation chairman), 17 March 2000.

The Humanitarian Demining Information Center at James Madison University (Harrisonburg, VA, U.S.) operated a Mines Awareness Program (JMU-MAP) for children in Quang Tri from February 1999 through March 2000. JMU-MAP originally worked in partnership with PeaceTrees, then continued to operate separately, with a U.S. government-funded budget of \$485,000 granted in May 1999.⁴³ At present, extension of the program has not been funded.

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen offered to provide clearance equipment to Vietnam during his March 2000 visit, a suggestion that seems to have been well received by Hanoi.⁴⁴ However, the details of the arrangement have yet to be finalized. The U.S. State Department's follow-up offer of approximately \$750,000 in deep-detection equipment and training still requires the approval of Vietnamese authorities.⁴⁵ The State Department's Humanitarian Demining Program has expressed interest in working in Vietnam on several occasions. A spring 1999 assessment mission to discuss possible types of assistance was inconclusive.⁴⁶

Mine/UXO Clearance

The People's Army of Vietnam conducts almost all organized mine and UXO clearance. From 1975-1985, clearance focused on heavily populated areas and agricultural land. A senior Quang Tri official says, "We paid a lot of attention to *bom-min* in the one and a half years or so right after reunification.... There were forty clearance teams and 2000 participants."⁴⁷ Postwar clearance was, however, fairly superficial, dealing only with explosive material at a depth of less than one foot (30 cm).⁴⁸ Clearance campaigns started up again from 1991 to 1998, according to government sources. Some 15-20% of explosives left by the war have been cleared, accounting for 7-8% of the country's total land area.⁴⁹

Recent military clearance has been undertaken along the Chinese border and to make way for new infrastructure projects as necessary. In the northeastern border province of Lang Son, one army battalion reports clearance of 400 hectares of minefields since 1991, preparing for the resettlement of over 2,000 people.⁵⁰

The rapid expansion of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City has led to new construction in previously affected areas. Army sapper units are contracted on a per-job basis to remove the explosives. On occasion, foreign investors and NGOs have also paid the army to clear

⁴³ Calvin Trice, "Land Mine Center Receives Grant," *Richmond Times Dispatch*, 21 June 1999.

⁴⁴ Paul Richter, "Cohen Begins Vietnam Visit, Pushes for Relations Between Militaries," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 March 2000; "US should do more to help overcome war legacy," *Viet Nam News*, 14 March 2000, p.1.

⁴⁵ Jan Scruggs (Vietnam Veterans Memorial Foundation) and Bui The Giang (Communist Party External Relations Department), speaking at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Corporate Council delegation seminar, Hanoi, 25 April 2000.

⁴⁶ Interview with Chuck Searcy, VVAF, 3 January 2000.

⁴⁷ Interview with Hoang Anh Quyet, Director, Department of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs, Quang Tri, 31 March 2000.

⁴⁸ Ministry of Defense officials, quoted in *Vi Cuoc song Binh yen*.

⁴⁹ Hoang, Tam and Trung, "Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges."

⁵⁰ *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* (People's Army) daily newspaper, 28 March 2000, p. 2.

land. During the 1999 construction of a motorcycle factory in Hai Duong, the Ford Motor Corporation reportedly paid \$60,000 for clearance of six hectares—a much cheaper rate than afforded by international demining organizations.⁵¹ Oxfam Hong Kong paid local militia \$14,000 to clear a four-hectare reservoir site during an environmental rehabilitation project in Quang Tri in 1998-9. The operation was completely manual, with safety procedures minimal to nonexistent.⁵²

At present, civilians who discover a mine or bomb are expected to inform the local military, who then come to remove or clear the site. However, the response time is often unacceptably slow. Newspapers have reported numerous accounts of residents of various provinces finding explosives, waiting as long as seven months for a clearance team, then attempting to dispose of the materials themselves.⁵³

Alternatively, residents call on the numerous scrap collectors and do-it-yourself deminers in the central provinces. Hoang Anh Quyet of Quang Tri's Department of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs claims there have been up to 4,000 people in his province alone engaging in their own clearance activities since the 1980s.⁵⁴ Civilian "wildcat deminers" form a virtual second army in the most affected areas.

The clearance being undertaken in Quang Tri and Thua Thien-Hue is mostly around former US/South Vietnamese military sites. MAG has been working in Gio Linh District, Quang-Tri Province since January 1999. 40 local civilian deminers have been trained, beginning clearance operations in July 1999. MAG's operations are closely linked in support of the provincial development plan; MAG works closely with the Provincial People's Committee, the local authority in charge of administration and development. MAG cooperates with a number of other NGOs which are working on and with the land cleared by MAG: Plan International – a housing construction program; Peace Trees Vietnam- mine awareness and replanting; and Oxfam Hong Kong-agricultural development. To date, MAG has cleared over 60 housing and garden plots handing them back to the families that own the land. This equates to approximately 40 hectares of safe land. Eighty-seven mines and 2,714 items of UXO have been destroyed.⁵⁵

GERBERA, under contracts with SODI and Potsdam Kommunikation, works in Cam Lo district and at Ai Tu in Trieu Phong district. It has cleared seventy-seven hectares of land and plans to clear forty-eight hectares in 2000. UXB, under contracts for PeaceTrees, is clearing around the former U.S. Marine logistics base in Dong Ha. It has cleared ten hectares of land and plans to clear thirteen hectares in 2000.⁵⁶

In each case, the provincial People's Committee suggested the site, or offered several sites out of which one was clearly the most in need of clearance. Recently, provincial officials have taken representatives of each of the international groups to

⁵¹ Interview with Chuck Searcy, VVAF, 3 January 2000.

⁵² Interview with Tran Thanh Binh (Oxfam Hong Kong), 19 April 2000.

⁵³ For example, *Thanh Nien*, 20 March 2000, p. 15; *Phu Yen* newspaper, 21 March 2000, p. 4; *Tien Phong* (Pioneer), 8 April 2000, p. 10.

⁵⁴ Interview with Hoang Anh Quyet, Quang Tri, 31 March 2000.

⁵⁵ Interviews with MAG staff, January-February 2000; MAG Quarterly Progress Report, 30 September 1999, and email from Tim Carstairs, MAG Communications Director, 28 July 2000.

⁵⁶ Interviews with GERBERA and UXB staff, January-February 2000.

proposed new sites, including Vinh Linh district in the former DMZ and around Khe Sanh.⁵⁷ The provincial government has submitted proposals to several other international NGOs for additional demining work, but no agreements have yet been reached.⁵⁸

Both MAG and UXB have proposed establishment of mobile detection (EOD) and clearance teams in Quang Tri. The concept has also received the endorsement of provincial authorities. The teams would respond to UXO incidents and suspected minefields anywhere in the province, reported through the provincial Mines Awareness Program.⁵⁹

Coordination of Mine/UXO Action

There is no body responsible for coordinating mine action operations, although there is substantial interest in forming one. The central government has appointed VUFO to form a master plan,⁶⁰ but there is no progress reported as yet. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official says he would welcome NGO support for the establishment of a Mine Action Center.⁶¹ Any decision to set up a "VMAC" will have to come directly from the Prime Minister.⁶² In a sign of significant movement on the issue, PACCOM agreed in March to Oxfam Hong Kong's proposal for a study tour to mine action centers in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Nine representatives of PACCOM, the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Committee on NGO Affairs, and the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Public Security took part in the two-week trip. Officials are particularly interested in raising and sharing funds, rehabilitation and resettlement activities, and improving relations among international donors and local partners.⁶³

Plans to hold a high-level meeting on landmines and UXO have been underway for at least three years, but have not yet been approved by the central government. According to Nguyen Van Kien of PACCOM, "This seminar will provide an opportunity for discussion among Vietnamese agencies and NGOs to find suitable partners for working in the areas of landmines and UXO."⁶⁴

International mine action organizations in Quang Tri hope that their project steering committees, which include local, provincial and army officials, would continue to operate after the conclusion of existing projects, possibly combining into a provincial mine action committee. The province's proposed Mines Awareness Program contains a structure that officials hope can become a nationwide model: "If we work well, the [central]

⁵⁷ Interviews with MAG, GERBERA and UXB staff, January-February 2000.

⁵⁸ Quang Tri People's Committee, Proposals for Demining in Cam Lo and Gio Linh Districts, 1997-99.

⁵⁹ MAG Vietnam, "Community Level Mine Action" (discussion paper), March 2000; UXB International, Mobile EOD Team proposal; Quang Tri People's Committee, Proposal for a Mines Awareness Program.

⁶⁰ Oxfam Hong Kong telephone interview with Vu Xuan Hong (VUFO), 27 April 1999.

⁶¹ Oxfam Hong Kong telephone interview with Le Huy Hoang, 22 June 1999.

⁶² Interview with Bui Minh Tam, 15 March 2000.

⁶³ PACCOM, "Issues of Interest to the Vietnamese Delegation on Studytour to UXO Centers in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia" (discussion paper), 12 April 2000; interviews with study tour participants, 14 April 2000.

⁶⁴ Working Notes from the Landmines, UXO and Agent Orange Sectoral Group, Forum on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, Phnom Penh, 26-29 January 1999.

government will allow others to develop regional centers, not just in our province.”⁶⁵ Vietnam’s bureaucratic system, however, restricts the province’s freedom to move ahead of central government policy.

Planning of Mine/UXO Action

A national mine and UXO clearance plan, similarly, is currently under discussion in the Vietnamese government. Vu Xuan Hong of VUFO claims that “Vietnam has a plan for demining south of the 17th Parallel,”⁶⁶ that is in the former South. It is unclear what implications this has for the north of the country. The difficulty of coordinating activities across many ministries and in some cases competing bureaucracies appears to be the major obstacle to faster action.

Quang Tri province is reportedly in the process of developing its own clearance plan.⁶⁷ A de facto plan appears to exist already, as witnessed by the way that the province has distributed international clearance projects around the province. The memorandum of understanding signed between the Quang Tri People’s Committee, James Madison University, and PeaceTrees contains the goal of “developing a Mine Action Master Plan to determine priorities of Landmine/UXO assessment and clearance activity for the province and to focus Mine Awareness Education as a primary goal...”⁶⁸ Other provinces would like to follow suit, but are waiting for central government direction and observing the progress in Quang Tri.⁶⁹

Reconstruction & Development of Cleared Areas

According to the Land Law, agricultural land allocation in rural Vietnam is carried out by the commune or village on the basis of family size and need. Land that is cleared by the military is turned over to local authorities, who then decide how best to use it. Hong Xuan Khang, chair of one Quang Tri commune, says that his community has 170 hectares of arable land, or 15% of the district total, that are currently unusable because of mines and UXO.⁷⁰ If local farmers can enjoy full use of the land, a significant obstacle to poverty would be overcome.⁷¹

In existing clearance programs in Quang Tri, the province and districts have identified intended beneficiaries for resettlement once clearance is complete. SODI has resettled fifty-four families since 1998 on a cleared military base site in Cam Lo, many of

⁶⁵ Interview with Nguyen Duc Quang, Quang Tri External Relations Department, 22 February 2000.

⁶⁶ Oxfam Hong Kong interview, 27 April 1999.

⁶⁷ Interviews with Hoang Dang Mai, Quang Tri Province External Relations Department, and other current and former provincial officials, 12-17 January 2000.

⁶⁸ “Memorandum of Understanding between Foreign Relations Department, Provincial People’s Committee of Quang Tri, and James Madison University & Peace Trees Vietnam for a Landmine Awareness Project,” February 1999.

⁶⁹ Interviews with international NGOs and Quang Tri officials, January-February 2000.

⁷⁰ Cited in *Vi Cuoc song Binh yen*.

⁷¹ Monan, *Landmines and Underdevelopment*, gives many case studies and anecdotal evidence to support this point.

them the children or relatives of families who lived there prior to the war.⁷² An additional hundred families whose villages were destroyed by a landslide will be resettled in 2000 on SODI's Ai Tu site.⁷³

MAG works in coordination with district authorities, Plan International and Oxfam Hong Kong on post-clearance development.⁷⁴ Of a planned 155 hectares to be cleared, one hundred will be used by the province as agricultural resettlement sites. During the approval process for MAG's project, Oxfam Hong Kong signed a memorandum of understanding to assist in development in cleared areas, a provision that was necessary for the project to begin.⁷⁵ The Vietnamese government places a high priority on redevelopment and has supported and fostered partnerships among clearance agencies and development NGOs.

Mine/UXO Awareness Education

Awareness programs are encouraged by Vietnamese authorities and have been carried out mostly on the local or provincial levels. Mass organizations such as the Women's Union or Committee for the Care and Protection of Children (CPCC) are particularly appropriate to carry out mine and UXO education, as they have levels of membership reaching into every commune and village.⁷⁶ Radio and television stations have produced reports on the danger and effects of explosives: for example, a half-hour prime time television documentary, "Mines and UXO in the Eyes of Children," aired on Quang Tri provincial television for two nights in January 2000. The documentary *Vi cuoc song binh yen* ("For a Peaceful Life," English version released as *Deadly Debris*), a valuable source of data and interview footage in its own right, was shown on national television in 1999.

Government officials and NGO staff who have attended mine conferences in Cambodia, Indonesia, Mozambique and elsewhere return with resources that are widely distributed and copied. In one case, JMU's Mine Awareness Program hired a local artist to adapt Cambodian materials to look more Vietnamese. In cooperation with the Quang Tri House for Children, JMU-MAP held a poster competition on "Keeping families safe from mines and UXO" in August 1999, with impressive results that have been distributed on calendars and notebooks. UNICEF's Mine Awareness Guidelines are understood and widely applied by the provincial People's Committee, especially the importance of making materials appropriate to the local cultural context.⁷⁷ The People's Committee is working on a standardized curriculum for mine and UXO education, with contributions from international organizations.⁷⁸

The Danaan Perry Landmine Education Center in Quang Tri is the first center of its kind in the country and contains displays and pictures relating to mine awareness. The center has been used as a base for PeaceTrees's tree-planting projects, using a mixture of

⁷² Interview with Wolfram Schwope (GERBERA), 23 February 2000.

⁷³ *Nong nghiep Viet Nam* (Vietnamese Agriculture) magazine, 1 March 2000, p. 2.

⁷⁴ Interview with Nick Proudman, MAG, 23 February 2000.

⁷⁵ Interview with Tran Thanh Binh, Oxfam Hong Kong, 21 February 2000.

⁷⁶ Interviews with Mark Pirie, JMU-MAP, 14 January and 23 February 2000.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Interview with Nguyen Duc Quang, Quang Tri External Relations Department, 22 February 2000.

American and Vietnamese volunteers. However, it has up to now been used only sporadically for education programs. JMU-MAP has conducted training courses for forty Women's Union and Committee for the Care and Protection of Children members, who will return and teach mine awareness in their home villages. A survey carried out in fall 1999 by JMU-MAP and the provincial Women's Union assessed mine and UXO awareness, casualties and socio-economic impact. Although the survey results are said to be complete, the province has not yet released them publicly.⁷⁹

Quang Tri's proposed provincial Mines Awareness Program would continue many of the activities of the James Madison project, as well as integrating detection, clearance, and rehabilitation activities into a cohesive structure. Target goals are reducing accidents through outreach and education; evaluating effects of mines and UXO on people's livelihoods, especially women and children; supporting victims; and updating information and statistics. Mobile teams, including education, clearance and medical components, would travel to schools and communities to carry out training programs.⁸⁰ If successful, this would be the first coordinated program of its kind in Vietnam.

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In the first nationwide survey on mine and UXO casualties since the end of the war, the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) reported in September 1999 that 38,248 people have been killed and 64,064 injured through May 1998 (out of a total population of 78 million).⁸¹ The U.S. State Department estimates 180 casualties per month.⁸² Officials agree that the actual numbers may be much higher than reported as many accidents, especially when death is immediate, are not counted. According to one member of the Quang Tri People's Committee, "The number of victims is higher still in reality because the provincial authorities do not have enough money to spend on detailed investigation."⁸³

More detailed surveys have been carried out in Quang Tri province, although the data is often contradictory. Provincial authorities report a total of 5,035 deaths and 6,824 injuries due to mines and UXO dating from the end of the war.⁸⁴ Hong Xuan Khang, a commune chairperson in Gio Linh district, says that out of 6,300 commune residents, 271 have died and 544 been wounded by mines and UXO since 1975⁸⁵--a 13% casualty rate. In one single village, where MAG is currently preparing resettlement sites, there have been 87 reported mine accidents since the end of the war.⁸⁶ Neighboring Cam Lo district, site of several large former U.S. bases, claims 54 deaths and 262 injuries out of a population of 41,335 (0.8%).⁸⁷

⁷⁹ Interview with Mark Pirie, JMU-MAP, 14 January 2000.

⁸⁰ Quang Tri People's Committee, Proposal for a Mines Awareness Program, March 2000.

⁸¹ "Leftover Ordnance In Vietnam Deadly," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 5 September 1999; "Explosive legacy of war kills more than 38,000," *South China Morning Post*, 24 December 1999

⁸² U.S. State Department, *Hidden Killers*, 1998.

⁸³ Cited in Jim Monan, *The Impact of Landmines on Children*.

⁸⁴ Quang Tri Statistical Office data collected by MAG, 1999.

⁸⁵ Cited in *Vi Cuoc song Binh yen*.

⁸⁶ Gio Linh People's Committee Annual Report, 1999.

⁸⁷ Quang Tri People's Committee, Proposal for Demining in Cam Lo District, 1997.

According to one limited survey of amputees, mine-caused injuries peaked during 1975-77, remained stable through the 1980s, and were reduced to half in the 1990s.⁸⁸ Data collected by the Quang Tri Department of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs shows consistently declining casualty figures since 1991. The department's director concludes that fewer mines and UXO are being found on the ground surface, and thus assistance to existing victims should be a higher priority for the province than further clearance.⁸⁹

There is not adequate data to determine whether there has, in fact, been any reduction in casualties. Mine incidents continue to be reported with frequency in the Vietnamese press: one article in December 1999 cited figures of 63 accidents in the preceding three months, killing 78 and injuring 138. Examples came from at least twelve provinces in all areas of the country.⁹⁰ A survey of five national and provincial newspapers over a one-month period from March to April 2000 found eleven mine and UXO deaths reported in southern Vietnam (Mekong Delta and Central Highlands), including eight children and three scrap collectors.

Quang Tri officials and Handicap International estimate that more than half of casualties occur to scrap dealers searching for explosives.⁹¹ Most injuries are classified as accidental or work-related. Adult men, most in their twenties or thirties, make up 85% of amputees.

Of 281 amputees receiving prostheses at the Quang Tri provincial hospital from 1994 to 1997, 78% had war-related injuries, 40% of which occurred since 1975. Antipersonnel mines, rather than UXO, accounted for the majority of *injuries*, but larger shells and bombs are of course more likely to kill their victims rather than maim them.⁹²

Little is known regarding the casualty rate among Vietnamese military deminers. Given the near-universal lack of international standard safety equipment, deaths and injuries are likely relatively high. For instance, at least two or three, and probably more, workers were killed in 1999 during construction of the road from Quang Tri to the Laotian border.⁹³ Thirty-seven soldiers were reported killed during demining along Vietnam's northern border from 1991-98.⁹⁴

Ministry of Health officials variously estimate the total number of people with disabilities in Vietnam between 3.5 and 5 million, or 4-7% of the population, with approximately 30% of the total due to war-related injuries. 70% of people with disabilities are in need of rehabilitative services, and 80% have below average living

⁸⁸ Handicap International, prosthetic survey from the Dong Ha (Quang Tri) clinic, November 1997. PACCOM cites statistics of 22,000 casualties in 1976 and 1977 alone.

⁸⁹ Quang Tri People's Committee, "General Introduction about Quang Tri"; Landmine Monitor interview with Hoang Anh Quyet (DOLISA), 31 March 2000.

⁹⁰ Pham Khuong, "Nhưng noi dau dai dang" (Prolonged Suffering), *Cong An Nhan Dan* (People's Police) daily newspaper, 20 December 1999.

⁹¹ Handicap International, Analysis of November 1997 Prosthetic Survey; interview with Hoang Anh Quyet, 31 March 2000.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Huw Watkin, "Help Needed to Clear Bombed Road Route," *South China Morning Post*, 24 March 2000; telephone interview with Chuck Searcy, Hanoi, 21 April 2000.

⁹⁴ Associated Press, "25 Years Later, Vietnam's Deadly Legacy of War," *Baltimore Sun*, 27 April 2000.

standards.⁹⁵ No national-level baseline survey has yet been conducted. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates the total number of amputees in Vietnam at 60,000 or 1 per 1,200. ICRC's rehabilitation program in Ho Chi Minh City, the first in Vietnam, fitted 15,000 people with prostheses from 1989-99.⁹⁶

Survivor Assistance

Vietnam's medical system is relatively effective for a poor developing country, with 90% of people having access to health care.⁹⁷ Government-run health stations exist down to the commune and village level, but outreach beyond commune centers is often a problem. In the past health care was provided virtually free of charge, but under a market economy patients are expected to cover the costs of an increasing amount of treatment. The quality of care available in major cities has improved substantially for those who can afford it, while market reforms have left many areas of the countryside behind. Rehabilitation and reintegration programs are typically conducted at provincial hospitals and in cities. In addition to seventeen government-run rehabilitation centers and fifty-four provincial hospitals, there are eighty "sanatoriums" throughout the country that provide physiotherapy.⁹⁸

The International Committee of the Red Cross opened a rehabilitation center in Ho Chi Minh City in 1989 with the cooperation of the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA). During the 1990s, prosthetic technology was introduced to other provincial capitals around the country. Since 1995, the ICRC presence has increasingly been taken over by non-governmental organizations, many following the Red Cross model, and expanded nationwide.⁹⁹

Nineteen international organizations currently conduct disability-related programs in Vietnam; of these, fifteen assist people with physical disabilities.¹⁰⁰ In 1998, state-run and non-governmental workshops combined to produce nearly 23,000 orthopaedic devices, including 13,500 prosthetic limbs. Despite these varied efforts, demand for limbs by amputees outstrips supply by more than two to one.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ Le Ngoc Trung, Nguyen Thi Hoai Thu and Dr. Nguyen Xuan Nghien, speaking at the Workshop on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of People with Mobility Impairments and Other Disabilities, Hanoi, 23-25 March 1998.

⁹⁶ International Committee of the Red Cross, "Briefing Paper on Cooperation Between MOLISA and ICRC on [the] Orthopaedic Programme In Vietnam," October 1999; ICRC Mines Overview, 1996.

⁹⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1998*.

⁹⁸ Thomas T. Kane, *Disability in Vietnam in the 1990s: A Meta-Analysis of the Data*, U.S. Agency for International Development, October 1999, pp. 47-49.

⁹⁹ ICRC Briefing Paper, October 1999.

¹⁰⁰ Those organizations are: AIFO (Italy); Catholic Relief Services (U.S.); DED (Germany); Handicap International (Belgium); Health Volunteers Overseas (U.S.); MCNV (Netherlands); POWER (UK); Prosthetics Outreach Foundation (U.S.); Rädna Barnen (Sweden); Save the Children Fund (UK); VIETCOT (Germany); Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped (U.S.); Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (U.S.); World Concern (U.S.); World Vision (U.S.).

¹⁰¹ Kane, *Disability in Vietnam*, p. 51.

Total disability project funding over the period 1997-2001 is \$17.3 million, with most funding coming from USAID and the European Union.¹⁰² If mine victims make up an estimated 15% of the total disabled population in Vietnam, then \$2.6 million of this funding can also be said to be mine-related.¹⁰³

In addition to these efforts, several NGOs and international donors are engaged in community development work in mine-affected areas. Oxfam Hong Kong first became interested in landmines through working in two districts in Quang Tri in the early 1990s where mines and UXO were a great obstacle to development; other NGOs had similar experiences.¹⁰⁴ Oxfam is now coordinating with MAG's demining project on community development activities.

Disability Policy and Practice

Vietnam's 1992 Constitution provides that "[t]he State should develop and consistently manage health-care-for-people activities, mobilizing and organizing social forces—in the direction of prevention."¹⁰⁵ National ordinance 06-L/CTN on Disabled Persons, adopted in July 1998, gives persons with disabilities the right to an education, adequate health care and job opportunities. People who became disabled during the war are given preferential treatment, as are identified victims of dioxin poisoning (Agent Orange).¹⁰⁶ In February 2000, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai announced an allowance of 48,000-84,000 dong (\$3.50-6) per month would be paid to disabled children of war veterans affected by toxic chemicals.¹⁰⁷ Postwar mine victims do not yet receive this assistance, nor do veterans of the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) or their children.

There is presently no national coordination body for disability issues. MOLISA is the lead agency dealing with mine victims; the Ministry of Education and Training and Ministry of Health are also involved, as are mass organizations such as the Committee for the Care and Protection of Children, the Fatherland Front, Veterans' Association, and Vietnam Women's Union. Among NGOs, a Disability Forum meets regularly at the VUFO-NGO Resource Center in Hanoi.

¹⁰² Health Volunteers Overseas, *Disabilities Programs—Vietnam 1999*.

¹⁰³ A 1994-95 Disability Survey by the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) found 19.1% of disabilities to be war-related; in Handicap International's 1997 survey of post-1975 amputees, 72% were caused by mines.

¹⁰⁴ Monan, *Landmines and Underdevelopment*.

¹⁰⁵ Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Article 39.

¹⁰⁶ "Ordinance on preferential treatment of revolutionary activists, fallen heroes..." etc.; Disability ordinance, Articles 2-3. *Official Gazette of the National Assembly*, No. 28, 10 October 1998.

¹⁰⁷ "Fund for Agent Orange victims mobilises VND10 billion," *Viet Nam News*, 29 February 2000; "'Toxin' Children get government help," *Viet Nam News*, 1 March 2000.

OTHER**EAST TIMOR**

Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony of East Timor in 1975 and annexed it the next year, setting off years of armed struggle with Fretilin rebels. On 30 August 1999, the people of East Timor voted in a referendum to become independent of Indonesia. This touched off a rampage with massive abuses by pro-Jakarta militia from West Timor supported by Indonesian soldiers. UN peacekeeping forces arrived on 20 September and restored calm.

East Timor is now recognized internationally as independent of Indonesia. It is being governed by the United Nations under a "transitional administration." It is expected to be able to assume full self-governing functions by late 2001 or early 2002.

There is no evidence that East Timorese Fretilin fighters ever used, produced, or possessed antipersonnel landmines. (See Indonesia country report regarding government use of AP mines in the 1970s).

During the violence in 1999, there were allegations of use of mines in East Timor by the militia from West Timor.¹ However, when peacekeeping forces arrived, they did not encounter antipersonnel mines. Canadian and Australian soldiers in the peacekeeping mission were equipped with command-detonated Claymore-type mines, which are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.²

Mrs. Yeny Rosa Damayanti of Solidamor (Solidarity for East Timor), based in Jakarta, visited Dili, East Timor from 1 July-12 September 1999 to monitor the vote. She visited all district areas and regencies except Los Palos, and never heard any reports of landmine use.³ Mr. Saut Sirait, a Christian priest from KIPP (Independent Committee for Monitoring Election) in Jakarta was also sent to East Timor from 20 August-12 September 1999 to monitor the vote. He visited small towns and district areas and talked with many East Timorese, but he never heard reports of landmine use.⁴

There has been no statement yet on mine ban policy from East Timor officials. Jose Ramos Horta, who received the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to achieve independence for East Timor, and is often mentioned as the likely first Foreign Minister, has spoken out strongly in favor of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines.

East Timor is not mine-affected.

¹ "Land mines threat to peace troops," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 December 1999; "E. Timor resistance warns Dili been mined," Reuters, Lisbon, 17 September 1999. Another report indicated use of booby-traps but not mines. "Van Doos Make for E. Timor Landing," *Toronto Sun*, 28 October 1999.

² "Canadian forces equipped with landmines," CP, Ottawa, 13 February 2000. "More than 1,000 Soldiers Begin International Peacekeeping Operation in East Timor," Associated Press, Dili, September 1999. This report and others indicated Australian forces brought "land mines," but it was later clarified these were Claymore-type mines.

³ Landmine Monitor interview with Mrs. Yeny Rosa Damayanti, Solidamor, Jakarta, 12 April 2000.

⁴ Landmine Monitor interview with Saut Sirait, Independent Committee for Monitoring Election, Jakarta, 14 April 2000.

TAIWAN

Key developments since March 1999: For the first time, a senior official made a clear statement of support for a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines. Mine clearance continued on Kinmen Island.

Mine Ban Policy

On 10 July 1999, Vice President Lien Chan said, "Hereby I would like to declare that the government of the Republic of China will give all-out support to ban production, use, storage, and transportation of landmines."¹ Taiwan is not eligible to sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It is not a member of the United Nations.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

In March 1999, a National Defense Ministry official told Landmine Monitor that Taiwan has stopped use and production of antipersonnel mines.² In the past, the company Hsing Hua produced copies of U.S. M16A1, M2A4, M3, and M18A1 mines.³

There is no evidence that Taiwan has exported antipersonnel mines. Taiwan has imported 36,747 antipersonnel mines from the United States, including 2,592 ADAM scatterable mines in 1992.⁴ It is not known if Taiwan imported mines from other nations. Details on Taiwan's stockpile are not available. See the Landmine Monitor 1999 report for details of the mine dumps on Kinmen (Quemoy) Island.⁵

An official of the Ministry of National Defense told Landmine Monitor in March 1999 that Taiwan has stopped use of antipersonnel mines.⁶

Landmine Problem

Most parts of Kinmen Island were mined in the 1950s due to its strategic location. Former military personnel have said that other small islands including Tongyung, Yuchou, Liantou, Siyian, Urtong, Tatong were also mined, although Kinmen Island is most heavily mined.⁷ As one press account put it, Kinmen "has been plagued by the danger posed by landmines for over four decades."⁸ A Mine Clearance Planning Agency report states, "Landmines from the coastal areas have not yet been cleared. A number of mine incidents involving civilians have taken place in the past. The island is currently

¹ Eden Social Welfare Foundation, "1999 Love Without Frontiers," p. 24.

² Interview, Taipei, 4 March 1999.

³ Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 475.

⁴ U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency table, "U.S. Landmine Sales by Country," provided to Human Rights Watch, 29 March 1994.

⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 522.

⁶ Interview, Taipei, 4 March 1999.

⁷ Interviews, Taipei, 23 March 2000.

⁸ Taiwan Central News Agency, "UK Firm Wins Bid to Clear Minefields on Kinmen Island," 30 November 1998.

being developed to be a National Park for tourist attractions. However, the presence of mines is a serious problem faced by the local residents and will discourage tourists.”⁹

Mine Action

The Ministry of National Defense conducted a minefield survey in Kinmen Island from January to April 1996 and specified two prioritized areas: (1) six mine dumps in the vicinity of Lee Kuan-Chian Temple in Hsiputou village and (2) Shuang-Ju-Shan and Hou-Pan-Tsun minefields.¹⁰

The Ministry of National Defense decided to put out clearance contracts worth NT\$304,716,000 (approximately U.S.\$10 million) for the fiscal years 1998, 1999 and 2000.¹¹

In 1997, Specialist Gurkha Services UK Ltd. (SGS) won a NT\$47 million (about U.S.\$1.5 million) contract to clear the minefield in front of a temple in Hsiputou village. The demining was completed in May 1998 as scheduled. SGS won another contract in November 1998 to clear the remaining seven minefields in Kinmen including five dumps in the vicinity of Lee Kuan-Chian Temple (Division A), Shuang-Ju-Shan minefield (Division B), and Hou-Pan-Tsun minefield (Division C). Clearance and Disposal of mines/UXO in Division A commenced on 15 December 1998 and was completed 1 March 1999. Division C commenced on 17 February 1999 and was completed on 13 April 1999. Division B commenced on 6 April 1999 and completed on 12 May 1999.¹²

In a June 1999 report, SGS reflected on the difficulties it encountered and recommended the establishment of a National Mine Data Center and adoption of a nationwide clearance program:

For the entire duration of the project, including the Tendering Stage, the ROC Army was unable to provide technical data on both the Mine Dumps and the Minefields. This included data such as the type and number of mines likely to be encountered in both the Dumps and the Minefields, the pattern in which mines were laid in the Minefields and the exact dimensions and location of the actual mine areas....

One means of alleviating this problem in the future is for the ROC MOND [Ministry of National Defense] to establish a National Mine Data Center. Such a Center would hold all relevant details and data of mined areas in the ROC and would be the source of technical information and data when compiling future contracts. The necessary information would be gathered by researching information presently held by the MOND and by conducting investigative Level 2 Survey of areas believed to be mined....

⁹ Sayed Aqa, MCPA, “Landmine Problem in Kinmen Island,” January 1998. MCPA is a Pakistan-based demining organization.

¹⁰ Ministry of National Defense document issued on 24 June 1999 in response to a Senator’s inquiry. NT\$ is New Taiwan dollars.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Specialist Gurkha Services (SGS) UK Ltd., “Mine Clearance Technical Transfer Report (Contract Number TB88001 W041PE),” 12 June 1999, pp. 1-3; and, interview with Mr. Chen Chih-Cheng, ROC Representative for SGS, Taipei, 23 March 2000.

The MOND could achieve savings if it adopted a Nation-Wide Clearance Programme in which several projects were run concurrently and projects flowed into each other. The key to such a programme is a long-term perspective based on accurate information on the true extent of the mine/UXO problem confronting the ROC.”¹³

There is almost no information on mine awareness programs, landmine casualties, or survivor assistance programs. The Eden Social Welfare Foundation, a Taipei-based NGO, has promoted a series of “Love Wheelchairs for the Disabled” activities, in which more than 3,200 wheelchairs have been donated to mine victims in Taiwan, South Korea, Cambodia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Jordan, and Mozambique.¹⁴

¹³ SGS, “Mine Clearance Technical Transfer Report,” 12 June 1999, p. 13.

¹⁴ Eden Social Welfare Foundation, “1999 Love Without Frontiers,” p. 27.

EUROPE/CENTRAL ASIA

STATES PARTIES

ALBANIA

Key developments since March 1999: Albania ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 February 2000. Albania inventoried its stockpiled mines and in May 2000 reported having 1,607,420 mines stored in 120 depots in the country. It estimates it will take up to two years to complete destruction at a cost of approximately \$560,000. It has destroyed 8,400 mines. On 8 October 1999 the Albanian Mines Action Committee (AMAC) was founded to coordinate mine action in the country. In June 2000, RONCO began demining operations in two priority areas defined by AMAC. In northern Albania the ICRC and CARE are carrying out mine awareness programs. As a result of the Kosovo crisis, in northern Albania AMAE had recorded eighty-five mine/UXO incidents, resulting in eighteen dead and 118 injured, by early July 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Albania signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 8 September 1998, and deposited the instrument of ratification at the United Nations on 29 February 2000. The treaty enters into force for Albania on 1 August 2000. Ratification was approved unanimously by parliament, and a Foreign Affairs Ministry official has said, "According to the instrument of ratification...the Convention is fully obligatory to Albania without any reservation or declaration."¹ Domestic legislation to bring into effect the penal sanctions required for implementation is being prepared.

On 25 May 2000 the Council of Ministers announced "Decision No. 269" including the following key elements: all stockpiled antipersonnel mines will be destroyed by 2004; all the areas of the Republic of Albania, infected with mines, must be demined by 2009; the Ministry of Defense is to present to the Council of Ministers the program and finances needed carry out these obligations, three months after this law comes into effect; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other state institutions will seek financial and technological support to meet these MBT obligations, and aid for mine victims as well. The decree enters into force after its publication in the "Official Paper."² The Chief of the Albanian EOD organization confirmed that the Council of Ministers has already prepared projects toward the implementation of the MBT.³

The government attended the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the MBT in May 1999. Government representatives have participated in one meeting each of the

¹ Interview with Armand Skapi, UN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tirana, 1 March 2000.

² Decision dated 25.05.2000-06-17 [sic] on Prohibition Of The Use, Storage, Production And Transfer Of Antipersonnel Mines And Their Destruction, signed by Prime Minister Ilir Meta and Defense Minister Luan Hajdaraga (unofficial translation).

³ Interviews with Ismet Miftari, Chief of Albanian EOD, Tirana, 6 April, 15 May, 16 June 2000; Draft Project of Republic of Albania-Ottawa Treaty related Ammunition Demilitarization, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Activities.

Standing Committees of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, Mine Clearance and General Status and Operation of the Convention. Albanian representatives also participated in the second Regional Conference on Landmines in Croatia in June 1999, and in the third regional conference in Slovenia in June 2000.

In December 1999, Albania voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B urging full implementation of the MBT, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions. *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* was well-received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which stated that the report “notes a survey on the history of using and producing the landmines from Albania, the current situation and problems caused by landmines which were [previously not] known...”⁴

NGO activity remains strong in Albania. In 1997 the AntiMining Friends Committee (AMFC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) started an awareness campaign focused on unexploded ordnance (UXO) and ammunition spread across the country. After the Regional Conference in Budapest in March 1998, efforts of the AMFC concentrated on promoting the Mine Ban Treaty with the general public and the authorities.

Albania is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but at the urging of the ICRC, the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs are now considering formal adherence to the CCW and its protocols.

Production

According to official sources AP mines have not been produced in Albania since 1990 or 1991.⁵ No funding is available so previous AP mine production facilities scheduled for conversion to civilian production simply remain closed. One facility formerly owned by the Ministry of Defense has been partially privatized and continues to produce explosives for commercial purposes.⁶

Transfer

Albania received large numbers of mines from the Soviet Union and China prior to 1975.⁷ There was no official transfer of AP mines during the Kosovo crisis in early 1999,⁸ but there were press reports of some groups of people being killed while transferring ammunition to Kosovo. Russian AP mines and Chinese antitank mines have been found in Kosovo, which may have been transferred from Albania.⁹

⁴ Interview with Armand Skapi, UN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tirana, 1 March 2000.

⁵ Ibid; Report of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Albania to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 23 November 1999, p. 3; for details of Albania's production of AP mines before 1990, see: International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p. 699.

⁶ Interviews with Ismet Miftari, Chief of Albanian EOD, Tirana, 6 April, 15 May 2000. Also, Email to LM/HRW by William Hunt, Senior Consultant, NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Ammunition Storage Training Team (NATO EODASTT), 16 July 2000.

⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 699-700, for details.

⁸ Interviews with Ismet Miftari, Chief of Albanian EOD, Tirana, 6 April, 15 May 2000.

⁹ UNMACC Threat / Factsheet No. 1, 27 October 1999.

Stockpile and Destruction

The Deputy Minister of Defense stated that “after the ratification of the Ottawa Treaty Albania is obliged to destroy the stockpile and to clear the mine fields as well as hot spots contaminated by UXO.”¹⁰ A considerable stockpile of AP mines is held by the Albanian Armed Forces. During 1999, a new inventory took place, with results that have been reported on two recent occasions (with slight differences):

Type of AP Mine	Selanik Conference May 2000 ¹¹	SCE Meeting May 2000 ¹²
Mine AP Wood	240,213	545,270 (type PMD-6)
Mine AP Bakelite	296,303	
Mine AP Fragmentation	937,131	930,050 (type POMZ-2)
Mine AP Fibre	127,765	132,100 (type PMN)
Total	1,601,412	1,607,420

The mines are of Russian, Chinese and Albanian production. Locally manufactured mines are of the PMD-6, POMZ-2 and PMN types. They are stored in eighty areas covering 120 depots.¹³

A plan for destruction of the stockpile with the assistance of the NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Ammunition Storage and Training Team (EODASTT) has been prepared.¹⁴ This will involve dismantling the PMD-6 and POMZ-2 mines, smelting their metal parts, re-using the explosives for demining, demolition or other commercial purposes, while burying the other materials, and destroying the PMN mines by demolition. It is proposed that this activity will be undertaken at nine regional locations based on selected ammunition storage facilities.

This plan will take up to two years to complete, at an estimated cost of US\$ 561,600, which, Deputy Defense Minister Ilir Boçka told the SCE on Stockpile Destruction in May 2000, is not “readily identifiable in our budget. Currently our funds re allocated to safety related issues involving the destruction of life-threatening, dangerous ammunition.... Albania will require considerable support in order to implement its plan.”¹⁵ He stated that Albania had started to destroy its AP mine

¹⁰ Interview with Ilir Boçka, Chairman of AMAC and Deputy Minister of Defense, Tirana, 22 March 1999.

¹¹ Presentation by Ismet Miftari, Chief of Albanian EOD, at conference *Action Against APMs*, Selanik, 3-4 May 2000.

¹² Briefing Notes, Deputy Minister of Defense and Chairman of AMAC Ilir Boçka, presentation to the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000. (Paper distributed as “Ottawa Treaty and Related Ammunition Demilitarisation, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Activities.”)

¹³ Presentation by Ismet Miftari, Selanik, 3-4 May 2000.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Briefing Notes, Deputy Defense Minister Ilir Boçka, SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000.

stockpile—a total of 8,400 thus far. In conclusion, Deputy Minister Bocka informed the SCE in May 2000:

Even in view of Albania's difficulties, this Committee and the International community should be aware that:

- Albania places the destruction of its Antipersonnel Mines high on its political agenda.
- The Albanian Government is confident that it is able to exercise appropriate control to ensure full cooperation of its Armed Forces in the implementation of its plans to carry out demilitarisation of Antipersonnel Mines.
- Our plans for the demilitarisation of our stockpile have been considered in terms of cost effectiveness, but also in terms of environmental aspects, socioeconomic factors and the expertise and technology currently available to Albania.
- Finally, Albania welcomes verification of its stockpile and the monitoring of the process and progress of its demilitarisation program by the Nation Members of this Committee and International Community at large.¹⁶

Use and Landmine Problem

During widespread rioting in early 1997, the population looted an estimated 600,000 antipersonnel mines from stockpiles.¹⁷ How many mines remain today in private hands is not known. Some of these stolen mines have been used for private purposes, for example mine explosive is used for fishing.

When the government signed the MBT on 8 September 1998 the Albanian Armed Forces were ordered not to use AP mines.¹⁸ Despite Serbian incursions into Albania in early 1999 “even during the Kosovo crisis Albania did not mine its borders, acknowledging the problems they would cause in a post conflict situation.”¹⁹

However, the border was mined and contaminated with UXO, including Albanian territory, by Serb forces. Artillery and ABABEL-50 multiple launch rocket systems contaminated sixteen areas (140 hectares) with unexploded KB-1 bomblets up to 25 kilometers inside Albanian territory. Additionally, the entire Albania-Kosovo 80 km-long border is affected by antipersonnel and antitank mines laid by Serbian forces during border incursions. The total area contaminated is approximately 1,400 hectares, in the districts of Tropoja, Kukes and Has.

The mines are mostly located around approaches to border crossing-points, but nearby agricultural areas, grazing land and villages are also contaminated. The mines

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Interviews with Ismet Miftari, Chief of Albanian EOD, Tirana, 6 April, 15 May 2000.

¹⁸ For past instances of AP mines used by Albania and by others on Albanian territory, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 701.

¹⁹ Briefing Notes, Ilir Bocka, SCE, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000; interviews with Ismet Miftari, April and 15 May 2000.

identified include PMA-1, PMA-2, PMR and TMA-5 types, which have been found up to 400 meters inside the border.²⁰

A villager from Dobruna, a village in the Has district described what happened on one occasion: "We were evacuated from our village. Serbs set fire to our houses and mined the whole area of the border. When we went back home to start our life again 150 meters behind my house I stepped on two landmines and as you can see I lost both legs."²¹

There are no reports of the border with Montenegro being mined.

These recent events have seriously aggravated what were the already substantial dangers and difficulties existing in much of Albania as a result of the 1997 riots. Explosions in thirty-eight depots, including fifteen major incidents, involving over 6,000 tons of explosives and ammunition of all types killed and injured many people, and contaminated large areas of land with UXO. The fifteen "hot spot" areas of gross contamination covered some 220 hectares of land.²²

Looting of ammunition depots, abandonment of looted ordnance including AP mines, private use, and the widespread use of AP mines to protect official buildings, added to this problem. Considerable socio-economic problems as well as physical danger have been caused by these successive phases of mine/UXO contamination.²³

"Weapons in Exchange for Development," a pilot UNDP program in 1999 in the district of Gramsh, aimed to collect weapons (including mines) and ammunition held by the population since 1997. This was completed at a cost of \$1,300,000, considered very successful and there are plans for it to be implemented in other districts.²⁴

Mine Action

With respect to the mine problem related to 1997 difficulties, six of the fifteen "hot spot" areas, amounting to some forty hectares of land, have been cleared of hazardous ammunition and related scrap.²⁵

With respect to the problem in the north related to Kosovo, the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) EOD organization conducted a Level 1 survey in August and September 1999, with the assistance of CARE International, to identify mine-contaminated areas. Some 1,400 hectares of land were assessed as potentially mined.²⁶ The AAF EOD team marked minefields along 120 kilometers of the northern border in August-September 1999 using 5,000 markers contributed by UNICEF. Due to theft of minefield markers and the damage caused by a hard winter, the AAF repeated this process in April and May 2000.²⁷

²⁰ Ibid; Presentation by Ismet Miftari, Selanik, 3-4 May 2000.

²¹ Interview with a mine survivor, Dobruna, Has District, 3 December 1999.

²² Briefing Notes, SCE, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000.

²³ Ibid.; *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 701-702.

²⁴ It has already been replicated in the Peshkopi and Elbasan districts. Email to LM/HRW by William Hunt, Senior Consultant, NATO EODASTT, 16 July 2000.

²⁵ Briefing Notes, SCE, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Email to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch by William Hunt, Senior Consultant, NATO EODASTT, 16 July 2000.

Since March 1999 the AAF EOD has maintained a constant operation to clear the hot spots with guidance provided by NATO-employed advisory staff. Protection equipment, detectors and some other relevant materials have been provided by NATO countries, principally Italy, Switzerland, UK and US.²⁸

Sixteen areas affected by KB-1 bomblets were cleared by the AAF EOD except where coincidental with mine contamination; approximately 140 hectares of land has been cleared and 2,700 bomblets destroyed.²⁹

On the 8 October 1999 the Albanian Mines Action Committee (AMAC) was founded, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister of Defense. The Committee is made up of representatives of the UN Development Program, UNICEF, the Emergency Management group and the Ministry for Local Government. The overall aims of AMAC are to obtain funding for humanitarian mine action and mine clearance, to carry out mine/UXO clearance and supervise these operations in order to optimize their impact.

To implement AMAC policy, the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) was formed and effectively functions as the national Mine Action Center. Albanian authorities continue to make potential donor-countries aware of the extent and nature of the landmine/UXO problem in the country and seek financial and materiel support. AMAC has requested the Albanian EOD organization to prepare further demining projects in anticipation of interest by a funding organization.

All the information gathered regarding minefields, minefield marking, mine victims, mine awareness, and fundraising is centralized at the AMAE. Maps of minefields, marking signs and information about mine victims are accessible on a computer database (system provide by the United States). For the AMAE office until March 2000 contributions totaling \$7,670 have been made by the UNDP (\$4,445), Royal Norwegian Embassy (\$725) and CARE International (\$2,500). The government of Canada will meet the administrative costs of the AMAE from July 2000 through March 2001, after which the Swiss government has pledged support until March 2005.³⁰

RONCO, a U.S. demining company arrived in Albania in early May to carry out an assessment, and has identified one contaminated area at Qafe Prushe, a border crossing point in Has District where clearance operations commenced in June, supported by a grant of \$2 million from the US Department of Defense through Slovenia's International Trust Fund. On 8 June the AMAE announced "the commencement of demining in Albania." RONCO has been contracted "to work in Qafe Prush (Has) and Qafe Morine (Tropoja) which are two priority areas defined by AMAC and AMAE.... The company has two demining teams and mine detective dogs that have been based in the town of Kruma.... The Albanian Mines Action Executive is responsible to supervise the demining operations. The company will continue demining next year too. It is worth mentioning that local inhabitants welcomed the company hoping that the number of casualties will drop. One day before the company commenced demining two incidents occurred. Two men crossing the Albanian border got injured. One lost his leg and the other was injured

²⁸ Interview with Major Besim Canga, Chief of the field EOD Team, Gjeroven, Berat, 5 May 2000. Also, Email to LM/HRW by William Hunt, Senior Consultant, NATO EODASTT, 16 July 2000.

²⁹ Briefing Notes, SCE, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000.

³⁰ Email to LM/HRW by William Hunt, Senior Consultant, NATO EODASTT, 16 July 2000.

in his face.”³¹ In July Germany announced a grant of DM 1.2 million to the German NGO HELP for demining in Albania.³²

It is very important to start the mine clearance in the border regions because in many areas, for the local population the nearest villages are in Kosovo which can be reached only by illegal crossings, as using the official crossing points takes much longer. To re-open these unofficial paths, local Albanians have preferred to demine the routes themselves. Also, in the summer of 1999 there were rumors about landmines being collected by villagers for resale, with articles about this in the local media. The actual practice seems to have been very small-scale, but the publicity itself served to encourage a very dangerous activity.

Mine Awareness

In northern Albania the AMAE is coordinating the ICRC and CARE mine awareness programs. The CARE program includes training of teachers in three northern districts to implement mine awareness programs in schools, as well as training of committees in villages to increase mine awareness. The CARE budget ended in January 2000 but UNICEF sponsored the work in February and March, and UNDP in April and May. Two teams of three instructors are based in Kukes and Has districts, and two instructors may be located in Tropoja who will be supervised from Kukes.

The ICRC has a community-based approach to mine awareness, which relies on the network of Albanian Red Cross volunteers. Volunteers coming from the problem areas are trained as instructors, who then teach mine awareness to the general public, including children, and combine this with the distribution of food in the war affected border-villages because this increases the impact of the mine awareness activities. There are three teams of five instructors, who also try to identify new mine victims. Three instructors in other towns where children are more exposed to ammunition and UXO have also made presentations relevant to those circumstances. This program, in which the Albanian Red Cross takes a leading role, started in October 1999. UNICEF supported some public events as lead-agency and trained teachers from all over Albania and representatives from the Youth Council in mine awareness. CARE and the ICRC provided trainers for these courses. The Balkan Sun Flowers organization is also involved in a mine/UXO awareness program, with UNICEF support.

Survivor Assistance

A record of mine victims is maintained by AMAE and is publicly available. Seven military personnel have been injured while marking fields or on border patrol or other duties.³³ After the Kosovo crisis the number of civilian mine victims increased significantly. By early July 2000 AMAE had recorded eighty-five incidents, resulting in

³¹ “Demining Begins in Albania,” AMAE Press Release, 8 June 2000.

³² Email to LM/HRW by William Hunt, Senior Consultant, NATO EODASTT, 16 July 2000, citing AMAE press conference, July 2000. Mine Awareness Coordination Meeting, Albania, 16 June 2000; email to the ICBL from UNICEF-Albania, 16 June 2000.

³³ Report to the OSCE, 23 November 1999, p. 3.

eighteen dead and 118 injured.³⁴ In addition to the two recent casualties mentioned by AMAE when announcing the RONCO contract, several children in the eastern town of Peshkopi in the district of Dibra were severely injured and one child was killed.³⁵

In general, most of the casualties were teenagers curious about what might be in prohibited areas. Many people were injured while attending grazing animals or crossing the borders illegally; some were killed or injured trying to rescue other people injured by mines. Illegal border-crossing is especially common in the Tropoja district where many people have no identification papers; because KFOR troops cannot allow them to cross the border without identification papers, the villagers use other routes through mined areas. The ICRC has raised this issue with the AMAE for the authorities' urgent attention.

State facilities provide immediate medical aid and treatment to mine victims. A one-year pension is available to people injured in the performance of their duties, such as border policeman or soldiers marking minefields, and approximately \$80 per month (equivalent to monthly salary in the public sector) to disabled people, including mine victims. There is no statutory obligation to provide prostheses to amputees.

Albania's Prosthesis Center (located in the Military Hospital) collaborates closely with the ICRC, which along with the Swiss Red Cross, provides raw materials for the production of artificial limbs. There is an agreement between the Center's Director and the ICRC to give priority to mine survivors. Mine awareness instructors identify lower and upper leg amputees, then a medical specialist determines which of the survivors is ready for measurement. The ICRC then transports them to Tirana, accompanied by a relative, for the first phase of the fitting process, and then three weeks later for the final phase. The ICRC covers all costs, including accommodation and a per diem during the period needed for fitting. When the process is finished the ICRC returns the survivors to their villages. The Albanian government granted the Center \$40,000 for 1999; any grant for 2000 is not known at present.

From April 1999 until the end of the year, Handicap International had an operation in Durres to provide psychological support to the victims of war for the Kosovar refugees. In Shkoder, HI distributed thousands pairs of shoes, orthopaedic devices, crutches and wheelchairs.

³⁴ Email to LM/HRW by William Hunt, Senior Consultant, NATO EODASTT, 16 July 2000. AMAE database on mine/UXO incidents; AMAE Press Release, 8 June 2000.

³⁵ Mine Awareness Coordination Meeting, Albania, 16 June 2000; email to the ICBL from UNICEF-Albania, 16 June 2000.

ANDORRA

Andorra signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, and deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on 29 June 1998. According to Andorra's Ambassador to the UN, Juli Minoves, the treaty is a good and necessary instrument to completely ban antipersonnel mines in the near future, and he insists that it should be signed and ratified as soon as possible by those governments that have not yet done so.¹

Andorra has not passed on any implementation legislation apart from the ratification instrument. Prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, Andorra did not have any domestic legislation specifically on mines, but it did have a decree on arms, dated 3 July 1989. Chapter 1, section 3, article 2 of the decree prohibits the use of antipersonnel mines in Andorran territory.

Andorra has not submitted its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report to the United Nations, which was due 27 August 1999. The reason given is that Andorra lacks the administrative resources to service all its increasing international commitments. This is also given as the reason why Andorra was not able to attend the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique in May 1999 or attend the subsequent meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts in Geneva. However, Ambassador Minoves states that the Article 7 report will be available shortly, and Andorra has recently opened a diplomatic chapter in Geneva.

Andorra voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999 in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Andorra has made numerous public statements promoting the treaty. Ambassador Minoves considers "an outrage the various new deployments, and allegations of new deployments being made of APMs around the world."

Andorra has not yet ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons, or the Amended Protocol II on mines, but will shortly do so. It is in favor of negotiating a ban on mine transfers in the Conference on Disarmament.

Andorra has not produced, stockpiled or used antipersonnel mines, and its territory is not mine-affected. Andorra does not have any military forces.

Although Andorra is not a big country, it has contributed to humanitarian action programs, especially to the UN Trust Fund (US\$ 10,000 in 1998, US\$ 10,500 in 1999, with US\$ 20,000 budgeted for 2000). The government is currently studying the possibility of funding training programs for deminers.

AUSTRIA

Key developments since March 1999: Austria continued to play an active role in promoting universalization and effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It developed the reporting format for Article 7 reports, and has been an important player in

¹ Telephone interview and correspondence with Ambassador Juli Minoves, 14 January 2000. All information cited comes from this source.

the intersessional work program. The government has approved an increase in mine action funding to US\$2 million in 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Austria signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on 29 June 1998. The Austrian Federal Law comprehensively banning AP mines entered into force on 1 January 1997, and, with penal sanctions for violations, served as the implementing legislation for the MBT in Austria.¹ Since the Austrian government was already committed to a total ban on AP mines, it was able to play a crucial role during the "Ottawa Process," including drafting the successive working texts of the Treaty.

Austria submitted its initial Article 7 report on 29 July, covering the short period from 1 March 1999 - 30 April 1999. Its second report, covering 30 April to 31 December 1999, was submitted on 28 April 2000; there was no updated information to report.

For many years Austria has made efforts to sensitize other countries to the landmine issue, and to universalize the MBT by encouraging more countries to join and fully implement its provisions. During 1999 the Austrian government made particular efforts to achieve a coordinated EU policy on AP mines, and also issued a number of statements condemning landmine use, particularly by the Yugoslav army in Kosovo. The Foreign Ministry believes these efforts have helped to increase the number of countries ratifying the MBT.²

Austria took the lead in developing the format for Article 7 reporting, which was then adopted at the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in Maputo in May 1999.³ The Austrian government welcomed the release of the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* at the FMSP, and considers the information contained in the report as valuable for the regular work in the Foreign Ministry on mine ban issues.⁴

Austrian representatives from Vienna and its permanent mission to the United Nations in Geneva have participated fully in all intersessional meetings of the MBT's Standing Committees of Experts. Austria has contributed in particular to the SCEs on Stockpile Destruction and on the General Status and Operation of the Treaty. At the first SCE meeting on General Status, held in January 2000, Austria was one of the governments that reiterated that under the definitions of the treaty antivehicle mines (AVM) with antihandling devices which function like AP mines – which may explode from an unintentional act of a person -- are banned under the MBT, noting that this is also consistent with the diplomatic record.⁵

¹ Federal Law on the Ban on Anti-personnel Mines, Bundesgesetzblatt I, no. 13/1997.

² Interview with Dr. Gerhard Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lt. Col. Hans Hamberger, Section for Arms Control, Non-proliferation and Verification, Ministry of Defense, Vienna, 20 March 2000.

³ Interview with Dr. Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lt. Col. Hamberger, Ministry of Defense, Vienna, 20 March 2000.

⁴ Interview with Dr. Wernfried Koeffler and Dr. Gerhard Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 19 April 2000.

⁵ Oral statement of the Austrian Delegation, Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, 10-11 January 2000.

On 27 July 1998 Austria ratified Amended Protocol II (1996) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which entered into force for Austria on 27 January 1999.⁶ It submitted the required Article 13 report on 11 October 1999. The government participated in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 1999.

Concerning the possibility of also dealing with AP mines in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Austria has stated recently that it continues to support “all efforts that might contribute to the total elimination of anti-personnel mine world-wide, in all appropriate international fora, including the Conference on Disarmament, provided these efforts are in support of and consistent with the Ottawa Convention.”⁷

Production

Production, export and use of AP mines were formally renounced in September 1995 under a prohibition order that was later superseded by the national legislation. The Austrian Chamber of Commerce has stated on several occasions that there has been no production of AP mines in Austria since 1945.⁸ This does not include command detonated directional fragmentation (Claymore-type) mines, which are not banned by the MBT, and which continue to be produced today.⁹

Command detonated mines (or “charges” as they are now called in Austria) are considered AP mines under the treaty if used with a tripwire. The Chamber of Commerce stated early in 1999 that the Austrian Federal Army holds only command-detonated directional fragmentation charges.¹⁰ More recently, the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs confirmed that stocks of directional fragmentation AP mines in the Austrian Federal Army have been modified by closing the inlet for the AP mine fuse to prohibit use in tripwire mode.¹¹ Dynamit Nobel Wien issued the following statement on 9 May 2000:

The Company DNW/DNG produces and distributes for more than 15 years Directional Fragmentation Charges and Anti Vehicle Charges. Since 1991 over 180,000 charges of this kind have been manufactured and delivered

⁶ Bundesgesetzblatt III, no. 17/1999.

⁷ Report of the Permanent Mission of Austria to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1 December 1999, p. 2.

⁸ Interview with Dieter Skalla, Department for Defense Economy, Chamber of Commerce, 2 March 1999; Letter from the Austrian Chamber of Commerce to Austrian Aid for Mine Victims, 8 December 1997.

⁹ Eddie Banks, *Antipersonnel Mines: Recognizing and Disarming*, (London: Brassey's, 1997), pp. 45-59; annual volumes of *Jane's Military Vehicles and Logistics*; United States Department of Defense database ((<http://www.demining.brtrc.com>); Norwegian People's Aid database (www.angola.npaid.org/minelist); both accessed 25 May 2000. These sources indicate Austria produced up to fifteen types of directional fragmentation mines, one of which has been found in Angola.

¹⁰ Telephone interview with Dieter Skalla, Chamber of Commerce, 2 March 1999.

¹¹ Interview with Dr. Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lt. Col. Hamberger, Ministry of Defense, Vienna, 20 March 2000, and subsequent telephone interviews and emails, March-April 2000.

mainly to European countries. Only minor test quantities have been delivered into other countries outside Europe. Although the above-mentioned products have not been banned under the Mine Ban Treaty of Dec. 3rd 1997, DNG/DNW has acknowledged the worries and the meaning of the treaty and began to modify its products in a way that they were even succeeding the requirements of the 1997 treaty.

- In future there will be no production, sales or trade with mechanical firing devices that can be tripwire operated.

- Development of ignition systems that can only be command operated.

- Since 1997 the DFC 19/29 are furnished with one firing well only (previously two wells) with a fixed built in electrical detonator to prohibit trip wire operation.

DNG/DNW fully supports the Austrian Government with its obligation to observe the keeping of the 97 Treaty and provides periodically information on its activities.¹²

Transfer

The transfer of AP mines is banned in Austria under the MBT and the preceding national legislation. Any import, export or transfer of any type of mine is tied to a strict system of licenses under the War Material Act. The Federal Ministry of the Interior, under whose jurisdiction this falls, stated initially that there were no requests for transfer licenses during 1999 and up to April 2000.¹³ Dynamit Nobel Wien indicated that it submitted a request for an export license in July 1999, which has not been processed.¹⁴ The Ministry of the Interior has since confirmed that one application was received in 1999, which has not been processed.¹⁵ The Chamber of Commerce states that there is strict control and monitoring of sales of directional fragmentation mines/charges, including strict checks on end-use; any such mines exported have been adapted so that they can only be command-detonated and re-conversion for use with tripwires is ruled out.¹⁶

A consignment of directional fragmentation mines/charges was exported to Norway in 1997.¹⁷ The official Austrian response is that the license to export these was issued before 1996 and that the mines were not prohibited by the Austrian federal law.¹⁸ This has been the subject of parliamentary questions to all relevant Ministers; they stated that

¹² Letter from H Richter, Managing Director, Dynamit Nobel Wien, to Austrian Aid for Mine Victims, 8 May 2000.

¹³ Interview with Dr. Schnabl, Ministry of the Interior, Vienna, 30 March 2000.

¹⁴ Interview with Herr Richter, Director of Dynamit Nobel Wien, Vienna, 8 May 2000.

¹⁵ Telephone message from Dr. Schnabl, Ministry of the Interior, 22 May 2000.

¹⁶ Interview with Dr. Lohberger, Chamber of Commerce, Vienna, 28 March 2000; Dr. Lohberger was formerly an executive at Dynamit Nobel Graz.

¹⁷ Nils-Inge Kruhag, "Norges store minebloff," *Dagbladet* (Norwegian daily newspaper), 28 August 1997.

¹⁸ Interviews with Dr. Koeffler and Dr. Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 19 April 2000, and with Dr. Schnabl, Ministry of the Interior, Vienna, 30 March 2000; Nils-Inge Kruhag, "Norges store minebloff," 28 August 1997.

the decision was taken in accordance with the law applicable at the time.¹⁹ A meeting between the Legal Division of Austrian Red Cross, the Austrian Federal Army, Ministry of the Interior, Dynamit Nobel Graz, Irmtraud Karlsson MP and the Chamber of Commerce (at the latter's invitation) revealed that directional fragmentation AP mines had been exported to Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Brazil and the Netherlands; the export to Norway was in spring 1997; only those AP mines delivered to Brazil were physically adapted to prevent tripwire/victim-activation. The representative from the Ministry of the Interior considered that both tripwire-activated and command-detonated AP mines were exempted from prohibition under Austrian law; hence the permit for their export to Norway. This meeting took place on 3 December 1997, the same day that the MBT opened for signature in Ottawa.²⁰

Official sources state that the dissemination of production and export data on armaments is protected by Austrian law²¹ (although Dynamit Nobel Wien has in fact released some such data on the export of directional fragmentation mines/charges as noted above). The Austrian government has been asked to reconsider this and provide information in the spirit of transparency embodied in the MBT, which Austria did so much to bring about.²²

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that, as a neutral country, Austria is keen to prevent any violations of the MBT and has denied transit to NATO countries either across its territory or through its airspace of any transport containing any weapons, in spite of NATO requests to do so during the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia.²³

Stockpile and Destruction

The Austrian government has stated that the "destruction of all anti-personnel mines belonging to the armed forces has been completed in 1996."²⁴ Austria's AP mine stocks included 116,000 US M14 mines, classified in Austria as Schuetzenminen M14, which were destroyed by the end of 1995.²⁵

The current stockpile of mines includes directional fragmentation charges modified to be MBT-compliant, and antivehicle mines. The quantities, dates and details of modification of these mines are not included in either of Austria's two Article 7 reports. In this respect Austria adheres strictly to the requirement of the reporting format for

¹⁹ Interview with Dr. Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 4 May 2000.

²⁰ Alexander Lang, *Report* 18 December 1997 of meeting, Felixdorf, 3 December 1997.

²¹ Interview with Dr. Alfred Schnabl, Head of Department II/13 (War Materials), Ministry of the Interior, Vienna, 30 March 2000; Interview with Dr. Rudolph Lohberger, Chamber of Commerce, Vienna, 28 March 2000.

²² Interview with Dr. Koeffler and Dr. Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 19 April 2000.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ MBT, Article 7 report, submitted on 29 July 1999, covering 1 March 1999-30 April 1999.

²⁵ Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Hamberger, Ministry of Defense, 4 March 1999 and with Alexander Lang, Legal Division, Austrian Red Cross, 8 June 2000; Alexander Lang, "Report of meeting between the Austrian Red Cross, Federal Army, Dynamit Nobel Graz, Chamber of Commerce, Ministry of the Interior, and Irmtraud Karlsson MP, Felixdorf, 3 December 1997," 18 December 1997.

Article 7 for details of “APMs destroyed after entry into force” (Form G). However, as these directional fragmentation charges previously formed part of the AP mine stockpile, it would enhance the effectiveness of Article 7 as a transparency measure if Austria reported information the details of modifications to the weapons under the section for “supplemental information.”

On the topic of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that may function as antipersonnel mines, and therefore be prohibited by the MBT, the Ministry of Defense stated in May 2000 that it “possesses only such types of anti-tank mines (including antivehicle mines) as are compatible with the content of the agreement concerning the ban on the deployment, stockpiling, manufacture and transfer of APMs and their destruction (so-called Ottawa Convention), as well as other national regulations and international obligations.”²⁶

Other sources list several Austrian antivehicle mines with antihandling devices of potential concern: the ATM 6, ATM 7, ATM 2000E, PM 83 and Pz MI 85 M, all because of sensitive fuzing; the AVM, SCRAM 95, SMI 21/11C and SMI 22/7C because of IR sensors; the Model 67 and Model 75 because of secondary fuze wells for antihandling devices, and finally the PM 3000, which possibly has a built-in antihandling device.²⁷

The Ministry of Defense states, “The mines of types PM 83 and PzMi 85M, which may be equipped with tilt rod fuses, are not known here. For this reason the Ministry of Defense cannot give an opinion on whether they would be permitted in agreement with the Austrian Republic's international legal obligations.”²⁸ It does not mention the other mines of concern.

The ICBL has called upon states parties to report under Article 7 on Claymore mines and steps taken to insure command detonation only as well as information on antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that may function as AP mines.²⁹

Mine Action and Victim Assistance

In addition to playing a leading role in the Ottawa Process, the Austrian government has also viewed mine action and victim assistance as critical elements of the ban movement. Speaking at the FMSP in Maputo in May 1999, Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner³⁰ (who was State Secretary for Foreign Affairs at the time and has since become Foreign Minister) said, “In our assessment there is not only a need for increased funding for mine action, but simultaneously for further improvement in international co-ordination and co-operation. We support the central co-ordinating role of the United Nations, in particular through the United Nations Mine Action Service, and acknowledge

²⁶ Letter from Lt. Col. Hamberger, Ministry of Defense, 9 May 2000.

²⁷ Mark Hiznay and Stephen Goose, Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” Prepared for the SCE on General Status of the Convention, Geneva, 10-11 January 2000, p. 4.

²⁸ Letter from Lt. Col. Hamberger, Ministry of Defense, 9 May 2000.

²⁹ ICBL letter to Foreign Minister, 20 December 1999, in preparation for the January 2000 SCE on General Status and Operation of the Treaty.

³⁰ Interview with Foreign Minister Ferrero-Waldner, Vienna, 28 March 2000. Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner, whose Ministry is in charge of the funding of these projects, is herself the daughter of a landmine victim. She has given personal assurances that the government remains committed to outlawing AP mines worldwide.

the first results of their as well as our common efforts. However, we view strengthening co-ordination and co-operation as an on-going endeavour that still offers considerable potential for refinement.”³¹

The draft Federal Budget for 2000 introduced a specific budget line for humanitarian mine action and increased the proposed sum for assistance from the previous annual figure (since 1996) of US\$1.25 million (ATS 18 million) to \$2 million (ATS 30 million). This was subsequently approved by the government. The Foreign Ministry is currently reviewing its policy on mine action funding and victim assistance, to be finalized in August 2000.³²

In recent years Austria has supported a wide range of mine action programs, via direct financial assistance and in-kind contributions, including donations to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations, and research and development into technologies related to demining. In April 2000, the Foreign Minister said that in the past “Austria has supported programs and projects in the countries which are the focus of Austrian Development Co-operation. These are Mozambique, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia... The co-operation in the field of mine action with internationally recognized NGOs such as Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group or Norwegian People's Aid has proved very helpful in the past. There is also a need to promote the relevant activities within the framework of the UN.”³³ Governmental financial and in-kind contributions to mine action and victim assistance in 1999 and 2000 are in Table 1.

³¹ Speech by Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3 May 1999.

³² Interview with Dr. Koeffler and Dr. Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 19 April 2000.

³³ Answer to a Parliamentary Question by Foreign Minister Ferrero-Waldner, 12 April 2000.

Table 1. Austrian governmental financial and in-kind contributions to mine action and victim assistance 1999-2000.³⁴

Country	Year	Donations in ATS (US\$)	Project
Namibia	1998-1999	300,000	Support to NGO demining program (MAG)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1999	(\$419,171)	Support NGO demining program (NPA) in Sarajevo
Cambodia	1999	(\$308,166)	Support to NGO demining program in Kompong Thom (MAG)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1999	(\$99,000)	Support NGO demining program (HI) in Bihac
Cambodia	2000	(\$267,913)	Support to NGO demining activities (MAG) in Kompong Thom
EU Program			
Palestinian Authority	1999	-	EOD-training for 4 Palestinians in Austria
Palestinian Authority	2000	-	Train the trainers program for EOD personnel in West Bank and Gaza.

Additional governmental assistance includes an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team in the Austrian UN peacekeeping and monitoring contingent on the Golan Heights. In Albania, Austria set up a camp and hospital in Skodra to assist refugees from Kosovo who fled there in 1999. This included a team of experts to inform people of the dangers of landmines and increase their mine awareness when they returned home. The Army unit currently stationed with KFOR in Kosovo also has an EOD team, part of whose job it is to train new trainers at a local level.³⁵ As part of its general promotion of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Austrian government provided financial support to delegations from the Cape Verde islands, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Rwanda and Uganda,³⁶ and has supported the Landmine Monitor with grants of \$80,000 in 1999 and again in 2000.³⁷

Governmental support to international organizations in recent years for mine-related activities is summarized in Table 2:

³⁴ Email from Dr. Doujak, Foreign Ministry, 24 May 2000; abbreviations: MAG – Mines Advisory Group, NPA – Norwegian People’s Aid, HI – Handicap International.

³⁵ Interview with Dr. Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lt. Col. Hamberger, Ministry of Defense, Vienna, 20 March 2000.

³⁶ Email from Dr. Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 February 2000.

³⁷ Interview with Dr. Gerhard Doujak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lt. Col. Hans Hamberger, Ministry of Defense, Vienna, 20 March 2000, and telephone interview with Dr. Doujak, 26 April 2000.

Table 2. Austrian governmental support to international organizations for mine-related activities³⁸

Organization	Year	Donations in ATS (US\$)	Project
ICBL	1999	1,000,000	Support for Landmine Monitor
WEU	1999	400,000	1 Expert Geographical Information System for WEU Mine Survey program in Croatia (in kind assistance) (EU Mine Action in Croatia)
ICRC	1999	500,000	Mine awareness program in Kosovo
UNHCR	1999	2,500,000	Mine related activities in Kosovo
Slovenian Trust Fund (ITF)	2000	600,000	Mine action programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Research and Development

The Austrian company Schiebel produces a wide variety of mine detectors and systems. It is currently concentrating on developing the CAMCOPTER, an unmanned, remote controlled mini-plane to detect mines from the air. Initially designed to detect antitank mines, it is now being refined to detect AP mines. Schiebel says it is trying to bring down the cost of the CAMCOPTER in order to put it within reach of humanitarian organizations, either by sale or lease, but to do this military involvement is needed. It considers the EU spending on research and development too little to get results within a short period of around five years.

Schiebel works closely with other research and development efforts, such as the EU FP4-ESPIRIT program whose objectives are set out in a March 2000 draft memoranda.³⁹ It is also involved in the “Angel” project, under Spanish management, which is trying to combine different technologies to create a complete demining system, and in the “Pice” project, mainly funded by Sweden, which aims to develop a hand-held device, which combines a metal detector with ground penetrating radar, to reduce the false alarm rate in mine detection. To date, the Austrian government has provided no funding for this research and development, nor has the EU. Most of the testing is done in cooperation with the United States Army in the USA, the Austrian Army abroad, and elsewhere where demining is being carried out.⁴⁰

Non-governmental Organizations

Austrian NGOs, including Austrian Aid for Mine Victims (AAMV), UNICEF, Care-Austria, the Austrian Red Cross, Caritas-Austria, Dreikonigsaktion, and Friedensburo, support mine action and victim assistance programs in a number of

³⁸ Email from Dr. Doujak, Foreign Ministry, 24 May 2000; abbreviations: UNDP – United Nations Development Program, UNICEF – UN International Children’s Emergency Fund, UNOCHA – UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Action, ICBL – International Campaign to Ban Landmines, WEU – Western Economic Union, ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross, UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ITF – International Trust Fund, EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal, UNMAS – UN Mine Action Service.

³⁹ European Commission, *Humanitarian Demining Technologies: R&D and Support Projects, Draft Document on EU Mine Action*, ref DG INFSO B4, March 2000.

⁴⁰ Interview with Dr. Schrottmayer and Leopold Skalsky, Schiebel, 20 March 2000.

countries. AAMV, Caritas, the Austrian Red Cross and ORF (the Austrian broadcasting company) participated in a national fundraising campaign "Neighbor in Need" to help mine victims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia.

AAMV has helped to raise funds for MAG projects in Cambodia, Namibia and the Sudan. In 1999/2000, it funded victim assistance projects in Cambodia; \$11,740 was donated to Jesuit Services-Cambodia for income generating projects and vocational training, with a further \$3,000 for wheelchairs etc. AAMV has received a donation of \$69,000 (ATS 1 million) from the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra,⁴¹ which has been earmarked for humanitarian mine action and victim assistance support in 2000. The Rotary club in Salzburg-West donated \$4,200 (ATS 60,000) to AAMV for mine action, and Rotary-Klosterneuburg donated \$3,500 (ATS 50,000) for mine action in Kosovo.

The UNICEF-Austria committee produced the German version of the UNICEF film "The Silent Scream" to be shown in schools in Austria. The Austrian Committee has also produced a user's guide and a summary of the MBT adapted for children, with the intention of raising awareness of the problem. The Austrian Committee fundraised for landmine-related UNICEF programs and contributed \$69,000 (ATS 1 million) to mine awareness programs in Bosnia and Croatia, as well as \$61,000 (ATS 886,250) to mine awareness and rehabilitation programs in Mozambique.⁴²

Care-Austria provided \$18,500 (DM 40,000) for a project in 1999 in Gornji Vakuf, central Bosnia, demining the local water supply pipeline and the bus station.⁴³

The Austrian Red Cross provided victim assistance in the Banja Luka area of the Bosnian Serb Republic, from March 1998 to April 2000. By the end of 1999, 170 mine victims were aided and fifty-four artificial limbs supplied. The Red Cross provided the equipment and technology for production of the prostheses, while the local manufacturers provided materials and labor. The cost per artificial limb was \$700 (DM 1,500).

It also supported rehabilitation programs and income-generating projects for mine survivors in Bosnia. The funding of this program was divided into two phases: from March to September 1999, \$45,000 (ATS 650,000) was provided by the 1998 Nachbar in Not (Neighbors in Need) fundraising effort in Austria; from September 1999 to April 2000 the Austrian Red Cross allocated \$69,000 (ATS 1 million) to this project.⁴⁴

Between January 1999 and May 2000, Caritas-Austria contributed ATS 5,096,540 (US\$352,000) to mine victim assistance projects. In Cambodia, it contributed to projects involving mine awareness in Pursat province via the Mines Advisory Group, an income-generating project for women carried out through AAMV, and via help packs, wells and housing grants through the Jesuit Service-Cambodia. In Croatia it funded Caritas-Zagreb for the medical and psychological rehabilitation of mine victims and Caritas-Djakovo for medical rehabilitation and computer training for mine victims. In Bosnia Caritas-Austria funded the Jesuit Service-Bosnia for the rehabilitation of elderly mine victims. In Sudan it co-funded the MAG project for training an OSIL demining team. The Carinthia branch of Caritas funded prostheses and rehabilitation for three Kosovar boys with double

⁴¹ This donation was pledged on stage at the Musikverein on 30 December 1999, after the New Year's Concert, which is traditionally reserved for the Austrian Federal Army.

⁴² Letter from Syla Trsek, UNICEF-Austria, 23 March 2000.

⁴³ Letter from Astrid Wein, Program Coordinator, Care-Austria, 29 February 2000.

⁴⁴ Letter from the Press Department, Austrian Red Cross, 4 February 2000.

amputations, and rebuilt their homes and some others in Kosovo. The Entwicklungshilfe Club contributed \$15,000 to victim assistance funding Jesuit Services-Cambodia projects building bamboo housing, with Misereor as partner-organization, starting in November 1999.

Dreikonigsaktion and other Catholic organizations were involved in several mine-related activities during 1999: the 'Three Kings Action' run by the Catholic Church youth movement, the Cambodia/Laos/Vietnam project (together with the Catholic Women's movement, the Diocesan Committee for the World Church and the development program of the Diocese Graz-Seckau). In previous years Dreikonigsaktion supported the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines with \$17,000 (ATS 250,000) and a rehabilitation project for mine victims in Gulu (Uganda) with \$7,000 (ATS 100,000).⁴⁵

BELGIUM

Key developments since March 1999: Belgium continued to play a leadership role in promoting universalization and effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Belgium served as co-rapporteur of the SCE on General Status of the Convention. The 1995 domestic AP mine ban law was amended to make it permanent. Belgium contributed about US\$ 2.3 million to mine action programs in 1999, plus \$1.4 million for mine action research and development activities.

Mine Ban Policy

In 1995 Belgium was the first country in the world to adopt domestic legislation banning the production, procurement, sale, export, use and custody of antipersonnel mines.¹ It played a central role in the "Ottawa Process" leading to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), which it signed on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 9 July 1998.

Part of the 1995 law was time-limited: Article 3 prevents the State or public administration from acquiring, supplying or using AP mines for five years. Parliament adopted a new law canceling the five-year limitation, which was voted in the Senate on 16 December 1999 unanimously with one abstention and in the Chamber of Representatives on 23 March 2000 unanimously. It was signed by the King of Belgium on 30 March 2000, published on 7 April 2000, and entered into force ten days later.²

Belgium continues to play an active role in the global movement toward the total elimination on antipersonnel mines, stating in April 2000, "Belgium's global action considers three priorities, namely, the promotion of the further universalization of the Convention, the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention and the provision of

⁴⁵ Letter from Johannes Trimmel, Project Leader, Dreikonigsaktion, 9 February 2000.

¹ Law related to anti-personnel mines, booby traps and devices of similar nature, N95-778, 9 March 1995, published in *Le Moniteur* (official publication), 1 April 1995, p. 8225.

² Law relative to the definitive interdiction of antipersonnel landmines, File No. 2-76, 30 March 2000, *Le Moniteur*, 7 April 2000.

assistance to victim countries both in the field and through the development of more efficient techniques.”³

Belgium participated in the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the MBT in May 1999, having been active in the preparation of the meeting with a group of countries, “all of which are ardent supporters of a rapid achievement of the goals of the Convention.”⁴

At the Meeting, in response to allegations of new AP mine use by some States, the Belgian Foreign Minister declared: “I notice with particular worry that in Europe, the Serbian Armed Forces are continuing to use anti-personnel mines. Belgium must insist that an end is brought to this practice as rapidly as possible. Belgium exhorts the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to renounce the use of anti-personnel mines.... While the removal of mines is a nearly superhuman challenge for the international community, it is incomprehensible that new mines are being laid. We have to strongly oppose those responsible for this deviation. As the Presidency of the European Union has underlined, it is even more serious that a signatory State of the Convention such as Angola continues to lay mines. It is with insistence that I have to exhort those countries to review their attitude.”⁵

Belgium was appointed as co-rapporteur (with Zimbabwe) of the Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) on the General Status and Operation of the Convention until the Second Meeting in September 2000, after which it will co-chair this SCE. It has attended all the intersessional SCE meetings of the MBT, with the exception of the second SCE meeting on stockpile destruction.

Belgium helped to develop the reporting format for reports required under Article 7 of the MBT. Although its first report was not required until August 1999, Belgium distributed an initial report at the FMSP in May 1999 to help develop a model of how to comply with the MBT obligations. This report covered from 3 December 1997 to the end of April 1999.⁶ Belgium submitted its second report on 15 August 1999, covering 1 May to 15 August 1999.⁷ A third report was submitted on 27 April 2000, covering the calendar year 1999. With other countries, Belgium is working to spur all States Parties to submit the annual implementation report in a timely manner, and various other initiatives

³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Belgium’s Position Regarding Action Against Anti-personnel Mines, realized in a coordinated approach by the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Michel, the Minister of Defense, André Flahaut, the State Secretary for Cooperation and Development, Eddy Boutmans, and their administrative representatives under the coordination of the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs,” update of the 1999 Position Paper, April 2000, p. 1. Hereafter referred to as: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Belgium’s Position regarding Action against Anti-personnel Mines,” April 2000.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵ Message from Erik Derijcke, Minister of Foreign Affairs, read by Ambassador Jean De Ruyt, Head of the Belgian Delegation, at the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, Mozambique, 3 May 1999.

⁶ Belgium First Article 7 Report, submitted 2 May 1999, covering 3 December 1997 to 30 April 1999.

⁷ Belgium Second Article 7 Report, submitted 15 August 1999, covering 1 May to 15 August 1999.

have been undertaken to help States Parties to fulfil their obligations to report fully progress towards implementation.⁸

During 1999 and early 2000, with the change of government in Belgium, political will regarding the AP mine issue has remained strong and many measures have been taken to promote the universalization and the implementation of the MBT. In March 2000 Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Michel sent letters to twenty-six countries encouraging ratification of the MBT, and explaining the intersessional process of SCE meetings which signatory states are welcome to attend.⁹ Other bilateral actions have been taken during the year, with follow-up in June 2000.¹⁰

An interdepartmental working group established under the coordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has continued to work on promoting the MBT. This special working group is composed of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and the State Secretary for Development Co-operation. The nongovernmental organization Handicap International is regularly invited to attend these meetings.¹¹

Belgium sponsored and voted in favor of the UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999, which called for universalization and full implementation of the MTB; it has supported previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.

On 10 March 1999 Belgium ratified Amended Protocol II (1996)¹² of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and is currently preparing its full implementation.¹³ The government submitted its annual report as required under Article 13 on 8 October 1999, and participated in the First Conference of States Parties to the Protocol in December 1999. The delegation made no statement, as there was a common European Union statement.¹⁴ At informal expert meetings in Geneva prior to the

⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Belgium's Position regarding Action against Anti-personnel Mines," April 2000, p. 2; interview with the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 June 2000.

⁹ Interview with the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 June 2000; Letter from the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Michel to the Director of Handicap International, 18 May 2000; sample letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to signatory states, 23 March 2000.

¹⁰ Interview with the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 June 2000. Also, in an earlier interview the Ministry clarified the origins of an earlier Belgian initiative – the annual reports by each country on their position vis-à-vis landmines to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – started before November 1997, not as had been reported in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 537.

¹¹ Speech of the State Secretary for Development and Co-operation, Landmine Monitor Researchers' Conference, Brussels, 31 January 2000.

¹² CCW Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and other Devices, CCW/CONF.I/partII,8/rev.1, 1996, page 7, available at: www.un.org/plweb-cgi.

¹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Belgium's Position regarding Action against Anti-personnel Mines," April 2000, p. 3.

¹⁴ Interview with the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Conference of CCW States Parties, Geneva, 15-17 December 1999.

Conference, on 31 May and 2 June 2000, the government had spoken in support of the ICBL being invited to participate.¹⁵

Regarding the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Belgian position has evolved since 1999: "In the international fora where this issue will be on the agenda, Belgium will support any additional action effectively contributing to the implementation of the Ottawa Convention, but will never agree to any measure which would be a step back vis-à-vis the Convention."¹⁶ In his opening speech at the CD on 8 June 2000 Ambassador Lint reminded delegates of the importance of universalizing the MBT.¹⁷

Belgium has not replied to the ICBL's inquiries about Belgium's position regarding the use of AP mines by a non-signatory of the MBT during joint military operations,¹⁸ but has confirmed its intention of replying soon.¹⁹ When asked how the government interprets the term "to assist," it answered, "the Ottawa Convention...did not provide for a definition of the term 'assist' in its Article 2 relative to definitions. This being said, any Belgian unit engaged in joint operations outside national territory cannot use anti-personnel mines, in any circumstances, whatever framework and subordination mode this engagement is undergoing. Belgium will also continue to undertake diplomatic and political steps to NATO partners who have not ratified the Ottawa Convention for them to adhere to the Convention."²⁰

Production and Transfer

Belgium has not produced AP mines since demilitarization of facilities in 1990: "Belgium has neither produced or developed anti-personnel mines since PRB (Poudreries Réunies de Belgique) was closed down. The actions in which Belgium participates, whether as a promoter or as a participant, are by no means aimed at conceiving or developing munitions whose operation would be similar to the operation of anti-personnel mines."²¹ Details of past production and transfer were reported in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.²² It is known now that the last years of production were 1983 to 1986. During that period around 112,000 mines were produced, nearly all were AP mines and none was bought by the Belgian Army; all were destined for export.²³

¹⁵ Interview with a representative of the Belgian mission to the UN in Geneva at the informal expert group meeting of the CCW, Geneva, 31 May 2000.

¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Belgium's Position regarding Action against Anti-personnel Mines," April 2000, pp. 2-3.

¹⁷ Opening speech of the Belgian Presidency of the UN Conference on Disarmament by Ambassador Lint, CD Plenary Session, Geneva, 8 June 2000.

¹⁸ ICBL letter to all NATO member-states, 20 September 1999.

¹⁹ Interview with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 June 2000.

²⁰ Letter from Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Louis Michel to Handicap International, 18 May 2000.

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Belgium's Position regarding Action against Anti-personnel Mines," April 2000, p. 1.

²² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 540-543.

²³ Answer by the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Justice and Economic Affairs to a parliamentary question by Senator Hugo Vandenderen, 25 April 1994, ref. 939411403.

Stockpile

Belgium was one of the first countries to complete the destruction of all stocks of AP mines, in September 1997.²⁴ Mines retained for permitted training and development purposes under Article 3.1 of the MBT were reported as 5,980 Type M35Bg as of August 1999, and 5,816 as of 31 December 1999,²⁵ the difference being “due to the consumption for training purposes.”²⁶ In an April 2000 letter to Landmine Monitor, the government cited a figure of 5,770 mines retained for training.²⁷

An issue of particular concern to the ICBL and others has been certain antivehicle mines (AVMs) with antihandling devices that might act like an AP mine and thus be banned under the MBT. This issue has been discussed in various fora, and was a point in the January 2000 meeting of the SCE on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. During that SCE, nine governments spoke to reiterate that under the treaty’s definitions antivehicle mines with antihandling devices which function like AP mines – which may explode from an unintentional act of a person -- are banned under the MBT, noting that this is also consistent with the diplomatic record. These governments supported a proposal put forth at the SCE to form an informal expert group to examine the antivehicle mine issue.²⁸ Belgium was silent on the issue, but later said that it believes that discussion of this subject has to be within the framework of an expert group.²⁹

This issue had been noted in various country reports in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, including that of Belgium where it noted that Belgium possessed antitank mines and “that a certain percentage of the antitank mines retained by the army are equipped with antihandling devices.”³⁰ The response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that “the Landmine Monitor has a mission to monitor the implementation by States Parties of the obligation of the Convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel landmines. The move to open the debate on the problem of mines, notably to antitank mines, should be relevant only if antitank mines were conceived to explode in the presence or the contact of a person. The general references to antitank mines in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* do then not have their place in the context of the mission of the International Landmines Monitor.”³¹

²⁴ In the Landmine Monitor Report 1999 this was reported as November 1997. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has since stated that the destruction officially ended in September although this was only reported in the press in November 1997.

²⁵ Article 7 Reports, submitted 15 August 1999 and 27 April 2000.

²⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Belgium’s Position regarding Action against Anti-personnel Mines,” April 2000, p 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ See, Report to ICBL from Stephen Goose, Human Rights Watch, Chair, ICBL Treaty Working Group, January 2000. (distributed via email).

²⁹ Interview with Belgian delegation, SCE on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 29-30 May 2000.

³⁰ Discussion with Belgian government representative at interdepartmental meeting, 18 March 1999.

³¹ Comments regarding the Belgian report in the Landmine Monitor Report 1999, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2000.

The Belgian antivehicle mines for which ban campaigners have asked clarification with respect to consistency with the MBT are: PRB-III and improved PRB-III, PRB-IV, PRM-ATK-3 (with PRB-M30 anti-lift device), as well as NR 141, NR 201, and PRB-408.³² The Landmine Monitor researcher has received no response regarding these antivehicle mines previously produced by Belgium and therefore possibly remaining in stockpiles. Some States Parties have already opted to destroy certain types of antivehicle mines that function as antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Problem

Today Belgium is not considered to be affected by landmines but is still occasionally affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mines from the two World Wars.³³ The Belgian Armed Forces maintains an explosive ordnance disposal unit, the SEDEE-DOVO, which still operates in Belgium on a regular basis as illustrated in the following statistics: in 1999 there were 3,463 notifications to the Unit and 1,489 in the first five months of 2000.³⁴ Also, in 1999 three incidents resulting in death or injury due to unexploded ordnance were registered by SEDEE-DOVO.³⁵ An engineer with the Braet company contracted to clear the beach of The Panne said in November 1999 that they had found thirty-nine mines and that the beach would be clear by the end of 2000.³⁶

Mine Action Funding³⁷

Belgium contributed approximately BEF 92.66 million (US\$ 2.3 million) to mine action programs in 1999, including victim assistance programs. An additional \$1.4 million was spent on research and development of new mine clearance detection and clearance technologies.

The financial contributions of Belgium to mine action in 1999 can be divided into various categories:

Support to advocacy work and public awareness: BEF 2.3 million (US\$57,500)

- BEF 1.9 million (\$47,500) was contributed to coordination of the Belgian network of the ICBL campaign, operated in cooperation with Handicap International Belgium.

³² See Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," January 2000, p. 4.

³³ GW, "La Maison Minée," Nord Eclair /Mons Borinage, 12 April 1999; "Un arsenal dans l'Eglise de Virton," La Dernière Heure, 28 January 1999; "Landmijn," Het Laatste Nieuws, 10 August 1999; "La place du jeu de balle minée," Le Soir, 26 January 2000; Désiré De Poot, "Verkoper landmijnen zaait paniek op rommelmarkt," Het Gazet van Antwerpen, 26 January 2000; DDP, "te koop aangeboden landmijnen zorgt voor paniek op markt," Het Belang van Limburg, 26 January 2000.

³⁴ Fax from Major Valentin, Head of Service for Removal and Destruction of Explosive Devices (SEDEE-DOVO), 7 June 2000.

³⁵ Fax to Landmine Monitor/Belgium from Major Valentin, 7 June 2000.

³⁶ "Strand van de Panne Kruitvat," Het Volk, 29 November 1999.

³⁷ Unless otherwise specified below, the source of information in this section is: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Belgium's Position regarding Action against Anti-personnel Mines," April 2000, pp. 3-10; all figures given are from the 1999 fiscal year budget except otherwise stated.

- BEF 0.4 million (\$10,000 for promotion of the MBT and advocacy through the production of the Belgian movie *Vanna*.

Support for the promotion and implementation of the MBT: BEF 6 million (\$150,000) over two years

- BEF 3 million (\$75,000) to the UN to make funds rapidly available for the FMSP, to Mozambique for more mine-related activities, and to several countries to enable them to attend the FMSP.³⁸ (from the fiscal year 1998).
- BEF 3 million (\$75,000) to promote the MBT and follow-up the FMSP, including to give countries the opportunity to attend international meetings about AP mines, such as the yearly meetings of States Parties, the intersessional meetings, as well as Landmine Monitor conferences.

Support for monitoring the MBT: BEF 6,350,000 (\$158,750)

To monitor correct implementation of the MBT, the Belgian Government has supported the Landmine Monitor since its creation in 1998. In 1999 BEF 2 million (\$50,000) was granted to support the research conference in Brussels in January/February 2000. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put the Egmont Palace in Brussels and logistic support and BEF 1 million (\$25,000) at the disposal of the ICBL for this event. Another BEF 3,350,000 (\$83,750) was charged to the Development Co-operation budget to enable delegates from developing countries to participate in this conference. The Ministry of Defense also supported the conference in organising an exhibition of AP mines.

Support to mine clearance operations (humanitarian or military cooperation projects): BEF 60,060,000 (\$1,501,500)

- Kosovo, (BEF 10 million, or \$250,000): In cooperation with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and Canada, for a first mine clearance capacity unit in Kosovo which later developed into a Mine Action Center which coordinates civilian mine clearance. A contribution was also given to setting up mobile units in order to react to emergency situations. Contributed via the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund and UNMAS. Belgium has also sent three permanent mine clearance experts to this region, who operate under the KFOR mandate and assist local demining organizations.
- Croatia, (BEF 2 million, or \$50,000): BEF 2 million was donated via the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund and UNMAS to CROMAC, the local mine clearance organization in Croatia, for demining agricultural land in the region of Osijek-Baranja. Three mine clearance experts have been operating under the SFOR mandate and assisting local demining organisations.

³⁸ Speech of Erik Derijcke, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at Press Conference organized by Handicap International on the occasion of the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, 1 March 1999.

- Cambodia, (BEF 31.36 million, or \$784,000): Since 1994 three mine-clearance experts have served as technical advisers to Cambodia Mine Action Center for a development project in three provinces supported financially by Belgium. International financial and technical support provided to this governmental organisation is coordinated by the UN Development Program (UNDP). Technical assistance is provided to enabling the Cambodian staff of the CMAC to ultimately operate independently. BEF 11.36 million (\$284,000) has gone to the financing of this specific project and BEF 20 million (\$500,000) to the UNDP Trust Fund for the development of local mine clearance capabilities.
- Laos: Since April 1998 four mine-clearance experts have served as technical advisers to the UXO LAO (the Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Program) to train Laotian mine-clearance experts in the province of Champassak.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH): in-kind contributions have been made to BH.

Support to victim assistance: BEF 18,008,400 (\$450,210)

- BEF 3 million (\$75,000) for the special appeal launched by the International Committee of the Red Cross (CRC) for the period 2000-2005 for prevention and assistance to victims of AP mines, released in late 1999.
- Financing (BEF 15,008,400, or \$375,210) of a Handicap International project in Cambodia, aimed at the economic and social integration of war victims.

Support to research and development (R&D) of new mine detection and clearance technologies: BEF 51,235,930 (\$1,405,773)

Belgium is involved in many different R&D projects and financial allocations to the main projects are summarized here:

- In 1999 Belgium allocated BEF 14.69 million (US\$ 367,250) to the HUDEM (*H*umanitarian *DE*Mining) program launched in 1997 on the initiative of the Minister for Defense, which looks at ground-penetrating radar, metal detectors and infrared, nuclear quadrupole resonance. This is financed jointly by the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs (International Co-operation Division).
- BEF 14,118,000 (US\$ 352,950) was granted to the Airborne Minefield Detection pilot project, which is co-financed by the European Commission, several EU States and organisations.
- Belgium contributed BEF 6,657,930 (US\$ 166,448) to a minefield detection project in Mozambique which aims to demonstrate under real conditions the feasibility of marking out mined areas.
- The APOPO project researching the use of 'bio-sensors' (African rats) in humanitarian mine-clearance operations continued in 1999, funded by BEF 15,765,000 (US\$ 394,125).
- The Ministry of Defense has contributed in kind to the ESPRIT/HOPE project, which is aimed at developing a portable, multi-sensor mine detection system demonstrator.

- Belgium funded the PARADIS project for BEF 5 million (US\$ 125,000) through the Scientific Policy department budget.

Research and Development³⁹

Belgium has been involved in R&D for new mine-related technologies for several years. The Royal Military Academy is involved in many projects as a research center and as a coordinator for other actors such as universities and schools, private companies, research institutes and others.⁴⁰ Following presentation of the results of the HUDEM (humanitarian demining) project in Berlin on 6-9 June 1999, the Belgian Royal Military Academy has been designated to chair the expert group “Mines and Countermining” for its first task: distance detection of minefields and close detection of individual mines.⁴¹ The Royal Military Academy also has the presidency of the Western European Union Mine Clearance Experts Working Group.⁴²

Such projects, some of which are noted above, are carried out within the framework of national or international consortia, involving academic institutions and industrial circles. Belgium has led and participated in numerous initiatives in the development of mine detection and clearance technologies, including protection equipment, detection by physical methods, satellite minefield mapping, ground-penetrating radar, electronics- and animal-assisted detection, processes for the destruction of devices containing explosives or harmful residues such as chemical munitions.

The Royal Military Academy is involved in the International Program for Test and Evaluation (ITEP) within the framework of a common action between the UN, EU, and the USA, which started in May 1998.⁴³

Casualties/Survivor Assistance

From time to time, accidents occur due to unexploded ordnance. There were three accidents in 1999. The “incidents involved only unexploded ordnance, two due to manipulation by the collectors and ended with one death and one person seriously injured. The third accident occurred while carrying the device, nobody was injured.”⁴⁴

In addition to the contributions noted in the section above, two recent meetings have focused on mine victim assistance. On 25 February 2000 the scientific society of the military medical services organized a colloquium on the political, medical, humanitarian socio-economic and preventive aspects of AP mines, entitled “Anti-personnel Landmines, an Everlasting Problem.”⁴⁵ More than 200 members of the Armed

³⁹ Unless otherwise specified below, the source of information in this section is: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Belgium’s Position regarding Action against Anti-personnel Mines,” April 2000.

⁴⁰ Contribution from the Royal Military Academy to the Definition of National and European Policies in Humanitarian Mine Action Research, April 2000, p. 2.

⁴¹ Contribution from the Royal Military Academy, April 2000, p. 4.

⁴² Ibid, p. 3.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Fax to Landmine Monitor/Belgium from Major Valentin, 7 June 2000.

⁴⁵ Alessandra Vicenzi, “Quand le travail des ONGs rencontre celui de l’Armée,” *Vox*, 11 April 2000; *Annales Medicinæ Militaris Belgicae* 2000, 14 January 2000; Ph.G., “Attention terrain mine,” *Vlan Bruxelles*, 23 February 2000, p. 13.

Forces were present. There were various presentations, focusing on the medical aspects of the treatment of landmine victims. On 24 March 2000 a benefit gala in favor of Handicap International's aid to landmine victims was organized under the patronage of Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg, and others.

NGO Activity

In 1999 and 2000 various activities have been organized around the mine issue to keep the public informed of developments. To mark entry into force of the MBT on 1 March 1999 a big event was organized in Brussels with the fake mining of a forest and bell ringing. A press conference was held by Handicap International attended by the then- Minister of Foreign Affairs. On 29 April 1999 a press briefing was organized to announce the first Landmine Monitor report, followed by a press release on 3 May 1999 at the time of the FMSP, after which there was a presentation of the report to Belgian NGOs. The *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* was widely distributed in Belgium. The Flemish section of the Belgian Red Cross organised a celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Geneva Convention on 9 May 1999, which the Belgian explosive disposal service SEDEE-DOVO attended and organized a demining demonstration in Sint Niklaas. On 25 September 1999 Handicap International organized a national day of blue laces for landmine victims, with many activities and awareness exhibitions for the public and the SEDEE-DOVO also put on an exhibition on landmines and demining.

The meeting on 31 January-2 February 2000 in Brussels of Landmine Monitor researchers was supported by the Belgian Government and included a press conference organized by Handicap International (HI). This was attended by Eddy Boutmans, State Secretary for Cooperation and Development, Jody Williams, Nobel Peace Laureate and ICBL Ambassador, and the Director General of Handicap International as guest speakers. On 1 March 2000, to celebrate the first anniversary of the MBT entering into force, HI launched a postcard campaign to encourage accession to the Treaty by the United States. The same day, HI representatives met the US Ambassador in Brussels to hand him more than 1300 petitions by landmine victims from around the world. Various other activities on the landmine issue including school and youth activities have been organized during the year.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Key developments since March 1999: BiH's Mine Action Center (BHMIC) reported approximately 3.7 million square meters of land were cleared of mines in 1999 and 573,229 square meters surveyed. Mine casualties have decreased significantly, from a high of sixty-nine mine victims per month in 1994, to an average of eight per month in 1999; there were ninety-four new victims in 1999, or 37% fewer than in 1998. BiH completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in November 1999, destroying 460,727 mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 8 September 1998. It appears that two laws are being developed simultaneously in the country, one on national implementing legislation and a law on demining.

On 1 November 1999, a “pre-draft” of proposed legislation, *Law on Application of Convention on Ban on Usage, Build-up, Production and Traffic of Antipersonnel-Pressure Mines and Their Destruction*, was sent from the Federation Ministry of Defense through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Council of Ministers. It addresses national implementation measures as required under Article 9 of the MBT.

The government is also drafting legislation that “will address all issues of demining including the legal requirements committed to under the terms of the Ottawa Convention.”¹ This law on demining was due to be completed by July 2000. Details of its content were not known at the time of writing, but it is believed that it will legalize the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMIC), with its standard operating procedures or technical guidelines becoming law.

The government attended the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) of the MBT in May 1999, where it announced the preparations for implementation legislation and the destruction of its stocks of antipersonnel mines, and possibly its antitank mines.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has participated in the intersessional work of the MBT, attending at least one of the meetings of each of the five Standing Committees of Experts (SCE) in Geneva. BiH’s mine awareness coordinator gave presentations to SCE meetings on mine awareness in September 1999 and March 2000. At the meetings, the government noted that, in addition to the MBT, the Dayton Agreement entails extensive responsibilities for the country in humanitarian demining and stockpile destruction, and that the support of the international donor community is needed to carry out these tasks.² However, BiH expects to achieve full compliance with the provisions of the MBT by the year 2010.³

Bosnia and Herzegovina representatives also participated in the regional conferences on landmines in Zagreb in June 1999 and Ljubljana in June 2000. It voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B calling for full implementation of the MBT in December 1999, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions.

Its initial Article 7 report to the UN on implementation measures was due by 27 August 1999. The government was aware of this reporting requirement but delayed

¹ Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 1 February 2000, covering the period 8 March 1999-1 February 2000. available at: www.domino.un.org/ottawa.nsf.

² For an account of the events leading to the formation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 and the agreements ending the conflict in 1994-1995, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 550-552, 554. See also, “Background Information,” *Landmine Policy and Mine Action on Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Washington DC: Landmine Survivors Network, 1999), pp. 2-4. BiH consists of two ‘Entities’, the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska.

³ Information available on website www.gichd.ch/docs/minebantreaty, viewed on 8 May 2000.

submission so that it could report on the completion of its stockpile destruction program.⁴ The Demining Commission prepared one report intended to meet both the August 1999 reporting requirement and the annual update required by 30 April 2000, which it submitted on 1 February 2000.⁵

There is no formal anti-landmine campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but there are many nongovernmental organizations working in the country that are also members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

The Stabilization Pact for South Eastern Europe (Cologne, 10 June 1999) resulted in four "Tables" to work on issues promoting stability and economic reconstruction in the region. Working Table III focuses on Security Issues; landmines are addressed within the Sub-Table on Defense and Security Affairs. The Sarajevo Summit Declaration states, "We will also promote civilian control of the armed forces and effective measures against organized crime, terrorism and problems caused by landmines and small arms proliferation."⁶

Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 1 September 1993, but has not yet ratified Amended Protocol II (1996).⁷

Production, Transfer and Use

About half the total defense production of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was located in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the SFRY was a prolific producer of AP mines, possessing an estimated six million mines of all types at the start of the conflict when Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in 1992. Former SFRY production capacity of AP mines was reported to have been located in Gorazde, Vogosca and Bugojno.⁸ No further reference to the Vogosca facility has been noted. There is no indication that Bosnia and Herzegovina has produced, exported or used AP mines since signing the MBT in December 1997, although occasional use by individuals cannot be ruled out.

Regarding the conversion of production facilities, Bosnia and Herzegovina reported in its Article 7 report in February 2000 that it "has not completed the planning process appertaining to the conversion or decommissioning of APM production facilities. This work is intended to be undertaken during this year (2000) and will be reported on as and when the plans are completed."⁹

In April 2000, the Federation Ministry of Defense provided more specific information to the Landmine Monitor: "In regard to conversion of production capacities, FBiH has provided information in its report to the State of BiH that landmine factory 'SLAVKO RODIC' Bugojno has completed the process of conversion."¹⁰ It noted that the factory's landmine stocks had been destroyed, as well as its parts and fuzes. "Tools"

⁴ Interview with Mr. Eddie Banks, Advisor to BiH Demining Commission, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000.

⁵ MBT Article 7 Report, 1 February 2000.

⁶ Sarajevo Summit Declaration available at: www.stabilitypact.org, viewed on 8 May 2000.

⁷ Information from: www.domino.un.org/ottawa.nsf, viewed on 8 May 2000.

⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 553-554.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form E.

¹⁰ Letter from Brigadier Haso Ribo, Ministry of Defense, dated 21 April 2000, received as email attachment 25 April 2000.

used for production of landmines were also destroyed. These activities were “done in the presence of members of international military forces (SFOR) and some embassies in BiH. One problem that remains unsolved and which FBiH will try to solve is employment of certain number of persons left without job due to conversion of the factory.... In the process of conversion this factory has developed civil programs that need international financial assistance....”¹¹ Finally it stated that the Ministry of Defense “would also like to underline that production of improvised landmines, so called ‘GORAZDANKA,’ was underway in small amounts during the war in city of Gorazde and that this factory never professionally/originally manufactured landmines.”¹²

From May to November 1999, Rebuild International developed a prospectus for the conversion of landmine production plants in Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing on product opportunities in the cities of Gorazde and Bugojno. The prospectus provides extensive background about these two facilities.¹³

Stockpile and Destruction

At the London Peace Implementation Conference, held in December 1996 to monitor implementation of the Dayton Agreement, BiH was urged to begin plans for destruction of its stockpiles of mines. In the spring of 1999 the Command Unit of the Stabilization Force (COMSFOR) directed that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two “Entities,” the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS) should destroy all of their stocks of AP mines. This was intended to be a confidence-building measure, but also had the benefit of meeting one of the key commitments of the MBT.¹⁴ Between March and November 1999, approximately 400,000 mines were destroyed and on 15 November 1999 the last stocks of AP mines in BiH were destroyed (with the exception of permitted retentions, as noted below).¹⁵ The types and number of AP mines destroyed are shown in Table 1.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ *Commercial Opportunities in Converting the Bosnian Defense Complex to Civilian Production – Prospectus for Landmine Production Plants*, Rebuild International, November 1999; Rebuild International is a consortium composed of six Canadian companies, focusing exclusively on international peace building and reconstruction projects. See also *Landmine Monitor 2000* appendix on Production Conversion.

¹⁴ SFOR Unclassified Report, 7 December 1999; interview with Lt. Col. Iain James, Chief Countermines/EOD Engineer Branch, Sarajevo, 14 December 1999.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Table 1. Types and number of AP Mines destroyed by each Entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999¹⁶

Type	Total	Republika Sprska	Federation of BiH
PROM-1	17,438	14,569	2,869
PROM-1P	760	760	-----
PROM-KD	33	-----	33
PMR-1	1,664	-----	1,639 (+25)
PMR-2	890	-----	890
PMR-2A	111,858	99,905	11,953
PMR-S1	2,560	2,560	-----
PMR-S3M	16,224	16,224	-----
PMR-3	6,187	5,980	207
PMR-4	8,840	8,778	62
PMA-1	110,971	103,103	7,868
PMA-2	83,161	59,936	23,225
PMA-2A	135	-----	135
PMA-3	89,924	57,106	32,818
PMA-4	1,146	1,146	-----
MRUD	4,025	-----	4,025
PPM Various	70	-----	70
PPM-VM	354	-----	354
PP Mine Improvised	4,487	-----	4,487
TOTAL	460,727	370,067	90,660

The Entity Armies destroyed their stockpiles at different locations with the assistance of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and NATO. The method of destruction was primarily by explosives though some dismantling and recycling occurred (in the case of PMR-type mines).¹⁷ There were two accidents in the RS during the destruction of AP mines, both in September 1999. One incident resulted in injuries to two RS soldiers; the second resulted in one RS soldier being fatally wounded and five other individuals injured (two SFOR soldiers, one SFOR interpreter and two RS soldiers).¹⁸

For training purposes permitted by Article 3 of the MBT, BiH retained 2,165 AP mines.¹⁹ Of this total, the Federation retained 165 AP mines.²⁰ These are held by the Entity Armies.²¹

¹⁶ Email from Lt. Col. James, 20 January 2000; Article 7 Report, Form G. Not noted in the Article 7 report or in BHMAC documents is the Caplinka mine, which one source had previously identified as having been produced in the Mostar Region. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 553.

¹⁷ Interview with Lt. Col. James, Sarajevo, 14 December 1999.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D. This lists the number retained for training as 2,165, but the figures for each type retained total only 2,145; the missing 20 are type PMR-2A retained by the Federation, according to the Ministry of Defense. See, *Information, Bosnia and Herzegovina*,

Table 2. Types and numbers of AP mines retained by the Republika Srpska and Federation of BiH for purposes permitted by Article 3 of the MBT²²

Type of Mine	Total	Republika Srpska	Federation of BiH
PMA 1	120	100	20
PMA 1A	9	---	9
PMA 2	229	200	29
PMA 3	229	200	29
PMR 2A	320	300	20
PMR 3	300	300	---
PROM 1	929	900	29
MRUD	29	---	29
TOTAL	2,165	2,000	165

SFOR continues to have a rigorous inspection regime within the country and will continue to play a monitoring role in accordance with the Dayton Agreement.

Mine Action Funding

Mine action funding in Bosnia and Herzegovina is complex and difficult to summarize comprehensively. A mine action funding summary is reportedly being undertaken by the Advisor to the Demining Commission and was due to be completed during the first quarter of 2000.²³ No further information is available on the status of this activity.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has contributed to mine clearance operations through the payment of salaries of all Entity Army demining teams, and through tax exemption status for demining organizations.

The Entity Mine Action Centers, in a report to the Board of Donors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reportedly received approximately \$4,572,000 during the period 1 January to 30 November 1999.²⁴

To date, the World Bank has provided or channeled approximately \$18 million for demining activities in BiH, through the Project Implementation Units (PIU) of each of the two Entities; these funds were allocated primarily to commercial demining companies. These PIUs are outside the Entity Mine Action Center (EMAC) structure, and can be

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, about Convention on Ban Usage, build-up, Production, and Trade of Landmines and Their Demolition, Verification Center, Ministry of Defense, Federation of BiH, 15 December 2000.

²⁰ *Information about Convention*, Verification Center, Ministry of Defense, Federation of BiH, 15 December 2000.

²¹ Interview with Lt. Col. James, Sarajevo, 14 December 1999.

²² Article 7 Report, Form D.

²³ Interview with Eddie Banks, Advisor to Demining Commission, 9 March 2000.

²⁴ *Report on Demining Activities in 1999*, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center, Sarajevo; the report was submitted to the Board of Donors on 7 December 1999 by Filip Filipovic, BHMAC Director.

used to channel mine clearance funds from other sources, as has already been the case with funds from the International Trust Fund.²⁵

The International Trust Fund (ITF), based in Slovenia, continues to play a major role in mine action funding for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since December 1998, all United States government funding for mine action goes through the ITF. In 1998 and 1999, the ITF received donations of \$12,167,573, which were matched by the United States, thus making \$24,335,146 available for demining and mine victim assistance in BiH. The amount actually spent in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999 is not known, although ITF reports demining success in these terms: area of 4,001,319 square meters demined, 1,250 AP mines found and 9,164 UXO.²⁶ Over 200 mine victims from Bosnia and Herzegovina were rehabilitated in Slovenia and fifty mine victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ITF plan for 2000 estimates five million square meters of land to be cleared and three hundred mine victims to be rehabilitated.²⁷

The Canadian government has pledged C\$ 10 million for mine action over five years, starting in 1998. Through SFOR, it has supported the demining efforts of the Entity Armies (ambulances, clearance equipment), as well as providing funds to the UN Development Program (in support of the MACs), Canadian organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in mine action.²⁸ The United States donated \$110,000-worth of protective footwear (240 pairs) to three local demining NGOs.

Landmine Problem²⁹

In its Article 7 report, BiH states that as of 1 February 2000 the number of suspect or mined areas was 18,293.³⁰ As of 9 March 2000, according to documents provided to Landmine Monitor, the BHMAL had recorded 18,223 minefields in the country, but estimated the probable total number of minefields in Bosnia and Herzegovina at 30,000.³¹ The majority of minefields are in the Zone of Separation, the total length of which is 1,100 kilometers and up to four kilometers wide.³² The BHMAL summary of minefield records indicates the number and location of minefields shown in Table 3.

²⁵ Interview with Mr. Aymeric-Albin Meyer, World Bank Transport Specialist, Washington, DC, 13 January 2000.

²⁶ Email from Robert Strazisar, Head of ITF Implementation Office, Sarajevo, 11 April 2000.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Interview with Barbara Curran, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000.

²⁹ The effect on the population of mines in Bosnia and Herzegovina was described in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 555-556; see also Sinisa Malesevic, "Notes from the Field: Bosnia", *Journal of Mine Action*, 1, 4.1, (Spring issue) 2000, pp. 40-43.

³⁰ Article 7 Report, Form C.

³¹ Documents provided by Zoran Grujic, BHMAL, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000.

³² Pamphlet distributed by the Federation MAC, date unclear but likely April 1999.

Table 3. Location and number of minefields as notified at 9 March 2000³³

Location	Minefields	Mines Recorded	
		antipersonnel	antitank
FEDERATION (cantons)	13,557	179,114	35,989
Central Bosnia	2,189	29,434	3,875
Neretva	1,379	17,044	1,319
Posavina	440	4,970	6,612
Sarajevo	1,815	21,235	2,491
Tomislavgrad	758	12,789	11,211
Tuzla-Podrinje	2,929	35,970	7,290
Una-Sana	1,639	24,166	1,266
Upper Drina (Gorazde)	253	10,350	53
Zenica-Doboj	2,155	23,156	1,872
REPUBLIKA SRPSKA	4,666	75,566	14,352
TOTAL	18,223	254,680	50,341

BHMAC's records and maps of mined areas are on a computer database and publicly accessible. In late 1999 these records were to be updated; it is unclear if this is completed or still in process.

On 15 December 1999, the Ministry of Defense stated that "there are around 740,000 landmines planted in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina."³⁴ Minefields in Bosnia and Herzegovina generally remain unmarked. It is believed there is little or no effect from marking as the signs or markers are often removed for other uses. The Demining Commission chooses instead to focus on mine risk education through schools and local media.³⁵

Coordination and Planning of Mine Action

The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center is the focal point for mine action in the country.³⁶ Governmental decrees/decisions established the Entity Mine Action Centers in the Federation on 14 May 1998 and in the RS on 23 April 1998. As of late 1999, these EMACs no longer conduct mine clearance operations. They work with surveying, quality assurance, and monitoring but do not engage in direct demining activities. The EMACs develop Annual Workplans identifying tasks and priorities to address throughout the year, which the Entity governments review and approve based on Entity priorities and agreed national priorities. Using the example set by the Federation

³³ Documents from Zoran Grujic, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000.

³⁴ *Information*, Ministry of Defense, Federation of BiH, 15 December 2000.

³⁵ Interview with Mr. Berislav Pusic, BiH Demining Commission, Sarajevo, 7 March 2000.

³⁶ For more information on early stages of demining program, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 555-556.

MAC in determining priorities,³⁷ the two main criteria for prioritizing mine action are humanitarian reasons for the return of refugees and displaced persons, and economic reasons for the extension of agricultural land and pastures as well as for the renewal, reconstruction and development projects.³⁸

Priority lists and demining project development occur in four phases:

- Phase 1: Nomination of priorities (can be made by institutions, donors, individuals, cantons);
- Phase 2: Site-survey activities (general survey to determine if area is a mine-risk area);
- Phase 3: If identified as risk area, proposer defines the category of risk:
 - Category 1: locations of regular civilian use, and/or of refugees and displaced persons return, and/or for infrastructure and economic renewal/reconstruction;
 - Category 2: locations of occasional use or in contact zone with category 1 economic resources;
 - Category 3: peripheral locations;
- Phase 4: Demining project development (contains all necessary data for the work executor).

The Federation MAC has been preparing priorities for the last two years and developed a list in February 2000, which covers 600 locations.³⁹ The EMACs are responsible for certification that areas are clear, but they do not take responsibility for ensuring cleared land is made available to those entitled to it. Generally, the municipalities decide how cleared land is allocated.⁴⁰

Survey and Assessment

A general survey (level one) by teams from the Entity Mine Action Centers (EMACs) started in May-June 1999. There are a total of sixteen teams of two men each (one surveyor and one inspector). The Federation has ten teams and the RS has six.⁴¹ Bosnia and Herzegovina feels there is no need for international survey teams, given the country's own capacity and the fact that a general survey is underway;⁴² it also believes the technical survey (level two) capacity exists within the MAC structure. According to BHMAL statistics, 573,229 square meters were surveyed in 1999 (it is unclear if this is level 1 or level 2).⁴³

³⁷ Landmine Monitor regrets the inability to meet with RS MAC staff during the visit to BiH in March 2000.

³⁸ *The List of Priority Tasks for Urgent Demining in FBiH*, Federation MAC, Sarajevo, February 2000.

³⁹ Interview with Mr. Ahdin Orahovac, Director, Federation MAC, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000; see also: www.bhmac.org/fed

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Interview with David Rowe, Acting Program Manager, BHMAL, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000.

⁴² Interview with Mr. Pusic, BiH Demining Commission, Sarajevo, 7 March 2000.

⁴³ Documents from Zoran Grujic, BHMAL, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000.

Mine Clearance

In March 2000 Mr. Filip Filipovic, Director of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center, said that while no one can say all landmines in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be removed in the next ten years, within ten years Bosnia and Herzegovina will reduce the risk by 90% for the population.⁴⁴

All mine clearance operations report progress to the EMACs, which then send summary information to the BHMIC. In its December 1999 report to the Board of Donors, the following BHMIC statistics were provided for activities to date in 1999: cleared area: 3,720,000 square meters, houses cleared: 488, schools: 7, villages: 6, macadam: 68 km, bridges: 17, railway: 6 km, electric powerlines: 48 km, water/waste facilities: 24, churches/mosques: 8, graveyards: 17, total mines found and destroyed: 2,551, total UXOs found and destroyed: 1,015.⁴⁵

Later statistics for 1999 from BHMIC are: area cleared: 3,608,575 square meters, area surveyed: 573,229 square meters, area fenced: 500 square meters, houses cleared: 512, APMs cleared: 2,989, antitank mines cleared: 134, UXO cleared: 1,314.⁴⁶ Of the land cleared in 1999, about 25% was agricultural land, and approximately 26% was housing, 12% around electrical power sites, and almost 15% categorized as "other." The rest of the areas demined included health and social facilities; educational facilities; water and waste management facilities; roads, railways, and bridges; telecommunications; and utilities.⁴⁷

Mine clearance is carried out by Entity Armies (trained and supervised by SFOR), by local and international NGOs, by commercial demining companies (local and international), and by the Civil Protection Organization, which is responsible primarily for unexploded ordnance (UXO). Until the end of 1999, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was also involved in demining.

All demining organizations must be accredited by BHMIC, and accreditation must be renewed annually. In 1999 there were thirty-eight organizations accredited to work in Bosnia and Herzegovina (eighteen were listed in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*). At present, there is a lack of legal authority to enforce decisions to suspend or cancel accreditation or to stop a non-accredited organization from working. Investigating legal options or the development of new laws is one important new area of work for BHMIC.⁴⁸

Methods for mine detection and clearance include manual demining, use of mine detecting dogs (there are sixty to seventy trained dogs in the country), and mechanical ground preparation/clearance. Bosnia and Herzegovina is the first country in the world requiring accreditation for dogs. In 2000, all dogs will be assessed by BHMIC and must be accredited before they can work.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Interview with Filip Filipovic, Director of BHMIC, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000.

⁴⁵ *Report on Demining Activities in 1999*, BHMIC, 7 December 1999; the report notes that figures for the last four months of 1999 may increase due to delayed reporting.

⁴⁶ Documents received from Zoran Grujic, BHMIC, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Interview with Zoran Grujic, Sarajevo, 14 December 1999.

⁴⁹ Interview with David Rowe, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000.

Entity Armies (EA)

There are forty-three nine-man demining teams (nineteen Bosnian, eight Croat, and sixteen Serb) in the Entity Armies (EA). During 1999, the EAs began using integrated demining techniques (mechanical ground preparation and dogs) to facilitate their work. There were no Entity Army deminer casualties during clearance operations. SFOR has a training and monitoring role in mine clearance, and each team has an SFOR soldier with them to monitor and supervise its activities. In 2000, SFOR's role will be selective monitoring with its soldiers encouraging the increased independence of the EA teams.

It is the EMACs which identify the areas where Entity Armies are to demine. In 1998, Entity Armies cleared 100,303 sq.m. of 4,691 AP mines, and in 1999, they cleared 589,170 sq.m. of 1,178 AP mines.⁵⁰

NGOs

The main international NGOs working with mine clearance in Bosnia and Herzegovina are Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and HELP. Other NGOs include Tamar Consulting and INTERSOS. There are four local NGOs actively involved in mine clearance activities. Three of these organizations started in 1999 (Stop Mines, located in Pale; Pro Vita, located in Mostar, and BH Demining, located in Sarajevo). The fourth NGO, Akcija Protiv Mina (APM or Action Against Mines), operated in Una-Sana canton and uses a combination of dogs and manual demining. It was established in 1997, with UN funding, in a program implemented by Handicap International (France) and became officially independent in September 1998. Since then, HI has continued as a partner, by providing technical assistance, management training and assistance in accessing international funding.

Commercial Demining Companies

There are over twenty commercial demining companies accredited to work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These include Amphibia, Decop, Defence Systems Ltd, Mechem, Oktol, RONCO, Unipak, UXB International, Greenfield, CZ Republike Srpske, CZ Federacije BiH, TNT Gorazde, Cum Call, AKD Mungos, Detektor, TNT Mostar, TWJ-deminiranje, GCI, C.F.D., A.B.C. Italy, MAAVARIM Israel, SGS UK Ltd and Geomines France.⁵¹

UNHCR

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees discontinued direct involvement with demining in BiH on 31 December 1999. It had been responsible for six demining teams and as part of a phase-out operation, five of the teams and all the equipment were integrated into NPA and HELP.⁵² The four teams acquired by HELP have yet to receive funding to support their operational activities. A media report on 5 June 2000 noted that "UNHCR is out of the de-mining business because of lack of funds" and quoted the head

⁵⁰ SFOR Unclassified Report, 7 December 1999; interview with Lt. Col. James, 14 December 1999.

⁵¹ List of all accredited demining organizations provided by David Rowe, BHMAL, Sarajevo, 9 March 2000.

⁵² Interview with Tim Horner, former UNHCR Head of Demining, Sarajevo, 6 March 2000.

of the UNHCR program as saying that he had 127 Bosnian staff unpaid since January and a million dollars worth of equipment lying idle.⁵³

Civil Protection Organizations

In August 1998, the European Economic Community (EEC) awarded HELP a contract to further develop the capacity of the Civil Protection Organization for UXO disposal and house clearance capabilities (in support of EEC reconstruction plan of returning refugees and displaced people). There are fourteen operational civil protection teams (fifteen people in each team, four with UXO disposal capability and eleven for house clearance) and two management teams. The management teams (eight to nine persons) are located in Sarajevo and Lukovica and are responsible for logistics, financial oversight, and supervision. The civil protection teams in the RS are located in Banja Luka, Pale, Doboj and Trebinje. In the Federation they are located in Bihac, Livno, Mostar (2), Gorazde, Sarajev, Busovaca, Zeche, Tuzla and Orasje.

These teams have had three years' experience and, at the end of 2000, HELP plans to hand over main responsibilities to them and remain as a monitoring body. Civil Protection is outside the MAC authority, but follows accreditation requirements and reports all completed activities to the EMACs.⁵⁴ For 1999, the Civil Protection and HELP/UNHCR activity report summary noted that cleared area totaled 471,066 square meters.⁵⁵

Research and Development

Bosnia and Herzegovina is testing a number of foreign-made demining products in the country to help advance mine detection and mine clearance activities. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) has been working with Development Technology Workshop (DTW) on their Tempest T4 and Tempest Mark 3 devices. The T4 is a vegetation-cutting tool now in use by NPA in Bosnia, and is also widely used in Cambodia. The Mark 3 is a newer version that was also initially made for cutting vegetation. NPA and DTW are working together to deploy a slightly modified version as a soil-cutting tool for ground preparation in April 2000.⁵⁶ NPA is also assisting Pretory, USA, Inc. in testing an IADE-device (flying reconnaissance for unexploded ordnance and landmines via helicopter).⁵⁷ An Arizona-based company (Chem Tech) has developed "ELF," a stand-off location system which was demonstrated in Croatia in late 1999. A formal testing program was to be undertaken by Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina beginning in April 2000.

Mine Awareness

The Mine Awareness Working Group (MAWG), which became the Mine Awareness Coordination Group (MACG) on 2 December 1999, assesses capabilities of

⁵³ Melissa Eddy, "Bosnia Still Littered With Mines, Corruption Slows Cleanup Process," *Associated Press and Washington Times*, 5 June 2000, p. 5.

⁵⁴ Interview with Graham Grant, Deputy Program Manager, HELP, Sarajevo, 8 March 2000.

⁵⁵ Letter from Ian Clarke, HELP to BHMIC Director, Sarajevo, 9 December 1999.

⁵⁶ Email from Kjell Bork, Acting Program Manager BiH, Norwegian People's Aid, 19 January 2000.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

the companies to deal with mine awareness in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The MACG consists of the following: BHMAC, Federation MAC, RS MAC, UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Federation Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport, RS Ministry of Education, UN Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank and SFOR. A Guide to Accreditation for Mine Awareness Organizations is being prepared, and organizations must be certified by the MACG in order to carry out mine awareness programs in the country.

UNICEF has continued two main programs for mine awareness, one in the school system and another through sport (working with both Ministries of Sport, the former Spirit of Soccer program).⁵⁸ All teachers in the Federation and RS have received mine awareness training. All primary schools have mine awareness information included in "special subjects" lessons. UNICEF plans to consider a workbook for pre-schools in 2000. Secondary schools are considering inclusion of mine awareness in extra subjects (drama or protection and defense class) for September 2000.

The school program targets children through the school system and out-of-school activities with a high involvement and support from the Ministries of Education in both entities. Mine awareness quiz competitions involving primary school children were organized all over the country, with the aim of encouraging them to mobilize communities, media and local authorities to work on the mine problem. The children showed great knowledge, and similar activities will be organized in the course of 2000. A theater play, based on Little Red Riding Hood, is being performed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina with 110 performances, fully supported by the Entity Red Cross organizations and Ministries of Education, for children aged three to ten years. In addition, the project included production and distribution of audiotapes and picture books.

The ICRC, in close cooperation with both Entity Red Cross organizations carries out mine awareness activities throughout the country, operating at the grassroots level through a network of 130 trained community-based mine awareness instructors and nineteen regional/cantonal coordinators. The program is gradually being handed over to the Entity Red Cross organizations, and local Red Cross coordinators at regional/cantonal level are increasing their involvement in most of the activities implemented in the field (community-based program, school program, data-gathering, media campaign), with the assistance and support of ICRC staff.⁵⁹ Support is given to community-based activities such as mine awareness sessions for high-risk groups (for example, returnees, groups such as hunters, fishermen, etc.), agricultural workers, refugees as well as local residents and children.

From June to December 1999, over 1,470 presentations were organized for some 36,500 people involving 130 community-based instructors. Printed materials (posters, leaflets, badges, notebooks, T-shirts, etc.), with specific mine awareness messages adapted to different target groups are being regularly disseminated throughout the country.

The ICRC media campaign includes radio and TV spots, talk shows, interviews and quizzes on the local radio and TV stations all over the country. Prior to this, a media

⁵⁸ Interview with Esperanza Vives, Mine Awareness, UNICEF, Sarajevo, 14 December 1999.

⁵⁹ Email from Vanja Bojinovic, MA Coordinator for BiH, ICRC, Sarajevo, 8 March 2000.

survey was carried out in order to identify the best way to approach high-risk populations (farmers, returnees, children etc.). The ICRC provided the following data on the mine awareness of those injured by mines.

Table 5. ICRC statistics on the 'Knowledge of Danger' (percentage) of those injured by mines⁶⁰

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Yes	16.5	13.5	17	15.5	25.5	33.5	39.5	44
No	83.5	86.5	83	84.5	74.5	66.5	60.5	56

The Tarzan project is a joint effort of the ICRC, UNICEF, UNDP, BHMIC and SFOR. Prior to showing the Tarzan movie, mine awareness footage for children are shown and materials distributed. By the end of March 2000 some 140,000 children had seen the film and mine awareness footage through 902 projections held in the Federation of BiH. The project started in the Federation in mid-October 1999 and will continue to June 2000, and started in the RS in April 2000 and will continue for six to eight months.

The UN Development Program supported mine awareness (mass media and training of a coordinator) through a donation from the Ted Turner Fund (US\$ 650,000), from May 1999 to May 2000. The original proposal was obsolete by the time the project coordinator arrived and a new plan was developed to include coordination efforts, accreditation issues and training of trainers.

In 1998 and 1999, Akcija Protiv Mina (APM) conducted teacher training in mine awareness in Una-Sana canton.

The Mines Information Coordination Cell provides mine awareness for all new arrivals and upon request by specific SFOR units or NGOs. Normally this is a two-hour brief. The British, Americans and Canadians have their own mine awareness capacity.

Mine Casualties

Information about landmine casualties is collected directly from mine-affected communities, the ICRC, the local Red Cross organizations, and other organizations involved in mine action; from hospitals and health centers; from local institutions for the war disabled; and from the police and military. Information pertaining to mine incidents and victims is stored on the ICRC database and the BHMIC database.

As of March 2000, the ICRC database contained 4,313 mine victims (those injured or killed by landmines). There has been a progressive decrease in the number of mine victims: a high of sixty-nine mine victims per month was reached in 1994, which has decreased to a monthly average of eight in 1999.⁶¹ Due to delays in reporting, these numbers may vary slightly from original reports and may further increase for the same reason.

In 1999 there were 94 new mine victims reported, compared to 149 in 1998; that represents a decrease of 37%.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Email from Vanja Bojinovic, MA Coordinator for BiH Sarajevo, ICRC, 14 April 2000.

Table 6. Numbers of mine victims 1992-2000⁶²

Year	Number of victims	Monthly average
1992-95	3,146	66
1996	625	52
1997	286	24
1998	149	12
1999	94	8
2000 (as of March)	13	---
TOTAL	4,313	---

Information about location of mine accident, type of injury, age/gender of victim, and military/civilian status are compiled from data collected up to December 1999.

Table 7. Number of mine victims by location 1992-December 1999⁶³

Location of Mine Accidents	Number of Victims
Banja Luka (4 regions)	810
Bijeljina (2 regions)	691
Bosnia-Podrinje	147
Central Bosnia	334
Herceg-Bosnia	23
Hercegovina-Neretvian	98
Pale (2 regions)	335
Posavina	11
Sarajevo canton	297
Trebinje (2 regions)	276
Tuzla canton	318
Una-Sana canton	566
Western Hercegovina	26
Zenica-Doboj canton	384
TOTAL	4,316

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

Table 8. Age breakdown of mine victims 1 January 1996 to 9 March 2000⁶⁴

Age	Number of Victims
0-5 years	10
6-10 years	42
11-18 years	192
19-25 years	155
26-35 years	227
36-45 years	195
46-60 years	191
over 60	88
Unknown	67
TOTAL	1167

Table 9. Age breakdown of mine casualties from 1996 to 2000 (to March 2000)⁶⁵

	TOTAL	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Children (0-18 years)	244	148	55	22	17	2
Adults (19-60 years)	768	404	194	98	62	10
Elderly (over 60 years)	88	39	20	18	10	1
Unknown	67	34	17	11	5	---
TOTAL	1.167	625	286	149	94	13

Table 10. Fatal and non-fatal injuries 1992-1999 (percentage) and 2000 (number to March 2000)⁶⁶

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Fatal	16	17.5	13.5	14	17	30.5	40	38.5	2
Non-fatal	84	82.5	86.5	86	83	69.5	60	61.5	11

The percentage of fatal injuries has risen in recent years. The ICRC explains this could be due to increasing occurrence of accidents caused by UXO and improvised explosive devices (IED), or the fact that injuries are often in remote areas with poor access to medical services.⁶⁷ It may also be due to the types of mines encountered.

⁶⁴ Ibid.⁶⁵ Ibid.⁶⁶ Ibid.⁶⁷ Ibid.

Table 11. Types of device causing injuries or death 1992-2000 (to March 2000)⁶⁸

	TOTAL	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Mine	3,415	709	676	724	575	383	182	89	66	11
UXO	505	49	69	85	66	101	73	48	13	1
IED	142	24	20	22	30	25	11	3	6	1
Unknown	251	19	23	23	32	116	20	9	9	--
TOTAL	4,313	801	788	854	703	625	286	149	94	13

Table 12. Types of injury 1992-March 2000⁶⁹

	Number of Mine Victims
Foot amputation	611
Below knee amputation	909
Above knee amputation	263
Upper limb amputation	318
Fragmentation wounds eye/head	376
Fragmentation wounds upper body/arms	1,163
Fragment wounds lower body/legs	1,280

Table 13. Civilian (40 per cent) or military (59 per cent) status of mine victims 1992-2000 (to March 2000)⁷⁰

	Total	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Civilian	1,726	175	188	183	159	510	268	145	87	11
Military	2,561	613	587	671	544	115	18	4	7	2
Unknown	26	13	13	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL	4,313	801	788	854	703	625	286	149	94	13

Table 14. Casualties by gender (percentages) 1992-2000 (to March 2000)

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Male	95	93.2	96	96.2	90.7	90.6	90.6	91.4	100
Female	5	6.8	4	3.8	9.3	9.4	9.4	8.6	

⁶⁸ Ibid.⁶⁹ Ibid.⁷⁰ Ibid.⁷¹ Ibid.

Table 15. Casualties by origin of the mine victim 1996-2000 (to March 2000)⁷²

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Number of mine victims	625	286	149	94	13
Internal displaced	20.5 %	22 %	23 %	25 %	2
Returnees	12.5 %	11 %	13.5 %	16 %	3
Local residents	67 %	67 %	63.5 %	59 %	8

The BHMIC has reports of 1,227 mine victims from January 1996 to March 2000. Since this data was received, further mine incidents have been reported in the media. On 11 April 2000, three children were killed after straying onto a reportedly unmarked minefield which is among seventy-seven Sarajevo areas slated for demining, but delayed for lack of funds.⁷³ On 26 June 2000, two deminers employed by the MAC in Banja Luka were killed at Jorgici-Vrela, Teslic municipality on the inter-Entity boundary.⁷⁴

Other organizations having detailed information about mine victims are Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) and Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). LSN has over 600 in-depth interviews with landmine survivors in its database.⁷⁵ JRS works directly with over 200 victims of landmines and houses specific information about these cases within their organization.⁷⁶

Mine Victim Assistance

There are six international organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina providing assistance to landmine victims: the Austrian Red Cross, ICRC, International Rescue Committee, JRS, LSN and Queens University. Bosnia and Herzegovina has agreed to complete the Strategic Framework outlined by the World Health Organization. The Federation Ministry of Health is responsible for drafting an action plan, following the Mozambique table/guide, which was to be completed by 15 March 2000.⁷⁷

Bosnia and Herzegovina has four university clinical centers, in Tuzla, Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka, which carry out all types of medical treatments. There are thirty-one general hospitals in the Federation of BiH, all in bigger towns, and the RS is believed to have about seven general hospitals. General hospitals do not treat complicated cases which are sent to the clinical centers. Blood transfusion centers are located in all

⁷² Ibid.; percentages were calculated for each year separately; though percentages may be higher, the actual number of mine victims per year is decreasing.

⁷³ "Landmines: UN Cites Plan to Combat Accidental Deaths," *Associated Press* and *Baltimore Sun*, 12 April 2000; "Three Sarajevo Children Killed by Landmine," *Reuters*, 11 April 2000; "Landmine Kills Three Children in Bosnia," *Associated Press*, 11 April 2000; Alexander S. Dragicevic, "Mines Still Render Bosnians Helpless," *Associated Press* and *Chicago Tribune*, 12 April 2000.

⁷⁴ "Two People Killed by Land-mine," *Icar/Tass*, 27 June 2000.

⁷⁵ Interview with Plamenko Priganica, BiH Director, Landmine Survivors Network, Tuzla, 13 December 1999.

⁷⁶ Interview with Eugene Quinn, MVAP Program Director, Jesuit Refugee Service, Sarajevo, 8 March 2000.

⁷⁷ Interview Dr. Goran Cerkez, Task Force Manager, Federation of BiH Ministry of Health, Sarajevo, 7 March 2000.

general hospitals. There are no private surgical clinics available in the country, only small private general practices. First aid posts are located in all health centers throughout the country. There are thirty-eight rehabilitation centers in the Federation, and one center opened in Banja Luka in the RS. There are prosthetic centers in the following regions: Sarajevo, two centers; Tuzla, one center; Zenica, two centers; Cazin, one center; Banja Luka, three centers; Trebinje; one center. Physical therapists are available in all rehabilitation and prosthetic centers. There are six occupational therapists in rehabilitation centers in Sarajevo and Tuzla.

There are no state programs for vocational rehabilitation but these programs are implemented through some NGOs working with disabled. There are no workshops for production and distribution of wheelchairs. Medico-social centers are located in Sarajevo, Travnik, Fojnica, Prijedor, Jakes and Tuzla. Social institutions helping disabled and all social categories of people are the only government organization. There are seventy-four Centers for Social Aid, located in all municipalities, that implement the legal regulations and social compensation for the disabled.

There are sixty-one NGOs, including local associations for the disabled, helping disabled people in Tuzla, Bihac, Mostar, Konjic, Sarajevo, Zenica, Banja Luka and Trebinje. Activities are mainly educational, reconstruction and reintegration programs. On the state level there are twenty-one sport clubs for the disabled.⁷⁸

Disability Policy and Practice

There are three laws on the State level regulating the rights of disabled: a law on the rudiments of social protection of civilian war victims and protection of families with children; a law on pension and invalid insurance; and a law on health protection. Cantonal law covering the rights of landmine survivors is also being developed. Public institutions and all other private and state companies pay social insurance for their employees as well as health insurance. There is also voluntary insurance paid by those who are not employed but paying insurance according to the coefficient established by the law on pension/invalid insurance.

All disabled people receive a pension in accordance with the percentage of their disability. Military victims receive pensions through the military invalid branch and civilian victims receive their pensions through the Social Institutions. Military victims do not pay for medical treatments but they have to pay for medicines, and civilian victims have to pay for treatment as well as the medicines. There is a coalition of organizations working with the disabled on the state level, that includes cantonal coordination bodies responsible for following the disability laws and suggesting changes to the laws. LSN is part of the coordination body for Tuzla Canton.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Information provided by Landmine Survivors Network BiH, January 2000.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

BULGARIA

Key developments since March 1999: From April to October 1999, Bulgaria completed demining of its territory, including the borders with Turkey, Greece, and Macedonia, destroying 17,197 mines from 76 minefields. In 1999 Bulgaria revealed the size of its AP mine stockpile for the first time (885,872), and began the destruction program, eliminating 107,417 mines between September 1999 and April 2000. It intends to complete destruction in 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Bulgaria signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 4 September 1998. On 10 August 1999, the Council of Ministers created an Interdepartmental Working Group to coordinate implementation measures, and on 16 September 1999, the Council of Ministers adopted a protocol that mandated a national program for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹ In May 2000, a Bulgarian representative stated that implementation legislation was pending.²

In May 1999 Bulgaria participated in the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in Mozambique. There its delegation stated that it "consistently supports all efforts, including those within the framework of the UN and the Conference on Disarmament, aimed at achieving a total ban of anti-personnel landmines, as well as the initiatives in this field of the EU, EAPC [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council], and other international fora and organizations."³

Bulgaria's representatives attended nearly all of the intersessional meetings of the ban treaty's Standing Committees of Experts (SCE). Bulgaria submitted its initial report as required under Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 on 27 August 1999 (covering 1 March-27 August 1999), and its second on 5 April 2000 (covering 27 August 1999-5 April 2000).⁴

Government representatives participated in regional landmine conferences in Zagreb, Croatia, in June 1999 and Ljubljana, Slovenia, in June 2000. Bulgaria also participates in Working Table III (Security Issues) of the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe, where it proposed a "[J]oint declaration by the countries of SEE on Anti-personnel Mines," in hopes of establishing a regional agreement on the elimination of landmines.⁵

¹ Decision No. 569/10.08.1999 and Protocol No. 40/16.09.1999, reported in Bulgaria's Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 5 April 2000, and its Article 13 report for Amended Protocol II of the CCW, 15 October 1999.

² Verbal remarks by Bulgarian representative at the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction meeting, Geneva, 23 May 2000.

³ Statement by Mr. Yuri Sterk, Head of NATO, WEU and Security Issues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

⁴ Bulgaria's Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports, submitted 27 August 1999 and 5 April 2000, available at: <http://www.domino.un.org/ottawa.nsf>.

⁵ "Humanitarian De-mining," Working Table III, Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe, available at: <http://www.stabilitypact.org/WT-3>.

On 15 March 2000, the parliament ratified an agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria on mutual non-use and clearance of landmines along their common border. The vote was 146 in favor of ratification with only one abstention. When an opposition party leader noted that Turkey had not yet signed the Mine Ban Treaty, the chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Foreign and Integration Policy, Asen Agov, responded that this agreement is "paving the way for such a move" on Turkey's part.⁶ The agreement was also approved by the Turkish National Assembly and it was concluded on 22 March 1999.

Bulgaria voted for the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had for similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. During the 1999 debate on the resolution in the UN First Committee, Bulgaria "emphasized the importance of a full and speedy implementation of the Ottawa Convention."⁷

Bulgaria is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It submitted its National Annual Report on landmines, as required under Article 13 of the Amended Protocol, on 15 October 1999⁸ and attended the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999.

Bulgaria is a member of the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD). In December 1999, it stated that it "strongly supports all efforts in the Conference on Disarmament aimed at achieving global ban on APLM and universalization of the Ottawa Treaty."⁹ During the first phase of the 2000 session of the CD, the Bulgarian representative supported a statement made by a coalition of countries, led by Germany, that included a motion for the "reappointment of a Special Coordinator to seek the views of Conference members on the most appropriate way to deal with questions related to anti-personnel landmines."¹⁰

Production, Transfer and Stockpile

Bulgaria previously produced and exported antipersonnel mines.¹¹ Restrictions were placed on exports in 1995, which became a full moratorium on export in 1996, and were superceded by the total ban under the Mine Ban Treaty.¹² In its Article 7 reports, Bulgaria noted that the decommissioning of its AP mine facilities was "in process."¹³

⁶ "Assembly Ratifies Bulgarian-Turkish Landmine Agreement," *World News Connection*, 15 March 2000.

⁷ Statement of the European Union and the Associated Countries, General Debate, UN First Committee on Disarmament, October 1999; available at: <http://www.acronym.org.uk/unfcomp.htm>.

⁸ National Annual Report on Amended Protocol II of the CCW, 15 October 1999.

⁹ Report of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bulgaria to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 13 December 1999.

¹⁰ "Conference on Disarmament concludes first part of year 2000 session; Speakers decry continuing stalemate on starting substantive work," *M2 Presswire*, 27 March 2000.

¹¹ For details of previous production and export see: *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 570-571.

¹² "Law on the control of foreign trade with arms and dual-use goods and technologies," November 1995. This was enhanced to become a full moratorium on the trade of landmines by Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 104/1996 and was extended to an unlimited moratorium by Decree No. 271/1998; Report to the OSCE, 13 December 1999, pp. 2-3.

¹³ This was reported in both the August 1999 and April 2000 Article 7 Reports, with the supplementary information, "DUNARIT Co."

In June 1999 at the Zagreb Regional Conference on Landmines, the Bulgarian delegation had acknowledged it held a stockpile of "around one million" AP mines, and would need financial assistance in order to carry out stockpile destruction.¹⁴ In its Article 7 report of 27 August 1999 this stockpile figure was revised to 885,872, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Stocks of AP Mines as at 27 August 1999¹⁵

Type of mine	Quantity
PM-79	350,181
SHR-II	62,210
OZM	61,893
PMN	59,411
PSM-1	300,941
MON-50	38,444
PFM-1C	12,792
Total	885,872

The government created an interdepartmental group to handle execution of Bulgaria's stockpile destruction goals, made up of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Industry, Trade and Tourism, Finance, Justice and Environment, as well as the Interdepartmental Council on the Military-Industrial Complex, which is chaired by a Deputy Minister of Defense.¹⁶

When the working group was formed, it was estimated that the cost of eliminating the stockpile would be Leva 2,884,960 (US\$1,398,100).¹⁷

From March 1999 through March 2000, Bulgaria destroyed 107,417 AP mines, from the stockpiles of the Army, National Border Police and National Gendarmery. The destruction was carried out at three sites: Terem Co. in Kostentz, Dunarit Co. in Russe and Deserted Mine Galleries and Quarries (no location given). At the first two sites the mines were eliminated by "discharge," whereas in the third, explosion was the method used. Dunarit Co. is also a former production site that is being decommissioned.¹⁸

¹⁴ Notes taken by Mary Wareham, ICBL, Zagreb Regional Conference on Landmines, 28 June 1999.

¹⁵ Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 August 1999.

¹⁶ Council of Ministers Decree No. 569/10.08.1999; "Cabinet Approves Program for Land Mine Removal," *BTA* in English from *FBIS*, 16 September 1999; National Annual Report on Amended Protocol II of the CCW, 15 October 1999; Report to the OSCE, 13 December 1999, pp. 2-3; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 27 August 1999.

¹⁷ "Cabinet Approves Program for Land Mine Removal," 16 September 1999. The Bulgarian representative at the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction meeting in Geneva, 23 May 2000, said the approximate cost would be 3 million German marks, roughly the same amount.

¹⁸ Article 7 Report, 27 August 1999.

Bulgaria announced that it is planned to destroy all remaining antipersonnel mines by the end of 2000 at the May 2000 SCE on stockpile destruction.¹⁹

In its Article 7 report, Bulgaria stated its intention to retain 10,446 AP mines for development and training purposes, noting at the same time that "the figures shown in this section will be subject to further reduction by 01.01.2000 as a result of an ongoing reassessment of the needs of the Bulgarian Army."²⁰ With its second report, the number of mines to be retained had been reduced to 4,010, including the following: PMN (175), OZM (70), PM-79 (345), SHR-II (66), PSM-1 (2,730), and MON-50 (624).²¹ Again, Bulgaria noted the figures would be subject to further reduction by 1 June 2000 as a result of ongoing reassessment of needs.

Bulgaria has also submitted a proposal to the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe for the "establishment of a regional facility for the destruction of landmines stocked in Bulgaria and later in the region." Some \$1.9 million has been requested for this project.²² In a fact sheet distributed during the First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999, Bulgaria described a process in which stockpiles could be destroyed by disassembly at costs ranging from \$2.50-\$4.00 per mine. Among the benefits attributed to this method were safety, environmental soundness, and economic efficiency.²³

Landmine Problem and Mine Clearance

Bulgaria began clearing its border with Turkey during April 1999 in compliance with the bilateral agreement signed in March 1999. The duty was given to the National Border Police, who were responsible for roughly 1,000 hectares of land along the border.²⁴ Bulgaria also engaged in clearance of its borders with Greece and Macedonia. Bulgaria reported clearing a total of 56 minefields and destroying 11,898 PSM-1 mines by the end of August 1999. It then cleared another 5,299 PSM-1 landmines from twenty minefields in Momtchilgrad and Smolian.²⁵ Demining of the borders with Greece and Macedonia was apparently completed by October 1999.²⁶ Bulgaria announced that it had "completed the demining process on its territory on the autumn of 1999."²⁷

In its Article 13 report submitted for the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, Bulgaria noted that during demining and stockpile destruction operations "special attention is given to safety and environmental protection

¹⁹ Untitled note presented by the Bulgarian representatives attending the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction meeting, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, 27 August 1999.

²¹ Article 7 Report, 5 April 2000.

²² "Humanitarian De-mining," Working Table III, Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe.

²³ "Technology for Safe and Ecologically Clean Destruction of Stockpiled APLs Through Disassembling," Fact Sheet distributed by the Bulgarian Delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, May 1999.

²⁴ "Bulgarian border police to start mine clearance on southern border on 27 April," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, BTA news service, 13 April 1999; Report to the OSCE, 13 December 1999, p. 3.

²⁵ Article 7 Report, 27 August 1999.

²⁶ "Border Wiring Removed," *PARI Daily* from *World Reporter*, 14 October 1999. This article stated sixty-eight minefields were cleared, destroying 13,926 mines.

²⁷ Untitled note presented at the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000.

measures" and that "a special form for the environmental impact assessment has been elaborated for projects, which are not subject to compulsory assessment."²⁸

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

According to Bulgaria's CCW Article 13 report, it has participated in the NATO/EAPC Ad-hoc working group on global humanitarian mine action, and has taken part in mine clearance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, though it is not clear in what capacity.²⁹

CROATIA

Key developments since March 1999: A total of almost \$24.4 million was spent on mine action in 1999, an increase of 80% over 1998. Estimates of mined or suspected mined areas have been revised down to 4,500 square kilometers. A total of 23.59 square kilometers of land was cleared of mines or declared not to contain mines. The ICRC and Croatian Red Cross organized mine awareness programs in 1999 in all fourteen mine-affected counties, reaching 66,612 residents in 3,165 presentations. CROMAC estimates that in 1999 there were fifty-one new mine victims, compared to seventy-seven casualties in 1998. Croatia destroyed its first 3,434 stockpiled mines in June 1999, but has reported no destruction since then. It plans to retain 17,500 mines, apparently more than any other nation.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Croatia signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 4 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on 20 May 1998.¹ According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ratification process served to incorporate the MBT into Croatian law and establish obligations on both national and international levels.² In its Article 7 report, submitted on 3 September 1999, the government reported on the "Proposal of the Law on Anti-Personnel Landmines," to be considered after the summer break, noting that "part of the law specifically elaborates on penal sanctions for violators, ranging from prison-terms of approximately 10 years and fines of up to hundreds of thousands of US\$."³ The status of that law is not known.

Croatia has helped to promote the treaty regionally, including hosting the Second Regional Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines in Zagreb in June 1999. Organized

²⁸ National Annual Report on Amended Protocol II of the CCW, 15 October 1999.

²⁹ Ibid.

¹ Croatia ratified the Mine Ban Treaty by enacting the *Law on Confirmation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction*, passed by the House of Representatives of the Parliament at the 24 April 1998 session, and published in the official journal *Narodne novine (NN)* as International Treaties No. 7 on 15 May 1998.

² Interview with Mario Horvatic, Head of Department for Peace and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zagreb, 19 January 2000.

³ Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 3 September 1999, information as of 31 July 1999. No starting date for the reporting period is given.

jointly by the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Croatian Red Cross, the ICRC and the Croatian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCBL), it was attended by about 300 participants from thirty-three countries, fourteen international organizations and fifty nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The conference was appraised as the most important multilateral event held in Croatia in 1999. In the opening plenary session, Foreign Minister Dr. Mate Granic stated:

The whole Ottawa process, this Conference also being a part of it, is not only based on national interests of respective states, but primarily on the noble goal to free the world of landmines. Many of the speakers will explain in detail the evil and damage which antipersonnel landmines cause. Losses in economic terms can be roughly calculated and are measured in billions of dollars. Damage to the environment can also be calculated, and it is far from being small. However, we cannot account for the loved ones lost forever. My country was among the first to join the Ottawa process, being fully aware of its far-reaching goals. Croatia has actively supported and participated in all phases of the Ottawa process, and was the twelfth country to ratify the Ottawa Treaty. Croatia is fulfilling its obligations in accordance with the Ottawa Treaty....⁴

Croatia attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999 and attended all of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts (SCE) of the MBT, except one meeting on mine clearance. The SCE meetings on stockpile destruction were attended by experts from CROMAC (Croatian Mine Action Center) and the Croatian Army, where they reported on recent experiences of mine clearance and destruction, and legal provisions related to humanitarian mine clearance. Government representatives also participated in the Regional Conference on Landmines held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on 21-22 June 2000.

Implementation of the MBT in Croatia is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense,⁵ which submitted its initial Article 7 report to the UN on 3 September 1999, providing information as of 31 July 1999. As of mid-July 2000 Croatia had not submitted its second report.

Croatia voted in December 1999 in favor of the UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B, which called for full implementation and universalization of the MBT; it had also supported pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. At the UNGA plenary session on 18 November 1999, Croatia's Permanent Representative declared, "The Republic of Croatia continues to welcome all efforts leading towards the global ban on anti-personnel landmines...Croatia shall work hard with all interested countries to support the Ottawa Convention [MBT] in its next phase."⁶

⁴ Statement of Dr. Mate Granic, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Croatia, at the Regional Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, Zagreb, Croatia, 27-29 June 1999, in: *Zagreb Regional conference on Landmines, Summary Report of the Proceedings*, p. 18.

⁵ Interview with Mario Horvatic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zagreb, 19 January 2000.

⁶ Statement by Ambassador Ivan Simonovic, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia, United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Plenary Meeting, Agenda Item 35: "Assistance in mine-action," New York, 18 November 1999.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated also that the government would not approve of either transfer or relocation of mines by another country on its territory, and would oppose the use of AP mines in Croatia in any joint military exercise or operation.⁷

The country is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). However, ratification of Amended Protocol II (1996) is still in process.⁸ Since January 2000 Croatia has a new government and parliament, which are changing many laws to increase democratization of the country; at present, having already ratified the MBT, further “mine-action laws” are not on the immediate agenda. The government attended the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 1999, as an observer. It supports efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to address the landmine problem.

At the Regional Conference in June 1999, at the suggestion of the CCBL, representatives of NGOs from Central and Southeastern Europe established a Regional Network to increase coordination and cooperation of mine-related activities, including assistance to mine victims, promoting the MBT within the region and monitoring its implementation, strengthening NGO activity in the region as well as increasing links with ban campaigns in Western European countries and fundraising. NGOs involved in setting up this Regional Network were the CCBL, Strata Research (Croatia), Landmine Survivors Network (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Center for Strategic Research and Documentation (Macedonia), Helsinki Human Rights Committee (Yugoslavia) and the Antimining Friends Committee (Albania).

Production and Transfer

Until 1992 Croatia was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) which manufactured AP mines. Upon the break-up of the SFRY and formation of the Republic of Croatia in 1991 none of the former production plants for AP mines or their components were located on its territory. According to Brigadier Slavko Haluzan of the Ministry of Defense, AP mines have never been successfully manufactured in quantity in the country.⁹ He states that during the war Croatia tried to develop the production of two types of AP mines at two state-owned companies. The PMA-3 blast mine was manufactured at the Cetinka plant in Trilje and the MRUD directional fragmentation mine was manufactured at the SUIB plant in Kumrovec. However, these mines never became available to forces in the field and did not become part of the Croatian arsenal, according to Brig. Haluzan. After abandoning attempts to produce AP mines, the factories resumed their normal production activities.¹⁰

⁷ Interview with Mario Horvatic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zagreb, 19 January 2000.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Interview with and written responses from Brig. Slavko Haluzan, President of the Commission for Demining Issues, Ministry of Defense, Zagreb, 12 December 1999.

¹⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* included information supplied by the Ministry of Defense which identified two other state-owned mine as producing companies, Vlado Bagat in Zadar and Rapid in Virovitica (p. 573); according to Brig. Haluzan this information was incorrect and these factories have never had the capacity to manufacture mines.

Stockpile and Destruction

The number and type of AP mines stockpiled by Croatian forces and scheduled for destruction are shown in Table 1. This data was provided by the Ministry of Defense on 30 December 1999, but repeats the information provided in Croatia's Article 7 report as of 31 July 1999. The Ministry of Defense added that, at present, these mines are stockpiled as found at the end of war actions and have yet to be sorted out into separate stocks.¹¹

Table 1. AP mine stockpiles

Type of AP Mine	Total Stockpile (Army + Ministry of Interior)	Quantity retained for permitted training (Army + Ministry of Interior)	Quantity scheduled for destruction
Pressure-activated (PMA-1, 1A, 2, 3)	108,878 (96,908+11,560)	8,400 (6,000+2,400)	100,478
Tripwire fragmentation (PMR-2A, 2AS, 3; PROM-1, 1P)	71,158 (68,538+2,620)	5,200 (4,000+1,200)	65,958
MRUD directional fragmentation AP mines	18,613 (16,913+1,700)	3,800 (3,000+800)	14,813
Total mines:	198,649 (182,359+16,290)	17,500 (13,100+4,400)	181,149
Fuzes	34,243 (34,243+0)	0	34,243

The MRUD is a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine, previously manufactured in the former Yugoslavia. The Ministry of Defense states that existing mines of that type can only be triggered electrically, "on command" and are therefore not banned under the MBT.¹² However, Croatia plans to destroy all MRUD stocks with the exception of 3,800 retained for training.

The retention of mines "for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction is permitted" under the Mine Ban Treaty (Article 3.1 of the MBT). However, the 17,500 mines to be retained in Croatia appears to be largest number kept by any State Party, and is much higher number than in most other countries retaining mines (quantities commonly range from 1,000 to 5,000). Brigadier Haluzan of the Commission for Demining Issues at the Ministry of Defense has responded that the testing of a single demining item with 99.6 percent reliability requires a simulated minefield of at least 400 mines.¹³ At the May 2000 meeting of the Standing Committee

¹¹ Interview with and written responses from Brig. Haluzan, Ministry of Defense, Zagreb, 30 December 1999. Also, Article 7 Report, 3 September 1999.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Interviews with Brig. Haluzan, Ministry of Defense, Zagreb, 13 March 2000 and 2 May 2000.

of Experts on General Status of the Convention, the Croatian delegation stated that the Army is re-evaluating the number of retained mines needed.¹⁴

The official start of AP mine destruction in Croatia was during the Regional Conference in Zagreb, on 27-29 June 1999, when 3,434 mines were destroyed at the military training range in Slunj. Since then, stockpile destruction has not continued due to a shortage of funds and Croatia welcomes any assistance from other countries or organizations, especially technical and financial help.¹⁵ The latest estimate of mine destruction costs amount to US\$ 3-5 per mine, assuming that military personnel carry out this work as part of their daily duties and their salaries are not included.

AP mine destruction will take place in specially prepared facilities at Ostarski Dolovi near Ogulin and the military training ranges Gasinci in Dakovo and Crvena Zemlja in Knin using the following techniques: explosion (PMA-2, PMA-3, PROM-1, PMR-3), repackaging (PMA-1, PMR-2) and disassembling (MRUD). Destruction will be conducted in compliance with all safety standards provided by the International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance and other regulations enacted by the Croatian Government. The quantities of AP mines stockpiled, retained, destroyed already or scheduled for destruction are reported in detail in Croatia's first Article 7 report, analyzed by each mine-type, and the locations and methods of destruction are given in detail. Brig. Haluzan's comments suggest that the data has changed little since July 1999.

Landmine Problem

The formation of the Republic of Croatia from the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the widespread use of antipersonnel mines in conflicts related to this process were summarized in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.¹⁶ According to the Ministry of Defense, AP mines were last employed for military purposes in the course of the war in Croatia.¹⁷ Since that time, there have been ten terrorist or criminal incidents in which AP mines were used, between October 1995 and October 1998.¹⁸

¹⁴ Oral remarks of Croatian delegate to the SCE on General Status of the Convention, Geneva, 30 May 2000. He also said Croatia is in favor of clear limits placed on the number retained by nations, and clear explanations of why mines are retained. He indicated Croatia needed mines more for testing new technologies than for training, and that Croatia would use live mines to test the ELF system and to help train mine detection dogs.

¹⁵ Interview with unnamed high-ranking officer of Ministry of Defense, Croatia, Zagreb, 26 April 2000.

¹⁶ For information on mine use and types deployed, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 573-574; see also: Marijana Prevendar, "Notes From the Field: Croatia," *Journal of Mine Action*, 1, 4.1 (Spring issue) 2000, pp. 44-47, and "Croatia," p. 78.

¹⁷ Interview with and written responses from Brig. Haluzan, Ministry of Defense, Zagreb, 30 December 1999.

¹⁸ Letter from Ivan Stanko, Head of Police Department, Ministry of the Interior, Zagreb, 18 January 2000.

Estimates of the number of mines deployed ranges from 400,000 to 1.5 million.¹⁹ Mined areas are spread over fourteen of the twenty-one counties of Croatia.²⁰ There is also a high concentration of mines in wider areas of the cities of Sisak, Benkovac, Knin, Karlovac, Osijek and Vukovar. The frontlines were stretched all over these areas during the war. Slavonia is the eastern region of Croatia, bordering Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and includes four of the heavily mine-affected counties noted above, which make up 18.5 percent of Croatian territory. This fertile region has the most productive land in Croatia. The county most affected by mines is Vukovarsko-Srijemska.

The latest estimate is that mined areas and suspected mined areas cover 4,500 square kilometers, or 7.95% of Croatia.²¹ Mined areas are often marked inadequately in terms of the quality and visibility of signs, and some mined areas have never been marked at all. As a result, there are many mine incidents. Data provided by the local Osijek office of the Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) gives a more detailed picture of the landmine problem in Slavonia.

Table 2. Mine-affected areas (confirmed minefields and suspected high-risk areas) in Slavonia region of Croatia²²

County	Area (km ²)	Mine-affected land (km ²)	Percentage of land mine-affected	Number of minefields	Number of mines found	Average number of mines per mine field
Osječko-Baranjska	4149	145.28	3.5%	1,016	43,598	43
Vukovarsko-Srijemska	2448	178.03	7.3%	878	45,551	52
Požeško-Slavonska	1821	49.37	2.7%	310	4,959	16
Brodski-Posavska	2027	6.57	0.3%	378	7,422	20
All four counties	10,445	379.26	3.63%	2,582	101,530	36

Note: In addition, there are still large areas treated as 'lower risk' for Osječko-Baranjska County; for example, 220 square kilometers of woods belonging to Hrvatske šume (Croatian Woods) and other public companies.

¹⁹ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 574-575; the higher estimate is from Marijana Prevendar, "Notes From the Field: Croatia," *Journal of Mine Action*, 1, 4.1 (Spring issue) 2000, p. 44.

²⁰ These include Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska, Brodsko-Posavska, Dubrovacko-Neretvanska, Karlovačka, Licko-Senjska, Osječko-Baranjska, Požeško-Slavonska, Sisacko-Moslavacka, Splitsko-Dalmatinska, Sibensko-Kninska, Viroviticko-Posavska, Vukovarsko-Srijemska, Zadarska and Zagrebacka counties.

²¹ *Izješce o radu hrvatskog centra za razminiranje* (Report on the operations of CROMAC), supplied by Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, Sisak, 19 January 2000; analysis of mined areas by land-use remains unchanged from 1999, see: *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 575.

²² Interview with Dubravko Krusarovski, Coordinator, CROMAC, Osijek, 19 April 2000.

In addition to the mined areas and suspected mined areas noted here, an unknown number of mines remain on the border with Hungary.

Mine Action Funding

To deal with its landmine problem, Croatia has allocated considerable financial resources to clearance operations, and has also received international support, such as loans from the World Bank. On 8 November 1999 the "Croatia Without Mines" trust fund for humanitarian mine clearance was established.²³ A total of KN 182,863,864 (US\$ 24.4 million), representing 0.123% of its GDP, was spent on mine clearance operations in Croatia in 1999, 80% more than in 1998. Of this amount, some KN 167,816,715 (US\$ 22.4 million) went to demining companies that carried out direct demining operations.²⁴

CROMAC estimates that KN 400 million (\$53.3 million) per year is required for demining operations in Croatia. Croatia has entered into a contract with the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance aimed at doubling existing funds.²⁵ In 1999, \$2.6 million was received from foreign donors for mine action, as outlined in the table below.

Table 3. Foreign donations for demining received in 1999 and respective areas demined²⁶

Donor	Amount (KN)	Amount (US\$)	Area (m ²)
HELP	1,345,344	179,379	53,900
UNOPS	8,444,040	1,125,872	778,340
ASB-EC	6,937,588	925,011	636,059
Federation Suisse De Deminage	792,870	105,716	42,545
UNMAAP & British Embassy	575,200	76,693	35,000
French Embassy	1,586,000	211,466	130,000
TOTAL	19,681,042	2,624,138	1,675,844

Mine clearance activities supported with these funds have included demining bridges, power lines, telecommunication networks, agricultural land, industrial sites, recreation centers, and homes and backyards.²⁷

²³ Report on the activities of CROMAC for 1999, Damir Gorseta, CROMAC, Sisak, 19 January 2000.

²⁴ Telephone interview with Nikola Pavkovic, CROMAC and fax from Damir Gorseta, Head of CROMAC, Sisak, 18 February 2000.

²⁵ Report on the operations of CROMAC for 1999, Damir Gorseta, CROMAC, Sisak, 19 January 2000.

²⁶ Fax from Nikola Pavkovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 26 April 2000.

²⁷ Ibid.

Research and Development

Several initiatives have been launched in Croatia related to research and development of mine detection and mine clearance technologies, mainly through the activities of the Scientific Council of CROMAC.²⁸ These initiatives include research on metal detectors, mine detection sensors, equipment for pyrotechnists, a mini-thresher, remote detection from the air and satellite digital mapping, and neutron methods of mine detection.²⁹ A regional center for furthering mine clearance technologies and cooperation has been established at Obrovac, and is currently testing mine detectors.

Mine Action Coordination and Planning

The Croatian Center for Demining (CROMAC) was set up by the government as the civilian operational body for demining activities. It is based in the city of Sisak, with branch offices in Karlovac, Knin and Osijek. The head of CROMAC is appointed by the Government, and the CROMAC Council liaises with government. NGOs and other agencies involved in mine action are not represented on its Council. Its duties include marking and surveying of minefields, planning and assigning demining resources, administering the tender and contract process, supervising projects and quality control of demining activities, maintaining data on mined areas and all operations, and financial management. All mine clearance agencies must be registered by CROMAC.

CROMAC invites tenders for contracts to undertake mine clearance operations, and in 1999, 131 contracts were concluded on demining operations, and each month there were twenty-five to thirty work-sites in operation. Twelve local and foreign commercial companies were involved: AKD Mungos, Ru-Ru, Termosolar, TT-KA, TNT-35, Dok-Ing, Piper, Abcd, Exbel-Emcrom, Tamar Consulting, Mechem, Dr. Koehler and Maavarin. In some areas demining was also performed by Special Police units. The biggest contracts went to the following companies: AKD Mungos (KN 102,562,589, which was 61% of the total spent on demining in Croatia),³⁰ Ru-Ru (KN 11,441,292), Dr. Koehler (KN 10,967,911) and Special Police forces of the Ministry of the Interior (KN 10,214,748).³¹

Other aspects of mine action, such as victim assistance and mine awareness, are currently carried out by NGOs without significant involvement of CROMAC. This may change with the recent establishment of regional coordination centers, which include NGO representation, in all counties of Croatia except Dubrovnik and Zagreb. These regional centers will involve county representatives, the Croatian Red Cross and the ICRC, Ministry of Education and Sport, mine victim and returnee associations, international NGOs involved in mine action in Croatia and other local NGOs in mine action planning and coordination. One of the aims of this more integrated approach to mine action is better information flow and integration of mine-awareness education.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ In June 1999, some twenty fully-equipped deminers from AKD Mungos demonstrated at a protest rally outside the Regional Landmine Conference over low and irregular pay. Eventually they left after they were promised that their problem would be looked into by the government. There has been no change in the low and erratic pay of the deminers.

³¹ Fax from Nikola Pavkovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 26 April 2000.

The cost of running CROMAC (excluding mine clearance activities) in 1999 amounted to KN 12,368,905 (\$1.6 million) in 1999, which represents 6.76% of total funds for demining in Croatia. This amount was allocated from the state budget. An additional KN 3,306,046 (\$404,806) was spent on fixed assets such as vehicles, technical equipment, and furniture. It has a staff of sixty-seven.³²

The government issues an annual "Plan for Demining of Croatian State Territory" that seeks to reconcile priorities such as the repatriation of refugees and reconstruction of residential and public facilities. Needs considerably exceed the activities included in the annual plans, due to the large areas still requiring survey and mine clearance. The official view is that Croatia cannot solve the problem of mined areas in a short period of time.³³

However, the annual plans are implemented and even exceeded.³⁴ The 1999 plan envisaged that a total area of 19,316,029 square meters would be surveyed and demined, but instead, owing to reduction in the areas suspected of being mined, a total of 23,590,431 square meters was demined or declared mine-free.³⁵ Records of demined areas are publicly available.³⁶

Minefield Marking, Surveying and Clearance

Minefield records from the war are often incomplete, with wrong coordinates and are generally considered useless for demining operations. CROMAC began a survey to determine mined areas and those suspected of being mined. Its Department of Central Records maintains a database on mine-polluted areas that is updated, controlled and amended on a regular basis. Maps of mined areas are designed and scanned; however, this is a slow process.

On the basis of a Level I survey, previous estimates of the extent of suspected mined areas in Croatia (6,000 km²) has been revised to 4,500 km² of land. CROMAC states that the suspected area will be further reduced as a result of additional activities planned in 2000.³⁷

Mined areas are usually marked with plastic tape, which is easily blown away or damaged by rain and wind. Where there are metal signs, it has been observed that local people and even tourists sometimes remove them as souvenirs.³⁸ There is rarely enough money to refurbish the signs, and minefields are often left unmarked and accessible for lengthy periods. Some minefields have never been marked, and fencing them off is rare. Signs are usually repaired or replaced only when there has been a mine incident with

³² Fax from Damir Gorseta, CROMAC, 18 February 2000.

³³ Fax from Milan Vukovic, Assistant to the Head of the Department of Reconstruction, Ministry of Development, Immigration and Reconstruction, Zagreb, 29 December 1999.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Report on the operation of CROMAC for 1999, Damir Gorseta, CROMAC, 19 February 2000.

³⁶ Fax from Milan Vukovic, Ministry of Development, Immigration and Reconstruction, 29 December 1999.

³⁷ Report on the operations of CROMAC for 1999, Damir Gorseta, CROMAC, Sisak, 19 January 2000.

³⁸ Interview with Igor Kmetec, UNMAAP, Knin, November 1999.

casualties.³⁹ Local people occasionally set up improvised warning signs. In Slavonia only about 10-20% of mine-affected and suspected areas are marked. Some were marked with standard metal triangles or plastic ribbons, but most have been destroyed in recent years by weather and vegetation. CROMAC has started systematic marking of mine-affected areas, and plans to mark 400 kilometers (linear) throughout Croatia in 2000 including the main tourist roads.⁴⁰

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance is performed both manually and mechanically, and with the assistance of specially trained dogs. Local companies employ mainly Croatian citizens and foreign companies are staffed by foreigners. Some companies employ women for demining jobs. Several cases of deaths or injuries of deminers have been registered so far. In order to obtain permission for demining, all companies must meet certain conditions and procedures required by the Law on Demining and the Rules on Procedures of Performing Demining Activities. CROMAC is not satisfied with the safety conditions, and has suggested amendments.⁴¹

A total of 23,590,432 square meters (23.59 square kilometers) was examined and cleared of mines in 1999, of which 14,330,862 square meters was cleared and the remainder (9,259,569 square meters) was "reduced upon pyrotechnical survey" (i.e. discovered not to contain mines).⁴² The CROMAC report gives data for areas cleared of mines or "reduced" in eleven of the fourteen mine-affected counties, as shown in Table 7. Arable land and infrastructure (roads, powerlines, waterworks, etc.) account for the highest percentage of cleared areas.

³⁹ Interview with Ivan Cvitkovic, a farmer who witnessed a mine incident in Maljkovo village, Splitsko-Dalmatinska County, November 1999.

⁴⁰ Interviews with Dubravko Krusarovski, Coordinator, CROMAC, Osijek, 19 April 2000, and Per Kvarsvik, Regional Mines Advisor, UNMAAP, Osijek, 23 May 2000.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Report on the operations of CROMAC for 1999, Damir Gorseta, Sisak, 19 January 2000.

Table 4. Areas cleared of mines or reduced upon survey in eleven counties in 1999⁴³

County	Area in square meters
Vukovarsko-Srijemska	6,985,431
Licko-Senjska	4,215,688
Zadarska	4,184,435
Sisacko-Moslavacka	3,101,892
Osjecko-Baranjska	3,032,391
Pozesko-Slavonska	557,470
Sibensko-Kninska	423,363
Karlovacka	412,921
Dubrovačko-Neretvanska	356,704
Brodsko-Posavska	299,136
Zagrebacka	21,000
TOTAL	23,590,431

Reconstruction and Development of Mine-Cleared Areas

Once cleared of mines, an area is made available to its pre-war owners.⁴⁴ Although arable land and infrastructure are the highest percentage of cleared areas, there is still a shortage of arable land due to mine pollution, so farmers often work on the uncleared and/or suspect land at their own risk. Local communities, mainly returnees, also stress that, apart from speeding up the demining processes (which in their opinion is too slow), it is also necessary to stimulate farming, improve living standards and fully revive these areas (through communications, social and cultural programs, etc.).⁴⁵

In many villages inhabitants who fled during the war have returned. Yards and village streets have been priority areas for mine clearance. But their fields are still mine-affected, and some villagers who relied on agriculture before the war (as in Slavonia to a large extent) are now struggling to survive economically, and many exist on state benefits. Mines complicate and worsen the situation in many ways. When irrigation canals are mined, they are not cleaned and water-flow slows or stops eventually. Then in spring and whenever there is heavy rain, fields are flooded. Some agricultural land has

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Areas that were inhabited by Serbs and then deserted after Croatian Army operations are at present inhabited by several thousand Croats, mainly refugees themselves, which complicates and inhibits repatriation of the Serbs who fled their homes. The new Croatian government gave assurances that all Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality will be able to return to their homes and land, and other housing and agricultural land will be provided for the Croats currently occupying Serbian property; see: "Racan backs up cantonization of Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Jutarnji list* (daily newspaper), 25 February 2000, pp. 3, and as reported on *Hrvatska danas* (Croatia Today, on HRT-Croatian National Television) when Foreign Minister Tonino Picula visited Banja Luka in Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9 March 2000; also interview with Ivan Grdan, Civil Guard of Viroviticko-Podravaska County, Slatina, 14 September 1999, and Peter Leskovski, UNMAAP, Knin, November 1999.

⁴⁵ Interview with Mr. Ivica Maric, expert in agriculture, economy, reconstruction and demining of Sunja municipality, Sisacko-Moslavacka County, 19 November 1999.

now been out of use for several years. Mine-affected land is sometimes the reason why people do not return to their homes, especially young people who should ideally be leaders of change and development of their communities.

Mine Awareness

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Croatian Red Cross (HCK) organized mine awareness programs in 1999 in all fourteen of the mine-polluted counties, involving forty-five local Red Cross organizations, many civilian associations and initiatives by local communities. These programs are financed mainly by the ICRC, although local volunteers contribute substantial amounts of time. Similar programs were also launched by the Ministry of Education and Sport in collaboration with UNICEF, and other NGOs initiated numerous programs.

Mine awareness programs include presentations and training of instructors in mine awareness. Local media and specialized radio broadcasts, fliers, brochures and posters, notebooks and calendars with educational messages are all used. The ICRC and HCK support programs initiated and conducted by local communities, such as stage performances that carry educational messages, exhibitions of pictures and photographs, rock concerts and sporting events in honor of mine victims and a great many similar multimedia events. Each program is accompanied with specific materials adjusted to a particular local community and is based on experience acquired through fieldwork. Materials are designed in collaboration with the volunteers from local communities.

From the beginning of January 1996 through 7 December 1999, 158 instructors were trained to conduct mine awareness programs, twenty-eight of them in 1999. At present there are seventy-five trained instructors still involved in mine awareness programs. The approach of the ICRC and HCK is that instructors should not just give lectures, but should also represent "the eyes of community," i.e. actively participate in finding solutions to mine-related problems and educating local communities in a wider sense.

Between 1 January 1999 and 7 December 1999, some 3,165 presentations were attended by 66,612 residents; since beginning the program in 1996, a total of 171,605 individuals have been reached through 7,974 presentations. Twenty-seven ten-day long exhibitions were set up, which were visited by 30,000 people. One single soccer tournament dedicated to the mine problem, held in the summer of 1999 in Vukovar, attracted 18,000 people. One of the stage performances that carries mine awareness messages got into the regular repertory in the theater of Karlovac and can be seen every day. Roundtables have been organized on mine issues in local communities with participation of ICRC representatives. The ICRC has given strong support to local NGOs involved in mine problems (such as Strata Research, NONA, Studeni, A3) and has taken part in numerous similar events related to mine awareness.⁴⁶

The mine awareness program conducted by the Ministry of Education and Sport and UNICEF started in 1996. This program, initiated by UNICEF, is intended to reach all children in Croatian schools and day-care centers, and includes seminars, publications and advertising materials. In the last three years UNICEF has provided schools with 150

⁴⁶ Interview with Ms. Maja Stanojevic, ICRC, Zagreb, 15 December 1999.

TV sets and video systems. The program is wholly financed by UNICEF, with a contribution from the Norwegian Government.

According to the Ministry, since 1996, 1,600 persons have been trained and qualified as program coordinators in schools and day-care centers. As of 1998 the project encompassed secondary to and apart from the coordinators, 2,500 teachers and parents and 900,000 children in day-care centers, primary and secondary schools attended seminars on mine awareness. In addition, the Ministry of Education and Sport points out that the programs were attended by three million people, school children's family members, and that 950,000 fliers were distributed to children and their parents, 1,500 educational packages containing brochures, posters and video cassettes were delivered to schools, with an extra 150 packages in Serbian language and another forty in Hungarian, for members of these minority communities.⁴⁷

The mine awareness program is incorporated in the school curriculum and efforts are made to make it a part of all extracurricular activities that can be related to the mine problem. The Ministry estimates that children have become more aware of mine danger, based on the "changed behavior of children in the outdoors and in threatening situations and also on the reduced number of victims."⁴⁸ CROMAC's annual report, however, states that the program has not been systematically conducted, that teachers had not been trained to implement the program and that certain elements of the program are not adequately adjusted to age groups (for example, too many technical terms).⁴⁹

Nongovernmental organizations carrying out mine awareness programs include the NONA association, which produced an educational video. The multimedia association Studeni organized a humanitarian concert in Nova Gradiska, dedicated to mine victims. Strata Research published an educational CD-ROM. A theater in Karlovac gave a mine-related performance. The association A3 designed and showed educational slides. Info-clubs in Slavonia organized exhibitions and film projections, and six soccer tournaments were organized in eastern Slavonia. As of February 2000, national TV and radio started broadcasting (free of charge) video clips and radio jingles on mine awareness, which were designed in collaboration with the ICRC, HCK, UNMAAP and CROMAC.⁵⁰ A survey of a national sample to investigate what the residents of affected regions think of and know about mines is being prepared by Strata Research, to give a clearer picture of the extent and impact of mine awareness among mine-endangered populations.

Mine Casualties

There is no central database of mine incidents and casualties publicly accessible in Croatia. The Croatian Alliance of Physically Disabled Persons' Associations (HSUTI) estimates that the total number of mine casualties (both military and civilian) since the start of the war is about 1,200, of whom 500 victims were severely disabled. The

⁴⁷ Interview with Ms. Marija Ivankovic, Department of Education, Ministry of Education and Sport, Zagreb, 7 January 2000.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Report on the operation of the CROMAC, Damir Gorseta, CROMAC, Sisak, 19 January 2000.

⁵⁰ Damir Gorseta, the head of CROMAC, on the promotion of radio and TV spots, Sisak, 22 February 2000.

population of Croatia is approximately 4.5 million. Casualties are higher among men (about 75%), and child victims are relatively few (about 3%). Civilians usually get hurt while logging in the woods, working in the fields, during hunting, fishing and picnics. Immediately after the war, many returnees were killed or wounded in their own yards and houses, as a result of booby traps.⁵¹

The Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) estimates that in 1999 there were thirty mine incidents in ten of Croatia's twenty-one counties, causing fifty-one casualties, mostly male civilians. Compared with the estimate for 1998 of seventy-seven casualties, this suggests a reduction in mine casualties of 33%. Of the fifty-one casualties in 1999, twenty-one were killed, thirteen wounded severely and seventeen lightly. Of those killed, nineteen were men and two were women; nineteen of them were civilians. Of those wounded, twenty-six were men, one woman and three children; twenty-six were civilians.⁵²

Victim Assistance and Disability Policy

The Croatian healthcare system is based on the Law on Health Care and the Law on Health Insurance ("NN" 1/97 - final version). These laws ensure thorough, specific and available healthcare for the entire Croatian population, including disabled persons. The country has 120 health centers, twenty-three general hospitals and many other health facilities, which are evenly distributed over the country.

Medical rehabilitation of disabled persons is conducted in specialized hospitals, and a special program of "active rest" is provided for disabled persons during summer months in the orthopedic hospital in Rovinj. In 1991 the Rehabilitation Board was established as part of the Ministry of Health to monitor implementation of rehabilitation programs, and in 1997 the Commission for Disabled People was established to coordinate the activities of the Ministry, other government agencies and NGOs related to the problems of disabled persons, provide expert opinion and monitor implementation.⁵³

The Law on Croatian War Veterans regulates disability rights and benefits. All Croatian citizens are entitled to primary medical care by law, and to hospital rehabilitation once a year provided that their illness is listed in the regulations, that they have functional disorders and that ambulatory rehabilitation is unavailable. Disabled people using orthopedic and other aids are exempt from payment for medical services if their monthly earnings are less than three average monthly salaries. Supplemental allowances for assistance and care are available to disabled people on certain conditions, and reduced taxation and housing costs. Disabled survivors of the war (military and civilian) who are more than 80% disabled are entitled to an apartment free of charge; people not disabled in the war are entitled to only 20% discount, provided they are in wheelchairs. There are widespread transport privileges, but the law on access to buildings for disabled people is generally disrespected.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Interview with Dr. Mirjana Dobranovic, President of the Croatian Alliance of Physically Disabled Persons' Associations (HSUTI), Zagreb, 9 December 1999.

⁵² Telephone interview with Nikola Pavkovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 23 February 2000; this data was later included in a Croatian government press agency report 11 June 2000.

⁵³ Letter from Zeljko Reiner, Minister of Health, Zagreb, 12 December 1999.

⁵⁴ *Mini katalog prava za zrtve mina* (Mini catalog of the mine victims' entitlements), Mine Victims Section, HSUTI, Zagreb, 2 October 1999.

However, no specialized rehabilitation institute for mine victims exists in Croatia. As a result, amputees often are not provided with proper care during rehabilitation and their stumps tend to become atrophied. This renders normal usage of orthopedic aids impossible, so that many disabled persons use their crutches or remain in wheelchairs, although they could have become capable of walking on their own had there been better rehabilitation programs. The standard orthopedic aids supplied by the government tend not to fully meet the needs of the disabled. Special orthopedic aids are sometimes four times more costly, and the difference in price is not covered by the government.⁵⁵

Many amputees travel to Ljubljana, Slovenia, which has a center with specialized rehabilitation program for amputees. Also according to HSUTI, there are no programs of psychological/social rehabilitation for mine victims, although the Ministry of Health claims that an initiative has been launched to establish an integral specialized center for disabled persons, following the World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines.

At the start of 1996 the Center for Rehabilitation and Adjustment to the Community was founded in Zagreb, to bring together experts in various fields and assist disabled persons in finding solutions to their health, social, legal and other problems. The Center is supported by the government body that provides assistance to the survivors of the Croatian War of Independence, by the Ministry of Health and WHO. Similar centers are being set up in Split and Osijek.

HSUTI established a mine victim section on 31 May 1999. Its operation includes research on the number and status of victims, assistance to its members, organization of meetings, education (optimization of self-help), seminars, and cooperation with other NGOs in Croatia and elsewhere. HSUTI has been active for more than twenty years and has centers in thirty-six cities all over the country. There are forty member-organizations, members of which acquire certain privileges, such as half-price telephone subscription and one hundred free phone units per month, half-price television subscription, free transportation in Zagreb and entrance to some cinemas, theaters and sporting events.⁵⁶

Although Croatia has extensive legal provisions for the rights and entitlements of disabled persons, which include mine victims, many are not fully implemented, partly because mine victims and other disabled persons have poor knowledge of their rights. Research conducted among mine victims revealed that one third (100 out of 300 respondents) are not familiar with benefits available to them. Mine victims have to pay for medicines not on the list of the Croatian Health Insurance Bureau, and for everything that exceeds the limits determined by national standards. Nationally, there is the Operational Headquarters for the victims of the Croatian War of Independence and the governmental Board for Persons with Impairments. However, there is no specific body to focus on issues related to mine victims.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Interview with Dr. Dobranovic, HSUTI, Zagreb, 9 December 1999.

CZECH REPUBLIC

Key developments since March 1999: The Czech Republic ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 26 October 1999 and it entered into force on 1 April 2000. National implementation legislation was passed on 18 November 1999 and entered into force on 3 December 1999. The original timeline of 20 June 2001 to complete mine/UXO clearance will likely slip to the end of 2001. By the end of 1999, a total of 9,972 hectares of land and 2,022 buildings had been cleared in and around the two main former Soviet bases.

Mine Ban Policy

The Czech Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, and ratified it on 26 October 1999. The treaty entered into force for the Czech Republic on 1 April 2000.

National implementation legislation was passed on 18 November 1999 and entered into force on 3 December.¹ Additionally, the criminal code was amended to impose imprisonment of one to five years for violations of the law.² Relevant sections of the treaty have been incorporated in military regulations with a view to preventing possible violations, and are taught at military colleges and universities.³

The government participated in the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique in May 1999, with a delegation headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Martin Palous.⁴ The government has participated in all the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty.

In a statement at the General Assembly on 22 September 1999, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Kavan stated, "We support all efforts towards achieving a universal applicability to this Convention."⁵ The government voted in favor of UN General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban on landmines in 1996, 1997, 1998 and in December 1999.

The country is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and submitted its national annual report required under Article 13 on 25 October 1999.⁶ The Czech Republic attended the First Conference of State Parties to

¹ Act 305/1999 on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and their Destruction, 18 November 1999.

² Amendment to Act 140/1961, Criminal Code, section 185a on the Development, Production and Possession of Prohibited Combat Equipment. Sanctions include imprisonment for one to five years for development, production, possession, stockpiling or import of any weapons or explosives prohibited by law or by an international treaty approved by Parliament; and imprisonment for one to five years for designing, constructing or using facilities for the development, production or storage of such weapons.

³ JUDr Alexander Slaby, Director of the United Nations Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, Letter No: 111558/2000-OSN, 31 March 2000.

⁴ Declaration of Markku Reimaa on behalf of the European Union, 11 October 1999, in the Conference on Disarmament, General Debate within the First Committee, General Assembly/DIS/3140.

⁵ Statement by Jan Kavan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, at the Fifty-fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 22 September 1999.

⁶ National annual report from the Czech Republic, CCW/AP.II/CONF.I/NAR.8, 25 October 1999.

Amended Protocol II in December 1999. At the Conference, the Secretary-General at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs Zdenek Matejka noted that, among the steps taken to ensure national implementation, the CCW and Amended Protocol II have been incorporated in national legislation, and “the relevant provisions are integrated in military instructions and operating procedures.”⁷

In his comments at the CCW Conference, Secretary-General Matejka also noted that the Czech Republic continues to support all other fora, in particular the Conference on Disarmament, aiming toward a universalization of Protocol II and the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Martin Palous, head of the Czech Delegation, had also stated this view at the FMSP in Maputo, where he said that “the Czech Republic has given lasting support to all other fora, in particular the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, that strive to involve all mine-producing States in the efforts to eliminate these lethal weapons. We are aware that such states may be able to cite sensible reasons for non-compliance; however, we are firm believers in the ability of the political process to overcome these obstacles in the near future, so that the Convention may become truly universal.”⁹

Declaration on Joint Operations with Non-Signatories of the MBT

With its ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty, the government deposited a declaration with which it seeks to protect its troops from prosecution for the “mere participation in the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military activity,” where non-signatories use AP mines.¹⁰ There is concern that the language of the declaration is so broad as to be inconsistent with the Mine Ban Treaty.¹¹

Production

The former Czechoslovakia was a significant producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines, and the Czech Republic inherited the AP mine production facilities when the country divided into the Czech and Slovak Republics. According to the Czech government, production of antipersonnel mines was halted in 1990. The types of AP mines produced by Czechoslovak state factories and some of the countries to which they were exported are noted in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.¹²

⁷ Statement by Zdenek Matejka, Secretary-General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, to the First Conference of State Parties to the Amended Protocol II of the CCW, Geneva, 15-17 December 1999.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Statement by Martin Palous, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Czech Delegation at the First Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 4 May 1999.

¹⁰ Text of declaration provided to Landmine Monitor by JUDr. Alexander Slaby, Letter No: 104237/2000-OSN, 7 February 2000.

¹¹ This issue of concern to the ICBL was described at length in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 676-678.

¹² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 707-708.

Two former producers of antipersonnel mines, POS Policka and Zeveta Bojkovice, both located in the province of Moravia, have now been converted to other types of production. POS Policka, near Uhersky Brod in southern Moravia, produced AP mines until 1989. About forty percent of its military production capacity has been converted to non-military programs (handles for petrol pumps), but it continues the production of antitank mines. Zeveta Bojkovice, near Usti nad Orlici in eastern Bohemia, also ceased production of antipersonnel mines in 1989. Sixty per cent of its military production capacity has been converted to non-military programs (spare parts for cars and other engineering production) while the rest of its capacity has been retained for the production of ammunition for small arms and light weapons.¹³

Regarding production of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices and other munitions that might function like antipersonnel mines, the Czech Foreign Ministry has made the following statement: "Under the terms of Article 2 of the Convention, Czech manufacturers produce and supply to the Army of the Czech Republic cargo projectiles with remotely-delivered antitank mines equipped with electronic anti-disturbance devices. There is no production of any other anti-handling devices or mines delivered by cargo projectiles."¹⁴ Despite the above disclaimer, Czech stockpiles contain antivehicle mines of concern to the ICBL. (See below).

Transfer

The former Czechoslovakia was a significant exporter of AP mines. The Czech Republic imposed a moratorium on exports in October 1994, which was made indefinite in November 1997,¹⁵ then was superseded by the Mine Ban Treaty.

Asked to clarify its position on the legality of another country transiting AP mines across Czech territory, officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the ban on transfers would apply also in the case of joint operations with countries which are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, for example within NATO. However, it was noted by Mr Tuma that the Czech Republic also has to meet its obligations to the Washington Treaty as a member of NATO.¹⁶ There appears to be ambiguity in the government's position.

Stockpiling and Destruction

By December 1997 the Czech Republic had destroyed all 44,353 non-detectable AP mines in its stocks that did not comply with Amended Protocol II.¹⁷ These type PP-Mi-Na mines were destroyed at Týniste nad Orlici.

On 23 May 1998, the Minister of Defense approved a stockpile elimination plan calling for completion of destruction by 30 June 2001.¹⁸ Between January 1998 and May

¹³ Letter from JUDr Miroslav Tuma, Deputy Director of the United Nations Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, No. 116684/2000-OMO, 11 May 2000.

¹⁴ JUDr Alexander Slaby, Letter No: 111558/2000-OSN, 31 March 2000.

¹⁵ Statement by JUDr Miroslav Tuma, Deputy Director of the United Nations Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, 26-28 March 1998.

¹⁶ Interview with Miroslav Tuma, Jaroslav Zouzal, and Lt. Col. Josef Trabalik, Prague, 26 April 2000.

¹⁷ Statement by JUDr Miroslav Tuma, Budapest, 26-28 March 1998.

¹⁸ JUDr Alexander Slaby, Letter No: 111558/2000-OSN, 31 March 2000.

2000 a total of 1,222 PP-Mi-Sr II APMs were destroyed, including 18 mines destroyed during testing of new equipment, 1,150 mines destroyed during testing of the AP mine dismantling facility and 54 mines destroyed during bomb disposal training courses. Due to technical and financial problems with the mine dismantling line the original timeline of 20 June 2001 to destroy the remaining 329,100 AP mines will be reconsidered, though not beyond the deadline of 1 April 2004 as required by Article 4 of the MBT.¹⁹

Due to the technical problems, AP mine destruction has been transferred to a small military facility in Bohuslavice nad Vlári near Slavicín in southern Moravia. The destruction of 329,000 PP-Mi-Sr and PP-Mi-Sr II metallic cased fragmentation mines started on 2 May 2000, with an anticipated rate of 600 mines per day. The mines are destroyed by disassembling and recycling some materials, such as scrap metal and TNT components.²⁰

The Ministry of Defense plans to retain 4,900 antipersonnel mines for testing new demining technologies and for training bomb disposal experts of the Czech Army, as permitted under the treaty.²¹ These mines are two types of metallic fragmentation mines: PP-Mi-Sr (1,400 to be retained) and PP-Mi-Sr II (3,500).

Regarding antivehicle mines, the Czech Army has PD-Mi-PK, PT-Mi-PK, PT-Mi-Ba III, PT-Mi-U, PT-Mi with tilt-rod fuse, PT-Mi-K, and PT-Mi-P mines in stock.²²

The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that will explode as the result of an unintentional act of a person, and antivehicle mines with sensitive fuse mechanisms that cause them to function as antipersonnel mines. Tilt rod fuses cause an antivehicle mine to function as an antipersonnel mine.²³ While some Czech authorities state that only the PT-Mi is used with a tilt-rod fuse, independent sources indicate that the PT-Mi-P and PT-Mi-U mines are also used with a tilt rod fuse.²⁴ Other Czech authorities have stated that none of the antivehicle and antitank mines listed above are fitted with any antihandling device,²⁵ and that: "[t]he only mechanical antihandling device ever produced in the Czech Republic was the anti-handling fuse Ro-10. The production was discontinued in 1990."²⁶

There is similar uncertainty on the question of whether any of these mines could be victim-activated by tripwire, a mode that is prohibited under the MBT. The Czech authorities interviewed could not assure that steps have been taken so that the listed

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ JUDr Miroslav Tuma, Letter No. 116684/2000-OMO, 11 May 2000.

²¹ JUDr Alexander Slaby, Letter No: 111558/2000-OSN, 31 March 2000.

²² Ibid.

²³ Several MBT States Parties have destroyed antivehicle mines with tilt rods because they were judged to violate the treaty.

²⁴ Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," prepared for the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 10-11 January 2000.

²⁵ Jaroslav Zouzal during interview with Miroslav Tuma, Jaroslav Zouzal, and Lt.Col. Josef Trabalik, Prague, 26 April 2000.

²⁶ JUDr. Miroslav Tuma, Letter No. 116684/2000-OMO, 11 May 2000.

mines cannot be used with a tripwire.²⁷ According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the PD-Mi-PK antivehicle mine can be fired "electro-mechanically by a contact cable, by command detonation or mechanically by a tripwire."²⁸ The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs states: "The mine (PD-Mi-PK)...is actuated by pressure of vehicles - by a contact cable, by a tripwire or command detonated. Like anti-tank mines, PD-Mi-PK is a directional mine designed to attack vehicle body, usually from the side. The Czech Republic does not classify PD-Mi-PK as an APM under Article 2 of the Convention."²⁹ From this information it is not clear that these mines would not be tripwire activated by "the presence, proximity or contact of a person" and therefore illegal under the MBT if used with a tripwire.

Landmine Problem

The country has long borders that were lines of confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War. The present-day Czech authorities state that during the Cold War the former Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic did not deploy live mines on its borders with former Federal Republic of Germany and Austria. There were only inert mines, arranged to look like live mines in order to deter intruders. These inert mines, together with booby traps and tetrahedrons, were removed after the 'Velvet Revolution' in 1989.³⁰

The government reported in 1995 that troops from the former Soviet Union had left approximately two tons of mines in waste dumps, in weapons pits, and in the ground near the Ralsko and Mladá military bases which were occupied by Soviet troops from 1968 to 1991. Army demining units have been clearing these bases of mines and UXO. The original plan to complete clearance by the end of 1999 could not be achieved.

Czech Army demining units will complete clearing mines and unexploded ordnance at Mladá by 30 June 2000, while clearing of the Ralsko base will take until the end of 2001.³¹ By the end of 1999 at Mladá, some 1,301 buildings and 4,600 hectares of land had been cleared. At Ralsko, 721 buildings and 5,372 hectares of land had been cleared by the end of 1999.³²

Mine Action

The Czech Republic has contributed to humanitarian mine action. In 1998, \$22,500 was donated to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance and \$3,500 to the ICRC to help mine victims. In 1999, \$107,000 was donated to the Slovenian International Trust Fund (ITF) for Demining, Mine Clearance and Assistance to Mine Victims, mainly for mine victim assistance. The Czech Ambassador to Slovenia Jana Hybaskova chaired the ITF Board of Advisors in 1999.³³ Czech SFOR (Bosnia and

²⁷ Interview with Miroslav Tuma, Jaroslav Zouzal and Lt. Col. Josef Trabalik, Prague, 26 April 2000.

²⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, "ORDATA II, Version 1.0," CD-ROM.

²⁹ JUDr Miroslav Tuma, Letter No. 116684/2000-OMO, 11 May 2000.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ JUDr Alexander Slaby, Letter No: 111558/2000-OSN, 31 March 2000.

³² Ibid.

³³ Interview with Miroslav Tuma, Jaroslav Zouzal, and Lt. Col. Josef Trabalik, Prague, 26 April 2000.

Herzegovina) and KFOR (FRY-Kosovo) units are engaged in mine clearance in their areas of responsibility.

In 1998 the Czech government said that "health facilities in the Czech Republic are ready to admit for paid medical treatment a limited number of landmine victims, in particular children, and to ensure the supply of all necessary prostheses."³⁴ This plan has now been altered: "In the light of the excellent results achieved by the Rehabilitation Institute in Ljubljana which, inter alia, produces prostheses, the Czech Republic abandoned its original intention to admit mine victims to Czech medical facilities or to supply prostheses, and pay the costs from its ITF contribution." The donation to the ITF (\$107,000) was used "to cover the costs associated with the short stay of Mr Jiri Hrabák, senior consultant at the prosthetic ward of the Teaching hospital in Plzen and Chairman of the Prosthetic Society, at the rehabilitation centres in Fojnica and Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in September/October 1999."³⁵

DENMARK

Key developments since March 1999: Denmark completed destruction of its stockpile of 266,517 AP mines on 14 December 1999. From the beginning of 1999 through the end of May 2000, it contributed approximately \$15.2 million for mine action programs. Denmark has established a humanitarian demining training center for NGOs.

Mine Ban Policy

Denmark was an active supporter of the "Ottawa Process" leading to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), which it signed on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 8 June 1998. With regard to additional implementing legislation, Denmark states, "No legal, administrative and other measures in addition to the legal, administrative and other measures already in force have been deemed necessary to comply with the Convention."¹

The government participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in Maputo in May 1999. It has attended at least one meeting of each of the five intersessional Standing Committees of Experts.

Denmark voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 promoting the MBT in December 1999, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions. The government sees the MBT as the main instrument for achieving a mine-free world. The treaty provides a policy-framework for Danish contributions to mine action.

Denmark submitted its initial Article 7 report to the United Nations on 27 August 1999. It is comprehensive, with detailed information on mines in stockpiles, plans for their destruction and the situation on the mine-contaminated peninsula of Skallingen.

³⁴ Statement by JUDr Miroslav Tuma, Budapest, 26-28 March 1998.

³⁵ JUDr. Miroslav Tuma, Prague, Letter No: 116684/2000-OMO, 11 May 2000.

¹ Denmark's Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, submitted 27 August 1999. Landmine Monitor is unaware of what penal sanctions are currently in place for violations of the treaty.

The second Article 7 report, for the calendar year 1999, due by 30 April 2000, had not been submitted by the end of June 2000.

Denmark is a State Party to CCW Amended Protocol II (1996). It attended the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999, but had not submitted its report as required under Article 13 by that time. Denmark is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but “supports all efforts to ban anti-personnel landmines, including efforts in the Conference on Disarmament.”²

Production and Transfer

The government of Denmark has stated that no antipersonnel mines have been produced since the 1950s.³ Denmark has not exported AP mines in the past. It imported AP mines from the United States, Germany and perhaps other nations.⁴

Stockpile Destruction

According to Minister of Defense Hans Hækkerup, Denmark completed destruction of its 266,517 antipersonnel mines on 14 December 1999.⁵ The quantities of each type destroyed were reported as: 97,095 Type M/47; 102,372 Type M/56; 54,280 Type M/58; 12,770 Type M/66.⁶ The destruction was carried out at the Ammunition Arsenal, Elling, and at Entsorgungsbetriebsgesellschaft mbH, Leipzig in Germany, by disassembling, burning and chemical destruction, following national, NATO and European Union safety and environmental standards.⁷

Denmark has retained a total of 4,991 AP mines for training purposes (60 Type M/56 and 4,931 Type M/58), which are under the control of the Chief of Defense, the Army Material and Operational Commands.⁸ Half of these AP mines will be used for development and testing of mine detection equipment, and half will be used for training in mine detection.⁹ The Article 7 report does not include mention of 1,000 Claymore-type M18A1 mines acknowledged to be in stocks, which the government states have been modified for use only in command-detonated mode.¹⁰

² Denmark's Report to the OSCE on the Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, 25 January 2000.

³ This has been contested by a group of Danish NGOs who claim that Danish companies were involved in production of components until 1983. For details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 581-582.

⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 582.

⁵ Letter to Fonden Danmark mod Landminer from Hans Hækkerup, Minister of Defense, 15 May 2000. This was confirmed by the Danish delegation in remarks to the meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on General Status of the Convention, Geneva, 30 May 2000.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 August 1999.

⁷ Ibid, Form E.

⁸ Ibid, Form D.

⁹ Ibid. Also, remarks by the Danish delegation at the meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on General Status of the Convention, Geneva, 30 May 2000.

¹⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 583.

Landmine Problem

Denmark is slightly mine-affected, but this is limited to the Skallingen peninsula on western Jutland, dating from World War II. The area is marked, and there are no reports of accidents caused by the mines there in recent years. Skallingen is a protected natural reserve, and the Danish government has gradually acquired almost all of the mine-infested territory. The area is currently being mapped, and a plan to clear the area will be developed. Denmark has reported, "According to the judgement of the Danish Ministry of Defense most of the mines are ineffective today, but there still is a small risk of some being effective."¹¹

Mine Action Funding

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for funding mine action programs. Denmark is a member of the Mine Action Support Group, a group of major mine action donors that meets in New York to coordinate their support for such programs.

Denmark has contributed a total of DKK 189,836,797 (US\$24 million) to a broad range of mine action programs from 1996 to 1999.¹² It provided DKK 49.9 (US\$7 million) in 1999, and a total of DKK 64.9 (US\$8.2 million) from January-May 2000. Funding totalled DKK 57 in 1996, DKK 38.6 in 1997, and DKK 44.3 in 1998.

In its draft strategy document for international assistance, Denmark states that the eradication of AP mines is a political, humanitarian and development task, and has to be worked on from all three approaches.¹³ According to the Danish International Development Agency, mine clearance will continue to have high priority in the years to come.¹⁴ The government has used the MBT as a framework for governing allocations for mine action, aiming at supporting countries that are members of the MBT. Denmark is reviewing its support for mine action programs in Angola, due to the new use of AP mines by the government. However, support is also given to non-MBT parties such as Laos and to programs in areas that cannot be state parties, such as Chechnya and Kosovo.

A new development in Denmark is the establishment of a training center for non-governmental organizations in humanitarian demining, aimed at reinforcing the capacity for humanitarian mine clearance. The first course started on 25 April 2000, with sixteen participants. This is also funded by a mine action grant.¹⁵

¹¹ Article 7 Report, Annex to Form E; see also, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 584.

¹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs (US\$ conversion by Landmine Monitor/Denmark).

¹³ *Partnership 2000*, Danish Development policy, draft edition, 14 June 2000, available at: <http://www.um.dk/danida/partnerskab2000/analyse.asp>.

¹⁴ DANIDA Five Year Plan 2000 – 2004, available at: <http://www.um.dk/danida/5aarsplan2000-2004/index.asp>.

¹⁵ Telephone interview with Ole Neustrup, Bureau Chief S3, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 July 2000. Also, remarks by Danish delegation at the meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on General Status of the Convention, Geneva, 30 May 2000.

Table 1. Governmental donations to mine action in calendar year 1999¹⁶

Agency	Country	Activity	Amount (DKK)	US\$
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)	Angola	Training program and information campaign in Toco north of Lubango	4,000,000	508,015
UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)	Kosovo	UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action in Kosovo	1,500,000	190,505
Danish Refugee Council	Angola	Information campaign etc.	5,000,000	635,019
UNOCHA	Afghanistan	Mine clearance program etc.	2,500,000	317,509
DanChurchAid	Kosovo	Mine education (total grant 1999-2000: 17.4 million)	11,900,000	1,511,346
NPA	Mozambique	Mine clearance program etc.	5,000,000	635,019
ADP/UNDP	Mozambique	Mine clearance program etc.	14,500,000	1,841,556
Mines Advisory Group	Vietnam	Bomb and mine clearance in Quang Tri Province (total grant 1998-1999)	7,100,000	901,727
OHR / DEMEX	Bosnia & Herzegovina	Identification of areas in Brcko where mine clearance is needed (Total grant 98-99)	460,000	58,421
DEMEX	Bosnia & Herzegovina	Mine clearance in Brcko (total grant 1998-1999)	1,720,000	218,446
Slovenian Trust Fund	Bosnia & Herzegovina	Demining (total grant 1998-1999)	700,000	88,902
Danish Demining Group	Somalia	Mine clearance (MIKA)	540,000	68,582
1999 IN TOTAL			54,920,000	6,975,047

¹⁶ Data supplied by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Conversion to U.S. dollars by Landmine Monitor researcher. Abbreviations -- UNOCHA: UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, ADP: Accelerated Demining Program, UNDP: UN Development Program, OHR: Office of the High Representative, Bosnia – Herzegovina.

Table 2. Governmental contributions to mine action in 1 January - 29 May 2000¹⁷

Agency	Country	Activity	Amount (DKK)	US\$
UNMAS	Mozambique	Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action in Mozambique	1,000,000	126,742
DFH /ASF	Chechnya	Mine awareness etc.	300,000	38,023
IPPNW	General	Support to mine campaigns	1,000,000	126,742
ICBL	International	Landmine Monitor initiative	350,000	44,360
DanChurchAid	Kosovo	Mine clearance program etc. (2 nd instalment of total grant 1999: 17.4 million)	5,500,000	697,085
DanChurchAid	Kosovo	Mine clearance program etc.	7,000,000	889,020
DanChurchAid	Chechnya	Mine clearance in Chechnya (3 rd instalment of 9.3 million)	2,300,000	291,508
UNDP	Laos	Bomb clearance program (total grant 1998-2000)	19,500,000	2,471,482
Nicaraguan Government	Nicaragua	Mine clearance program (total grant 1998-2000)	8,000,000	1,013,941
OAS	Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica	Mine clearance program (total grant 1998-2000)	15,000,000	1,901,140
IND/UNOPS	Mozambique	Technical assistance to National Demining Institute	2,972,700	376,768
Dandec	General	Grant to education in mine clearance	2,000,000	253,485
2000 (January-May) IN TOTAL			64,922,700	8,230,296

An additional DKK 5,000,000 is granted for the UNDP/CMAC mine clearance program in Cambodia, but not yet allocated, due to Danish dissatisfaction with Cambodia Mine Action Center management. Denmark will not disburse this grant until adequate guarantees for changes at CMAC are received.¹⁸

Research and Development (R&D)

The main R&D initiative is the Nordic Demining Research Forum (NDRF).¹⁹ The Danish machine manufacturer Hydrema has produced a civilian version of its mine clearance vehicle Hydrema MCV 910, which is used by Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)

¹⁷ Ibid. Abbreviations -- IPPNW: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, OAS: Organization of American States, IND: National Demining Institute, UNOPS: UN Office for Project Services.

¹⁸ Telephone interview with Ole Neustrup, Bureau Chief S3, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 July 2000.

¹⁹ For details see report on Norway in this edition of the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

in Angola and by DanChurchAid in Kosovo. Hydrema cooperates with these agencies to improve the design based on field experience.

Non-Governmental Organizations

Two NGOs in Denmark are involved in humanitarian mine action programs: DanChurchAid,²⁰ a humanitarian NGO connected to the Danish Church, and Danish Demining Group,²¹ a cooperative agency involving the Danish Refugee Council and Danish People's Aid. DanChurchAid is also the focal point for mine action in Action by Churches Together, a global cooperation of church organizations involved in humanitarian work. Both these NGOs receive a major part of official Danish mine action funds. A new NGO, Fonden Danmark mod Landminer, advocating the need to support mine action and the ban, is in the process of being established.²²

Landmine Casualties

Although some Danish peacekeepers have been injured by mines, it has not been possible to establish the exact number. Denmark has all modern medical and rehabilitation facilities.

FRANCE

Key developments since March 1999: France completed destruction of its nearly 1.1 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines in December 1999. France served as co-chair of the SCE on Technologies for Mine Action. The national commission to monitor ban treaty implementation became operational in June 1999. France contributed about US\$2.7 million to mine action programs in 1999, including donations to the EU.

Mine Ban Policy

France signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 25 June 1998. Domestic implementation legislation was enacted on 8 July 1998. Since then France has made rapid progress on implementation of the MBT.

In a December 1999 letter, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin noted, "Since the Convention's ratification and the adoption of the national law, France has defended the Mine Ban cause, victim assistance and mine clearance, in the framework of international fora as well as in numerous bilateral contacts. It seems to me that this determined diplomatic action has to remain the French Government's main contribution to the universalization of the Ottawa Convention."¹

Toward that end, the government created the Commission Nationale pour l'Élimination des Mines Anti-personnel (CNEMA, the National Commission for the Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines). Its mission is to ensure monitoring and

²⁰ DanChurchAid: www.dca.dk.

²¹ Telephone interview with Arne Vågen, Danish Demining Group. See also: arvc@drc.dk.

²² Information available at: www.finn.dk

¹ Letter from Prime Minister Lionel Jospin to Handicap International, received 16 December 1999.

enforcement of the MBT and of international actions by France to help landmine victims and to aid in mine clearance.² The Prime Minister attended the first meeting in June 1999; there have been five meetings since then. CNEMA is noteworthy for including nongovernmental organizations such as Handicap International. CNEMA representatives have attended the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) meetings as part of the French delegation, and witnessed stockpile destruction. The CNEMA annual report, due to be presented to the Prime Minister in July 2000, includes an account of French implementation measures and also recommendations which have been the result of discussions among different components of the CNEMA.

The government participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999, where it agreed to serve as co-chair of the newly established SCE on Technologies for Mine Action. France has attended meetings of all the Standing Committees of Experts. The Ministry of Defense made a presentation at the Stockpile Destruction SCE on 22 May 2000.³

France submitted its first Article 7 report on 26 August 1999, covering the period 1 March 1999 to 31 July 1999. Some information was considered unclear by the Observatoire des Transferts d'Armements that led to discussion in the CNEMA. These questions were resolved in the second report, submitted on 3 May 2000, covering the period 1 August 1999 to 31 March 2000.

France has taken other initiatives in favor of universalization and implementation of the MBT. When French mine stockpiles were destroyed at the end of 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a press release to all embassies with the instruction to present this information to local authorities and raise the landmine issue with them.⁴ In 1999 the ICBL contacted all of the Francophonie Heads of States about universalisation and implementation of the MBT. After the Francophonie summit, Jacques Chirac informed Handicap International that "the issue had effectively been debated among Heads of States and governments in Moncton.... The Action Plan we adopted includes this commitment and the expression of our willingness to contribute to the implementation of the provisions of this fundamental text."⁵ A new resolution was adopted during the Francophonie Parliamentary Assembly, which was held in Yaounde in Cameroon in July 2000.

A few days before the first anniversary of the entry into force of the MBT on 1 March 2000, France confirmed its intention to organize, jointly with Canada, a regional

² Law n°98-564 of 8 July 1998 with the intent of eliminating antipersonnel mines, article 9: "A National Committee for the Elimination of Antipersonnel landmines shall be created, to be composed of Government representatives, two deputies and two senators, representatives from humanitarian organisations and representatives from corporate management and organised labor," *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 587-588.

³ Handicap International has expressed concern that given the fact that France completed destruction of its stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in 1999, it could play a major role in the SCE on stockpile destruction, but the Ministry of Defense has not made any concrete proposals to help other countries or play an active role in this important aspect of implementation of the treaty.

⁴ Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 9 May 2000.

⁵ Letter from Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, to Philippe Chabasse, Director of Handicap International, 13 September 1999.

seminar in Africa to “promote universality and comprehensive implementation of the Ottawa Convention.”⁶ It is planned to take place in the beginning of 2001.

France ratified Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 4 March 1998, and attended the First Conference of States Parties to the protocol in December 1999, having submitted its report as required under Article 13. France supports the European Union initiative to have an AP mine transfer ban apply to countries which are not MBT signatories, but regrets the lack of commitment by other States on this issue.⁷

During the United Nations General Assembly in September 1999 France tried unsuccessfully to propose a resolution supporting mine ban deliberations in all relevant fora, including the Conference on Disarmament (CD). It was withdrawn after strong opposition and, the government fully supported the UNGA resolution 54/54B in December 1999.

Production

A moratorium on AP mine production was announced in September 1995, later superseded by the national legislation of 8 July 1998 implementing the MBT in France.⁸ Additionally, the Ministry of Defense stated that the interministerial commission responsible for war material export authorizations would refuse any request concerning components which could be used in the production of AP mines.⁹

Companies which were previously involved in this industry are still not transparent on what has happened to AP mine-production facilities. In a letter responding to the President of the CNEMA, SAE Alsetex stated that since 1995 it has converted its former production facilities, has not produced AP mines since 1982, and never licensed production of either AP mines or their components. Surprisingly, Giat Industries stated that it has never developed, produced nor sold any AP mines, components or disseminating system, does not possess AP mine-production facilities, and has not licensed production of AP mines or their components.¹⁰ Yet Giat has long been identified as one of the two major landmine producers in France, after the company bought Poudres Réunies de Belgique in 1990.¹¹

Presented with inquiries regarding some French antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that may function as AP mines, and if so, would therefore be banned

⁶ Fax from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Handicap International, 25 February 2000.

⁷ Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 May 2000.

⁸ For details of types of mines produced and manufacturers, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 590-596.

⁹ Letter from Christian Lechervy, Ministry of Defense, 15 May 2000.

¹⁰ Letters annexed to the CNEMA annual report: “1999 Annual Report,” Commission Nationale pour l’Élimination des Mines Antipersonnel, Section II, Chapter 5, (to be published in September 2000); available at the Documentation Française or from the CNEMA, 35 rue Saint Dominique, 75700 Paris.

¹¹ Belkacem Elomari and Bruno Barillot, *Le Complexe Français de Production des Mines et Systèmes Associés*, (Observatoire des Transferts d’Armements, 1997), p. 46.

by the MBT,¹² the Ministry of Defense responded as indicated in the list below.¹³ Further investigations of mines stated as “currently stockpiled” will be carried out by NGOs.

1. Mines that, according the Ministry of Defense, have been studied but never produced:
 - APILAS (inherent anti-disturbance features)
 - APILAS-APA (break wire sensor package)
 - HPD 1-A (inherent anti-disturbance features)
 - HPD 2 (inherent anti-disturbance features, cocked striker mechanism in firing chain)
 - HPD 3 (inherent anti-disturbance features)
 - ACPM (contains secondary fuze wells for antihandling device)
 - HPD (seismic sensor and magnetic influence fuze),
 - M AZ AC Wide Area Mine (acoustic sensors),
 - MI AC PM E (pressure plate, unknown sensitivity)
 - MI AC DISP (unknown antihandling capability),
 - MITRAL (item in development, unknown sensitivity of pressure fuze)
2. Mines that are currently stockpiled, according to the Ministry of Defense:
 - HPD F 2 (inherent anti-disturbance features)
 - MIACAH F1 (break wire fuze)
 - MI AC Disp F1 (magnetic influence fuze)
3. Mines that have been destroyed, according to the Ministry of Defense:
 - MI AC M CC MLE 56 (also designated Model 1956, tilt rod fuze)
 - Model 48/55 (can be used with M1954 tilt rod fuze)
 - Type 1954 (tilt rod fuze)
 - Model 1947 (provisions for one or two booby trap fuzes)
 - Model 1948 (Model 1952 Pressure/Pressure Release fuze provides an anti-withdrawal feature)
 - Model 1948 T (including tilt rod variant)
 - Model 1951 -- including all metallic, nonmetallic, tilt rod, and shaped charge variants -- (contains secondary fuze wells for antihandling device, such as M1951 fuze)
 - Model 1951 Grille (contains secondary fuze wells for antihandling device, cocked striker mechanism in firing chain)
 - Model 1952 -- including all metallic, nonmetallic, tilt rod, and shaped charge variants -- (contains secondary fuze wells for antihandling device, such as M1951 fuze)

¹² Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” Prepared for the First Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 10-11 January 2000, pp. 7-9.

¹³ Letter from Christian Lechervy, Ministry of Defense, 15 May 2000.

- Type 542-L (contains secondary fuze wells for antihandling device)
 - Type 1953 (uses unknown mine as initiating charge, other fuzing unknown)
 - In addition, HPD F 1 (inherent anti-disturbance features) is awaiting destruction.
4. Mines which are unknown to the Ministry of Defense:
- L14A1 (variant produced for UK contains break wire)
 - ACL 89 (item in development, seismic and IR sensors)
 - ATM Heavy (unknown nomenclature, motion sensitive fuze)
 - ATM Light (unknown nomenclature, motion sensitive fuze)
 - GIAT Lance (magnetic influence fuze)
 - MACIPE (unknown antihandling capability)
 - MI AC PR F2 (pressure plate, unknown sensitivity)
 - MI AS DISP (unknown antihandling capability)
5. Mines for which France stopped its participation in research and development:
- MI AC PED GIAT (item in development, break wire sensor)
 - MI AC PED ARGES (in development with GE and UK, IR sensor)

In the lists above, the descriptions are taken from a Human Rights Watch document outlining antivehicle mines with antihandling devices of concern.¹⁴

Transfer

France was an exporter of landmines in the past.¹⁵ Questioned about France's interpretation of the MBT prohibition on "assist" with respect to transfer and transit, the Ministry of Defense stated that any transfer or transit operation for another purpose than the ones authorized under Article 3 of the Convention would be considered as illicit.¹⁶

Stockpile and Destruction

On 20 December 1999, France destroyed its last AP mines in the presence of Alain Richard, Minister of Defense, three years ahead of the MBT deadline. In its second Article 7 report, France gives significant details about its stockpile, including names, quantities, lot numbers, status and location of destruction (either within the country or overseas), and bodies responsible for the destruction (either the Army or private companies). Seven different types of fuzes have also been destroyed.

¹⁴ HRW, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," 10-11 January 2000, pp. 7-9.

¹⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 596-598. It had been indicated that France had exported AP mines to Rwanda in 1992, but a declassified document from the Interministerial Commission for the Study of War Matériel Exports indicated that on 16 April 1992 the Ministry of Defense authorized the export to Rwanda of 20,000 AP mines and 600 igniters. CNEMA has obtained documents which state that this export had been considered but vetoed by the International Relations Delegations of the General Directorate of Armament (Direction Générale de l'Armement) and by the Ministry of Defense. See: Paul Quilès, "Investigation of the Rwandan Tragedy (1990-1994)," National Assembly Report N° 1271, Volume 2, Appendices, 15 December 1998.

¹⁶ Letter from Christian Lechervy, Ministry of Defense, 15 May 2000.

Table 1. Mines which have been destroyed overseas by the French Army¹⁷

Date	Location	Number of Mines
6 and 7 September 1999	French Guyana	368
28 September 1999	Ivory Coast	120
11 and 12 October 1999	New Caledonia	1074
2,3 & 4 November 1999	Djibouti	2444
TOTAL		4006

Between 17 June 1996 and 20 December 1999 a total of 1,098,281 mines, 192,439 fuzes and 132,786 components have been destroyed, as detailed in Table 2.

Table 2. Progress of AP Mine destruction 1996-1999¹⁸

	Destroyed since 1996 by DCMAT*	Destroyed since 1997 by other Army bodies	Destroyed in 1998 by private companies	Destroyed in 1999 by private companies	Destroyed overseas by Army	Total	Total retained
APMs	88,348	4,006	706,865	295,056	4,006	1,098,281	3,873
Fuzes	4,351	683	169,321	18,068	16	192,439	0

*Direction Centrale du Matériel de l'Armée de Terre (DCMAT)

In addition to the above, the private company Formetal destroyed 132,786 components, and 2,996 exercise AP mines were destroyed by Formetal and AF Demil in 1998 and 1999. Greater detail of the destruction of French stockpile, including a breakdown by year, type of mines, numbers, date, site of and the entity responsible for destruction is given in the CNEMA report.¹⁹

The second Article 7 report gives the actual total of French mines retained for training purposes, as permitted under the MBT, as 3,873 and details its composition, plus 641 foreign AP mines, totalling 4,514.²⁰ This stock can be renewed. NGOs have encouraged France to include in its Article 7 reports not only the composition but also the use of this stock. This issue is also of concern to the CNEMA, as stated in its first annual report.²¹

In its second Article 7 report, France also mentioned a suspected mined area in the military storage area of La Doudah, a French military zone on the territory of Djibouti. This situation seemed to have occurred after torrential rains prevented the total clearance of this minefield. France reported that this area being inside a military zone is not

¹⁷ "La France détruit ses dernières mines antipersonnel," Ministry of Defense, press file 20 December 1999.

¹⁸ Article 7 Report, 1 August 1999-31 March 2000.

¹⁹ "1999 Annual Report," CNEMA, to be released September 2000.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, 1 August 1999-31 March 2000.

²¹ "1999 Annual Report," CNEMA, to be released September 2000.

accessible to the public, does not pose any danger to people and is properly marked and posted with warning signs.

Use

During parliamentary debates in June 1998, the Minister of Defense said that France had already declared before the Atlantic Alliance that “it would unreservedly enforce the Ottawa Treaty. France will prohibit the planned or actual use of antipersonnel mines in any military operation whatsoever by its military personnel. Furthermore, France will refuse to agree to rules of engagement in any military operation calling for the use of antipersonnel mines.”²² This was made effective in a directive sent out by the Joint Chief of Staff in November 1998.

During the NATO air operation in Kosovo in early 1999, some parliamentarians questioned the government on this issue, and the government answered that “during the conflict in Kosovo, France did not use either antipersonnel landmines or submunitions....”²³

The ICBL has called on all NATO members to adopt a NATO-wide policy of non-use of AP mines in joint operations. In October 1999 Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, recalled the directives officially stated by the Chief of Staff in November 1998, which forbid any French military personnel to use APMs, participate in planning operations employing use of APMs, or give an agreement to any document mentioning a possible use. These elements were presented in the framework of a NATO military working group in May 1998. The Minister added that if France cannot determine the rules that the army of another State has to obey, it recommends in case of joint operation the use of means in accordance with the MBT. France will make sure that rules adopted by its partners will not put it in a position which would contradict its international commitment.²⁴

Mine Action Funding

In 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a new “Fund for Aid for Cooperation” (FAC) for mine action programs, which will be endowed with FF 20 million (US\$2.85 million) for a period of three years. While signalling its interest in mine action, the amount is small to cover all activities related to mine action, including victim assistance. (Funds from the FAC will not be used for research and development in demining technology.) Both French NGOs and CNEMA have encouraged the government to increase this endowment rapidly.

Projects funded from the FAC will have to be implemented in a country either signatory or State Party to the MBT, with an exception for humanitarian considerations. This policy helps promote the MBT and follows existing European Union policy. The beneficiary country must also be identified as a priority in the French Co-operation policy. FAC funds will be able to be used via UN agencies in a specific country.

²² Extract from speech by Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Debate, Official Journal of the French Republic, unabridged report of Parliamentary sessions of Thursday, 25 June 1998, pp. 5402-5403.

²³ Answer from Ministry of Defense to written question from Marie-Claude Beaudeau, n° 19132, 30 September 1999.

²⁴ Letter to ICBL from Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 October 1999.

France also wants to pay special attention to other sponsors of a project, in order to maximize coordination and the effectiveness of projects. However, French implementing agencies (whether NGOs or not), which are not numerous in this field, are still favored in funding decisions. This can inhibit the work of French and international NGOs attempting to coordinate projects together and limits the ability to respond to needs in the field.²⁵ By changing this policy, France could have a presence in countries where no French agencies are operating but which are a high priority for the French government.

The total French contribution to mine action programs in 1999 was about US\$2.74 million, including bilateral and multilateral programs, as well as its share of EU contributions to mine action.

Table 3. French involvement in mine action programs in 1999:

A. bilateral aid

Country	Amount in Francs	Beneficiary	Allocation
Kosovo	1 million (\$160,000)	Handicap International	Mine Clearance
Senegal	1 million (\$160,000)	Handicap International	Mine Awareness

B. multilateral aid

Country	Amount in Francs	Beneficiary	Allocation
Kosovo	600,000 (\$98,000)	International Trust Fund	Mine Clearance
	2 million (\$330,000)	UN Mine Action Service	
	Non evaluated	KFOR/demining activities	113 military personnel ²⁶
Croatia	1 million (\$160,000)	CROMAC	
	Non Evaluated	WEU	Secondment of one person

France has also supported mine action through its contributions to the European Union. Its share represents 17.2 percent of the total, which means for 1999 a contribution equivalent to 1,938,268 Euros.

²⁵ For example, this is the case with Handicap International, the Mines Advisory Group and Norwegian People's Aid, which have set up a policy of cooperation and coordination of their efforts.

²⁶ Information given by the Ministry of Defense to the CNEMA, 15 March 2000.

Table 4. European Union funding of mine action 1998 and (provisional estimates) 1999

Year	1998 (amount in ECUs)	1999 (amount in Euros)
Mine action	15,782,423	11,179,476
General ²⁷	8,000,000	89,522
Research and development	8,370,000	8,550,095
Overall total	32,153,413	19,839,093
French share of the total	5,530,387	3,412,324
French share of EU contribution to mine action (excluding R&D)	4,090,576	1,938,268

Due to the complex European system regarding mine action funding, it is extremely difficult to get a comprehensive picture (and figures) of what has actually been done. However, it is noticeable that the difference between the two years is mainly due to specific support dedicated to the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1998 for victim assistance in the context of a joint action adopted by EU member states in 1997.

The data for 1999 is of more interest, as it shows a reduction in the amount dedicated to mine action but consistently high support for research and development (which is not always immediately useful for the poorest mine-affected communities). Claiming to be one of the major contributors to mine action, the European Union and its member States have already been encouraged by NGOs to improve the transparency of their actual involvement in mine action.

France is often unclear regarding mine action undertaken by French soldiers in multilateral peacekeeping operations, such as in Kosovo. What the Army considers as operational demining is often blurred with French support for humanitarian demining. For instance, in his answer to one Member of Parliament, the Minister of Defense stated, "In Kosovo, the Leclerc Brigade has undertaken many actions since its installation in the Mitrovica region: mine awareness for local population, survey, marking and demining, notably to secure the work of International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia officers, inventory of munitions and control of military storage."²⁸

But other sources indicate the difference: "In Kosovo, the French Armies do not participate directly to humanitarian demining but support mine action undertaken by NGOs or Governmental organisations, notably with mine awareness operation for local populations.... The mine awareness team is not trained nor qualified to execute neither operational demining nor any humanitarian demining missions."²⁹ While the military plays a valuable role in this situation, their mandate is to secure the area under their

²⁷ In 1998, "General" meant a contribution to the ICRC appeal for assistance to mine victims and mine awareness through funding from the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In 1999, it was a contribution from DGVIII to a study researched by HI-France on the use of mechanical devices in support of humanitarian demining operations.

²⁸ Answer from Ministry of Defense to written question from Marie-Claude Beaudeau, n° 19132, 30 September 1999.

²⁹ "La France détruit ses dernières mines antipersonnel," Ministry of Defense, press file, 20 December 1999.

responsibility. French forces do not have a mandate to respond to civilian requests for mine clearance. France provides some support for humanitarian demining through the secondment of qualified personnel to UN mine action centers for example, as it has in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, French NGOs (especially Handicap International, the only French organization implementing mine action programs) have asked the French government to be more involved in humanitarian demining, either through a broader funding policy or the secondment of deminers from the Civil Security to NGOs and international organizations.

Research and Development (R&D)

Significant funds have been invested since 1993 in the research and development of mine clearance technologies, mainly into countermine techniques with few possible applications for humanitarian demining.³⁰ The CNEMA has pointed out that minefield breaching does not correspond to today's humanitarian mine clearance needs, and even the French Army has to buy mine clearance technology abroad. CNEMA also underlined the absence of dynamic French companies in this field, as compared with the United States, Germany and Sweden, as well as an apparent lack of understanding of the differences between demining for military and for civilian purposes.³¹

Research programs in France are mainly in the fields of mine-affected area identification, mine detection, mine clearance and management in the framework of military operations. Private companies involved include Thomson CSF and SAGEM for detection systems, Giat Industries, Matra Baé, DCN/ Saint Nicolas and ITS for demining systems. Different governmental bodies, mainly attached to the Ministry of Defense, also develop their own research, mainly the Etablissements Techniques de Bourges et d'Angers. For test purposes, a minefield will be set up in Bourges during 2000, under the supervision of the Armament General Directorate (DGA) of the Ministry of Defense.

Table 5. French investment (in millions of Francs) in research and development 1993-2003 (amounts for 2000 to 2003 are estimated)

Year	Detection	Clearance	Decoys	Counter-Mining	Total (US\$ million)*
1993-1998	36.4	2.3	2	5.5	46.2 (\$8.385)
1998	1.4	0	0	0.4	1.8 (\$0.305)
1999	22.5	1.9	0	1	25.4 (\$4.127)
2000	26.2	7	5	4	42.2 (\$6.432)
2001	25.2	4.6	6	0	35.8 (\$5.457)
2002	8	3	4	0	15 (\$2.286)
2003	0	4	15	0	19 (\$2.896)

*dollar equivalents are calculated at the average for each time-period

³⁰ "1999 Annual Report," CNEMA, July 2000.

³¹ Ibid.

In addition to this investment in R&D, the French Army has also been authorized by the Parliament to spend approximately FF 1,803 million on new detection and countermining systems between 2001 and 2015.³²

Victim Assistance

Victim assistance does not appear to be a priority for the French government. No specific budget for victim assistance appears in information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999. There seems to be a confusion for the French government between what can be considered as direct and immediate assistance to a mine victim and what is required from States Parties as legal obligations under the MBT. In many written answers to Members of Parliament, the government explained at length its policy on the mine ban or mine clearance, but gave only a couple of lines to victim assistance.

In February 1999 Handicap International (HI), which is the major French NGO in the field of victim assistance, called on the government to become involved in comprehensive and long-term cooperation with other States Parties which are developing policies for support for work with the disabled, including mine victim assistance. HI also has begun to work on the rights of mine victims, as part of its continuing efforts (with other French NGOs) to promote the MBT and its full implementation by State Parties. In 1999 HI dedicated its campaign to the rights of the mine victims, culminating with the organization of a shoe pyramid and a day of national mobilization against landmines. The most recent event in September 1999 took place in 19 cities and was attended by over 40,000 people. On 1 March 2000, the second anniversary of the entry into force of the MBT, HI organized a postcard campaign to Members of Parliament, the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic to question the low level of France's commitment to victim assistance and mine clearance, and ask the French government to lead the battle for the rights of mine victims. The official response was non-committal, and HI intends to develop this important issue in the coming months.

GERMANY

Key developments since March 1999: In 1999, Germany contributed about US\$18.1 million to humanitarian mine action programs, including its share of EU mine action spending. Germany served as the co-rapporteur for the SCE on Technologies for Mine Action.

Mine Ban Policy

Germany signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) in Ottawa on 3 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 27 July 1998. Domestic implementation legislation was enacted on 9 July 1998. Germany was an early supporter of a ban on AP mines. It adopted an export moratorium in 1994, banned use of the weapon in 1996, and completed destruction of its stockpile in December 1997.

Germany participated in the First Meeting of State Parties to the MBT in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999, where the State Minister of the German Foreign Office Dr.

³² Ibid.

Ludger Volmer spoke on behalf of the presidency of the European Union (EU). In his statement, he reconfirmed the commitment of the European Union to the goal of the total elimination of antipersonnel mines.¹ It has served as co-rapporteur (with Yemen) of the MBT's intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Technologies for Mine Action; it has also participated in all the meetings of the other four SCEs in 1999 and 2000. In December 1999, it voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for universalization and full implementation of the MBT, as it had with the previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions.

The government submitted its first MBT Article 7 report on 31 August 1999, followed by the second report on 30 April 2000.²

On 12 April 2000, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs submitted its 1999 report on disarmament to Parliament in which it outlined the government's clear steps toward the prohibition of AP mines and reconfirmed its commitment to the disarmament as well as the humanitarian obligations of the MBT.³ The report states that Germany "regrets the absence of important states like China, Russia and the USA. Their joining would be very important for the desirable universalization of the Ottawa Convention."⁴

With respect to the issue of joint military operations with a non-signatory to the MBT who uses AP mines, German legislation definitively forbids under any circumstance involvement in AP mine-laying operations whether in Germany or elsewhere.⁵ While the government does not want to interfere in the military strategy of another state, it must ensure that German soldiers do not violate the law. The Ministry of Defense says, "[A]s far as joint and combined operations are concerned German soldiers will be in full compliance with the Ottawa Convention and national laws."⁶ How German soldiers would avoid violations if a non-MBT ally were to use AP mines in joint operations has not been explained.

Germany is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and ratified the Amended Protocol II on 2 May 1997. It participated in the May 1999 preparatory meeting for the Conference on Protocol II, submitted its report as required under Article 13 and participated in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Protocol II in December 1999. The German Initiative to Ban Landmines (GIBL) took particular note of the government's position in the CCW on AT mines, since this international forum deals also with antitank (antivehicle) mines which cause in the view of the GIBL a similar humanitarian impact to antipersonnel mines. As the German

¹ Intervention by State Minister Dr. Ludger Volmer, German Foreign Office, On behalf of the Presidency of the European Union, delivered at the First Meeting of State Parties to the MBT, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999; see also, "Europa bleibt treibende Kraft im Ottawa-Prozeß" ("Europe remains a driving force within the Ottawa-process"), press release 4 May 1999, available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de>.

² Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 31 August 1999, covering 1 March 1999-27 August 1999; MBT, Article 7 Report, submitted 30 April 2000, covering 1 January 1999-31 December 1999, available at: <http://domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf>.

³ Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp. 17 ff.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I (Federal Law Gazette, Part I), No. 43, 9 July 1998, p. 1778.

⁶ Letter from Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 15 May 2000.

delegation to the Conference stated: "[A] special value of the Amended Protocol II, in our view, is that it addresses problems of weapons not covered by the Ottawa Convention, in particular anti-vehicle mines."⁷ Germany called for technical restrictions in order "to minimize the dangers resulting from long-lived or non-detectable mines."⁸ The GIBL considers it doubtful that technical restrictions can significantly reduce the effects of antitank mines on civilians.⁹

The German government has also consistently stated that any developments on the AP mine issue in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) must not "fall behind the achievements of the Ottawa Convention" and that it views the Mine Ban Treaty as "the comprehensive legal instrument on the subject of anti-personnel mines which should gain universal acceptance. The CD could contribute to this objective by negotiating solutions to specific areas..."¹⁰

Production

As reported in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, Germany no longer produces AP mines.¹¹ Germany continues to produce and to develop antitank mines¹² and other mine related technology.¹³ The government, in a report to Parliament, argues that AT mines enable the military to reduce its personnel costs. It declares that the threat of these mines to civilians is reduced by self-neutralization mechanisms, which are designed to deactivate the mines after a certain time (at the longest, after forty days).¹⁴ However, in the view of the GIBL, since the self-neutralization mechanisms are not one hundred percent reliable, the threat of AT mines to civilians remains.¹⁵

⁷ Statement by the German delegation to the First Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 15-17 December 1999.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ For examples of the impact of AT mines see Thomas Küchenmeister, "Antipersonnel Effects of Antivehicle Mines – Why Antivehicle Mines should also be Banned," German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Berlin, January 2000, available at: <http://www.landmine.de>.

¹⁰ Reports of the Permanent Delegation of the German Federal Republic to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 25 January and 13 December 1999.

¹¹ For past production, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 611-613.

¹² "Antivehicle" mine and "antitank" mine are used interchangeably in this report. For past production of antitank mines, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 614-618. In last year's *Landmine Monitor*, it was reported that the high-tech COBRA area-denial mine was under development, but on 9 March 2000, officials of the Ministry of Defense said that funds for its development had been suspended; it is not known what the reason is for the suspension or if such "suspension" is permanent.

¹³ For information on the concerns of the GIBL regarding this production, in particular mine-related patents held by German companies, see the longer version of this report, available at: <http://www.landmine.de>.

¹⁴ Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/667, <http://www.bundestag.de>: "The main task of our armed forces remains the national and alliance defense. Especially in times of decreasing troop strength the Federal Armed Forces need technical aids in order to fulfill their mission. Anti-Tank-Mines belong to those technical aids."

¹⁵ Rae McGrath, *Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance - A Resource Book*, (London: Sterling, 2000), p. 11. McGrath refers to off-the-record statements of producers and military which estimate the failure rate of correctly deployed self-neutralizing landmines at around ten percent.

The ICBL, GIBL, and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have expressed concerns about antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes that might function like AP mines -- explode from the unintentional act of a person -- and therefore are banned under the MBT. In its argument for AT mines, the government makes no mention of these particular mines. The GIBL has identified the following mines as those which may be in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty or Amended Protocol II: AT1 because of its built-in antihandling/antidisturbance device; DM1233/AT2 because of its built-in antihandling/antidisturbance device and magnetic fuze; DM-12/PARM-1 because of its built-in breakwire sensor; DM-21 because of its built-in tilt rod; DM 31/FFV 028 SD and MIFF because of their built-in antihandling/antidisturbance-device and magnetic fuze; MUSPA, PM-60/K-1 (ex-GDR), TM-62P3 (ex-GDR) because of their built-in antihandling/antidisturbance-device; COBRA because of its built-in antihandling/antidisturbance device and its penetration warhead; SMART155(AM) because of its fragmentation warhead.¹⁶

Member organizations of the GIBL published an open letter to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder detailing these concerns,¹⁷ which was widely taken up by the media.¹⁸ The Ministry of Defense responded to assure that the government adheres to the MBT and disputed that the MUSPA targets people, stating that it is not a prohibited weapon.¹⁹ It is interesting to note, however, that in its recent Article 7 report, Italy lists the MUSPA (and the MIFF) as AP mines or weapons that can function like an AP mine.²⁰

In November 1999, the Ministry of Defense confirmed that it planned to export 36,000 AT-2 antitank mines to Greece.²¹ The AT-2 is an antivehicle mine of concern because of its antihandling features, which might make it act as an AP mine. The government takes the view that the AT-2 mine cannot be detonated by the unintentional act of a person.²²

Stockpiling and Destruction

Germany states that in December 1997 the destruction of all AP mines of the German Armed Forces including those of the former German Democratic Republic was

¹⁶ See GIBL website at: <http://www.landmine.de> The ICRC and other members of the ICBL, such as Human Rights Watch, have also developed lists of antivehicle mines of concern. Variations in such lists point to the need for States Parties to clarify the status of such mines.

¹⁷ German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Open Letter to the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Berlin, 11 November 1999.

¹⁸ For example: *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22 November 1999; *die tageszeitung*, 22 November 1999; *AFP Agence France-Presse*, 22 November 1999; *Berliner Morgenpost*, 22 November 1999; *Sindelfinger Zeitung*, 22 November 1999; *Berliner Zeitung*, 22 November 1999.

¹⁹ *die tageszeitung*, 22 November 1999; *Sindelfinger Zeitung*, 22 November 1999.

²⁰ Italy, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 29 March 2000, Annex B-1.

²¹ *Associated Press*, 3 November 1999; *die tageszeitung*, 4 November 1999. The GIBL had begun looking into this export, which was widely reported in the German media: *die tageszeitung*, 3 November 1999; *Associated Press*, 3 November 1999; *Handelsblatt*, 3 November 1999; *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 4 November 1999; *Südwest Presse*, 4 November 1999; *Rhein-Zeitung*, 4 November 1999; *Berliner Zeitung*, 4 November 1999; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 4 November; *Freitag*, 5 November 1999.

²² Letter from Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 10 February 2000.

completed, with the exception of approximately 3,000 AP mines retained for training and technical tests, as permitted under the MBT.²³ In May 2000, the Ministry of Defense clarified that the DM 39, a weapon that seems to be able to serve as either an antihandling device or as an AP mine, is no longer in use, and destruction of stocks should be finished within the year 2000.²⁴

While there is no clear requirement under the MBT to report on stockpiles destroyed before entry into force of the treaty, it would be desirable, in the interests of full transparency, for Germany to report on the dismantling methods and types and quantities of AP mines destroyed, as well as information on the conversion of former AP mine production facilities (especially facilities of the Former German Democratic Republic).²⁵

The United States has more than 112,000 AP mines stockpiled in Germany, according to Human Rights Watch, including approximately 75,000 U.S. Army ADAM, 16,000 Army GEMSS, 14,000 Air Force Gator, 6,000 Volcano and 1,000 MOPMS AP mines.²⁶ Germany's Article 7 reports fail to mention stockpiles of U.S. AP mines in Germany. The government's position is that under the Status on Foreign Forces Agreement, weapons of foreign forces within Germany are not under German jurisdiction or control,²⁷ and thus Germany is not obligated to destroy those mines, or to request the U.S. to remove them. This understanding was reiterated by representatives of the Ministry of Defense in March 2000.²⁸ This position accords with the Memorandum of

²³ Article 7 Reports, Form D, submitted 31 August 1999 and 30 April 2000. Also, interview with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 9 March 2000; Report to the OSCE, 13 December 1999; Letter from Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 15 May 2000. Quantities of AP mines destroyed were reported in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 620-621. One source has said there is some evidence that some mines, reported as destroyed, had been transferred to other countries prior to the destruction of stocks. Thomas Küchenmeister and Otfried Nassauer, "*Gute Mine*" zum bösen Spiel: Landminen made in Germany (Idstein: Komzi-Verlag, 1995), p. 119.

²⁴ Letter from Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 15 May 2000. The U.S. Defense Department describes the DM 39 as an antipersonnel mine which is "intended for emplacement under an antitank mine. Its pressure release fuze, with clockwork-regulated arming delay, allows this mine to be used directly in its antilift role safely and without modification" (*Mine Facts*, Department of Defense, CD-ROM database, undated). The German Ministry of Defense had taken the view that the DM 39 is not an AP mine, rather an explosive charge with a pressure release fuze.

²⁵ For instance it was reported in the press that the Spreewerk former munitions production factory in Lübben in the German Democratic Republic was converted into a munitions dismantling works. "Im Spreewerk werden 300.000 Landminen zu einem Haufen Asche" (Spreewerk destroys 300,000 landmines into ashes), *Die Welt*, 8 February 2000.

²⁶ Data as of 1997. Provided to Human Rights Watch by U.S. government sources in March 1999.

²⁷ "Tretminen – Verbotene Lagerung" (Pedal Mines – Prohibited Stockpiling), *Spiegel*, 21, 1998, p. 20: "According to the Agreement on the stay of foreign forces and Nato's Status on foreign Forces Agreement weapons of foreign forces and their stockpiling does not fall under German control," argues the spokesperson of the German Ministry of Defense." Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 2 December 1997: "Wie alle andern Waffen unterliegen auch die US Landminen aufgrund obiger Bestimmungen nicht der Kontrolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland." ("Due to regulations mentioned above [SOFA] US landmines like all other weapons do not fall under control of the Federal Republic of Germany.")

²⁸ Interview with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 9 March 2000.

Understanding issued in January 1998, at the time of Germany's ratification of the MBT.²⁹

Transfer

In 1994 the government declared a unilateral export moratorium on AP mines, which was prolonged indefinitely in 1996 and then superceded with the total ban under the MBT.³⁰

On the related issue of transit – movement of a foreign force's AP mines across the territory of a state party -- the government has said, "According to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), storage and transport of APM for the purpose of stationed forces is legally permitted, as these weapons do not come under German sovereignty or control."³¹

Mine Action Funding³²

At the FMSP in May 1999, the State Minister, in speaking on behalf of the presidency of the European Union (EU), highlighted three main points regarding mine action. First, he stressed that "in 1998, total funding by the European Commission and Member States in landmine-related activities amounted to approximately US\$95 million," making the EU "the world's major donor in these areas." Second, he emphasized that "the EU will focus its efforts on State Parties, and on signatories who fully observe in practice the principles and objectives laid down in the Convention." Third was the principle that "mine clearance cannot be disconnected from the general development strategy of a state. This raises automatically the questions, which area should be cleared at first, and what should happen with it afterwards."³³

The GIBL points out that efforts to concretely describe the relationship between mine clearance and development have primarily come from the NGO community. The fundamental principle is that humanitarian mine action and development require the combination of mine clearance, mine awareness, and mine victim rehabilitation with reconstruction, reconciliation, and peacekeeping/building activities, as laid out comprehensively in NGO-developed guidelines known as the "Bad Honnef Framework."³⁴ The GIBL continues to press the government to make all of its funding decisions in such a framework.

²⁹ For details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 608-609.

³⁰ For past export, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 618-620.

³¹ Letter from the German Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 26 June 2000. Also, interview with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Berlin, 9 March 2000.

³² The exchange rate used throughout this report is US\$1 = DM 1.9.

³³ Intervention by State Minister Dr. Ludger Volmer, FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999; see also, press release 4 May 1999.

³⁴ In 1997 at a conference held in Bad Honnef, Germany, international experts, those involved in program work in the field, and mine campaigners gathered to develop guidelines for mine action programs from a development-oriented point of view, which became known as the "Bad Honnef Framework." This was further refined in a second conference held in 1999. See "Mine Action Programs From a Development-Oriented Point of View" ("The Bad Honnef Framework"), the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Revised Version, 1999, available at: <http://www.landmine.de>. The Bad Honnef Framework is also available in Arabic, French, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Chinese and Russian. Please contact the GIBL (email: gibl.haake@t-online.de).

In 1999, Germany contributed DM 21.7 million (US\$11.4 million) to humanitarian mine action programs, plus another \$6.7 million as its share of EU mine action spending. The GIBL commends the German government for its continued spending in this area, even if this was not an increase from the level of 1998.³⁵

From 1993-1999, German contributions to humanitarian mine action totaled DM 108 million (\$57 million). Programs are funded primarily by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development. In 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent DM 19.67 million (\$10.35 million) on mine action programs, as detailed in Table 1.

Table 1. Funding of humanitarian mine action by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999³⁶

COUNTRY	TYPE OF ASSISTANCE	DM	US\$ EQUIVALENT
Angola	Support of mine clearance projects of NGO Menschen gegen Minen in Bengo Province; support of mine clearance projects of the NGO Stiftung Sankt Barbara in Cunene Province	2,210,000	1,163,158
Guinea-Bissau	Delivery of mine detectors	50,000	26,316
Chad	Delivery of mine detectors	110,000	57,895
Zimbabwe	Support of the UN assessment mission	20,000	10,526
Mozambique	Provision of a German technical advisor, physician and equipment for national mine clearance agency CND; support of a mine clearance project of NGO Phoenix; support for testing of airborne multisensor mine detector	1,050,000	552,632
Somalia	Support of an level II-survey	200,000	105,263
Afghanistan	Support of UN emergency aid program; support of Afghan NGO Mine Dog Center for education and use of mine tracker dogs; support through experts, provision of 75 detection tools to UNOCHA; support of "Female & Children Mine Awareness" program and mechanical mine clearance program of Afghan NGO OMAR	5,430,000	2,857,895
Tadjikistan	Provision of detection tools for increase national mine clearance capacity	80,000	42,105
Yemen	Provision of personnel to UN mine clearance program	80,000	42,105
Vietnam	Support of mine clearance project of NGO Solidaritätsdienst International within resettlement program; support of NGO Potsdam Kommunikation for UXO survey in Hue Province	950,000	500,000
Laos	Support of a project to clear mines and UXOs (with German supervisor of Laos demining teams)	2,170,000	1,142,105

³⁵ For details of German spending on mine action pre-1999, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 621-624, also a longer version of the report on Germany in 1999, available at: <http://www.landmine.de>.

³⁶ Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp. 63-65.

COUNTRY	TYPE OF ASSISTANCE	DM	US\$ EQUIVALENT
Cambodia	Support of mine clearance project in Siem Reap Province; field testing and operation of Rhino mine clearance technology with Cambodia Mine Action Center	2,550,000	1,342,105
Kosovo	Support of mine/UXO clearance project of HELP; support of UXO clearance project of Potsdam Kommunikation; support of UXO clearance project of Halo Trust; provision of German military experts to MACC; support of the mine awareness project of Handicap International	1,570,000	826,316
Kosovo	Provision of DM 1.2 million to Slovenia's International Trust Fund (ITF) for continuation of projects in 2000	1,200,000	631,579
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Support of mine clearance project of HELP in the frame of reconstruction of Stup and Filipovic villages; support of mine clearance project of NGO Köln Franziskaner in the frame of the reconstruction of Kosici village; provision of military mine clearance experts to BHMIC in Banja Luka; support of clearance project of Entity Army through provision of tools and aid for the mine victim fund; integrated mine clearance project of NGO Weltentminungsdienst in Vidovice region	1,070,000	563,158
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Provision of DM 0.8 million to the ITF for continuation of projects in 2000	800,000	421,053
Croatia	Provision of detection tools to CROMAC; provision of military mine clearance experts to WEU mission; support of mine clearance project of Weltentminungsdienst within reconstruction of Pakrac village	130,000	68,421
TOTAL		19,670,000	10,352,632

From 1993 to 1999, the total allocated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for humanitarian mine action was DM 73,905,797 (\$38,897,788). The GIBL finds that of this amount only about 8.4% (DM 6.2 million/\$3.25 million) went to mine clearance related to development measures, while approximately 89% (DM 65.6 million/\$45.5 million) was allocated specifically for mine clearance/mine awareness activities.

Of the DM 73.9 million, 13 % (DM 9.75 million or \$5.13 million) was allocated mainly to field-test mine clearance technology in Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Cambodia.³⁷ In 1999 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent DM 2.55 million (\$1.34

³⁷ Roughly half of this amount (DM 4.88 million, or US\$2.57 million) went to companies related to landmine producers--former AP and/or current AT mine producers. It is not possible to specify the exact amount spent on the test trials, because these trials were combined with other activities. Letters from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 22 November 1995, 17 September 1997, 2 February 1999, 3 December 1999; Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp. 63-65.

million) on a field-test of the Rhino mine clearance machine developed by MAK; this expenditure represents thirteen percent of the 1999 budget for humanitarian mine clearance. The Bad Honnef framework acknowledges the necessity of research and development in mine clearance technology, but stresses that this should “be based on end-user requirements and existing technologies.” The GIBL believes it is doubtful if the technologies promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meet these requirements. An example is the Minebreaker 2000, which has been widely criticized as too costly and inappropriate for many mine affected countries.³⁸

Germany contributed DM 129 million (\$67.89 million) to the European Commission between 1992-1999, which allocated a total of approximately \$236 million to humanitarian mine action in that period.³⁹

Mine victim assistance and rehabilitation is the responsibility of the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development. In the period 1993-99 a total of DM 34.2 million (around \$18 million) was allocated to mine clearance/mine awareness or victim assistance activities (see Table 2) and, in 1999 a total of DM 2.03 million (\$1.05 million).⁴⁰ The Ministry finances mine-related activities only if they can be integrated as part of broader development projects.⁴¹ The GIBL points out that this is an obstacle for mine action programs applying for funding if those programs are not in countries where Germany runs development projects, but it does ensure that all mine-related activities funded by the German Development Department are part of a broader development strategy – at least theoretically.

Most of these activities are actually implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ – German Company for Technical Co-operation) which follows the policies set out in its program handbook *Development-oriented Emergency Aid - Integrated Demining*. This handbook describes in detail mine clearance activities which involve mine-affected communities in the demining, but development measures like medical and social rehabilitation are supported only for activities such as collection of data on mine victims, and recommendations.⁴² The title - *Emergency Aid* - indicates that these programs are carried out in emergency situations, so longer-term development measures are left to follow-up programs, which are not part of GTZ mine action.

³⁸ See, <http://www.landmine.de>. See also, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 624.

³⁹ Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, p. 19.

⁴⁰ Source: Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, pp.18 and 66. The figures in this document are inconsistent: the text indicates a total of DM 21.7 million for both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1999 (which means a total of DM 2.03 million allocated by the Development Department if one subtracts the 1999 total funding of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DM 19.67 million), while the Table in the appendix indicates a total of 1999 funding of the Development Department of around DM 2.6 million.

⁴¹ Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, p. 18.

⁴² Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), *Entwicklungsorientierte Nothilfe – Integrierte Entminung, Arbeitspapier* (Development-oriented Emergency Aid – Integrated Demining, working paper) No. 7, undated, p. 10.

Table 2. Funding of development-oriented emergency aid (integrated demining) by the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development 1993-99⁴³

Total of Funding in the Period 1993-1999			DM	US\$ equivalent		
			34,228,233	18,014,859		
Period	Supported country	Description of assistance	Resources in DM for mine clearance	US\$ equivalent	Resources in DM for victim assistance	US\$ equivalent
1994 – 2000	Angola	Technical cooperation/ survivor assistance for physical therapy and rehabilitation center in Luanda	-	-	13,187,000	6,940,526
1996 & 1998	Angola	Emergency aid/ survivor assistance for rehabilitation center in Luena/Moxico	250,000	131,579	2,512,000	1,322,105
Not specified	Mozambique	Technical and financial cooperation/ mine clearance: especially for reconstruction of national roads	2,374,000	1,249,474	-	-
Not specified	Mozambique	Emergency Aid: rural reconstruction program in Manica and Sofala provinces	1,000,000	526,316	-	-
Not specified	Mozambique	Community mine awareness	600,000	315,789	-	-
1996 & 1997	Cambodia	Technical and financial cooperation/ mine clearance: e.g. extension of rural paths	2,190,000	1,152,632	-	-

⁴³ German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Bonn, 14 April 2000; Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache (German Parliament Document) 14/3233, p. 66.

Total of Funding in the Period 1993-1999			DM	US\$ equivalent		
			34,228,233	18,014,859		
Period	Supported country	Description of assistance	Resources in DM for mine clearance	US\$ equivalent	Resources in DM for victim assistance	US\$ equivalent
1993 & 1997	Cambodia	Technical and financial cooperation/ survivor assistance	-	-	942,000	495,789
1995 – 1997	Laos	Financing cooperation/ survivor assistance: reconstruction of the national road, clearing UXO, training demining personnel	773,233	406,965	-	-
1993 – 2000	Vietnam	Technical cooperation / survivor assistance: Center for Orthopedics	-	-	10,400,000	5,473,684
Subtotals			7,187,233	3,782,754	27,041,000	14,232,105
Percentage			21%		79%	

Compared to its declared aim of integrating mine action into a broader development context, the GIBL notes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to favor a technical rather than a development-oriented approach. While promoting mine clearance technology, it does seem that most of the resources have been spent on enhancing the local capacities to carry out mine clearance. The slight increase in funding for development-oriented mine action programs in 1999 may be a sign of change in the funding policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Partly due to limits imposed by budgetary rules, partly due to overall policy decisions, there is a lack of coordination between German funding offices resulting in an inability to assist each other in concrete mine action operations. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds mine-related activities (mostly with a technical approach) in Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Yemen, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development is not present in these areas to tackle mine-related development problems. In Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam both ministries funded or still fund mine-related activities, but there is no coordination between them and no link between mine clearance operations funded by the Foreign Ministry and rehabilitation or

reconstruction activities funded by the Development Ministry, at least as far as the GIBL could determine.

This lack of coordination, coupled with a strict division of support for mine clearance and development issues, results in funds not being readily available for those trying to turn the concept of an integrated approach into programmatic reality.⁴⁴ Different policy priorities, application formats, as well as reporting requirements make it nearly impossible to respond to the mine problem in a comprehensive way. Coordinated, long-term funding commitments are key to making a reality of development-oriented mine action.

NGO activities

There are many NGO initiatives to assist mine victims.⁴⁵ Their activities range from mine clearance and mine awareness projects to emergency aid, to physical, psychological and socio-economic rehabilitation of mine victims, their families and communities, in line with the Bad Honnef framework. Member organizations of the GIBL spent approximately DM 20.74 million (\$10.91 million) on mine-related activities from 1995-1999.⁴⁶ (See Table 3.) Sixty-five percent of these funds were allocated to victim assistance embedded in socio-economic rehabilitation measures or in development/ food/ reconstruction/ resettlement/ peacekeeping activities or in integrated mine action programs which cover mine clearance, mine awareness, physical and psychosocial rehabilitation, socio-economic and cultural rehabilitation as well as political advocacy.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ For a discussion of such a program, see Thomas Gebauer, medico international, "Integrated Mine Action Programmes – The Example of the Rehabilitation Centre in Moxico/Angola," unpublished lecture presented at the Bad Honnef Framework Roundtable, London, 1 March 2000.

⁴⁵ These NGO initiatives are too numerous and diverse to describe here; many are small mine-related projects or programs. This report concentrates on the activities of GIBL member organizations: Bread for the World, Christoffel Mission for the Blind, German Justitia et Pax Commission, German Committee for Freedom from Hunger, German Caritas, Social Service Agency of the Evangelical Church in Germany, EIRENE International, Handicap International Germany, Jesuit Refugee Service, Kindernothilfe (Help for Children in Need), medico international, Misereor, OXFAM Germany, Pax Christi, Solidarity Service International, terre des hommes, UNICEF Germany. Projects of the German NGO Help e.V. and Weltentminungsdienst e.V. (World Demining Service) are not considered; they run bigger mine clearance/mine awareness projects partly with reconstruction/resettlement components in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo; see: <http://www.help-ev.de/projecte/>, <http://www.welt-entminungs-hilfe.de/proj.html>.

⁴⁶ Some of these programs are cofinanced by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Co-operation and Development; their contributions are subtracted from the total in order to show the NGO contribution. Sources: Misereor questionnaire to GIBL member organizations 1995-1998, email from Hein Winnubst, Aachen, 25 November 1999; GIBL questionnaire to member organizations 1999, Markus Haake, Berlin, June 2000.

⁴⁷ Nineteen percent of the total was spent on restricted mine clearance and mine awareness programs. Twelve percent of the funds went to restricted victim assistance programs, concentrated on medical treatment and physical rehabilitation of individual mine victims. Five percent of the funds was spent on advocacy work.

Table 3. NGO Funding of humanitarian mine action 1995-1999⁴⁸

YEAR	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	1995-99
Total amount in DM	1,095,301	1,181,483	3,886,554	4,140,544	10,440,501	20,744,383
Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Mine clearance & mine awareness activities	-	2,250	295,826	1,024,600	2,606,195	3,928,871
Percentage	0.00%	0.19%	7.61%	24.75%	24.96%	18.94%
Victim assistance (medical treatment, physical rehabilitation)	-	-	95,200	-	2,340,794	2,435,994
Percentage	0.00%	0.00%	2.45%	0.00%	22.42%	11.74%
Victim assistance (psychological + socio-economic rehabilitation)	972,125	1,069,586	2,719,550	868,760	1,590,224	7,220,245
Percentage	88.75%	90.53%	69.97%	20.98%	15.23%	34.81%
Victim assistance and development/food/reconstruction/resettlement/peace-keeping activities	55,176	18,447	651,978	56,250	843,600	1,625,451
Percentage	5.04%	1.56%	16.78%	1.36%	8.08%	7.84%
Victim assistance (support of political advocacy)	68,000	91,200	124,000	246,934	457,071	987,205
In percentage	6.21%	7.72%	3.19%	5.96%	4.38%	4.76%
Integrated Mine Action Program (mine clearance, mine awareness, physical & psycho-social rehabilitation, socio-economic and cultural rehabilitation, political advocacy)	-	-	-	1,944,000	2,602,617	4,546,617
Percentage	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	46.95%	24.93%	21.92%

The GIBL is encouraged to see that some of these integrated programs are co-financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, yet the programs exist in the absence of a long-term funding commitment by the donors.

At the same time, it is of concern to the GIBL that the efforts to carry out integrated mine action programs decreased last year to twenty-five percent of the total spent on humanitarian mine action, while in 1998 it represented forty-seven percent. It is difficult to identify the reason for this decrease; it might be that the project departments of the NGOs involved are not aware enough of the integrated approach, or that the donor side restricts support to limited activities.

⁴⁸ Misereor questionnaire to the member organization of the GIBL, 1995-1998, email from Hein Winnubst, Aachen 25 November 1999; GIBL questionnaire 1999 to the member organization of the GIBL, Markus Haake (GIBL), Berlin June 2000.

Landmine Problem and Mine Victims

On 5 December 1995, the German government announced that all mine-affected areas on the old east-west divide had been cleared and the last zone, near the Bavarian town of Hof, reopened to the public.⁴⁹ However incidents still do occasionally occur. On 16 March 2000, while walking two people found a strange little black box in the ground at the former frontier. As they were kicking it, one of them remembered the lessons he learned in the Army and realized this could be a landmine, which it was.⁵⁰ Twenty years after the military of the former German Democratic Republic demined the frontier, probably one of the best recorded minefields in the world, and ten years after private companies undertook a second mine clearance operation in this area,⁵¹ this AP mine still remained in the ground.

German soldiers on peacekeeping operations are also at risk. On 22 September 1999 five German soldiers, part of the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping forces, went into a minefield near the Albanian border. Three of them sustained minor injuries while two of them were seriously injured.⁵² According to one report, several German soldiers of the KFOR peacekeeping forces have been killed or injured by landmines since the KFOR operation started in Kosovo/Yugoslavia.⁵³

HOLY SEE

The Holy See signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 February 1998. At the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999, the Holy See was represented by Archbishop Juliusz Janusz who stated that "the Holy See intends to implement fully the provisions of the Convention by continuing to urge all States to become Parties to it. It will also continue to support efforts for effective and rapid mine clearance and for the adequate care for mine victims."¹ The Holy See has participated in meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees of Experts (SCE) of the MBT, including meetings on victim assistance, mine clearance, and treaty status and operation. It submitted its Article 7 report on 28 August 1999, in which it is stated that

⁴⁹ Press Release, Federal Ministry of Defense, 5 December 1995. For more information, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 624-625.

⁵⁰ "Unscheinbar versteckt im Boden" (Inconspicuously hidden in the ground), *Volksblatt-Mellrichstadt*, 18 March 2000, <http://www.volksblatt-wuerzburg.de>

⁵¹ As reported in the longer version of the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for Germany, available at: <http://www.landmine.de>; see also: Bundesdrucksache (German Parliament Document) 13/1023, p. 1, <http://dip.bundestag.de>.

⁵² *Reuters*, 23 September 1999, *Associated Press*, 23 September 1999, *Spiegel-online*, 23 September 1999.

⁵³ *Spiegel-online*, 23 September 1999.

¹ Statement of the Holy See by H.E. Archbishop Juliusz Janusz, Apostolic Nuncio in Mozambique, at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

national legislation to implement the treaty is "under consideration."² The Holy See does not possess, produce, transfer, or use antipersonnel landmines and is not mine-affected.

The Holy See is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It participated in the First Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol in December 1999.

In a statement before the UN General Assembly, Archbishop Martino noted that "funding for mine clearance must become and remain an integral part of the aid and development programs of both donor and afflicted States."³ As of September 1999 the Holy See has donated \$4,000 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.⁴ During his trip to the Middle East, Pope John Paul II made a stop at Qasr el-Yahud, a religious site located in the occupied West Bank, in what was characterized as "a landmine-strewn Israeli military zone."⁵ He did not directly address the landmine situation during his visit.

HUNGARY

Key developments since March 1999: Hungary completed destruction of the 356,884 AP mines in stockpile in June 1999. It has also destroyed 100,000 UKA-63 antivehicle mines with tilt-rod fuzes. Hungary served as the chair of the SCE on Stockpile Destruction.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Hungary signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997, and was the eighth country to ratify on 6 April 1998. On 24 February 1998, the Hungarian Parliament passed national legislation adopting the MBT, which came into effect on 7 March 1998.¹

Hungary attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999. Since the FMSP, it has served as co-chair of the MBT's intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, and has taken a lead role in promoting the importance of stockpile destruction internationally as preventive mine action. It also has participated in nearly all of the other SCE meetings. Hungary attended the regional landmine conferences in Zagreb in June 1999 and Ljubljana in June 2000.

The government submitted its initial Article 7 report on 1 October 1999, covering 1 March 1999 to 27 August 1999, and its second Article 7 report on 25 April 2000,

² Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 28 August 1999, covering February 1998-August 1999.

³ Statement of Archbishop Renato R. Martino, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 19 November 1999.

⁴ "Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action: Total Contributions By Donor, October 1994 to September 1999," Table, UN Mine Action Service.

⁵ Richard Engel, "In the Birthplace of Christianity, Pope supports Palestinian Homeland," *Agence France-Presse*, 22 March 2000.

¹ Act X of 1998 ratifying the MBT. Act LXXXVII of 1998, Articles 38 and 60, and Act LXXI, Article 14, of 1993 amend the criminal code (Act IV of 1978) to provide penal sanctions for violations of international law.

covering 27 August 1999 to 25 April 2000.² The reports are minimalist, providing little supplemental information.

Hungary voted in favor of the December 1999 UNGA resolution supporting the treaty, as it has on the other pro-ban UN resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998.

Hungary is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. The government participated in the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol in December 1999, having submitted its report as required under Article 13. Hungary continues to support attempts to negotiate a transfer ban of AP mines in the Conference on Disarmament.

Production and Transfer

Hungary informed the United Nations in 1995 that it no longer produced or exported AP mines.³ However, it had been a significant past producer and exporter of AP mines. Hungarian Mechanical Works (Magyar Mechanikai Muvek, MMM) was the sole producer for many decades.⁴ It produced M-49, M-62, GYATA-64 and POMZ-2 AP mines, as well as the UKA-63 antivehicle mine.⁵

On 1 January 1998, MMM became Mechanical Works Special plc (Mechanikai Muvek Specialis RT., MWS). This company, owned by the Ministry of Defense, handles the destruction of all mines in Hungary. While MWS is still capable of producing antivehicle mines on a large scale, Hungary stated in its Article 7 report that conversion of AP mine production capabilities had been completed.⁶

Stockpile and Destruction

Hungary completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile on 29 June 1999.⁷ According to Hungary's initial Article 7 report, a total of 356,884 AP mines were destroyed in 1998 and 1999, including 207,198 GYATA-64 mines in the period 1 March

² Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports, submitted 1 October 1999, covering 1 March 1999-27 August 1999, and submitted 25 April 2000, covering 27 August 1999-25 April 2000, available at: <http://domino.un.org/ottawa.nsf>.

³ UN General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General: Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines," (New York: United Nations, 1995), A/50/701, 3 November 1995, p. 6.

⁴ Magyar Honved (Ed.), "Eltaposott aknak," *A honvedelmi Minizterium hetilapja* (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 10 April 1998, pp. 4-8: This article reported that in the "past few decades," MMM has completed the renewal of twenty to thirty million mines for the Hungarian Army.

⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 627-628. *Landmine Monitor Report 99* reported production of three other mines, the RAMP blast mine, No. 1131 bounding mine, and Model 36 fragmentation mine, but Hungarian officials are unaware of Hungarian production of such mines. Telephone interviews with Dr. Laszlo Lukacs and Gyorgy Viczian, 29 May 2000.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form E, submitted 1 October 1999, covering 1 March 1999 to 27 August 1999.

⁷ Statement by HE Mr. Gabor Bagi, Deputy State Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at the Zagreb Regional Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, 28 June 1999.

1999 to 27 August 1999.⁸ According to MWS, all the mines that were destroyed in 1998 and 1999 were GYATA-64 mines.⁹

In addition to the GYATA-64, the Ministry of Defense has acknowledged that prior to beginning destruction, Hungary also had in stock POMZ-2 AP mines and MON-50 Claymore-type directional fragmentation AP mines.¹⁰ The Article 7 reports did not include information on these mines.

Apparently, all of the POMZ-2s were destroyed prior to entry into force of the MBT, including many in 1997.¹¹ It has been indicated that none of the stocks of MON-50s have been destroyed and there are no plans to do so.¹² The MON-50 is a directional fragmentation mine; use of tripwire operated directional fragmentation mines is not permitted by the MBT, but use of such mines in command detonated mode is allowed. A landmine expert from the Military College of Technology states that Hungary also has MON-100 and MON-200 directional fragmentation mines, and that all are equipped with electric percussion cap and cable and can be detonated only by remote control; there is no tripwire attached for victim-activation.¹³ When such a modification might have been made is not known.

The Article 7 reports provide no information regarding the two other AP mines produced by Hungary in the past, types M-49 and M-62. The Ministry of Defense declined to provide requested information on these mines on at least two occasions.¹⁴ However, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official has indicated that these mines were

⁸ MBT, Article 7 Report, Form G 1, available at: <http://domino.un.org/ottawa.nsf>.

⁹ Interview with Deputy Director-General Molnár, MWS plc, Törökbálint, 10 March 2000.

¹⁰ Letters from Col. László Tikos, Head of Public Information, Ministry of Defense, 28 February 2000 and 21 March 2000. In November 1996, it was reported to the Parliament that the army possessed a total of 375,306 AP mines.

¹¹ Interview with Deputy Director-General Molnár, MWS plc, Törökbálint, 10 March 2000; Magyar Honvéd (Ed), "Eltaposott aknák," *A Honvédelmi Minisztérium hetilapja* (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 10 April 1998, pp. 4-8. A newspaper report in December 1997 had stated that 15,000 POMZ-2s had been destroyed and that "a few hundred" MON-50s were not destroyed; see Col. József Tián, technical head, land forces, Hungarian Army, in: Matyuc Péter, "A hidépítés rövidebb ideig tart, mint az aknatelepítés," *Népszabadság*, 24 December 1997, pp. 1 and 4. On 12 July 2000 Col. Jozsef Tian told the LM researcher that 29,720 POMZ-2 had been destroyed up until 14 June 1999. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official indicated that POMZ-2 destruction began in 1991 and was completed before MBT entry into force; thus destruction was not reported in the Article 7 report. Email to Landmine Monitor/HRW 26 July 2000.

¹² Col. László Bodrogi, Head of Department for Technology of Tactical Operations, Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defense, "Lehet-e hatása a gyalogság elleni aknák betiltásáról szóló nemzetközi egyezményeknek a katonai védelmi tevékenységekre?" *Muszaki Katonai Közlöny, MHTT Muszaki Szakosztály folyóirata* (technical magazine of the Hungarian Army), No. 4, 1999, pp. 36-39; this information was confirmed by several sources which wished to remain anonymous, Budapest, January-April 2000.

¹³ Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Lukács, Military College of Technology, 29 May 2000. This was confirmed by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. Email to Landmine Monitor/HRW 26 July 2000.

¹⁴ Landmine Monitor letters on this subject to Col. Tikos, Ministry of Defense, 17 February 2000; MoD responses 28 February 2000 and 21 March 2000.

produced shortly after World War II and had an expired shelf life; thus they were destroyed as part of the regular ammunition maintenance program some time ago.¹⁵

It would be useful, in the interests of complete transparency, for information regarding POMZ-2s, MONs, M-49s and M-62s to be provided in the Article 7 report.¹⁶

Hungary reported that 1,500 GYATA-64 mines would be retained for development of demining techniques, as permitted under Article 3 of the MBT.¹⁷ In March 2000, a letter from the Ministry of Defense noted that the number retained was 2,000 mines.¹⁸ However, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated in July 2000 that in fact Hungary had retained no AP mines, and that all had been destroyed.¹⁹

In an interview in March 2000 with the deputy-director general of the MSW destruction facility, he revealed that some 100,000 UKA-63 type mines, representing half the stockpile, had been destroyed from September 1996 to March 2000, and that the remaining 100,000 units were scheduled to be destroyed by March 2002.²⁰

The destruction of the UKA-63 mines is of particular interest to the ICBL, as it is an antivehicle mine with a tilt rod fuze, which likely makes the mine act like an AP mine and therefore banned under the MBT.²¹ The ICBL has pressed governments to report on such mines in the interest of transparency and to help establish which antivehicle mines with antihandling devices are prohibited under the treaty.

Hungary's Article 7 reports provides no detail about methods used for destroying the mines or about safety and environmental standards observed in their destruction. The reports state only that destruction is carried out by MWS at Törökbálint, by the "disassembly" method, according to "industrial standard."²²

MWS and Foreign Ministry officials indicate that stockpile destruction (carried out by the Ministry of Defense-owned MWS) takes place in the assembly plant on a specially developed production line that can process 200 kilograms in an eight-hour shift. There is a stand-by machine in case of failure of the production line. Dismantling takes place in three steps behind concrete protecting walls. Three mines are dismantled simultaneously, and workers have to account for every mine. All parts of the GYATA-64 and UKA-63 mines are recycled, except the detonator, which is destroyed by explosion. Explosives from the mines are used for excavating; steel plates are sent to furnaces. Explosive charges used in excavations are exported to the Scandinavian firms, Dinamo Nobel and

¹⁵ Email to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 26 July 2000.

¹⁶ Article 7 Report, Hungary, 1 March 1999-27 August 1999, and 27 August 1999-25 April 2000.

¹⁷ Article 7 Report, 1 March 1999-27 August 1999, Form G 1.

¹⁸ Letter from Col. László Tikos, Ministry of Defense, 21 March 2000.

¹⁹ Email to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 26 July 2000.

²⁰ Interview with Deputy Director-General Molnár, MWS plc, Törökbálint, 10 March 2000; Magyar Honvéd (Ed), "Eltaposott aknák," *A Honvédelmi Minisztérium hetilapja* (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 10 April 1998, pp. 4-8.

²¹ There are two other Hungarian antivehicle mines of concern, the CVP 1 Dual Purpose, which has a variable pressure fuze, and a nonmetallic-shaped ATM, whose designation is unknown. See Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," January 2000.

²² Article 7 Reports, Form F, 27 August 1999, and 25 April 2000.

Nitro Nobel, and to a German company, with a one to three years' guarantee, and cannot be converted to arms again. Other parts, such as non-decaying or slowly decaying plastic covers, are used in highway construction or destroyed in combustion furnaces. Mine dismantling has been performed without any casualties so far.²³

Hungary would like to establish a "regional mine-destruction center" at an established military base with good infrastructure, in the eastern part of the country near Nyíregyháza. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is financing this project. A profit-oriented Hungarian company owned by the Ministry of Defense has the contract to destroy mines in an environment-friendly way, utilizing plasma-burning technology developed in the United States. The glass-like end product would be used in highway and embankment construction. In the future, landmines from other regional states could be destroyed there, but the plant would be able to burn other kinds of hazardous refuse as well.²⁴

Landmine Problem and Mine Clearance

The government reports that there are no mined areas in Hungary. While the country was demined after World War II, there are "mine and munitions contaminated areas" in Hungary today.²⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that "[T]here is no official register" of underground objects.²⁶

Affected areas in Hungary come from three periods and sources: World War II, the Soviet Army 1944-1991, and the conflicts in Yugoslavia 1991-1995. There is only one such World War II mined area remaining, around 3,000-5,000 hectares of wooded area near the village of Nagybjom. Mine accidents were last recorded in this area in the 1950s, but each year one or two mines are found in the forest.²⁷

Soviet troops occupied 104 Hungarian settlements, from 1944 to June 1991. They stocked mines of unknown quantity and types in Hungary. From 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1999, the MH-HTAZ found 2,300 antitank mines on land formerly used by the Soviet Army. Mines of Soviet origin were found in shooting-ranges and drill grounds of Kunmadaras, Veszprém, Orgovány, Kecskemét, Debrecen and Esztergom (the latter was the most contaminated).²⁸

During the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, especially in the periods of the Serbian-Croatian war (1991-1992, 1994-1995), mine barriers were deployed on the Yugoslavian side of a sixty-six kilometer-long section of the border, starting at the junction of the river Dráva and the Danube. Mines were usually deployed within a few

²³ Interviews with Deputy Director-General Molnár, Törökbálint, 10 March 2000, and Dr. László Deák, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 25 February 2000; confirmed independently by two workers of MM, who wished to be unnamed.

²⁴ Interview with Dr. Deák and György Viczián, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 25 February 2000.

²⁵ Ibid; Letter from Dr. Deák, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 February 2000; Letter from Lt. Col. László Lukács, Head of Technical Department of Bólyai János Military College of Technology, Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defense, 3 March 2000.

²⁶ Ibid; Telephone interview with Captain Lajos Posta, Head of the Reconnaissance Department of the First Bomb-disposal and Mine-searcher Battalion of the Hungarian Army (MH HTAZ), Budapest, 7 April 2000.

²⁷ Telephone interview with Dr. József Fehér, clerk to Nagybjom, 11 April 2000.

²⁸ Ibid.

meters of the Hungarian border, some of them stretching into Hungarian territory from a few centimeters to three meters. Border guards and bomb-disposal experts of the Hungarian Army neutralized all mines found on Hungarian ground. The settlements of Erdőpuszta, Kölked, Udvar, Lippó, Ivándárda, Old, Alsószentmárton, Magyarboly, and Drávaszabolcs all had such mine deployments on their outskirts. According to the Hungarian Border Guard authority, they have installed one hundred warning boards in the Hungarian area facing the mined border line, and strongly advise local inhabitants to take these warnings seriously.²⁹

Mine Action

Hungarian troops have engaged in some demining as part of the IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping contingent in Croatia. Hungary has also stationed a 350-strong KFOR contingent in Kosovo at Pristina since summer 1999. There is a mine searcher, bomb-disposal team in this contingent, which so far has demined the road to the KFOR telecommunications center that they protect.³⁰

At the Budapest Regional Conference on Landmines in March 1998, then-Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs announced Hungary's "Agenda '98," consisting of six items with the purpose of banning and destroying antipersonnel landmines and lessening the damage caused by the weapon. Among other things he said that Hungary would establish a physio- and psychotherapeutic institution to help landmine victims, and would pursue a German-Hungarian demining initiative in the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia.³¹

In the two years since then, Hungary offered \$3,000 for the Slovenian demining program in 1999 and another donation is expected in 2000, but further contributions to demining programs are uncertain. The German-Hungarian initiative has not been realized. Between ten and forty professional Hungarian deminers work in Croatia, employed by foreign, profit-oriented private companies.³²

The physio- and psychotherapeutic program to aid the recovery of landmine victims was to have been funded by Canada (\$100,000) with a similar amount of Hungarian support in the form of buildings. But the project, managed by the Children for Children Foundation, did not gain support from any Hungarian Ministry up to July 1999,

²⁹ "Aknatelepítés a Drávaszögben," *Magyar Hírlap*, 25 April 1995, p. 27. Through the good offices of the Management of Duna-Dráva National Park, the Landmine Monitor researcher had the opportunity to inspect these areas in March 2000; details are available upon request.

³⁰ "KFOR-krónika," supplement to *Magyar Honvéd*, 12 March 2000, p. 14.

³¹ László Kovács, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary (1994-1998), Statement, in: ICBL Report, Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, 26-28 March 1998, pp. 4-9: "Hungary has undertaken to complete the elimination of her entire stockpile of anti-personnel landmines by December 31, 2000. We stand committed, however, to mobilize the necessary resources to accomplish this goal well before the end of this year." This statement was understood at the time to commit Hungary to stockpile destruction by the end of 1998 and was reported as such in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*. For a fuller account of Agenda 98, see: *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 626-627.

³² Telephone interview with György Viczián, military expert for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 May 2000.

after which the Canadian Government ordered a revision of the project, to be completed by spring 2000.³³

ICELAND

Key developments since March 1999: Iceland ratified the MBT on 5 May 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Iceland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 5 May 1999. The treaty entered into force for Iceland on 1 November 1999. National legislation to ensure implementation is being prepared.¹ Iceland voted in favor of the United Nations General Assembly pro-ban resolutions 1996-1998, and again in December 1999. It attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 1999. It has not submitted its Article 7 report, which was due by 29 April 2000. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Iceland views the Mine Ban Treaty as important, but does not play an active role in its implementation work.²

Iceland has no military forces of its own, but is a member of NATO and has a bilateral defense agreement with the United States. This provides that the U.S. will carry out the defense of Iceland in accordance with its responsibilities under NATO and that Iceland will make all acquisitions of land and other arrangements required to permit use of defense facilities.³ This leaves unclear the question of whether Iceland, as an MBT State Party, would permit a non-MBT party such as the U.S. to stockpile or transfer prohibited antipersonnel mines on or through Icelandic territory, or assist U.S. forces with mine-related activities prohibited under the MBT. However, when Iceland deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations it made no additional qualifying statement that would indicate that U.S. stockpiling or transfer of antipersonnel mines in Iceland, or other assistance, would be regarded as permissible.

Iceland does not produce, transfer or use landmines, and maintains no landmine stockpiles.⁴ It is not landmine-affected, although sea mines from World War II occasionally wash up on its shores.⁵

Iceland has stated that it will focus its contributions to mine action on victim assistance programs, and in 1997 granted US\$1.3 million for mine victim assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to provide prostheses. By June 2000 just under US\$1 million has been spent on this.⁶

³³ Telephone interview with Dr. Andrés Blahó, President of the Advisory Board, Children for Children Foundation, 12 April 2000.

¹ E-mail from A. Edda Jokullsdottir, Political Affairs Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 2000.

² Telephone interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 June 2000.

³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs information available at: <http://brunnur.stjr.is/interpro/utannr/utn-eng.nsf>.

⁴ E-mail from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 2000.

⁵ See, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 711.

⁶ E-mail from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 2000.

IRELAND

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Ireland has long been in the forefront of countries working toward the elimination of antipersonnel landmines. The Irish government was able to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) immediately upon signature on 3 December 1997, because it took as implementing legislation the Explosives (Land Mines) Order that had been approved by the Dail, the Irish parliament on 12 June 1996. This Order makes the manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and use of antipersonnel landmines a criminal offence in Ireland.¹ The tactical doctrine and training manuals of the Defence Forces have been amended to comply with the MBT.²

David Andrews was one of the few Foreign Ministers to head a delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the MBT in Maputo in May 1999. Minister Andrews and officials from the political division, Irish Aid and UN sections of the Foreign Ministry visited minefields in Mozambique prior to the meeting. In his address to the FMSP he stated:

This process is unique in many ways. It follows from a coalition of governments from all quarters of the globe. It includes countries, many of which have contributed to the causes of the landmine crisis. A particular strength has been the initiative of the mine-affected countries themselves.... But the fundamental novelty of this process has been the unique partnership between governments and the peoples they represent. Without the direct action of non-governmental organizations which coalesced around the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), there would be no Convention.³

Ireland's initial report under Article 7 of the MBT was deposited with the UN on 16 August 1999, and its second (annual) report was deposited on 14 April 2000.

Ireland has participated in the meetings of the treaty's Standing Committees of Experts. At the January 2000 SCE meeting on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Dr. Darach MacFhionnbhairr, Head of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke for the Irish government in reiterating that under the terms of the treaty, antivehicle mines (AVM) with antihandling devices which function like AP mines – which may explode from an unintentional act of a person -- are

¹ For more on the evolution of Irish national law banning AP mines see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 629. The law does not include specific penal sanctions for MBT violations, as called for in the treaty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informally indicated a willingness to address this deficiency, but has been preoccupied with its intense involvement in the resolution of conflict in Ireland.

² CCW, Amended Protocol II, National Report for Article 13, 9 December 1999.

³ Address by David Andrews TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3 May 1999.

banned by MBT. He proposed the formation of an informal expert group to examine the AVM issue.⁴

In December 1999 Ireland co-sponsored the UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B urging full implementation of the MBT and has voted in favor of all pro-ban resolutions at the United Nations.

Ireland is a state party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The government participated in the First Annual Meeting on Protocol II in December 1999, having submitted its report as required by Article 13 of the Convention.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

The two Article 7 reports⁵ of progress toward implementation of the MBT in Ireland state that Ireland has no stockpile of AP mines, no minefields and has no AP mine production facilities. Ireland has retained 129 antipersonnel landmines for research into mine clearance techniques (as permitted by Article 3.1 of the MBT). It is not known where or when this small quantity was obtained.

Commercial and homemade explosive devices have been widely used by paramilitaries in the Irish conflict for many years, but instances of the use of conventional antipersonnel mines are not known. The recent statement by the non-state paramilitary Irish Republican Army that it will put its arms “beyond use” further reduces the possibility of AP mines or other mines being used in Ireland.⁶ Irish Defence Forces have been trained to deal with landmines during their participation in many UN peacekeeping operations, and have routinely dealt with explosive devices in Ireland.

Mine Action Funding

Governmental funding of humanitarian mine action, including victim assistance, has increased recently from year to year. Since 1994 Ireland has contributed over IRP 3 million (US\$2.6 million) to mine action programs.⁷ Beneficiary countries since 1994 include Bosnia, Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Chechnya, Cambodia, Angola, Somalia and Mozambique. In 1999 the following organizations received support from the Irish government.⁸

⁴ Oral statement of Dr. Darach MacFhionnbhairr, Head of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SCE on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 10-11 January 2000.

⁵ Mine Ban Treaty, Article 7 Reports, submitted 16 August 1999, covering 3 December 1997-16 August 1999, and submitted 14 April 2000, covering 16 August 1999-14 April 2000.

⁶ “Sequence of Statements Issued by Governments and the IRA,” *The Irish Times* (newspaper), 8 May 2000, p. 6.

⁷ Report of Ireland to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 25 January 2000, p. 2.

⁸ Political Division and Irish Aid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2000; Abbreviations: HI – Handicap International, MAC – Mine Action Center, UNDP – UN Development Program, ITF – International Trust Fund for Demining in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Trocaire is the Catholic Agency for Development set up in 1973.

Country	Donation (IRP)	Project	Organisations
Angola	200,000 (US\$ 175,000)	Fabrication of prosthetics	HI
Bosnia	150,000 (US\$ 130,000)	Mine Action Program	MAC
Bosnia	150,000 (US\$ 130,000)	Mine Action Program	HI
Bosnia	150,000 (US\$ 130,000)	Mine Action Centre	UNDP
Bosnia	50,000 (US\$ 44,000)	Demining	ITF
Cambodia	256,000 (US\$ 230,000)	Demining	Halo Trust
Cambodia	95,000 (US\$ 83,000)	Victim Assistance	Trocaire
Somalia	136,000 (US\$ 118,000)	Services to the Disabled	HI
FYR (Kosovo)	247,000 (US\$ 215,000)	Demining Team: Set up	Halo Trust
FYR (Kosovo)	282,000 (US\$ 245,000)	Demining: Running Costs	Halo Trust
Total	1,716,000(US\$ 1,500,000)		

ITALY

Key developments since March 1999: Italy ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 April 1999 and it entered into force on 1 October 1999. From February 1999 through April 2000, Italy destroyed 2.05 million antipersonnel mines. Between May 1999 and March 2000, Italy pledged about US\$ 7.33 million for mine action programs. The Senate approved the establishment of the Humanitarian Demining Trust Fund in October 1999, but it awaits further endorsement.

Mine Ban Policy

Italy signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997, and deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations on 23 April 1999. The treaty entered into force for Italy on 1 October 1999. Ratification seems to have marked the climax of Italian efforts to transform the country's reputation as one of the three major producers and exporters (with Russia and China) of landmines up to 1992.¹ The major role of nongovernmental organizations in this evolution of Italian policy was described in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.² Even before the signing of the MBT, Italy was one of

¹ Human Rights Watch and Physician for Human Rights, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 36.

² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp.712-717. This section of the report by researchers of the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines traces the history of the Italian role in landmine production and trade, and the roles of the ICBL and ItCBL in the evolution of governmental policy. An updated and longer version of the 1999 report was published in book form in Italy to celebrate the second anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty, as: *Mine: Il Cammino che Resta (Mines: the Remaining Steps)*, (Rome: Rubbettino, December 1999). The book was presented during a major event at the stockpile destruction site, at Baiano di Spoleto, on 2 December 1999.

very few nations to have domestic legislation banning antipersonnel landmines,³ and this Law 374/97 is still widely considered one of the most stringent legislative tools in the world.

Italy participated in the First Meeting of States Parties of the MBT in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999, where State Secretary Rino Serri underlined Italy's preference for an effect-based definition of AP mines, which would appear to cover more weapons than the existing MBT definition.⁴ The government has also participated in meetings of the MBT's intersessional Standing Committees of Experts. Italy voted in favor of the 1999 pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution, as it did with the prior three resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.

Italy submitted its first Article 7 report as required by the MBT on 29 March 2000, reporting on implementation measures up to 31 January 2000.⁵

Italy's major mine ban policy statements tend to focus on the pivotal role of its national legislation, which highlights the government's efforts to eliminate the weapon. This effort marked quite a precedent in Italy's foreign and domestic policy, especially in terms of partnership between institutions and civil society.⁶ Italy's mine ban policy has become a frequent example of its new, more engaged, higher profile foreign policy. Given this emphasis, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines (ItCBL) has called for more concrete attempts to influence governments that have not yet acceded to the Treaty and in responding to new deployments of landmines around the world.

Italy has taken other important domestic initiatives. On 22 February 1999 the *Comitato Nazionale per l'Azione Umanitaria Contro le Mine* (National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action) was launched by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following a proposal put forward by the ItCBL.⁷ The purpose was to create a permanent working

³ Law 374/97, Norme per la Messa al Bando delle Mine Antipersona (Provisions Prohibiting Antipersonnel Mines), approved on 29 October 1997.

⁴ Statement of the Head of the Italian Delegation, Senator Rino Serri, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Maputo, Mozambique, 3 May 1999.

⁵ Italy, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 29 March 2000. The report does not give the starting date of the reporting period.

⁶ The relevance of this partnership was stressed by the rapporteur of the national legislation, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Commission at the Chamber of Deputies Achille Occhetto, when presenting law 374/97 in Ottawa: "First of all, I feel obliged to underline what I consider the main feature of this year's activity, namely the exceptional concordance between the legislative body...and civil society, through NGOs and particularly those engaged in the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines. It often happens in all countries that behind laws passed by parliaments there are lobbies expressing interests of various natures, more or less legitimate, not always transparent. Rarely are these interests, or better the promoters of these interests, acknowledged as inspirers of the legislator's will." Foreword of Achille Occhetto to Law 374/97, presented in Ottawa, 2 December 1997. This sentiment was repeated at the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999, by the Head of the Italian delegation. This cooperation model, unprecedented in Italy, has served since then for other actions promoted by civil society, such as the campaigns against child labour or for debt cancellation.

⁷ The idea was originally formulated on 12 December 1997 during the first international conference on humanitarian demining organized by the ItCBL, with the title "From Landmines to Food: Clearing the Road to Development." The ItCBL proposed a joint, *ad hoc* "working table" on mine action to State Secretary Rino Serri, attending the conference. The proposal was later presented again to Secretary Serri on 26 May 1998, in a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

group made up of those involved in the landmines issue: ministries, parliamentarians, NGOs, commercial demining companies, the military, the Red Cross, etc. The objective is to develop joint guidelines for Italian humanitarian action against landmines worldwide which are more caring for the people - mine victims in particular - and for the socio-economic development of the affected areas, rather than solely removal of mines from the ground.

The Comitato Nazionale, chaired by State Secretary Rino Serri, is divided into five working groups: (1) Political action and international relations chaired by the Political Department of the Ministry Foreign Affairs and mandated to produce a policy paper on Italian mine action;⁸ (2) Operational training, chaired by the Ministry of Defense, to develop a standard curriculum for the training of civilian humanitarian deminers; (3) Operations, chaired by the Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to create a database for humanitarian mine action and a pool of experts capable of selecting programs to support humanitarian demining and victim assistance in the field; (4) Technological research, chaired by the Ministry of University and Scientific Research, to identify the most appropriate and sustainable end-user oriented technologies for mine clearance and humanitarian assistance to the mine-injured; and (5) Information and public awareness, chaired by the ItCBL, whose task is to promote Italy's commitment to mine action, increase public awareness through the media and various other grassroots activities.

In July 1999 the last plenary meeting of the Comitato was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and work was to shift from debate on the major principles to the beginning of an operational plan. The latter has not really taken off, with the exception of a big public initiative promoted by the ItCBL in December 1999 on behalf of the Comitato, to celebrate the second anniversary of the signing of the MBT. Lack of budgets, lack of structures, new priorities are all plausible explanations for the current deadlock in the Comitato.

A good opportunity to revive interest in the AP mine issue could be provided by the recent move to create a Humanitarian Demining Trust Fund. The Bill to establish this, promoted in Parliament by the Green Party,⁹ follows most of the guidelines set by the Comitato Nazionale. The Trust Fund would be granted L50 billion (US\$25 million) annually, beginning in fiscal year 2000. In 2000 alone, an additional L20 billion (US\$10 million) would be dedicated specifically to mine clearance in the Balkans. The Bill was approved by the Senate in October 1999 and in May 2000 was still waiting for endorsement by the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.¹⁰

⁸ The English version of the Italian policy paper on mine action, as finally endorsed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can be found on the website of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining: <http://www.gichd.ch>.

⁹ The establishment of a trust fund for humanitarian demining was a binding recommendation annexed to Law 106/99 that ratified the MBT.

¹⁰ The ItCBL has solicited a rapid debate and approval via a letter to Achille Occhetto, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 22 February 1999. At the end of April 2000, the legislative department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent out a note expressing its objections to the additional L20 billion fund dedicated to the programs in the Balkans, with the twofold reason that

Italy is a party to Amended Protocol II of the CCW and participated in the Amended Protocol II conference in December 1999. Its report as required under Article 13 was submitted.

Italy continues to be involved in efforts to deal with AP mines in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. On 4 March 1999 Italy was one of twenty-two countries to submit a "Working paper concerning CD action on an APL transfer ban."¹¹

Production and Transfer

Italy's former role as a major producer and exporter of AP mines is described in detail in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, including the major manufacturers Valsella, Misar and Tecnovar, the mine-types they produced and countries to which they exported AP mines.¹²

Italy's Article 7 report gave scant or incorrect information on Form E ("Status of programs for conversion or de-commissioning of AP mine production facilities"). Valsella, contrary to what is stated, has undergone a painstaking conversion program involving the municipality of Castenedolo, trade unions and civil society, the result being that Valsella Meccanotecnica's shares were handed over to the new companies VE&D srl and Prode srl, which manufactures ecological vehicles, in February 1998. No mention is made of Misar facilities; Misar produced AP mines and is currently owned by the Brescia-based Societa' Esplosivi Industriali (SEI), controlled since August 1998 by the French holding company, Societe' Anonyme d'Explosifs de Produit Chimique.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Italy began destruction of its AP mine stockpile in February 1999.¹³ Of the 6.5 million AP mines in stock, a total of nearly 1.7 million had been destroyed as of 31 January 2000,¹⁴ and 2.05 million as of 30 April 2000.¹⁵ The Italian government states that stockpile destruction will be completed by October 2002 as required by the national law. Currently, about 12,000 mine per day are destroyed, at a cost of about US\$1.20 per mine.¹⁶ The total cost for destruction of AP mines and their components is now estimated to be less than L16 billion (US\$8 million), versus a previous estimate of L30 billion (US\$15 million).

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have the budget for it in year 2000, and no sufficient details are provided on how the money ought to be spent in the field."

¹¹ CD/1572.

¹² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 717-729.

¹³ "Destruction of Antipersonnel Landmines in Italy," Presentation by Ministry of Defense to SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000. Destruction of "warfare mines" began in February 1999, of "practice mines" in November 1998.

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, submitted 29 March 2000, data as of 31 January 2000. The report cites a beginning total of 6,529,809 "total warfare APM" in stock. That included 2.068 million PMC mines (designated as "out of order"), 1.736 million AUPS mines, and 1.423 million VAR 40 mines. The report indicates that 1,672,934 mines had been destroyed (all AUPS mines), leaving a total of 4,856,875 yet to be destroyed.

¹⁵ "Destruction of Antipersonnel Landmines in Italy," Presentation by Ministry of Defense to SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000. The precise number cited was 2,053,286 destroyed.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

At the May 2000 meeting of the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, the Italian delegation stated that all U.S. antipersonnel mines stockpiled in Italy had been removed.¹⁷

Information on AP mine stockpiles in Italy has come from two interministerial reports in 1998 and 1999, the MBT Article 7 Report (with data as of 31 January 2000), and most recently a report to the SCE meeting on 22-23 May 2000. This information has some inconsistencies and leaves some unanswered questions. The first official information on Italian military and mine producer stockpiles of AP mines was required by the governmental decree on stockpile destruction approved by Parliament on 2 December 1998. The same information was given in the first interministerial report to Parliament on 28 May 1998 on the implementation status of Law 374/97, which requires such reporting every six months. The vagueness of these first figures raised a series of questions that were only partly clarified by the government.

The second report was released five months late on 30 April 1999. Article 6 of the Law required that a *Registro delle Mine* (Register of Mines),¹⁸ be attached to the report, but it was not. The ICBL repeatedly asked the Defense General Staff for a copy of the Register, but there was no response until 29 October 1999 when it was finally provided. This first Register reported on stockpiles through 16 November 1998, about one year before its actual release. It contained detailed information on all mines and their components in stocks, divided into explosive and inert material, belonging both to Italian Armed Forces and Italian landmine producing companies. The materials reported as belonging to private companies have been delivered to the Italian Armed Forces in order to be destroyed. Data in the Register can be summarized as follows:

Explosive material (numbers):

	Mines	Components
Army	6,482,876	257,199
Navy	6,039	19,589
Air Forces	40,160	-
Valsella	758	15,335
Total	6,529,833	292,123

Inert material (numbers):

	Mines	Components
Army	551,947	720,826
Navy	3,086	2,032
Valsella	14,736	1,133,137
Tecnovar	19,375	-
Total	589,144	1,855,995

¹⁷ Oral remarks by Italian delegation to the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 23 May 2000. This information has not been officially confirmed.

¹⁸ *Registro delle Mine* (Register of Mines), 16 November 1998, released 30 April 1999/29 October 1999.

Explosive AP MINE materials belonging to the Italian Army and Navy are reported as:

Type	Army (number)	Navy (number)
Valmara 69	409,132	600
Claymore		69
AUPS	1,735,259	614
MAUS 1	623,447	1,000
MK2	214,178	2,550
MK48		60
PMC*	2,068,193	
V*	11,081	110
R*		36
VAR 40	1,421,586	1,000
Total Mines	6,482,876	6,039
AC/52*	146,644	
AU/52*	110,555	
Detonator		18,813
Valmara spares		276
AUPS spares		500
Total components	257,199	19,589

*no longer in service/out of order

Explosive AP MINE materials belonging to the Italian Air Force are reported as:

Type	Number
KB44	21,840
MIFF	6,400
MUSA	1,760
MUSPA	10,160
Total	40,160

The November 1998 Register of Mines (released in October 1999) clarifies some previous questions about AP mine stockpiles which arose from the first interministerial report in May 1998:

- The approximately 2 million pressure mines (no longer in service) declared in the first document refer substantially to the Army's PMC mine;
- The 450,000 wide-range mines declared in the first report refer to Valmara 69 AP mines belonging to the Army and the Navy;
- Claymore mines form part of the military stockpiles, in particular of the Navy, both as explosive and as inert material, though in limited quantities; no details are given if they have been adapted for use only in command-detonated mode or not; it was decided to destroy all of them;
- VA50 mines are present in military stocks as inert material (2) and in Valsella stocks as explosive (180) and inert (652) material.

Some important questions remain to be answered after examination of the 16 November 1998 Register of Mines:

1. No explosive or inert material belonging to the former Misar company (currently SEI) is included in the Register. Were Misar stocks removed or destroyed by the company before the expiry dates fixed by the national Law for their disclosure and delivery?
2. No mention is made of the mines belonging to foreign armed forces (United States in particular) and of NATO located on Italian territory. Under Law 374/97 they should have been disclosed in quantity and category by 17 March 1998, to be handed over to special designated sites by 14 June 1998. According to U.S. government sources, as of 1997 the United States had stockpiled about 90,000 antipersonnel mines in Italy, including ADAM, Gator, GEMSS, and MOPMS mines.¹⁹
3. Part of the Register lists the patent rights and technologies for the production of AP mines or components declared by landmine producing companies, as required to be declared by Article 4 of Law 374/97. Of the three Italian companies only Valsella declares construction drawings. However, Law 374/97 does not require destruction of the AP mine technologies and plans (or their requisition) therefore such declarations have no effect in avoiding the transfer abroad of AP mine projects, technologies and so on.

The final section of the Register is supposed to cover the destruction of stockpiles (both inert and explosive) but it contained no information. The first information on stockpile destruction was given by the Ministry of Defense during the NGO visit to the military plant at Baiano di Spoleto on 2 December 1999. The Baiano di Spoleto military site is in charge of destroying the pressure mines type AUPS, MAUS/1, VAR-40, MK-2, except their detonators; practice AP mines of any kind and their components, plus Valsella and Tecnovar components and residual production of practice AP mines. The visit was organized by the National Committee for Humanitarian Action against Antipersonnel Mines, at the urging of the ItCBL.

By the end of November 1999 the Baiano di Spoleto plant had destroyed:

- 1,425,050 AP mines (all of AUPS type) out of 3,999,614 that the plant was charged to destroy (the total number of AP mines is 6,529,833);
- 206,222 inert material/practice AP mines belonging to Army, Navy, Valsella and Tecnovar, out of a total 587,317; and,
- 1,303,346 components, out of a total of 2,576,408.

The MBT Article 7 report updates stockpile destruction to 31 January 2000. It reports that 1,672,934 (all of AUPS type), plus 222,251 practice mines have been destroyed. The report contained no information on the destruction of components;

¹⁹ Information provided by U.S. government sources to Human Rights Watch, March 1999.

although some information on destruction of components was presented at the SCE meeting in Geneva on 22-23 May 2000.

The Article 7 report released late March 2000 states that 8,000 AP mines (as also specified in the national law) will be retained for training in and development of mine clearance and destruction techniques, but which mine types will be retained is noted as “to be determined.”²⁰

As with the gaps in the Register of November 1998 described above, absence of any information on NATO stockpiles was expected in the Article 7 report, but the failure to report AP mines which had been produced and stocked by the Italian company Misar/SEI was not expected.²¹

On Form H of the report (“Technical characteristics of each type produced/owned or possessed”) the Ministry of Defense noted: “...information [is] provided for the most common warfare models of AP mines produced by national manufacturing companies and owned in a large number by IT ARMY; further information concerning the entire production will be provided as soon as it will be available.” This could imply that Misar/SEI has not yet met the obligations under Article 3 and 4 of Law 374/97 to report the quantity and nature of its AP mine stocks, as well as to deliver them to local authorities. Or it could be that the Ministry of Defence has not yet counted the mines produced by Misar. Given that these are among the most common Italian AP mines, it seems incongruous that the Italian Army would have none in its own stockpiles.

New information was made available during the May session of the Standing Committee of Experts on stockpile destruction.²² Italy added details of the destruction of inert material/practise AP mines (236,621) belonging to Army, Navy, and manufacturing companies and components (1,303,346) as of 30 April 2000.²³

A new decree concerning stockpile destruction was approved by the Italian Parliament in May 2000, replacing the decree of 2 October 1998. This charges the Baiano di Spoleto plant with destruction also of PMC mines and ML1 (or ML4) and OTO detonators, and the Noceto di Parma military plant with destruction of Valmara 69 mines, at an estimated cost one-fifth of the cost tendered by private companies. However, destruction of remaining mines and components will be given to private companies.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, submitted 29 March, data as of 31 January 2000.

²¹ The Italy section of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* deals with the numerous shareholders’ passages of Misar at length. The acquisition of Misar by SEI makes it potentially the only company in Italy still active in the landmine producing sector. While no sales of landmines have been registered up to 1998 (the ItCBL was not able to get relevant data for 1999) the location of Misar stocks remains unknown, whether in Italy or even in France. No response has been given so far to the ItCBL’s requests for clarification, which were repeated during the press conference held in Baiano di Spoleto on 2 December 1999 after visiting the military site where stockpile destruction is taking place.

²² “Destruction of Antipersonnel Landmines in Italy,” Presentation to the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000.

²³ There are some differences between the figures in the Article 7 report (as of 31 January 2000) and the SCE presentation (as of 30 April 2000), small differences concerning Army explosive material (Article 7: 6,482,876 units, SCE: 6,482,852), more substantial differences in Army inert materials (Article 7: 551,947, SCE: 555,629) and components (Article 7: 720,826, SCE: 1,441,239), and manufacturing companies’ inert materials (Article 7: 34,111, SCE: 31,857).

Use and Landmine Problem

The former use of AP mines by Italian forces and the landmine problem in Italy after World War II are detailed in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 729-730.

Mine Action Funding

The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not appear to have a clearly defined policy or program for mine action. An expert in the Ministry's Emergency Office commented: "This is something that should be hoped for, but what I see at present is just a series of isolated actions."²⁴ Between May 1999 and March 2000, the Development Cooperation Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pledged a contribution of L13.941 billion (US\$7.33 million) for mine action activities through the following multilateral and bilateral programs:²⁵

²⁴ Interview with Vincenzo Oddo, Office VI (Emergency), Development Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 15 March 2000.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Note: abbreviations used in this Table are: UTL - Local Technical Unit of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HI – Handicap International, NPA – Norwegian People's Aid, CUAMM – University College for Aspirant Doctors and Missionaries, NRRDS – Nuba Relief Rehabilitation Development Society, OMAR - Organization for Mine Awareness and Rehabilitation UNMAS – United Nations Mine Action Service, WHO – World Health Organization, UNOCHA - United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, UNOPS - UN Office for Project Services, ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross, UNDP – UN Development Programme, AVSI - Association of Volunteers for International Service, SCF – Save the Children Fund.

Country	Funding	Counter-parts	Objectives	Progress and details of the project
ANGOLA ²⁶ - Uige Province	L4.30 billion (US\$2.26 million) ²⁷	Local Italian Embassy and UTL	Demining of a water reservoir, war victim assistance, orthopedic surgery	US\$29,500 to HI for orthopaedic assistance to disabled war victims in Negage. US\$50,586 to NPA for mine clearance of a water reservoir and adjacent area in Uige. US\$180,000 to CUAMM (Italy) for victim assistance at Uige Hospital. Another contract is expected in March 2000 in Bengo province.
SUDAN- Nuba Mountains	L0.013 billion (US\$ 6,842)	Local Italian Embassy and UTL	Food and accommodation for UXO victims	These funds were part of a development project of L0,5 billion lire (US\$263,000), entrusted to NRRDS to provide food and accommodation in Lokichokio (Kenya) for mine victims from Sudan being assisted in Kenya's hospitals.
YEMEN- Taiz	L1.2 billion (US\$ 631,600)	Local Italian Embassy and UTL	Surgery programs at the Taiz Orthopedic Center	The project has been completed (carried out by the Italian surgeon Carlo Astini).
ANGOLA- Huíla	L1.4	European	Demining activities	Started in October 1999 by Intersos, an Italian NGO; two

²⁶ Angola is considered a priority area by the Cooperation Department.

²⁷ Only US\$900,000 has actually been spent out of this contribution; the rest is to be given back to the Italian Government, as residual funds that could not be spent by 31 December 1999 (in compliance with the Law of 18 November 1923 no. 2440 on the State's General Accounts); this does not take into consideration the bureaucratic slowness peculiar to Cooperation procedures (it takes at least 3 to 5 months for a contribution to be disbursed, after its approval), and risks paralyzing many initiatives.

Country	Funding	Counter-parts	Objectives	Progress and details of the project
Province	billion (US\$ 737,000)	Union		priority clearance areas have been identified in the municipality of Matala, to support the resettlement process.
ANGOLA-Cuando Cubango Province	L0.6 billion (US\$ 316,000)	European Union	Victim rehabilitation programs	Intersos started the project in October 1999 that included the implementation of a rehabilitation center and training of specialized personnel. ²⁸
ANGOLA-Location not available yet	L0.5 billion (US\$ 263,000)	UNMAS ²⁹	Victim assistance and rehabilitation	Funds were disbursed with great delay (March 2000) ³⁰ and the project is still to be started; probably to be carried out in coordination with ICRC and WHO. ³¹
CROATIA-Slavonski Brod	L0.5 billion (US\$ 263,000)	UNMAS	Demining activities	Funds were disbursed with great delay (March 2000) and the project is still to be started. ABC seems most likely to win the demining contract. The choice of Slavonski Brod, a frontier district, as a priority area is aimed at promoting integration and reconciliation between Bosnians and Croats.
CAMBODIA-Battambang	L0.7 billion (US\$ 368,500)	WHO	Support to the orthopaedic surgery center	An agreement with WHO has been signed, which provides for participation of the Italian NGO Emergency, ³² but the contribution is blocked due to WHO bureaucracy. ³³

²⁸ Interview with Stefano Calabretta, Intersos, Rome, 9 March 2000.

²⁹ This is the first time the Italian Government has pledged a contribution to UNMAS. This policy has been confirmed for the year 2000, when another L1 billion is expected to be contributed to this UN agency.

³⁰ The delay in this and the following project was due to an "oversight" on the part of the Treasury.

³¹ Interview with Nicola Occhipinti, Office II (Multilateral Cooperation), Development Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 22 March 2000.

Country	Funding	Counter-parts	Objectives	Progress and details of the project
AFGHANISTAN - Anabah	L0.8 billion (US\$ 421,000)	WHO	Victim assistance in two first aid centers	
AFGHANISTAN - Location unknown	L0.186 billion (US\$ 97,000)	UNOCHA	Demining and mine awareness activities	Funds disbursed and entrusted to local (ARCS, OMAR) and international NGOs (HI, BBC-AEP, SCF). Details after publication of 1999 UNOCHA Report. ³⁴
MOZAMBIQUE- Maputo, Sofala and Manica Provinces	L2.28 billion (US\$1.2 million)	UNABPS UNOPS	Demining and mine awareness activities	Funds disbursed at the end of 1999; part of the PDHL/MOZ, an Italy/UNOPS/UNDP joint project for human development in Mozambique, started in March 1999 to which Italy contributed L.32 billion (US\$16.842 million). Maputo Province: 96,130 sq m cleared and 86 explosive devices disarmed. Further 1,173,500 sq m identified in other areas. Matutine District should be declared mine-free by June 2000. Sofala and Manica Provinces: surveying activities completed, by HI and Mozambique's Red Cross; mine awareness programs reached 30,552 people; 209 suspected

³² Telephone interview with Giorgio Raineri, responsible for the Operating Support Unit of Emergency, 23 March 2000.

³³ An officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized WHO for its "slowness and inability to manage this kind of project." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is taking steps to stir WHO into action, and is even considering withdrawing the funds. Interview, Rome, 15 March 2000.

³⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not routinely monitor directly the implementation of projects which it supports through multilateral channels, unless serious problems are reported, as in the case of WHO; even in these cases, visits of monitoring delegations are organized only rarely and only for contributions exceeding L1 billion. This is mostly due to the Cooperation Department's scarcity of means and personnel. Interview with Mrs. Dradi, Office II (Multilateral Cooperation), Development Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 15 March 2000.

³⁵ Programma Italia/UNDP/ILO/UNICRI/UNOPS di Svi luppo Umano a Livello Locale in Mozambico, aggiornato a gennaio 2000 (1999 PDHL/MOZ Report), pp. 24-30.

Country	Funding	Counter-parts	Objectives	Progress and details of the project
TCHAD- Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi	L0.4 billion (US\$ 210,500)	UNDP	Demining	minefields identified. Demining operations will start in coming months. ³⁵ Funds disbursed at the end of 1999; supported also by USA, Japan, Germany and Canada. Visit by Italian Embassy to monitor progress scheduled in 2000.
UGANDA- Gulu	L0.06 billion (US\$ 31,500)	UNICEF	Equipment and activities for victim rehabilitation	US\$33,665 (20,000 in equipment and 13,665 in cash for activities) to the Milan-based NGO AVSI via UNICEF (Uganda), as part (10.51%) of program run by AVSI with private donor support. ³⁶
—	L1 billion (US\$ 526,000)	ICRC	Mine awareness, victim assistance, data collection and study, promote adherence to the MBT. ³⁷	Part of the L10 billion (US\$5.263 million) annual contribution of Italy to ICRC; disbursed in July 1999 after ICRC Special Appeal Mine Action 1999-2003 was issued; not allottable.

³⁶ Report of the Medical Rehabilitation Programme for War Victims, AVSI. Interview with Alberto Repossi, Programme Officer Desk Africa, AVSI, 9 March 2000.

³⁷ Special Appeal Mine Action 1999-2003, International Committee of the Red Cross.

Mine Clearance

Intersos is the only Italian NGO involved in mine clearance, through its Mine Action Unit, and is also active in mine awareness and mine victim assistance.³⁸ Intersos works with EOD experts selected from retired members of the Italian Army's Engineers Corps. Mine action was carried out in 1999 in Bosnia, Kosovo and Angola with funds from several Italian local councils (Veneto Region and Venezia Province) and from private donors. In Kosovo, Intersos clearance activities started in June 1999 with funding by the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and the "Mission Rainbow" special Italian fund for Kosovo. In Angola, in November 1999, Intersos started an eighteen-month demining project in Huila Province, funded by the EU and Italian Government for a total of 1.7 million Euros.

In Bosnia the ItCBL donated L180 million (US\$ 95,000) to Intersos for clearance in the Stup district of Sarajevo. With contributions by the Province of Venice (L50 million, US\$ 25,000) and other local municipalities, this activity will continue.

The Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines is also funding mine/UXO clearance in Afghanistan through its local partners the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) and Organization for Mine Awareness and Rehabilitation (OMAR). The ItCBL has raised funds totalling US\$ 80,000; of that US\$ 35,000 was allocated to MCPA in January 1999 and US\$ 45,000 to OMAR in August 1999. From 21 November to 1 December 1999, a visit to Afghanistan to monitor the clearance activities was carried out by the ItCBL, which formed a favourable assessment of these activities, the organizational ability of its local Afghan partners, the economic value of the demining operations and the involvement of women in most of the programmes.³⁹

Appalti, Bonifiche, Costruzioni (A.B.C.) is a private commercial company involved in mine clearance in Croatia since 1999.

Italian Army engineers sent two Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialists, as part of the UN peacekeeping forces in East Timor in 1999. A large team of EOD specialists carried out mine clearance in Kosovo as part of the West Multinational Brigade of NATO, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a team of twelve EOD specialists.

Mine Awareness

During 1999 the ItCBL, with Handicap International, printed 100,000 leaflets both in Serb and Albanian informing people from Kosovo about the dangers of mines and UXO, soon after the end of the war in Serbia and Kosovo. These leaflets have been delivered to all Italian organizations working in the Balkans.

³⁸ Interview with Stefano Calabretta, Humanitarian Mine Action Unit, Intersos, Rome, 28 January 2000.

³⁹ Interview with Col. Mario Pellegrino, technical expert deminer and volunteer of the ItCBL, Rome, 1 February 2000. The clearance follows standardized procedures for the manual (metal detectors and prodders) and mechanical activities, but ItCBL noticed little attention paid to the safety of personnel in the field. There was also a lack of reconstruction, social and economic programs in favour of the refugees, and quite strained relationship with UNOCHA. The ItCBL team could not verify the relations between its local partners and the Taleban regime; OMAR denies any collaboration with the political power. The liberty with which they act indicates good relations with the Taleban, but this is necessary to operate in Afghanistan.

In Albania UNICEF Italy financed a major mine, cluster bomb and UXO awareness campaign, to the total value of over L2 billion (US\$ 1 million).⁴⁰ In districts of the cities of Kukes, Skoda and Tirana, the local youth has been involved in social activities aimed at informing people about the landmine problem. Some 560,000 mine awareness leaflets were printed by UNICEF in Albania. The Aibi (Associazione Italiana Amici dei Bambini — Italian Association Friends of the Children) mine awareness campaign directed at children in Albania took place in many cities: Tirana, Fier, Durazzo, Scutari, Berat, Lezha, Lac, from June to July 1999. This campaign was completely financed by Aibi, as part of a larger project under the “Rainbow Mission” in the Balkans led by the Italian Government.⁴¹

Intersos, whenever possible, includes mine awareness in its mine clearance programs.⁴² In Bosnia, it used T-shirts printed with mine and UXO drawings and warnings in the local language as a mine awareness tool for children; distributing about 10,000 T-shirts to schools in Sarajevo, both on Federal and Serb side with funding from the Canadian Embassy, ECHO and Italian private funds. In Kosovo, Intersos trained and employed six local operators to provide mine awareness sessions to families with houses being cleared of mines and UXO. Also in Kosovo, in the cities of Pec, Decani and nearby villages, a mine awareness campaign was carried out by the NGO Cesvi (Cooperation and Development) over the summer of 1999.⁴³ During emergency activities related to food delivery and the reconstruction of houses, about 2,000 mine/UXO awareness leaflets, in Serb and Albanian produced by the ItCBL, were distributed.

In Nicaragua’s San Francisco Libre Municipality, the NGO Movimondo Molisv took part in a program supporting a three-year campaign to clear rural areas, financed by the European Union.⁴⁴ Mine awareness was mainly carried out through training courses for communities living in the areas suspected of containing mines, with educational material aimed at schools and producers’ associations. The program, at a cost of US\$ 30,000 and involving about 12,000 people, was coordinated with the municipality, including the use of local mass media.

In Senegal in 1999, in the zone between the river Casamance and the border with Guinea-Bissau, the NGO Cospe began a mine awareness programme financed by ECHO for a total of 1,100 Euros, to support war and landmine victims. With the help of twelve local officers many meetings were held, as well as the showing of films, distribution of drawings, posters and leaflets. A large house for the mine victims and survivors (442 in total) was reconstructed. A total of 190 villages and 80,820 people have been involved in

⁴⁰ Interview with Luca Cappelletti, Press Office, UNICEF-Italy, Rome, 26 January 2000.

⁴¹ Telephone interviews with Stefano Otolini, Aibi, Milano, and Carola Molteni, Aibi officers for Albania, 31 January 2000.

⁴² Interview with Stefano Calabretta, Intersos, Rome, 28 January 2000.

⁴³ Telephone interview with Simona Stella, Cesvi, Bergamo, 7 March 2000.

⁴⁴ Interview with Elena Abbati, Latin America Area Assistance, Movimondo, Rome, 7 February 2000.

this program, and they have also been helped to begin their artisan and agricultural activities in those areas declared safe.⁴⁵

Survivor Assistance

Italian NGOs are involved in programs offering assistance to landmine survivors in a number of countries. The mine victim/survivor assistance program carried out by the NGO AVSI in 1999 is part of a three-year project that began in July 1998, in many districts of northern Uganda (Gulu, Kingtum, Lacor, Lira, Apac, Nebbi, Adjumani), with the collaboration of local structures, medical offices and disabled people's associations. The program includes delivery of prostheses and subsequent rehabilitation of amputees. A budget of US\$33,665 was proposed, of which US\$20,000 was for purchase of instruments and the remainder for associated activities; UNICEF in Uganda financed 10.51 per cent of the project, the rest being paid by AVSI through private funds and donations. About thirty patients having their lower limb amputated have been treated. Seminars, training and specialization courses have been held for local technical, social and medical personnel. The program has been a success so far. In the majority of cases patients have learnt how to use their prostheses and taken advantage of them; some returned to the activities they practiced before the casualty occurred and children returned to schools. In some cases (15 percent) there were problems: prostheses broke or had technical problems; in other cases the patient had little motivation to use the prosthesis. This has been solved sometimes through the intervention of a social assistant.⁴⁶

In 1999, at the Experimental Center For Prostheses Application of the National Institute for Insurance Labour Accidents (INAIL) situated in Budrio (Bologna), prosthetic operations and rehabilitation were carried out for five people heavily injured by landmine blasts. This small group was aged between 9 and 37 years old, one was a female; they are from Former Yugoslavia, Albania, Libya and Somalia. Three of them have undergone amputations of lower limbs, the others of their upper limbs.

The NGO Emergency assists mine victims and survivors by establishing surgical hospitals and rehabilitation centers, providing basic medical assistance, and training local people to face the most urgent medical and surgical necessities.⁴⁷ In 1999, 214 patients were treated at the surgical center for war victims in Sulaimaniya, Iraqi Kurdistan, 82 patients were treated at the surgical center in Ebril, Northern Iraq, and 333 were treated at the surgical center "Ilaria Alpi" in Battambang, Cambodia. Since December 1999, 21 patients have been treated at the surgical center in Anabah, Afghanistan. At the rehabilitation center in Sulaimaniya, prostheses produced and fitted to lower limbs number 610 and to upper limbs number 34. The center also provides special courses for the reintegration of handicapped people into society; over 70 per cent of the staff employed is composed of disabled patients. This center costs US\$31,000 per month to maintain. All centers in Northern Iraq were financed by the European Commission until

⁴⁵ Telephone interview with Raffaella Di Salvatore, Cospe, Firenze, 2 February 2000; Cospe has worked in close contact with Handicap International, having offices in the cities of Ziguinchor and Dakar in Senegal.

⁴⁶ Telephone interview with Alberto Reposi, Program Officer for Africa, AVSI, Milano, 20 March 2000.

⁴⁷ Telephone interview with Giorgio Raineri, Emergency, Milano, 24 March 2000.

July 1999, then by UNOPS. For the centers in Cambodia and Afghanistan Emergency has used its own funds and private donations.⁴⁸

The NGO International Cooperation (Coopi) was involved in the treatment and assistance of injured people coming from the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the districts of Congo, Libengue and Moboy Mbongo, from September to December 1999. First aid and surgery were provided for mine victims, then, where possible, rehabilitation courses were organized. Thirty-six patients were treated in collaboration with the Re-education Center for Motor Disabled in the city of Bangui, supported by EU funding (L120 million; US\$60,000).⁴⁹

CUAMM is an NGO mainly involved in medical cooperation and training. In Angola in 1999, in the provincial hospital in Uige and the municipal hospital in Nagage, CUAMM activities focused on technical and organizational support of the orthopaedic department where patients injured by landmines are treated. These activities were financed by the Italian Episcopal Conference, the EU, the Italian Embassy in Luanda and private contributions.⁵⁰

In Angola, Intersos is supporting a center for prostheses and rehabilitation of landmine victims in the Cuando Cubango Province. This area is heavily affected by fighting and landmine pollution; the Center is the only resource for mine victims in the Province. The project includes training local personnel in rehabilitation and prosthesis production. Specific attention is paid to social and economic reintegration of the disabled, through vocational training. The total budget for the project is 800,000 Euros, financed by the EU, Italian Government and Intersos.⁵¹ In April 1999 the Orthopaedic Project implemented by Intersos in Burundi with ECHO funds came to an end: more than 450 patients have been treated including 230 treated surgically in a six-month period, several of them being mine victims.

The Italian Red Cross⁵² continued collaboration with the ICRC throughout 1999 to finance the Rehabilitation and Victim Assistance Centers in Kabul and Addis Abeba.

LIECHTENSTEIN

Key development: Liechtenstein ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 October 1999.

Liechtenstein signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 5 October 1999. The treaty entered into force for Liechtenstein on 1 April 2000. It is not known to have enacted implementation legislation. Liechtenstein did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999, and has not participated in the intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. It voted for UN General

⁴⁸ These figures refer only to surgical operations, not including ambulatory patients and first aid activities.

⁴⁹ Telephone interview with Ennio Miccoli, Coopi, Milan, 3 February 2000.

⁵⁰ Telephone interview with Claudia Belleffi, CUAMM, Padua, 14 April 2000.

⁵¹ Interview with Federica Biondi, Intersos, Rome, 7 March 2000.

⁵² Telephone interview with Maria Letizia Zamparelli, Studies and Planning Special Activities Service, Italian Red Cross, Rome, 24 April 2000.

Assembly Resolution 54/54B urging full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

Liechtenstein is a state party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It attended the December 1999 First Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II and submitted its required Article 13 report transparency report. Liechtenstein supports efforts within the Conference on Disarmament to eliminate antipersonnel mines provided that these efforts are complementary to and not detracting from the Mine Ban Treaty.¹

During 1999 Liechtenstein provided unspecified financial support to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance and to the Slovenia International Trust Fund, which funds mine action in Bosnia-Herzegovina.²

Liechtenstein is not mine-affected, and has not produced, possessed or used antipersonnel mines.

LUXEMBOURG

Key developments since March 1999: Luxembourg ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 14 June 1999. It has not yet submitted its Article 7 report, due by 28 May 2000. In 1999 and 2000 it has supported mine action and victim assistance projects in Angola, Bosnia, Kosovo and Laos. Luxembourg ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 5 August 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Luxembourg signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 14 June 1999.¹ The Treaty entered into force for Luxembourg on 1 December 1999. National legislation was passed to incorporate the MBT into Luxembourg law; it is not known at present whether this includes penal sanctions for treaty violations.²

Luxembourg attended the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the MBT in May 1999, represented by Marc Courte, Ambassador to the Netherlands. Luxembourg attended one of each of the meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees of Experts on victim assistance, stockpile destruction and technologies for mine clearance. In late June 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that its first Article 7 report, which was due on 28 May 2000, is being prepared.³

Luxembourg sponsored and voted in favor of the UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. After national elections in June 1999, the new government dissolved the

¹ Report of Liechtenstein to the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe, 25 November 1999, p. 2.

² Ibid, p. 3.

¹ Letter from Robert Lauer, in charge of security and disarmament questions, Political Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 June 2000; see also: <http://www.un.org/depts.treaty/final>.

² Law of 29 April 1999, approving the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfers of Mines and on their Destruction, signed in Ottawa 4 December 1997, ratified 14 June 1999, and published in the Official Journal, No. 50, 6 May 1999, p. 1189.

³ Telephone interview with Robert Lauer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 June 2000.

Ministry of Public Forces and transferred its functions to the newly formed Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade, Cooperation and Defense, which now deals with all matters relating to landmines and mine action.⁴

On 5 August 1999 Luxembourg ratified Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It participated in the First Annual Conference of Amended Protocol II in December 1999.

NGO activities on landmine issues in 1999 included an event on 1 March 1999 to mark the entry into force of the MBT, organized by Handicap International, with the cooperation of the Catholic and Protestant Churches.⁵ Church bells rang throughout Luxembourg. On 25 September 1999, HI also organized the first shoe pyramid in Luxembourg, combined with other activities, to raise public awareness about the landmine problem. Princess Maria Teresa visited the activities organized that day, which were widely covered in the media.⁶

Luxembourg has never produced or exported AP mines. It imported mines in the past from the U.S. and Belgium. Destruction of its stockpile of 9,600 mines was completed in August 1997.⁷ The Army kept 500 mines of each type it had in stock for training purposes, as permitted under the MBT. These include the Belgian M35bg, and U.S. M2A1 and M16 AP mines.⁸

Mine Action

In addition to its contributions to the United Nations and European Union, Luxembourg has financed several mine projects related to demining and mine victim assistance.⁹ In 1999 this included Flux 1,480,000 (US\$37,000) donated to Handicap International for work raising public awareness in Luxembourg, as well as the following projects:

- Angola: pilot project for airborne detection of minefields through the International Institute for Aerospace Survey and Earth Services; project currently suspended; contribution of Flux 5 million (US\$125,000).
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: contribution to the International Trust Fund for Demining and Victim Assistance; Flux 2 million (US\$50,000) for rehabilitation of mine victims.
- Kosovo: emergency demining through the UNMAS program; Flux 5 million (US\$125,000).
- Laos: support for the UXO-Lao mine action center through the UN Development Program Trust Fund; Flux 15.4 million (US\$385,000).

⁴ Letter from Robert Lauer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 June 2000.

⁵ "Entrée en Vigueur du traité d'Interdiction des mines antipersonnel," *Lëtzeburger Journal*, 27 February 1999, p. 21.

⁶ "Journée nationale des lacets bleus et de la pyramide de chaussures," *Lëtzeburger Journal*, 29 September 1999, p. 19; "Pyramide de Chaussures," *Tageblatt*, 24 September 1999, p. 44; "Samedi 25 septembre, Jour des lacets bleus," *Tageblatt*, 18 September 1999, p. 44.

⁷ Answer to Parliamentary Question No. 504, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 November 1998.

⁸ Interview with Lt.-Colonel Ries, Deputy Chief of Staff, 22 March 1999.

⁹ Letter from Robert Lauer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 June 2000.

In 2000, mine action projects are being supported in Kosovo and Laos:

- Kosovo: demining in Djakovica region through Handicap International; Flux 2 million (US\$50,000).
- Laos: support to UXO Lao through the UNDP trust fund; Flux 10 million (US\$250,000).

MACEDONIA (FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF)

Key developments since March 1999: As thousands of refugees flooded into Macedonia from Yugoslavia in 1999, an urgent mine awareness effort was carried out regarding the danger of mines on the Yugoslav side of the border.

Mine Ban Policy

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 9 September 1998.¹ It attended the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in May 1999, represented by Undersecretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sami Ibraimi, who stated that legal and administrative measures have been taken to prevent any activity prohibited by the MBT.² Macedonia has not participated in any of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts. Its initial Article 7 report was submitted to the United Nations on 25 May 1999, covering the period 4 December 1997 to 31 March 1999. But its report for full calendar year 1999 had not been submitted as required by 30 April 2000.

Macedonia voted for the December 1999 UNGA resolution supporting universalization and full implementation of the MBT; it had voted in favor of the previous pro-ban resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. The government participated in the regional landmine conferences in Zagreb in June 1999 and Ljubljana in June 2000.

The country is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not ratified Amended Protocol II (1996). It participated as an observer in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in December 1999. In its statement to the Conference, Macedonia indicated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had initiated the ratification of the protocol on 3 November 1999, and it expected "the ratification process to be finalized early next year."³

¹ In its MBT Article 7 report, submitted on 25 May 1999, Macedonia refers to its law of 2 July 1998 ratifying the treaty, which entered into force on 10 July 1998, but there is no other information offered to indicate that this law does provide implementing measures, including penal sanction for violations.

² Statement by Mr. Sami Ibraimi, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999. No further details about the measures were provided. In its statement to the Amended Protocol II Conference in December 1999, Macedonia again said, with respect to the MBT, that it had undertaken all appropriate legal measures.

³ Statement by Mr. Goce Petreski, Permanent Representative to the UN for the Republic of Macedonia, First Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II of the CCW, Geneva, December 1999.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

It is believed that some of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's mine production facilities were located in Macedonia. According to the Foreign Ministry Macedonia had produced antipersonnel mines but ceased doing so "even before it signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty."⁴ It is not known to have exported AP mines.

In its Article 7 report, Macedonia acknowledged a stockpile of 42,921 antipersonnel mines stored at in twelve locations.

Table 1. Stockpile of APMs as at 31 March 1999⁵

Type of mine	Quantity
Magnetic PMA-1	8,353
Magnetic plastic PMA-3	4,030
Magnetic PMA-3	560
Antimagnetic plastic	50
PMR-2A	29,918
APM	10
TOTAL	42,921

The 25 May 1999 Article 7 Report also stated that the government of Macedonia is "preparing a comprehensive program on destruction of stockpiled mines," while reserving fifty mines for research and training purposes.⁶ In December 1999, Macedonia again said that it was preparing a destruction program and "it will be finalized very soon."⁷ However, there has been no information to indicate that actual stockpile destruction has begun.

Use

Macedonia states that it is not mine-affected,⁸ though several of its neighbors have laid mines on their side of the borders. Yugoslavia dramatically increased the number of minefields along the border during the 1999 war in Kosovo, and these have posed dangers to Macedonians and refugees in the border areas. On the other hand, Bulgaria has demined its length of the Macedonian border, following signature of the MBT.

The only account of mines planted on Macedonian soil was a report from Tanusevci, a village outside Skopje, where a father and son had buried fifteen antipersonnel mines and eighteen antitank mine detonators in their own yard. They claimed they happened upon the mines and buried them in an effort to avert "accidental

⁴ Statement by Mr. Sami Ibraimi at FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999; for details of mines previously produced, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 632.

⁵ Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 25 May 1999, covering 4 December 1997-31 March 1999; available at: <http://domino.un.org/ottawa.nsf>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Statement to the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, Geneva, December 1999.

⁸ Ibid. Also, Article 7 Report, 25 May 1999.

injuries," however Macedonian police arrested the pair and charged them with "terrorist preparations."⁹

Victim Assistance

There were scores of reports of landmine casualties as thousands of refugees crossed the border from Yugoslavia into Macedonia during 1999, and according to Macedonian figures, at least a dozen of these were fatalities.¹⁰ As the official border checkpoints became overcrowded and passage began to stagnate, many refugees sought illegal entrance, unknowingly crossing through minefields to reach Macedonia. In one case, a 14-year-old Kosovar refugee was fleeing from Macedonian border guards when he stepped on a mine in Yugoslav territory, injuring himself, another refugee and the three guards.¹¹

As Macedonia is not mine-affected, there was little or no formal victim assistance infrastructure in place to begin dealing with this problem. Relief agencies, already overtaxed by the sheer numbers of incoming refugees, had few resources to assist with mine-related emergencies. Most reports show victims being transported for treatment to hospitals in the capital, Skopje, or Tetovo, an hour outside the capital. There was one report that indicated a victim was taken to "a provisional medical center at the border" for immediate attention.¹²

Mine Awareness

As realization of the landmine situation spread beyond the Macedonian border, relief agencies began initiating mine awareness programs in the refugee camps. With funding assistance from the United States, France, United Kingdom, Norway, Canada and Belgium, groups began distributing materials to educate the refugees on the danger of landmines.¹³ The nongovernmental organization CARE worked with refugees in the Cegrane and Stenkovec II camps. UNICEF trained teachers in mine awareness, and handed out and pinned up more than a million pamphlets and posters; it also sent out mobile theater groups to enact landmine dramas.¹⁴ Comic books with an anti-landmine message were brought into the Macedonian camps to educate young people.

While visiting the Stenkovec Camp, U.S. President Clinton urged refugees to remain at the camp until paths could be cleared for their return to Kosovo.¹⁵ Eventually,

⁹ "FRYOM Police Arrest 2 Albanians in Possession of Mines," *SRNA* (FBIS -World News Connection), 10 August 1999.

¹⁰ Christian T. Miller, "Crisis in Yugoslavia Land Mines: Latest 'Weapon of Terror,'" *Los Angeles Times*, May 23 1999.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² "Mines Kill Refugees Fleeing Kosovo," *Reuters*, 28 April 1999.

¹³ "Demining Kosovo: The American Response," *USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing*, Federal News Service, Federal Information Systems Corp, 28 June 1999.

¹⁴ "The Human Cost of Landmines in Kosovo," UNICEF, 5 July 1999; available at: www.reliefweb.int.

¹⁵ "In Macedonia, Clinton says he Fears Retaliation," *Kansas City Star*, June 23 1999.

as the tide of refugees began turning back toward Kosovo, UNHCR officials at the Blace checkpoint handed out mine awareness pamphlets as the refugees walked by.¹⁶

MONACO

The Principality of Monaco ratified the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 17 November 1998, and it entered into force for Monaco on 1 May 1999. It voted in favor of the pro-ban United Nations General Assembly resolutions in 1997 and 1998, and co-sponsored and voted in favor of the December 1999 resolution. Monaco has not submitted its initial implementation report as required by Article 7, which was due by 27 October 1999.

However, in its annual report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 31 January 2000, Monaco indicated that it passed legislation on 30 August 1999 implementing the MBT.¹ Details of the legislation are not known.

Monaco is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It did not attend the First Conference of States Parties of the Amended Protocol in December 1999, nor had it submitted its report as required under Article 13 by that date.

Monaco has not produced, traded, stockpiled or used antipersonnel mines, and is not mine-affected. It has contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.

THE NETHERLANDS

Key developments since March 1999: The Netherlands ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 April 1999 and it entered into force on 1 October 1999. The Netherlands has continued to be a leader in promoting universalization and effective implementation of the treaty. It has served as co-rapporteur of the SCE on Mine Clearance. Since January 2000 it has chaired the Mine Action Support Group. The Netherlands contributed about US\$10 million to mine action programs in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The Netherlands was one of the first countries to opt for a fast track process to ban antipersonnel mines, joining the “core group” of countries which worked together in what became known as the ‘Ottawa Process’ to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). Netherlands signed the Treaty on 3 December 1997. Ratification of international treaties

¹⁶ “Refugees return to Kosovo Despite Danger of Landmines,” *Agence France-Presse*, 15 June 1999.

¹ Report of the Monaco Delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 31 January 2000, p. 3: “Par Ordonnance Souveraine no 14.123 du 30 aout 1999 publiee au Journal de Monaco le 3 septembre 1999 la Principaute de Monaco s’est donne les moyens juridiques de s’acquitter de deux series d’obligations: - interdiction et repression des activites visees par la Convention; - controle du respect des dispositions de la Convention.”

is a lengthy procedure in the Netherlands, and was achieved for the MBT on 12 April 1999. Thus, the treaty entered into for the Netherlands on 1 October 1999.

National implementation legislation has also proceeded slowly, and was still being drafted in May 2000. Each part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (i.e., the Dutch Antilles) will proceed separately with its implementation legislation. For the Netherlands, "The General Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties Implementation Act," was drafted by the Ministers of Justice, Home Affairs and Defense, and sent to the State Council in October 1999 for advice.¹ The final legislation was expected to be sent to Parliament in the spring of 2000, but had not been as of 1 May.² The government has stated, "Before this Act enters into force, provisions of the Convention will be implemented on the basis of existing legislation, such as the Import and Export Act 1962."³

In May 1999 the Netherlands participated in the First Meeting of State Parties (FMSP) to the MBT in Maputo, Mozambique, having been one of the "Group of Friends of Maputo" which helped to organize the FMSP. The Dutch delegation also included an NGO representative. In the framework of the Friends of Maputo, the Netherlands together with South Africa, Canada, Belgium and Sweden has encouraged State Parties to present their Article 7 reports on time.

At the FMSP, the Netherlands became co-rapporteur (with Peru) of the intersessional Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) on Mine Clearance, which held meetings in September 1999 and May 2000. In September 2000, the Netherlands will become co-chair of the SCE. The Netherlands has been very actively involved in all five SCEs. At the SCE meeting on General Status of the Convention in January 2000, the Netherlands was one of the governments which reiterated that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices which function like AP mines – which may explode from an unintentional act of a person -- are banned under the MBT.⁴

The Dutch delegation welcomed the release by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* at the FMSP. The government of the Netherlands strongly supports the work of Landmine Monitor and co-hosted the Landmine Monitor researchers meeting preparing for the 2000 report in Noordwijkerhout on 15-17 May 2000.

On 7 January 2000 the Netherlands presented its first report under Article 7 of the MBT, for the period 1 March-31 December 1999, which provided comprehensive information on implementation measures and destruction of stockpiles.

The Netherlands has supported all UNGA pro-ban resolutions to date, and has also served as chair of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) in New York since 1 January 2000. MASG coordinates the mine action policy of the twenty-two most significant donors.

¹ Telephone interview with the legal affairs desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2000.

² Telephone interview with the legal affairs desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 May 2000.

³ Report to the OSCE, 28 January 2000, p. 3.

⁴ Oral statement of the Dutch Delegation, Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, 10-11 January 2000. See also, Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," January 2000.

It has also actively promoted the universalization of the MBT. In a letter to the Dutch Campaign, the Foreign Minister stated, "The Netherlands has played an active role in the Ottawa process and will continue to make every effort for universal endorsement and implementation of this treaty."⁵ The Netherlands, especially within the framework of the European Union and Common Foreign & Security Policy, presses governments that have not done so to ratify or accede to the Treaty. The government has particularly focussed on Turkey and the USA.⁶

Regarding Dutch policy about possible involvement in joint military operations where AP mines are used by non-signatory countries, the government's position has been made clear by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on two occasions. In a letter to the NGO Pax Christi, Foreign Minister J J van Aartsen stated that within NATO operations AP mines can no longer play a role. The Dutch military will not participate in any preparatory operational activity with the intention to use AP mines or mixed systems which contain them. Dutch soldiers are not allowed to assist with the use of AP mines, nor incite or request the use of these weapons. The command structure has also been made subordinate to this policy: a Dutch commander in joint operations will not order the use of AP mines and Dutch soldiers under US or Turkish command will not execute any order to use AP mines but look for alternative methods to achieve the objective.⁷

The Minister of Foreign Affairs also stated in the Senate on 23 March 1999 that none of the NATO partners will assist Turkey or the USA (within NATO only the USA and Turkey have not signed the MBT) with the use of AP mines or with preparations for use, and will not tolerate the use of AP mines on their territory.⁸

The Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) was approved by the Dutch Senate on 2 February 1999.⁹ The Netherlands submitted its report as required under Article 13, and participated in the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW in December 1999, where its delegation viewed the United States' proposal for strengthening Amended Protocol II on antivehicle mines as containing useful elements for further discussion. At the Netherlands' request, the Quakers' United Nations Office in Geneva organized an informal meeting during the CCW Conference at which representatives of several governments and NGOs discussed the need and possibilities for strengthening the Amended Protocol II with regard to antivehicle mines.¹⁰

The Netherlands does not oppose discussion on landmines within the Conference on Disarmament, but insists that if a new treaty is developed this should not lessen the scope of the Mine Ban Treaty which is regarded as "the comprehensive legal instrument on the subject of antipersonnel mines which should gain universal acceptance. The

⁵ Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, J J van Aartsen, to Pax Christi, 21 December 1999.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ *Handelingen Eerste Kamer* (Acts of Parliament, Senate), The Hague, 23 March 1999.

⁹ *Handelingen Eerste Kamer* (Acts of Parliament, Senate), The Hague, 2 February 1999, 18th Session, pp. 639-642.

¹⁰ Interviews with Alexander Verbeek, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 January and 15 February 2000.

Netherlands supports all efforts that might contribute to the total elimination of anti-personnel mines in whatever form, provided these efforts do not detract or deviate from the high standards set in this Convention.”¹¹

Production and Transfer

According to the Ministry of Defense, production of landmines stopped twenty years ago.¹² For the acquisition of alternatives to AP mines, between US\$25-100 million (Dfl 50 and 200 million) is planned for 2003.¹³

With the October 1999 entry into force of the MBT for the Netherlands, its limited export moratorium of September 1993, which had been expanded in 1996, became a complete ban on exports of AP mines except for the sole purpose of their destruction. There has been little information about past exports of AP mines by the Netherlands.¹⁴ Some AP mines were transferred to Germany for their destruction, as permitted under the MBT.

The Netherlands imported mines from the United States, Germany, Austria and perhaps other nations.¹⁵ These include 822 directional fragmentation mines from Austria in 1997, which are reported to have no tripwires and can be command-detonated only (mines with tripwires which allow victim-activation fall within the MBT definition of an AP mine),¹⁶ as well as 630 Claymore mines from the US in 1984-86 and 5,984 Gator AP mines in 1991.¹⁷ The Netherlands has decided to destroy the Gator mine, which is a mixed mine system in which AP mines are packaged with antitank mines, as described below.

The Ministry of Defense is considering importing Claymore mines and antitank mines with antihandling devices, within the limits imposed by the amended Protocol II of the CCW.¹⁸ Given the strong view of the Dutch government that, under the MBT, antivehicle mines with antihandling devices which explode due to the unintentional act of a person are banned, it is anticipated that the government would take great care in what

¹¹ Report to the OSCE, 28 January 2000, p. 2.

¹² For details of past production, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 749.

¹³ Ministry of Defense, *Materieel Projekten Overzicht 2000*, K1 16 and KL 17, 15 December 1999.

¹⁴ *De Nationale Ombudsman*, Rapport 99/175, 19 April 1999. The report revealed exports of twenty-one AP23 mines to the US in 1981. Although more of these mines were offered to potential buyers in 1991/92, they were withdrawn from sales catalogues because of technical failures which led to the Dutch decision to destroy them.

¹⁵ For details of past imports, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 750.

¹⁶ 1997-98 Acts of Parliament, Appendix 368, Answer of the Minister of Defense, Voorhoeve, 2 December 1997, to questions raised by MP J Hoekema (D66), 11 November 1997.

¹⁷ U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales of Antipersonnel Mines, as of 8/11/93*. See also: The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 73.

¹⁸ Ministry of Defense, *Materieel Projekten Overzicht 2000*, K1 16 and KL 17, 15 December 1999.

type of mines it decided to import.¹⁹ The Netherlands has also decided that existing stocks of antitank mines will be destroyed when new AT mines have been acquired.²⁰

Stockpiling and Destruction

Research into the safe destruction of AP mines was started in 1994 by the Ministry of Defense, after pressure from the two main political parties and the Dutch Campaign to Ban Landmines.²¹ In 1997 the Minister of Defense told Parliament that 440,000 landmines would be destroyed, of which 254,526 were AP mines.²² A total of 209,500 type AP22 mines were destroyed in June 1997, jointly with Belgian mines to share costs, by incineration by the Buck company in Germany at a cost of US\$314,000 (Dfl 628,500).

From late 1996 to May 1998 the French company AF Demil (or NAMSA) destroyed 45,026 Model AP23 antipersonnel mines and 155,000 antitank mines, by separating the explosives and the metals.²³ The metals have been recycled.

Claymore mines are not mentioned in the Article 7 report as forming part of the stockpile; the Ministry of Defense decided in 1997 that Claymores fall outside the MBT definition of an AP mine.²⁴ Command-detonated Claymore mines are permitted under the treaty; tripwire-operated Claymores are prohibited.

Apart from Claymores, the only AP mines remaining in stock are the 5,984 Gator mines imported from the U.S. in 1991. The Netherlands has 272 Gator systems (or canisters), each with 22 AP mines and 72 AT mines. In 1997, the Netherlands originally planned to modify the Gator mixed mine system by removing the AP mines and replacing them with antitank mines with antihandling devices. Because recent conflicts such as in Kosovo have shown there is a decreased need for such area denial munitions, the decision was changed in 1999. The entire Gator mixed mine systems will be destroyed, including all AT and AP mines. The destruction order has been tendered and also sent to the NATO Materiel Agency. The mine systems will be destroyed in the period 2002-2003 at a budgeted cost of approximately \$1.5 million.²⁵ According to its Article 7 report and the report to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE):

¹⁹ During two intersessional meetings of the SCE on General Status of the Convention, in January and May 2000, the government strongly expressed its view that such mines are outlawed by the treaty.

²⁰ Telephone interview with E Buskens, information desk, Ministry of Defense on 26 February 1999; Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg (report of a general meeting of the Foreign Affairs parliamentary committee with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense), 13 March 1997, 25 000 V, nr. 72, pp. 7-8.

²¹ *Handelingen Tweede Kamer* (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 30 November 1994, 29th Session, pp. 133-135.

²² “*Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg*,” (Report of a general meeting of the Foreign Affairs parliamentary committee with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense), 13 March 1997, 25 000 V, nr. 72, p. 7; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 7 January 2000.

²³ According to information from the Ministry of Defense in January 1999 they were destroyed by AF Demil. The MBT Article 7 Report mentions, however, another French company, NAMSA, as carrying out this work.

²⁴ Letter to Novib from Ministry of Defense, 5 December 1997.

²⁵ Minister of Defense F H G de Grave, Letter to Parliament, 8 September 1999.

“The Netherlands has stockpiled a total of 272 Cluster Bomb Units 89 “GATOR” which are non-Ottawa Convention compliant because they contain APMs.... Recently, however, the Minister of Defence has announced that all GATOR systems will be dismantled and destroyed. This decision was communicated to Parliament in a letter dated September 8, 1999. The destruction of the 272 GATOR systems will be completed within the time frame the Convention stipulates. For the Netherlands the deadline is 1 October 2003.”²⁶

The Netherlands Article 7 report also states that 4,076 AP22 mines will be retained for development and training purposes, clarifying the earlier approximate number of 5,000 given by the Ministry of Defense in February 1999.²⁷

It was reported last year that United States military bases in the Netherlands have no munition stockpiles.²⁸

Use

There has been no use of AP mines in the Netherlands except for training humanitarian deminers of the Dutch armed forces. In 1997, a research project was started to develop new demining techniques, financed by the Ministry of Defense and the Development Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this project AP mines may be used for testing new techniques.²⁹

Mine Action Funding - Governmental

The Netherlands has contributed considerable resources to mine action programs over the last four years. Between 1996-1998, approximately US\$30.2 million (Dfl60.4 million; 1999 exchange rate) was spent, and in 1999, approximately US\$10 million (Dfl23 million; 2000 exchange rate). From 1996-1998, approximately US\$14 million (Dfl28 million) was donated to the United Nations (UN Development Program Trust Fund, Mine Action Centers, UNMAS Trust Fund); in 1999 this amounted to US\$3.55 million (Dfl7.8 million). Dutch donations to NGOs between 1996-1998 totaled US\$14.1 million (Dfl28.2 million) and in 1999, US\$5.3 million (Dfl11.8 million).³⁰

In 1999, the Dutch government contributed to mine action in the following countries as follows:³¹

- *Abkhazia/Georgia*: Dfl 325,000 (US\$0.2 million) to the Halo Trust.

²⁶ Report to the OSCE, 28 January 2000, p. 3.

²⁷ This number is substantially greater than the 1,500 which the then-Foreign Minister announced would be retained at the MBT-signing conference in Ottawa in December 1997. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 751.

²⁸ Telephone interview with a representative of the Ministry of Defense, March 1999.

²⁹ *Handelingen Tweede Kamer* (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), 10 February 1999, 50th Session, p. 3340.

³⁰ Telephone interviews with P M Kraan, Humanitarian Aid Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 January 1999 and 6 January 2000; Report to the OSCE, 28 January 2000. For a breakdown of country mine action programs supported from 1996-1998, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 751-752.

³¹ Telephone interviews with P M Kraan, Humanitarian Aid Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 January 1999 and 6 January 2000; Report to the OSCE, 28 January 2000.

- *Afghanistan*: Dfl 3 million (US\$1.35 million) to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid.
- *Angola*: Dfl 4 million (US\$1.8 million) to Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and Menschen gegen Minen.
- *Bosnia*: Dfl 2.5 million (US\$1.2 million) to the UNDP Trust Fund and Bosnia-Herzegovina MAC.
- *Cambodia*: Dfl 645,000 (US\$0.3 million) to the UN Development Program (UNDP) and Cambodia MAC (Mine Action Center).
- *Chechnya*: Dfl 520,000 (US\$0.2 million) to the Halo Trust.
- *Kosovo*: Dfl 1 million (US\$0.46 million) to the Halo Trust and Dfl 1.7 million (US\$0.9 million) to the UNMAS Trust Fund.
- *Mozambique*: Dfl 1.7 million (US\$0.8 million) to the Halo Trust and NPA.
- *Somalia*: Dfl 250,000 (US\$0.1 million) to the UNDP.

For these country contributions there is no breakdown of the funding for demining, mine awareness programs or victim assistance. The Netherlands believes that these elements should be integrated within mine action and cannot be separated. In addition to these country-specific contributions, US\$1.8 million (Dfl 4 million) was given to the ICRC for victim assistance in 1999. The Dutch government also supported the Landmine Monitor project with US\$50,000 in 1999 and US\$100,000 in 2000.³²

In 1999, the government adopted a policy framework for humanitarian mine action. The Netherlands will only support mine clearance program which follow the criteria of UNMAS, which requires country-specific coordinated programming of the following elements: mine awareness; minefield surveys, marking and mine clearance; victim assistance; mine ban advocacy; and strengthening of local capacity through training and quality assurance.

Only countries which have signed and implemented the Mine Ban Treaty are eligible for support, although in exceptional cases support will be given – as in the case of Angola, which has signed the MBT, but continued to use landmines. In this case, the Netherlands decided to support demining in the areas surrounding internally displaced populations. The Netherlands will no longer support conferences or research and development, as it did in the past (see below). The focus of funded programs should be on actual mine clearance. The Netherlands also wants to transfer demining tasks as soon as possible to the local organizations; local capacity building and training has therefore high priority.³³

The government has made in-kind contributions to mine action. The Dutch armed forces have a pool of eighty humanitarian deminers available for mine action by international organisations. In 1999 eight deminers were deployed as instructors to Cambodia at CMAC and to Bosnia-Herzegovina at BHMAL. Dutch deminers have also

³² Ibid.

³³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Beleidskader Humanitair Ontmijnen* (Humanitarian Demining Policy-Framework), 1999.

given mine awareness training to Kosovar refugees in Holland before they returned home.³⁴

“HOM 2000” is a research project into new demining techniques initiated in 1997 by TNO, The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research. The Ministry of Defense and the development department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported this effort, focused on a new multi-sensor system, with funding of US\$10 million (Dfl 20 million) in 1997. It is expected the project will be discontinued in the fall of this year.

The International Institute for Aerospace Survey and Earth Sciences (ITC) in Enschede, the Netherlands, is also involved in a mine detection project. In August 1999, it presented an airborne remote-sensing minefield detection system, which is the result of a US\$4.6 million (Dfl10 million) international project involving ten partners in eight countries (Luxemburg, Sweden, United Kingdom, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands), financed by the European Commission, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Portugal and ITC. This is a multi-sensor system, involving optical sensors in the visible/near infrared region, thermal sensors in the infrared region and sensors in the microwave region. The airborne minefield detection multi-sensor system, which can be helpful to supplement level one surveys, was tested at the end of 1998 in Mozambique.³⁵ According to ITC the results of the Mozambique test were very positive. Not only minefields were found by airborne remote sensing, but also individual mines.³⁶

Mine Action Funding - Nongovernmental

In the Netherlands, Kerken in Actie (ACT – Netherlands, Action by Churches Together), Anti-Landmijn Stichting (Anti Landmine Foundation), Pax Christi/Cordaid, Stichting Vluchteling (Refugee Foundation) and Novib fund mine action programs.

Kerken in Actie funded programs in Cambodia and El Salvador (a mine survey by the International Demining Foundation). The Anti-Landmijn Stichting raises funds for mine action by international organizations, and has funded projects in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Sudan and Chechnya, donating US\$190,000 (Dfl379,690) each to MAG and the Halo Trust in 1997, with slightly smaller amounts in 1998. Pax Christi and Cordaid have jointly funded a mine awareness program in Southern Sudan. Stichting Vluchteling has financed a MAG mine awareness program in northern Iraq since 1996 (totaling US\$ 160,000 over four years) and co-financed (with the Dutch government) mine clearance carried out by MAG in northern Iraq in 1996-1997.³⁷

³⁴ Telephone interview with the Information Department of the Ministry of Defense, 25 January 2000; telephone interview with a representative of the Ministry of Defense in January 1999; *Handelingen Tweede Kamer* (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 10 February 1999, 50th Session, p. 3339; Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg (report of a general meeting of the Foreign Affairs parliamentary committee with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense), 13 March 1997, 25 000 V, nr. 72, pp. 7-8.

³⁵ Website of ITC: www.itc.nl/ags/projects/minefield_detection.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, site visited 17 March 2000.

³⁷ Interview with Jaap 't Gilde of Kerken in Actie and Jan Gruiters of Pax Christi Netherlands, 7 March 2000; Annual reports of Novib 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; Daniel Koning, “Leven tussen mijne velden,” a 1997 folder of the Anti-Landmijn Stichting.

Novib contributed US\$6 million (Dfl13million) from 1995-2000 to demining and mine awareness projects in Afghanistan through OMAR. In Cambodia Novib supported local capacity training by MAG in 1995 and 1996 with US\$82,000 (DFL180,000). In Laos a mine awareness and demining programme in Xieng Khouang province carried out by MAG was supported with US\$250,000 (Dfl550,000), and a MAG demining program in Moxico province of Angola in 1998 received US\$142,000 (Dfl215,000). In Mozambique Novib has supported ADEMO, a local landmine survivors network, from 1997-2001 with US\$380,000 (Dfl800,000).

NORWAY

Key developments since March 1999: Norway contributed US\$ 21.7 million to mine action in 1999. Norway played a leading role in the establishment and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional work program.

Mine Ban Policy

Norway ratified the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) in June 1998 and deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations on 9 July 1998. National legislation was passed in the parliament on 16 June 1998.

The treaty is seen as a central instrument in Norwegian foreign policy. In a speech marking its entry into force, the Minister of International Assistance and Human Rights Hilde Frafjord Johnson stated that "1 March 1999 will be remembered as one of the most important milestones on the road towards a world free of the effects of anti-personnel landmines."¹ On numerous occasions, Norwegian authorities have stressed that the MBT is the platform for Norwegian policy on the issue, and that Norway is committed to the success of the treaty. A key element of this policy has been to stress the importance of including NGOs in the process, both in national politics and in the international diplomatic effort: "We must vigorously follow up the partnerships between governmental and non-governmental actors and between North and South so successfully developed during the Ottawa process."² Following this view, the Norwegian official delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in Maputo in May 1999 included a representative from Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), as well as support for active NGO participation in the political process.

Norway played a very active role in the FMSP. Its delegation was led by the Minister of International Development and Human Rights. In her opening statement, the Minister called for the establishment of an intersessional work program, a recommendation that was adopted by the states parties.³ As the key architect of the

¹ Opening Statement, Ms. Hilde Frafjord Johnsen, Minister of International Assistance and Human Rights, Seminar on the Entry into Force on 1 March 1999 of the Mine Ban Convention, Nobel Institute, Oslo, 1 March 1999.

² Ibid.

³ Statement of Ms. Hilde Frafjord Johnsen, Minister of International Assistance and Human Rights, First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

intersessional program, Norway has been very actively involved, attending all meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts (SCE). At the SCE meeting on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Norway was one of the governments which reiterated the understanding of the treaty's definitions that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices which function like AP mines – which may explode from an unintentional act of a person -- are banned under the MBT. The government supported a proposal to form an informal expert group to examine the antivehicle mine issue.⁴

For the period following the Second Meeting of States Parties, Norway has been proposed as rapporteur for the SCE on General Status and Operation of the Convention, and has been nominated for the presidency of the SMSP in September 2000. Norwegian NGOs, the Red Cross and NPA, have been supported in their participation in the intersessional work, as has the ICBL.

Norway submitted its initial Article 7 report on 26 August 1999, covering the period 1 March 1999 to 26 August 1999. Norway has not submitted its second Article 7 report, for calendar year 1999, due 30 April 2000. The first report has two troubling aspects: U.S. antipersonnel mines stockpiled in Norway, and AP mines retained for training. (See below) Norway was the only States Parties where U.S. AP mines are stored to report the existence of U.S. stocks in the Article 7 report. Although the treaty requires reporting on type and quantity of all stockpiled mines “under its jurisdiction or control,” Norway did not provide any details: “There are pre-stocked US mines on Norwegian territory. Due to previously concluded agreements, information on pre-stocked military material is not available for reporting.”⁵ The U.S. AP mines are stockpiled on territory under Norwegian jurisdiction, in stores under Norwegian jurisdiction; this was a crucial point made explicit when the U.S. stores were established in 1981.⁶

When Norwegian officials have visited foreign countries, it has been standard procedure to include issues related to the Mine Ban Treaty on the agenda of these visits.⁷ The MBT is also regularly raised when representatives of foreign governments visit Norway, as well as in various international meetings and conferences. The government has formally protested against the new use of AP mines in Angola, through its ambassador in Luanda.⁸

However, in other Norwegian foreign policy initiatives, such as in the conflict settlement efforts in the Middle East, Sri Lanka and West Africa, the issue of landmines is not a priority. Only a small group of officials is involved in landmine policy, and there is no formal position such as “Mine Action Ambassador.” Government agencies have

⁴ Oral statement of the Norwegian Delegation, Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, 10-11 January 2000. See also, Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle mines with antihandling devices,” 10 January 2000.

⁵ Article 7 Report, Form B, 26 August 1999.

⁶ The non-governmental organization Norwegian People's Aid sent a letter of complaint about the non-reporting on U.S. AP mines in Norway to Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik on 7 September 1999, to which there has been no reply.

⁷ Interview with Svein Henriksen, Mine Action Consultant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 May 2000.

⁸ Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 May 2000.

published little on the landmine issue and the official website ODIN⁹ only presents archival documents.

Norway responded positively to *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*. Norwegian authorities have on several occasions praised the Landmine Monitor initiative for its accuracy, scope and independence, and pointed to the role this project has in successful implementation of the MBT.

In December 1999 Norway voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B promoting the MBT, as it has with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions.

Norway has stated that it “does not regard the Conference on Disarmament as an appropriate forum for dealing with anti-personnel landmines, given that there are already two instruments specifically designed for this purpose (Protocol II and the Mine Ban Convention).”¹⁰ Norway is a party to Amended Protocol II (1996) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and has complied with the Article 13 reporting requirement. Although it attended the States Parties meeting in December 1999, it did not make a statement, as it regards the MBT as the primary international norm on mine issues.

Production

Production of AP mines, as defined by the MBT, is illegal in Norway. In its comments on the law, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted: “[T]he ban is on production of anti-personnel mines and components to APMs, as long as it is clear what end-purpose the component has and that it is difficult to imagine alternative use of the components. Other parts, such as explosives or chemicals, that on a later stage may be used for many other ends than APMs, do not fall under the ban, unless it is clear that production of APMs is the final end.”¹¹

According to the Norwegian Institute for Defense Research, no research is done in Norway on munitions that may function as AP mines, or on antitank mines and cluster munitions.¹² Norway participates in the NATO SAS-023-group, studying the consequences of the AP mine ban and possible technological alternatives that do not have the negative effects of AP mines. The focus of the work is operational studies and technical evaluations. This group is led by the United States and has been in progress for about a year and a half, and plans to continue for another year.¹³

Transfer

Norway has reserved the right to import Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines (officially termed “sector charges”) and has imported them as recently as in 1997, from the Austrian company Hintenberger/Südsteirische Metallindustrie. Use of Claymore mines when detonated by tripwire is clearly prohibited by the MBT; use of

⁹ ODIN is available at: www.odin.dep.no.

¹⁰ Report of the Permanent Delegation of Norway to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 1 February 2000, p. 3.

¹¹ Paper No. 72 (1997–98) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Parliament, p. 2, (advice on ratification of MBT; unofficial translation).

¹² Telephone interview with Bjarne Haugstad, Research Director, Institute for Defense Research, 21 June 2000.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Claymore mines in command-detonation mode by an operator (i.e. not victim-activated) is permitted. Thus, Norway argues that new purchases of Claymores are not ruled out. Research in Austria has shown that the Claymores imported by Norway in 1997 were probably not physically modified to remove the prohibited mode of detonation.¹⁴ But since then, Claymore mines have been modified so that they cannot be used with a tripwire.

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 detailed concerns on Norway's position on the issue of transit – another country transporting AP mines across the territory of a states party. Norway has continued to hold that transit is permissible under the treaty; Norway defines transfer as a two-step operation, involving both the physical movement of mines and the transfer of property rights. Hence Norway has chosen a position that will allow the U.S. to move its stockpiled AP mines both out and in from the stores in Norway, without any Norwegian interference.¹⁵

This was particularly relevant during the air war against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. If they had wanted to, the U.S. military could have transported AP mines from the stores in Norway for use in Yugoslavia. In the view of the Norwegian Campaign to Ban Landmines, this would have constituted a violation of Article 1 of the MBT. Norwegian nongovernmental organizations continue to raise this issue with authorities. The new Labor Government, which took over from the Central-Christian Coalition in March 2000, has not given any signals of change in this position. A number of States Parties, as well as the ICRC and ICBL, have publicly stated that they view such transit of antipersonnel mines as a violation of the treaty.¹⁶

Stockpiling and Destruction

According to official sources, all Norwegian AP mines were destroyed in October 1996.¹⁷ This does not include the Claymore-type AP mines that have been rebuilt for command-detonated mode by LIAB in Sweden. This conversion started in the fall of 1998, and is now finished.¹⁸

In its Article 7 report, Norway reported that it was not retaining any mines for training or research purposes, as permitted under Article 3. When questions were raised in several Standing Committee of Experts meetings by the ICBL, ICRC and others about the need for, and the number of, mines being retained by some States, Norway spoke forcefully on this issue, emphasizing that its armed forces did not require any live mines for training or research purposes.

¹⁴ See report on Austria in this edition of the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*

¹⁵ Paper No. 73 (1997–98) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Parliament, 5.2.32, (advice on ratification of MBT; unofficial translation). In a 20 May 1998 letter to Secretary of State Albright, then Foreign Minister Vollebaek stated “Norway will not oppose the transit of U.S. mines over Norwegian territory...since transit is not prohibited by the Ottawa convention.” He also said, “The United States will be able to transport mines both in and out of the storages in Norway during this four-year period.”

¹⁶ This issue was discussed at the January and May 2000 meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

¹⁷ Report to the OSCE, 1 February 2000.

¹⁸ Letter to Norwegian People's Aid from the Ministry of Defense, 28 June 2000.

Thus, it came as an unwelcome surprise when Norwegian People's Aid received a letter from the Ministry of Defense in June 2000 stating that the Army has "kept a very limited number of APMs. The number is per date less than 100 units."¹⁹ The MoD wrote that the AP mines are for training of personnel participating in international operations. It is not clear whether the MoD had these mines at the time Norway submitted its Article 7 report or if they were acquired later. The MoD letter adds that it is *importing* a limited number of AP mines from areas where Norwegian military personnel are going to operate,²⁰ and a MoD official explained that there are no particular procedures for notifying other government agencies when the MoD imports AP mines.²¹

Parallel to ratification, an understanding between Norway and the United States was reached regarding the presence of U.S.-controlled stockpiles of arms in Norway under which the government will not report on the U.S. mines stored in Norway, and will permit them to remain in Norway for the maximum four-year period from entry into force for retaining stockpiles, as stipulated by Article 4 of the MBT.²² According to information provided to Human Rights Watch, in 1997 the U.S. had 123,084 ADAM mines stored in Norway. ADAM comes in a 155mm projectile with each projectile holding 36 individual ADAM mines.²³

Use

Norway has reserved the right to future use of Claymore-type AP mines in command-detonated mode. Antipersonnel landmines were an integrated part of official Norwegian defense policy until the national ban in 1995. It has been difficult to verify to what extent minefields were actually deployed inside Norway. However, there is no reason to believe that there are any minefields left in Norway.²⁴ According to the MoD, its training of military personnel has been modified to comply with the international treaties to which Norway is party.²⁵

Norwegian military forces can participate in joint operations with non-MBT members, as long as Norwegian personnel do not take part in the use of AP mines or assist the non-signatories in doing so. However, the formulations are vague on this. In a letter to Norwegian People's Aid on the issue, the Ministry of Defense writes that: "Norway will fulfill its NATO-commitments even if other NATO-countries will use anti-personnel mines on a tactical level. Norwegian soldiers will however not bring nor actively deploy anti-personnel mines."²⁶ It has not been possible to get precise information on how the MoD defines the term *actively deploy*.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Telephone interview with Ministry of Defense, 29 June 2000.

²² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 639-670. The 20 May 1998 letter from Vollebaek to Albright stated, "US anti-personnel mines and mixed munitions may remain prepositioned in Norway during this four-year period [after entry into force]."

²³ Information provided to Human Rights Watch by U.S. Government sources, March 1999.

²⁴ Article 7 Report, Form C, 26 August 1999.

²⁵ Letter to Norwegian People's Aid from the Ministry of Defense, 28 June 2000.

²⁶ Ibid. (unofficial translation).

Humanitarian Mine Action

The government is a major contributor to humanitarian mine action programs. Norwegian NGOs, private sector, academic institutions and the military forces are engaged in various ways in mine action. The obligations of the MBT also constitute a framework for its financial support for mine action programs. For example, Norway primarily will support mine action programs in countries that signed and ratified the treaty, or signaled intention to do so. It is part of the Mine Action Support Group of donor countries at the UN in New York.

Funding

In 1997, the government committed to contributing US\$120 million to mine action activities over a five-year period.²⁷ The funding is mainly from two public sources: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD). As Norway's fiscal year follows the calendar year, Table 1 covers the whole of 1999. Monetary contributions in 1999 totaled \$21,694,679.

²⁷ Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollback to NPA, 6 July 1998.

Table 1. Overview of Norwegian support for mine action 1999²⁸**A. By Country**

Country	Activity	Amount in US\$	Agencies
Afghanistan	Integrated mine action	1,362,500	UN Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund, UNOCHA, UNDP
Angola	Clearance, survey, victim assistance	2,714,500	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Trauma Care Foundation (TCF)
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Clearance, awareness, victim assistance	2,692,375	NPA, Norwegian Institute for Public Health, Helping Hand, International Trust Fund
Cambodia	Coordination, clearance	562,500	NPA, UNDP, CMAC
Croatia	Clearance	125,000	UN, WEU
Guatemala	Clearance	975,000	OAS
Iran	Victim assistance	50,000	TCF
Iraq/ Kurdistan	Clearance, victim assistance	689,563	NPA, TCF
Jordan	Victim assistance, clearance	1,014,884	Government of Jordan
Lao	Clearance, EOD	687,500	NPA
Mozambique	Clearance	937,500	NPA
Somalia	Victim assistance	183,094	Norwegian Red Cross (NRC)
Thailand	Survey	375,000	TMAC, Survey Action Center, NPA
Yemen	Awareness, clearance	312,500	Yemen Mine Awareness Association, UNDP
Kosovo	Clearance, coordination	3,312,500	UN Trust Fund for Mine Action, NPA

B. By Region

Africa	Mine awareness – Western Sahara	53,860	NPA
Americas	Mine awareness, Peru/Equador border	187,500	Asociacion Latinamericana para los Derechos Humanos
Asia– Pacific	Ban advocacy, Caucasus	25,000	IPPNW

²⁸ Data on funding from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2000; a detailed breakdown of these contributions is available on the UN Mine Action Investment database; abbreviations: UNOCHA – UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, UNDP – UN Development Program, CMAC – Cambodia Mine Action Center, WEU – Western Union, OAS- Organization of American States, TMA – Thailand Mine Action Center, IPPNW – International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, AMAC – Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities, PRIO - Peace Research Institute of Oslo, WHO – World Health Organization.

C. Thematic

Coordination	Contribution to UNMAS	975,000	UN secretariat
Research	Impact of mine action programs	173,300	AMAC/ PRIO
Outreach	FMSP, Maputo	7,180	UN secretariat
Outreach	Regional workshop in Lebanon	25,000	ICBL
Advocacy & Outreach	Follow-up of Mine Ban Treaty	267,000	NPA, ICBL
Research	Evaluation of mine action programs	103,125	Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining
Information	Mine action specialist to MFA	71,434	Henriksen Consulting
Victim Assistance	Integration of victims in national health programs	687,500	TCF, WHO
Victim Assistance	ICRC mine victims appeal	3,477,656	ICRC, NRC

In addition to these governmental contributions, NGOs raise funds from the general public for mine action projects. It is difficult to quantify these amounts. The major mine action NGO in Norway, Norwegian People's Aid, also receives funds from non-Norwegian sources. For Angola, NPA received donations from USAID, Danish, Dutch and Swedish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, World Food Program, and the oil exploration companies Statoil and British Petroleum. For Mozambique, NPA received donations from Danish International Development Agency, Swedish International Development Agency and Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; for Bosnia and Herzegovina from AustCare; and for the West Bank & Gaza from The Diana Princess of Wales Memorial Fund. For Kosovo, an anonymous donation was received.

Policy

Although Norway still has not formalized a written policy on contributions for mine action, there is a practice in place based on the MBT, which is reinforced by two Foreign Ministry working-memos from 1998. A comprehensive policy for mine action funding is reported to be ready in the fall of 2000.²⁹ Norway has a policy of supporting mine-affected areas, primarily in countries that are either party to the MBT or that have signaled a willingness to join. There is also a policy of "rewarding" countries that have joined the MBT.

However, the Foreign Ministry has also said that they have an obligation to support programs that started up prior to the MBT and will follow these up within reasonable limits. Recognizing that some mine-affected areas cannot be party to the MBT, for example Northern Iraq/Kurdistan, the Foreign Ministry has signaled that support for mine action programs will continue. In general, Norway does not support research into mine detection or clearance technologies from money allocated for mine action. There is no formal body coordinating Norwegian contributions to mine action, but there are ongoing informal communications between the NORAD and the Foreign Ministry.

²⁹ Email from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 June 2000.

Non-governmental Organizations

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) is the largest agency involved in mine action in Norway. Starting with mine clearance in Cambodia in 1992, it now has mine-related programs in Angola, Mozambique, Western Sahara, Palestine, Kurdistan/Northern Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos. In addition, NPA has undertaken mine awareness campaigns among war refugees from the Balkans in Norway. It is actively engaged in international advocacy for the MBT and has been a member of the Coordination Committee of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) since 1998. In 1999, NPA housed the ICBL Resource Center in Oslo. NPA is also in the Core Group of the Landmine Monitor initiative, and thematic coordinator for humanitarian mine action in this project. As a field organization, NPA is involved in various research and development initiatives, with private and public sectors, but the agency is not undertaking such projects alone.

The Norwegian Red Cross is involved in victim assistance projects, working in close cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross. In Norway, the Red Cross has played a vital role in advocacy, with particular emphasis on the legal and humanitarian side of landmines.

The Trauma Care Foundation is a Norwegian agency with chapters in Cambodia, Northern Iraq and Angola, which coordinates local victim assistance programs, provides medical teachers and helps develop local teaching aids. The Tromsø Mine Victim Resource Center was established in November 1999 to coordinate research and training programs for pre-hospital mine and war victim assistance. It is also a support center for Trauma Care Foundation and distributes teaching aids, photo documentation and books. With Third World Network, it recently published a 200-page handbook, *Save Lives – Save Limbs*.

Research and Development (R&D)

There are several R&D initiatives in Norway involving practitioners, industry and academic institutions. Norwegian Demining Consortium (NoDeCo) is a group of Norwegian industrial companies that has developed a small mechanical mine clearance vehicle called MineCat. NoDeCo has cooperated with NPA on its development, and the vehicle is now operational in Kosovo. The funding for this has been private.

The Defense Research Institute (FFI) is involved in studies on molecules emanating from AP mines buried in the soil, in order to improve the use of dogs in mine clearance. FFI is also cooperating with the Norwegian Competence Center on mine-searching dogs, in a project aimed at establishing certification procedures. The Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining is involved in this. FFI has conducted a study on the environmental impact of mechanical mine clearance for NPA. FFI is funded outside the Foreign Ministry program of mine action grants.

The Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research at the Norwegian Institute of Technology (SINTEF) is involved in a large European Union program developing ground-penetrating radar to be used in combination with a metal detector to locate mines. This project is still in its research phase, and includes partners such as Schiebel in

Germany and Celsius in Sweden. The research is funded outside the Foreign Ministry program of mine action grants.³⁰

Nordic Demining Research Forum (NDRF)³¹ is a coordination initiative, with participation from industry, academic institutions and mine action operators. NDRF aims at stimulating R&D into improved demining efficiency and safety through promotion of cooperation between operator, R&D and industry, initiating cross-border and cross-sector R&D between companies and institutions in Nordic countries. The work is funded from a variety of sources.

The Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) hosts the research project Assistance to Mine Affected Communities (AMAC). The AMAC project undertakes studies of mine-affected communities with the aim of further exploring opportunities to build on local resources and competence in humanitarian mine action. The project is based on the conviction that improved assistance to mine-affected communities must start with a deeper understanding of local responses to landmines. AMAC has published a series of papers on the issue called *Landmine Memos*³² and is partially funded by the Mine Action Grant from Norway.

Mine Awareness and Victim Assistance

Norwegian People's Aid has been giving mine awareness courses for Kosovar refugees in Norway since July 1999; they have been offered a one-day course before returning to Kosovo. To date, some 5,000 individuals have gone through this course. Written material on mine awareness in Kosovar was produced during the summer and autumn of 1999. NPA is now producing a film on mine awareness in Kosovo, due to be finalized in July 2000. These activities have been financed by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, with NOK 600,000 (\$69,000), outside the Foreign Ministry program of mine action grants.

In Norwegian mine action policy, victim assistance is seen as an integral part of humanitarian mine action, and some \$4,566,000 of the mine action grants in 1999 was earmarked for various victim assistance projects. However, recent thinking in NORAD and the Foreign Ministry is that projects directed towards landmine victims should be more integrated with overall health service initiatives.³³ The major initiative on victim assistance is the newly established Tromsø Mine Victim Resource Center, at the Tromsø University Hospital.³⁴

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ For more information, see: www.nfdr.dk

³² Letter from AMAC; see also: www.prio.no/amac.

³³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs meeting with NGOs, Oslo, 7 June 2000.

³⁴ Third World Network, *Save Lives, Save Limbs*, (Penang: Third World Network, 2000), ISBN 983-9747-42-8; see also: tmc@rito.no.

PORTUGAL

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Portugal on 1 August 1999. For the first time Portugal publicly revealed details of its AP mine stockpile, when it reported possessing 272,410 mines in its Article 7 report.

Mine Ban Policy

Portugal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, and deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on 19 February 1999. The treaty entered into force for Portugal on 1 August 1999.¹ The treaty was incorporated into national legislation by virtue of publication in the *Diário da República* (the official journal of Portuguese legislation), but this did not constitute full implementation legislation with penal sanctions.²

Portugal was represented at the First Meeting of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999 by the State Secretary for National Defense, Pereira dos Penedos.³ In his statement to the plenary, he expressed concern about the new mine incidents in the Balkans. Portugal has attended four of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts, two on Technology and one each on Stockpile Destruction and the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

Portugal voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had for similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

On 1 February 2000 Portugal delivered its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report to the UN, covering the period 3 December 1997 to 31 January 2000.⁴

With regard to the issue of joint military operations involving non-signatory states using AP mines, the Ministry of Defense has said that Portugal accepts that other members of NATO could use antipersonnel mines in joint operations as long as Portugal does not gain any benefit from such use, since the philosophy of Portugal is to fulfil all its obligations, while creating awareness of the mine problem and excluding no parties.⁵

¹ Officials indicate that due to an error in official publication in the *Diário da República* (the official journal of Portuguese legislation), the treaty formally did not have force of law domestically until 23 February 2000. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states this was only an error in formalities, which had no impact on the implementation of the treaty. Interview with Dra. Fátima Mendes, Director of the Direction of Services for Defense and Security Organizations, and Dr. Antonio Ressano, Chair of the Conventional Weapons Export Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 28 March 2000.

² *Diário da República* - II Série, n°273, 23 November 1999, and I-Série-A n°45, 23 March 2000.

³ In addition to its UN-assessed contribution for the FMSP, Portugal donated \$11,000 to Mozambique to offset its costs of hosting the Meeting.

⁴ Mine Ban Treaty, Article 7 Report, submitted 1 February 2000, available at: <http://domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf>.

⁵ Interview with Dr. Saldanha Serra, General Direction for National Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense, Lisbon, 29 March 2000.

Regarding the Base das Lajes on Terceira Island in the Atlantic Azores Islands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials stated that “the base is American but under Portuguese sovereignty, so the Treaty of Ottawa should apply to the base.”⁶

Portugal is a party to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The government attended the First Annual Conference of Amended Protocol II in December 1999, but has not submitted its transparency report as required under Article 13.

Although Portugal is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), it continues to support efforts through the CD to deal with antipersonnel mines, provided they do not detract from the total prohibition enacted by the Mine Ban Treaty. Portugal has stated, “Portugal accepts the principle of complementarity of all international and regional fora, leading to the universalization of the Ottawa Convention. In no case, will be acceptable any negotiation which can set up exceptions to the ultimate goal of the Ottawa Convention.”⁷

Production, Transfer and Use

Portugal stopped the regular manufacture of antipersonnel mines in the late 1970s, with sporadic production up to 1988 (the last being for export to Nigeria).⁸ It is now thought that at least eight different types of antipersonnel mine were produced, which have been found in nine countries.⁹ It is reported that all production facilities have been closed, rather than converted to other products.¹⁰ Portugal stopped using mines at the end of its colonial wars in 1974.

A representative of the Ministry of Defense has stated that Portugal reserves the right to eventually study alternatives to antipersonnel mines and if such studies are initiated these will be carried out in full respect of the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹¹

Stockpiling and Destruction

In its Article 7 report, Portugal reported possessing 272,410 mines, including imported Claymores, Valmara and VS-50 mines, as of 31 January 2000.¹²

⁶ Interview with Dra. Fátima Mendes, Director of Direction of Services for Defense and Security Organizations, and Dr. Antonio Ressano Garcia, Chairman of the Conventional Weapons (Arms) Export Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 28 March 2000.

⁷ Report of the Portuguese Delegation to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 7 December 1999, p. 2; interview with Dra. Mendes and Dr. Ressano Garcia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 28 March 2000; interview with Dr. Saldanha Serra, Ministry of Defense, Lisbon, 29 March 2000.

⁸ Report to the OSCE, 7 December 1999; Article 7 Report.

⁹ Article 7 Report; Jane’s Defense Equipment Library, CD ROM Issue 14, December 1999. The mines include M412, M421, M432, M966b, M969b, MAPS (also known as M411--an improved version of the M969), M972, and M996. Mines have been found in Angola, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

¹⁰ Article 7 Report.

¹¹ Interview with Dr. Saldanha Serra, Ministry of Defense, Lisbon, 29 March 2000.

¹² Article 7 Report. No mention is made of the types M412, M421, M432, M996 and M972 AP mines known to have been produced previously. These older mines were likely destroyed in the past.

Mine Type	Quantity
Blasting AP Mine M969	216,939
Blasting AP M969 (inert)	391
AP Mine M972	23,863
AP Fragmentation Mine M966	14,332
AP Fragmentation Mine M966 (inert)	107
Boobytrap Fragmentation Grenade M969	10,237
Boobytrap Fragmentation Grenade M969 (inert)	25
AP Fragmentation Mine M18A1 (Claymore, USA)	5,004
AP Fragmentation Mine Valmara (Italy)	500
Blasting AP Mine VS-50 (Italy)	500
AP Landmines (no designation)	512
TOTAL	272,410

Of these stocks, Portugal will keep approximately 3,000 active mines and 523 inactive mines for permitted training purposes. Small quantities of each type will be retained, but the exact quantities have not yet been decided. The only Claymores retained will be those which are command-activated.

While states parties are not required to report on antivehicle mines, the ICBL has pressed for transparency on such mines when equipped with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes which might make the mine function like an AP mine, and thus banned under the MBT. The M453 is a weapon of concern because of its electronic antihandling feature, which could cause it to explode from an unintentional act of a person.¹³

Portugal plans to destroy its stock of mines in a one-year period, beginning in October 2000, at Alcochete in a muffle furnace after disassembly of some parts, conforming to safety standards (Decree 336/83 of 19 July 1983) and environmental standards (Decrees 239/97 of 20 November 1997, 236/98 of 1 August 1998, 273/98 of 2 September 1998).¹⁴

Mine Action and Victim Assistance

Portugal is not a country affected by mines. Portugal has donated \$150,000 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance, two-thirds of which was destined for Angola.¹⁵ Portuguese soldiers have helped demining in Angola through a program of bilateral assistance. Portugal also participates in INAROE (Instituto Nacional

¹³ Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," prepared for the First Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 10-11 January 2000.

¹⁴ Interview with Dr. Saldanha Serra, Ministry of Defense, Lisbon, 29 March 2000. Article 7 Report; Report of the Portuguese Delegation to OSCE, 7 December 1999, p. 3. *Landmine Monitor 1999* reported that Portugal had destroyed part of its stockpile after 1996; the Article 7 report indicates no destruction during the reporting period of 3 December 1997 to 31 January 2000.

¹⁵ UN General Assembly, "Secretary General's report: Assistance in Mine Clearance," A/53/496, 14 October 1998, p. 29.

Angolano para a Remoção de Objectos Explosivos) with training in mine removal provided by Portuguese officers.¹⁶

Government representatives state that Portugal is willing to get more involved in mine action and victim assistance, especially in relation to the PALOPs (African Countries with Portuguese Official Language, which includes the heavily mined countries of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau). It is also willing to diversify its actions to other areas, for example to Bosnia, where Portuguese soldiers are already present. Toward this end, a donation to the UN of between \$150,000 and \$200,000 is budgeted for 2000.¹⁷

The Jesuit Refugee Service-Portugal provides support to JRS-Angola for education to mine victims in Luena, including elementary schooling and training in tailoring or carpentry.¹⁸ On 25 March 2000 Esperança, a young Portuguese training association mainly formed by Angolans living in Portugal, organized a race with the help of the Câmara de Lisboa (town council of Lisbon), denouncing the mine situation in Angola. Esperança organized a photographic exhibition on landmine victims at the Expo site in Lisbon on 25 May 2000, and is planning to launch a rehabilitation center in Luanda to offer skills-training in subjects such as IT, tailoring, carpentry, mechanics.

Portuguese law concerning the disabled and war victims is very extensive. In 1999, under the auspices of Portuguese Technical-Military Cooperation, the Ministry of Defense started a project to assist children who are amputee war victims, involving the Hospital Militar de Coimbra.¹⁹

SAN MARINO

The Republic of San Marino signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 March 1998. As of June 2000 it had not submitted its Article 7 report to the United Nations, which was due on 27 August 1999, nor is it believed to have enacted domestic implementing legislation. San Marino voted in favor of UN General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban on landmines in 1996, 1997 and 1998, and co-sponsored and voted for the December 1999 resolution in support of the MBT. Mr. Dario Galassi, Embassy Chancellor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented the government at the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999. San Marino has not participated in any of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts. San Marino does not produce, transfer, stockpile or use antipersonnel landmines, and is not mine-affected.

¹⁶ Interview with Dr. Saldanha Serra, Ministry of Defense, Lisbon, 29 March 2000.

¹⁷ Interview with Dra. Mendes and Dr. Ressano Garcia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 28 March 2000.

¹⁸ Interviews with Dra. Rosário Farmhouse, JRS-Portugal, Lisbon, March 2000.

¹⁹ Interview with Dr. Saldanha Serra, Ministry of Defense, Lisbon, 29 March 2000.

SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for the Slovak Republic on 1 August 1999. Stockpile destruction began in August 1999 and 127,781 antipersonnel mines were destroyed by the end of April 2000. Destruction is expected to be completed by August 2000. Slovakia also destroyed its PT-Mi-K antivehicle mines with anti-lift mechanisms. It has served as a co-rapporteur of the SCE on Stockpile Destruction. Slovakia ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 30 November 1999, and its UN Ambassador serves as President-elect of the Second Annual Conference.

Mine Ban Policy

The Slovak Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997, and deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on 25 February 1999. Officials indicate that national implementation was achieved when the Slovak Parliament approved ratification of the MBT on 4 June 1999, making it part of national legislation.¹ It was published as a new law on the same date in the official bulletin of the Ministry of Justice, *Zbierka zákonov*.² Complementary to this, small changes to the penal code are expected. According to officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, violations of the Mine Ban Treaty law are already covered in the penal codes prohibiting weapons of mass destruction.³

Slovakia participated in the First Meeting of State Parties (FMSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique, in May 1999. The delegation noted that Slovakia has supported the MBT from the beginning and wishes to contribute to activities that promote the elimination of antipersonnel landmines. It stated its intention of destroying all stockpiles within two years, as well as its willingness to share its expertise in mine clearance, training and victim assistance.

Since the FMSP, the government has taken an active role in meetings of the Intersessional Standing Committees of Experts and Ambassador Mária Krasnohorská of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has acted as one of the co-rapporteurs of the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction. After the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000, Slovakia will become co-chair of this committee. The Slovak Republic voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution, as it had with the previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998.

Slovakia's initial Article 7 report as required under the MBT was submitted to the United Nations on 9 December 1999, and covers the period from 3 December 1997 to 30

¹ Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic No. 121/1999 Coll., On the ratification of the [Mine Ban Treaty], 4 June 1999.

² Letter from Ambassador Mária Krasnohorská, Director of the Department of OSCE, Disarmament and Council of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bratislava, 16 March 2000.

³ Interview with Ambassador Mária Krasnohorská, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr Marcel Jesenský, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bratislava, 27 April 2000.

November 1999.⁴ A second report was submitted on 12 June 2000, covering 1 December 1999 to 30 April 2000. The second report is an update on stockpile destruction.

On 30 November 1999, Slovakia ratified Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Slovakia participated as a State Party at the First Conference of State Parties to the Amended Protocol II in December 1999 in Geneva, but had not submitted its report as required under Article 13 by the time of the conference. Mr. Kálmán Petcz, Slovakia's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, serves as President-elect of the Second Conference of State Parties to the Amended Protocol II, which will be held in December 2000.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Slovakia continues to support attempts to consider the negotiation of a ban on transfers of antipersonnel landmines in the CD. In his statement to the FMSP in May 1999, the State Secretary said, "[W]e believe that a global ban on transfers of antipersonnel landmines negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament could be another step that would properly address this issue for the time being and would be a precious contribution to our final goal - the universality of all bans in the Ottawa Convention. We must use every opportunity to make antipersonnel mines unavailable for those who still take recourse to emplacing these weapons of terror."⁵ That position was reiterated by Ambassador Petcz at the CD on 2 September 1999: "Along with our firm and unabating commitment to the Ottawa process, we believe that the commencement of negotiations in the CD on a ban of APM transfers would be a very positive step in the right direction. We would see those two processes complementary rather than competitive."⁶

Production and Transfer

The former Czechoslovakia was a significant producer and exporter of arms, including landmines, but when the country divided, Slovakia did not inherit any of Czechoslovakia's landmine production facilities.

There was an export moratorium on AP mines in place from 1994, which was superseded by the MBT. Regarding the Slovak government's position on the transfer or transit of AP mines by other countries across Slovak territory, in March 2000 the Foreign Ministry stated that "Slovakia as a State Party of the Ottawa Convention fully complies with all obligations of the Convention, that includes also the transfers of APMs (with the exceptions permitted in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention)."⁷ The Slovak Republic regards its obligations to international treaties to which Slovakia is a state party as superior to any other international (e.g. bilateral) agreement, and therefore Slovakia

⁴ Slovak Republic Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 9 December 1999. Names of the antipersonnel mines included do not correspond with the original names of mines known to have been produced in the former Czechoslovakia.

⁵ Statement by Dr Jaroslav Chlebo, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, at the First Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 4 May 1999.

⁶ Statement by Ambassador Kálmán Petcz, Representative of the Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the United Nations, at the Plenary Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 2 September 1999.

⁷ Letter from Ambassador Krasnohorská, 16 March 2000.

would not agree to any transfers or transits of AP mines through its territory by a non-state party to the MBT as in, for example, the case of a joint military operation.⁸

Stockpiling and Destruction

As reported in its initial Article 7 report, Slovakia had a total of 187,060 antipersonnel mines in its stockpile when it began destroying them in August 1999.⁹ By the end of April 2000 it had destroyed a total of 127,781 antipersonnel mines (107,222 AP-S-M and 20,559 AP-C-M1).¹⁰ According to the Ministry of Defense, the remaining stock of 52,279 will be destroyed by the end of August 2000 so as to be completed before the Second Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2000.¹¹ None of the stockpiled AP mines are of the Claymore directional fragmentation type.¹²

The mines are destroyed at the Military Repair Enterprise in Nováky by disassembling them, which is considered the most cost-effective and environmentally friendly method according to the Slovak authorities.¹³ The Military Repair Enterprise in Nováky has a higher destruction capacity, "approximately one million mines per year with possible doubling of this capacity if required," than is needed to destroy the Slovak mines.¹⁴ The government has offered to help other countries in the region, or beyond, with stockpile destruction.¹⁵ Slovak authorities have had discussions with countries including the Ukraine and Croatia about assisting with the destruction of their stockpiles, but in order to do so, the government would need financial support. Officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs note frustration at not being able to make use of its expertise and technology in demining and stockpile destruction due to lack of funding and cooperation from other countries in finding financial assistance.¹⁶

Slovakia has reported that it plans to retain 7,000 AP mines as permitted under the MBT: 5,000 AP-S-M (PP-Mi-Sr) and 2,000 AP-C-M 1 (PP-Mi-Na1). The former can be detected with a metal detector, the latter cannot.¹⁷ According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this number may be reduced further.¹⁸ Retained AP mines will be used for training Slovak demining experts, and development and testing of new demining techniques.¹⁹

⁸ Interview with Ambassador Krasnohorská and Marcel Jesenský, Bratislava, 27 April 2000.

⁹ Article 7 report, 9 December 1999.

¹⁰ Article 7 Reports, 9 December 1999 and 12 June 2000. The AP-S-M is usually known as the PP-Mi-Sr and the AP-C-M1 as the PP-Mi-Na1.

¹¹ Interview with Col. Jaroslav Tomas, Head of Slovak Verification Center of the Ministry of Defense, and Major Frantisek Zak, Slovak Verification Center, Bratislava, 27 April 2000.

¹² Letter from Ambassador Krasnohorská, 16 March 2000.

¹³ Statement by Major Frantisek Zák, Slovak Verification Center at the Ministry of Defense, at the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 9-10 December 1999. An article describing the process was written for the Army magazine: Anton Fillo, "Pozor! Miny!" *Apologia, Casopis Armady Slovenskej Republiky*, January 2000, p. 8-9.

¹⁴ Statement by Major Zák, Geneva, 9-10 December 1999.

¹⁵ Statement by Dr. Chlebo, Maputo, 4 May 1999.

¹⁶ Interview with Ambassador Krasnohorská and Marcel Jesenský, Bratislava, 27 April 2000.

¹⁷ Article 7 report, 9 December 1999.

¹⁸ Letter from Ambassador Krasnohorská, 16 March 2000.

¹⁹ Ibid.

There is no official list of antitank mines retained by the Slovak Army since this is regarded as restricted information, though new guidelines on what information should be restricted in the future are under discussion.²⁰ However, antihandling devices fitted to antitank mines have been the subject of discussions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. Following this, all the Slovak Army stocks of the PT-Mi-K antivehicle mine with anti-lift firing mechanisms were destroyed.²¹ The two ministries have already agreed to discuss other antivehicle mines that could function as antipersonnel mines, after destruction of all stockpiled AP mines has been completed.²² The ICBL applauds the government for taking the step of destroying the antivehicle mines with anti-lift devices that function as antipersonnel mines, and suggests that it would be appropriate to include this information in Article 7 reporting.

Use

The Foreign Ministry states that the Slovak Army has not replaced its AP mines with other alternatives, and all training procedures and military manuals regarding landmine use have been adjusted to reflect the obligations contained in the MBT.²³

Landmine Problem

Slovakia is not a mine-affected country. During the Cold War, as part of the former Czechoslovakia, it had only a short border with one country outside the Warsaw Pact, Austria, which according to the authorities was not heavily mined.²⁴

Mine Action

In 1996 Slovakia donated \$10,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action. In 1999 it gave \$35,000 to the ICRC fund for mine victims. Since 1993 Slovakian demining troops have been involved in mine clearance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia and Croatia, and since 1999 also in Kosovo under the UNPROFOR, UNTAES, SFOR and KFOR missions. As urged by Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Slovakia has expressed a readiness to provide assistance in mine clearance, training, and stockpile destruction. Slovakia has also been active in developing new mine clearance technology, notably the demining machines "Bozena," produced by Willing Industry a.s. in Krupina, and "Belarty," by Technopol International a.s. in Bratislava, which are being used by Slovak deminers in SFOR and KFOR missions.²⁵

SLOVENIA

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Slovenia on 1 April 1999. The Slovenian International Trust Fund raised \$24.3 million dollars in 1998-1999, which has supported the demining of 3.15 million square meters of

²⁰ Letter from Ambassador Krasnohorská, 19 May 2000.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Interview with Ambassador Krasnohorská and Marcel Jesenský, Bratislava, 27 April 2000.

²³ Letter from Ambassador Krasnohorská, 16 March 2000.

²⁴ Interview with Col. Tomas and Major Zak, Bratislava, 27 April 2000.

²⁵ Ibid.

mine-affected land in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ITF had also supported the treatment of 172 mine victims in Slovenia in 1999-2000 and another fifty victims in Bosnia. Slovenia began stockpile destruction in April 1999 and had destroyed 8,104 mines by 30 September 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Slovenia signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on 27 October 1998. The treaty entered into force for Slovenia on 1 April 1999. Slovenia has not enacted domestic implementation legislation.

Foreign Minister Dr. Boris Frlec headed Slovenia's delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999, where he said, "There are also some cases in which the Ottawa Convention has not been fully respected and abided by. There should be a strong message from our First Meeting that State Parties should fully comply with all relevant provision of the Convention. We are also deeply concerned by the fact that we are witnessing the practice of planting new mine fields in some crises areas by certain countries, which are thus endangering the existing peace efforts and aggravating the overall humanitarian situation."¹

Slovenia participated in the intersessional work of the MBT, attending one each of the meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts on Mine Clearance, Stockpile Destruction and Technology and both meetings of the SCE on General Status and Operation of the Convention. It submitted its initial Article 7 report on 7 September 1999, covering the period 1 April to 30 September 1999.²

Slovenia participated in the second regional conference on landmines in Zagreb, Croatia, in June 1999. It hosted the third regional conference in Ljubljana on 21-22 June 2000. Foreign Minister Peterle, who opened the conference, made the recommendation that the Slovenian International Trust Fund (ITF, discussed below) "acquire the status of an agency for demining in southeastern Europe within the framework of the Stability Pact."³

Slovenia has been active in promoting the universalization of the MBT, via organizations such as the UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁴ In December 1999 it voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for universalization and full implementation of the MBT, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions.

Slovenia is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not yet ratified Amended Protocol II. In December 1999 Slovenia took part as an observer in the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, and at the

¹ Speech of Dr. Boris Frlec, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP), Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

² Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 7 September 2000, covering 1 April 1999-30 September 1999.

³ Researcher notes from "Ljubljana Regional Conference on Landmines," Ljubljana, Slovenia, 21-22 June 2000.

⁴ Letter from Janez Lenarcic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ljubljana, 13 January 2000.

landmine conference in Ljubljana in June 2000 a representative of the Foreign Ministry stated that Slovenia “is preparing to ratify the Protocol II...”⁵

Slovenia supports efforts to deal with the issue of landmines in the Conference on Disarmament, which it believes “should serve as an instrument for furthering of political momentum of the international community which could contribute in a great deal towards the universalisation of the Convention.”⁶

Production, Transfer and Use

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the country has never manufactured AP mines, including Claymore-type mines.⁷ Slovenia has no AP mine production facilities but does manufacture components for practice mines intended exclusively for non-combatant educational and training purposes; the number and nature of these components is not known.⁸ It does not take part in the research, development or production of alternatives to AP mines. The country has never exported or imported AP mines. Its mines were inherited from the stockpiles of the former Yugoslav People’s Army.⁹

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs knows of no data indicating recent usage of AP mines in Slovenia.¹⁰

Stockpiling and Destruction

On 1 December 1998, not long after the ratification of the MBT, the Defense Minister reported on an implementation plan for the destruction of antipersonnel mines, and the Slovenian Army Chief of Staff issued the order for destruction of its AP mine stocks to the Slovenian Army on 14 April 1999.¹¹

At the FMSP in May 1999, Foreign Minister Frlec said, “[W]e consider the destruction of stockpiled mines to be an important aspect of the implementation of the Convention. Destruction of mines is in our view in particular an act of improved confidence among neighboring states...”¹²

From April 1999 through September 1999, Slovenia destroyed 8,104 of its initial stockpile of 171,898 antipersonnel mines. The total mines stockpiled, those destroyed and the quantity retained for training purposes permitted by the MBT are shown in Table I below.

⁵ Researcher notes, “Ljubljana Regional Conference on Landmines,” 21-22 June 2000. However, in May 2000 an official said the government does not regard ratification to be a high priority since the MBT covers the same area of prohibition. Letter from Primoz Seligo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ljubljana, 5 May 2000.

⁶ Letter from Janez Lenarcic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 January 2000; Report of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 15 February 1999, p. 3.

⁷ Ibid.; Report to the OSCE, 15 February 1999, p. 3.

⁸ Article 7 Report, Form E, 7 September 1999; Letter from Janez Lenarcic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 January 2000.

⁹ Letter from Primoz Seligo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

¹⁰ Letter from Janez Lenarcic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 January 2000.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Statement of Dr. Frlec, FMSP, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

Table 1. Quantities of mines stockpiled, retained, destroyed and to be destroyed, as reported 7 September 1999¹³

Type	Total	Retained for Training	Destroyed	To be Destroyed
PMA-1	70,487	500	6,634	63,353
PMA-2	44,390	500	1,470	42,420
PMA-3	12,960	2000	0	10,960
PMR-2A	28,085	1000	0	27,085
PROM-1	15,976	3000	0	12,976
TOTAL	171,898	7000	8,104	156,794

The remaining AP mines are stockpiled at the military warehouse in Borovnica near Ljubljana, where disassembling of the mines and mechanical destruction of inert components is also carried out. The location for destruction of primer caps and explosive charges was described in the Article 7 report as undecided, but at the Ljubljana regional conference in June 2000 Zoran Ravbar from the Ministry of Defence stated that destruction will take place at Pocek near Postojna.¹⁴ Methods used are disassembling, explosion and incineration, carried out by the Slovenian Army in compliance with its safety standards (SSNO 1976 and 1980) and in accordance with "Slovenian law about environment protection."¹⁵ To date, Slovenia has received no assistance from other countries in destroying its AP mine stockpile.¹⁶

The 7,000 mines retained are to be used for training deminers in Slovenia and, through ITF, in the region. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also declares that there are no mine stockpiles on Slovenian territory that belong to other countries, and no non-state groups possess stocks of AP mines.¹⁷

Mine Action Funding

The Slovenian government has felt that a regional approach would be the most effective means of mine action and allocated US\$ 1.3 million to establish the International Trust Fund (ITF), in March 1998.¹⁸ The Foreign Minister said at the time that the government has "followed a regional approach and decided to assist the most mine affected country in the region of South Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina.... We are glad to note that there is a growing support for the Trust Fund.... The key to the success of our endeavors is also the partnership co-operation that has been established with the mine afflicted country – with BH. Success in BH will enable the Trust Fund to act regionwide, thus assuming the role of a regional project."¹⁹

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form B, 7 September 1999.

¹⁴ Researcher notes, "Ljubljana Regional Conference on Landmines," 21-22 June 2000.

¹⁵ Article 7 Report, Form F, 7 September 1999.

¹⁶ Letter from Janez Lenarcic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 January 2000.

¹⁷ Letter from Primoz Seligo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

¹⁸ *ITF Bulletin*, April 1999, p. 1. The full name of the ITF is the "International Trust Fund of the Republic of Slovenia for Demining, Mine Clearance and Assistance to Mine Victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

¹⁹ Speech by Dr. Frlec, FMSP, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

The ITF has an implementation office in Sarajevo, which coordinates activities on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and prepares monthly reports on demining activities.²⁰ The selection of demining projects depends on both entities (Republika Srpska and the BH Federation) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The grantors themselves make decisions on the allotment of funds. If grantors are unwilling to do so, the ITF Director designs a costing plan in compliance with priorities obtained from the local structures and makes it available to the Advisory Board for adoption.²¹

In June 1999, at the Zagreb Regional Conference, the Slovenian delegation was headed by Roman Kirin, State Undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and President of the Managing Board of the ITF,²² who announced the expansion of the ITF to assist with mine action in the Republic of Croatia and in Kosovo. An agreement was reached with the Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) on a Croatian donation to the ITF of \$1 million, that would be doubled with matching funds from the United States.²³ In the course of 1998 and 1999, ITF obtained grants from twenty-one countries, three non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and seven companies, as shown in Table 2 below.

²⁰ *ITF Bulletin*, July 1999, p.2.

²¹ Interview with Jernej Cimperse, Director of ITF, Zagreb, 17 January 2000.

²² The ITF Managing Board is made up of four representatives from Slovenia and three from BH, and meets three to four times per year; its president is from the Foreign Ministry. The most important body is the Advisory Board, represented by all grantors and headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Slovenia. ITF operates in Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between the Republics of Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was signed on 11 December 1998.

²³ Letter from Primoz Seligo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 2000.

Table 2. Donations to the International Trust Fund 1998-1999²⁴

Grantor	Amount (US\$)	Date
Daewoo	29,805	5 January 1999
Rehabilitation Institute of Slovenia	39,541	November 1998
Qatar	199,980	23 March 1999
Liechtenstein	13,628	16 March 1999
Switzerland	862,527	12 April, 7 December 1999
Kuwait	250,000	23 April 1999
Republic of Slovenia	1,662,335	28 December 1998; 4 April, 7 July, 7 December, 9 December 1999
Norway	2,599,635	3 May, 19 July 1999
Canada	746,758	19 May 1999
Rotary Club Ljubljana	5,235	29 July 1999
Red Cross of Slovenia	59,711	9 Aug and 21 Oct 1999
Germany	1,645,463	12 December 1998; 3 September, 8 November, 9 November, 6 December 1999
Great Britain	833,000	19 October 1999
Czech Republic	107,000	28 December 1998, 19 Oct 1999
Hungary	3,000	25 October 1999
Bosnia and Herzegovina	555,555	26 October 1999
Japan	1,000,000	27 October 1999
Acord 92	4,543	16 November 1999
Republic of Croatia	1,000,000	16 November 1999
SPEM	50,102	17 November 1999
Luxembourg	51,586	26 November 1999
Mrs. Lynn Montgomery	42,554	6 December 1999
CARE International	97,557	6 December 1999
Republic of Ireland	64,000	7 December 1999
Siemens	10,737	8 December 1999
Otto Bock	7,894	8 December 1999
Denmark	100,000	9 December 1999
France	93,600	9 December 1999
Adria Airways	31,718	8 December 1999
Subtotal 1998 and 1999	12,167,573	
United States of America (matching funding)	12,167,573	
TOTAL	24,335,146	

²⁴ A Survey of Grants to ITF in 1998 and 1999, ITF Office, Ljubljana, 10 February 2000.

In February 2000 Sweden decided to contribute US\$300,000 to the ITF; half is earmarked for national capacity building and half for demining projects in BiH primarily to facilitate the return of the displaced.²⁵

Over a two-year period the U.S. donated \$28 million, with a requirement for matching funds; this means that for every dollar of U.S. funds spent by the ITF it has to raise an equal amount in matching donations. The Trust Administrative Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the United States on U.S. matching donations was signed on 4 November 1998.²⁶

The ITF reports that in 1999 it supported the demining of 3,156,003 square meters, which is approximately two-thirds of the mine-affected area in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In these operations, 1,001 mines and 815 UXO were found. 80% of the demining operations were carried out by commercial companies and 20% by NGOs (for details on mine clearance, see report on Bosnia and Herzegovina).²⁷

Research and Development

A new R&D project involving nuclear quadropole resonance technology for mine detection was launched in 1999, undertaken by an international consortium of academic institutions, which have applied to the European Union and Stability Pact for financial support of the project.²⁸ The project anticipates field testing of NQR devices in the mine-polluted areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but is in the preparatory stage at present.²⁹

Landmine Problem

Slovenia's Article 7 report in September 1999 stated that there are no areas in Slovenia "that contain anti-personnel mines."³⁰ The ITF Bulletin stated: "There are no mine-polluted areas in Slovenia, nor are there areas suspected to be mine-polluted. The mines laid by the Yugoslav People's Army and many UXOs [unexploded ordnance] left behind after the brief War of Independence in 1991, were removed in 1992....Over 18 different battle locations, covering the area of 1,500 hectares were thoroughly surveyed. They found 600 AP mines."³¹ However, the same issue of the ITF Bulletin stated, "In the areas where the fighting had taken place, unexploded grenades, mines, bombs and other explosive devices remained, and they still occasionally inflict accidental death or physical disablement on children, construction workers or collectors".³² It has not been possible

²⁵ Memorandum of Understanding between Republic of Slovenia (ITF) and Kingdom of Sweden (SIDA), 10 February 2000.

²⁶ *ITF Bulletin*, April 1999, p. 3.

²⁷ Letter from Eva Veble, Deputy Director for International Affairs, ITF, Ljubljana, 20 March 2000.

²⁸ The consortium is made up of the following institutions: Jozef Stefan Institute (Ljubljana), King's College (London), Rudjer Boskovic Institute (Zagreb), Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Zagreb), Faculty of Chemistry and Chemical Technology (Ljubljana) and Quantum Magnetism company (U.S.).

²⁹ Letter from Janez Lenarcic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 January 2000.

³⁰ Article 7 Report, Form C, 7 September 1999.

³¹ *ITF Bulletin*, July 1999, p. 4.

³² *Ibid*; see also: "Slovenia," *Journal of Mine Action*, 1, 4.1 (Spring issue) 2000, p. 82; *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 31 and 647, which described Slovenia as a mine-affected country, drawing on the UN Demining Database for this information.

to get further information of the extent of the mine/UXO problem remaining in Slovenia today.

Mine Victim Assistance

In addition to removing landmines from affected areas, one of the main tasks of the ITF is rehabilitation of landmine victims. In talking about the ITF, Dr. Jadranko Prlic, Foreign Minister of BH, said, "The provision of the Memorandum of Understanding [for the IFF], by which at least 50 % of the Program of mine victim rehabilitation will be carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is also significant. The competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina will take part in the selection of the patients - mine victims, as well as in providing special trainings for physicians, engineers and technicians and in designing educational program for mine victim rehabilitation."³³

Through special programs and therapies, mine victims are assisted in their reintegration into society. In order to provide rehabilitation, the Center for Rehabilitation of Mine Victims has been set up within the Slovenian Institute for Rehabilitation (founded in 1954 in Ljubljana) and provides medical rehabilitation, prosthetics, orthopedics and speech rehabilitation. The Institute overall has 450 employees and treats about 10,000 patients a year, treating a wide array of problems, including: amputations, spinal and head injuries, bruises, multiple sclerosis, neuromuscular disorders and cerebral paralysis.³⁴

The Rehabilitation Center began operation in May 1998, and its program has two components: the rehabilitation of twenty patients per month who come from the BH Federation and Republika Srpska, and training for physicians and technicians from both entities so they can carry out rehabilitation programs independently. The rehabilitation procedure itself involves cooperation between the Center and the two political entities, as the programs are also carried out in medical institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first patients from Republika Srpska joined the rehabilitation program on 3 November 1998. By the end of May 1999, the Center for Rehabilitation of Mine Victims treated ninety-three patients.³⁵

Two NGOs took part in the program, Landmine Survivors Network and the International Rescue Committee.³⁶ In addition to therapy, once a week patients participate in seated volleyball matches and swimming, as well as other activities during their stay. The staff of the Center have permanent close contact with the Ministries of Health of the BH Federation and Republika Srpska. As a result, three orthopedic technicians and one therapist from Republika Srpska went through training at the Center from 24 January to 30 April 1999.³⁷ The Boston-based Center for International Rehabilitation has applied for funding to provide computer-based distance-learning on prosthetics and orthotics to Slovenia's Institute for Rehabilitation.³⁸

³³ See ITF website www.sigov.si/itffund.

³⁴ *ITF Bulletin*, July 1999, p. 7.

³⁵ *Ibid*

³⁶ Letter from Eva Veble, ITF, Ljubljana, 20 March 2000.

³⁷ *ITF Bulletin*, July 1999, p. 7.

³⁸ See <http://www.worldrehab.org/partners/slovenia.htm>.

By the end of February 2000 a total of 205 mine victims had been treated in Slovenia altogether (33 in 1998, 151 in 1999, and 21 in 2000 by the end of February), and another 50 were treated in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁹

SPAIN

Key developments since March 1999: The treaty entered into force for Spain on 1 July 1999. Spain plans to complete destruction of its AP mine stockpile in the year 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Spain signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, and deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on 19 January 1999. The treaty entered into force for Spain on 1 July 1999. Prior to formal ratification, the Spanish Parliament passed national legislation that came into force in October 1998.¹ The Spanish law follows the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty, but it does not enact the penal sanctions required by Article 9 of the treaty. The annex to the law states that sanctions will be developed in further implementing legislation. The law includes some provisions on mine clearance and victim assistance, and obliges Spain to destroy the existing stockpiles of antipersonnel mines within three years.

Spain attended the First Meeting of State Parties held in Maputo in May 1999. According to the statement made by the Head of the Spanish Delegation José Eugenio Salarich, "Spain is fully convinced about the link between development and security, between the worldwide initiative on demining and the added special difficulty for the poorest countries.... We encourage those States not yet members of the Mine Ban Treaty to sign and ratify the Convention.... Spain is proud of our initiatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Peru and Ecuador, specially in the fields of training, mine awareness and equipment."²

Spain participated in both meetings of the Intersessional Standing Committees of Experts on General Status of the Convention and one meeting each of the other four SCEs. Spain submitted its initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report to the UN on 15 December 1999, covering the period from 1 July 1999-28 December 1999.³ Spain voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

With respect to the issue of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, one official pointed out that Spanish Law 33/98 refers to antipersonnel mines and *weapons with similar effects*. He said, "If an antihandling device or the antivehicle explosion mechanism itself made these devices have a similar effect to antipersonnel mines, they

³⁹ Letter from Eva Veble, ITF, Ljubljana, 20 March 2000.

¹ Law Banning Antipersonnel Landmines as well as those Arms with Similar Effects, Law 33/1998. A copy of the Spanish law can be found in the official journal of the state, Boletín Oficial del Estado, num. Ver. 239-1998, 6 October 1998.

² Speech of José Eugenio Salarich, Head of the Spanish Delegation, First Meeting of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

³ Mine Ban Treaty, Article 7 Report, submitted 15 December 1999; available at: <http://domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf>.

would be included in the applicability of the law.”⁴ The Spanish Campaign to Ban Landmines points out that this corresponds to the Mine Ban Treaty, which exempts antivehicle mines with antihandling devices from the definition of an AP mine only if they cannot be activated by the unintentional act of a person.

The Spanish Campaign has raised questions about two Spanish mines, types CETME and SB-81/AR-AN, that have antihandling devices that may be capable of exploding when disturbed unintentionally, and that may cause the mine to have similar effects to an antipersonnel mine. These mines are not included in the stockpile destruction program declared by Spain in its report to the UN under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Spain is a party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and attended the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II in December 1999. It submitted its report under Article 13 as required. The government continues to support efforts to negotiate a ban on mine transfers in the Conference on Disarmament, of which it is a member.⁵

Production, Transfer and Use

Spanish production of antipersonnel mines ceased officially in May 1996; details of past production and export are noted in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.⁶ No progress has been reported on the conversion of production facilities, nor on the Valsella Meccanotecnica and Expal negotiations on production of mine delivery systems reported last year.

Governmental sources, when asked if Spain would allow U.S. planes or ships carrying antipersonnel mines to use Spanish airfields and ports, have replied that Article 2.4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, which defines “transfer,” does not include the concept of “transit.”⁷ This is a curious comment, as Spanish law clearly bans the transit of another country’s AP mines across its national territory.⁸

The last use of AP mines by Spanish forces was on the Moroccan border in 1975.⁹ There is no indication that non-state actors may be using AP mines.

Stockpiling And Destruction

According to the information in its Article 7 report, 356,871 antipersonnel mines were stockpiled in Spain as of 28 December 1999.¹⁰ According to the Article 7 report:

⁴ Telephone interview and correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 March 2000.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 650-652.

⁷ Telephone interview and correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 March 2000.

⁸ L. Ayllon, “Espana insiste a EE.UU. para que destruya sus minas antipersonal,” *ABC*, 2 November 1998, p. 23. See also the Spanish national law in the official journal of the state, *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, num. Ver. 239-1998, 6 October 1998.

⁹ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 654.

¹⁰ It is still unclear if the 200,000 antipersonnel landmines that had gone past their useful date and should have been destroyed long ago are included in the figures presented in the Article 7 report,

	Army				Total	Navy	Air Force	Faex*	Total
	El Vacar	Chinchilla	Vadollano	Dadrete					
P-5	2,000	2,000	2,000	43,238	49,238	1,305	1,000		51,543
P-4-B	26,753	37,700	53,673	21,636	139,762	4,615		89,475	233,852
P-5-AR			5,486	2,322	7,808				7,808
P-S-1-A	8,696	10,561	3,556	4,229	27,042				27,042
P-S-1	19,786		14,684	2,156	36,626				36,626
OTROS									0
TOTAL	57,235	50,261	79,399	79,399	260,476	5,920	1,000	89,475	356,871

* Fabricaciones Extremenas

Spain had 853,286 mines when the Mine Ban Treaty and the national law were approved.¹¹ From July 1998 through December 1999, nearly 500,000 mines, all type P-5, were destroyed, leaving about 350,000 more to be destroyed.¹² On 30 May 2000, a Spanish official said that there were 210,602 antipersonnel mines left to destroy.¹³

According to officials from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, destruction will be completed in the year 2000. The rate of destruction is about 1,000 mines per day at a cost of about 638 pesetas (US\$ 3.25) per mine. The destruction is being carried out by Fabricaciones Extremenas, in El Gordo in Caceres region. The contract was signed in 1998 and will end in 2000.

The process of destruction is by incineration after the separation of plastic materials for recycling. This system conforms with the norms approved by the Ministry of Defense as per Ministerial Order 65/93 of 9 June 1993 (BOE n. 114 of 14 June, 1993). Mine destruction is being carried out in accordance with environmental protection laws and with the European Community Council Directive 94/67EC introduced into Spanish legislation by Royal Decree 1217/1997.¹⁴

The Ministry of Defense initially planned to keep 10,000 mines (9,784 of the P-5 type, and 216 of the P-4-B) for training purposes during the next ten years, as permitted by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁵ However, more recent information provided by the Ministry of Defense indicates that it has now decided to retain only 4,000 AP mines, to be used for training on demining under the "Angel" program.¹⁶

see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 652. The Article 7 report also makes no mention of the P4A mine previously understood to be stockpiled in unknown quantities.

¹¹ Telephone interview and correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 March 2000.

¹² Article 7 report.

¹³ Oral statement by Spanish representative at the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status of the Convention meeting in Geneva on 30 May 2000.

¹⁴ Article 7 report.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ This was publicly announced at the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status of the Convention meeting in Geneva on 30 May 2000. The Spanish delegate said a re-evaluation had taken place the past few months and that a decision had been reached that 4,000 is the "minimum number absolutely necessary."

The Spanish government stressed in November 1999 that it would urge the U.S. to withdraw 2,000 AP mines stockpiled in the U.S. military base of Rota (Cádiz) before 30 November 1999.¹⁷ Otherwise these AP mines would be destroyed according to the 1988 Spanish-U.S. agreement on jurisdiction over Spanish territory. According to an official *note verbale* from the U.S. Embassy to the Spanish Ministry of Defence, the U.S. Forces have withdrawn all the mines prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. Recent information has confirmed that the withdrawal has taken place.¹⁸ The U.S. apparently has around one hundred AP mines of the Claymore type that both U.S. and Spanish authorities agree are not banned by the MBT.

Mine Action Funding

Spain has contributed to the following humanitarian mine actions:¹⁹

1997	100,000,000 ptas.	Angola and Mozambique (UN Voluntary Trust Fund)
	75,000,000 ptas.	Organization of American States
	175,000,000 ptas. (US\$ 1,166,666)	TOTAL 1997
1998	50,000,000 ptas.	Angola and Mozambique (UN Voluntary Trust Fund)
	50,000,000 ptas.	Central America – Organization of American States
	50,000,000 ptas.	Peru-Ecuador border (bilateral program)
	1,600,000 ptas.	Croatia (sponsorship to the NGO <i>Pueblos Fraternos</i>)
	151,600,000 ptas. (US\$ 1,010,666)	TOTAL 1998
1999	29,642,550 ptas.	Kosovo (UN Voluntary Trust Fund)
	100,000,000 ptas.	Central America – Organization of American States
	44,100,000 ptas.	Bosnia-Herzegovina (bilateral program, MoD)
	4,374,600 ptas.	Peru-Ecuador border (bilateral program)
	178,117,150 ptas. (US\$ 1,187,447)	TOTAL 1999
TOTAL (1997-99): 504,717,150 ptas. (US\$ 3,364,781)		

The Spanish Campaign has expressed concern that the 1998 figure represents only 1% of the total spent by European states and the European Commission on humanitarian mine action, and that very little public information exists on projects that have been

¹⁷ “EEUU presiona a España para convertir Rota en su base más importante del sur de Europa.” (Europe puts pressure on Spain to make Rota its most important military base in southern Europe), *El País*, 25 November 1999, p. 28. While press accounts cited 2,000 U.S. mines at Rota, Human Rights Watch obtained information from U.S. government sources indicating that in 1997 the U.S. had 37,260 U.S. Army ADAM antipersonnel mines and 930 U.S. Navy air-delivered Gator antipersonnel mines stored in Spain.

¹⁸ Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 29 February 2000.

¹⁹ Telephone interview and correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 March 2000.

totally or partially financed by Spain, making it very difficult to analyse the effectiveness of the programs.

SWEDEN

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Sweden on 1 May 1999. From May 1999 through January 2000, Sweden destroyed 1.15 million antipersonnel mines, and nearly 2 million since 1998. Sweden contributed about US\$11.5 million to mine action programs in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Sweden signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 25 November 1998. Thus, it entered into force for Sweden on 1 May 1999. The government felt national implementation of the MBT could be achieved through additions to existing legislation; these revisions also came into force on 1 May 1999. The penal code was amended to provide for up to four years in prison for violation of the comprehensive ban and up to ten years "if the crime is gross...contribut[ing] essentially to the mines being used in a way that constituted a danger to the life and health of many persons."¹

Sweden's Article 7 report describes other measures taken, including a statute to deal with the MBT Article 8 compliance/inspections procedures and an amendment regarding immunity and privileges in certain cases.² Additionally, on 27 January 2000 the government decided to enact legislation to make the Swedish Armed Forces the responsible agency to assist any inspections; it also obliges the Armed Forces to educate their personnel in the provisions of the MBT, to collect and analyze information relevant to the MBT, and to report this annually to the government.³

Sweden participated as a State Party at the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in May 1999. The Swedish delegate stated:

Being the first State to have formally proposed, in 1994, a total ban, Sweden is particularly gratified at the entry-into-force of the Convention banning anti-personnel mines. Now we have to turn our attention and our efforts, in close co-operation with our EU partners, to making the vision embodied by the Convention a reality.... We therefore join other States...in calling on all States, which have not yet done so, to promptly accede to the Convention. In particular we address this call to producers, exporters and States particularly affected by these mines.... No state should be discouraged from acceding to the Treaty due to the costs involved in stockpile destruction. The Swedish government, for its part, is prepared to

¹ Penal Code, 1998: 1703, Ch. 22, Sec. 6 b. (official translation).

² Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 29 October 1999, covering 1 May 1999-30 September 1999. Statue 1998:1705 deals with inspections and 1976:661 with revisions to immunity and privileges in certain cases.

³ Förordning om inspektioner enligt konventionen om förbud mot användning, lagring, produktion och överföring av antipersonella minor (truppminor) samt om deras förstöring (ordinance on inspection according to the Ottawa Convention), UD2000/43/RS, 27 January 2000.

contribute to such assistance, bilaterally and together with its EU partners and other interested countries.⁴

Sweden has taken part in all meetings of the MBT Standing Committees of Experts (SCE). At the meeting on Mine Victim Assistance in September 1999, Sweden was charged with reviewing donor cooperation and reporting to the SCE in March 2000 on proposals to improve the structure for cooperation.

Sweden submitted its initial Article 7 report to the United Nations on 29 October 1999, within the required time frame. It has not yet submitted a subsequent annual report. The initial report covers the period 1 May 1999–30 September 1999. While responsive to most areas for reporting, excepting mines retained for training, the report does not provide the type of supplemental information included by many other States Parties.

Sweden is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It was decided that no national implementation legislation was required for implementation of the Amended Protocol II, as existing legislation already has wider scope than the Protocol. Sweden's Amended Protocol II Article 13 annual report was submitted in time for the annual meeting in December 1999, chaired by the Swedish Ambassador to the Permanent Mission in Geneva, Johan Molander.⁵

Sweden voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had on similar resolutions in the past. Sweden was also the chief sponsor of UNGA Resolution 54/48 in support of Amended Protocol II, as it had been in previous years.

Sweden has not opposed work to try to negotiate a ban on transfers of antipersonnel landmines in the Conference on Disarmament while the criteria and definitions used are at least as strict as those in the Mine Ban Treaty.⁶

Production, Transfer and Use

The government states that it has not produced or exported AP mines (not including Claymore-types) since 1974. In the past, explosives were the most important contribution of the Swedish industry to global mine production. The Swedish companies FFV, Bofors and LIAB produced and developed twenty-one different types of AP mines since World War II. The major part of production was transferred to the Swedish Armed Forces (For detail on types of mines and transfers, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 657-659).

According to the MBT reporting requirements, states shall report on the technical characteristics of "each type of anti-personnel mine produced...and those currently

⁴ Statement (revised version) by Deputy State Secretary Anders Bjurner, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

⁵ CCW Amended Protocol II Report, 14 October 1999; Interview with Per Almqvist, Director, Department for Global Cooperation, Håkan Bengtsson, Department for Global Cooperation, and Susanne Karlsson, Department for Global Security, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 25 January 2000.

⁶ Email from the Swedish Foreign Ministry, 19 January 1999.

owned or possessed,⁷ but Sweden's Article 7 report makes no mention of a number of AP mines that have been manufactured in Sweden.

Asked about the Swedish position on the legality of joint military operations involving non-signatories of the MBT where AP mines are used, and/or transited across Swedish territory, officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that at present there is no official Swedish interpretation of the terms "transit," "transfer," or "assist" with respect to the MBT. On these matters Sweden is awaiting the outcome of the work of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operations of the Convention.⁸

Stockpiling and Destruction

Although comprehensive numbers have not been reported, it appears that when Sweden began stockpile destruction in 1998, it had about 3.2 million AP mines.⁹ As of 25 January 2000, about 1.98 million AP mines had been destroyed, and 1,206,495 AP mines remained in stock. In accordance with a parliamentary decision of 1996, all Swedish stockpiles should be destroyed by the end of 2001, with the exception of the as yet undeclared number to be retained as permitted by Article 3 of the MBT.

According to Sweden's Article 7 report, most of the mines destroyed have been Types 10, 41, and 49B, with small numbers of 9 and 43T. Likewise, those still held in stock awaiting destruction were primarily Types 10, 41 and 11, as well as 49B and various types of 43T, with small numbers of Types 48 and 9.

Last year it had been reported that Sweden would provide data on the number of mines to be retained for training in its Article 7 report.¹⁰ However the report states:

"The number of mines not yet destroyed far exceeds any assessments of how many mines will be needed to be retained for art. 3 purposes at the end of the mandated destruction period. For the time being, therefore, live anti-personnel mines from existing stocks slated to be destroyed are being used in mechanical mine clearance trials currently in progress for the purposes of developing techniques and equipment for mine detection, clearance and destruction. The ongoing trials, in addition to contributing to diminishing existing stocks, will allow for a practical assessment of the numbers and types needed to be retained when existing stocks will have been depleted at the end of the destruction period. It is also assumed that a few foreign-made mines will need to be obtained for art. 3 purposes."¹¹

⁷ Mine Ban Treaty, Article 7.1h.

⁸ Interview with Per Almqvist, Håkan Bengtsson and Susanne Karlsson, Stockholm, 25 January 2000.

⁹ Based on Sweden's Article 7 report and Defense Materiel Administration, letter to SPAS (ref. Plan 13 301:7558/00), 24 February 2000. Information calculated as follows: Sweden reportedly destroyed 315,000 AP mines in 1998. Between May 1999 and January 2000 (nine months) 1,152,774 AP mines were destroyed. No figures are available for the period January 1999 to April 1999 (four months) but if the same rate of destruction is assumed as for the rest of 1999 (128,000 AP mines per month), then 512,000 AP mines were destroyed in that period. This totals 1,980,000 mines destroyed. In January 2000 there were 1,206,495 in stock, giving an initial total stock of 3,186,000 AP mines.

¹⁰ Telephone interview with Olof Carelius, the Swedish Armed Forces HQ, 7 January 1999.

¹¹ Article 7 Report, 29 October 1999.

This statement would not seem fully compliant with the requirements under the MBT to report *annually* on the “types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction ... in accordance with Article 3.”¹²

While Article 7 reporting does not require information on directional fragmentation mines, the ICBL has pressed state parties to provide such information, particularly data on steps taken to modify the mines so that they can only be command-detonated. Sweden has not given any information on the Truppmina 12 directional fragmentation mine that it is retaining, other than a statement by the Defence Materiel Administration (DMA) that the modification of these mines will be completed by November 2000.¹³ The explanation given is that Sweden now categorizes this as “a different device” and will modify it so that it “has to be discharged by a soldier.”¹⁴ Furthermore, the DMA has stated: “Since Truppmina 12 and 12B are not covered by the conditions of the Ottawa Convention no answer to this question is required.”¹⁵ Nor is any information provided on the FFV 013 or FFV 013R command-detonated mines, that can also be fitted with tripwires. These are considered to be antivehicle mines by the Swedish government, but independent databases classify both of them as AP mines.¹⁶

As was reaffirmed by a number of States Parties during the January and May 2000 meetings of the SCE on General Status of the Convention, antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that may be activated by the unintentional act of a person are considered AP mines and thus are banned under the MBT.¹⁷ Sweden considers antivehicle mines an essential element in Swedish defense, but there is no official view on antihandling devices that can be activated by an unintentional act; a standpoint will be worked out during summer/fall 2000.¹⁸ For the present, Sweden insists that it is not evident from the preparatory work for, nor the actual text of the MBT, that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices should be banned.¹⁹

¹² Mine Ban Treaty, Article 7.1.d.

¹³ Telephone interview with Camilla Gustafsson, VapenP Division, Defense Materiel Administration, 28 January 1999.

¹⁴ Telephone interview with Susanne Karlsson, Desk Officer, Department for Global Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 12 May 2000; also Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 14 October 1999.

¹⁵ Defense Materiel Administration (FMV), letter to SPAS (ref: Plan 13 301:7558/00), 24 February 2000.

¹⁶ *Ordata II, Version 1.0*, CD ROM, Unit for Special Operations and Low Intensity Operations (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 1999). See also *LM Report 1999*, pp. 661-662.

¹⁷ See, Human Rights Watch, *Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices*, Fact Sheet prepared for the First Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 10-11 January 2000.

¹⁸ Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Olof Carelius, Swedish Armed Forces HQ, 16 February 2000.

¹⁹ Email from Lt. Col. Olof Caerelius, Swedish Armed Forces HQ to Svenska Freds, 13 April 2000.

Mine Action Funding

Sweden has made substantial financial and in-kind contributions to mine action over many years, some of which are summarized in this section. There appears to be no clearly formulated policy governing Swedish support for mine action. However, the government has charged Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) with the evaluation of previous projects and the proposal of strategies for Swedish aid to mine action. Initial proposals should be presented by 1 July 2000, although full evaluation of earlier projects (from which final proposals will follow) will take longer.²⁰

Mine Action Funding through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In mid-1999 the Swedish government decided to contribute SEK 3 million (US\$ 353,000) to UNMAS in support of its coordinating role in the United Nations system.²¹ In December 1999 the Foreign Ministry decided to contribute SEK 5 million (US\$ 588,000) towards the Swedish Rescue Services Agency mine action work, of which SEK 1.2 million (US\$ 141,000) is earmarked for cooperation with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining on the evaluation of the use of mine-seeking dogs.²² In February 2000 Sweden decided to contribute to the Slovenian International Trust Fund (ITF) for Demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). From the donation, US\$ 150,000 is earmarked for national capacity building and US\$ 150,000 for demining projects in BiH primarily to facilitate the return of the displaced.²³

When it agreed to contribute to the ITF Sweden noted, "A contribution by any single country is followed by a matching contribution by the USA. Well knowing that it is the prerogative of any donor to decide upon the use of its donation, Sweden anyhow would like to advise upon the use of the matching donation. Swedish technology in the field of mine detection and clearance is advanced and some companies have achieved promising results. It is the sincere hope of Sweden that the matching contribution is directed into supporting Swedish technology for operational use in areas where mine action is supported by the ITF."²⁴

Canada has requested Sweden support the destruction of Ukraine's AP mine stockpile; no decision has yet been taken.²⁵

Mine Action Funding through SIDA

In September 1999, the Swedish International Development Agency reported that mine action aid equivalent to SEK 94.5 million (US\$ 11.1 million) for 1999 had been

²⁰ Interview with Per Almqvist, Håkan Bengtsson and Susanne Karlsson, Stockholm, 25 January 2000; also Telephone interview with Per Almqvist, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 11 May 2000.

²¹ *Regeringsbeslut* (Government decision), UD1999/913/GC, 15 July 1999.

²² *Regeringsbeslut* (Government decision), UD1999/1529/GC, 16 December 1999.

²³ Memorandum of Understanding between Republic of Slovenia (ITF) and Kingdom of Sweden (SIDA), 10 February 2000.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Interview with Per Almqvist, Håkan Bengtsson and Susanne Karlsson, Stockholm, 25 January 2000.

provided (a reduction from SEK 129.5 million in 1998). The following programs were supported in 1999:²⁶

<i>Country</i>	<i>Support in SEK</i>	<i>Implementing agency</i>
Afghanistan	18.7 million (US\$ 2.2 million)	UNOCHA
Angola	14.3 million (US\$ 1.7 million)	NPA, UNICEF, UNDP
Bosnia	1 million (US\$ 118,000)	BHMAC
Cambodia	14 million (US\$ 1.6 million)	CMAC, UNDP TF
Iraqi Kurdistan	20 million (US\$ 2.4 million)	MAG
Kosovo	8.8 million (US\$ 1 million)	UNMACC
Mozambique	18.7 million (US\$ 2.2 million)	UNDP, NPA, HI
Total	94.5 million (US\$ 11.1 million)	

Afghanistan: SIDA donated SEK 18 million (US\$ 2.1 million) to UNOCHA for the mine program in Afghanistan, and SEK 700,000 (US\$ 82,000) of this sum is to cover the cost of a Swedish expert in Afghanistan. Since 1990, SIDA has granted a total of SEK 124.1 million (US\$ 14.6 million) towards UNOCHA's mine program in Afghanistan, of which SEK 2.1 million (US\$ 247,000) was for a Swedish expert stationed in Afghanistan.²⁷

Angola: The greater part of the SIDA contribution in 1999, SEK 12.3 million (US\$ 1.4 million), went to Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) for its mine clearance in Malanje and Kwanza Norte provinces. In all, SIDA's contribution to NPA's work in Malanje since 1996 amounts to SEK 43 million (US\$ 5 million).²⁸ The Swedish Ambassador in Luanda stated that: "Sweden's aid strategy for Angola 1999-2001 will give priority to humanitarian aid aimed towards long term development... [The Swedish] embassy sees mine clearance to be a part of long term development work, so internal refugees and, naturally, the local population can be allocated cultivatable land."²⁹ Also: "Angola has signed but not ratified the Ottawa Convention against the laying of AP mines. Thus the laying of new mines by the government army is not a breach of the Convention per se but contrary to the spirit of the convention."³⁰

Bosnia: SIDA decided in 1997 to support mine clearance in Bosnia, but due to reorganization of the UN system it was hard to find a contracting partner. The project period was 8 August 1998 to 31 February 1999, after which no further contributions were made in 1999. The support was directed in line with UN Development Program (UNDP) suggestions to support capacity for national mine clearance coordination through funds for administration and equipment such as computers, but the major part of the support was directed toward mine clearance activities.³¹

²⁶ SIDA, *Fact sheet: Sida support to mine-action 1990-1999*, September 1999.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Memorandum, Swedish Ambassador, Luanda, 4 June 1999.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Email from Lars Johansson, SIDA, 14 April 2000.

Cambodia: Of the total SEK 10 million (US\$ 1.2 million) for mine projects in Cambodia, SEK 2 million (US\$ 235,000) went to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) through the UN Trust Fund, SEK 1 million (US\$ 118,000) to CMAC for technical development channeled through the UNDP and SEK 7 million (US\$ 824,000) towards the mine dog project run in cooperation with CMAC and the Swedish Armed Forces since 1995.³² However, these figures were reported by SIDA in September 1999 and, for the mine dog project, the figure reported is probably an estimate. The Swedish mine dog project in Cambodia had cost SEK 19.5 million (US\$ 2.3 million).³³ On 20 January 2000 the government decided on SEK 22.6 million (US\$ 2.7 million) in continued support to the dog project, covering the period 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2002.³⁴

Iraqi Kurdistan: SIDA has supported the Mine Advisory Group (MAG) mine clearance operations in northern Iraq since 1 October 1996 for a total of SEK 54.6 million (US\$ 6.4 million).³⁵ In August 1998 SIDA decided on support to MAG for 1998-99 amounting to SEK 29 million (US\$ 3.4 million); of this sum, SEK 16 million (US\$ 1.9 million) is for 1999.³⁶ In September 1999, it allocated a further SEK 16 million (US\$ 1.9 million) for the years 1999-2000. Of this sum, SEK 4 million (US\$ 471,000) is for 1999 and SEK 12 million (US\$ 1.4 million) for 2000.³⁷ This means that the contribution approved for 1999 totals SEK 20 million (US\$ 2.3 million); in SIDA's own compilation support for mine action is given as SEK 13 million (US\$ 1.5 million); the reason for this discrepancy is not known.

Kosovo: On 22 June 1999, Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) decided to carry out a factfinding mission to Kosovo for a possible mine clearance operation, that SIDA financed with SEK 200,000 (US\$ 23,500).³⁸ As a result, the Rescue Services Agency applied for government support of operations there. It was assumed that the operation would be financed by SIDA at a cost of SEK 8.5 million (US\$ 1 million).³⁹ The government decided on 15 July 1999 that SRSA should have a coordinating role within the Kosovo UNMACC. The SRSA force consisted of eleven people with their

³² SIDA, *Fact sheet: Sida support to mine-action 1990-1999*, September 1999.

³³ Interview with Nils Rydberg, Project Officer, SIDA, Stockholm, 14 January 1999.

³⁴ SIDA, *Project Document (Final draft), Mine Detection Dog Project*, 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2002.

³⁵ In February 1999 SIDA turned down an application from NPA for support of a mine program in northern Iraq, noting that "under present conditions it is not expedient to extend aid to further channels in northern Iraq, partly in view of the insecure situation in the area and region, difficulties in gaining access and the matter of legitimacy in relation to the Baghdad regime, and partly since SIDA is at present supporting mine clearance programs via the Mines Advisory Group (MAG)."

³⁶ SIDA, *Project Decision*, Dnr 1998-03577, 28 August 1998.

³⁷ SIDA, *Project Decision*, Dnr 1999-01825, 6 September 1999. In its decision document SIDA writes that they "have had discussions with MAG on increasing the number of contributors to the program. SIDA and DFID [the UK government's Department for International Development] are at present the principal donors. MAG has difficulty in finding more donors, mainly because northern Iraq is 'stateless' and has not signed the Ottawa Convention."

³⁸ Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Decision, Dnr 512-1234-1999, 22 June 1999.

³⁹ Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Decision, Dnr 512-1144-1999, 9 July 1999.

equipment, including dog experts, quality and control functions, data technicians, a chief, a nurse, liaison and radio personnel.⁴⁰

Mozambique: In 1999 Handicap International (HI) received SEK 4 million (US\$ 471,000) in continued support for its mine awareness programs and also SEK 5.7 million (US\$ 671,000) toward the new Inhambane Mine Clearance Project (IMCP) for small-scale mine clearance.⁴¹

In addition, SIDA provides SEK 4 million (US\$ 471,000) to a multisensor research and development project.

Mine Action by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency

The Swedish government approved SRSA's re-allocation of SEK5 million (US\$ 588,000) for building its capacity for mine action and indicated that the Foreign Ministry can provide a further SEK 5 million. SRSA supports tests of Swedish mechanical mine clearance equipment, SCANJACK, Countermining Technologies and Bofors' Mine-Guzzler. The tests are being carried out in Croatia at an estimated cost of SEK 1.2 million (US\$ 141,000). SRSA has purchased prototypes of a biosensor from Biosensor Application for tests and development, at an estimated cost of SEK 1.2 million (US\$ 141,000). In cooperation with the Defence Research Establishment, SRSA is carrying out research on chemical analysis based on mass spectrometry, at a cost of SEK 1 million (US\$ 118,000).⁴²

Mine Action by the Swedish Armed Forces⁴³

During 1999 the Swedish Armed Forces contributed thirty personnel to SFOR to mine clearance in Bosnia, fifty to KFOR in Kosovo, six to CMAC in Cambodia and two to WEUDAM in Croatia.⁴⁴ The Swedish Armed Forces includes the Swedish Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and the Demining and Military Engineering Centre (SWEDEC). At SWEDEC personnel are trained for mine clearance, both for Swedish foreign service forces and for civil operations for UN bodies, NGOs and Mine Action Centres (MACs). Mine clearance training has been increased during 1999; some thirty courses have been run at SWEDEC. The recruitment potential for international service has thus been increased.

All foreign service personnel have been trained in mine awareness and SWEDEC also ran courses for foreign researchers (twenty-two students from ten countries) in conjunction with NPA. A Nordic project to work out common certification rules regarding training in explosives and mine clearance has been carried out. The project proposal will be signed by the respective countries and evaluated at a combined Nordic EOD course in 2000.

Studies by the Swedish Demining Unit (SDU) are underway into methods for coordinating the basic elements in explosives clearance: man, machine and dog.

⁴⁰ Swedish Government Press Release: "Svensk militär personal till Kosovo," 15 July 1999.

⁴¹ SIDA, Project Decision, Dnr 1999-00665, 5 May 1999.

⁴² SRSA, email to Svenska Freds, 13 April 2000.

⁴³ Swedish Armed Forces Annual Report 1999, International activities, Annex 3.

⁴⁴ Telephone interview with the Swedish Armed Forces International Command (SWEDINT), Information Department, 27 April 2000.

Trials with metal-detecting mine detectors are underway and should be completed during 2001. SWEDEC and NPA cooperate as final users in a European industrial project on multisensors, with Celsius AB as the project coordinator; this project is partly funded by the European Union. The Armed Forces through SWEDEC have supported inventors and industry by testing different types of equipment. The software for an explosives clearance database (EOD IS) is ready and planned to come into operation early 2000.

The possibility of forming a pool of mine-seeking dog teams, corresponding to a personnel pool of about seventy-five people, is being investigated. Training courses have been run for volunteers belonging to the Swedish Working Dog Club. Twelve newly trained dogs for explosive-seeking work are ready. Six dogs have been brought back from Bosnia. The development of training of four new types of explosive-seeking dogs, known as surface-seeking dogs, is underway and they are expected to be ready by the summer of 2000.

During 1999 SWEDEC started mine awareness activities to returning Bosnian and Somali refugees. Three refugee camps were visited on behalf of the Swedish Immigration Board.

Mine Victim Assistance

Swedish contributions to mine victim assistance are channeled through SIDA, which reports that SEK 3 million (US\$ 353,000) has been devoted to rehabilitation programs during the last two years. From 1990-1999, SIDA has also supported rehabilitation of mine victims through its general support of the ICRC, which totaled SEK 212 million (US\$ 24.9 million);⁴⁵ it estimates that a maximum of 10% of this amount was devoted to rehabilitation of mine victims.⁴⁶ Svenska Freds (the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society) has expressed concern that the Swedish government has no overall policy or program for mine victim assistance.

SWITZERLAND

Key developments since March 1999: Switzerland has served as co-chair of the SCE on Victim Assistance. Switzerland will host the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2000. In 1999 Switzerland provided US\$5.8 million for mine action programs.

Mine Ban Policy

Switzerland signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 March 1998. Before this, national legislation banning antipersonnel landmines (AP mines) had already been enacted by the Swiss Parliament on 13 December 1996, which entered into force on 1 April 1998.¹ This national legislation concerns war material in general. One of the sections specific to AP mines imposes penal sanctions (maximum

⁴⁵ SIDA, *Fact sheet: Sida support to mine-action 1990-1999*, September 1999.

⁴⁶ ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 663.

¹ La Loi Federale sur le Materiel de Guerre, 13 December 1996.

imprisonment of ten years for intentional violations, maximum imprisonment of one year or a fine of SF 500,000/US\$290,000 for negligent violations).² The section dealing with AP mines is broader than the Mine Ban Treaty in that it also bans devices *adapted* to function as AP mines.³ However, the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines (Swiss CBL) remains concerned about two aspects of the national law that are weaker than the MBT (see below).

Switzerland submitted its initial report required under Article 7 of the Treaty to the United Nations on time on 4 August 1999, covering the period 1 March 1999 to 20 August 1999. The report is brief, since Switzerland is not mine-affected, had already destroyed its entire stock of AP mines, had no production facilities, and is retaining no mines for training purposes. On 11 April 2000 Switzerland submitted its second annual report, covering calendar year 1999, that simply indicated there were no changes in information from the first report.

Switzerland took part in the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) of the MBT in Maputo, Mozambique, in May 1999. The Swiss representatives expressed the willingness of the government to host the Second Meeting in September 2000 and also highlighted the work of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. The GICHD provides a computer network linking mine clearance centers, provides a venue for the UN's annual meetings on this activity, and serves as an institution for the study of and training in mine clearance. Since the FMSP in Maputo, the GICHD has also hosted the meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts (SCEs), that are charged with facilitating the implementation of the MBT.

Switzerland has co-chaired (with Mexico) the SCE on Victim Assistance, Socio-economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness, that met in September 1999 and March 2000. It has also been very active in other SCE meetings. At the first SCE meeting on General Status and Operation of the Convention, held in January 2000, Switzerland was one of the governments that reiterated that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices which function like AP mines, which may explode from an unintentional act of a person, are banned under the MBT.⁴

Switzerland is not a member of the United Nations, and therefore never appears in the list of signatories of UN resolutions. However the Swiss delegation stated at the FMSP in Maputo that the UN offers the most effective means of executing mine action.

After the NATO intervention in Kosovo in early 1999, the Swiss CBL asked for the government's views on the fact the United States had reserved the right of to use antipersonnel mines, despite the fact that all the other members of NATO had signed the MBT except for Turkey. The official response was that such questions were not relevant, since Switzerland is not a member of any military alliance and allows no foreign military bases on her territory.⁵

The Swiss authorities have welcomed the Landmine Monitor and the initiatives on transparency regarding the implementation of the Treaty. However, in response to the

² Ibid, Article 35.

³ La Loi Federale sur le Materiel de Guerre, Article 8.3.

⁴ Oral statement of the Swiss Delegation, Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, 10-11 January 2000.

⁵ Letter from the Department for Foreign Affairs to the Swiss CBL, 30 November 1999.

Landmine Monitor Report 1999, Switzerland indicated that it believes “the report makes it difficult to distinguish factual information provided by the governments of the Member states from the evaluations of the authors.” The government notes that some member states might feel wrongly discredited and some non-signatory states might be dissuaded from joining the MBT.⁶

Switzerland is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Its annual report was submitted to the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 1999 as required, and at that meeting Switzerland intervened to request that signatory countries’ reports become public, as are those of the MBT.⁷

Regarding the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Switzerland supports the principle of negotiating a ban on mine transfers in the CD, provided that this does not endanger the implementation or universality of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸ The Swiss view of the primacy of the MBT has been stated in clear terms: “Switzerland is ready to discuss ways towards solving the problems caused by anti-personnel mines in any appropriate forum. However, it would oppose the creation of new international norms short of or contradicting the prohibitions and obligations imposed by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.”⁹

Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines

In March 2000, the Swiss CBL, in cooperation with a number of other national landmine campaigns, hosted a conference to begin a dialogue seeking to engage armed non-state actors (NSA) in the landmine ban.¹⁰ The first conference of its kind, attended by representatives of armed opposition groups, government observers and ban campaigners, it was an important step toward consistent work in this area of critical importance to banning AP mines. The objectives of this conference were to provide education about the problem of mines used by NSAs, to increase understanding of how an antipersonnel mine ban can be achieved among NSAs, and to build confidence in and strengthen the ICBL initiative to engage NSAs in a ban on mines.

During the conference it was noted how crucial rebel participation is in mine-clearing operations, from identifying mined areas to the actual removal or destruction of mines. Legal experts explored the introduction of innovations to international humanitarian and human rights law, that would allow armed non-state actors to obligate themselves to a ban. Geneva Call, a Swiss-registered international NGO, was put

⁶ Swiss government letters to the Swiss CBL, 31 January 2000 and 5 May 2000.

⁷ During the 1999 CCW conference Switzerland also suggested that states parties should develop a new protocol on cluster bombs, including a preparatory conference on this subject involving concerned countries.

⁸ Interview with the Swiss Mission, May 1999.

⁹ Report of the Swiss Delegation to the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, 19 February 1999, p. 2.

¹⁰ A full report of the International Conference on Non-State Actors is available from the Swiss CBL, ereusse@worldcom.ch.

forward by anti-landmine campaigns from several countries to receive such ban commitments from NSAs, and serve as a basis for holding armed groups accountable.¹¹

The Swiss CBL has expressed concerns about two aspects of the national mine ban law. First, the national law does not reflect the definition of an antihandling device in the MBT. The Mine Ban Treaty defines antihandling devices as those that activate when “an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise *intentionally* disturb the mine,” thus devices that may be activated by an unintentional act of a person are considered to be AP mines and thus banned by the MBT.¹² As noted above, Swiss officials have recently reiterated that this is the Swiss understanding. Moreover, inquiries by the Swiss CBL have established that the antihandling devices on antitank mines currently stocked by Switzerland do conform to the MBT. Despite this, and the fact that international treaties prevail over national law, the Swiss CBL expects the authorities to specify in the national law what types of antihandling devices are and are not permitted.

Secondly, the Swiss law reserves the right to use antipersonnel mines “as a protection or in order to fight their effects.”¹³ The need to use mines for training dogs in mine detection is given as an example of what this is intended to permit.¹⁴ However the Swiss Campaign considers this exemption to be so general as to allow its misuse, along the lines of “if the enemy uses mines, then I am allowed to use them so as to ensure my protection.” The Swiss CBL considers that the national law should be amended in this respect also and have the same definition as the Mine Ban Treaty. The MBT allows antipersonnel mines to be retained only for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques.¹⁵

Production and Transfer

Switzerland produced bounding mines (type 64) and stake mines (type 49) at a government controlled facility from 1967 to 1969; other past production details are noted in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.¹⁶

The legal sanctions against production of mine components are described in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (see p. 669). The Swiss CBL has identified a company that previously produced detonators for mines and is now producing detonators for air bags.¹⁷ In case these detonators could be used in the manufacture of antipersonnel mines, the Swiss CBL wrote asking whether the company was keeping a watch on its exports, and would research into modifying the detonators in order to prevent any possible use in the manufacture of mines. The company replied that exports were watched but that it is impossible to use the detonators for mines.¹⁸

¹¹ Information on the Geneva Call deed is available from: Geneva.Call@gkb.com.

¹² Mine Ban Treaty, Article 2.3 (emphasis added).

¹³ La Loi Federale sur le Materiel de Guerre, Article 8.2b.

¹⁴ Interview with the Department for Defence, 5 May 2000.

¹⁵ Mine Ban Treaty, Article 3.1.

¹⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 668-669.

¹⁷ Letter to the Swiss CBL from the Ems Company, 27 January 2000, and information given to the Swiss Parliament, June 1996, in answer to questions from parliamentarians.

¹⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 669.

Switzerland does not produce antitank mines equipped with antihandling devices and has no research programs on these weapons. There was research into alternatives to antipersonnel mines, in the form of video monitors and various technical sensors, but this has ceased for lack of worthwhile result.¹⁹

The export of antipersonnel landmines and components was restricted in 1994 to other CCW signatories, then banned completely in December 1996. However, the export of explosives does not require export authorization and does not appear to be affected by the MBT as implemented in Switzerland by the 1996 law. Imports of various AP mines were recorded up to 1965, as detailed in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (see p. 670).

Transit of AP mines through Switzerland is forbidden for any purpose, including by any peacekeeping forces and the UN.

Stockpiling

Switzerland's Article 7 report indicates that destruction of stockpiled AP mines began following a 25 November 1995 decision of the Minister of Defense, and that destruction was completed by 15 March 1999.²⁰ It noted that 212 type Tretmine 59 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in March 1999, by demolition charges at the Weapon Systems and Ammunition Test Centre of the Defence Procurement Agency. The government had stated previously that all stocks of AP mines were destroyed by the end of 1997.²¹ In response to the Swiss CBL's questions, the authorities explained that these mines had been forgotten in a warehouse.

The total number of AP mines destroyed from stockpiles is not provided in the Article 7 report. However, at the December 1999 meeting of the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, a Swiss representative cited a figure of 3.85 million. He noted the work was done by government-owned factories and one private firm.²²

Despite a request by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the Swiss government has not included in its Article 7 reports any information about Claymore-type mines.²³ When these directional fragmentation mines are victim-activated by tripwire, they are prohibited by the treaty; when command-detonated by the user, they are permissible. The Department for Defence takes the position that Claymores are no longer to be considered as antipersonnel mines because they have been altered to prevent activation by tripwire. They are deemed essential for the military security of the country.²⁴

¹⁹ Interview with the Department for Defence, 5 May 2000.

²⁰ Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted 4 August 1999; available at: <http://domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf>.

²¹ Report to the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe, 19 February 1999, p. 2.

²² Oral statement to SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 9 December 1999. Human Rights Watch subsequently incorporated this figure into its report, "Antipersonnel Landmine Stockpiles and Their Destruction," 14 December 1999. The Swiss delegate indicated that some destruction took place as early as 1990. The mines destroyed included 3 million Type 59; 620,000 Type 49; 171,000 Type 64; and, 59,000 Type 63.

²³ ICBL letter to the Foreign Minister, 20 December 1999, in preparation for the January 2000 meeting of the SCE on General Operations and Status of the Convention.

²⁴ Interview with the Department for Defence, 5 May 2000.

The Swiss CBL has confidence that these mines have indeed been adapted for command-detonation only and that operational policy in Switzerland reflects this. Nevertheless, the Swiss Campaign has called for a ban on Claymore mines, due to its concern that if Claymores continue to be used in any form there is a possibility that they will be used illegally. The Swiss CBL has provided the government with two legal opinions on the legality of Claymore mines under Swiss law, and is awaiting a response.

The Swiss government acknowledges owning antivehicle mines fitted with antihandling devices (which may be the type VM88 imported from Austria from Thomson Brandt Armament between 1991 and 1994, worth US\$ 225 million),²⁵ and antitank mines dating from the sixties that are not fitted with antihandling devices.²⁶ The Swiss authorities explain that, because three factors must be simultaneously combined in order to make antivehicle mines fitted with antihandling devices explode, theoretically they entail no risk for civilians. Also, antivehicle mines held by Switzerland are said to meet criteria set out by the ICRC: they are detectable, require 150 kg minimum pressure for detonation, and will not explode if unintentionally disturbed.²⁷

Mine Action Funding

In 1999 Switzerland provided US\$5.8 million of support for mine action programs: \$2.65 million for humanitarian mine clearance, \$1.3 million for victim assistance, \$300,000 to help increase local capacity for mine action, and \$1.55 million for various projects including the GICHD, strengthening the UN, supporting nongovernmental organizations and sponsoring delegates from mine-affected countries to attend the FMSP in Maputo, Mozambique.

Funds donated to mine clearance include \$1.1 million for Kosovo (involving projects carried out by Handicap International, Halo Trust and the Mine Action Center), \$1.2 million for Bosnia (Handicap International, Norwegian People's Aid, and the International War Crimes Court, to demine a mass grave), \$140,000 for Croatia (Swiss Federation for Humanitarian Demining) and \$180,000 for Mozambique (Halo Trust and others).

Mine action policy is based on Switzerland's principle of peace promotion. The most significant aspects of this guiding principle are: good knowledge of the situation in the country concerned, appropriate choice of experienced partners, integration of all stakeholders in both project design and implementation, strengthening of local capacity, consideration of related security, political and trade issues (with regard to the recipient country and Switzerland), and coordination between donors and implementing agencies.

Applied to mine-related activities, these criteria favor the selection of: the most mine-affected regions in the world and those engaged in reconstruction and reconciliation; links between mine clearance projects with peace-promotion initiatives; selection of mine clearance sites in participation with local governments, local communities, the UN, Swiss embassies and bureaus of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, other donors and experienced international NGOs; the

²⁵ Letter to the Swiss CBL from the Department for Defence, 22 January 1999.

²⁶ Interview with the Department for Defence, 5 May 2000.

²⁷ Ibid.

importance of local capacity building; assessment of needs and impact on mine action programs. Coordination is provided by the Department for Foreign Affairs.

The Swiss government is not involved in and does not support any research program for mine clearance technologies; neither does it train bomb-disposal experts.

Several NGOs within the Swiss CBL support mine clearance and victim assistance programs: Co-operaid and Swiss Protestant Mutual Aid have programs in Cambodia, Handicap International in various countries and the Swiss Foundation For Landmine Victims Aid in Pakistan. In 1999 the Fondation Pro-Victimis provided financial support to the Halo Trust for mine clearance in Abkhazia (\$407,000), in Upper-Karabakh (\$91,000), and in Kosovo (\$780,000). Pro-Victimis also financed (\$70,000) publication of a book examining the extent of the landmine problem worldwide.²⁸ The Swiss Federation for Mine Clearance operated mine clearance programs during 1999 in Croatia and Kosovo, and mine awareness programs involving a theatrical troupe in Bosnia. It also trained members of the Swiss army in mine clearance supervision, and is designing a light machine for mine clearance.

In 1999, Handicap International (Switzerland) supported mine clearance operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (\$355,000) and Kosovo (\$275,000); mine awareness in Bosnia-Herzegovina (\$21,700) and Angola (\$41,600); victim assistance in Mozambique (\$250,000), Albania (\$26,700), Cambodia (\$51,000), Nicaragua (\$43,300), Rwanda (\$69,566), Senegal (\$12,174) and Somaliland (\$26,700). Handicap International (Switzerland) also supported a study, "The use of mechanical means for humanitarian demining operations" (\$19,300).

A Swiss company, SM Swiss Ammunition Enterprise Corp., is manufacturing a system that it claims will allow mines and unexploded ordnance to be made safe without having to touch or explode them. This involves a small hollow charge that destroys the mine, ensuring much greater safety for the bomb-disposal experts. This Swiss system (SM-EOD) is now being used increasingly in many mine clearance tasks.

TAJIKISTAN

Key developments since March 1999: Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 October 1999. The treaty entered into force for Tajikistan on 1 April 2000. A Russian official has said Tajikistan is possibly reviewing its decision to join the treaty.

Background

Five years of civil war in Tajikistan were formally brought to a close on 27 June 1997, when a peace accord was signed between the government and the opposition, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), though fighting erupted again in 1998. Landmines were used throughout the fighting. In 1999, progress toward peace led to the UTO officially declaring that it would disband its armed units.¹ In May 2000, it was reported that the

²⁸ Ilaria Bottigliero, *120 million landmines deployed worldwide: fact or fiction?* (Geneva: Pro Victimis, 2000); email: pro.victimis@iprolink.ch.

¹ UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1274, 12 November 1999.

United Nations would likely be announcing the end of its peacekeeping mission in the country.²

Mine Ban Policy

Tajikistan had not shown particular interest in banning antipersonnel mines. While it attended the early Mine Ban Treaty preparatory meetings, it did not participate in the Oslo negotiations, and was one of eighteen countries which abstained from voting for the 1997 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the treaty. Tajikistan was absent from the vote on the pro-treaty 1998 UNGA resolution. Tajikistan did not participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Mozambique in May 1999. It has not attended any of the treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva.

But, on 12 October 1999, Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The treaty entered into force for Tajikistan on 1 April 2000. Tajikistan voted for the December 1999 UNGA resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Tajikistan also acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Landmine Protocol on 12 October 1999. It did not attend the First Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II in December 1999. Tajikistan is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

A senior Russian diplomat has told Landmine Monitor that at the January 2000 summit of the CIS states, Tajikistan indicated a possible review of its decision to join the Mine Ban Treaty, due to an evaluation of the consequences of clearing minefields from the Tajik-Afghan border. Tajikistan has communicated the same thing in correspondence with the Russian Foreign Ministry.³

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Tajikistan is not believed to have produced antipersonnel mines. Tajikistan reportedly did have some industrial facilities that had the capability of producing landmines and their components, but it appears all military production facilities have been shut down.⁴

Tajikistan inherited a stockpile of antipersonnel mines that the Soviet Union stored in the republic. According to a Russian official there is no evidence that Tajikistan imported any other mines to add to the stockpile.⁵ Tajikistan is not known to have exported AP mines. In early 1999, a member of the opposition forces in Afghanistan said that Tajikistan was their main supply route for acquiring new mines.⁶

Information on the size and composition of Tajikistan's current stockpile of antipersonnel mines is not available. Most of the mines laid by the government were of

² Review of printed media of Tajikistan, at <http://www.soros.org/tajik/sigest4.7html>. Site visited 16 June 2000.

³ Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor, Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

⁴ Analytical Note by Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor, Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2000.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ 1999 interview with Deputy Military Attache, Embassy of Afghanistan, Dushanbe, Tajikistan (information contained in fax received 4 January 1999).

Soviet origin. It is unknown if the UTO received its supply of mines from outside sources or if they were obtained from Tajikistan's stockpiles. In March 2000, Tajik governmental forces discovered and seized in Adjent a hidden weapons cache with ammunition and more than 3,000 landmines.⁷

Use

Both the government and the UTO opposition were responsible for laying mines. According to the UN military observer team (UNMOT) in Tajikistan, the Tajik government used primarily Soviet PMN, PMN-2, PMD-6 and OZM antipersonnel mines. The UTO used a mix of antipersonnel and antitank mines (Italian TC-6, Pakistan P2Mk2 and Soviet PMN series), as well as booby-traps.⁸ Several CIS countries sent peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan, including Russia's Border Forces. The RBF planted antipersonnel mines along the Tajik/Afghan border.⁹

Landmine Problem

Tajikistan has a serious problem with antipersonnel landmines. In 1998 the U.S. State Department estimated that there are approximately 100,000 landmines in Tajikistan,¹⁰ and the UN Mine Action Service estimated the total at 200,000.¹¹ The United Nations carried out assessment missions in Tajikistan in 1996 and 1997. The 1997 mission concluded that the landmine problem in Tajikistan was not as severe as originally thought, and recommended moving ahead with a mine action plan and mine action center, but on a reduced scale.¹²

The major areas affected by landmines are the central Tavildara region, the Garm Valley, Khalaikhum, and the border with Afghanistan. Currently the most problematic areas in terms of landmines are Pyangi, where a number of mine incidents with border servicemen and children have been recently reported¹³ and Moskovsky district where during the active phase of the conflict the number of refugees and displaced people

⁷ Interview with Imed Barakhanov, General Director of the "Asia Plus" Information Agency (based in Dushanbe, Tajikistan), in Bishek, Kyrgyzstan, 16 March 2000.

⁸ Country Report: Tajikistan, United Nations, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/tajikist.htm>.

⁹ Ibid. See also, L. Medlev and L. Gavaza "Sappers Are Needed By All Power-Enforcement Ministries," *Armeysky Sbornik* (magazine), Issue No. 1, 1999; Statement of A.V. Nizhalovsky Deputy Chief Commander of Engineer Forces, at the Moscow Landmine Conference "New Steps To A Mine-Free Future," 28 May 1998; and Landmines: Outlook from Russia, IPPNW-Russia interim report, 1999. Shortly after an assault on a border post against Russian units of the MoD and the Federal Border Service, taking part in limited peacekeeping operations for Tajikistan, mines were deployed to protect strategic sites and facilities, parts of the Tajik-Afghan border, military depots and to block and isolate rebel forces and cut off possible routes through the border area. OAM-72, PMN-2 and PFM-1S mines were used.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, (Washington, D.C., September 1998), p. A2.

¹¹ UNMAS Working Document: Mine Action Profiles, 15 November 1998.

¹² United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs Interoffice Memorandum, on the Concept for Mine Action in Tajikistan, 10 October 1997.

¹³ Interview with Imed Barakhanov, General Director of the "Asia Plus" Information Agency, 16 March 2000.

reached one million.¹⁴ The mined areas are not generally well marked. (See also *LM Report 1999*, pp. 816-817.)

Mine Action

There are no humanitarian mine clearance programs underway in Tajikistan. The 1996 UN assessment mission estimated that it would cost \$736,425 to demine areas where civilians and UN and aid workers were at risk.¹⁵

The Tajik governmental forces take steps to demine territories that they deem no longer necessary to be protected with landmines. Russian peacekeepers in Tajikistan have found and destroyed more than 21,000 landmines and UXOs.¹⁶

In July of 1999, U.S. military representatives met with Tajik government officials to explore ways in which the United States might help the country. The U.S. proposed that it provide experts to assist with mine clearance in the eastern regions of the country where the fighting had taken place.¹⁷

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has implemented mine awareness programs. The ICRC set up a data collection system to try to gather more detailed information about the whereabouts of landmines, and printed leaflets in Russian and Tajik, which alerted people returning to their homes about the possible presence of landmines.¹⁸

Landmine Casualties and Victim Assistance

Civilians and military personnel have been killed and injured by landmines, though it is very difficult to get information regarding casualties. The remote geography and poor medical facilities mean that it is likely that most mine casualties go unreported. From 1992 through July 1997 only twenty mine incidents were reported to the ICRC. The number of victims has been recently increased up to 20 mine victims annually.

TURKMENISTAN

Key developments since March 1999: Turkmenistan has not submitted its Article 7 report that was due by 27 August 1999.

Turkmenistan was the first country in Central Asia to sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It signed on 3 December 1997 and was the fourth country globally to ratify on 19 January 1998. However, it has not yet enacted national legislation implementing the

¹⁴ Interview with Nuraly Davlatov, journalist and historian, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 16 March 2000.

¹⁵ United Nations, Demining Programme Report: Tajikistan, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/program/tajikist.htm>.

¹⁶ Landmines: Outlook from Russia, IPPNW-Russia interim report, 1999.

¹⁷ "US Offers Assistance in Clearing Tajik Mines," First Channel Network, Tajik Television, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 23 July 1999.

¹⁸ International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1997.

treaty, nor has it submitted its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report that was due by 27 August 1999.

The Turkmenistan government hosted the first regional conference on landmines in Central Asia in Ashgabat in June 1997. However, Turkmenistan did not attend regional landmine meetings in Moscow in 1998, in Tbilisi in 1999, or in Minsk in 2000. The government did not send a delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique, nor has it participated in any of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings taking place in Geneva. Turkmenistan voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the ban treaty, as it had in 1997 and 1998. Turkmenistan is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Turkmenistan is not believed to have ever produced or exported landmines. Turkmenistan acknowledges that it "has a small stockpile of landmines,"¹ likely inherited from the USSR.

The government has declared that there are no uncleared landmines in Turkmenistan.² There are no reports of landmine casualties. Turkmenistan is not known to have contributed to any international mine action programs.

Landmine Monitor 2000 inquiries for new or updated information sent to Turkmenistan ministries and departments and to the Turkmenistan Embassy in Moscow have gone unanswered.

UNITED KINGDOM

Key developments since March 1999: The UK completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in October 1999. It contributed \$25.7 million to mine action in 1999/2000. The UK has served as co-chair of the SCE on Mine Clearance, and has played an important role in promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. In May 2000, the UK acknowledged participating in fifteen joint military operations involving use of AP mines over the last three years, while stressing that in no instances were UK armed forces responsible for their use. Attempts were made by Romanian and Pakistani companies to sell AP mines in the UK.

Mine Ban Policy

The UK government signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997. On 3 July 1998 a Landmines Bill was published to implement the MBT in British law and to enable the UK to ratify. The bill became the Landmines Act, receiving Royal Assent on 28 July, and the United Kingdom deposited the instrument of ratification with the United Nations on 31 July 1998.

The UK participated in the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in May 1999, with Department for International Development Minister Baroness Amos representing the government for part of the meeting. At the FMSP the UK became the co-chair for

¹ Essen Aidogdyev, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Turkmenistan to the United Nations, New York, letter to Human Rights Watch, N051/99, 18 March 1999.

² Ibid.

one year, with Mozambique, of the Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) on Mine Clearance established to take forward implementation of this aspect of the treaty. This SCE met in September 1999 and March 2000. The UK also actively participated in all the other SCE meetings.

The UK submitted its first Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report to the UN on time on 26 August 1999, covering the period from 1 March 1999 to 1 August 1999. While generally thorough, there are several gaps as described in the section below on stockpiling. The UK's second Article 7 report was submitted on 17 April 2000, covering the period from 1 August 1999 to 1 April 2000.

The UK undertook advocacy efforts through its Overseas Missions to promote the MBT in 1999 and 2000. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office wants "to see a truly universal ban on anti-personnel mines, and...shall continue to press all states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the [Ottawa] Convention as soon as possible."¹ In addition, the Department for International Development has provided funds for the Landmine Monitor initiative in 1999 and 2000. In most public statements the government has stressed the importance it attaches to the MBT and its implementation. For example, the UK was one of the eighty-five sponsors of the 1999 UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B promoting the MBT, and voted in favor of the Resolution.

The UK is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The government submitted its CCW Protocol II report as required under Article 13 and participated in the First Conference of States Parties to Protocol II in December 1999.

The UK continues to support efforts to work on a transfer ban of AP mines in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

Declaration on Joint Operations with Non-Signatories of the MBT

With its ratification of the MBT, the UK deposited a declaration with which it seeks to protect British troops from prosecution for the "mere participation in the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military activity," where non-MBT states use AP mines.² The UK Working Group has expressed concern that the language of the declaration is so broad that it effectively only prohibits the actual laying of AP mines by British troops, in what would appear to be a direct contravention of the MBT. British government explanations and clarifications have not allayed concern about the British declaration.³ This issue was described at length in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 675-678.

On 17 May 2000 the Ministry of Defence stated, "UK armed forces were involved in 15 joint operations involving the use of anti-personnel landmines over the last three

¹ Letter to UK Working Group on Landmines from Keith Vaz MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 February 2000.

² Treaty Series No. 18 (1999), Cm. 4308, March 1999.

³ See statements of Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to the House of Commons, Hansard, 10 July 1998, col. 1347 and col. 1348; Statement of the Defence Minister, Hansard, 10 July 1998, col. 1391.

years, primarily involving operations in the Balkans. However, in no instances were UK armed forces responsible for their use.”⁴

The Ministry of Defence also stated on 12 May 2000 that the UK has participated in ten joint operations and thirteen joint exercises outside the UK since 1 March 1999 with the armed forces of twenty-five non-states parties to the MBT: Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, India, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the U.S.⁵

Production

The UK has been a major past producer and developer of antipersonnel mines.⁶ There are no private companies now producing AP mines in the UK. In its Article 7 report, the status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities was described as “completed.”⁷

British firms continue to cooperate with European firms on the production or development of antivehicle mines. There is concern that the following mines, although categorized by their manufacturer as antitank, can be fitted with fuses that may enable the mine to be activated by a person, and thus have the effect of AP mines:

- Ajax-APILAS off-route antitank mine produced by Manurhin, British Aerospace Systems and Equipment, and Giat,⁸
- ARGES (Automatic Rocket Guardian with Electronic Sensor) rocket-launched antitank mine system produced in a consortium of Giat Industries, Hunting Engineering, Dynamit Nobel and Honeywell Regelsysteme,⁹
- the German AT2 antitank mine utilized in the MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System), manufactured by a consortium of European companies including the UK’s BAE Systems and Hunting Engineering.

In June 1999 details emerged of contracts between Royal Ordnance, a subsidiary of British Aerospace, and the U.S. Army. One five-year contract, worth £55 million, makes Royal Ordnance the sole supplier of RDX, an ingredient of explosive charges commonly used in the past by the U.S. in its AP mines. 40% of the RDX is to be manufactured at Bridgwater in Somerset. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the Royal Ordnance contract with the U.S. Army contained nothing to prevent the use of RDX in any future AP mine production or replenishment, although the company is said to be attempting to renegotiate the contract to achieve this.¹⁰ Although the U.S. has not renounced production, there has been no production of AP mines since 1997, nor are there any current plans for production.

⁴ Hansard, 17 May 2000, col 161W.

⁵ Hansard, 12 May 2000, col. 514W.

⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 680-682.

⁷ UK, Article 7 Report, submitted on covering 1 March 1999-1 August 1999.

⁸ Belkacem Elomari and Bruno Barillot, *Le complexe français de production des mines et systèmes associés*, (Lyon: Observatoire des Transferts d’Armements, 1997).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Jonathan Theobald, “Britain Sells Landmine Explosive to US Army,” *Independent on Sunday*, 27 June 1999, p. 1.

A briefing prepared by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in December 1998 describes “a few of the non-lethal alternatives” to AP mines, including “blunt impact” munitions, pyrotechnic stun, electric stun, entanglements, anti-traction agents, foams and malodorous agents, and acoustics. It is not yet known which UK manufacturers might be involved in the production of such alternatives. In reply to a Parliamentary question on alternatives to landmines, a UK Government Minister said, “There is no single weapon that can replace the capability previously provided by anti-personnel landmines. Work is continuing to establish how best to provide the required capability in the future, consistent with our obligations under UK and International law. Where necessary, antitank mines will continue to be used in military operations.”¹¹

Transfer

The UK was a major exporter of antipersonnel mines in the past.¹² According to the UK government, there have been no exports of AP mines from the UK since the late 1980s. Parliamentary Questions on the numbers of British mines exported since 1979 remain unanswered.

Since April 1996 there has been a moratorium on the export of all types of AP mines to all destinations.¹³ The export from the UK of all landmines and their designs has been controlled by Export of Goods (Control) Orders. Section 2(1) of the Landmines Act 1998 is now the primary UK legislation banning the production and transfer of all AP mines and their components as defined in the Act and MBT.

Imports of AP mines are now banned under the Landmines Act 1998. In addition, “HM Customs and Excise make targeted checks at import to enforce the prohibition on the importation of anti-personnel mines and components”¹⁴ (For information on past imports see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 684-685).

There were two attempted transfers of AP mines in the UK in 1999. At the Defence Systems and Equipment International (DSEi) exhibition in Chertsey, Surrey between 14 and 17 September 1999, the Romanian company Romtehnica was offering AP mines for sale (See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000--Romania* also). Three items were being offered: the MS-3 Surprise Mine, which, although re-named, is identical to the ML-3 antipersonnel mine; the MAI-75 antipersonnel mine; and the Leaping Splinter Mine (MSS). The Romtehnica sales representative made it clear to a researcher that the items were for sale. A color brochure was available for the MS-3 Surprise Mine, that

¹¹ Hansard, 9 February 1999, col. 129.

¹² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 683-684. Sources including Jane's Information Group, *Mines and Mine Clearance*, 1998, and HRW and PHR, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* indicate that British mines have been found or are held by the armed forces in the following countries: Abu Dhabi (barmine), Australia (barmine), Afghanistan (Mk &), Angola (Mk 2, Mk 5, Mk 7), Denmark (barmine), Egypt (barmine, Mk 2, Mk 5, Mk 7), Eritrea (Mk 7), Ethiopia (Mk 7), India (barmine), Jordan (barmine, Mk 5, Ranger), Kenya (barmine), Kuwait (barmine), Libya (Mk 2, Mk 5, Mk 7), Mozambique (Mk 5, No 6), Namibia (Mk 7), New Zealand (barmine), Nigeria (barmine, Ranger), Oman (Mk 7), Peru (barmine), Saudi Arabia (barmine), Somalia (Mk 2, Mk 7), Spain (barmine), Zambia (Mk 7), Zimbabwe (Mk 5, Mk 7, No 6). This list is not exhaustive.

¹³ Hansard, 22 April 1996, col. 28.

¹⁴ Hansard, 31 January 2000, col. 462W.

included technical details. Also available was a *List of Romanian Defense Industry Products* that included the Leaping Splinter Mine, and the MAI-75, that has been used widely in Angola and is clearly prohibited under both the MBT and the Landmines Act. In a Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces said:

Prior to the opening of the exhibition, my Department was in regular contact with Defence Systems and Equipment International Ltd., the private company which working closely with the Defence industry trade organisations organised the event at Chertsey. We made sure that DSEi Ltd. was fully aware of the Government's policies concerning the export of Defence equipment, and we sought and obtained from them assurances that they would require exhibitors to comply with these policies and with UK legislation, including the Landmines Act 1998.

Following allegations in the British media that a Romanian company was promoting anti-personnel landmines at DSEi, we instructed the MOD Police to investigate the matter. Separately, the Romanian authorities have contacted the MOD to explain that, in error, their company had on its stand literature, which mentioned an anti-personnel landmine. They have informed us that they stopped manufacturing this item in 1990, but that the company had not updated its equipment lists. We have received an apology from the Romanian authorities, but the MOD Police are still investigating the matter and will submit a file to the Crown Prosecution Service in due course.¹⁵

In a second incident, in November 1999, the state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) and a Pakistani official in London offered AP mines for sale to a television journalist from TV Channel 4, who was posing as a representative of a private company seeking a variety of arms. (See LM report on Pakistan also). First contact with POF was made in September 1999 at the DSEi exhibition in Surrey. POF were not asked about landmines at that time. However, at a subsequent meeting in London, a technical attaché to the Pakistan embassy in London unexpectedly also offered to sell AP mines. This meeting was filmed and shown on the Channel 4 television program *Dispatches*.¹⁶ The mines appeared in a subsequent faxed quotation from POF. They are described in detailed technical specifications accompanying the quotation as the "Mine A.P. Jumping P-7 MK2," and the "Mine anti personnel fragmentation P5A3."

In a Parliamentary Answer, a Foreign Office Minister said that "the allegation that an official at the Pakistan High Commission offered to sell anti-personnel mines has been referred to HM Customs and Excise as the appropriate law enforcement agency and I have protested strongly to the Pakistani High Commission."¹⁷ The POF stand was "reviewed by MoD officials and, at that time, no literature promoting Anti-Personnel Mines was found. No specific action was therefore required or taken to prevent the company from exhibiting brochures at DSEi99."¹⁸

¹⁵ Hansard, 3 November 1999, cols. 213-214.

¹⁶ *Dispatches*, Channel 4 Television, 9 November 1999.

¹⁷ Hansard, 10 January 2000, col. 2W.

¹⁸ Hansard, 31 January 2000, col. 462W.

The UK government has made no further announcements as to the progress of investigations into these two incidents.

A stock of 297,990 HB 876 mines was transferred to EBV Ammunition Company in Saxony, Germany, for destruction, as permitted under the MBT, which was completed on 19 October 1999.¹⁹

Stockpile and Destruction

The UK completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in October 1999. Information released by the MoD shows that, before stockpile destruction began in earnest in 1995 (even before the MBT), the UK's AP mine stockpile amounted to some 2,103,626 mines. 1,277,882 AP mines were destroyed from 1997-1999.

Prior to the MBT, the government announced that 44% of its AP mine stocks were to be destroyed, including 60% of Elsie stocks and 40% of Ranger AP mines. In addition, in May 1997, the government classified the L27 mine as an AP mine because it is activated by a breakwire, and withdrew the mine from service.²⁰ The majority of stocks were destroyed by incineration. In 1997 the cost of destroying the stockpiles was expected to be \$8.2 million (£5 million).²¹

The UK government announced in October 1999 that "the UK no longer stores any operational anti-personnel mines. The last of the Army's operational stocks of APMs were destroyed on 22 February this year [1999]. The destruction program for the last of the RAF's operational stocks of APMs – the HB 876 sub-munition for the JP233 weapon system – was completed on 19 October 1999."²² The HB876 were destroyed by thermal disposal by a contractor in Germany. In a Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question, the Secretary of State for Defence announced that no AP mines are held by the Royal Navy or Special Forces. The Defence Minister described the stockpile destruction as "accelerated to demonstrate to the world the UK's clear and unequivocal commitment to the MBT."²³

The government announced in April 1998 that the UK would "retain about 4,000 anti-personnel landmines, less than half of one per cent of current stocks, in order to be able to carry out training in demining."²⁴ The relevant section of the first Article 7 report stated that in addition to 3,578 AP mines of UK and Canadian origin, in August 1999 "the UK held 859 APMs of foreign manufacture for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques."²⁵ Additional non-UK AP mines were transferred to the UK between August 1999 and April 2000, making a total of 4,519 mines retained at the time of the second Article 7 report (as of 1 April 2000). UK forces also possess "inert" AP mines, that are designed for training purposes, as UK forces do not use live mines for training. The UKWGL has pointed out that, in the

¹⁹ Hansard, 25 October 1999, col. 695.

²⁰ Mines Advisory Group, "UK Landmine Stockpiles," February 1998.

²¹ Hansard, 10 July 1998, col. 1369.

²² Hansard, 25 October 1999, col. 695.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to UK Working Group on Landmines, 27 April 1998.

²⁵ MBT Article 7 Report, submitted 26 August 1999, covering 1 March 1999-1 August 1999.

light of this, and the training possibilities for UK forces posted overseas in carrying out humanitarian mine clearance, the retention of stocks for training appears unnecessary. Instead, the MoD stresses the retention of AP mines is for the development of mine detection, clearance or destruction techniques.

UK mine stockpiles and mines retained under Article 3 of the MBT

Mines and Ministry of Defence classification	Stockpile ²⁶
C3A1 Elsie anti-personnel (AP) blast mine	- Pre-1995: 581,364 - 1995-96: 207,107 - 1996-97: 100,844 - August 1999: 1,056 retained
L10A1 Ranger AP blast mine	- Pre-1995: 1,517,184 - 1997-98: 879,048 - August 1999: 2,088 retained
HB876 AP mine bomblets contained in JP233 runway denial weapon	- March 1999: 297,990 - October 1999: 434 "inert training shapes" retained
M86 Pursuit Deterrent Munition	- Pre-1993: 204 - October 1999: 0
Various AP mines of foreign manufacture.	- August 1999: 859 - April 2000: 1,375 retained
L1E1 Projector Area Defense (PJRAD) AP fragmentation mine	Stock not known – not considered AP mines by MoD
M18A1 Claymore AP fragmentation mine	Total stock held: not known – not classified by the MoD as a mine when in command detonated mode.

While the UK Article 7 reports appear to provide most of the information required by the treaty, there are several gaps. First, there is no information given on the technical characteristics of a number of British mines (most of which are found in minefields in Africa). Although technical characteristics of Canadian-produced Elsie mines are given, there is no information on other AP mines still possessed by the UK that were manufactured overseas. Also, no information is given about Claymores or PJRADs. While information on command detonated mines is not required under the Treaty, the ICBL has urged governments to provide such information in the spirit of transparency which has been a hallmark of the Ottawa Process. In particular, information about tripwire destruction and adaptation of mines to make them unable to be activated by tripwires is requested.

The UK Government does not consider Claymores or PJRADs to be AP mines because they are to be used in command detonated mode only. Asked about Claymore mines, MoD officials stated that all tripwire mechanisms for Claymore mines have been withdrawn, instruction has been amended to reflect the MBT, and soldiers are taught that

²⁶ Ibid; Hansard, 25 October 1999, col. 695.

the use of Claymores in tripwire mode is illegal. It is not known whether the tripwires have been destroyed.²⁷ Additionally, there is no specific indication that the Claymore mines have been *physically* adapted (by closing the second fuse well for tripwire activation) to prevent use in the victim-actuated mode. The PJRAD was understood to remain in service in Northern Ireland at least until mid-1998.

Antivehicle mines

During discussions at the SCE meeting on the General Status and Operation of the MBT in January 2000, nine states parties restated that under the treaty's definitions and provisions, antivehicle mines (AVMs) with antihandling devices (AHDs) that can be activated by the unintentional act of a person are banned by the MBT. This is based on what was negotiated in Oslo in September 1997, when the treaty text was finalized by consensus (including the UK government) to exempt from prohibition only those antihandling devices, which activate "when an *attempt* is made to tamper with or otherwise *intentionally* disturb the mine."²⁸ It was proposed at the January SCE to set up an informal, expert group to examine the AVM/AHD issue. Only the UK delegation publicly opposed this proposal, and by May 2000 no consensus had been achieved on the establishment of such a group.

At the May 2000 SCE on the General Status of the Convention, the UK delegation stated that the UK had a different understanding of the words in the Convention than that expressed by other States Parties, but supported a proposal by the ICRC to hold consultations on this issue of AVMs and AHDs in early 2001.

Although the UK acknowledges that some very sensitive antidisturbance devices do exist, the MoD argues that these are not found in UK stocks. According to Parliamentary statements, "All UK weapons systems have been checked for compliance with the provisions of the MBT. There are no weapons or munitions in the UK inventory which fall under the Ottawa definition of an antipersonnel mine."²⁹ The UK argues that it is problematic to try to distinguish between intentional and unintentional acts that cause a mine to detonate. Although the MoD is concerned about potential humanitarian problems, AVMs are not considered to be a cause of these.³⁰

The UKWGL is concerned that the antivehicle mines in the following chart may have features that could cause them to explode from an unintentional act of a person, thus functioning as antipersonnel mines.

²⁷ Interview with Ministry of Defence officials, 8 May 2000.

²⁸ Mine Ban Treaty, Article 2.3 (emphasis added).

²⁹ Hansard, 19 October 1999, col.420.

³⁰ Interview with MoD officials, 8 May 2000. Remarks of the UK delegation at the SCE on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 29 May 2000.

UK Antivehicle mines with antihandling devices

Mk 7 antitank (AT) blast mine Can be used with tilt rod fuse.	Total stock held: not known. To be phased out in 2000/01.
L27A1 Off Route AT blast mine Classified anti-personnel because it is activated by breakwire, and withdrawn from service.	1995-96: 4,874 1997: 4,870 October 1999: 0
Barmine pressure operated AT blast mine Has three add-on fuse options including Anti Disturbance Double Impulse (ADDI) fuse (detonates mine when it is rotated about its longitudinal axis); and the Full Width Attack Mine Electronic (FWAM (E)) fuse, with a seismic and magnetic sensor.	Total stock held: not known.
AT2 AT shaped charge mine (scatterable) Contains integral antihandling device. Designed to self-destruct after a maximum four days.	Total stock held: estimated 100,000
Shielder Vehicle Launched Scatterable Mine System L35A1 AT mines with full width attack magnetic influence fuses L35A1 are designed to self-destruct after a maximum fifteen days. They contain no integral antihandling device, but moving the mine through the earth's magnetic field will cause it to detonate.	Total stock held: minimum 63,300 L35A1 mines

Foreign stockpiles on UK territory

In written answers to questions put to a Foreign Office Minister of State, the government stated that "NATO itself does not have stocks of APL. There are no US stocks in Britain. The question of transit is being looked at carefully by legal advisers." In addition, a Ministry of Defence statement said, "There are no anti-personnel mines as defined under the MBT stocked by other governments or their armed forces, or on behalf of other governments and their armed forces, in the UK."³¹ Allies who "have forces stationed in the UK are well aware of the MBT's obligations which include the prohibition of the stockpiling of APMs on UK territory."³² Also, according to the government, the UK holds no stocks of AP mines outside UK territories.³³

Official U.S. sources have indicated that the U.S. has stored AP mines at Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean some 1,000 miles southwest of India, governed by a Foreign Office commissioner, that now houses only military personnel. Information obtained in the U.S. suggests that as of 1997 more than 10,000 Gator, Volcano and

³¹ Hansard, 24 January 2000, col. WA168.

³² Hansard, 8 December 1999, col. 559W.

³³ Hansard, 20 March 1998, col. 746.

MOPMS mines were held at Diego Garcia.³⁴ The UK Article 7 report makes no mention of these U.S. mines. In March 2000 the UK Government gave the following response to a request for a statement about the storage of AP mines at Diego Garcia:

“The 1966 Exchange of Notes between the UK and the USA concerning the availability of the British Indian Ocean Territory for Defence purposes provides for the Territory to remain available to meet the Defence needs of both Governments, while remaining under UK sovereignty. There are no US APM on Diego Garcia. We understand that the US stores munitions of various kinds on US warships anchored off Diego Garcia. Such vessels enjoy state immunity and are therefore outside the UK’s jurisdiction and control. The US understands the importance we attach to their adherence to the Ottawa Convention as soon as possible.”³⁵

Mine Action Funding³⁶

The UK contributed \$25.7 million to mine action in 1999/2000, a very significant increase on previous years. This included \$9.6 million spent on mine action in Kosovo. From 1993 through 1999, the UK government had spent about \$43 million on humanitarian mine action.³⁷ Between 1992-1996, it also indirectly funded mine clearance through the European Community, with contributions of \$17.7 million (£ 10.87m.)³⁸ and another \$8.8 million (£ 5.4m.) in 1998.³⁹ In addition, \$15.7 million (£ 9.6m.) for humanitarian mine clearance was contributed through various UN funds and programs between 1992 and November 1998, and more than \$28.7 million (£ 17.6m.) in the same period to NGOs.

The only known funding to assist other countries with stockpile destruction is \$24-27 million (£ 15-17m.); this MoD expenditure is to destroy Saudi Arabian stocks of HB876 weapons, and replace them with one hundred Paveway 3 bombs.⁴⁰

Nearly \$31 million of UK mine action spending, or 72% of funding, went to equipment and mine clearance activities.

³⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 328-334.

³⁵ Hansard, 6 March 2000, col. 504W.

³⁶ For a more detailed breakdown of past funding described in the first paragraphs of this section, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 689-695. This includes breakdown by country, also by activity. For even more detail, more tables are available from UKWGLM or Landmine Monitor. See also see information supplied by DFID to UNMAS Mine Action Investments database.

³⁷ UNMAS Mine Action Investment database.

³⁸ Paul Bowers and Tom Dodd, *Anti-personnel mines and the policies of two British Governments*, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal, February 1998, p. 17.

³⁹ Department for International Development, *Humanitarian mine action, a progress report*, (London: DFID, February 1999), p.7.

⁴⁰ Hansard, 15 March 1999, col. 506.

UK Government grants by activity (US\$)⁴¹

Activity	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
Advocacy & Prevention: Campaign Support	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$320,000	\$0	\$320,000
Coordination: Mine Action Center Core Support	424,791	0	840,000	0	0	757,200	2,021,991
Information: Evaluation/ Lessons Learned	24,504	0	0	0	0	0	24,504
Information: General/ Unspecified	0	56,636	34,945	0	0	0	91,581
Information: Surveys	1,155,308	1,605,712	77,344	0	0	0	2,838,364
Mine Awareness: Education	0	727,017	237,291	101,250	480,000	0	1,545,558
Mine Awareness: General/ Unspecified	0	24,368	24,000	3,211,027	1,004,241	0	4,263,636
Mine Awareness: Training	0	0	88,000	0	0	0	88,000
Mine Clearance: Demining	3,730,148	4,482,190	893,920	2,075,497	3,816,908	8,209,954	23,208,617
Mine Clearance: Equipment	0	0	406,435	38,600	0	0	445,035
Mine Clearance: General/ Unspecified	800,000	0	1,640,000	31,604	48,000	128,000	2,647,604
Mine Clearance: Training	208,000	0	2,056,000	1,194,047	1,184,000	0	4,642,047
R&D: Equipment Development	167,884	0	0	357,588	160,000	0	685,472
R&D: Studies	0	0	0	31,604	193,600	0	225,204
R&D: Testing	0	0	0	174,883	0	0	174,883
Year Total:	\$6,510,635	\$6,895,923	\$6,297,935	\$7,216,100	\$7,206,749	\$9,095,154	\$43,222,496

⁴¹ Information supplied by DFID to UNMAS Mine Action Investments database.

Since 1997, the Department for International Development (DFID) has funded mine and UXO clearance in Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Northern Iraq, Jordan, Lao, Mozambique and Yugoslavia (Kosovo). In 1998, surplus equipment valued at £375,000 (\$611,250) was donated by the UK Government for mine clearance.⁴² In June 1999, the government committed more than US\$ 9 million for humanitarian mine clearance in Kosovo. The Secretary of State for International Development announced, "As part of the Government's recently announced package of £50 million for humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance for Kosovo, £5 million has been allocated for mine clearance and mine awareness education. We have provided grants and practical assistance for UN Mines [Action] Service (co-ordination and oversight), Halo Trust (region wide survey), and clearance teams from Mines [Advisory] Group."⁴³

An update in July 1999 confirmed that DFID funded twelve emergency clearance teams, including MAG, Halo Trust, Defence Systems Limited (DSL), BACTEC, and Greenfield Consultants. Mines awareness training was also funded, through UNICEF. This was the first time that resources made available by DFID went to commercial mine clearance.

Two Aardvark Mk II Flail Units were donated by DFID to Jordan in September 1999, a package of assistance including funding for training personnel and essential maintenance equipment valued at £500,000 (\$800,000).⁴⁴ A further donation of sixty-six surplus military vehicles, consisting of earth-moving plant and administrative vehicles, was made to Halo and MAG on 5 April 2000.⁴⁵

MoD funded activity since 1992 has taken place in Bosnia, and more recently UK military personnel have been attached to the Mine Action Center in Kosovo, in the Falklands/Malvinas, the UK's Mine Information and Technology Center, the UN Mine Action Service in New York and at the Geneva Center for International Humanitarian Demining. In total, fifty-nine personnel, about 14% of trained EOD specialists, were "involved in, or training for, mine clearance operations."⁴⁶ The majority, forty-six, were a part of the Bosnia Stabilization Force. More recently, four teams of EOD personnel have been based in Kosovo, where they undertake "demining tasks in support of KFOR operations, although they have also responded positively to local requests to clear unexploded ordnance where there was a pressing humanitarian need."⁴⁷

⁴² Hansard, 9 March 1998, col. 11.

⁴³ Hansard, 22 June 1999, col. 344.

⁴⁴ DFID Press Release, 1 September 1999.

⁴⁵ Ministry of Defence Press Release, 5 April 2000.

⁴⁶ Hansard, 4 March 1999, col. 869.

⁴⁷ Hansard, 6 March 2000, col. 498W.

Funding for mine action: recipient countries⁴⁸

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
Afghanistan	\$1,956,939	\$2,760,000	\$1,640,000	\$3,200,000	\$1,744,000	\$0	\$11,300,939
Angola	1,516,954	485,712	0	0	0	0	2,002,666
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	24,368	24,000	0	0	0	48,368
Cambodia	1,109,478	2,088,590	1,693,920	1,103,497	2,611,659	0	8,607,144
Egypt	0	0	800,000	139,692	0	0	939,692
Georgia	0	0	0	192,000	161,249	0	353,249
Iraq	24,504	0	1,256,000	1,054,355	1,184,000	0	3,518,859
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0	727,017	237,291	101,250	528,000	0	1,593,558
Mozambique	663,731	753,600	0	780,000	580,000	0	2,777,331
Rwanda	48,000	0	0	0	0	0	48,000
Yemen	160,000	0	78,435	0	0	0	238,435
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of	0	0	440,000	0	0	9,095,154	9,535,154
Mine Action Information*	63,145	56,636	34,945	42,631	44,241	0	241,598
Mine Clearance*	800,000	0	16,000	242,385	0	0	1,058,385
Monitoring and Compliance*	0	0	0	31,604	193,600	0	225,204
Research and Development*	167,884	0	77,344	328,686	160,000	0	733,914
Year Total:	\$6,510,635	\$6,895,923	\$6,297,935	\$7,216,100	\$7,206,749	\$9,095,154	\$43,222,496

(* Not Country or Region Specific)

⁴⁸ Mine Action Investments Database, June 2000.

Planned expenditure⁴⁹

At the time of writing, the UK had also published plans to provide support for regional, multilateral or thematic programs amounting to \$7,811,200 up to 2002. This includes research and development projects, advice, monitoring, advocacy and information, as well as DFID participation in conferences. Confirmed country-specific spending on the \$7.8 million for the period ending 2002 and the programs this will support are as follows:

Afghanistan: demining in Kabul and Shomali for resettlement; UNOCHA Mine Action Program.

Albania: EOD protective clothing and clearance of unexploded ordnance which pose a civilian threat; jointly supporting clearance by Albanian armed forces through NATO/EODASTT; protective clothing for two clearance teams.

Cambodia: evaluation of Pearson tractor as a mechanical tool for demining; Halo Trust Demining – Humanitarian Mine Action Banteay Meanchay, Oddar Meanchay and Siem Riep for resettlement and improved access for rural communities; Mines Advisory Group – Battambang Province – humanitarian demining for resettlement and improved access for rural communities; MAG – continuation of mine clearance activities in western Cambodia in support of post-conflict resettlement from 1 April 2000-31 March 2001; contribution to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) with UNDP Trust Fund.

Croatia: to support the United Nations Mine Action Awareness Program through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund.

Georgia: Halo Trust Mine/UXO clearance and national capacity building in Abkhazia.

Guinea-Bissau: HUMAID – To clear unexploded ordnance in Bissau.

Northern Iraq: MAG - Integrated mine/UXO program to reduce impact on rural communities and develop regional mine action capacity.

Jordan: mine clearance – procurement of mine clearance equipment for Jordan Valley project; to improve efficiency and safety of humanitarian mine clearance in the Jordan Valley.

Laos: MAG – UXO/mine clearance in Saravanne Province.

Sierra Leone: mine awareness assessment.

Thailand: To quantify to international standard the impact of landmines and UXO on communities

Kosovo: UN Mine Action Center Deputy Program Manager to assist in the work of UNMACC and the implementation of the work plan for UXO clearance throughout 2000; equipment for MAG mine clearance (Mitrovica); to improve efficiency of UN mine action.

Spending on mine action programs in the UK

The Ministry of Defence monitors and maintains the minefields in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, as well as maintaining the presence of an Explosives Ordnance Disposal Response Team. The Department currently spends approximately £3 million

⁴⁹ Ibid.

(\$4.9 million) per annum on research into countermine technologies, although the MoD's remit is to fund research only into military demining, rather than humanitarian mine clearance. Ministers have stated that this funding has increased significantly over the past three years and is expected to remain high for the next five years at least. The MoD is researching sensors and countermine technologies, including (since May 1997) "ground penetrating radar, polarized thermal imaging, metal detection, quadropole resonance, ultra-wide band radar, and ultra-wide band synthetic aperture radar," for military demining. Spending on the latter is approximately \$624,000 (£390,000) to date. In addition, research is being carried out on technology for neutralization of mines for military purposes, including "projectile attack, shaped charge attack, lasers, pyrotechnic torch, disruptors and mechanical extraction."⁵⁰

A new Mine Information and Technology Center at the Royal Engineers Battlefield Engineering Wing, at Minley in Surrey, was also established in November 1997; this provides information on demining operations and offers mines awareness training to both military and civilian personnel in the UK. The additional annual cost to the defense budget is \$203,750 (£ 125,000).⁵¹

The Department for International Development (DFID) funds R&D of new technologies to improve the safety, efficiency and speed of humanitarian mine clearance. This source of support for R&D has been small in scale until recent years. However, it amounted to 9.3% of DFID spending allocated to humanitarian mine action in 1998-99. DFID contributed \$326,000 (£ 200,000) towards EC trials for a multi-sensor system.⁵² In addition, funding has been made available for assessment trials of prototypes and full field trials of equipment for AP mine detection and clearance, preliminary vegetation clearance, operator safety tests and studies to improve the effectiveness of UN-managed operations.⁵³ DFID has invited proposals from UK-based organizations for new mine clearance and detection technology, under a Humanitarian Mine Action Knowledge Generation and Research Program. The MoD's Defence Evaluation and Research Agency is also evaluating mine detection technology for humanitarian demining.

⁵⁰ Hansard, 11 February 2000, col. 345W.

⁵¹ Bowers and Dodd, *Anti-personnel mines and the policies of two British Governments*, RUSI Journal, February 1998.

⁵² Hansard, 2 March 1999, col. 681.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

Planned expenditure on research and development

Planned Expenditure (US\$)	Program Description	Years
\$208,000	Advice and services on demining technology. DFID requires specialist advice and services on aspects of demining technology from time to time for specific self-contained tasks.	1999 - 2000
\$640,000	Mine Action Knowledge Generation and Research - DFID funding the development, testing and evaluation of demining techniques and equipment designed to employ these techniques.	1999 - 2002
\$49,600	Testing of protective boots for mine clearance. DFID contribution for phase 1 of testing by AIGIS.	1999 - 1999
\$160,000	Defense Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) field trials of Redbus Landmine Disposal System (LMDS) M1. To undertake field trials to assess the effectiveness of the Redbus Landmine Disposal System (prototype).	2000 - 2000
\$104,000	Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining: To provide the secondment of Assistant Project Manager (Technology).	2000 - 2002

Funding for Survivor Assistance

DFID does not specify funding allocated for mine survivors, instead providing support for "health care and community-based rehabilitation assistance...through DFID's bilateral development co-operation Programs or institutional Program support. The financial records do not disaggregate assistance to land mine survivors from other categories of special needs."⁵⁴ In January 1999, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, set up to commemorate the Princess of Wales and to support causes with which she was associated, donated £1,055,225 (\$1.7 million) to thirteen charitable organizations working with landmine survivors. These grants are to address "the problems of people and communities who have been physically, mentally and economically affected by landmines."⁵⁵ A further £1 million (\$1.6 million) was awarded to landmine projects in August 1999, including funding for the Cambodia Trust, the Halo Trust, MAG, Sandy Gall's Afghanistan Appeal, and the UK Working Group on Landmines; projects supported include mine clearance, advocacy and victim assistance.⁵⁶

Landmine Problem

Most of the UK, and territories currently under its administrative authority, are not significantly mine- or UXO-affected. There is, however, a problem in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, where AP mines, including remotely-delivered mines, were

⁵⁴ Hansard, 25 October 1999, col. 709.

⁵⁵ Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund press release, 12 January 1999.

⁵⁶ Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund press release, 2 August 1999.

used by British and Argentine forces in the war of 1982 (See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*—Falklands/Malvinas). Because of the lack of civilian casualties the government has considered the Falklands/Malvinas a low priority for demining. Argentina offered funding for the clearance of landmines in December 1993, an offer that was welcomed by the UK Government. Recent statements indicate that negotiations between the UK and Argentina are continuing.

SIGNATORIES

CYPRUS

Key developments since March 1999: In November 1999, the United Nations reported military construction along both sides of the cease-fire line, including minefield refurbishment.

Mine Ban Policy

When the Republic of Cyprus signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 in Ottawa, the Cypriot delegate linked this with his government's desire "to reduce tension and promote mutual confidence" on the divided and heavily mined island.¹ But the government has not yet ratified the treaty.

In December 1999, the government reported to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe that it "fully subscribes to the principles enshrined in the [Mine Ban Treaty], the ratification of which will take place as soon as conditions relating to the implementation of its relevant provisions are fulfilled."² Those conditions have not been specified, nor has an expected date of ratification has been indicated.³ More disturbingly, in May 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that, for security reasons, it is the intention of the Cyprus to "keep landmines until we have to remove them."⁴

The United Nations reported in November 1999 that "military construction along the cease-fire lines continued on both sides, including minefield refurbishment...."⁵ It is not known if the refurbishment included both antitank and antipersonnel mines. A military official said that "the Greek Cypriot army do not have the armed forces to convert from a defensive to an offensive position. The doctrine of our armed forces is defensive, mines are part of our defensive weapons."⁶ Likewise, a Turkish Cypriot leader stated that "security is a vital issue, landmines do not exist in a vacuum, they are a manifestation of conflict."⁷

Cyprus attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique, in May 1999, but did not make a statement to the plenary. It has

¹ Statement by Ambassador Alecos Shambos, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Mine Ban Treaty Signing Conference, Ottawa, Canada, 4 December 1997.

² Report of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cyprus to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 9 December 1999, p. 2.

³ The OSCE report of 9 December contains no specific information on conditions; the information was not forthcoming when requested in May 2000 in an interview with Taffos Tzonis, Director of Political Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 5 May 2000.

⁴ Interview with Taffos Tzonis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 May 2000.

⁵ "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus for the period 10 June to 29 November 1999," document S/1999/1203, 29 November 1999, available at: www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999.

⁶ Interview with unnamed army official, Greek Cypriot National Guard, Nicosia, 5 May 2000.

⁷ Interview with Osman Ertug, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, TRNC, Nicosia, 4 May 2000.

not participated in any of the intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. It voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999 supporting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had with the other pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.

Cyprus is a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, but has not ratified the Amended Protocol II on landmines. Cyprus has applied to become a member of the Conference on Disarmament but is at present an observer, and is "...fully committed to all international efforts for disarmament ... including naturally anti-personnel land mines."⁸

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

The Republic of Cyprus has reported that it "neither produces nor transfers anti-personnel landmines. It has not however adopted legislation or taken any specific measures regarding the use, production, storage, transfer and destruction of anti-personnel landmines. No moratorium has been introduced."⁹ There appears to be no information on stockpiles of mines, other than an acknowledgement that Cyprus does currently possess stockpiles.¹⁰ The Turkish Cypriots will divulge no information on mine production, transfer, stockpiles or use.¹¹

Use and Landmine Problem

The buffer zone created in 1974 along the cease-fire line extends approximately 180 kilometers across the island. Many parts of the buffer zone, as well as areas outside of the buffer zone on both sides, were mined by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces. Unofficial sources within the Greek Cypriot army gave an informal estimate recently that there are approximately 10,000 landmines laid on the Greek Cypriot side of the buffer zone.¹²

The UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) monitors the cease-fire, maintains the buffer zone and has military responsibility for all activities inside it. Most information on minefields was gathered during the initial period following the conflict in 1974, and has been updated since then, based mainly on sightings by UN personnel. The first survey was not conducted until 1989 when Canada proposed clearance of most minefields inside the buffer zone. This project was stopped due to objections from the Turkish side.¹³

The UNFICYP Minefield Records Officer stated that "mine laying patterns and the exact number and types of mines in minefields inside the buffer zone are not known to

⁸ Report to the OSCE, 9 December 1999, p. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.* The US government has identified Cyprus as a past producer. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 704.

¹⁰ Interview with unnamed army official, Greek Cypriot National Guard, Nicosia, 5 May 2000.

¹¹ Interview with Osman Ertug, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, TRNC, 4 May 2000.

¹² Interview with unnamed army official, Greek Cypriot National Guard, Nicosia, 5 May 2000. *Landmine Monitor 1999*, p. 705, reported 7,976 AP mines, and 16,942 total mines, citing UN sources.

¹³ "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus for the period for the period 1 June to 30 November 1991," document S/23263, 30 November 1991.

UNFICYP as UNFICYP is not mandated to investigate the contents of minefields.”¹⁴ However, UNFICYP is carrying out a new administrative survey, analyzing all documents, statements, photographs, sketches and accident reports. Its intention is to have the most updated and accurate information on minefield location and layout inside the buffer zone as possible, so that if mine clearance is agreed in the future, UNFICYP will have all the necessary information.

It was recorded previously that there are thirty-eight known minefields inside the buffer zone, which has now been updated to forty-eight minefields; the previous total of seventy-three minefields within 400 meters of the buffer zone has now been updated to seventy-five.¹⁵ It is expected that this data will continue to change. The following types of antipersonnel mines have been recorded from sightings inside the buffer zone: U.S. M2, M2A4, M14, M16, and M16A2.¹⁶

UNFICYP has military control of the buffer zone and maintains observation of it. Military personnel from either side who have entered the buffer zone are requested to leave. As a result, minefields inside the buffer zone are not believed to have been maintained or “refreshed” since being laid in 1974, and therefore are likely to be highly dangerous. They are clearly marked.

Outside the buffer zone, UNFICYP involvement with mine-related issues is dealt with by liaison officers who contact the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Front. Maintenance and “refreshment” of minefields in Greek Cypriot territory has been observed, and may be assumed to have occurred also on the Turkish Cypriot side of the buffer zone. The UN reported in November 1999 that “military construction along the cease-fire lines continued on both sides, including minefield refurbishment and the construction of anti-tank ditches by the National Guard.”¹⁷

The mandate of UNFICYP has to be renewed every six months, with the agreement of both parties, and results in biannual reports by the UN Secretary-General. In May/June 2000 the Republic of Cyprus initially refused to renew the UN mandate, but it has been renewed.

Minefield Marking/Awareness

UNFICYP follows NATO standard military procedure with regard to mine warning signs, and minefields within the buffer zone are adequately marked. During peacetime UNFICYP soldiers are mandated to stay 1,000 meters away from signs that indicate a minefield.¹⁸ Members of UNFICYP are trained in mine awareness before they begin their tour of duty in Cyprus. The following procedures apply: “Sometimes there is work carried out on minefields that are close to the buffer zone. When the work is to be carried out by either side close to the buffer zone the UN is to be advised and a 1,000-meter

¹⁴ Interview with Captain J. J. Simon, Mine Fields Records Officer, UNFICYP, Nicosia, 3 May 2000.

¹⁵ Telephone interview with Captain Simon, 27 June 2000. Also, email from Minefield Records Officer, 26 July 2000.

¹⁶ Ibid. *Landmine Monitor 1999*, citing UN sources, also listed U.S. M2A3, British Mark 2, and Russian PMD-6 and PMD-7TS AP mines. P. 705.

¹⁷ “Report of the Secretary-General,” document S/1999/1203, 29 November 1999.

¹⁸ Interview with Captain Simon, UNFICYP, 3 May 2000.

security zone (for anti-tank mines) is placed around the work areas to protect the UN soldier from an accident.”¹⁹ All soldiers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard receive training in mine awareness.

Mine Clearance

In the Greek Cypriot National Guard one unit is trained in demining. Defense Minister Yiannakis Chrysostomis stated, “The methods used by the National Guard are those internationally recommended and used by most NATO countries.”²⁰ However, House Defense Committee member Marios Matsakis is quoted as saying that “the army did not have the specialised equipment to remove primitive mines and that, despite recommendations from the House, the National Guard had failed to purchase the necessary equipment to clear decades-old rusty land mines.”²¹

Despite strong statements about the continuing necessity of landmines for defense, a military official has stated that Cyprus has dealt with the issue of demining from a humanitarian as well as military perspective: “Since 1973 the Greek Cypriot army have destroyed lots of mines from places where the army considers are not strategic to defense. The Greek Cypriot army are planning to begin procedures for demining certain areas for humanitarian reasons.”²²

Inside the buffer zone, “UNFICYP is the given authority.... Its task is among other things to maintain the status quo. Only with the consent of both parties will the status quo be changed, and only if it is beneficial to the reduction of tension/a solution to the Cyprus Problem. UNFICYP would like to see all mines lifted, but not if this means tension would rise.”²³ UNFICYP “does not itself undertake demining in the buffer zone, except where this is required to ensure the safety of its own troops, or in the event of a humanitarian emergency. In such cases, it would only be able to respond with demining resources obtained from organisations outside UNFICYP.”²⁴

The UN Security Council has made numerous resolutions on the demining of land inside the buffer zone. Requests made by UNFICYP to both sides regarding demining and responses to these requests are noted biannually in the Secretary General’s reports to the Security Council; all references to date report a lack of progress on this issue. UNFICYP has also requested specific information from both sides on the location of minefields in and around the buffer zone, with the following result: The Greek Cypriot “National Guard has stated its readiness to hand over minefield records provided that the other side does the same. The military authorities in the north indicated that they would be ready to negotiate the minefield issue with UNFICYP immediately following

¹⁹ Letter from Jim Prudhomme, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 22 May 2000.

²⁰ Charlie Charalambous, “Interview with Defense Minister Yiannakis Chrysostomis,” *Cyprus Mail*, 24 March 1999.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Interview with unnamed army official, Greek Cypriot National Guard, Nicosia, 5 May 2000.

²³ Email from Major Paul Kolken, Military Public Information Officer, UNFICYP, 16 May 2000.

²⁴ Letter from Jim Prudhomme, UNMAS, 22 May 2000.

agreement on the UNFICYP package of measures to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines.”²⁵

In May 2000, the Turkish Cypriots repeated their earlier position that they will only deal with the issue of demining within the context of the 1996 further de-confrontation measures put forward by UNFICYP and “when this package is accepted we can discuss the issue of demining.”²⁶ In June 1999, the Security Council again called upon “both sides to take measures that will build trust and cooperation and reduce tensions between the two sides including demining along the buffer zone.”²⁷ The Secretary-General’s report of 29 November 1999 noted no significant developments on demining.²⁸ However, recently the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it has been “re-examining the whole issue and will come up with new proposals for demining inside the buffer zone.”²⁹

Mine Casualties

The UNFICYP Mine Fields Record Officer indicated that there have been no civilian or military casualties as a result of landmines in the buffer zone in the last year.³⁰ In Greek Cypriot territory there have been no civilian mine casualties in the last year, but one military casualty: a National Guardsman was killed instantly when an antitank mine exploded in front of him during a demining operation in Potamia village south of Nicosia.³¹ A Turkish Cypriot official stated: “There are no and have been no civilian casualties as a result of mines in the north of Cyprus. Landmines are not a humanitarian risk, the issues of landmines are dealt with within the military context, not the humanitarian context.”³²

GREECE

Mine Ban Policy

Greece signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 4 December 1997, but has yet to ratify it. In December 1999, in its report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the government reiterated its position as outlined in Ottawa when

²⁵ “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the period 8 December 1997 to 8 June 1998,” document S/1998/488, 10 June 1998; available at: www.un.org/documents/repesc.htm.

²⁶ Interview with Osman Ertug, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, TRNC, 4 May 2000.

²⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1251 (1999), 29 June 1999; available at: www.un.org/Docs/sc/resolutions/1999.htm.

²⁸ “Report of the Secretary-General,” document S/1999/1203, 29 November 1999.

²⁹ Interview with Taffos Tzonis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 May 2000.

³⁰ Interview with Captain Simon, UNFICYP, 3 May 2000.

³¹ Charlie Charalambous, “Officer killed in mine clearing operation,” *Cyprus Mail*, 24 March 1999.

³² Interview with Osman Ertug, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, TRNC, 4 May 2000; for details of past casualties, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 706.

signing the treaty: "[R]atification will take place as soon as conditions relating to the implementation of its relevant provisions are fulfilled."¹

In June 2000, when asked to indicate what the preconditions for ratification are and when they might be met, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that "efforts in that effect are taking place in all relevant fields.... [However] no timetable for the ratification has been announced."² The primary reasons for not ratifying the MBT were explained as threefold. The first is the technical difficulty of removing the landmines remaining after the civil war. The second is the cost and "priorities of the units working on the removal of mines." And the final concern was the "general situation in our area, adherence or not of other countries to the Ottawa Convention and to the Amended Protocol II to the CCW...."³ The Ministry added that although it has not yet ratified the MBT, "Greece has taken adequate measures to refrain from acts [which might] undermine the scope of the Treaty...."⁴

The government attended the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in May 1999 in Maputo, but did not make a statement. Greece simply associated itself with the statement of the European Union in the presentation by Mr. Athanassios Theodorakis, Deputy Director-General of the European Commission whose spoke on behalf of the Commission. Most of that statement was focused on the European Commission's contribution to humanitarian mine action.⁵ Greece has not participated in any of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts related to the treaty.

Greece voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution in December 1999, as it had in 1997 and 1998.

Greece attended both the Regional Conference on Landmines in Zagreb, Croatia, in June 1999 and in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in June 2000. At the latter conference, the Turkish delegation issued a statement referring to a proposal to Greece to demine the common border, to which (it said) Greece had not responded.⁶ It has not been possible to verify this with the Greek government.

Greece ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 20 January 1999.⁷ It attended the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 1999, and submitted its annual report as

¹ Report of the Permanent Mission of Greece to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 15 December 1999, p. 2.

² Faxed statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 2000; a revised version of this statement was given to an ICBL representative by a representative of Legal Office, General Staff, Hellenic National Defense, at the Regional Conference on Landmines, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 21-22 June 2000.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Statement by Mr. Athanassios Theodorakis, Deputy Director-General, European Commission, at First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

⁶ Statement by the Turkish Delegation at the First Panel of the Regional Conference on Landmines, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 21-22 June 2000.

⁷ Law No. 2652; published in the Official Gazette (No. 249), 3 November 1998.

required under Article 13 on 3 December 1999, which provided only minimal information.⁸

While not a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Greece has submitted a request for membership, and participates as an observer. It continues to hold the position that "the Conference on Disarmament should deal with the issue of APLs."⁹

Production, Transfer and Stockpile

Greece is known to have produced and exported at least one type of antipersonnel landmine, a copy of the U.S. M16A2.¹⁰ The Foreign Ministry notes that, along with the other members of the European Union, it has observed an unlimited moratorium on the production and transfer of antipersonnel landmines.¹¹ Its report to the OSCE states that "Greece is neither a producing nor an APL exporting country."¹²

There is no definitive information on the current size or composition of Greece's stockpile of antipersonnel mines, although one report indicated a stockpile of 1.5 million mines.¹³ In addition to domestic production, Greece is known to have previously imported AP mines from the United States and Italy.¹⁴ In November 1999 the German Ministry of Defense confirmed that it planned to export twenty-three Skorpion mine delivery systems and 36,000 AT-2 antitank mines to Greece.¹⁵

Use and Landmine Problem

Mines are not known to pose a danger to civilians in the country, although mines dating from the Greek civil war (1947-1949) are found along the northern border. The border with Turkey, in part along the Evros River, has also been mined for decades. The only publicly available information about these minefields comes from occasional press reports of civilian and military casualties occurring along the border, with newspaper

⁸ National Annual Report--Greece, 15 October 1999, to the First Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, 15-17 December 1999.

⁹ Report to the OSCE, 15 December 1999, p. 3.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts," CD-ROM.

¹¹ Fax from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 2000; see also 97/817/CFSP: Joint Action of 28 November 1997, European Council, Document 497X0817, 28 November 1997; available at: <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex>.

¹² Report to the OSCE, 15 December 1999, p. 3.

¹³ A Greek journalist cited a figure of 1.5 million at a Medecins du Monde press conference in Athens, 18 September 1997, according to an email from Mines Advisory Group (UK), 23 March 1999.

¹⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 710, 720-723.

¹⁵ This was widely reported and discussed in the German media: *die tageszeitung*, 3 and 4 November 1999, *Associated Press*, 3 November 1999, *Handelsblatt*, 3 November 1999, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 4 November 1999, *Südwest Presse*, 4 November 1999, *Rhein-Zeitung*, 4 November 1999, *Berliner Zeitung*, 4 November 1999, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 4 November, *Freitag*, 5 November 1999. Concerns have been raised about the AT-2 mine because its sensitive fuse may make the mine function like an AP mine, and therefore banned by the MBT. One antivehicle mine produced by Greece, PYRKAL, has also been identified as a mine of concern. See, Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," January 2000.

maps of the mined area published occasionally as well. Also the border with Bulgaria is mined, although demining there is underway.

Mine Clearance

In November 1997, Greece and Bulgaria agreed to demine their common border.¹⁶ Bulgaria's side of the border was declared landmine-free during fall 1999,¹⁷ while Greece's demining efforts on this border are in progress. The Ministry of Defense estimates that it may take two to three years to complete the demining.¹⁸ The predominant method of mine removal employed by Greece is manual, though canine detection is now being explored.¹⁹

Regarding mines along the border with Turkey, the Greek position is unclear. In September 1997 Deputy Defense Minister Dimitris Apostolakis said "[T]he minefields will stay as long as we have a frontier on the Evros."²⁰ Then, after mine casualties on 31 October 1999, a government spokesman stated that "Greece would forge ahead with its policy on removing land mines...."²¹ One month later, after twenty-one casualties occurred in one of the minefields on the border with Turkey, a government spokesman indicated that "minefields in Greece would be cleared as soon as a relevant agreement was ratified by the country's Parliament."²² And in June 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, "Greece has taken measures to improve and increase the markings and the perimeters of existing mine-fields...[and] incidents of illegal migrants, inadvertently entering mined areas no longer occur. No [mine] victims have been reported since 1998."²³

However, landmine casualties have continued to occur in Greek minefields. The details of marking and demining programs have not been reported (Greece's annual report to the CCW states no more than that demining started on the Bulgarian border in November 1997).²⁴

Landmine Casualties and Victim Assistance

Landmine casualties have been reported in the Greek press, in most cases involving illegal immigrants entering the country from Turkey. There appears to be no central register of mine incidents and casualties that is publicly available.²⁵ Press reports

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ "Border Wiring Removed," *PARI Daily* from World Reporter, 14 October 1999; untitled note presented by Bulgarian representatives at the MBT Standing Committee of Experts, Geneva, 22-23 May 2000.

¹⁸ Fax from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 2000; interview with Lt. Col Dinitrios Zafiropoulos, International Law Office, General Staff, Hellenic National Defense, Athens, 26 May 2000.

¹⁹ National Annual Report--Greece, Amended Protocol II, 15 October 1999.

²⁰ "A River of Blood on the Evros," *Eleftherotypia* (daily newspaper), 1 November 1999.

²¹ "Greece Sticks to Policy on Removing Land Mines," *Xinhua*, 1 November 1999.

²² Ibid.

²³ Fax from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 2000.

²⁴ National Annual Report--Greece, Protocol II, Form B, 15 October 1999.

²⁵ Interview with Mr. Konstantinos Koutras, Attache, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 June 2000.

indicate a total of thirty-eight deaths and twenty-six injuries since 1993,²⁶ including the following:

- 15 September 1997: three Iraqi Kurds killed, eleven injured (four severely) in a minefield near Nea Vissa-Edirne (near border with Turkey) – reportedly entered “fenced-in minefield and set off two landmines.”²⁷ Another report of the same incident stated that from 1 January to 15 September 1997, “more than 20 immigrants have died on the Nea Vissa minefields.”²⁸
- 15 June 1998: two soldiers killed, one injured in a minefield near Yemisti Kipon Evrou near the border with Turkey – reportedly by an AP mine in one of the oldest minefields on the border.²⁹
- 31 October 1999: five Iraqi Kurds killed, sixteen injured in a minefield near Kipi border post (on border with Turkey).³⁰ According to other reports, the minefield was marked.³¹
- 8 May 2000: one male illegal immigrant killed in a minefield along the Evros River, described as “clearly marked and fenced.”³²

In most of the incidents occurring on the Turkish border, these reports quote officials as describing the minefields as marked and fenced. For example, the September 1997 incident occurred in a minefield described as surrounded with three layers of barbed wire and with clear signs (“phosphorescent”) every fifteen meters.³³

Most if not all mine victims on the Turkish border receive emergency treatment in Alexandroupolis Hospital. No details of rehabilitation programs were given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when asked in June 2000,³⁴ nor did Greece make any entry under the section provided for “Rehabilitation Programs” in its Protocol II report of 15 October 1999.³⁵ It appears that survivors are discharged with minimal follow-up and, apparently, nothing that could be considered rehabilitation. In two known cases, mine victims were taken to prison on discharge from hospital. Because most victims are

²⁶ “Maimed and Seeking a Home, Kurds Languish in Pendeli,” *Athens News*, 29 January 2000.

²⁷ “Three Kurds Killed in Minefield After illegally Crossing Border,” *Athens News* (daily), 16 September 1997.

²⁸ Doukas Dimakas and Pavlos Alisanoglou, “Demetris Reppas Accuses the Turks,” *Ta Nea* (daily newspaper), 16 September 1997.

²⁹ Pavlos Alisanoglou, “Two Soldiers Were Killed and One Injured on a Mission Disabling Landmines,” *Ta Nea*, 16 June 1998.

³⁰ “5 Kurdish immigrants killed in Greece border minefield,” *Associated Press*, 31 October 1999.

³¹ “Five illegal migrants die at Greek-Turkish Border,” *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 31 October 1999.

³² “Immigrant Killed in Mine Field,” *Athens News*, 9 May 2000.

³³ Doukas Dimakas and Pavlos Alisanoglou, “Demetris Reppas Accuses the Turks,” *Ta Nea*, 16 September 1997.

³⁴ Fax from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 2000; interview with Mr. Koutras, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 June 2000.

³⁵ National Annual Report--Greece, Protocol II, Form B, 15 October 1999.

potential asylum-seekers, described and treated as illegal immigrants, many may well attempt to avoid attention, but those who do reach Athens often go to Sismanoglou Hospital as outpatients.

Mine Action Funding

Greece has donated \$80,000 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.³⁶ It also takes part in the Joint Action of the EU Member States providing "financial and technical assistance to landmine victims and affected countries."³⁷

LITHUANIA

Mine Ban Policy

On signing the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 26 February 1999, Lithuania stated in a declaration at the time, "The Republic of Lithuania...declares that ratification of the Convention will take place as soon as relevant conditions relating to the implementation of the provisions of the Convention are fulfilled."¹

Lithuania participated in the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the MBT in Mozambique in May 1999. The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs told the plenary, "The entry into force of the anti-personnel mine ban convention was a milestone event. This convention is a successful chapter of the conventional disarmament process, but, first and foremost, this is a victory of humanitarian consideration over military doctrines.... It is true that military doctrines have to be adapted and APLs destroyed.... Having signed the Ottawa Treaty, Lithuania recognizes the obligation to put an end to the suffering caused by APLs and will work towards ratification of the Convention. Apparently, the ratification is not so distant future simply because we have never produced, used, imported, exported anti-personnel mines or traded in them."²

In a report to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in December 1999, Lithuania said it "intends to accede...in the future, taking into account accession to and ratification by neighboring countries in the region."³

As with other Baltic countries, the necessary preconditions for ratification of the MBT focus on the regional security context. As an official from the Ministry of Defense said, "Lithuania recognizes that AP mines are a barbaric arm and shall be eliminated

³⁶ "Total Contributions by Donor, October 1994-September 1999," Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action; available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/vtfma.htm>.

³⁷ Report to the OSCE, 15 December 1999.

¹ Interview with Dainius Baublys, Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vilnius, 18 February 2000.

² Intervention by Dr. Rokas Bernotas, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 4 May 1999.

³ Report of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1 December 1999.

from the arsenals.... The negative attitude of Lithuanian neighbors towards the ban is also to be taken into account.”⁴

The Foreign Ministry adds that ratification would be more straightforward if there was more coordination between countries in the Baltic region.⁵ Concerns about national security are based on the Baltic countries’ shared history of recent invasion and occupation, and present-day uncertainty particularly with regard to Russia. It appears that the possession of antipersonnel mines provides a sense of security out of proportion to the numbers stockpiled.

At the same time, the Foreign Ministry states that it considers Lithuania to be bound (under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) to refrain from all acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the MBT.⁶

Lithuania has not attended any of the MBT intersessional meetings in Geneva. In December 1999 it voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B urging full implementation of the MBT. The Foreign Ministry welcomed *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* as a “notably valuable and comprehensive source of information on anti-APL policy, practise and plans world-wide. It is a credible source, open to broad general public. Most notably, LM Monitor has served its purpose, that is to stir up public attention and action on the issues that hitherto were confined to exclusively governmental establishment.”⁷

Lithuania is a party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The government attended the First Annual Conference of the States Parties to the Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999, and has submitted its required Article 13 transparency report. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Lithuania would like to cooperate more with Western countries in the search for alternatives to antipersonnel mines, which is considered too costly to engage in alone. There is some assistance provided by the Canadian Embassy in Vilnius. But any search for alternatives is said to be unconnected with ratification of the MBT.⁸

Production, Transfer and Stockpile

Lithuania has stated on many occasions, including at the FMSP in May 1999, that it does not produce, use, import or export AP mines.⁹ Production of all articles of military application is subject to license. No licenses for the import or export of AP mines have been granted or applied for since Lithuania's independence in 1990.¹⁰ However, this

⁴ Telephone conversation and interview with Andrius Krivas, Director of the Department of International Relations, Ministry of Defense, Vilnius, 20 January 1999.

⁵ Interview with Dainius Baublys, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vilnius, 18 February 2000.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2000.

⁸ Interview with Tomas Urbonas and Paulius Dranseika, Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Defense, Vilnius, 18 February 2000.

⁹ Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2000.

¹⁰ Ibid.

statement appears to be qualified by the Ministry of Defense statement in early 1999 that existing stocks of AP mines were obtained in the early 1990s from the Soviet Union.¹¹

On 1 September 1998 a two-year moratorium on the export of AP mines was enacted, in order to contribute to the elimination of AP mines worldwide and harmonize Lithuania's position with that of the EU.¹² Lithuania borders Belarus and the heavily militarized Kaliningrad region of Russia (which is enclosed by Lithuania and Poland, therefore has to be accessed by land across Lithuanian territory). Earlier agreements to allow the transfer through Lithuania of Russian military equipment have been extended; checks are made and Lithuanian military accompany all such convoys; whether AP mines have formed part of these transfers has not been ascertained.¹³

The Foreign Ministry says that the precise number of AP mines may not be disclosed under the Law on State Secrets which entered into force on 1 January 2000, but described the number as a mere fraction of what is deemed to be the minimum under the MBT, and kept in stockpiles exclusively for mine clearance training and demonstration purposes.¹⁴

Landmine Problem and Mine Clearance

Lithuania is not facing very serious problems with landmines and UXO left from military operations during World War II, though these "remnants of war" from World War II are described as rather commonplace finds. There are no maps available showing contamination with explosives, and Lithuania does not have a national mine clearance plan.¹⁵

In recent years special units have been formed, and deminers are equipped with Shebel, Valun (Austrian), MSG-75 (German), IMP and RVM (Russian) mine detectors. A military engineering school has been founded in Kaunas which will serve the demining and EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) needs of the Baltic region; in the initial phase Danish assistance is involved.¹⁶ There has been international cooperation on mine clearance. Partners included the 871st U.S. Engineer Battalion, Swedish Mine Clearance Training Center, Danish Engineers and Chemical Defense School, German War Engineers School, ENTEC (NATO technical training center), and the 15th Polish Mine Clearance Battalion. The Lithuanian armed forces have received technical assistance from Denmark, Sweden and Germany.¹⁷

¹¹ Telephone conversation and interview with Andrius Krivas, Ministry of Defense, Vilnius, 20 January 1999.

¹² Joint Action of the EU 97/817/CFSP and EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 8 June 1998.

¹³ Interview with Dainius Baublys, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vilnius, January 1999; emails and telephone interview with Tomas Urbonas, Ministry of Defense, 18 February and 10 May 2000.

¹⁴ Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2000.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Interview with Tomas Urbonas, Ministry of Defense, Vilnius, 18 February 2000.

¹⁷ Lithuanian National Report under Article 13 of CCW Amended Protocol II, 25 October 1999.

Research and Development

In 1994, the Institutes of the Lithuanian Academy of Science and several private companies formed a technological base to create high-tech systems for underground investigations, including mine detection. In the former Soviet Union, Lithuania was one of the centers of R&D for high-speed electronics. The former Vilnius Scientific Research Institute of Radio-Measurement Devices was the main developer of radio-measurement techniques for the whole of the Soviet Union. Scientists formerly working at this Institute have formed private companies and continued the development of Ground Penetrating Radar; the products of these companies are presently exported to the United States, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, China and Russia.¹⁸

Mine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Landmine victims (mostly elderly people injured in World War II and a few from the Afghan war) receive social support as disabled persons.¹⁹ There are some nongovernmental organizations, the Veterans Union, and the Charity Fund of Afghan Veterans, where war veterans can get assistance. There is active cooperation with similar organizations in Belarus, and joint meetings and rehabilitation in a special center in Vitebsk, Belarus. There are about 1,500 Afghanistan war veterans in Lithuania, including 824 in Vilnius, with fifty-eight injured veterans (including landmine victims) in Vilnius alone.²⁰

¹⁸ Interview with Saulius Balevicius, Director of the Semiconductor Physics Institute, Vilnius, 18 February 2000; further information on these systems is available from the Landmine Monitor researcher: igors@latnet.lv or Igers.Tipans@rtu.lv.

¹⁹ Interview Dainius Baublys, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vilnius, 20 January 1999.

²⁰ Telephone interview with Alexander Litvinenko, Head of the Charity Fund, 5 May 2000.

MALTA

Malta signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 4 December 1997. It has not yet ratified the treaty, though may do so by September 2000. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that Malta would ratify as soon as the legislation had passed through the Cabinet and Parliament.¹ Malta participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999, where its ambassador to Mozambique, Miguel de Brangança, asserted that "the Sovereign Military Order of Malta is ready to be associated with any international action directed at obtaining legal and practical measures that can resolve the problem of landmines and that this work must constitute the first aim of this Conference."² Since then Malta has taken part in three intersessional meetings of the MBT: the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance, Victim Assistance, and General Status and Operation of the Convention.

Malta voted in favor of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in 1996, 1997, and 1998, and co-sponsored and voted for the December 1999 pro-ban resolution. It does not possess, produce, transfer, or use antipersonnel landmines and is not mine-affected. As of September 1999, it had donated \$1,952 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.³ It is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but has not ratified the Amended Protocol II; it was an observer at the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol in December 1999.

MOLDOVA

Key developments since March 1999: The Parliament ratified the Mine Ban Treaty and the President signed the law. It awaits deposit at the UN. Progress was made in training deminers; clearance operations are expected to get underway.

Mine Ban Policy

Moldova signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. Government officials had said that the treaty would not be ratified until the issues related to the status of the Pridnestrovie Moldavian Republic (PMR) are resolved,¹ and Russian troops

¹ Interview with Tony Borg, Department of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Valletta, 2 June 1999.

² Statement of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta by Ambassador Miguel de Brangança, Ambassador of Malta to Mozambique, First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, May 1999.

³ "Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action: Total Contributions By Donor, October 1994 to September 1999," Table, UN Mine Action Service.

¹ On 8 May 1997, "The Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Trans-Dniester Moldavian Republic," was signed in Moscow. On 16 July 1999, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and PMR met in Kiev, under the auspices of the OSCE, where an agreement was signed on the fundamentals of a peace settlement of the conflict, pursuant to which a Joint Control Commission was formed with representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Moldova,

withdrawn from its territory.² (For background on Moldova and PMR, see *LM Report 1999*, pp. 743-744.) However, on 27 April 2000, the Moldovan Parliament ratified the Mine Ban Treaty.³ The President signed the law on 14 June 2000. According to an official of the Foreign Ministry, the instrument of ratification will be sent to the United Nations in September 2000.⁴

Moldova did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, nor has it attended any intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings related to the treaty. The main reason is financial constraints. The government sent representatives to the second international conference on landmines in Russia and the CIS held in Tbilisi, Georgia in December 1999. Moldova voted for the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in 1997 and 1998.

On the same day that it ratified the MBT, the Moldovan Parliament also ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and all of its protocols, including Amended Protocol II on landmines.⁵ The government did not participate in the First Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999, though it did attend the preparatory meeting in May 1999.⁶

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

The Moldovan government is not believed to produce landmines. The Moldovan government is not known to have imported or exported antipersonnel landmines, but does not have an export moratorium in place.

Moldova inherited mine stocks from the USSR. According to the government, Moldova's army has approximately 12,000 mines.⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Moldova would be able to destroy 10,000 mines on its own, but will need international support for the other 2,000.⁸

Types of antipersonnel mines thought to be in Moldovan arsenals include: PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, KSF-Is, PFM-Is, and POM-2s.⁹ (See *LM Report 1999*, pp. 745-746.)

According to Moldovan officials, there has been no new military use of mines. Criminal use of mines and other explosives stolen from storage or obtained during the conflict, however, is reported.¹⁰

PMR, and OSCE. Subsequently, issues related to withdrawal of Russian troops from PMR complicated progress.

² Interview with Mr. Vladimir Lupan, Deputy Head, European Security Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova, Chishineu, 17 February 2000.

³ Resolution of Parliament, #973/14, 27 April 2000.

⁴ Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ICBL-Ukraine, 23 June 2000.

⁵ Resolution of Parliament, #975/14, 27 April 2000.

⁶ Procedural Report, CCW//AP.II/CONF.1/PM/6, 2 June 1999, p. 2.

⁷ Statement of Vladimir Lupan, Foreign Ministry of Moldova, made at the First International Conference on Landmines in Russia and the CIS, Moscow, 27-28 May 1998.

⁸ Interview with Mr. Vladimir Lupan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 February 2000.

⁹ *Annual Report*, Ukrainian Peacekeepers Veterans Association, 1998.

¹⁰ Vladimir Shirochenko "The thieves are handing of arms to the thieves," *Argumenti I Fakti* (newspaper), 20 January 2000.

Mine Clearance

In an official ceremony Canada's Ambassador to Moldova handed over to Moldovan sappers ten sets of personal protective equipment for deminers, valued at U.S.\$ 120,000. He indicated Canada would also be providing training courses on use of the equipment. Brigadier General Ion Coropchan, Chief of General Staff of the Moldovan Armed Forces has said the equipment would be used in the demining of 150 hectares near the village of Pogrebya in the Chishineu district, and also for clearance of UXO left after WWII.¹¹

In 1999, a group of the Moldovan police officers underwent a demining training course in the United States.¹² On 9 February 2000, U.S. military representatives provided equipment for detection and demining, valued at \$104,000 dollars.¹³ In February and March, deminers from the Second Infantry Brigade of the Armed Forces were trained to use the equipment in demining operations at Moldova's Military Engineers Center.¹⁴

In early 1999, under the Joint Control Commission (see footnote 1), it was agreed to carry out demining operations of about eighty hectares of land near Pogrebya which lies in the security zone and under the auspices of peacekeeping troops. However, the operation did not move forward because of concerns as to where to locate the Moldovan sappers.¹⁵ Finally at an 18 April 2000 session of the Joint Control Commission, it was agreed to place forty-nine Moldovan sappers in the village of Koshnitsa, in the immediate proximity of the mined areas. Demining is scheduled to take place from 1 May through 1 September.¹⁶ The demining of the minefields near Pogrebya is a difficult exercise, plagued by an absence of maps, a high density of mines (said to be 150-200 mines/hectare), and dense vegetation.

Mine Awareness

There are no systematic mine awareness programs in Moldova. During mine clearance operations, deminers meet with the local population and give them information about what to do if they come upon mines or UXO. In 1999 representatives of Ukrainian Peacekeepers Veterans Association (UPVA) created the Ukrainian Mine Action Information Center (UMAIC), which has representatives in Moldova and PMR. UMAIC supports Ukrainian activity with Moldova / PMR, in organizing mine awareness activities with the population. The Center has also sought to educate the government and private sector about the needs of landmine victims.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Statistics on mine casualties are not public information. There is only sketchy information on mine incidents in local media. (See *LM Report 1999*, pp. 746-747.) On

¹¹ (<http://www.cry.ru/crime.news/1999/08/09/19990809110610.html>).

¹² Data from the Police of Moldova, 17 February 2000.

¹³ "Soviet Mines will be destroy by American demining equipment," *Narodna Armiya* (newspaper), #31, 18 February 2000.

¹⁴ *BASA - Press*, 9 February 2000.

¹⁵ Interview of Mr. Georgiy Roman, Moldovan Co-chair, Joint Control Commission, *Interlik*, 9 November 1999.

¹⁶ *BASA - Press*, 9 February 2000.

14 April 2000, the parliament enacted laws to protect the rights of the disabled and war victims.

Pridnestrovie Moldavian Republic

The Transnistria region of Moldova declared independence from Moldova in 1990, and calls itself Pridnestrovie Moldavian Republic (PMR). It is not internationally recognized. Forces from Moldova and PMR battled in 1992, with both sides using landmines.

PMR officials have made no public statements about the Mine Ban Treaty. Officials have said they have received no official information about the treaty and Moldova and international landmine activity.¹⁷

Moldova has said that PMR produces its own arms, including antipersonnel mines. Arms factories located in Ribnita, Tiraspol, and Tighina were part of the Soviet Union's military supply complex and are continuing to produce weapons, Moldovan officials claim, including production of the basic Russian-type mines. The PMR government admitted to producing arms in order "to maintain the same military footing with Moldova."¹⁸

The Russian 14th Army has allegedly provided PMR separatists with mines. The PMR may in turn have supplied mines to others; it has allegedly provided support to Abkhazia against Georgia, and the Krajina Serbs against Croatia.¹⁹ Moldova has recently charged that mines manufactured in PMR are smuggled out of the country.²⁰ However PMR leaders and the head of Security Service of PMR General Vladimir Antufeev said that the allegations do not correspond to reality; the charges are an attempt to discredit the government of PMR.²¹

The number of mines in the PMR stockpile is unknown, but likely in the thousands. Types of antipersonnel mines thought to be in their arsenals include: PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, KSF-1s, PFM-1s, and POM-2s.²²

According to PMR there has been no new military use of mines. However, mining of the territory is considered by the leadership of PMR as the main means of defense of PMR territories.²³

PMR does not disclose data and information about mine incidents. However, the President of PMR Igor Smirnov said that eight PMR sappers have been killed by mines since the end of the conflict.²⁴

¹⁷ Interview with President of PMR Mr. Igor Smirnov, 30 November 1999.

¹⁸ "Moldova: Speranta Bloc Claims Dniester Produces, Exports Arms," *FBIS*, FBIS-TAC-98-064, 5 March 1998. Also, Interview with Mr. Vladimir Lupan, 17 February 2000.

¹⁹ Moldova: Speranta Bloc Claims Dniester Produces, Exports Arms," *FBIS*, FBIS-TAC-98-064, 5 March 1998.

²⁰ Interview with Mr. Vladimir Lupan, 17 February 2000.

²¹ Interview of Minister of State Security of PMR General Vladimir Antufeev, *Olvia Press*, 17 April 2000.

²² *Annual Report*, Ukrainian Peacekeepers Veterans Association, 1998.

²³ Interview with President of PMR Mr. Igor Smirnov, 30 November 1999.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

The PMR guarantees citizens free health care. In addition to its own citizens, its veterans' hospital accepts Moldovan citizens for free treatment.

POLAND

Mine Ban Policy

Although it signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 4 December 1997, Poland has said that it is not likely to ratify the treaty in the foreseeable future. At the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999, head of delegation Zbigniew Szymanski, Director of UN Political Affairs for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spelled out the reasons for this position. Noting Poland's "particular geostrategic situation," he said that while showing support for the MBT by signing it, states "can not neglect the other side of the anti-personnel landmines problem, the Convention has also considerable security implications."¹

In February 2000, the government said "the treaty has not been ratified yet because neither the US, nor China, nor, what is more important, Russia or other of Poland's eastern neighbors has done so."² A distinction was made between the "humanitarian" rationale for signing the MBT and the "security" rationale for not ratifying it, stating that the security rationale will only be satisfied when these other states ratify the MBT.³ As an example of the security side, in March 2000 Bronislaw Komorowski, Chairman of the Sejm Commission for National Defense (a parliamentary committee) cited the conflict in Chechnya as a positive example of the utility of mines.⁴

In its report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Poland also set out three conditions which must be fulfilled to make it possible to ratify the Convention: that all main producers and permanent members of the UN Security Council should join the Convention, that all neighboring countries of Poland should join the Convention, and that the Polish Army have alternatives for the weapon.⁵ One observer noted that according to some Polish diplomats this will remain the case until at least 2006, the year that the United States has proposed to join the MBT.⁶

Government representatives attended meetings of each of the Standing Committee of Experts (SCE), except for Mine Clearance. Poland also participated in the regional landmine conferences in Zagreb in June 1999 and Ljubljana in June 2000.

Poland voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban on landmines in 1996, 1997, and 1998, and co-sponsored and voted for the 1999 resolution supporting universalization of the MBT. During the 1999 debate in the UN

¹ Statement by Mr. Zbigniew Szymanski, Director of UN Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

² Letter from Zbigniew Szymanski, Director of UN Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Piotr M. Hajac, 10 February 2000.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Pawel Wronski, "Straight Face for Bad Mine," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 7 March 2000.

⁵ Report of the Mission of Poland to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 14 December 1999, p. 1.

⁶ Pawel Wronski, "Straight Face for Bad Mine," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 7 March 2000.

First Committee, Poland associated itself with the European Union statement that "emphasized the importance of a full and speedy implementation of the Ottawa Convention."⁷

Poland is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but has not ratified its Amended Protocol II (1996). It attended the First Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II in December 1999 as an observer. In the same month Poland reported to the OSCE that all ministries and institutions supported ratification of Amended Protocol II, and expected formal ratification in early 2000.⁸

The government continues to view the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the appropriate forum for dealing with landmines. In a statement before the Conference, Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, indicated that "a global ban on transfers of anti-personnel landmines...would be a fitting theme for the Conference on Disarmament" and insisted that Poland regarded the CD "as the principle, indeed sole, multilateral disarmament negotiating body of the international community."⁹ It has also argued that a transfer ban in the CD would contribute to keeping landmines out of the hands of "non-governmental forces and terrorist groups."¹⁰

Production, Transfer and Stockpile

Poland has produced at least one type of antipersonnel landmine, the PSM-1,¹¹ but has stated on more than one occasion that its production stopped in the mid-1980s.¹² An export ban was first enacted in 1995 and has been extended indefinitely.¹³ The size and composition of Poland's AP mine stockpile is unknown. In May 2000 a Foreign Ministry official stated that the stockpile of AP mines is small and kept solely for reasons of national security.¹⁴

⁷ Statement by the European Union and the Associated Countries, UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 1999 General Debate, 11-20 October 1999; available at: <http://www.acronym.org.uk/unfcomp.htm>.

⁸ Report to the OSCE, 14 December 1999.

⁹ "Security has to be a Common Commodity which is Assured to All," Polish Foreign Minister Tells Conference on Disarmament," Press Release DCF/364, Conference on Disarmament, 23 March 1999.

¹⁰ Statement by Mr. Zbigniew Szymanski, FMSP, May 1999.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD ROM.

¹² United Nations General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General: Moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines," A/50/701, 3 November 1995, p. 3; Statement by Mr. Zbigniew Szymanski, FMSP, May 1999.

¹³ "Report of the Secretary-General Moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines," A/50/701, 3 November 1995, p. 3; Report to the OSCE, 14 December 1999.

¹⁴ Telephone interview with Mr. Tomaszewski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 18 May 2000. In addition to AP mines, Human Rights Watch has identified several antivehicle mines produced and stockpiled by Poland that may have antipersonnel capabilities, and thus may be prohibited by the MBT. These include the MN-111, MN-121, MN-123 and MPP-B antivehicle mines. See, Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," January 2000.

Mine Action

The government reported in 1998 that Poland is not mine-affected but may still have a problem with unexploded ordnance (UXO) from World War II.¹⁵ By 1985 Poland had disposed of over eighty-eight million items of UXO, including fifteen million mines.¹⁶

The Foreign Ministry reports that Poland has provided training and assistance for demining and rehabilitation of mine victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Lebanon.¹⁷ Poland also sent specialists to demining training programs in Albania and Yemen, and granted \$10,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1999, in support of victim assistance operations.¹⁸ Poland has also played an active role in humanitarian demining via the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and NATO's Partnership for Peace.¹⁹ It has not contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action.

ROMANIA

Key developments since March 1999: A Romanian company offered antipersonnel mines for sale at an arms fair in the UK in September 1999; the government called the incident a "regrettable error."

Mine Ban Policy

When Romania signed the Mine Ban Treaty at the opening ceremony in Ottawa on 3 December 1997, Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Severin declared: "Our military experts have no reasons to consider that antipersonnel landmines are essential to guarantee the security of Romania."¹ Yet, Romania has not yet ratified the MBT.

In November 1999, the Minister of Defense Victor Babiuc stated that "ratification started as a process and will finalize, probably in the first half of the year 2000."² In the same month, the Foreign Ministry stated, "Romania is now in the process of identifying the financial resources for the destruction of stockpiles, in order to be able to ratify the Convention."³ The Defense Minister, on 15 February 2000, noted that because "the process of ratification has been relatively recently released, there is no juridical act drawn up...."⁴

¹⁵ Statement of Mr. Kazimierz Tomaszewki to Budapest Conference, 26-28 March 1998; available at: <http://www.un.org.Depts/Landmines/index.html>.

¹⁶ Arthur H. Westing, "Explosive Remnants of War: an Overview," in Arthur H. Westing, Ed., *Explosive Remnants of War: Mitigating the Environmental Effects*, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and UN Environment Programme, 1985), p. 6.

¹⁷ Statement by Mr. Zbigniew Szymanski, FMSP, May 1999.

¹⁸ Report to the OSCE, 14 December 1999, p. 3.

¹⁹ Interview with Grzegorz Poznanski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 February 2000.

¹ *Adevarul* (daily newspaper), 10 December 1997.

² *Adevarul* (daily newspaper), 2 November 1999. See also, Victor Babiuc, Minister of State, Minister of National Defense, Letter to Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, 3 November 1999.

³ "Romania's Integration into NATO," NATO, WEU and Strategic Issues Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1999; available at: <http://domino.kappa.ro/dosare.nsf>

⁴ Letter from the Minister of Defense to *Sibienii Pacifisti*, No. SG 700, 15 March 2000.

In a meeting with the ICBL in October 1999, Romania's Ambassador to the UN, Mr. Ion Gorita, stated that even though ratification had not taken place, Romania was committed to respect the provisions of the treaty and was in effect already implementing the treaty: no use, no export, no production, beginning of destruction of AP mine stockpiles.⁵

Romanian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in the mine ban campaign note that there had been regular changes of personnel in charge of the signing and ratification process of the MBT, which may have simply resulted in loss of continuity in the process overall, or may indicate disagreements over the priority to be given to ratification of the MBT. Official responses to inquiries have not been forthcoming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Officials at the Ministry of Defense said they were unable to assist in the research for Landmine Monitor. No clear and meaningful political support has been expressed for speedy ratification of the MBT in Romania.

Romania attended the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the MBT in Maputo, Mozambique, in May 1999, where the delegation commented on the financial implications of implementing the MBT. It has participated in most meetings of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts of the MBT, with the exception of those related to victim assistance.

Romania voted in favor of the UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B urging full implementation of the MBT in December 1999, as it had with the previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998.

It is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and in November 1999, it was announced that ratification was underway of the Amended Protocol II (1996).⁶ However, one month later, Romania's report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) stated "Romania has not signed or started the formal adherence process to the Protocol II."⁷ It attended as an observer the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999.

Romania continues to support "complementary" negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament to ban the transfer of antipersonnel mines.⁸

Production and Stockpiling

In its December 1999 report to the OSCE, Romania stated that it does not produce AP mines.⁹ Officials have said that production stopped in 1990.¹⁰ Concerning past production, the Ministry of Defense has confirmed the accuracy of the list of seven types

⁵ Amb. Ion Gorita, Permanent Mission of Romania to the UN, meeting with Jody Williams and Steve Goose, ICBL, New York, 6 October 1999.

⁶ "Romania's Integration into NATO," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1999.

⁷ Report of the Permanent Mission of Romania to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 28 December 1999, p. 2.

⁸ "Romania's Integration into NATO," NATO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1999.

⁹ Report to the OSCE, 28 December 1999, p. 3.

¹⁰ Victor Babiuc, Minister of State, Minister of National Defense, Letter to Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, 3 November 1999. The UN Ambassador cited a date of 1993. Amb. Ion Gorita, Permanent Mission of Romania to the UN, meeting with ICBL, New York, 6 October 1999.

of AP mines presented in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*¹¹ and offered further data on their technical characteristics. The number of these AP mines currently in stockpiles is not known, but it is thought to be substantial.¹²

The government has stated that the costs of stockpile destruction are a factor influencing MBT ratification and Romania has asked for financial assistance to destroy its stocks.¹³ In June 1999 the Chief of the Defense Staff arranged for Romanian experts to visit Austria to discuss stockpile destruction; the trip included a tour of “the premises of UXO-experts as well as a visit to an industrial destruction site at Radmer (private company).”¹⁴ In October 1999, Romania’s UN Ambassador told the ICBL that stockpile destruction began in 1998, but there has been no confirmation of or further information about this.¹⁵

Transfer

A moratorium on the transfer of AP mines was declared on 1 July 1995. The export moratorium was extended until 15 September 2000, but plans for future extensions have not been reported.¹⁶ This prohibition did not prevent the Romanian company Romtehnica from offering AP mines for sale in September 1999 at the Defence Systems and Equipment Exhibition International (DSEi) at Chertsey in the United Kingdom. Seven types of mine were being offered, three of which were AP mines: the MAI-75 pressure mine, the MS-3 “Surprise Mine” (formerly designated as the ML-3), and the Leaping Splinter Mine (MSS). Although no details are available to further identify this latter, previously unknown, device, it is considered likely to be a bounding fragmentation AP mine.

The Romtehnica sales representative made it clear to a researcher from the UK who attended the Exhibition that the items were for sale. A color brochure was available for the MS-3 Surprise Mine, which included its technical details. The brochure states that the mine has a dual purpose: it is an anti-lift device and a standard mine. Also available was a List of Romanian Defense Industry Products, which included the other two AP mines, the MSS and the MAI-75.

The UK Working Group on Landmines was informed, and police and customs officials contacted. The issue was widely reported in the press, both in Romania and in the UK. The Romanian authorities explained the incident as a simple error in documentation. Col. Florian Ionica, Romtehnica’s General Manager, told a news

¹¹ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 756.

¹² The Mines Advisory Group has estimated that it could be several million, based on discussions with Romanian officials. See MAG Stockpile Fact Sheet, September 1998. In addition to AP mines, there are several Romanian produced antivehicle mines of concern. The MC-71 with a tilt rod fuze is likely prohibited by the MBT because of its AP mine-like effect. There are several other models that may also function as AP mines: MAT-46, MAT-62B, MAT-87; P-62. See, Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” January 2000.

¹³ Telephone interview with a Staff Officer, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999.

¹⁴ As reported in Austria’s National Report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, 11 October 1999.

¹⁵ Amb. Ion Gorita, Permanent Mission of Romania to the UN, meeting with ICBL, New York, 6 October 1999.

¹⁶ Report to the OSCE, Romania, 28 December 1999.

conference that two marketing managers had been dismissed and the commercial manager disciplined over an “error of information.... The list, which is not a commercial offer, contained two types of anti-personnel mines produced in the past, but not in current production for either internal use or export.... The inclusion of these two models is a regrettable error for which Romtecnica assumes full responsibility.”¹⁷

In the UK, in a Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces said:

Following allegations in the British media that a Romanian company was promoting anti-personnel landmines at DSEi, we instructed the MOD Police to investigate the matter. Separately, the Romanian authorities have contacted the MOD to explain that, in error, their company had on its stand literature, which mentioned an anti-personnel landmine. They have informed us that they stopped manufacturing this item in 1990, but that the company had not updated its equipment lists. We have received an apology from the Romanian authorities, but the MOD Police are still investigating the matter and will submit a file to the Crown Prosecution Service in due course.¹⁸

At each stage of these official explanations, the incident changes: from three AP mines actually on sale, to two (Ionica’s press conference), to one (Romanian explanation to the UK), and from a direct offer of sale to the “mere” inclusion in a list apparently not updated for almost ten years. The explanations are further called into question by a news report that quoted Romtecnica managers as saying that the sales list had been “conceived especially for this event.”¹⁹ Also, a mine clearance expert reports having seen AP mines listed in the Romtecnica sales catalogues at military exhibition in Delhi in March 1998.²⁰

NGO Activity

It was the Romtecnica incident that prompted the involvement of the NGO *Sibienii Pacifisti* (*People of Sibiu for Peace*) in the landmine issue. The NGO has called upon the authorities to prepare an Article 7 report, even before ratification, as demonstration of the government’s serious commitment to the MBT, but this was ignored. Additionally, to try to speed up the process of ratification, *Sibienii Pacifisti* addressed two open letters to the Parliament to provide an opportunity for Members of

¹⁷ “Anti-personnel landmines on sale at the UK arms fair,” UK Working Group on Landmines, November 1999, p. 2.

¹⁸ John Spellar MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Written Answer, Hansard, 3 November 1999, cols. 213-214.

¹⁹ Radu Tudor, “The Leadership of Romtecnica Officially Proved Culpable for the Enormous Blunder Presenting Antipersonnel Mine Lists,” *Cotidianul*, (daily newspaper), 22 September 1999, p. 3.

²⁰ Personal communication to the UK Working Group on Landmines, 20 September 1999.

Parliament to call for the ratification process to be prioritized. Although this caught the attention of the press for a few days, there was no clear response from the Government.²¹

To increase public pressure on this issue, a Working Group was formed, focusing on three tasks: to collect information on AP mines appearing in the Romanian press; to contact public officials and others who are involved in this issue; and to provide research for the Landmine Monitor Report 2000. A series of conferences and other activities were organized, especially for academics but also for all representatives of civil society to build public awareness. One particular effort is to find sponsors for its program of assistance to mine victims.

On 27 December 1999 a new Open Letter was addressed this time to the Presidency of Romania, Parliament, Government, Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, the Embassies of the accredited states in Bucharest, and to all media and press agencies in Romania. This letter called again for the speeding up of ratifying the MBT and requested approval to contact representatives of the Ministries, institutions and relevant companies. The response has been very poor, with the only positive response from the German Consulate in Sibiu. In general, the civilian population as well as politicians are not well informed about the effects of AP mines, perhaps partly because Romania has not been affected by mines.

Mine Action

Romania has made contributions to several mine action programs in recent years: to Angola, with one engineers platoon and vehicle from 1995 to 1997, to Bosnia-Herzegovina with one engineering platoon and associated vehicles and equipment, and to Albania with two engineer squads and vehicles in 1997. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania spent over \$330,000 in 1996-1998 on mine clearance efforts.

UKRAINE

Key developments since March 1999: The start of Ukraine's stockpile destruction program has been delayed beyond the original target of the year 2000. Full destruction is now contemplated in 2007. In 1999, an International Demining Training Center was created, the Ministry of Defense formed a demining company for domestic and foreign demining operations, and the non-governmental Ukrainian Mine Action Information Center was established. Ukraine ratified CCW Amended Protocol II (Landmines) on 21 September 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The key stumbling block to Ukraine's immediate and full embrace of the Treaty has been concern about its ability to bear the costs of destroying its significant mine stockpile within the required four years. After months of diplomatic and technical discussions, on 28 January 1999 Ukraine signed an agreement with Canada regarding

²¹ The Open Letter was published in the following newspapers: *Dimineata*, 21 September 1999; *Cotidianul*, 22 September 1999; *Libertatea*, 20 September 1999; *Cronica Romana*, 22 September 1999; and *Ziua*, 20 September 1999.

cooperation in the destruction of the stockpiles.¹ On the same day, President Leonid Kuchma declared that Ukraine would join the Mine Ban Treaty and in less than a month, on 24 February 1999, the Ambassador of Ukraine to Canada signed the treaty at the United Nations.

Although work has continued to be able to carry out the terms of the agreement on destruction of stocks, the Parliament has not made any move toward ratification of the treaty. As a first step, the Parliament must ratify the agreement between the government and Canada on stockpile destruction; technical questions and problems regarding the procedure for the destruction are yet to be resolved. The current position of the government is that ratification of the treaty itself will only be considered after the first stage of the bilateral program for stockpile destruction has been completed.²

Ukraine continues to participate in relevant landmine meetings. The government delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 was headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The government also participated in nearly every ban treaty intersessional meeting. Representatives from Ukraine attended regional conferences on landmines held in Zagreb in June of 1999, Tbilisi in December of 1999, and in Minsk in February of 2000.

Ukraine voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in 1997 and 1998.

Ukraine ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines) to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons on 21 September 1999, and opted for the nine-year delay in implementation of key provisions. It took part in both the preparatory meeting in May 1999 and the First Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II to the CCW in Geneva in December 1999.

The military determined that to be in compliance with Amended Protocol II, it would have to destroy 1.146 million PFM mines and 6 million PFM-1S mines, because they do not meet the technical requirements of the protocol. The military considers that the following mines, if adapted with Soviet-made manual control devices, would be in compliance: POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, OZM-4, OZM-72, and MON. The adapting devices (23,300 complete sets of a type VKPM and 42,300 complete sets of VKPM) would cost U.S. \$2.7 million. Ministries responsible for carrying out the obligations under the Amended Protocol include the Ministries of Defense, Industrial Policy, and Foreign Affairs.³

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Ukraine has supported its negotiation of a transfer ban.

¹ "Memorandum on Mutually Beneficial Cooperation Between the Government of Canada and the Government of Ukraine on Destruction of Antipersonnel Landmines Stockpiled by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Prohibited by the [Mine Ban Treaty]," 28 January 1999.

² Interview with Mr. Yuri Polurez, Deputy of Head Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 January 2000.

³ Ibid.

Production and Transfer

Under the Soviet Union, Ukraine produced components for Soviet landmines.⁴ Representatives of the Ukrainian government and military have repeatedly stated in a number of fora that the country does not manufacture landmines and has not since independence.⁵

A 1993 U.S. State Department communiqué identified Ukraine as an exporter of antipersonnel mines, though Landmine Monitor is unaware of any documented cases of transfer since independence.⁶ Ukraine enacted a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines from August 1995 to September 1999.⁷ That moratorium was extended through 2003.⁸ It is not believed that Ukraine has imported AP mines, having inherited such large stocks from the USSR.

Stockpiling

Ukraine has approximately 10.1 million AP mines in its stockpiles, inherited after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.⁹ Weapons, including landmines, had been stored at the North (Kiev), South (Odessa) and West (Prikarpatkiy) Military Districts.¹⁰ The following types of AP mines have been reported in the Ukrainian stockpile: PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, KSF-1 cluster bomb with PFM-1 AP mines, KPOM-2 cluster bomb with POM-2 AP mines, PFM-IS, and the POM-2.¹¹

In March 1998, Ukraine destroyed 101,028 PFM-1 landmines from the Ukrainian Army arsenals on the proving ground near Kiev.¹² Based on experience destroying mines such as the PFM-1, Ukraine has concerns about environmental safety when destroying mines.¹³ The preliminary information released by the Ministry of Ecological and Nuclear Safety of Ukraine after the destruction of landmines has shown that the pollution of the environment exceeds by hundreds or more times the permissible norms and standards of

⁴ Annual Report, Ukrainian Peacekeepers Veterans Association (UPVA), 1999.

⁵ These have included statements by Ambassador Volodymyr Furkalo at the Treaty Signing Conference, Ottawa, Canada, 4 December 1997; by Mykhailo Osnach, Representative of Ukraine at the Budapest Regional Conference, 26-28 March 1998; and by Colonel M. Mikhailenko, Ukrainian Engineers Corps, Minsk Landmine Conference, 6-7 March 2000.

⁶ U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, 7 December 1993.

⁷ United Nations, Country Report: Ukraine, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/ukraine.htm>.

⁸ Order of PM, #426, 22 March 1999.

⁹ Mine Action Database, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. While 10.1 million is the commonly accepted number of the stockpile, other Ukrainian sources have put the number at 9.6 million and Sergey Pashinskiy, Head of Ukrainian Mine Action Center, put it as high as 11 million speaking at the Minsk International landmines Conference in March 2000. Informal estimates have put the number of PFMs close to nine million and an additional one million for PMNs.

¹⁰ Statement by Sergey Pashinskiy, Head of Ukrainian Mine Action Center, Minsk International Landmine Conference, 6-7 March 2000.

¹¹ Military Parade magazine.

¹² General Volodymyr Vorobiov, Head of the Corps of Engineers, 28 April 1998.

¹³ Statement by Colonel M. Mikhailenko, Minsk Landmine Conference.

pollution.¹⁴ The main pollutants are oxide of aluminum, lead containing residues, and cyanide of hydrogen (cyanhydric acid). The range of area polluted by hazardous substances when burning one box with PFM -1 cassettes ranged from 0.3 up to 6.7 kilometers, for 10 boxes ranged from 1 up to 21.2 kilometers.¹⁵

Under the January 1999 agreement, Canada will be providing financial and technical support for destruction. Under the terms of the agreement, Canada and Ukraine are to choose a company to destroy the stockpiles and draft a contract to begin work. Environmental assessment and financial and technical verification mechanisms are also being developed. It had been hoped that a destruction plan would be announced in 1999, but this did not occur. The delay will push back the anticipated initiation of stock destruction beyond the original target of the year 2000.¹⁶

From the Ukrainian side, Sodrzhestvo Corporation, which carried out trial runs in 1999 to check the technology for the destruction of a sample of one type of PMN landmine,¹⁷ agreed to participate, but a Canadian counterpart has not yet been selected. Ukraine created a special team headed by Lt. Gen. Vorobiyov, Commander of the Engineer Forces, to select the Canadian participant in the joint project. In the autumn - winter of 1999-2000 two Canadian companies, Taron, Inc., and Katridis, presented their proposals to representatives of the Ukrainian Interdepartmental Workgroup on salvaging mines in Kiev.¹⁸

Two main steps in the destruction process are contemplated. During the first stage, from 2000-2003, the technical plans for stock destruction would be developed and the industrial facilities for the destruction built. The cost of developing the technology and the industrial capacity for the destruction could reach U.S. \$5.5 million. During the second stage, from 2003-2007, destruction of landmines would be carried out.¹⁹ Estimates of cost of destruction cannot be confidently made until technology for destruction is clearly determined. But it seems that the cost of destroying the PFMs alone could be between U.S.\$ 10-15 million.²⁰ The Ministry of Industrial Policy is responsible for the development and implementation of the agreement for destruction of stocks.

On 28 October 1999, through NATO's "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) program, Canada proposed cooperation in the destruction of Ukrainian landmines. On 11 November 1999 in Brussels, during a session of the Political - Military Steering Committee of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), cooperation measures within the current PfP program were discussed, including information on location and

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Government of Canada, DFAIT, "Safe Lane," #10, Winter 1999-2000; Statement by Sergey Pashinskiy, Head of Ukrainian Mine Action Center, Minsk, 6-7 March 2000.

¹⁷ Statement by Sergey Pashinskiy, Ukrainian Mine Action Center, Minsk, 6-7 March 2000.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

²⁰ Ibid.

safety of mines. Some NATO countries supported the proposals of Canada, but the USA did not support revealing locations and safety of stocks.²¹

Use

The Ukraine Ministry of Defense states that AP mines have not been used on Ukrainian territory since WWII. However, Ukrainian police have recorded individual cases of landmine use for criminal purposes. In 1999 there were 220 explosive incidents in Ukraine and the police confiscated more than 1,055 explosive devices.²² According to Ukrainian experts, one half of all mines, manual explosive devices and other explosives confiscated were in the Odessa area, at the Moldova and Pridnestrovie borders.²³

Mine Clearance

Ukraine is still affected by mines and unexploded ordnance from World War II. The demining of Ukrainian territory is carried out by the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Bombs Disposal Division of the Ministry of Interior's Special Police Demining Teams (SPDT). The Secret Service of Ukraine also has a demining unit.²⁴ (See also *LM Report 1999*, pp. 759-760.)

For clearance purposes, Ukrainian territory is divided into 497 areas of responsibility; of these, the Ministry of Defense is responsible for demining 442 areas, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations is responsible for demining in the remaining fifty-five areas.²⁵

The Ministry of Defense (MoD) has 135 demining teams, of which 12-13 teams work daily to clear mines and UXO. According to MoD reports, its teams cleared 13,436 mines and UXO in 1999.²⁶ The Ministry of Emergency Situations Demining Teams collected 4,430 mines and UXO in 1999. The cost of maintaining one demining team is about U.S. \$500.²⁷

Mine Awareness

There are no systematic mine awareness programs in Ukraine. During mine clearance operations, deminers meet with the local population and educate them on the rules of behavior when they come across a UXO. In the Kiev area in 1999, children discovered more than 600 air bombs, shells, mines and UXOs from WWII, all of which were immediately neutralized.²⁸

After a series of "terrorist acts" in Russia from 9-13 September 1999, the President of Ukraine issued a special directive to the police, Ministry of Defense and other central bodies to carry out preventive measures, directed at the strengthening of public safety and

²¹ Report of joint meeting of the delegation of Ukraine to NATO and the Political-Military Steering Committee of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council, 11 November 1999.

²² "Vibuh-tehnichna sluzba," Militia of Ukraine, #4, April 2000, p. 12.

²³ Vladimir Shirochenko, "The thieves are handing arms to the thieves," *Argumenti I Fakti* (newspaper) 20 January 2000.

²⁴ Report of General Volodymyr Vorobiov, Head of the Corps of Engineers, 28 April 1998.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Statement by Colonel M. Mikhailenko, Minsk Landmine Conference.

²⁷ Demining Annual Report, The Ministry of Emergency Situations, 1999.

²⁸ ElVisti analytic group, Doc. # 1084218, November 1999.

providing mine awareness education. Special Police Demining Teams (SPDT) of the Ministry of the Interior's Bomb Disposal Division made 734 mine awareness presentations in Ukrainian mass media.²⁹

In 1999 the Ukrainian Mine Action Information Center (UMAIC) was formed. It is composed of members of the Ukrainian Peacekeepers Veterans Association (UPVA), which has branches and representatives in Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Vinnitsa, Odessa, Ternopol, Zhitomir and other cities in Ukraine. The Center is to become a focal point for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information about victim assistance, refugee resettlement, and other landmine-related issues. Through conferences and seminars, UMAIC seeks to educate the government, military and general public about landmine related issues.³⁰

International Demining Programs

In 1999 an International Demining Training Center was created in the town of Kamenets Podolsk, Ukraine. The main task of the Center is to train foreign personnel for demining operations.³¹ A group from Nigeria was trained at the Center in September/October 1999.³² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a delegation on a working trip to West Africa. In meetings with Senegal, that government considered the possibility of cooperating with Ukraine in training of personnel in mine clearance.³³

The Ministry of Defense created a demining company, Podolskzvivprom, for participation in domestic and foreign demining operations. The major Ukrainian state arms trader, Ukrspetsexport, has been working to support the demining company in creating joint demining programs in foreign countries.³⁴ In 1999, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explored with the EC, WEU, and others the possibility of participation in foreign demining operations. One of the main problems for Ukraine is that it adheres to old Soviet standards; UN standards for mine clearance are not followed in Ukraine.³⁵

Ukraine is active in research and development of new mine detection technologies. In 1997 a joint Ukrainian - Turkish research laboratory, located in Marmara, Turkey, was created for this purpose. The laboratory is managed by the Ukrainian Ministry of Science and Education, and the Turkish Ministry of Defense.³⁶ Additionally, the Ukrainian Space Agency, Magellan, has a special project for research on the development of technology for the detection of mines from aircraft and helicopters.³⁷

²⁹ "Vibuhotechnichna sluzba," Militia of the Ukraine, # 4, April 2000, p. 12.

³⁰ Statement by Sergey Pashinskiy, Minsk Landmine Conference.

³¹ Statement by Colonel M. Mikhailenko, Minsk Landmine Conference.

³² Ibid.

³³ "INTERFAX - UKRAINE" news agency, 22. September 1999.

³⁴ Statement by Colonel M. Mikhailenko, Conference Minsk, 6-7 March 2000.

³⁵ Annual Report, UPVA, 1999.

³⁶ Report of Alexey Vertiy, Head of Ukrainian - Turkish landmines scientific - research laboratory, 18 May 1999.

³⁷ Alexander Koshchenko, "MAGELLAN" Annual Report, 1999.

Landmine Survivor Assistance

An estimated 1,500 civilians have been killed by mines and UXO since 1945.³⁸ There are an estimated 80,000 mine and UXO victims in Ukraine today.³⁹

The main institution for assistance to mine victims is the Social Rehabilitation Center in Kiev, which provides artificial upper and lower limb orthopedic goods, and works in close contact with the Otto Bock company in Germany.⁴⁰ The country also has thirty hospitals for veterans and war victims.⁴¹

Ukraine has enacted laws providing measures on social rehabilitation of disabled people and a Special Council for the disabled was created in May 1999.⁴² The Council is made up of representatives of the main ministries along with representatives of the main non-governmental and veteran organizations of Ukraine, which are active on issues related to war victims and the disabled. (See also, *LM Report 1999*, p. 761.)

Of the estimated 80,000 mine victims in Ukraine, 20,000 need prosthetic devices.⁴³ Of the U.S. \$20 million budgeted in 1999 for the Ukrainian State Fund for Social Protection of the Disabled, only 50% was available.⁴⁴ In the November 1999 meeting of the CIS in Kiev, Ukraine sought partners for joint cooperation to create national landmine victims support programs under the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴⁵

On 3 December 1999 President Leonid Kuchma took part in the annual activities marking the World Day of the Disabled, which also coincided with the anniversary of the signing of the Ottawa Convention. During his visit to the Ukrainian Campaign to Ban Landmines exhibit, the President stated that the country will make every effort to expand social protection for war victims and the disabled. The *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* was presented to the President at that time.

During 1999 in Ukraine the Russian victims of war in the Chechen Republic have been given prosthetic assistance.

Ukraine has initiated the development of a program of humanitarian cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan for assistance and medical rehabilitation for mine victims. In late March 2000, a Ukrainian delegation led by the Maj. General Sergey Chervonopisky, Chairman of State Department for Veterans Affairs, visited Pakistan. Ukraine has offered to Pakistan and Afghanistan, pursuant to the Mine Ban Treaty, joint cooperation between government and non-governmental agencies for support to war victims and for prosthetic repair. Toward this end, Ukraine has planned to send to Pakistan mobile field medical groups, which have new technologies for prosthetic work and conduct workshops.⁴⁶

³⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 761, for more details on casualties.

³⁹ "INTERFAX -UKRAINE"- news agency, 12 October 1999.

⁴⁰ After a visit to a Ukrainian center for prosthetic repair for veterans of the war in Afghanistan, by Presidential order all state prosthetics plants should use Otto Bock technology. *Trety Tost* (newspaper), State Department for Veterans Affairs, February 1999.

⁴¹ *Uryadoviy Currier* (The Government Courier/newspaper), 10 February 2000.

⁴² Order of the Government of Ukraine, No. 925, 27 May 1999.

⁴³ "INTERFAX -UKRAINE"- news agency, 12 October 1999.

⁴⁴ Annual Report, Labor and Social Policy Ministry, 1999.

⁴⁵ Report of the Ukrainian State Committee for Veterans Affairs, 15 November 1999.

⁴⁶ The Order of the President of Ukraine, # 1-14/1736, December 1999.

NON-SIGNATORIES**ARMENIA****Background**

Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in conflict over the Nagorny-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan from 1988 to 1994. Nagorny-Karabakh is an autonomous region of western Azerbaijan, but the majority of the inhabitants are Armenian. Mines were used by all sides in the conflict. A cease-fire agreement was signed in May 1994, but negotiations for a final peace settlement are on-going under the auspices of the OSCE. Landmines and demining are reportedly on the agenda of the peace negotiations.¹ (See also reports on Azerbaijan and Nagorny-Karabakh.)

Mine Ban Policy

Armenia has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Armenia has made it clear that it will not join the treaty unless Azerbaijan agrees to do so.²

In welcoming the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized the "Ottawa Convention as an important step forward in the total elimination of an entire category of excessively injurious weapons.... Armenia's accession to the Convention is contingent on a similar level of political commitment by other parties in the region to adhere to the Convention and comply with its regime. We are concerned with Azerbaijan's rigid position not to accede to the Convention, which has remained unchanged from the first steps of the Ottawa process."³ Subsequently, at a landmine seminar organized by the Armenian National Committee of the ICBL and IPPNW-Russia in April 2000, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the willingness of the government to sign the treaty, but stressed that it had to be done simultaneously by all neighboring countries.⁴

In commenting on the seminar a few days later, Vardan Oskanian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, noted that at this stage Armenia cannot unilaterally accede to the ban treaty. He said that the landmine issue is being dealt with in conjunction with

¹ United Nations Mine Action Service, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," 5 November 1998, p. 13.

² Felix Corley, "Landmine Use Now Set to Continue," *Jane's Intelligence Review - Pointer*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1 January 1998, p. 2. See also: "Armenia Reluctant to Ban Landmines," *RFE/RL Newslines*, 18 November 1997.

³ "Armenia's Views on the Issues of Antipersonnel Landmines," Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Republic of Armenia, March 1999.

⁴ Mr. Ruben Shugarian, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, at landmine seminar, "The issue of antipersonnel mines and its media coverage," Armenian National Committee of ICBL and IPPNW-Russia, Yerevan, Armenia, 19-21 April 2000. See also, Reply of the Republic of Armenia to the Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC.DEL/92/00, 29 March 2000.

other issues within the framework of the negotiations on settlement of the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict.⁵

Officials at the Ministry of Defense stated that landmines on the dividing line are an important defense element and mine clearance in those areas in the foreseeable future is problematic for Armenia and, if unilateral, unacceptable. At the same time the readiness was expressed for bilateral talks with Azerbaijan to “design symmetrical measures to that effect.”⁶

In December 1999, Armenia voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has with the other pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Armenia has not participated in the ban treaty intersessional meetings.

Armenia is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). However, the government is considering the possibility of acceding to the Amended Protocol II on landmines. In light of this, Armenia told Landmine Monitor that it has decided, on a voluntary basis, to submit the annual report required under Article 13, and to contribute to improving the coordination and effectiveness of mine action.⁷

The government has expressed its belief that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is the central forum for negotiating a global ban on mines, even though it is not a member of the CD.⁸

Armenian nongovernmental organizations established the Armenian National Committee of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in January 1999 and have been very active in raising the issue of a mine ban and other mine-related issues to military and government representatives and with the public at large. Representatives have participated in international and regional conferences and organized a wide range of activities in Armenia, including a seminal meeting with military, government, media and NGO representatives in April 2000, to raise the profile of the mine issue and develop constructive dialogue with all key players in reaching a ban, and to press for mine action and victim assistance.

In a major activity since its establishment the National Committee conducted a poll of 400 individuals in five regions and in the city of Yerevan to gauge the awareness of the population on a number of mine-related issues.⁹ One part of the questions related to the government position on the Mine Ban Treaty.

Evaluating the position of the government on non-accession of Armenia to the treaty, 35% of those polled supported the government's position, 23% were against it and 42% did not offer an opinion. Those respondents who disagree with the position taken by the authorities point out a serious danger posed by mines to civilians as their major

⁵ Minister of Foreign Affairs Vardan Oskanian, interview with Artak Alexanian, of the “Lraber/News” program of “Prometevs,” TV channel, 22 April 2000.

⁶ Interview with officials at Defense Ministry of the Republic of Armenia, 19 April 2000.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The poll was conducted in Syunik, Tavush, Ararat, Gegharkunik and Yerevan. Of the people interviewed, 83% were between the ages of 21-50, the remainder over 50; 60% were men and the remainder, women. Seventy-four percent have children, 71% a college degree, 41% employed in the education sector, 22% government officials and 14% employed in the health care system. The poll did not pretend to be scientific, but was intended to give an idea about the issues in question.

argument. Only one of the respondents voiced the opinion that Armenia should accede to the treaty immediately, even unilaterally.

Most respondents believe that the main reason why Armenia does not accede to the treaty is that the Karabakh problem is not resolved yet and that all the neighboring states--Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran--have not acceded. Replying to the question of the possibility of Armenia's acceding to the treaty, almost 80% of respondents believe that Armenia can accede only if the regional security guarantees are given (final solution of the Karabakh problem, durable peace in the region, and accession of the neighboring states).

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Armenia is not believed to be a landmine producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines, though it has no formal restrictions on production or trade in place. In April 2000, the Minister of Defense said that Armenia has not imported landmines since its independence. He said the only landmines in the country were those that had been left at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Specific information about current stockpiles of AP mines is unavailable, but the Minister said that the stock was "negligible."¹⁰

Use

Landmines were used by all sides throughout the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict.¹¹ In an interview, Armenian Defense Minister Harutiunian acknowledged that landmines had been used on a large scale and in a chaotic fashion and that mixed mining (i.e. planting of antitank and antipersonnel mines) was a common occurrence. Individuals who did not have special engineer training often laid those mines, and the minefields were not recorded. That is why mine clearance in those areas may pose a serious problem in the future.¹²

The Armenian forces used Soviet-made mines, primarily PMN, MON and PMD. OZM-type mines were also used, but the Head of the Engineer Troops Colonel V. Adoyan asserted that by now most of them would no longer be operational.¹³

In 1998 the United Nations indicated that mines continued to be used.¹⁴ While an Azerbaijan military official alleged in April 2000 that "Armenian sabotage and reconnaissance squads" enter Azeri territory and mine roads and shepherd's paths,¹⁵ Landmine Monitor has not found concrete evidence of such use. Defense Minister Harutiunian has stated that since his appointment to the position in June 1999 not a single order to lay new landmines had been issued. He further stated that it is not planned to

¹⁰ Interview with Lt.-Gen. Vagharshak Harutiunian, Minister of Defense, Republic of Armenia, 19 April 2000.

¹¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 762-765.

¹² Interview with Lt.-General Harutiunian, 19 April 2000.

¹³ Interview with Colonel V. Adoyan, 19 April 2000.

¹⁴ United Nations Mine Action Service, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," 5 November 1998, p. 14.

¹⁵ Interview by Azeri researcher with Col. Isa Sadikhov, former deputy of the Minister of Defense, Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines Office, 17 April 2000.

issue such orders in the future provided the military-political situation in the region remains stable.¹⁶

Although it has been reported that landmines are laid on the Armenian-Turkish border, the Head of the Armenian Engineer Troops stated this is incorrect. He said this segment is guarded by the joint forces of Russian and Armenian border guards and no landmines are used. However, he acknowledged there is a reserve stock of landmines in ammunition depots in the rear for “threat-posing emergencies.” Moreover, he stated that mines are not used around strategic installations, including nuclear power plants.¹⁷

Landmine Problem

According to the Ministry of Defense, the 900 kilometer-long line that divides the warring sides is replete with landmines. In a statement to the OSCE, the government noted an estimated 50-80,000 mines along the border.¹⁸ The Ministry of Defense has said that minefields and mined areas on the dividing line are, as a rule, beyond the forward posts of the stationed troops and border guards, enclosed with barbwire and the local population is well-informed.¹⁹

Territories bordering on the dividing line are regarded as mine-contaminated. These are agricultural and woodlands where warfare was conducted and/or which came under fire. At least 1,700 hectares in regions bordering on Azerbaijan are in need of engineer reconnaissance, demining and/or clearance of unexploded ammunition. The Armenian Defense Ministry has been conducting such activities on its own and has expressed its interest in cooperation and in technical and financial assistance of international organizations.²⁰

According to information obtained by Landmine Monitor during its investigations along the border in ten rural communities of the Syunik region (David-Bek, Kaghnut, Uzhanis, Yeghvard, Agarak, Nerkin Gand, Shirakhog, Srashen, Chekaten, Nerkin Khendzoresk) the regional government indicated that of a total area of 183,000 hectares of agricultural land, some 1,699 hectares had been mined. Within the mined areas, 251 hectares is land that had been privatized and given to peasants, including 236 hectares of arable land and 15 hectares of vineyards. Some 1,448 hectares of non-privatized land, including 393 hectares of arable land and 1,055 hectares of pasturelands had also been mined.²¹ From 1994-1999, in Syunik region, landmines were the cause of thirty deaths, forty-four injuries, and also killed 197 cattle (including cows, sheep and horses) and destroyed 27 vehicles.²²

¹⁶ Interview with Lt.-Gen. Vagharshak Harutiunian, 19 April 2000.

¹⁷ Interview with Col. V. Adoyan, Head of the Engineer Troops, Defense Ministry, 19 April 2000.

¹⁸ Reply to the OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, 29 March 2000.

¹⁹ Information provided by the Ministry of Defense of Armenia, April 2000.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ According to the data provided by the Department of Agricultural and Environment, Syunik regional Governor's Office, December 1999. Information checked by Landmine Monitor researcher in investigations in the rural communities noted above.

²² Interview with Mr. A. Torozian, Head of Department of Agriculture and Environment, Syunik Regional Governor's office, 13 July 2000.

In the Tavush region, bordering with Georgia and Azerbaijan, with a total area of 27,150 square kilometers, the regional government reported some 9,409 hectares of privatized land had been mined, including 4,777 hectares of areas under crops, 1,198 hectares of vineyards, 1082 hectares of orchards, 678 hectares of hayfields and 1,674 hectares of pasture land.²³

Forty-two villages in the Tavush region are located very close to the border with Azerbaijan, including fourteen villages that are located not more than one kilometer from the border. Close proximity to the border and mined land are a serious hindrance for the villagers to engage in farming.²⁴

Mine Action

Armenia is not known to have contributed to international mine action programs. Armenia inherited Soviet equipment that could be used for mine clearance.²⁵ To date, no humanitarian mine clearance projects have been implemented in Armenia, nor has the government been allocating money for mine action.

But local governments have started to estimate the damage sustained during the years of conflict as a result of hostilities in general and of mines in particular. They identify the damaged infrastructure (schools, hospitals, houses of culture, residential houses, consumer services facilities, etc.) in order to assess the need in reconstruction activities in the border-areas and to use the assessment as a basis for calculating the required funding and for designing the programs of stage-by-stage mine clearance.

Since the beginning of 2000, there have been some positive changes related to progress in humanitarian demining. Armenia has been taking measures to train combat engineers and has been making conscious efforts to acquire equipment and protective gear for combat engineers.

During a March 2000 visit of Admiral Charles Abbot, an agreement was reached for cooperation between Armenian and US combat engineers in humanitarian demining. A US inter-departmental group on demining was scheduled to visit Armenia in May and conduct special seminars for Armenian combat engineers, and in October 2000, South Caucasus-wide joint exercises will be held in Georgia.²⁶

Mine Awareness

Mine awareness programs are not underway in Armenia. At the same time, in the limited context of the Armenian National Committee's poll previously discussed, the information gathered indicates that the overwhelming majority of respondents (88%) are aware of the danger posed by mined areas, especially for civilians. Some 44% of the respondents in the border areas are aware that there are mined areas in their regions and 10% of the respondents replied that they live in close proximity to mined areas. They

²³ According to data provided by Tavush regional Governor's Office, February 2000. Also, checked against information gathered by Landmine Monitor researcher.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ U.S. State Department, *Hidden Killers*, July 1993, p. 48.

²⁶ "Armenia will take part in the humanitarian mine action program," *Arka* News Agency, Noratert, 23 March 2000. This information was confirmed by Vostanik Adayan, Head of the Engineer Troops Department in the Defense Ministry of Armenia on 20 April 2000.

believe that the greatest danger is posed by agricultural lands and forests near the border as well as transportation lines and roads with adjacent territories.

Some 33% of respondents did not have information as to whether mine clearance operations had been undertaken in their region and 25% replied that such endeavors had been made primarily in agricultural lands and in roads with adjacent territories. Another 33% held that mine clearance operations had not been undertaken in their district.

The poll indicated that local governments do not take the measures to ensure safety for civilians: 36% noted the absence of warning signs to notify the population about mines and 49% had difficulty answering that question. As to the question of whether mine awareness education programs had been conducted for civilians, only 12% of the respondents replied in the positive. Some 13% of the respondents believed that such programs are offered at schools. Nevertheless, the respondents tend to believe that mine awareness education programs should be offered both to adults (88%) and to secondary school students (93%). The respondents assigned key role to mass media (59%), especially to TV (45%) in raising mine awareness of the population.

The results of the poll indicate that there is a perceived need of mine awareness education programs. Just over 65% of respondents held that they are not sufficiently informed about mine danger and less than 9% believed that they possess sufficient knowledge. Breaking down the answers by the respondents' gender we could see that men have a clearer idea of actions and behavior than women in case of coming across a landmine. That can be accounted for by the fact that during military service men receive some training about landmines. Thus, mine awareness education is especially important for women.

Landmine Casualties

Reliable data on landmine casualties is not available; it is not considered public information. The Ministry of Health & Social Welfare does not keep track of information on mine victims, nor have NGOs or international organizations made concerted efforts to collect such data. In 1994, the U.S. State Department indicated that there were approximately five to ten casualties per year in Armenia due to landmines.²⁷ Armenia received a total of \$1.15 million in 1993 and 1994 through the U.S. Leahy War Victims Fund for the provision of prosthetics to amputees.²⁸ A prosthetic workshop had already been put in place in Armenia after the 1989 earthquake. It is estimated that between 300-500 people per year since 1989 received a prosthetic, about half of whom had suffered war related injuries.²⁹

There is a difference in medical assistance for military personnel and that available to civilian mine victims. Servicemen wounded by mines receive immediate care at the Central Clinical Military Hospital of the Ministry of Defense for specialized medical assistance. The Hospital keeps track of those wounded (this information is classified) and conducts research on some aspects of landmine-related wounds.

²⁷ U.S. State Department, *Hidden Killers*, December 1994, p. 24.

²⁸ *Portfolio Synopsis: Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund*, United States Agency for International Development, October 1997.

²⁹ Telephone interview with Allen Randlov, former Director of the War Victims Fund, 15 March 1999.

Civilian victims usually get treatment in local hospitals where highly qualified medical assistance is not always available and where records are not kept of mine victims. Information about civilians with wounds of the extremities is relatively more accessible because they are brought to Yerevan to the Center of Traumatology, Orthopedics & Rehabilitation for treatment.

In the course of this research, 108 cases (covering victims from 1992 to the present) provided by the Center of Traumatology were studied. The average age of the victims was from 18 to 40; four were boys under 16 and one was a woman. The extremities of seventy-four of them were amputated. The wounded civilians are primarily residents of the border districts of the country.

Amputees, both military and civilian, get their prosthetic devices from the Yerevan prosthetic and orthopedic plant, which indicated in March 2000, about 1,250 landmine victims have so far received prosthetic devices.³⁰

Survivor Assistance

Armenia has a total of 179 hospitals with beds for 25,300 patients. There are also six military hospitals in the country. The largest specialized medical institutions are concentrated in the country's capital. It is noteworthy that the medical potential of the country for rendering post-traumatic surgical, orthopedic and rehabilitation aid was significantly broadened and strengthened after the devastating Spitak Earthquake of 1988.

Thus, the Center for prosthetics and personnel training was established where the prosthetic appliances, including bio-prosthetic devices, are made which meet the highest standards. The Bavarian Red Cross set up the department of technical orthopedics and rehabilitation affiliated with the Center of traumatology, which produces orthopedic prosthetic devices for children. The International Center for Post-Traumatic rehabilitation was built with the support of the International Federation of Red Cross. Experts employed by these institutions received special training and professional development abroad.

Thus, the country has adequate material-technical base and qualified personnel for rendering specialized medical assistance, producing prosthetic devices and for rehabilitation of landmine victims. At the same time the lack of adequate funding for these institutions poses a serious problem for the country, since the existing facilities and personnel cannot be used efficiently and are not adequately accessible for landmine victims.

A number of NGOs focus on the issues of the disabled and some collaborate with the Ministry to provide humanitarian assistance to the disabled and to ensure their psycho-social reintegration into the community.

Individuals disabled by landmines are to a varying degree taken care of by these NGOs. However, until recently there were no NGOs that would specifically deal with the issues of landmines. Since the establishment of the National Committee of ICBL in January of 1999 one of the coordinators of the Committee, together with a group of orthopedic physicians, initiated some activities targeting the landmine victims, set up a

³⁰ According to the data of Yerevan prosthetic and orthopedic enterprise, March, 2000.

database and a rehabilitation center for those disabled by landmines and for their reintegration into society.

Disability Policy

The issues and rights of the disabled persons are regulated by the “Law about the social protection of the disabled in the Republic of Armenia” adopted by the National Assembly and signed by the President on 24 May 1993. The Law stipulates certain privileges for the disabled, such as free medical treatment and medication, free prosthetic devices and other appliances, free use of public transportation as well as provision of pensions. There are no laws specific to the rights and privileges of civilian mine victims.

Military personnel who are landmine victims and their family members are entitled to privileges and benefits under the law “On social security system for military personnel and their family members” adopted by the National Assembly on 27 October 1998 and signed by the President on 25 November 1998. The Law made provisions for many more privileges and for larger pensions. However if a serviceman is affected by the landmine not at the time of discharging his duties he will be issued a certificate about the wound and he will be given a civilian, not military pension.

The country’s grave economic crisis and scarcity of the State budget result in regular delays in disbursements for health care. The delays have been becoming progressively more protracted and at present they exceed eight months. As of 1 January 2000, the debts of the State to the sector were over 7 billion AMD. Provision of medical services to the disabled for free within the framework of the existing laws is problematic when in reality the State’s funding is unavailable.

At the national level the coordination of the disabled-related issues are overseen by the department of the Ministry of Health & Social Welfare and by the sector for social security of the Ministry of Defense.

AZERBAIJAN

Key developments since March 1999: As of March 2000, the civilian Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action had developed a National Mine Action Plan, initiated a National Mine Database, prepared for training of deminers, and begun to purchase equipment. Training of national deminers started in March 2000 and demining operations start in July 2000.

Background

Azerbaijan and Armenia engaged in conflict over the Nagorny-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan from 1988 to 1994. Nagorny-Karabakh is an autonomous region of western Azerbaijan, but the majority of the inhabitants are Armenian. Mines were used by all sides in the conflict. A cease-fire agreement was signed in May 1994, but negotiations for a final peace settlement are on-going under the auspices of the OSCE. Landmines

and demining are reportedly on the agenda of the peace negotiations.¹ (See also reports on Armenia and Nagorny-Karabakh.)

Mine Ban Policy

Azerbaijan has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Azerbaijan voted in favor of the 1996 pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution, but abstained on the three subsequent resolutions in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, most recently in December 1999.

In its February 2000 response to an OSCE questionnaire on landmines, the government said, "Azerbaijan believes that a total ban and elimination of antipersonnel landmines is a necessary humanitarian goal with which the world community is faced in the 21st century. However, under the conditions of the continuing occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan territories by Armenian troops and threats of renewed military operations with extensive use of land mines by the enemy on Azerbaijan territory, Azerbaijan is forced to use appropriate measures as a deterrence.... Azerbaijan cannot become a party to the Convention at this stage, since it would be unable to fulfill the obligations that result from it."²

In April 1999, Vice Prime Minister Abid Sharifoff said that Azerbaijan intends to sign the Mine Ban Treaty and Amended Protocol II (1996) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons as soon as a peaceful settlement of the conflict is achieved.³ Azerbaijan is not a signatory to the CCW or its original Protocol II on landmines. Although it is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Azerbaijan stated in February 2000 that it considered the CD "to be the proper forum for discussion of the question regarding anti-personnel land mines."⁴

The government did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999, nor any of the ban treaty intersessional meetings, nor the first Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999. It did, however, attend the NGO-sponsored regional landmine meeting in Tbilisi, Georgia in December 1999. This participation was largely the result of the work of the Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL) and its ongoing work to raise public awareness in support of a ban.

The ACBL organized a landmine conference in February 2000 in Baku. Government representatives took part and were pressed to demine border areas and join the Mine Ban Treaty. At that conference, Colonel Isa Sadikhov, the former deputy of the Minister of Defense, said that the experience of recent conflicts showed that mines are very efficient weapons. He stated that as long as there is a threat of renewed hostilities

¹ United Nations Mine Action Service, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," 5 November 1998, p. 13.

² Response to Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC.DEL/28/00, Vienna, 2 February 2000.

³ "Azerbaijan Mine Action Program," a joint project of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and United Nations Development Program, April 1999, page 2.

⁴ Response to OSCE Questionnaire, 2 February 2000.

and Azeri territory is occupied, it would be impossible to conduct demining operations or join the treaty.⁵

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Azerbaijan is not believed to be a landmine producer or exporter. When the Soviet army left Azerbaijan in 1992, it left landmines behind and this is likely the source of Azerbaijan's stockpile of antipersonnel mines. The number and types of mines in Azerbaijan's stockpiles are unknown.

Use

Landmines were used by all sides throughout the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict.⁶ In 1998 the United Nations indicated that mines continued to be used.⁷ While Azerbaijan clearly insists on its right and need to use antipersonnel mines, Landmine Monitor is not aware of allegations of Azeri forces laying new mines in 1999 or 2000.

In April 2000, an Azerbaijan military official alleged that "Armenian sabotage and reconnaissance squads" continue to enter Azeri territory and mine roads and shepherd's paths.⁸ A border area resident also alleged this, saying that people and cattle are killed and injured on roads on which they used to walk safely.⁹ However, Landmine Monitor has not found concrete corroborating evidence of such use, and Armenian officials deny such charges.¹⁰

Landmine Problem and Survey

The conflict resulted in twenty percent of Azerbaijan's territory being occupied by Armenia and fifteen percent of the population becoming internally displaced.¹¹ UNMAS noted in June 2000, "More than five years after the cessation of hostilities, the biggest impediment to reconstruction and rehabilitation remains the problem of landmine contamination."¹² A complete, nationwide survey has not been undertaken because of the political situation.¹³ UNMAS has estimated that 19,500 square kilometers of land is mine-affected.¹⁴ UNMAS has also stated that approximately twenty-four of the sixty-five

⁵ ACBL Landmine Conference, Baku, Azerbaijan, 19 February 2000.

⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 762-765.

⁷ United Nations Mine Action Service, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," 5 November 1998, p. 14.

⁸ Interview with Col. Isa Sadikhov, former deputy of the Minister of Defense, Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines Office, 17 April 2000.

⁹ Interview with Vagif Hanbabayev Hasan, Kazakh District, Azerbaijan, 10 September 1999.

¹⁰ Armenian Defense Minister Harutiunian has stated that since his appointment to the position in June 1999 not a single order to lay new landmines has been issued. Landmine Monitor/Armenia interview with Lt.-Gen. Vagharshak Harutiunian, Minister of Defense, Republic of Armenia, 19 April 2000.

¹¹ UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, "Country Programs: Azerbaijan," June 2000, p. 37, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/Portfolio.pdf>.

¹² UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, June 2000, p. 34.

¹³ A partial Level 1 survey of 260 of the 700 square kilometers potentially mined in the Fizuli region was carried out in 1998 by BACTEC International. UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," p. 9

¹⁴ UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, p. 34.

Azerbaijan regions are believed to be contaminated, that seven Azeri regions controlled by Armenians are suspected of having mines, and that fourteen other regions “contain defensive minefields laid by the Azerbaijan Defense Forces.”¹⁵

According to information from the Ministry of Defense the front line of military contact covers 1,039 kilometers and much of this territory is mined. Mines can also be found in and around villages, agricultural regions, pastures, roads, bridges, schools, water sources and forest regions. The Ministry of Defense states that it marks minefields and informs the population about them. The Ministry of Defense also says that it has records and maps of all its minefields. The information is classified.

Mine Clearance and Funding

On 18 July 1998 the civilian Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) was established to assume responsibility for mine clearance. As of March 2000, it had developed a National Mine Action Plan, initiated a National Mine Database, constructed several administrative buildings, selected places for training of deminers, and begun to purchase equipment.¹⁶ It is planned to conduct 24 demining training courses for 115 individuals.¹⁷ In 2000 it is planned to demine more than 5 million square meters of territory. Demining operations were expected to start in June 2000 in Fizulu.

British-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG) stated training of deminers in March 2000.¹⁸ Several teams of deminers are now operational under MAG technical supervision. The deminers are employed by the local NGO Relief Azerbaijan, coordinated by ANAMA. Funding is from UNDP through contract with UNOPS.

The National Mine Action Plan delineates a four-phased approach to the mine problem. UNDP is assisting ANAMA with the first phase, the aim of which is to establish the capacity to deal with the mine problem in government-controlled territory (and secondarily to build capacity to eventually deal with the mine problem in territory currently occupied). The estimated cost for establishing the program and the first year of operation is almost \$3.53 million.¹⁹

The breakdown of the budget includes: international training and supervision agency (\$120,000), national demining NGO (\$340,000), international dog support and training contractor (\$550,000), national quality assurance and dog support NGO (\$240,000), mine awareness (\$150,000), victim assistance (\$150,000), general survey (Level One) (\$120,000), facility development (\$200,000), and equipment and material procurement (\$1,658,900).²⁰

On 10 March 2000, ANAMA met with donors of the Azerbaijan Mine Action Program. It announced that \$2.265 million of the \$3.53 million budget had been raised.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁶ Interview with ANAMA Director Ilyas Badalov, *Zerkalo*, 10 March 2000; *Zerkalo* (newspaper), 11 March 2000, available at: <http://www.zerkalo-daily.com>; UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, p. 35.

¹⁷ Interview with ANAMA Director Ilyas Badalov, *Zerkalo*, 10 March 2000.

¹⁸ Email from Tim Carstairs, Communications Manager, Mines Advisory Group to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

Of this sum the Azeri government contributed \$600,000, UNDP \$500,000, the World Bank \$600,000, the Japanese government \$500,000, and Canada \$65,000.²¹

The ultimate beneficiaries of clearance efforts in Azerbaijan will be the 350,000 inhabitants, including refugees, IDPs living in tent camps and people who never left their place of residence in the conflict ridden and contaminated areas. These groups are among the poorest of Azerbaijan's population and include a large percentage of women and children. The project will also provide some income generation activities for people who will be eventually involved in the mine action program.

Apparently, discussions are underway between officials of Azerbaijan and Turkey regarding an agreement to demine the border and prohibit future use on the border, similar to an agreement Turkey has made with Bulgaria.²²

Mine Awareness

The National Mine Action Plan calls for mine awareness instruction to be given to people living next to the mined territories, as well as to refugees and IDPs. According to preliminary estimates the number of people who will be reached by the mine awareness programs will be some 110,000 individuals.²³

Beginning in 1996, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations Development Program and HALO Trust carried out mine awareness programs in Nagorny-Karabakh. The ICRC's mine awareness program works in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Education, UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).²⁴ ICRC field officers have trained 5,400 schoolteachers in mine awareness, who then teach their students. Some 81,000 children have had instruction in mine awareness. In addition these teachers pass on the information to parents in the IDP camps. The ICRC program is community-based and uses locally produced materials, such as videos, leaflets, brochures, and posters. These programs were conducted throughout 1999 in refugee and IDP camps in Barda, Sabirabad and Saatli.²⁵

UNICEF, in partnership with the Ministries of Education, Health, Labor and Social Welfare, the national Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Areas, ANAMA, other UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs, requested \$300,000 for mine awareness in Azerbaijan between February-December 2000. The objective of the project is to "sensitize the IDPs of the danger of mines and reduce/eliminate the potential incidence of mine fatalities and injuries among children in Azerbaijan."²⁶

ACBL and Institute of Peace and Democracy, with financial support from the Landmines Project of the Open Society Institute Development Foundation, are implementing two projects for humanitarian mine action during August 1999- July 2000.

²¹ *Zerkalo* (newspaper), 11 March 2000, available at: <http://www.zerkalo-daily.com>.

²² Statement by the Turkish Delegation to the Ljubljana, Slovenia Regional Conference on Landmines, 21-22 June 2000.

²³ Interview with ANAMA Director Ilyas Badalov, *Zerkalo*, 10 March 2000.

²⁴ UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," p. 12.

²⁵ Statement of Musa Jalalov, Mine Awareness Program of International Committee of the Red Cross, delivered at the Landmine Seminar "Mine Free Caucasus," Baku, 17 November 1999.

²⁶ UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, p. 37.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Based on official data provided by the government, 5,561 people injured in the Karabakh conflict have been registered in the country; of these, 78% are military and 22% civilian. Many of them are mine victims.²⁷ Data from the Society of the Invalids of the Karabakh conflict indicate there are more than 7,000 invalids from the conflict and that more than 70% of them are mine victims.²⁸

The ICRC runs an orthopedic/prosthetic center in Baku, as does the government. Since April of 1997, Azerbaijan has had a law for the protection and rehabilitation of disabled. (For more on casualties and mine survivor assistance, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 768-769.)

BELARUS

Key developments since March 1999: Belarus destroyed nearly 7,000 antipersonnel mines from 1997-1999. Belarus hosted an “International Workshop on Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination” in Minsk on 6-7 March 2000. Belarus is actively seeking assistance for stockpile destruction. Mine clearance by the military continues.

Mine Ban Policy

Belarus has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It has, however, voted for the 1997, 1998 and December 1999 UN General Assembly resolutions supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Government officials have stated that Belarus “fully supports” the ban treaty.¹ In December 1999, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs said, “We completely share its humane purposes, but taking our international obligations seriously, we cannot become a party to the Convention today without having adequate resources for its implementation. We shall constantly keep in mind the scope of commitments under the Ottawa Convention though it is not legally bound by them.”²

Belarus has stated that it hopes to become a party to the treaty in the future, and toward that end, welcomes international financial and technical assistance for clearance and the destruction of millions of antipersonnel mines stockpiled in the country.³

Belarus hosted an “International Workshop on Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination” in Minsk on 6-7 March 2000.⁴ Discussions were aimed at

²⁷ *Yeni Musavat*, 13-19 August 1998.

²⁸ *Azadliq* (Independent), Baku, 12 August 1998 (in Azeri).

¹ Presentation, Republic of Belarus, Colonel S. Luchina, Deputy Chief of Staff, Corps of Engineers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, on the occasion of the International Seminar on Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination, Minsk, 6-7 March 2000.

² Statement by H.E. Mr. Sergei Martynov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus to the First Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

³ Statement of Mr. Ivan Grinevic, Third Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Belarus at the Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, 26-28 March 1998.

⁴ Participants included representatives from Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland,

accurately defining the scope of the landmine problem in Belarus, developing possible solutions and identifying international resources that could be made available to assist the Republic of Belarus in its demining and stockpile elimination activities. A regional approach to the problem was discussed, based on possible cooperation between Belarus, Canada and Ukraine, as the most effective and efficient strategy for Belarus to be able to join the Mine Ban Treaty.

In March 2000, Belarus legislators reconfirmed their commitment to support the total ban on landmines as soon as the assistance necessary to destroy existing stockpiles is provided.⁵ The government is wary of premature commitment, given its negative experience when it had to destroy ten percent of its weapons under European arms reduction agreements almost without international assistance. The military is also concerned that Belarus' neighbors, Latvia and Russia, have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty.⁶

Belarus has indicated that it was not able to participate in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, Mozambique because of lack of funding. The representative of the Belarus Campaign to Ban Landmines (BCBL) did attend the meeting and subsequently was able to brief Belarus authorities on the meeting, which was viewed positively by the government. Belarus attended the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction meetings in Geneva in December 1999 and May 2000.

The Belarus authorities welcomed the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* and the need for further collaboration with the ICBL and BCBL was indicated. As stated by Major General I. Misuragin, Chief of the Corps of Engineers, the government is "trying to be as open as possible in mine-related issues. This is proved by our close co-operation with various public organizations, in particular, the SCAF Center [Support Center for Associations and Foundations], which renders assistance to the Defense Ministry in dealing with mine-related issues. For the past two years the Ministry of Defense has been answering questions of the non-governmental organization International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) for its research activities."⁷

On 7 October 1996, the government ratified Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. However, its instrument of ratification has not been submitted to the depository "due to financial constraints on its implementation."⁸ The Armed Forces have studied the provisions of Amended Protocol II, and have started their implementation.⁹ Material on the basic provisions of the Mine Protocol has been

Turkey, Ukraine, U.S., ICRC, Geneva Humanitarian Demining Center and the Secretariat of the United Nations, among others.

⁵ Presentation by Piotr Zhushma, Vice-Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs and Relations with CIS, House of Representatives, National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus at the International Workshop on Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

⁶ Statement by Major General I. Misuragin, Chief of the Corps of Engineers, at the International Workshop in Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

⁷ Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

⁸ Statement by Colonel Luchina, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

⁹ Nikolai Kuts, "Mines with delayed action," *Vo slavu Rodini* (newspaper), 27 July 1999.

developed and distributed to the Army. Special attention is given to studying the Protocol in curricula for cadets and students at the Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus. Belarus participated in the First Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva in December 1999.

Belarus supports negotiation of a ban on mine transfers at the Conference on Disarmament, of which it is a member.¹⁰

Production and Transfer

According to officials in the Ministry of Defense, Belarus has never produced and will not produce or modernize antipersonnel landmines, or their components, including Claymore-type mines or any other mines, in the future.¹¹ They also stated that Belarus is not producing or conducting research on any munitions which might function like antipersonnel mines and pose dangers to civilians (such as antitank mines with anti-handling devices, submunitions, cluster bombs), and that Belarus is not engaging in research on alternatives to antipersonnel landmines.¹²

Government officials say that Belarus is not exporting AP mines nor has it exported them in the past.¹³ In 1995 President Alexandr Lukashenka announced a moratorium on the export of all types of landmines from 1 September 1995 until the end of 1997.¹⁴ In late 1997 the president extended the export moratorium to the end of 1999.¹⁵ On February 4, 2000 the moratorium was extended again until the end of 2002.¹⁶ A decree at the beginning of 1998 banned the transit of AP mines and certain other goods through the territory of the Republic of Belarus.¹⁷

Stockpiling

Belarus has very significant stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. It estimates that it would need U.S.\$10-50 million, depending on the method of destruction used, to develop

¹⁰ Statement of Sergei Martynov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Geneva, 11 February 1999.

¹¹ Statement by Sergei Martynov, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

¹² Interviews with Colonel Ignaty Misuragin, Head of Department of Engineer Forces, Belarus Ministry of Defense and Colonel Sergei Luchina, Deputy Head of Department of Engineer Forces, Belarus Ministry of Defense, Minsk, 21 January 1999. Also Letter # 17/1043 from the Belarus Ministry of Defense to the Support Center for Associations and Foundations (SCAF), "About Information on Landmine Issues," 24 November 1998.

¹³ Statement of Ivan Grinevic, Third Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Belarus at the Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, 26-28 March 1998.

¹⁴ Decree # 335 of the President of the Republic of Belarus, "Introduction in the Republic of Belarus Moratorium on Export of Landmines," 22 August 1995.

¹⁵ Decree # 628 of the President of the Republic of Belarus, "About the Prolongation of the Moratorium on Export of Landmines Till the End of 1999," 4 December 1997.

¹⁶ Decree # 42 of the President of the Republic of Belarus, "About the Prolongation of the Moratorium on Export of Landmines Till the End of 2002," 4 February 2000.

¹⁷ Decree #27 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, "About State Control Over Transit Through the Territory of the Republic of Belarus of Specific Goods," 10 January 1998.

technologies necessary for and to carry out the destruction of its stocks. Belarus does not have either the scientific capabilities or the facilities to destroy landmines.¹⁸

Government officials have declined to divulge the total number of mines in stockpile, and have spoken only of “millions” of stockpiled mines.¹⁹ The Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus have in stock MON-50, -90, and -100 fixed directional mines, PMN and PMN-2 blast mines, OZM-72 circular area fragmentation mines, PFM and POM-2 cluster mines, and MS-3 booby-trap.²⁰ Most of the landmines at the Armed Forces storage facilities are believed to be the cluster types that cannot be brought in compliance with the requirements of Protocol II.

Although the CCW Protocol II does not require destruction or dismantling of mines that do not meet the requirements of the Protocol’s Technical Annex, in 1997 the Armed Forces began a step-by-step process of destroying these landmines.²¹ About 7,000 mines of different types have been destroyed by explosion since that time. The first types to be destroyed were mines with an expired shelf life. Belarus has completely destroyed the most treacherous explosive devices – MB-2 booby-traps made to look like pens and used by the Special Forces.²²

Number and type of AP mines and booby-traps destroyed in 1997-99²³

Type	Model	Number
Circular area	POMZ-2m	3908
	OZM-4	210
Blast	PMN	551
Directional	MON-50	66
	MON-90	1088
Booby-trap	MC-3	965
Booby-trap	MB-2	151
Total		6939

Belarus indicates that it has not been able to undertake larger-scale destruction of landmines because their destruction by explosion is viewed as environmentally unsound. Some 3.5 million landmines could be destroyed by explosion or incineration. However two-thirds of the KSF clusters with PFM mines have liquid explosive content and cannot be destroyed this way, as it would generate hydrocyanic acid and lead, creating danger for the environment.²⁴

In 1999 the shelf life of 1.5 million PFM-1 antipersonnel cluster mines expired. This type of mine has a liquid explosive, and their continued storage may cause an irreversible chemical reaction and result in an explosion. The number of mines with

¹⁸ Statement by Colonel Luchina, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

¹⁹ Statement by H.E.Mikhail Khvstov, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.

²⁰ Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

²¹ Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

²² Letter #17/1096, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 29 November 1999.

²³ Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

²⁴ Nikolai Kuts, “Mines with delayed action,” 27 July 1999.

expired shelf life increases by 5-10% annually.²⁵ The Belarus Ministry of Defense has identified the destruction of PFM-1 landmine stockpiles as a priority.²⁶ There is no plant specialized in destruction of landmines.

When assessing environmental consequences of landmines destruction, Belarus used the methodology of ecological threat assessment, worked out by experts of the Russian Federation in the course of destruction of permanently packed KSF-1 clusters with PFM-1 mines by incineration in the open air.²⁷ The preliminary assessment of this method has determined that: (1) Aluminium oxide, lead compounds, liquid explosive (unburned remains), hydrogen cyanide (hydrocyanic acid) are the main pollutants of the environment; (2) The scale of general pollution with harmful substances will come to: with incineration of one box with clusters – 0.29-6.8 km, and ten boxes – 0.92-21.6 km. (3) Incineration of cluster boxes on the one-by-one basis in the center of the working zone with the radius of 50m exceeds the admissible pollution level on most types of harmful substances by 1800 to 2000 times. (4) The radius of a long-time pollution zone (due to fallout of lead compounds to the surface) will come to: with incineration of 1 box – 46m, and one dispatching automobile lot (252 boxes) – 730 m.

Possible ways to solve the problem were discussed at the First International Workshop on Humanitarian De-mining and Mines Stockpile Elimination in Minsk on 6-7 March 2000. A regional approach was proposed by SCAF. The most effective and efficient way to eliminate PFM-1 mines could be their destruction at the specialized plant constructed by western donors in one of the countries that has similar type of mines to be destroyed (Russian, Ukraine, Bulgaria). However only part of the PFM-1 stockpiles could be safely transported to another country while at least some 1.5 million of these mines need to be destroyed on the spot.

It is expected that technical, financial and legal assessments of Belarus' exact needs in humanitarian demining and stockpile elimination will be completed by October 2000.

Use

The Belarus Ministry of Defense states that AP mines are not used on its territory, for border defense or otherwise.²⁸ Officials state that antipersonnel mine use is not part of the military's doctrine or training, and that the stocks of mines are an "unwanted heritage from the former Soviet Union."²⁹ The Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also said, "Belarus does not use any other munitions which might function like an antipersonnel mine and pose dangers to civilians such as antitank mines with anti-handling devices, improvised explosive devices, certain submunitions/cluster bombs."³⁰

²⁵ Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

²⁶ Letter #1274/18, Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 February 1999 and Letter #17/70, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 26 January 1999.

²⁷ Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

²⁸ Letter #17/1043, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 24 November 1998.

²⁹ Statement by Mr. Sergei Martynov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 17 December 1999. Also, ICBL meeting with Mr. Martynov, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

³⁰ Letter #17/1096, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 29 November 1999.

Landmine Problem

There is an unknown number of World War II vintage German and Soviet mines scattered about old battlefields, in particular in the Vitebsk, Gomel and Minsk regions where the major battles of WWII were fought.³¹ Most of this mined land is agricultural fields and forests. The requests for mine clearance of these territories come from the local authorities and it is the local population that benefits from the humanitarian mine action.³²

Few records or maps exist of the mined areas and no research has been conducted yet in this respect.³³ Most of the mined land is not marked. The most dangerous parts of the mined areas are those where trench battles took place.³⁴ Mined areas are marked as soon as they are located. Recently most of the UXO have been found in the Brest, Gomel, Mogilev, Minsk and Vitebsk regions. The Vitebsk region is the most affected, where the area of 191 square kilometers should be checked, and is of special concern.³⁵

Mine Clearance

The Ministry of Defense has cleared some 26 million explosive devices from Belarus' territory since the end of World War II. Over the past 10 years, from 5-80,000 explosive items were detected and defused annually.³⁶ Of that number, about 1,500 were AP mines. The clearance of the mined area is carried out by specially trained detachments of the Belarus Military Forces.

Belarus lacks funding needed for mine action. It has never received any international assistance in this respect.³⁷ Belarus has asked the UN Mine Action Service to provide assistance in assessing the extent of the mine and UXO problem in the country. The government will host a UN experts' mission in July-September 2000 to examine the situation and to estimate the costs of demining.³⁸ Belarus actively participates and fully supports the activities of the special group to support Global Humanitarian Mine Action within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

No national program on humanitarian mine action currently exists in Belarus. The organization and coordination of mine clearance is carried out by the Department of Engineer Forces in the Main Headquarters of the Belarus Military Forces and by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There are 200 deminers in forty-four mobile military groups that belong to Army engineer detachments that undertake mine clearance and training operations in Belarus. For example, five districts in the Brest region and two

³¹ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines*, (Washington, D.C., 1993).

³² Letter #17/1096, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 29 November 1999.

³³ Mr. Rudi Wildheim, a member of Hildenbrandt-Electronic Company's Board of Directors and who fought in World War II, made available for Belarus experts Bundeswehr's maps of minefields the German Army had laid in Belarus during World War II. These materials were very helpful in demining the territory of the Dubrovensky district in the Vitebsk region.

³⁴ Letter #17/1096, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 29 November 1999.

³⁵ Nikolai Zhuchko, "Deminers Make Mistakes," *Respublica*, (newspaper), 13 March 1997.

³⁶ Presentation by the representative of the Belarus Ministry of Defense, Minsk, 6-7 March 2000.

³⁷ Letter #17/1096, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 29 November 1999.

³⁸ Nikolai Zhuchko, "Deminers Make Mistakes."

districts in the Grodno region are served by two mobile military groups of six deminers. Manual, dogs and mechanical modes of operations are used. Recently no deminers have been killed. One officer was severely injured in a demining operation in 1998.

Almost everyday the groups are called to clear UXO. Two specially equipped automobiles are used to transport the teams to the location of detected UXO. In November 1999 the team cleared over 3,439 UXO, including AP mines in the industrial area of the city of Grodno.³⁹ The operation was videotaped and shown on national TV. UXO were destroyed by explosion.

The total area cleared in Belarus from 1991 until 1999 is 350 hectares, most of which could not be used for agricultural or production purposes before clearance. The location of areas recently cleared includes Krupsky district in the Minsk region, Dubrovensky district in the Vitebsk region, and Baranovichi district in the Brest region. The records of areas cleared are maintained and these records are publicly accessible.⁴⁰ The cost of mine clearance is approximately \$12,000 per square kilometer depending upon complexity of engineer works. The funding is spent primarily on calling-out of reserves and resources for demining efforts. To this end, 1,000 combat engineers were called out from reserve in 1992-99. The major obstacle to a more effective mine clearance program is lack of funding.

Mine Awareness Education

The demining teams use mine clearance operations for education aimed at victim prevention. However there is no systematic mine awareness program being carried out.

The NGO SCAF collaborates with the Ministries of Education and Defense to develop mine awareness programs for Belarus' schools. The Ministry of Education has recently incorporated mine awareness issues in the national secondary education curriculum.

Mine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

For the period from 1944-99, there were 5,997 mine and UXO casualties, including 3,375 maimed and 2,622 killed.⁴¹ In the past ten years, sixty-two children were injured, including thirty-seven wounded and twenty-five killed. All of these people were civilians and the accidents happened in uncultivated fields. (See also *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 774-775.)

Medical, surgical, rehabilitation and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in facilities coordinated by the Ministry of Health. Most prosthetic and rehabilitation facilities are available in Belarus. The Belarus Prosthetic-Rehabilitation Center (BPRC) is the main producer and supplier of prosthetics. This network has the capacity to produce 259 wheelchairs and 1,220 prosthetic devices monthly.

³⁹ Zhuchko, "Deminers Make Mistakes."

⁴⁰ Letter #17/1043, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 24 November 1998.

⁴¹ Presentation by the representative of the Belarus Ministry of Defense, Minsk, 6-7 March 2000.

A national disability law exists in Belarus: "Law on Social Protection of People With Disabilities in the Republic of Belarus."⁴² The National Council on the Problems of Disabled and Handicapped, which is chaired by the First Deputy of the Prime Minister, coordinates the implementation of the law.⁴³ A Law on Psychiatric Counseling has recently been adopted by the parliament and hopefully will result in better services to be provided to AP mines victims/survivors. (See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 776-777.)

ESTONIA

Key developments since March 1999: Existing law was amended on 17 July 1999 to prohibit the export and transit of antipersonnel mines. In March 2000, the Foreign Ministry said that Estonia has less than 1,000 AP mines in its stockpile, which are used for training purposes. Estonia acceded to CCW Amended Protocol II on 20 April 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Estonia has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), despite making statements in favor of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines, and voting in favor of all pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions.¹ According to an official at the Foreign Ministry, Estonia is concerned that there may be problems with verification of other countries' compliance with provisions of the MBT. Estonia does not exclude the possibility of joining the MBT, although not in the near future.²

Because of its occupation under the Soviet Union, there remains a perceived need for secure defenses, but limited defense budgets preclude acquiring the expensive defense systems thought necessary to substitute for AP mines. At present, there are poor diplomatic relations with Russia, with attacks on the Estonian embassy in Moscow. In this situation, traditional arguments by the military that antipersonnel mines can be an inexpensive and efficient method of slowing massive land invasion are persuasive, despite the small size of actual AP mine stocks in Estonia and the lack of recent production capacity. Although responsible officials recognize that in practice the long-term humanitarian costs of AP mines greatly outweigh their short-term military value, this has yet to be translated into acceptance of the ban.³

There are periodic security consultations between Estonia and Finland, and Estonia closely follows Finnish policy on the landmine issue,⁴ although the Ministry of Defense

⁴² Law on Social Protection of People With Disabilities in the Republic of Belarus, 25 November 1991.

⁴³ Law on Social Protection of People With Disabilities in the Republic of Belarus, Article 6, p. 36.

¹ For details of Estonia's previous statements on ban policy, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 778.

² Interview with Malle Talvet, Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn, 10 March 2000.

³ Analysis formed from interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January-March 2000.

⁴ Interview with Malle Talvet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2000.

insists that there is no need to link the Estonian position on the AP mine issue to that of any other country.⁵

Estonia did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties of the MBT in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. It has not sent representatives to any of the MBT's intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts.

Estonia acceded to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 20 April 2000.⁶ Estonia would prefer that a ban evolve through the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This remains the government position, as stated in its report to the OSCE:

The Conference on Disarmament has a clear mandate to address conventional disarmament issues. As part of this mandate, the Government of Estonia believes the CD has a role to play in strengthening the existing international regime against anti-personnel landmines. The Conference counts all key countries as its members and also provides for the possibility of active participation by non-members. An APL transfer ban negotiated by the CD would only enhance the task of implementing a global regime against landmines. Estonia welcomes the initiative of those countries who promote the Conference on Disarmament action on an APL transfer ban and regrets that during its 1999 session the Conference was not able to establish an appropriate mechanism to deal with this issue. The Government of Estonia hopes that a Special Co-ordinator is re-appointed and consultations start during the early part of the Conference's next session.⁷

Production, Transfer and Stockpile

According to the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Estonia is not now producing AP mines and has not produced them in the past.⁸ The "Weapons Act" of 1 January 1996 was amended on 17 July 1999 to prohibit the export and transit of AP mines, related technologies and materials.⁹

⁵ Interviews with Erik Männik, Head of Defense Policy Planning, and Hestrid Tedder, Defense Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Defense, Tallinn, 10 March 2000.

⁶ E-mail messages from Hestrid Tedder, Ministry of Defense, 3 May 2000, and from Malle Talvet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2000.

⁷ Report of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Estonia to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 9 December 1999, p.2.

⁸ Interview with Tiit Aleksejev, Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn, 20 January 1999; fax message from Erik Männik, Ministry of Defense, 10 March 1999.

⁹ Report to the OSCE, 9 December 1999. It notes the following additional recently adopted or amended legislation that regulates primarily the transfer, but also the use, production and storage or destruction of AP mines in the Republic of Estonia: Strategic Goods Export and Transit Act (17 July 1999), Regulation on Procedure for Export and Transit of Strategic Goods (9 October 1999), Customs Act (19 January 1998, amended 31 October 1999), and Minister of Defence Regulation on Procedure for Procurement, Storage, Conveyance and Carrying of Weapons and Munitions in the Area of Government and of the Ministry of Defence (2 December 1997).

In March 2000, the Foreign Ministry said that Estonia has less than 1,000 AP mines in its stockpile, which are used for training purposes.¹⁰

Landmine Problem and Mine Clearance

Landmines and other explosives left from military operations during World War II and from the Soviet occupation have been cleared from Estonian islands in the Baltic Sea, notably from Pakri and Naissaar, which were used as military test sites by the Soviet army. After these clearance operations there are no more “closed areas” in Estonia. Mines and UXO found occasionally in various parts of Estonia are destroyed by the Rescue Board, a division of the Ministry of Interior that employs about twenty people to perform clearance operations, and which has received British, Swedish and U.S. assistance. There is also a group of well-trained demining specialists in the Estonian Defense Forces, which the government has proposed could be involved in conflict zones elsewhere in the world.¹¹

Mine Action and Victim Assistance

In 1999 Estonia contributed US\$2,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.¹² Officials of the Foreign Ministry said that Estonia is willing to contribute one platoon-sized unit for mine clearance in mine-affected countries. Estonian officers serving in SFOR missions have successfully participated in clearance of minefields in Bosnia. The preferred framework for such assistance would be the Demining 2010 Initiative.¹³

During recent years there have been no mine accidents, but accidents with UXOs still occur. In 1999, several schoolchildren were injured on an island near Tallinn when they attempted to burn a mortar shell. It is possible that there are landmine victims among Afghanistan war veterans. There are legal benefits for disabled people, including any mine/UXO victims, and hospitals in Tallinn and other towns can provide high quality treatment.¹⁴

FINLAND

Key developments since March 1999: Finland contributed US\$5 million to mine action programs in 1999 and deployed mine clearance teams to Kosovo and Mozambique. It contributed about \$1.9 million to mine action January-April 2000. Finland has carried out destruction of some non-detectable mines, in accordance with Amended Protocol II. Finland reiterated its goal of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in 2006.

¹⁰ Interview with Malle Talvet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2000.

¹¹ Interview with Erik Männik and Hestrid Tedder, Ministry of Defense, 10 March 2000.

¹² Report to the OSCE, 9 December 1999, p. 2.

¹³ Interview with Tiit Aleksejev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn, 20 January 1999; e-mail message, 20 February 1999.

¹⁴ Interview with Malle Talvet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Finland is the only country in the European Union that has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). In part to mitigate its isolation in the EU in particular, and the wider international community, it has become Finnish policy to voice support for the total banning of antipersonnel mines and indicate “readiness” to join the MBT in the future.¹

The government formed a working group comprised of officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense to consider the AP mine issue. In its report of December 1997, it declared that Finland was in the process of moving toward a total ban on AP mines and would be prepared to replace them with other methods of independent and reliable defense. But the working group insisted that Finland needed additional money - several million U.S. dollars - for alternatives to AP mines; even if alternatives and the funds to acquire them were available the transitional period would take at least ten years.² In December 1999, the goal of being able to join the MBT by 2006 and replace its mines before the end of 2010 was reiterated in its report on AP mine policy to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.³ The working group continues its deliberations.

In March 2000, officials of the Foreign Ministry said that it was not an easy decision to remain outside the MBT: “The step to take was difficult. We are not usually outsiders in international politics and disarmament.”⁴ The government felt it had to stay out of the Ottawa Process because it was “not capable of influencing the end result. We could not join the Ottawa Treaty because of the requirement to destroy stockpiles in such a short time. We could not do it in four years. We could, of course, have signed the treaty, but we could not ratify. So we decided not to sign. We think that it is better that if we are going to sign we would also be capable to ratify. We decided that we will not take part in the process. After that Finland found its position easier.”⁵

Officials consistently point to Finland’s geographical and geopolitical position, as a large country with a small population bordering on Russia, with whom it has fought two wars in the last sixty years as a fundamental reason for staying outside the MBT. Finland wants to have, and to give the signal that it has, a “strong, credible, independent defense.” In March 2000, an official from the Ministry of Defense explained: “Antipersonnel landmines are part of the Finnish defense system. Finland is a country fragmented by the lake system, full of different areas around the waterways. To defend these kind of areas Finland needs landmines which fit well and are essential.”⁶ He repeated the claim often made that the military would need a budget increase of 3-5 Miljard Finnish marks (US\$500-800 million) to cover the expenses of replacing AP mines.⁷

¹ Council of State, Report to the Parliament, 17 March 1997.

² Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 352, 16 December 1997; Jalkaväkimiina - työryhmän raportti (report of the APM-working group), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 December 1997.

³ Report of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2 December 1999, p. 2.

⁴ Interview with Counselor Timo Kantola, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2000.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Interview with Col. Yrjö Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 2 March 2000.

⁷ Ibid.

While government and military officials always refer to Russia when discussing AP mine issues, they deny that Finland is afraid of its neighbor, saying that a possible attack from Russia is already out of question and history.⁸ This claim seems to contradict the explanations about the need for strong border defenses. One military official noted, "Even though Russia is not the threat, it is an uncertain factor. I think, nobody can really estimate how time and the situation will change. We have a long border with Russia."⁹ Defense officials deny that Finland looked upon any other states as an example not to sign the MBT, and say that the Ministry of Defense is unanimous in this decision, which has been taken from a national point of view. They note that "many Finnish people think that landmines are a very important part of the defense policy."¹⁰ In Finland, war veterans and most of Finnish society defend and support the priorities and needs of the Defense Forces.

What no government or military official has explained is the real practicality of relying on AP mines as border-defense against invasion when the mines are in stockpiles rather than already deployed.¹¹ Finland has no mass-delivery systems,¹² and would have to rely on hand-emplacement of hundreds of thousands of mines in a country where the lake systems make travel difficult and slow. It is the view of the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland that, if the military were to admit that AP mines are an out-dated form of defense, they would risk discussion of the relevance of current defense doctrine and planning; this is a discussion the Finnish defense establishment is not ready to take up.

A member of the Finnish Parliament says that Finnish policy is double-sided. "Finland is in a way the 'superpower of disarmament' but this is when it is about the strategic weapons of other countries. When the disarmament concerns the weapons strategically important to Finland we are not as positive about it. It is embarrassing that we are in the same group with the United States of America, China and Russia. We have to remember that while planning to plant antipersonnel landmines around strategic places, these are also where civilians are in danger."¹³

Finland held the presidency of the European Union in the last half of 1999. Despite being the only European Union member not to have signed the MBT, it was put in the position at the United Nations of delivering the EU statement in favor of the implementation of the MBT:

The EU emphasizes the importance of full and speedy implementation of the Ottawa Convention, including the reporting obligations and the deadlines laid down in the Convention as to the destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined areas and in stockpiles as well as assistance to the mine victims. Moreover, the EU calls upon all States to combine their efforts in order to achieve the total elimination of

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Telephone interview with Commander GS Henrik Nysten, Ministry of Defense, 4 May 2000.

¹⁰ Interview with Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 2 March 2000.

¹¹ Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 3.

¹² Telephone interview with Commander GS Henrik Nysten, Ministry of Defense, 4 May 2000.

¹³ Interview with Parliamentarian Kimmo Kiljunen, Social Democratic Party, 6 April 2000.

antipersonnel mines worldwide. In this context, the importance of the possibility the Convention offers for States Signatories to provisionally apply its provisions pending its entry into force should be stressed. The EU and its Member States will actively participate in the program of intersessional work adopted at the First Meeting of State Parties.¹⁴

At the time of this statement, the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland pointed out the irony of a country that has not even signed the MBT being able to give a pro-treaty statement on behalf of EU countries that are signatories, many of whom have taken key leadership roles in the Ottawa Process which produced the MBT. Despite the strength of the EU statement, it has been difficult for the EU to act cohesively in encouraging the signing, ratification and implementation of the MBT when one of its member countries has not signed the treaty.

A Finnish member of the European Parliament (MEP) said that in the EU, Finland does not come under great pressure to join the MBT because its borders are seen as an independent problem.¹⁵

Regionally, the Finnish position has also had a negative influence. An NGO dealing with issues in the Baltics and based in Riga, Latvia, believes that Estonia and Latvia are following Finland's lead on the MBT.¹⁶

In the United Nations, Finland has voted for all key resolutions in favor of banning AP mines, including Resolution 54/54B in December 1999 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Finland also attended as an observer the First Meeting of State Parties in May 1999; the delegation was led by the Head of the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Finland has also followed the intersessional work of the MBT, attending meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts.

Finland has been a core supporter of negotiating landmine issues in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). It would be happy to see a transfer ban negotiated in the CD but has been careful to not take any steps or voice its support for initiatives seen as hostile by countries that support the Ottawa Process and MBT. Finland sees the different approaches as complementary to each other.¹⁷

Finland is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Finland participated in the First Conference of States Parties on Protocol II in December 1999, and submitted its Article 13 report at that meeting.

¹⁴ Statement of Finland on behalf of the EU to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, New York, 11 October 1999.

¹⁵ Interview with MEP Heidi Hautala, President of the Green Group in the European Parliament, 31 March 2000.

¹⁶ Statement by Dr. Igors Tipans, Baltic International Center for Human Education, at ICBL seminar in Brussels, 31 January 2000.

¹⁷ Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 2.

Production

Almost all AP mines in stock are Finnish-made mines, said to be produced between 1945 and 1981. No mines have been produced since then.¹⁸ From this, the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland concludes: "This means that the majority of the mines in stocks are quite old, some of the oldest have been given new fuses, or renewed in some other ways, but mainly the stock should probably be anyway, for military technical reasons, modernized and replaced with new mines or now after this ban process with something else."¹⁹ Finland has the capability and the know-how to produce AP mines and it is, in principle, possible to do so as long as there is no legislation that prohibits production. (For more detail, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 786-787.)

Until 1981 several Finnish companies produced components for simple, "basic" mines that the army assembled as blast-mines, fragmentation-mines, and some Claymores; however, most of the Claymores in stock were imported from Austria.²⁰

Finland has no mine delivery systems. "APMs are mainly meant to be delivered by hand, but there are some future delivery development plans for the new military readiness groups. Using helicopters as a delivery system has been researched only in a theoretical way. At the moment Finland does not have technical equipment for delivering APMs."²¹

On the question of replacing and finding alternatives for AP mines, the Defense Ministry said that it "evaluate[s] possibilities in different kinds of research and follows with the development in other countries."²²

Transfer

The Defense Ministry stated in 1998 and again in 1999 that Finland does not export AP mines.²³ However, in another interview a Defense Ministry official said that "Finland has exported components of mines (antitank) but never whole APMs."²⁴ Following regulations in the CCW Amended Protocol II, which came into force in Finland in December 1998, Finland does not transfer any AP mine production technology to any other country.²⁵ All exports and transfers of know-how or production licenses of military goods and components are regulated under arms trade law (which now incorporates the CCW restrictions) and must be licensed by the Ministry of Defense.²⁶

Finland has imported Claymore-type mines (model VM88) from Austria.

¹⁸ Interview with Lt. Col. Jaakko Martikainen, Defence Staff, 5 February 1999; Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 3.

¹⁹ Laura Lodenius, Coordinator, Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland, 31 January 1999.

²⁰ Telephone interview with Col. Arto Mikkonen, Defense Staff, 18 February 1999.

²¹ Telephone interview with Commander Nysten, 4 May 2000.

²² Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 12 February 1999.

²³ Telephone interview with Senior Governmental Secretary Jari Takanen, Ministry of Defense, 5 February 1999; Press Release, Defense Force, No. 200, 2 December 1998.

²⁴ Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 12 February 1999.

²⁵ Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 5 February 1999.

²⁶ Telephone interview with Senior Governmental Secretary Jari Takanen, Ministry of Defense, 5 February 1999.

Stockpiling

Finland's tradition of transparency does not include military issues, especially if it means disclosing information on stockpiles and other information that has to do with war plans. But at the CCW Protocol II meeting in December 1999, Finnish delegates told the ICBL that in the near future Finland may give information on the number of mines in stockpiles.²⁷ At present, public knowledge of AP mine stockpiles remains as described in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*: officially numbering hundreds of thousands but less than a million.²⁸

But the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland continues to believe that "the stated amount is in clear contradiction with statements that APMs are an essential part of Finland's defense, and especially in consideration of Finland's long land border and with the statement that it would be very expensive to consider alternatives and destroy the stocks because Finland has more landmines on average than other European countries."²⁹ Also, a government officer, who wishes to remain unnamed, commented that the size of the stockpile is probably bigger than reported in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.

Finland will not destroy its mine stockpiles before it finds alternatives to AP mines for its defense and signs the MBT. However, ratification of the CCW Amended Protocol II has resulted in destruction of some stocks to be compliant with the Protocol. It is not known what impact Protocol II has had on the absolute numbers of mines, but the changes to the composition of the stockpiles resulting from ratification are clearer. It has been necessary to destroy some of the older AP mines (types Sakaramiina SM57 and SM61), and adapt others (Sakaramiina SM65). The SM65 blast-mines do not meet the Amended Protocol II requirements in terms of being detectable; Finland has decided not to add metal to the stockpiled mines except when they are used in training, maintaining the capacity to add the metal if the mines should be taken out from stocks for use. When this change is made these mines will be called Sakaramiina 65-98.³⁰ One official said that they "started to destroy old blast mines already before the end of last year (1998) and they are already all destroyed."³¹ Some antitank mines (Pohjamiina PM76) have also been destroyed. The old mines have been destroyed in Lapland or they have been recycled; for example, all the copper has been collected for reuse.³²

As in other countries, the Finnish Ministry of Defense has renamed its Claymore mines as directional fragmentation "charges" or "explosives" as of 3 December 1998. But the Defense Staff has also stated it will not use the weapon by tripwire-activation: "Finland has changed and classified all Claymore mines as weapons and they are

²⁷ Laura Lodenius, Coordinator, Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland, reported after the CCW First Conference of States Parties, Geneva, December 1999.

²⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 789-790.

²⁹ Laura Lodenius, Coordinator, Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland, 31 January 1999.

³⁰ Press Release, Defense Staff, 3 December 1998. See also, Finland's National Report required by CCW Amended Protocol II, Article 13, dated 11 November 1999.

³¹ Telephone interview with L. Col. Heikki Backstrom, Ministry of Defense, 22 February 1999.

³² *Ibid.*

command-detonated only.”³³ The name has changed and the policy is to use them only in command-detonated mode, but no modifications of the weapon have been made: “[I]t is still possible to trigger them by tripwires.”³⁴

Use

Antipersonnel landmines remain an essential part of Finnish defense doctrine, and Finland reserves the right to use them and other weapons that might function as AP mines. But the mines are in stocks and there are no minefields in peacetime in Finland.³⁵

Finland has reported that it also reserves the right to use explosive booby traps in population centers under certain conditions. In its Article 13 report for Amended Protocol II, Finland states: “Use of booby traps is forbidden in population centers where civilians are still present and fighting has not yet escalated or it is not expected immediately, except situations where the center is connected to a military installation or in close proximity. Booby traps may be used in population centers if dangerous areas are guarded, fenced and properly signed.”³⁶

Mine Action Funding

Since the early 1990s Finland has supported mine action programs with FIM 103 million (US\$16.7 million) in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Laos and Mozambique.³⁷ The Finnish contribution includes cash contributions, personnel and in-kind assistance.

For the period 1998-2001 Finland has allocated FIM 120 million (US\$19.5 million) for mine action as detailed below.³⁸ In connection with this decision Finland established in June 1998 a Stand-by Unit for Humanitarian Demining, which consists of twenty to thirty people to be deployed according to operational needs in assisting demining programs. The Unit has the capacity to train local deminers and carry out mine awareness training, and includes a mechanical mine clearance capacity. One expert of the Stand-by Unit participates in the Western European Demining Assistance Mission (WEUDAM), which was deployed in May 1999 to train mine clearance specialists and instructors in Croatia.

In 1998 a mechanical mine clearance project was also started, in Cambodia, which involved a six-man team (Finn Flail Team), two Finnish RA-140 DS mine clearance vehicles and one XA-180 command and control vehicle. These projects are provided with full support and service packages (vehicles, maintenance, spare parts, personnel

³³ Telephone interviews with Lt. Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense and Lt. Col. Martikainen, Defense Staff, 5 February 1999; and Press Release, Defense Force, Press Release 200, 2 December 1998.

³⁴ Telephone interview with Col. Mikkonen, Defense Staff, 18 February 1999.

³⁵ Statement of Brigadier General Kari Rimpi, Defense Staff, Press Release, 2 December 1998.

³⁶ Finland’s Article 13 Report, Amended Protocol II, dated 11 November 1999.

³⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 790-791; further details are available from the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland.

³⁸ Memorandum of Ilkka-Pekka Similä, First Secretary, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Department for International Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2000; Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 3.

costs). In 1999 mechanical mine clearance teams were also deployed in Mozambique and Kosovo. The mechanical mine clearance project in Kosovo is the newest project funded from Finland's humanitarian aid budget, at a cost of FIM 18 million (US\$3 million) for the first two years. There are two RA-140 DS (Raisu) clearance vehicles and six persons in the area of Pejen (Pec) and Deqanin in west Kosovo, clearing or investigating suspected mined rural fields. This project is carried out in cooperation with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA).³⁹ Finland also supports mine action programs of Finnish nongovernmental organizations, including the Finnish Red Cross and Finn Church Aid. Finland and South Africa started cooperating on mine action by signing a Memorandum of Understanding in Helsinki on 15 March 1999 during the visit of President Nelson Mandela. Within this framework Finland and South Africa will cooperate on mine clearance, mine awareness, mine information and victim assistance in southern Africa.

³⁹ Press release, Department for International Development Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 17 April 2000.

In 1999, the following mine action projects were funded by Finland:⁴⁰

Country	FIM	Program	Organization⁴¹
Afghanistan	3 million (US\$541,000)	mine clearance	UNOCHA
Angola	3 million (US\$541,000)	victim assistance, mine awareness	ICRC
Bosnia	3 million (US\$541,000)	local prostheses production	Finnish Red Cross
Cambodia	3,569,190 (US\$650,000)	Finnish mechanical mine clearance	
Cambodia	592,000 (US\$107,000)	mine incident database project	HI
Croatia	360,000 (US\$65,000)	planning/project officer	WEUDAM
Kosovo	9,846,000 (US\$1.8 million)	Finnish mechanical mine clearance	UNDP/NPA in kind/personnel assistance
Mozambique	7.7 million (US\$1.4 million)	Finnish mechanical mine clearance	UNDP in kind/personnel assistance
UNMAS	540,000 (US\$100,000)	contribution to core functions	
TOTAL	28.7 million (US\$5 million)		

⁴⁰ Memorandum of Ilkka-Pekka Similä, First Secretary, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Department for International Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2000; Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 3; the country totals do not tally with the total for each funding year due to fluctuation in the exchange rate during this period.

⁴¹ Abbreviations: UNOCHA - UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; WEUDAM - Western Union Demining Assistance Mission; UNDP - UN Development Program; NPA - Norwegian People's Aid; UNMAS - UN Mine Action Service; HI - Handicap International; MAG - Mines Advisory Group; ADP - Accelerated Demining Program; ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross.

*In the year 2000 as at 1 May, the following mine action projects were funded:*⁴²

Country	FIM	Program	Organization
Afghanistan	3 million (US\$ 488,000)	mine clearance	UNOCHA
Cambodia	3,510,000 (US\$ 570,600)	mine clearance	Halo Trust
Cambodia	1.2 million (US\$ 195,000)	mine clearance, 3 rd phase	Finn Church Aid/MAG
Cambodia	900,000 (US\$ 147,000)	mine incident database, 2 nd phase	HI
Cambodia	565,000 (US\$ 92,000)	mine awareness	Finnish/Cambodian Red Cross
Mozambique	1.2 million (US\$ 195,000)	Finnish mechanical demining	UNDP/ADP
UNMAS	615,000 (US\$ 100,000)	Support for coordination functions	
UNMAS/UNDP	615,000 (US\$ 100,000)	Support for Level 1 survey	

GEORGIA

Key developments since March 1999: It appears that Georgian groups continue to lay antipersonnel mines inside Abkhazia. The Georgian government acknowledges that it is considering mining the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border. Russian aircraft dropped mines inside Georgia in what Russia called an accident.

Mine Ban Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, even though as early as September 1996, President Shevardnadze said: "I, as the President of Georgia, declare that Georgia takes the obligation never to produce, use or import antipersonnel mines."¹

At the treaty signing conference, in December 1997, the representative of Georgia stated that the country could not sign the Mine Ban Treaty for two reasons: first, antipersonnel mines have been used in the region of Abkhazia and Georgia cannot fulfill its treaty obligations to conduct mine clearance until Abkhazia is reintegrated with Georgia; second, Georgia lacks funds, proper equipment, and trained deminers to conduct the mine clearance operations.²

⁴² Memorandum of Ilkka-Pekka Simila, 19 April 2000.

¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, "Georgia and Problem of Anti-Personnel Mines," June 1998.

² Address of H.E. Tedo Japaridze, Ambassador of Georgia at the Signing Ceremony of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ottawa, 3-4 December 1997.

In February 1999 President Shevardnadze stated his intention to sign the ban treaty,³ but the Ministry of Defense remained opposed, insisting on the right of the military to use antipersonnel mines.⁴ In March 2000, in a letter to the ICBL Georgian Committee, the Ministry of Defense cited additional reasons for not joining the treaty: (1) Russian military forces located on Georgian territory have “great amounts of landmines;” (2) “none of the states of our region” have signed; and (3) “Russia continues mining of Georgian territories....”⁵

Georgia was one of twelve observer delegations at the May 1999 Maputo First Meeting of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty. It voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty United Nations General Assembly resolution in December 1999, as it had in 1997 and 1998. In a July 2000 letter to Landmine Monitor, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “I would like to underline that Georgia has been a supporter of the ‘Ottawa Process’ and shares its ultimate goal of complete elimination of the landmines. I would also like to reiterate our support to the International Campaign for Banning Landmines and express our will to reach one of the most important goals of mankind – world free of landmines.”⁶

An NGO-sponsored regional conference on landmines was held in Tbilisi in early December 1999 and was attended by military and governmental representatives from the region as well as NGOs.

Georgia is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II on landmines, but has not ratified 1996 Amended Protocol II. It did not participate in the December 1999 first annual conference on Amended Protocol II. Georgia is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

As reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, officials state that Georgia is not a producer or exporter of antipersonnel landmines, and has not imported AP mines since independence.⁷ Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the former Soviet Union, though the exact size and composition is not known. It has not destroyed any of its landmine stockpiles.⁸ In addition, there are antipersonnel mines stockpiled at military bases under Russian control. The most commonly found types of mines in Georgia and Abkhazia are MON-50, MON-100, MON-200, MON-90, OZM-72, PMN, PMN-2 (former Soviet Union); and the TS-50 (Italy).⁹

³ “Georgian Leader Supports Joining Convention on Banning Landmines,” Kavkasia-Press news agency, Tbilisi, 9 February 1999, reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring.

⁴ Jody Williams, report to ICBL on visit to Georgia, email dated 22 February 1999.

⁵ Letter to Georgian Landmine Campaign from the Public Relations Department, Georgian Ministry of Defense, 14 March 2000.

⁶ Letter from Georgi Burduli, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, 6 July 2000.

⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p.793.

⁸ Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s Mine Action Database.

⁹ United Nations, *Country Report: Georgia*, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/georgia.htm>.

Use

The resumption of fighting in Chechnya has had an impact in Georgia. On 9 August 1999, two Russian Su-25 aircraft entered Georgian airspace from Dagestan, where Russia was involved in fighting against Dagestani rebels, and bombed in and around the village of Zemo Omalo; three people were wounded, one severely.¹⁰ Georgian military identified the weapons used as KSS-1S cluster bombs, containing PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.¹¹ On 17 August, it was reported that Air Force headquarters would “[o]n behalf of the Russian Defense Ministry...officially apologize to Georgia in the near future for mistakenly dropping mines on Georgian territory 9 August 2000.” The incident had been confirmed by a special commission set up to investigate the incident.¹²

In April 2000, it was reported that the “military leadership and border services of Russia and Georgia have adopted the decision to mine several stretches of the border” in order to stop the flow of men and material between Georgia and Chechnya. Russian military spokesmen said that over twenty mountain passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80 kilometer stretch of the border near the southern Chechen Argun Gorge.¹³ The Georgian Department for the Protection of the State Border, for its part, has stated officially it is “considering the possibility of mining the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border.” That possibility was said to be a direct response to the decision of the Russians to mine the area.¹⁴

Both Georgian and Abkhazian forces laid tens of thousands of mines during the intense fighting in 1992-93.¹⁵ In 1999 and 2000, there continued to be numerous reports of groups from Georgia, allegedly linked to the Georgian government,¹⁶ infiltrating into Abkhazia and laying antipersonnel mines. (See report on Abkhazia). At the Regional Conference in Tbilisi in December 1999, an official from the Georgian Ministry of Defense noted, “Those mines and ammunition we use at present are military secrets.

¹⁰ “Prime-News,” (television), Tbilisi, Georgia, 10 August 1999.

¹¹ “Georgian Deputy Says Type of Russian Bomb Established,” Moscow RIA News Agency, 11 August 1999.

¹² “Sources Say Russian Air Force to Apologize to Georgia,” Moscow Interfax, 17 August 1999. A U.S. government official told the ICBL that there was a second incident in which a Russian helicopter dropped mines inside Georgia. ICBL meeting with U.S. delegation to CCW Protocol II meeting, Geneva, 13 December 1999.

¹³ Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,” *Moscow Kommersant* (daily newspaper), 12 April 2000.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ United Nations Development Program, *United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia* (United Nations, March 1998), available at: <http://www.abkhazia.org>. Russian soldiers and peacekeepers based in Georgia have also used mines in the past. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 793-4.

¹⁶ Two main Georgian groups have claimed responsibility for mine attacks, the “White Legion” and the “Forest Brothers.” See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 838, for more details on mining and links to government. In April 2000, the Abkhaz Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that members of the White Legion and Forest Brothers patrol the Georgian side of the Ingur River.

Landmines have their importance and let us leave it in secret.”¹⁷ Areas of Lower Gali Region in Abkhazia are subject to ongoing limited conflict.¹⁸

In a response to Landmine Monitor regarding potential use during this reporting period (March 1999-May 2000), the Georgian Foreign Ministry stated that Georgian armed forces have been “strictly abstaining of laying landmines since long before March 1999. Unfortunately, as you are aware, certain parts of Georgia are not under the control of the Government of Georgia, therefore we are not able to control any kind of military or paramilitary activities there. Neither the Government of Georgia is supporting or controlling the paramilitary units functioning on the above mentioned territories.”¹⁹

There have in the past been allegations of Abkhazian military groups or partisans laying mines in Georgia,²⁰ but Landmine Monitor is not aware of allegations in the March 1999-May 2000 time period. A January 1999 UN Security Council resolution “condemns the activities by armed groups, including the continued laying of mines, which endanger the civilian population, impede the work of the humanitarian organizations and seriously delay the normalization of the situation in the Gali region, and *deplores* the lack of serious efforts made by the parties to bring an end to those activities....”²¹

Landmine Problem

According to the United Nations, there are approximately 150,000 landmines in Georgia and Abkhazia, the majority of which are near the Inguri River separating Georgia and Abkhazia.²² The U.N. Development program has estimated that there are 15,000 mines just in two heavily mined areas along the Inguri River and the Gali canal.²³ Outside of Abkhazia, mines pose dangers to civilians in Georgia mainly in areas near the border with Abkhazia and near military bases, which have been mined. (See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for more details). There are also mines on the border with Turkey.

Mine Clearance

Georgia has no national programs for humanitarian clearance, mine awareness, or survivor assistance. Responsibility for mine clearance is entrusted to the Ministry of Defense for the zone of military actions and territory of military bases, to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for populated areas, roads, and railroads, and to the State Department for

¹⁷ Vacho Jgrenaya, Sapper Administration, Georgian Ministry of Defense, “Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future Without Landmines,” Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.

¹⁸ HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, “Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report,” March 2000, p. 11.

¹⁹ Letter from Georgi Burduli, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, 6 July 2000.

²⁰ 1999 Landmine Monitor interview with M. Rapava, Head of Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia.

²¹ UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1225, 28 January 1999.

²² United Nations, *Country Report: Georgia*, available at: www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/georgia.htm. The UNDP estimates 50,000 mines throughout Abkhazia, which makes the UN estimate of 150,000 for all of Georgia seem high.

²³ UNDP, *Needs Assessment Mission*, March 1998.

frontier areas. Since 1994, CIS peacekeepers have conducted demining operations in the security zone along the Inguri River. The non-governmental organization HALO Trust has been conducting humanitarian mine clearance in Abkhazia.²⁴ (See Landmine Monitor report on Abkhazia).

In 1999, the government of Georgia requested U.S. assistance to “clear protective minefields surrounding two ex-Soviet military bases in Georgia so that the areas may be returned to civilian use.”²⁵ The U.S. has budgeted \$1,062,000 for mine action assistance for Georgia and Abkhazia in U.S. fiscal year 2000.²⁶ Georgia will host a unique U.S.-sponsored joint humanitarian demining training exercise with personnel from Armenia and Azerbaijan from September-November 2000.²⁷

Apparently, discussions are underway between officials of Georgia and Turkey regarding an agreement to demine the border and prohibit future use on the border, similar to an agreement Turkey has made with Bulgaria.²⁸

Mine Awareness

The ICBL Georgian Committee has begun a mine awareness campaign, including mapping mined areas, organizing lectures and seminars for teachers in high-risk regions, and publication of a mine awareness brochure for people in Georgia and Abkhazia. The ICBL Georgian Committee is cooperating with Abkhazian NGOs on these issues. During the Tbilisi Regional Conference in December 1999, ten teachers and 300 school children were involved in mine awareness activities with the Georgian Committee.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

The ICBL Georgian Committee believes that there has recently been a reduction in the number of people killed or injured by antipersonnel landmines in Georgia, primarily because a large number of people have left the mined territories. However, after displaced persons return to their homes, it is anticipated that there will be an increased number of mine casualties.

According to information from the Head of Science and Technical Research Department of Georgian Army General Staff, Colonel Tavadze, about 70% of casualties during the war were landmine victims.²⁹

²⁴ HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, “Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report,” March 2000.

²⁵ U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining,” 2 September 1999. The U.S. is considering the request.

²⁶ Human Rights Watch, “Clinton’s Landmine Legacy,” July 2000, pp. 27, 34.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 34. The exercise will involve a total of sixty deminers from the three countries.

²⁸ Statement by the Turkish Delegation to the Ljubljana, Slovenia Regional Conference on Landmines, 21-22 June 2000. Also, in a letter to Georgian Campaign from K. Imnadze, Deputy to the Secretary of the National Security Council, No. 342, 10 March 2000, he states representatives of the governments of Georgia and Turkey met in December 1998 to begin these discussions.

²⁹ Landmine Monitor 1999 interview with Colonel G. Tavadze, head of the Main Department of the Strategic Planning and Science-Technical Research.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) runs orthopedic projects for the war disabled, many of whom are landmine victims. It has centers in Tbilisi and Gagra (Abkhazia) where an average of thirty-one patients in Tbilisi and six patients in Gagra are fitted with prostheses or orthoses per month.³⁰ In 1997, the ICRC manufactured 669 prostheses in the Tbilisi and Gagra workshops, 184 of which were for mine victims.³¹

Hospitals throughout Georgia, including in Abkhazia, routinely run into shortages of basic medical supplies. Lack of surgical equipment and the facilities to store blood prevent adequate care for landmine survivors. No special rehabilitation assistance is provided to landmine victims in Georgia. There are medical rehabilitation centers, but expensive surgical and rehabilitation measures are inaccessible to most people. There are no national programs to provide psychological counseling for landmine victims. Although a general law for the "Social Protection of Disabled" exists in Georgia, necessary legislation for its implementation has not been developed. The aforementioned law makes no mention of mine victims.

KAZAKHSTAN

Mine Ban Policy

Kazakhstan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The government has said that it supports the ideas of the Ottawa process and its humanitarian aspects, but "joining the treaty in the close future is problematic, primarily because the treaty obliges complete and immediate destruction of landmines which are used in Kazakhstan for defensive purposes only, to protect considerable parts of its long border. Clearing these landmines away and their substitution with the most modern types of landmines will require considerable financial resources."¹

Kazakhstan abstained on the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in 1997 and 1998. (It voted in favor of the pro-ban UNGA resolution in 1996). Kazakhstan did not participate in any of the diplomatic meetings on landmines in 1999 or 2000.

Kazakhstan is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). In response to the OSCE questionnaire about antipersonnel mines, the government noted, with respect to the CCW and Protocol II on landmines, that:

The fulfillment of obligations under the provisions of this Convention... may require high financial expenditures. The extent of the financial outlay and other assistance on the part of the states party to the Convention have not been specified, and the possibility that such assistance can be provided evokes doubt. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, if our state were to join this Convention, would be deprived of one of the most

³⁰ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Update No. 98/01 on ICRC Activities in Georgia*, 4 June 1998, available at: <http://www.icrc.org>.

³¹ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1997, Georgia*, 1 June 1998.

¹ Letter from E. Kazykhanov, Director of the Department of Multilateral Cooperation, Embassy of Kazakhstan in Moscow, Russian Federation, in response to IPPNW-Russia inquiry. Letter No.20/178, 19 April 2000.

inexpensive and effective types of defensive weapons which, at the present time, we would find impossible to replace with alternative systems.²

The government concluded, therefore, that it was “inexpedient...to join the Convention...at this stage.”³ Nevertheless, an official has indicated that Kazakhstan bases its policies on landmine issues on the provisions of the CCW and its Protocol II.⁴

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

In April 2000, government officials said that the country does not produce AP mines, does not have industrial facilities for their production and does not plan to construct such facilities.⁵ Kazakhstan is not known to have exported mines. It inherited a stockpile of mines from the Soviet Union.

The United Nations and Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the government declared a comprehensive moratorium on production in December 1996 and a ban on the export of antipersonnel landmines in August 1997.⁶

It is not known if Kazakhstan has imported AP mines in the past. But, the government has stated, “It is possible for Kazakhstan to import landmines only from countries that are not party to the Convention [CCW] from now on. This means it is necessary to preserve the available stores of APMs in case they have to be used in the interests of state security.”⁷

Landmine Problem

The U.S. State Department in 1993 reported that an unknown number of German and Russian landmines from World War II were scattered about Kazakhstan.⁸ However, Kazakhstan declared to the United Nations in 1995 that it was not mine affected⁹ and has repeated the assertion in April 2000: “There are no mine-affected territories in Kazakhstan, thus there are no necessity of demining, no danger of mine-incidents with civilians and mine-victim assistance.”¹⁰ There have been no recent reports of casualties due to uncleared mines.

Kazakhstan acknowledges that its long borders are mined.¹¹ It can be assumed that Kazakh mines are deployed along its border with China.

² Response to Questionnaire on Antipersonnel Landmines, Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC.DEL/32/00, Vienna, 3 February 2000.

³ Response to OSCE, 3 February 2000.

⁴ Letter from E. Kazykhanov, 19 April 2000; Response to OSCE, 3 February 2000.

⁵ Response to OSCE, 3 February 2000.

⁶ United Nations, *Country Report: Kazakhstan*, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/kazakhst.htm>.

⁷ Response to OSCE, 3 February 2000.

⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines*, July 1993, p. 111.

⁹ United Nations, *Country Report: Kazakhstan*.

¹⁰ Letter from E. Kazykhanov, 19 April 2000.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Kazakhstan is not known to have made any contributions to international mine action programs. The Kazakhstan armed forces reportedly have sophisticated mine removal and mine destruction capabilities.¹²

KYRGYZSTAN

Key developments since March 1999: Six Kyrgyz soldiers were reported to have been killed by landmines during border conflict in mid-1999. Uzbekistan is reported to have laid new mines on its border with Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Kyrgyzstan voted for the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions from 1996-1998, but was absent from the vote on the 1999 resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Kyrgyzstan is not known to have made any statements on landmines, or attended any diplomatic meetings on landmines, in 1999 or 2000. Kyrgyzstan is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

According to a Russian diplomat, Kyrgyzstan has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, but did inherit a stockpile from the Soviet Union. He said that the stocks are very old, storage dates have expired, and many of the mines are “of special menace” because they have liquid explosive, which cannot be destroyed cheaply.¹

In June-September 1999 an armed conflict took place near Botkem, close to the border with Uzbekistan. An armed group from Tajikistan intruded into Kyrgyz territory and was repelled during combat actions in which Kyrgyz armed forces and Uzbeki air forces took part.² In the fighting, twenty-seven Kyrgyz servicemen were reported to have been killed, six by landmines.³ It is unknown who laid the landmines.

As a result of the conflict Uzbekistan is reported to have reinforced its unmarked border with Kyrgyzstan with landmines.⁴ One of the reported cases is the mining by Uzbeki military of territory near the Kyrgyz settlement of Boz Adyr, which is a disputed area of the Kyrgyz-Uzbeki border. Initially the area was marked with warning signs, which later disappeared.⁵

There are landmines on the Kyrgyz-China border, laid during the time of the Soviet Union. How much of the Kyrgyz-China border is mined or how many mines are laid is unknown. However, in early 1999, Kyrgyzstan began discussions with China on how to

¹² *Hidden Killers*, p. 111.

¹ Analytical Note by Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor, Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control, RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2000.

² Interview with Asel Otorbaeva, correspondent of *Vecherny Bishkek* daily, and Marat Bozgunchiev, Director of the WHO Information Center for republics of Central Asia, 17 May 2000.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Email communication with Nick Megoran of Eurasia Insight, Central Eurasia Project, regarding the situation on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, 22 June 2000 and 1 July 2000; Daniyal Karimov, article in *Delo* newspaper, 3 May 2000.

⁵ Daniyal Karimov, article in *Delo* newspaper, 3 May 2000.

clear the border minefields between the two countries.⁶ Also Kyrgyzstan has sought help from the United States in the demarcation of its border with Uzbekistan. The U.S. government plans to donate \$3 million to help resolve the border problems. After the Russian Border Service troops withdrawal from Kyrgyzstan in 1999, the Kyrgyz leadership has been faced with the problem of the protection of their borders with China and Uzbekistan.

The number of landmine victims in Kyrgyzstan is not known. Kyrgyzstan is not thought to have made any contributions to international mine action programs.

LATVIA

Key developments since March 1999: Latvia has announced that it has 4,500 antipersonnel mines in stockpile. During 1999 the Ministry of Defense decided to shift primarily to command-detonated AP mines or antitank mines. Mines and UXO remain a substantial problem, but there are few resources for clearance.

Mine Ban Policy

Although Latvia has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), officials attended many meetings of the "Ottawa Process" leading to the MBT. The Foreign Ministry confirmed in January 2000 that Latvia welcomes the efforts of the international community to stop the use of antipersonnel mines and, eventually, to eliminate all deployed and stockpiled AP mines. The government considers that the MBT is the most decisive political step ever taken in this respect.¹

The Foreign Ministry insists that Latvia meets the MBT requirements, although it has not signed the treaty: AP mines are not produced in Latvia, and there are no minefields on the borders or elsewhere. The existing small number of AP mines is estimated to be sufficient for training purposes for no longer than the next several years.²

Latvia did not send observers to the First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999, but the Foreign Ministry states that it closely followed developments there and studied the related documents,³ including the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, which is considered a valuable resource.⁴ Latvia has voted in favor of all the pro-ban resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly.

The National Armed Forces have held that AP mines are useful to protect strategic objects, and that combined with antitank mines they are considered an efficient tool in the case of massive land invasion. The Baltic countries' shared history of invasion and occupation probably influences these perceptions, as well as present-day uncertainties in the region. More recently, military sources stated that while a direct military threat seems

⁶ Correspondence from International Committee of the Red Cross official, Tashkent, 13 January 1999.

¹ Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000.

² Interview with Ivars Apinis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga, 20 January 2000; Report of Latvia to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 21 January 2000, p. 3.

³ Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000.

⁴ Interview with Ivars Apinis, Riga, 20 January 2000.

unlikely now, until it joins NATO Latvia would be isolated in the event of a conflict, and therefore AP mines provide “psychological security.”⁵ But it is accepted now in military circles that AP mines do more harm to the civilian population than the aggressor, particularly if they are not the newer self-destruct type, and pose little of an obstacle to a modern army.⁶ The Foreign Ministry confirmed that Latvia’s position on the MBT prohibition of AP mines is highly influenced by the regional context, especially the policies of neighboring countries such as Finland, Russia and Belarus.⁷

Latvia signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II in 1993, but it has never ratified the Convention or its Amended Protocol II (1996) on landmines. Latvia is not a member of the Conference of Disarmament, but would support negotiations there on the issue of AP mines.⁸

Production, Stockpile and Transfer

Officials state that Latvia is not producing and has not previously produced antipersonnel mines; all mines of the Latvian armed forces are Soviet in origin.⁹ Early in 1999, the National Armed Forces said it held approximately 20,000 mines in stockpiles.¹⁰ But in January 2000, the Foreign Ministry stated that remaining stocks total 4,500.¹¹ This difference has been explained in terms of the larger figure including antitank mines while the smaller figure represents those AP mines that cannot be adapted to command-detonation and would have to be destroyed under the MBT prohibition.¹² During 1999 the Ministry of Defense changed its policy away from non-command detonated AP mines and put the emphasis on antitank mines; the plan (approved at the end of 1999) is for each engineering platoon to have “controllable” (that is, command-detonated) mines or antitank mines. It has been concluded that most of the AP mines can be converted to command-detonation mode.¹³

In September 1995 an indefinite export moratorium on AP mines was imposed, which the Foreign Ministry says will be confirmed in a new law by the end of 2000. Transfer of AP mines requires approval by the Latvian Strategic Goods Control Committee. Existing regulations require several licenses for the transit of strategic, military and dual-use goods. A transit license through Latvian territory is issued only if the authorities are in possession of a corresponding export license of the exporting country and import license of the importing country. It is said to be doubtful that such transit would be authorized in the case of AP mines.¹⁴

⁵ Interviews with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, December 1998 and 1 March 2000.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000; Report to the OSCE, 21 January 2000, p. 3.

⁸ Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000.

⁹ Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000; Report to the OSCE, 21 January 2000, p. 3.

¹⁰ Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, January 1999.

¹¹ Interview with Ivars Apinis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga, 20 January 2000.

¹² Telephone interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, 6 June 2000.

¹³ Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 1 March 2000.

¹⁴ Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000.

Use

There is no evidence of new use of AP mines by Latvian Armed Forces. But in Latvia, as in other Baltic countries, explosives sometimes including antipersonnel mines are used by criminal elements. According to the Latvian State and Riga City Police,¹⁵ the number of such incidents is decreasing, from a total of 67 in 1995, to 35 by 1999. Most of these incidents caused death, injury and serious damage to vehicles or buildings. Most were targeted on other criminal elements involved in “business disputes.”

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) left from World Wars I and II and from the Soviet occupation remain a substantial problem today in Latvia; the absence of assistance by Germany or Russia in clearing these “remnants of war” is sometimes put forward as a reason for reluctance to join the Mine Ban Treaty. Large areas of agricultural land still are closed to civilian use. To determine locations polluted by explosives, Latvia has used a methodology elaborated in 1998 by the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development. The classification includes nine levels of pollution; according to Ministry of Defense data there are about 60,000 polluted areas¹⁶ covering approximately 100,000 hectares.¹⁷ Areas intensively contaminated by mines and UXO are marked by signs and partially guarded. Every year EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) teams of the Armed Forces neutralize or dispose of more than 3,000 explosive items, as detailed in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.¹⁸ Destruction of such explosives continues and between January-September 1999, Homeguard Units (a voluntary defense organization under the National Armed Forces) destroyed 2,847 such devices.¹⁹

Eight army officers and instructors were honored for their work in destroying 4,500 explosive items during 1999. Among them was Zane Silina, the only woman deminer, who destroyed more than 1,000 explosives in 1999. She says that the most active time of year is spring, but even in winter there is much disposal work to be done due to increased construction; many explosives are found on construction sites in Latvian towns.²⁰

In the Zvarde region which was heavily contaminated in World War II and later used as a Soviet military test site, there are about 580 peasant families who still cannot return to their homes. According to one Homeguard deminer, Andris Rieksts, during the first two months of 2000 there were six calls from returning peasants for clearance. Zigurds Firers, Head of the District Council of Saldus, said construction of roads is necessary for this region of rich arable land. Gaidis Zeibots (of the National Armed

¹⁵ Interview with Ieva Zvidre, Press Center of the Riga City Police Department, Riga, February 1999, updated in telephone interview with Kristis Leiškalns, Latvian State Police Press Center, 5 May 2000.

¹⁶ Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 1 March 2000.

¹⁷ Report to the OSCE, 21 January 2000, p. 3.

¹⁸ *Landmine Monitor 1999*, pp. 800-802.

¹⁹ *Diena* (daily newspaper), 12 October 1999.

²⁰ Airis Rikvelis, “Best Army Deminers Honoured,” *Neatkarīga rita avize* (daily newspaper), 25 November 1999.

Forces at that time) says that Zvarde region could be used as a real-life training ground for NATO deminers.²¹

According to an official of the Armed Forces, the concentration and depth of explosives in Cekule (Riga district) is such that complete clearance would require resources comparable to several annual defense budgets. In Cekule about 4.3 million cubic meters of soil will have to be moved in the clearance operation, and there is the question of whether this makes sense.²²

Since 1995 there has been little state funding for demining and EOD operations. Local government funding for equipment has decreased from approximately US\$4,000 to US\$3,000 annually. State funding exceeded US\$16,000 in 1999. For seriously affected regions there are very scarce government subsidies; for example, state financing for Zvarde region totals only about US\$5,000 per year. Due to insufficient financing local governments are able to cover the costs only partially. One consequence is that there are no commercial demining companies in Latvia. Assistance has been provided in recent years by the United States, Norway and Denmark.²³

Latvian Armed Forces are training EOD personnel from the Latvian Homeguard Units, Navy and Ministry of the Interior personnel. About 200 Homeguard and ten professional deminers are able to participate in operations (except at sea). There have been problems with equipment, but this situation improved in 1999 when German equipment was purchased by the State. Generally there has been no international assistance for EOD and demining activities in Latvia. In 1999 talks started on a longterm Norwegian-Latvian project to set up EOD Training Centers in the Adazi district of Riga and in Liepaja, with significant financing by Norway; this project is included in Latvia's NATO Membership Action Plan. The Centers should open in 2002, and as a result it is expected that within a few years Latvia will employ only professional deminers and EOD personnel. There is language training for Latvian military specialists under the Latvian - Canadian Agreement on Military Cooperation, and there has been other assistance in demining/EOD operations by Denmark and the United States. The Ministries of Defense and of the Interior have also decided to establish a joint training course to neutralize improvised explosive devices, with three centers in Latvia.²⁴

There are few mine awareness programs in Latvia. One Latvian nongovernmental organization, the Baltic International Center of Human Education, previously carried out a mine awareness project financed by Open Society Institute and local organizations.²⁵ Latvia has laws and social guarantees for disabled persons, including the victims of mine and UXO accidents. Disabled people are treated primarily at the Institute of Traumatology and Orthopedics (which was famous for its surgeons during the Afghanistan war), the Center of Microsurgery, and the National Centre of Rehabilitation in Vaivari, Jurmala (a former rehabilitation centre for Soviet astronauts).

²¹ Latvian Radio report, 1 March 2000.

²² Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 15 February 2000.

²³ Interviews with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 20 January and 15 February 2000.

²⁴ Ibid; Interviews with Guntis Aizporietis and Egils Lescinskis, National Armed Forces, Riga, January 1999; visit to the National Armed Forces Headquarters, Riga, 1 March 2000.

²⁵ Baltic International Center for Human Education, webpage www.bc-cfp.lv.

RUSSIA

Key developments since March 1999: Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan from August 1999 to the present day. In April 2000, Russia announced plans to mine its border with Georgia. CCW Amended Protocol II was submitted to the State Duma for ratification in May 2000. Destruction of significant numbers of obsolete and non-Protocol II compliant AP mines has continued.

Mine Ban Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Although government officials and, perhaps most notably, then-President Boris Yeltsin have stated Russia's willingness to sign at some point in the future,¹ it is clear that the military still considers antipersonnel mines a necessary weapon, as evidenced by its extensive use of the weapon in operations first in Dagestan in August 1999 and then in Chechnya from September 1999 to the present day.

In addition to stating concerns about costs related to implementing the treaty, the military insists that alternatives to antipersonnel mines must be in place before Russia can ban the weapon. In its December 1999 response to an OSCE questionnaire on antipersonnel mines, the government stated: "The Russian Federation believes that what is important to solve the 'mines' problem is a realistic approach taking into account the interests of all the members of the international community and, first of all, of the states which historically or due to their geostrategic location are compelled to rely on this defensive weapon to ensure their security. The Russian Federation advocates the search for mutually acceptable solutions for anti-personnel mines and opposes the division of the international community into supporters of a hasty ban on anti-personnel mines and those states that are still unable to take this step and propose other ways to meet this goal."²

Although President Vladimir Putin has not made any public statements regarding a mine ban since his election, a government press release in March 2000 spoke of the policy "aimed at banning of landmines," declared by the president. It noted that the pending ratification of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), would "enable the Russian Federation to carry out a more active role in landmine-related issues in the international political arena."³

Russia attended, as an observer, all of the treaty preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, as well as the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique in May 1999. It has also participated in many of the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. However, Russia has continuously stated its strong preference for dealing with controls on AP mines through the CCW and the Conference on Disarmament (CD),

¹ For examples of statements by Yeltsin and other officials see *New York Times*, 11 October 1997; *New York Times*, 11 October 1997; Statement by Mr. B.A. Schiborin, Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry at the Budapest Regional Seminar on Landmines, 26-28 March 1998.

² Response to OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-personnel Landmines, Delegation of the Russian Federation on Military Security and Arms Control, FSC. DEL/425/99, 15 December 1999.

³ Press release, AP RF Division of Governmental Information/Information Analytical Materials, No. 177, 9 March 2000.

rather than the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴ Russia abstained on the vote on the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has every pro-ban resolution since 1996.

At the same time, Russian officials are always quick to point out some of the positive steps Russia has taken toward a ban: a moratorium on export of non-detectable and “dumb” antipersonnel mines, a ban on the production of blast mines, and the destruction of more than half a million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.⁵

Conference on Disarmament and Convention on Conventional Weapons

Russia has consistently favored the CD “as the main forum for the mine action issue.”⁶ It called for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an export ban.⁷ Again in December 1999, it stated that it “reiterates its proposal to establish a special committee in the framework of the CD that could deal with the problem of the universal ban on APM transfer.”⁸

Russia is a party to the 1980 CCW and its original Protocol II on landmines. Putin submitted Amended Protocol II (1996) to the State Duma for ratification in early May 2000.⁹ Hearings will presumably take place in late June 2000 with fairly good chances for its approval.¹⁰

A government press release on preparations for the submission for ratification noted that it “complies with the interests of the Russian Federation” because it allows for the destruction of “huge stocks of outdated APMs with expired life-time,” with minimal financial burden, coupled with relative ease in military-technical terms, and for the development of alternatives. It also noted that ratification would not affect Russian defense capacity or security.¹¹

For several years the Russian military has stated that steps were already being taken to fulfill requirements of the Amended Protocol: “Necessary recommendations on the combat use of APMs in compliance with the new requirements have been prepared and released to the related staffs and commanders of military units.”¹² At the December 1999

⁴ For elaboration of these issues, see Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” position paper prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999. See also Col. Vladimir P. Kuznetsov, “Ottawa Process and Russia’s Position,” *Krasnaya Zvezda* (daily newspaper), 27 November 1997.

⁵ Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” 26 February 1999.

⁶ Schiborin and Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” 26 February 1999.

⁷ Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999 when twenty-two CD members called for a Special Coordinator and an Ad Hoc Committee.

⁸ Response to OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-personnel Landmines.

⁹ “Putin Urges Ratification of Protocol Limiting Mines,” Itar-Tass, Moscow, 7 May 2000.

¹⁰ Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2000.

¹¹ Press release, No.177, 9 March 2000.

¹² Press release of the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of RF at the opening of the 1998 Moscow conference “New Steps To a Mine-Free Future,” IPPNW-ICBL, 27-28 May 1998.

Tbilisi Conference, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Nagorny stated that “the Russian Engineers are fulfilling all requirements of the CCW to a full extent.”¹³

The costs associated with implementing Amended Protocol II are officially budgeted at 3,066,805 rubles (approximately U.S.\$109.53 million) over the eight-year period 1998-2005.¹⁴ According to information from the Ministry of Defense obtained by International Physicians to Prevent Nuclear War-Russia, full costs to implement Amended Protocol II are estimated at about U.S.\$374.6 million, which includes costs for making some mines compliant with the Protocol, development and production of some alternatives, and destruction of some stocks. A similar estimate of the cost of joining the Mine Ban Treaty is about U.S.\$576 million, which includes costs for development and production of alternatives as well as destruction of all stockpiles. Below are two charts illustrating the total estimated cost projections:¹⁵

¹³ Working Materials, Second International Conference on Landmines in Russia and FSU, IPPNW-Russia, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.

¹⁴ Press Release, No. 177, 9 March 2000. This is the approved interdepartmental/governmental budget that still requires approval of the State Duma.

¹⁵ *Landmines: Outlook from Russia*, IPPNW-Russia, report for the Second International Conference in Russia and FSU, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999, p. 63.

Cost estimate of Russia's joining the MBT prepared by the RF Ministry of Defense for the RF government in 1998:

Actions	AMOUNT OF FINANCES NEEDED, in mln Russian R (as of 1998)											
	Total	Year by year										
		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11		
1. Development of engineer munitions – alternatives to LM	210	30	30	30	30	30	30	30				
2. Production & accumulation of a minimally necessary quantities of engineer munitions – alternatives to LM	3000	5	10	50	250	300	450	550	650	735		
3. LM stockpiles destruction (reprocessing)	390	50	180	80	80							
Total:	3600	85	220	160	360	330	480	580	650	735		

Cost estimate of Russia's meeting the requirements of the CCIW and its amended Protocol II:

Actions	AMOUNT OF FINANCES NEEDED, in billions Russian Rubles (as of 1998)											
	Total	Year by year										
		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11		
1. Modernization of the existing munitions (LMs) and development of new ones (alternatives to LMs), including the preparation of their production	200	33	44	56	38	27						
2. Production and accumulation of a minimally necessary quantities of new munitions	80	-	3	28	22	27						
3. Outdated LM stockpiles destruction (reprocessing)	1891.25	7	12	141.75	265.5	375.5	367	362	360.5			
Total:	2341.25	46	64	82	219.75	332.25	409.5	399	394	392.5		

Production

Russia has been one of the world's largest producers and exporters of AP mines. It is believed that since 1992, it has been producing at least ten types of antipersonnel mines.¹⁶ In May 1998, representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Russian Federation stopped producing blast AP mines.¹⁷ Russian military reconfirmed this at the Tbilisi landmine conference in December 1999.¹⁸ (For more detail on mines types, production sites, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 805-806.)

In the former USSR there were more than 20 enterprises that either assembled landmines or produced their components. According to the public statements of the Command of the Russian Engineer Forces, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, ninety percent of Russia's ammunition and armament production facilities were left outside the territory of Russia, namely in Ukraine, Belarus and in the Baltic republics of the former USSR.¹⁹ But, within the last three to five years, the military has managed to begin the production of different modern types of ammunition, including mines and fuses, which were previously produced outside its territory.²⁰ Some plants that have assembled AP mines are now involved in destruction technology.

According to official sources, it should not be assumed that Russia has increased its production of AP mines as a result of the on-going conflict in Chechnya. They state current stocks of mines compliant with CCW Protocol II are significant -- and will be for quite some time.²¹ Instead Russia is increasingly focusing more efforts on research and development of landmine alternatives.²² In the above charts estimating costs of implementing the MBT, points one and two show costs of development and production, respectively, of alternatives. (For more on alternatives see *Landmine Monitor 1999*, pp. 807-808.)

¹⁶ *Russia's Arms Catalogue*, Army 1996-1997, published by "Military Parade," JSC, under general supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces, Ordnance, Moscow, 1996, Vol. 1, p. 276-83. See also, *Landmines: Outlook from Russia*, report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999.

¹⁷ Presentations by B. Schiborin, chief counselor of the Disarmament Department, Russian Foreign Ministry, and A. Nizhalovsky, deputy-commander of Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, at the Moscow Landmine Conference, 27 May 1998.

¹⁸ Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, senior officer, Division of Engineer Forces, 2nd International Conference on Landmines in Russia/FSU, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999. At the CCW Protocol II conference in Geneva on 16 December 1999, Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Ministry of Defense, also confirmed this, noting that PMN-1 and PMN-2 mines are no longer produced.

¹⁹ Interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 16, 1999; Vladimir Kuznetsov, "S Uchetom Boevogo opyta zivut I uchatsya inženierie voiska," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (The Red Star), 21 January 1998; A. Raylyan, "Like a Phoenix From Its Ashes," *Armeysky Sbornik Magazine*, No. 1, 1998, pp. 64-65.

²⁰ Vladimir Kuznetsov, "Novyi Oblik Inženernih Voisk," (New outlook of the Engineer Troops), *Armeysky Sbornik* (Army's journal) No.1, 1998, p. 11.

²¹ Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2000.

²² *Ibid.*

Transfer

The Soviet Union was one of the world's largest exporters of antipersonnel mines. However, on 1 December 1994 it announced a three-year moratorium on the export of AP mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. This was extended for another five years on 1 December 1997.²³ Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny of the Russian Engineer Forces stated, "Since 1991 Russia entirely stopped the export of APMs in any countries of the world. The only exception is APMs left behind in the CIS countries according to governmental agreements with the countries in question. Since 1991 no planned transfers of APMs have taken place."²⁴ (For more details on transfer, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 808.)

But apparently a black market operates. On 13 January 2000, on a trip to the US, Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iliya Akhmadov stated that Chechens were being provided "arms, ammunition, including explosives...by Russia." Chechen military have said that the only method of receiving and replenishing their AP mines is through contacts with representatives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.²⁵

Stockpiling

There is no official public number of antipersonnel landmines stockpiled in Russia. One published report states that Russia has approximately 60 million landmines that fall under the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty.²⁶ ICBL interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well as knowledgeable officials from other governments, indicate that Russia likely has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock. (For information on types and locations of stocks, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 805-806, 809.) Both military officials and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs admit that through governmental agreements huge stocks have been left in CIS states, in particular in Belarus and Ukraine, and that certain stockpiles remain at the disposal of Russian military units and contingents presently located in CIS countries.

Destruction

Russia carries out systematic destruction of its obsolete AP mines as well as mines with an expired shelf life, primarily PMN and PMN-1s. Some mines are recycled, extracting explosives and reprocessing them for civilian use. Mines currently slated for destruction also include those not in compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II. In 1998, more than 500,000 such mines were destroyed.²⁷ According to Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, of the Engineer Forces, the number of mines destroyed will reach 800,000 by the end of 2000.²⁸ However, General Kuznetsov (ret.), who was the commander of the Russian Engineer troops from 1986-1999, stated that in 1998-1999

²³ Presidential Decrees No. 2094 of 1 December 1994, and No.1271 of 1 December 1997.

²⁴ Lt. Col. Mikhail Nagorny, 2nd International Conference on Landmines, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.

²⁵ Interview with Col. M. Arsaliev, engineering service, Chechen military, May 1999.

²⁶ Andrei Korbut, "Prisoedinenie Rossii k Konvenzii o Zaprete Protivopechotnich min znachitelno podorvalo ee oboronosposobnost (The Signing by Russia of MBT to a Substantial Degree Could have Undermined its Defense). *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, No. 39, p. 6.

²⁷ *Landmines: Outlook from Russia*, IPPNW-Russia, interim report, 1999.

²⁸ Statement at Tbilisi Landmine Conference, December 1999.

alone, 850,000 mines were destroyed.²⁹ Plans call for destroying non-CCW compliant mines by 2005,³⁰ but Nagorny said that destruction would not be completed until 2010-2012.³¹ The Ministry of Defense has calculated that it will cost about U.S.\$6.4 million annually to destroy all of its non-CCW compliant mines.³²

Use

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines in 1993 during the conflict in Tajikistan, during large-scale combat operations in Chechnya from December 1994 until June 1996, in military operations against Dagestan in August 1999, and then again on a wide-scale basis in Chechnya since September 1999. Russian forces in CIS peacekeeping operations in Georgia/Abkhazia and perhaps elsewhere have also used mines.

A government official, describing their use in Dagestan wrote, "The use of antipersonnel landmines there was nothing less but a 'dire necessity.' In Dagestan we had to do everything possible not only to safeguard the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, but first and foremost to protect the civilian population from international terrorists.... The Russian Federation uses antipersonnel landmines only for the purposes of defense and in the first place to deter terrorists, drug smugglers and other potential illegal trespassers who wish to penetrate into our territory."³³

In the renewed fighting in Chechnya, which continues as Landmine Monitor goes to print, mines have been used in significant numbers by all armed fighters, but particularly by Russian forces. Chechens have made unverifiable claims that Russia has used between 200,000-300,000 mines since the fighting broke out.³⁴ Questions have been raised if the types of mines and methods of mine use have been consistent with CCW Protocol II, as well as its requirements for mapping, marking, and protecting minefields.

Russian officials themselves, including at the highest military levels in the operation in Chechnya, admit the large-scale use of mines throughout the operations. Russian troops have used hand-laid mines, air- and artillery-scattered mines, as well as remotely controlled devices. The main objectives of the initial stages of the operation were the creation of "security zones," and a "sanitary corridor." The military has said that at that point, only MVZ mines were used to protect check-points, outposts and

²⁹ Interview with General Kuznetsov (ret.), Commander of the Russian Engineer troops from 1986-1999, by General Mehov (ret.), Russian Humanitarian Mine Action Center/RAVUNPM, Moscow, April 2000.

³⁰ Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999; N. Antonenko, "Second Wind," *Armeysky Sbornik*, No. 1, 1998, pp. 62-63.

³¹ Statement at Tbilisi Landmine Conference.

³² Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999. The estimate was 40 million rubles, prior to the devaluation of the currency.

³³ Letter to Jody Williams and Stephen Goose from Mr. Alexander V. Zmeevski, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, 22 October 1999, as a follow up to a meeting at the Russian Mission on 5 October 1999.

³⁴ "Chechens Say Russians Laid 300,000 Mines," *Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency* (Internet), 5 June 2000.

temporary positions, and that the mines were removed whenever the units changed position.³⁵ They also said that the minefields were mapped and the "security zones" were marked.³⁶ As operations expanded, so did the use of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Hand-laid mines included OZM-72, and MON-50/90/100 mines.³⁷ It is likely that, in many cases, decisions to use mines were made at individual command and/or small reconnaissance team and patrol level.³⁸

The Russians also have widely used scatterable mines, mostly dropped from aircraft, to cut off potential withdrawal routes from Dagestan, against guerrillas in the mountainous areas of Chechnya, and to cut off both weapons supply and guerrilla reinforcement along the Russian-Georgian border. In December 1999, a Georgian officer noted that such operations had been going on for two months, and he stated that on one day alone, Russian aircraft scattered mines along a 20 kilometer stretch in the Chechen border area. He noted that it is very difficult to precisely locate air-scattered mines.³⁹ The most commonly used mine has been the PFM-1S, which is equipped with a self-destruct mechanism.⁴⁰ Artillery-delivered mines have also been used, notably in the mining of the estuary of the River Sunzha and in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu.⁴¹

Much of the Chechen capital of Grozny has been laid to waste in the fighting.⁴² Mines have been used extensively in the city and have taken their toll on combatants and civilians alike. In one of the most notorious incidents in the fighting for Grozny, on 31 January 2000, a column of some 2-3,000 rebels evacuated the city through a minefield, suffering heavy casualties.⁴³ Russians officials claimed they lured the guerrillas into a trap by pretending to accept a bribe in exchange for safe passage out of Grozny. "Frankly, we did not expect bandits, especially the key figures, to swallow the bait," said

³⁵ Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Russian Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 16 December 1999.

³⁸ "Night Patrol of 'Fittermice,'" *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January 2000. In a radio interview, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov noted that the decision to use mines is taken by junior commanders, in both Chechen and Russian forces. Radio Svoboda, March 2000.

³⁹ Lieutenant-General Nickolaishvili Guram Georgevich, "Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future Without Landmines," Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.

⁴⁰ Ibid. Also, ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999. Col Bobkov said only self-destructing PFMs were used, not older non-self-destructing ones.

⁴¹ Interview with a colonel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, RTR television, March 2000. In the interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by artillery.

⁴² Daniel Williams, "Russians Declare Victory, Raise Flag Over Grozny," *Washington Post*, 7 February 2000. Regarding the level of destruction in the city, the article reported that "Gen. Gennady Troshev, one of Russia's top commanders, toured the city today and said he had trouble finding intact buildings to use as command posts. After more than five months of bombing and shelling, 'the city is ruined,' he said."

⁴³ "Chechen Rebels Lured into Minefield," *Segodnya* (newscast), Moscow NTV, 3 February 2000; Daniel Williams, "Grozny Nearly in Russian Forces' Grasp: Chechen Rebels Head South After Taking Heavy Losses in Escape from Capital," *Washington Post*, 4 February 2000, p. A.26.

Gen. Vladimir Shamanov.⁴⁴ Several hundred fighters were killed or wounded, including rebel commanders.⁴⁵ One doctor in the nearby village of Alkhan-Kala said that in two days, he amputated limbs on sixty-seven mine victims, including rebel commander Shamil Basayev, who lost his right foot.⁴⁶

Shortly after the incident, the Russian military closed Grozny to returning civilians. On Russia's NTV television, Col. Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, a top Russian commander, said, "As long as the city isn't cleared of all mines and shells, and there is a threat of buildings collapsing, civilians are being banned from entering." He added, "Under civilian disguise, militants are trying to return to pick up their wounded."⁴⁷

On 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the city had been "completely cleared of mines." They did, however, note that the "city is still unsafe," charging continued mine use by Chechen fighters.⁴⁸ In May 2000, Russian authorities began using mines again to protect factories and power plants in Chechen's capital, Grozny. The Russian-appointed mayor of the city, Supyan Mokchayev reported that such mining was necessary to stop "a plague of looting by their own [Russian] troops."⁴⁹

Russia has also "accidentally" dropped mines on Georgian territory. On 9 August 1999, two Su-25 aircraft entered Georgian airspace from Dagestan, where Russia was fighting against rebels and bombed in and around the village of Zemo Omalo; three people were wounded, one severely.⁵⁰ Georgian military were able to identify the weapons used as KSS-1S cluster bombs, containing PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.⁵¹ On 17 August, it was reported that Air Force headquarters would "[o]n behalf of the Russian Defense Ministry...officially apologize to Georgia in the near future for mistakenly dropping mines on Georgian territory 9 August." The incident had been confirmed by a special commission set up to investigate the incident.⁵²

⁴⁴ Lyoma Turpalov, "Minefield massacre bleeds rebels; Russia says it was a trap," *Associated Press*, (Alkhan-Kala, Russia), 4 February 2000.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May 2000. He estimated 300 wounded, including 50 civilians who fled Grozny with the fighters, plus many killed. See also, Andrew Kramer, "Doctor becomes enemy of all after treating both Russians and Chechens," *AP*, 18 February 2000; Alvi Zakriyev, "Doctor Hassan Baiyev: life-saving Chechen surgeon," *AFP*, 19 February 2000; Dave Montgomery, "Brutal attacks reported in Chechnya: Accounts surfacing about executions, other atrocities by Russian troops," *The Dallas Morning News*, 27 February 2000.

⁴⁷ "Russia Blocks Civilians From Returning Home to Grozny," (*AP*, Nazran, Russia), *Washington Post*, 15 February 2000, p. A.19.

⁴⁸ Olga Allenova, "'Mine Warfare' Seen Continuing in Grozny," *Moscow Kommersant* (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.1.

⁴⁹ Giles Whittel, "Grozny is Mined to Stop Troops Looting," *London Times*, 13 May 2000.

⁵⁰ *Prime-News*, (television), Tbilisi, Georgia, 10 August 1999.

⁵¹ "Georgian Deputy Says Type of Russian Bomb Established," *Moscow RIA News Agency*, 11 August 1999.

⁵² "Sources Say Russian Air Force to Apologize to Georgia," *Moscow Interfax*, 17 August 1999. A U.S. government official told the ICBL that there was a second incident in which a Russian helicopter dropped mines inside Georgia. ICBL meeting with U.S. delegation to CCW Protocol II meeting, Geneva, 13 December 1999.

In April 2000, it was reported that the “military leadership and border services of Russia and Georgia have adopted the decision to mine several stretches of the border” in order to stop the flow of men and materiel between Georgia and Chechnya. Russian military spokesmen would not “disclose precisely” the type of mines to be used, noting only that over twenty mountain passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80 kilometer-long stretch of the border near the southern Chechen Argun Gorge.⁵³ Russian officials stated that mining would be carried out in compliance with CCW Protocol II, and that the majority of the minefields would be remote controlled which will eliminate the indiscriminate effect of their use.⁵⁴ The Georgian Department for the Protection of the State Border, for its part, has stated officially it is “considering the possibility of mining the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border.”⁵⁵

Mine Clearance

The USSR was heavily infested with mines and UXOs after World War II and they are still a problem in some areas. Today there are requests for mine/UXO-clearance from 10 territories in Russia where World War II battles took place. (For more detail, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 811-812.)

In the post-World War II period, demining operations were carried out by the Engineer Forces of the Defense Ministry. Today demining operations are the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense’s Engineer Forces; the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources’ Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations; and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ demining brigades.⁵⁶ Demining is also conducted by non-governmental enterprises like the company "Fort" (Moscow), which is carrying out demining in Tver, Moscow and Vladimir regions, and the company "Iskatel" (St.-Petersburg). Employees of these companies are mainly retired officers of engineer forces.⁵⁷

Russian engineers perform extensive demining in the CIS/FSU countries and regions, as well as taking part in demining operations in more than twenty countries, e.g., Algeria, Bosnia, Libya and Syria. The Russian Ministry of Defense's participation in humanitarian demining operations is carried out within the framework of military-technical co-operation with foreign governments.

In August 1999 the temporary press service of the Russian “joint grouping” in Dagestan reported finding two depots with mines and other weapons “during an operation to liberate villages in the Botlikh district.” It also reported that Russian troops would carry out demining operations in the villages of Ansalta, Rakhata, and Shodroda, and

⁵³ Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,” *Moscow Kommersant* (daily newspaper), 12 April 2000; “Federalists to Mine 80Km of Chechnya-Georgia Border, *AVN*, 11 April 2000.

⁵⁴ Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 May 2000.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Presidential Decree #1010 of November 13, 1995, "On Russian National Corps for Emergent Humanitarian Operations."

⁵⁷ A. Kostiuikov, demining commercial enterprise “Fort”: verbal statement at the working group meeting, 10 November 1998.

clear mines from roads....⁵⁸ Demining has also been carried out by Russian soldiers and the Police of Dagestan in Boltlikh and Tsumadinskom.⁵⁹ In October-November 1999 a platoon of the Russian Engineer Forces conducted a survey and began clearance of landmines and UXOs in Novolaks district of Dagestan, in the areas where combat actions had taken place. The platoon cleared more than 100 hectares of agricultural land, but had to suspend work due to the beginning of frost.⁶⁰

In Chechnya, on 3 April 2000, the Russian Military News Agency reported that “160 hectares of land has been cleared of mines and prepared for ploughing in the Pravoberezhny district. Sappers have surveyed 653 hectares of land in the Urus-Martan district.”⁶¹ After gaining control of Grozny at the beginning of February, clearance operations began in the city. By late February there were reportedly 500 sappers working in Grozny alone.⁶² Shortly thereafter, as noted above, on 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the city had been “completely cleared of mines,” noting, however, that the “city is still unsafe,” charging continued mine use by Chechen fighters.⁶³ (See report on Chechnya.)

From 6 August to 15 November 1999, a demining team of twenty sappers and four mine dogs from the Ministry of Emergent Situations and Catastrophes conducted a special operation in Kosovo within the framework of a Swiss-Russian humanitarian program. Under the order of the UN Mine Action Coordinating Committee (UNMACC), Russian deminers conducted a mine survey and humanitarian demining of the most dangerous areas, in particular in the vicinity of the town of Glogovac, where the most fierce combat clashes took place and resulted in a large number of mine victims. As a result, 85,309 square meters was surveyed and ten minefields detected. Thirty-name AP mines were cleared, along with other explosive devices and UXOs. Between 23 August and 20 September 20, 1999, the Russians also demined the Yugopetrol oil depot in Pristina.

Since 1994, the special engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense as a part of the CIS CPKF has been demining in Abkhazia. Roads, land and infrastructure in Abkhazia and the south bank of the Ingur River have been surveyed and demined by the Russians. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, some 23,000 explosive devices have been cleared since 1994.⁶⁴ The British demining organization HALO Trust states that Russian engineers “have undertaken limited clearance of items in Abkhazia,” particularly in Gumista minefields. HALO notes that “some mines were missed and

⁵⁸ “Ministry Confirms Bombing of Chechnya,” Moscow Interfax, 26 August 1999.

⁵⁹ Report from Press Center, Police of Russia in Dagestan and Infoart Agency, September 1999, <http://www1.infoart.ru/>.

⁶⁰ Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, Working materials of the Second International Conference on Landmines.

⁶¹ “Ploughland Cleared of Mines, Rebels Detained in Chechnya,” AVN (Russian Military News Agency), 3 April 2000.

⁶² “When the Thunderstorm Passed Grozny,” *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 25 February 2000.

⁶³ Olga Allenova, “‘Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” *Moscow Kommersant* (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.1.

⁶⁴ A.Nizhalovsky, Deputy-Commander of the Engineering Forces, Russian Ministry of Defense: presentation at the IPPNW-ICBL Landmine Conference. Moscow. 27 May 1998.

HALO had to re-clear some areas.” HALO states that currently Russian engineers only deal with “increasingly rare” incidents of new use, and check the stretch of M27 between Gali town and Inguri bridge “several times each day.”⁶⁵

Currently the Ministry of Emergent Situations and Catastrophes is negotiating the participation of its demining units in humanitarian demining operations in Chad. Similar consultations are under way with Egypt, Libya, Angola, and Peru among other countries.

Russia has not made any donations to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, nor has it received any funds for mine action programs within Russia.

Mine Awareness

During the Soviet era, dissemination of mine awareness information in mine-affected areas was carried out by district military recruiting offices.⁶⁶ Also, the compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary military training providing information on mine danger to students living in mine-affected areas. After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these activities ground to a halt, although the secondary school courses have been reinstated.⁶⁷

With the increase of mine danger in a number of areas of the Russian Federation, the lack of mine awareness programs becomes increasingly serious. Currently there are no federal mine awareness activities in the areas of on-going conflict. No mine awareness programs are under way either in Dagestan or Ingushetia.

IPPNW-Russia is launching the broadcast of a series of TV-clips on mine awareness.

Landmine Casualties

There have been a significant number of mine casualties in parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya since 1994 and Dagestan since 1999. (For casualties post-WWII, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 814.)

There is no complete official data on mine casualties/incidents among the Russian soldiers fighting in Chechnya, or for civilians, available at the moment. Such is not likely to ever be made available. The Russian Armed Forces Command and the governmental officials are objectively not interested in collection of this data, let alone making it public. However, judging by highly fragmentary information coming from the conflict zone, one can estimate a rather high level of mine-caused losses. For example, for the period from the beginning of the combat operation in Chechnya into May 2000, just one hospital of the Ural Military District located in Ekaterinburg has treated 126 mine-wounded soldiers.⁶⁸ Another indicator of the scope of the problem is the fact that the MOD's Military Medical Department ordered seventy-eight prostheses for soldiers, injured in

⁶⁵ HALO/AMAC, “Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report,” March 2000, p. 26.

⁶⁶ The so-called “District Military Committee” – “raivoenkomat.”

⁶⁷ Interview with V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998.

⁶⁸ “When Soldier Is Wounded We All Feel Pain,” *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (national daily), 5 February 2000.

Chechnya for the period 1 August 1999- 1 February 2000, from the RKK "Energiya" only.⁶⁹ (See Chechnya report for civilian casualties).

The number of mine-injured in the republic of Ingushetia since the beginning of the last Chechen conflict in August 1999 is 347,⁷⁰ including: forty-eight children, eighty-nine women and 210 men. The number of persons that need prosthetics is 300, twenty-five of them critically.⁷¹ There are no prosthetic shops in the republic, but one is to be built in the near future; the project has been approved and funds have already been allocated. The total number of hospitals/medical centers in Ingushetia is 12, including: 1 of Republican-level, 2 of city-level, 4 of territorial/regional level, 1 rural, 2 local and 2 dispensers (1 TB and 1 Dermato-venereologic).

There is the only rehabilitation center, a pediatric center in Troitskaya stanitsa. There are no mine awareness programs, either provided by the republic authorities or NGOs.

Survivor Assistance

Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in treatment of blast injuries, predominantly during World War II. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia. According to the 1995 Federal law "On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped" an individual rehabilitation and reintegration program is developed and offered for each handicapped person. Under the existing 1997-2000 Federal program "Social Insurance for Military Handicapped" (1997-2000), a total of 22 million rubles was allocated for 1999.

There are seventy specialized federal prosthetic enterprises operating in the Russian Federation. The total annual need for prosthetic devices is said to be 200,000 pieces, including 120,000 lower limb prostheses and 32,000 upper limb prostheses. In December 1994, "Energiya," the Russian Space Corporation, began to produce prostheses. At present, it produces more than 200 types of prosthetic modules, reaching 40,000 components per year, which are up to international standards.⁷² "Energiya" has developed standardized prosthetic workshops, including mobile ones. Eight experimental mobile workshops vehicles (based on the PAZ-3205 bus) have been produced to provide operative prosthetic aid in the remote areas. Unfortunately, due to constraints of the federal budget, not all elements of its plans have been carried out. It is now planned to consolidate its achievements within the framework of the new 2000-2005 federal program, "On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped," developed in the fall of 1999 and approved in January 2000.

⁶⁹ Military Medical Department, RKK "Energiya" (Russian Space Corporation), 15 March 2000.

⁷⁰ Interviews with Minister of Public Health Kambulat Uzhakhov, Deputy-Minister of Labor and Social Security Khalifa Zaurova and Ministry of Education via Suleiman Arselgov, Chair of the Council of Eldest and Chair of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights of the Republic of Ingushetia, February 2000.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² *Landmines: Outlook from Russia*, interim report, 1999.

Over the past two years, through the International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors (IPRLS) and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics, mine victims have been treated by bringing U.S. manufactured prosthetic technology to the Institute where their physicians supply the surgical and rehabilitative component for the most cost-effective delivery of the services. The cost of the procedure in Russia is about \$3,500 per person; in the U.S., the same treatment has been estimated at \$25,000. In 1998, the program treated four children and three adults.⁷³ The IPRLS has proposed a St. Petersburg Center for children which, if fully funded, could provide treatment and rehabilitation for up to 500 children who require surgery. The proposal has been accepted by UNICEF and is under consideration by the World Bank.⁷⁴

TURKEY

Key developments since March 1999: In December 1999, Turkey reported that a military directive banning the use of AP mines on Turkish territory has been in place since January 1998. In May and December 1999 Turkey stated its intention to join the Mine Ban Treaty in the near future. In March 1999 Turkey signed an agreement with Bulgaria to demine and prohibit future use of mines on their common border. Turkey reported on similar negotiations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and a similar proposal to Greece. Through the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe Turkey is proposing a region-wide agreement to clear common borders. The PKK rebel forces apparently continue to use AP mines in Turkey and Northern Iraq.

Mine Ban Policy

Turkey has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), but did attend the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in May 1999 as an observer. The Turkish delegate stated that "the security situation around Turkey so far preclude[s] my country from signing the Ottawa Convention." Upon closing his speech, however, he announced the government's intention "to sign the Ottawa Convention at the beginning of the next decade if present conditions would not change adversely."¹

In its report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Turkey noted on 15 January 1999 that "a comprehensive study is underway to reassess the country's security requirements and to develop alternative strategies to the use of anti-personnel landmines."² In its 14 December 1999 OSCE report Turkey reaffirmed its

⁷³ "International Meeting Highlights Aid to Amputee Landmine Survivors," (Stoughton, MA), 13 July 1999.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹ Statement by Mr. V. Vural Altay, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

² Reports of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 15 January 1999.

intention to join the MBT at the beginning of the next decade if the situation does not "change adversely."³

In a meeting with ICBL members in Geneva in December 1999, Turkish officials noted that landmine policy had changed dramatically in the past two years. They stated Turkey hoped to be in a position to join the treaty in two or three years, assuming the security situation did not deteriorate.⁴

Turkey has attended nearly all of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts of the MBT. Turkey has taken part in regional landmine conferences in Zagreb, Croatia, in June 1999 and in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in June 2000. After abstaining from voting on the 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions in support of a landmine ban, Turkey voted in favor of the 1998 and December 1999 pro-ban resolutions.

Turkey's delay in signing the MBT can be attributed to ongoing armed conflict with the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), long-standing concern about the security of its borders in the context of regional rivalries, and the situation in Cyprus where a heavily mined buffer zone divides the Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces. In recent years the conflict with the PKK and some regional rivalries appear to have lessened.

The Turkish government has undertaken bilateral negotiations with some neighboring countries regarding demining of common borders. The first agreement was concluded with Bulgaria on 22 March 1999, prohibiting the use and mandating the removal and destruction of landmines in common border areas. This agreement has been approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and was ratified by the Bulgarian Parliament on 15 March 2000, where the hope was expressed that the bilateral agreement was paving the way for Turkey to join the MBT.⁵ There have been numerous reports of Turkey's desire to conclude similar agreements with its other neighbors. According to the Turkish delegation's statement at the Ljubljana Regional Conference on Landmines on 21 June 2000, negotiations are underway with Georgia and Azerbaijan, while a response to Turkey's proposal is awaited from Greece.⁶

Turkey has also pursued this idea within the framework of the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe, where its submission to Working Table III (Security Issues) is entitled "Regional Agreement for Common State Borders to be Kept Free from Mines." The objective of this proposal is "a legally binding agreement between the states in the SEE region to eliminate all anti-personnel mines placed and/or stored along common

³ Report to the OSCE, 14 December 1999, p. 3. This report also noted that a seminar had been organized on 23-24 December 1998 by the General Staff to brief the Turkish Armed Forces on the provisions of the MBT and "other international efforts aimed at the total elimination" of AP mines.

⁴ ICBL meeting with members of delegation of Turkey to the First Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose.

⁵ Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site, Arms Control and Disarmament section, available at: www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ai/01.htm; "Bulgarian assembly ratifies landmine removal agreement with Turkey," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, *BTA* (news agency) 15 March 2000.; also "Assembly Ratifies Bulgarian-Turkish Landmine Agreement," *World News Connection*, 15 March 2000.

⁶ Statement by the Turkish Delegation, Regional Conference on Landmines, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 21-22 June 2000.

border areas.⁷ The importance of these initiatives is increased by the fact that, of the nations bordering Turkey, only Bulgaria is a party to the MBT and only Greece is a signatory.

Turkey is a signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and announced in June 2000 that ratification of the CCW and its Amended Protocol II was underway.⁸ It also participated, as an observer, in the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 1999.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), it continues to support the CD as an appropriate forum for addressing the landmine issue, stating that "a global regime against antipersonnel mines would be enhanced if a transfer ban in the CD is pursued."⁹

Production, Transfer and Stockpile

Turkey is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines but has produced and imported them.¹⁰ In June 2000, Turkish officials told a representative of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines that Turkey no longer produces AP mines, but there has been no formal confirmation of this information.¹¹ Its 1996 moratorium on the sale and transfer of AP mines was extended on 15 October 1998 for a further three years from its expiry on January 1999.¹² Turkey will not reveal details about its current stockpile of AP mines, but past production and import of AP mines suggests that stockpiles are substantial.

The United States is believed to maintain a stockpile in Turkey of 1,100 U.S. Air Force Gator antipersonnel mines.¹³

Use

From the recent initiatives with Bulgaria, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Greece, it can be concluded that these borders have been mined, although the extent and exact locations of minefields have not been made known. The borders with Syria, Iran and Iraq are also mined, and it is in this southeast region where there has been the most widespread use of mines by both sides in the conflict between Turkey and the PKK (For more detail, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 821-823). Confirmation of mine use by either side in the PKK conflict is difficult, as access to the southeastern region is often severely restricted.

⁷ "Humanitarian De-mining," Summaries of Working Table III Projects, The Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe, available at: <http://www.stabilitypact.org>.

⁸ Statement by the Turkish Delegation at the First Panel of the Regional Conference on Landmines, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 21-22 June 2000.

⁹ Statement by Mr. V. Vural Altay, at the FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

¹⁰ For details see, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 820-821.

¹¹ Discussion between Susan Walker, ICBL Government Liaison, and two members of the delegation of Turkey to the regional conference on landmines in Slovenia, 21 June 2000.

¹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site, Arms Control and Disarmament, Statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, document CD/1559, 21 October 1998.

¹³ Data as of 1997. Provided to Human Rights Watch by U.S. government sources, March 1999.

During the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999 the Turkish delegation disputed information in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* about mine use, stating that "the report contains incorrect, inaccurate and misleading information with regard to my country.... [N]ew antipersonnel mines were not laid by my government, more precisely by the Turkish Army, between December 1997 to early 1999 as alleged in the report."¹⁴ In a January 2000 letter to the ICBL, Turkey's Permanent Mission to the UN stated that "not even a single mine had been planted in Turkey since January 1998."¹⁵ In December 1999, Turkey reported to the OSCE that "with humanitarian considerations in mind, a directive has been issued by the Chief of Turkish General Staff in January 1998, banning the use of APMs on Turkish territory. A phased demining initiative in Turkey is also intended by this directive."¹⁶

Landmine Monitor has no evidence and has received no allegations of new use of AP mines by Turkish forces in the current reporting period of March 1999 to May 2000.

PKK

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 also reported use of AP mines by PKK forces, and it appears that use has continued. There are frequent accusations of landmine use by the PKK. Turkish officials maintain that "APM's are being indiscriminately used by the PKK terrorist organization."¹⁷ On 17 July 1999, the Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan radio claimed that the PKK emplaced landmines in July along roads in the Chaman border area. A local man was reported injured by one of these mines.¹⁸ A United Nations report in June 2000 noted that the UN Office for Project Services "remains concerned about the incidences of freshly laid mines being found in previously cleared minefields" in Northern Iraq.¹⁹ The report does not identify the user of mines.

Turkey states that during operations against the PKK the security forces "regularly recover AP mines."²⁰ According to an Italian press report, since 1994, a total of 14,025 devices have been seized, 11,339 of them across the Turkish border with Iraq where the PKK has bases. This total includes over 12,000 Italian AP mines, alleged to have been

¹⁴ Additional Statement by Mr. V. Vural Altay, FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

¹⁵ Erdogan Iscan, Deputy Permanent Representative to the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN, Geneva, letter to Susan Walker, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 17 January 2000.

¹⁶ Report to the OSCE, 14 December 1999, p. 3. Also in December 1999, Turkish officials told the ICBL that mines had not been laid in 4-5 years. ICBL meeting with members of delegation of Turkey to the First Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

¹⁷ Statement by Mr. V. Vural Altay, FMSP, Maputo, May 1999.

¹⁸ News Archive, *Stratford-Iraq*, 17 July 1999, <http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/news/an990717.htm>.

¹⁹ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1281 (1999), S/2000/520, 1 June 2000, p. 13. The report addresses distribution of humanitarian supplies throughout Iraq.

²⁰ Erdogan Iscan, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to UN in Geneva, letter to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch, 12 January 2000.

supplied by Saddam Hussein from Italian exports to Iraq in the 1980s.²¹ This press report is based in part on material supplied the Turkish military, and also a dossier prepared by the municipal authority in Florence, Italy.²² Another report apparently based on the same data stated that Turkish security forces captured 15,000 landmines from the PKK, of which 3,250 were seized in Turkey's South Anatolia region and the remainder found in Northern Iraq. Of the 3,250 mines, 2,866 were reported to be AP mines and 384 were antitank mines.²³

Representatives of the PKK attended a conference on non-state actors and banning landmines in Geneva on 24-25 March 2000. While several non-state actors attending the conference declared they will not use landmines, the PKK was not one of them. At the conference the PKK representatives spoke only of how Kurdish civilians have suffered from mines.²⁴

There has also been one report of a cache of landmines seized during a series of raids against the militant Islamic group Hezbollah in February 2000; the number and types of mines seized were not reported.²⁵

Mine Clearance

Turkey has engaged in mine clearance operations, ostensibly along the Bulgarian border and perhaps elsewhere. Details of the "phased demining initiative" noted above have not been reported. At the FMSP Turkey spoke of unspecified demining operations, and these were described as "ongoing" in January 2000.²⁶ In a report submitted to Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, the Southeast Industrialist and Businessmen's Association called for the demining of the border with Northern Iraq to allow for trade across the border.²⁷

Turkish Parliamentarians reported in 1996 that mined areas have not been properly mapped and marked.²⁸

²¹ Fausto Biloslavo, "Almost All the Land Mines Used by the PKK Are Italian," *Il Giornale* (newspaper), 1 July 1999, p. 10.

²² *Ibid.* According to the latter, in the late 1980s these Italian mines also reached the PKK via a triangular arrangement involving the Swedish firm Bofors, Chartered Industries in Singapore, and Iraq. It was also reported that Italian-licensed mines manufactured in Egypt may have reached the PKK and that Yevgeniy Primakov when head of the Russian KGB secret service facilitated this trade.

²³ "Over 12,000 Land Mines Seized From PKK Italian Made," *World News Connection*, 8 October 1999.

²⁴ "Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban," Conference hosted by Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines in cooperation with Mines Action Canada, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, UK Working Group on Landmines, and Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines, Geneva, 24-25 March 2000.

²⁵ "Turkey to Continue Fighting Terrorism: Interior Minister," *Xinhua* (news agency), 20 February 2000.

²⁶ Additional Statement by Mr. V. Vural Altay, at FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999; also Erdogan Iscan, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN, Geneva, letter to Susan Walker, ICBL, 17 January 2000.

²⁷ "People in the Southeast React Favorably to Ecevit's Comments on Border Trade," *Turkish Daily News*, 13 June 2000.

²⁸ "Turkey Hindered by own Landmines on Syrian Border," *Reuters News Service*, 6 December 1996.

Landmine Casualties

There are reports of landmine casualties in Turkey, concentrated in the southeast and east where conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK has been most intense, as well as in border areas. The casualties involve both military personnel and civilians. In August 1999, Prof. Serdar Necmioglu, chairman of the Medical Faculty Orthopedic and Traumatology Section of Dicle Hospital, stated that the number of patients admitted to that hospital for landmine-related injuries had reached 1,000 for the period between 1990 and 1999. He reported that the rate had increased during 1992-93, but slowed again following 1995. The injuries listed included chest trauma, abdomen, blood vessel and eye injuries in addition to orthopedic damage.²⁹

Following the discovery of Italian-made mines in PKK stockpiles, legal action ensued, in the names of those killed or wounded as a result. It was estimated that between 1984 and 1999, 368 people died and 1,560 were injured due to these mines in particular.³⁰ The Sovereignty of Law Association charged that "the Italian government should therefore be held responsible for the consequences of selling them to an illegal organization."³¹ Migrants are frequent casualties of Greek minefields having crossed the Turkish/Greek border illegally.³²

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

Turkey has not contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance. Turkey reports a donation of \$50,000 to mine-clearance activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also that Turkish military units take part in mine clearance there.³³ During the regional conference in Ljubljana the delegation indicated Turkey has participated in mine clearance, contributing funding and personnel, in Kosovo and other countries. The statement also noted that it had organized mine clearance training through NATO Partnership for Peace and various bilateral agreements.³⁴

UZBEKISTAN

Key development since March 1999: Uzbekistan is reported to have reinforced its border with Kyrgyzstan with landmines.

Mine Ban Policy

Uzbekistan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. According to a Russian Foreign Ministry official in May 2000, at high political levels the Uzbekistan government

²⁹ "Turkey, Number of Wounded in Mine Explosions Detailed," *Istanbul Hurriyet*, Ankara edition from FBIS, 9 August 1999.

³⁰ "Over 12,000 Land Mines Seized from PKK Italian Made," *World News Connection*, 8 October 1999.

³¹ "Lawsuit Against Italian Government," *Turkish Daily News*, 14 October 1999.

³² See report on Greece in this edition of the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*.

³³ Reports to the OSCE, 15 January 1999 and 14 December 1999.

³⁴ Statement by the Turkish Delegation, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 21-22 June 2000.

shares the goals and aims of the Mine Ban Treaty, but cannot immediately join because of financial constraints.¹ Uzbekistan is not known to have made any statements on landmines, or attended any diplomatic meetings on landmines, in 1999 or 2000.

In December 1999, Uzbekistan abstained on the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. This contrasted with its vote in favor of similar resolutions in 1996 and 1997 (it was absent from the 1998 vote). The change comes in the wake of reports of Uzbekistan use of mines in 1999.

Uzbekistan is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, but has not ratified the original or the amended Protocol II on landmines. Uzbekistan is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Uzbekistan is not believed to have produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. It inherited stockpiles of AP mines from the Soviet Union. One official from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that many of the mines have an expired shelf-life (ten to twelve years of storage). He said, "More than half of the stored mines are in fact the items of special menace, because they are equipped with the liquid type of explosive. These types of mines are difficult to destroy by the cheapest possible way – by burning – because it could lead to contamination of the air, which is harmful to the environment."²

Use

In June-September 1999 a conflict took place when an armed group from Tajikistan intruded into Kyrgyz territory near the Uzbekistan border. The intruders were repelled during combat actions in which Kyrgyz armed forces and Uzbeki air forces took part.³

As a result of the conflict Uzbekistan is reported to have reinforced its unmarked border with Kyrgyzstan with landmines.⁴ One of the reported cases is the mining by Uzbeki military of territory near the Kyrgyz settlement of Boz Adyr, which is a disputed area of the Kyrgyz-Uzbeki border. Initially the area was marked with warning signs, which later disappeared.⁵ It has been reported that animals have been killed by detonating mines in the area. Local papers reported that the area had "been mined only recently."⁶

¹ Analytical Note by Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor, Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control, RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2000.

² Ibid.

³ Interview with Asel Otorbaeva, correspondent of *Vecherny Bishkek* daily, and Marat Bozgunchiev, Director of the WHO Information Center for republics of Central Asia, 17 May 2000.

⁴ Email communication with Nick Megoran of Eurasia Insight, Central Eurasia Project, regarding the situation on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, 22 June 2000 and 1 July 2000; Daniyal Karimov, article in *Delo* newspaper, 3 May 2000.

⁵ Daniyal Karimov, article in *Delo* newspaper, 3 May 2000.

⁶ Email communication with Nick Megoran of Eurasia Insight, Central Eurasia Project, 22 June 2000 and 1 July 2000.

Mine Action

Uzbekistan is not considered to have a mine problem.⁷ Uzbekistan is not known to have contributed to any international mine action programs.

YUGOSLAVIA

Key developments since March 1999: In the conflict in Kosovo, Yugoslav forces laid at least 620 minefields and an estimated 50,000 mines, with the great majority concentrated in the south near the Albanian and Macedonian borders. The KLA also used mines in the conflict.

Background

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consists of two Republics, Serbia and Montenegro. The Republic of Serbia has two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Serbia has a mixed ethnic population of which a small percentage is Albanian, while in Kosovo most of the population is ethnic Albanian. The FRY has been involved in armed conflicts almost continuously since the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia.

Early in 1999 the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union demanded that the FRY cease repressive measures against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, withdraw its Army and police units from Kosovo, and enable UN peacekeeping forces and international civilian missions to enter and operate in the province. The Yugoslav authorities responded to these demands by increasing repressive measures and starting and accelerating the expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.

On 24 March 1999 NATO started an air campaign against FRY that lasted until 9 June 1999. During this time the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) conducted military operations against Serbian forces in Kosovo. Under UN Resolution 1244, the province was placed under the administrative control of the United Nations. Throughout this most recent conflict, mines were used by both the Yugoslav army and the KLA (See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000—Kosovo*).

Mine Ban Policy

The FR of Yugoslavia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). On 11 January 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that “in spite of the expressed interest of the FR of Yugoslavia to take part in the preparatory stage for the Convention [MBT], it has not been given the opportunity to do so from the very outset. Having joined the negotiations at a later stage, it was not possible for the FR of Yugoslavia to make all necessary preparations related to its possible accession to the Convention before the Ottawa Conference, held in December 1997.”¹ The Foreign Ministry also stated:

⁷ U.S. State Department, *Hidden Killers*, December 1994, p. 24.

¹ Letter to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) from Assistant Federal Minister Miroslav Milosevic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 11 January 2000.

“The NATO aggression against the FRY of Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 has raised completely new questions about the use of inhumane weapons, among which anti-personnel landmines represent but only one category.... The population of Kosovo and Metohija was also a victim of anti-personnel landmines planted by the terrorist organization of the so-called KLA.... I wish to assure you that we stand ready to continue to participate actively in the efforts towards the elimination of all types of weapons, inhumane weapons in particular, and will make our concrete contribution to this as soon as appropriate conditions have been created to this effect.”²

Clearly the key reason Yugoslavia has not signed the MBT is that its military still sees the weapon as useful. In 1996, Col. Dusan Stanizan, chief of engineering on the Yugoslav Military’s General Staff said, “Considering the fact that Yugoslav military doctrine is primarily defensive, antipersonnel and antitank landmines have a very important place in our defensive system.”³ In January 2000, he commented on their utility in the conflict in Kosovo when he wrote that the Yugoslav Army’s mining of some routes from Albania into Kosovo had prevented KLA soldiers from breaking through.⁴

There has been no perceptible change in official attitudes toward AP mines, despite continuing efforts to open dialogue on the issue by international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including the Yugoslav Campaign to Ban Landmines (YUCBL) and the Red Cross. With the aim of raising public awareness about AP mines and involving more NGOs in the effort, the YUCBL organized roundtables in Novi Sad, Podgorica and Pristine during 1999 and 2000, to which the Army and Ministry of Defense were invited but refused to attend.⁵ On 21 February 2000 the YUCBL wrote to the General Staff and Ministry of Defense requesting information for this report; there has been no reply. Efforts to arrange interviews also failed, and open letters published in newspapers received no response.⁶

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had signed and ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1981 and 1983 respectively. Because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia asserts itself to be the legal successor of the SFRY, it claims that the CCW has become part of Yugoslav national legislation. The FRY has not ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines).

Production, Transfer and Stockpile

The SFRY was one of the largest producers of AP mines in the world, and a major exporter, primarily to the lesser developed countries.⁷ There have been official and

² Ibid.

³ Col. Dusan Stanizan, “Mines: Weapon Without Aim,” *Novi glasnik* (military magazine), March/April 1996.

⁴ Dusan Stanizan, “Bridges of Spite and Hope,” *Vojska* (military magazine), 20 January 2000, p. 6.

⁵ Eighteen panelists and approximately seventy participants took part in these roundtables, in Novi Sad (Vojvodina) on 29 September 1999, Podgorica (Montenegro) on 25 November 1999, and Pristine (Kosovo) on 1 March 2000; it was planned to publish material from the roundtables in June 2000.

⁶ *Danas*, 2 October 1999; *Pobjeda*, 26 November 1999.

⁷ For details of mines produced and therefore likely to be in FRY stockpiles, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 827-829.

unofficial claims that the FRY has stopped producing and exporting antipersonnel mines, but it is not possible for Landmine Monitor to affirm or disprove these statements.⁸ It is likely that current stockpiles remain substantial.

Recent Use

The Yugoslav Army used mines extensively in Kosovo. Maps and other information handed over to the UN Mine Action Coordination Center by Yugoslav authorities in the second half of 1999 indicate that 620 minefields were laid by Yugoslav forces. Although it has been reported that some 500,000 mines were laid, the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center (KMACC) has told Landmine Monitor that the actual number is likely to be around 50,000.⁹ About eighty percent of the landmines are concentrated near the southern border, while nuisance mines are concentrated in the interior of the province.¹⁰ Yugoslav and KLA use of mines in this province is described in more detail in the separate report on Kosovo.

During 1998 and 1999 the Army also mined areas on the Croatian border, especially bridges and their environs, in anticipation of a possible NATO invasion from the west and north. During this period, minefields were laid near the community of Sid, some of which have been cleared according to a military source.¹¹ However, the forested left bank of the Bosut River remains very dangerous for civilians. Peasants collecting wood have activated mines with their tractors and now no longer enter this area.¹²

Landmine Problem

In November 1999 the Serbian Ministry of the Interior reported that there are one hundred locations on FRY territory (excluding Kosovo) contaminated with UXO.¹³

During the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, especially in the periods of the Serbian-Croatian war (1991-1992, 1994-1995), mine barriers were deployed on a sixty-six kilometer-long section of the Hungarian-Yugoslavian border, starting at the junction of the river Dráva and the Danube. These minefields were created on the Yugoslavian side of the border by Serbian military corps (Yugoslav People's Army) and para-military troops (Krajinian Serb Republic). The border section, located west of the current Yugoslavia-Croatia-Hungary triple border as far as Drávaszabolcs, is full of AP mines: PMR-2 (concrete Yugoslavian-made), PMR-2A (tripwire, metal, Yugoslavian-made), OMSZ-2 (tripwire) and antitank mines: TMM-1 (metal, Yugoslavian made), TMRP-6

⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 828-829.

⁹ Email from Lt. Col. John Flanagan, Program Manager, KMACC, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August 2000.

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch interviews with UNMACC and KFOR officials, Pristina, 23-27 August 1999.

¹¹ Interview with Petar Skokandic, ex-officer of Yugoslav Army, member of Vojvodina Reform Democratic Party, Novi Sad, 14 March 2000.

¹² Interview with Dusan Radosavljevic, member of Vojvodina Reform Democratic Party, Sid, 15 March 2000.

¹³ Interview with Col. Vladimir Aleksic, Ministry of the Interior, *Politika*, 27-30 November 1999.

(plastic, Yugoslavian made).¹⁴ Presumably in 1995, Serbian soldiers replaced detonators in the minefields deployed from 1991. It is likely that mines were deployed in the order of ten thousands to form contiguous mine blockade.¹⁵ There are no detailed maps of those minefields.

There have also been successive minings and (partial or complete) deminings of Yugoslavia's western border with Croatia since approximately 1991, about which there is fragmentary information. An unofficial source reported that the left bank of the Danube has been mined and remined, especially around bridges (for example, bridges near Batina village in Sombors community, near Bogojevo village in Apatin community, and near Backa Palanka).¹⁶ When armed conflict with Croatia ceased, the Yugoslav Army undertook clearance operations in these areas, but an army officer involved in the original mining operations said that many mines were placed in the sand around bridges, that would have been shifted by the river.¹⁷

Zoran Begovic from the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior claims that after the peace agreement between Yugoslavia and Croatia, the Yugoslav Army cleared all minefields on the border with Croatia in the Debeli Brijeg region.¹⁸ However, in 1997 Yugoslavia refused a proposal to demilitarize the border with Croatia.

Near the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Sjeverin village in Priboj community from 1992 to 1998 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees built eight houses for returning refugees. On 13 January 1998 the first returnees found AP mines in the yards of their new homes, and the return of other refugees was stopped.¹⁹ The Prevlaka peninsula in the FRY Republic of Montenegro was heavily mined but may have since been cleared.

Mine Action

At the conclusion of NATO hostilities on 9 June 1999, the FRY also agreed to mark and clear its minefields from Kosovo, and UN Resolution 1244 permitted Yugoslav personnel to return to Kosovo for this purpose; it is not clear what progress has been made as Kosovars did not want them in the province. The FRY also organized teams for clearance of UXO in most communities where NATO dropped cluster bombs, but some areas remain uncleared.²⁰

¹⁴ Telephone interview with Captain Posta, MH HTAZ, Budapest, 7 April 2000;

L. K., "Botlószinóros aknák magyar területen," *Magyar Hírlap*, 23 January 1996, p. 1; Németh A. Endre – Erdei Éva, "Új feladatok a déli határon," *Magyar Hírlap*, 22 January 1996, p. 8.

¹⁵ E. É., "Akna magyar területen," *Magyar Hírlap*, 10 April 1997, p. 21.

¹⁶ Interview with officer of Yugoslav Army (who requested anonymity) who took part in mining bridges in Backa Palanka during 1991 and 1999, Backa Palanka, 16 March 2000.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Interview with Zoran Begovic Minister of the Interior, Republic of Montenegro, Podgorica, 25 November 1999; this was also stated by Mr. Begovic at the YUCBL roundtable in Podgorica, 25 November 1999.

¹⁹ Interview with Sefko Alomerovic, President of Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Podgorica, 25 November 1999; this was also stated by Mr. Alomerovic at the YUCBL roundtable in Podgorica, 25 November 1999.

²⁰ Col. Rajko Stevanovic, "Bombs Remain at One Hundred Locations," *Vojska*, 16 June 1999.

In the SFRY, mine awareness was been regarded as an important element of Yugoslav military doctrine, in the historical context of preparedness of the population in the event of attack, and it had a well-developed program for the general population. However according to one source, the FRY has never organized mine awareness programs for the general population.²¹

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

From the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s, 1,250 mine victims were treated in the Institute for Orthopedics and Prosthetics in Belgrade.²² There are many patients from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia who need new prostheses, and the Institute has had difficulty producing these. The Institute in 1999 and early 2000 received forty-five new patients. It has received no international support for several years, and lacks the financial resources to import materials for fabrication of prostheses, which was an expensive process even before the war. One prosthesis costs approximately \$2,000. There are a few Yugoslav companies trying to produce the necessary materials and components, but these are not fully tested. Some patients (mostly young people from Croatia and Bosnia) subject to psychological and social problems have prolonged their stay at the Institute.²³

There is little information regarding casualties from mines following the fighting in 1999. The impact on civilians has likely been greater from cluster bombs.²⁴

The FRY had well developed surgical and rehabilitation services for mine victims, as well as reintegration services for them.²⁵ In general, the worsening economic situation in Yugoslavia means that disability laws and programs for skills training continue to be poorly implemented if at all, and most landmine survivors are left to the care of their families. Most mine survivors receive disability pensions but all pensions in the FRY are very low.

²¹ Interview with Dr. Nikola Bogunovic, vice manager of Yugoslav Health Institution, Belgrade, 15 January 1999.

²² Interview with Ljubisa Jovanovic, prosthetics ward chief, and chief technician Branko Savic, Institute for Orthopedics and Prosthetics, Belgrade, 29 January 1999; Interview with Ljubisa Jovanovic, Belgrade, 4 March 2000; this figure was previously reported as 600 mine victims. They were from Krajina, which is part of Croatian territory then under the control of the ethnic Serb majority. For details of rehabilitation services in the FRY, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 834-836.

²³ Statement by Ljubisa Jovanovic, Institute for Orthopedics and Prosthetics, Belgrade, at the YUCBL roundtable, Novi Sad, 29 September 1999.

²⁴ "Report from Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs," *Politika*, 18 May 1999, says that during the NATO campaign in 1999, 200 people were reported killed, and more than 450 wounded from cluster bombs.

²⁵ For more information on survivor assistance, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 834-836.

OTHER

ABKHAZIA

Key developments since March 1999: HALO Trust and the Abkhazia Mine Action Center completed the nationwide minefield survey, and estimate 18,366,000 square meters of potentially mine threatened land in Abkhazia. As of May 2000, 460,077 square meters of land had been cleared, and 2,448 antipersonnel mines destroyed. Systematic mine awareness programs have been underway since early 1999 aimed at school children in mine affected communities. It appears that there is on-going use of mines in Abkhazia by Georgian armed groups. The Ministry of the Interior reported thirty-three landmine casualties between January 1999 and May 2000.

Background

After the disintegration of the USSR, the long-standing dispute over the political status of Abkhazia resulted in the outbreak of war between Abkhazia and Georgia, with significant use of mines, followed by a cease-fire agreement in May 1994. Peace negotiations are ongoing, but no progress has been made on agreement on the political status of Abkhazia. On 3 of November 1999 a national referendum took place, resulting in an Abkhazian declaration of independence. However, the international community did not recognize Abkhazian independence.¹ Skirmishes continue.

Mine Ban Policy

Abkhazia is not an internationally recognized state; it cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty. In early December 1999, in an interview with Landmine Monitor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the first time expressed his support for the treaty and readiness to address landmine issues in the context of the Abkhazia-Georgia peace process.² In May 2000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs clarified that Abkhazia would be ready to ban landmines and any other weapons as soon as they are not necessary for the defense of the national security of Abkhazia, depending on an appropriate commitment from Georgia.³ Mines are still viewed as a legitimate and necessary weapon, and are used to protect Abkhazia from infiltration of armed groups from Georgia.

Landmine issues are addressed during the Abkhazian-Georgian talks at the governmental level mainly in the context of insurgent activities in the security zone between Abkhazia and Georgia. Despite the importance of the landmine problem no formal negotiations have taken place specifically concerned with the issue of landmines.

The Abkhazian Committee of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (AbCBL) was established in late 1999. In January 2000, AbCBL held a meeting with representatives of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), HALO Trust (British demining agency),

¹ UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1287, 31 January 2000, called the referendum "unacceptable and illegitimate."

² Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia Sergei Shamba, Sukhum, Abkhazia, December 1999.

³ Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Shamba, Sukhum, Abkhazia, 5 May 2000.

Abkhazian Mine-Action Center (AMAC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia and local NGOs. During the meeting AbCBL expressed its determination to achieve a mine-free Abkhazia.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

It is not believed that Abkhazia has produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Abkhazia currently maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, though the size and composition are largely unknown. Most mines used in the conflict have been of Soviet manufacture, and it is likely that those types are now in the Abkhazian arsenal. These would include PMN-2, PMN, MON-50 and MON-100 mines.⁴ (For information on transfer, see *LM Report* 1999, p. 837.)

Use

Both Georgian and Abkhazian forces used antipersonnel landmines extensively during the war of 1992-93. Mines have continued to be used in varying degree as the conflict heats up and cools down again since the May 1994 cease-fire. (For information about earlier use, see *LM Report* 1999, pp. 837-838.)

It appears that mines continue to be used in Abkhazia by armed groups that infiltrate from Georgian territory. Abkhazia's Ministry of the Interior states that from January 1999 through May 2000 there were twenty-four mine incidents on the territory of Abkhazia.⁵ UN sources have confirmed to Landmine Monitor that in this time period there were numerous mine attacks and ambushes targeting Abkhazian militia and civilians, killing and injuring a significant number of militia, civilians, and CIS peacekeeping troops.⁶ On some occasions the use of improvised explosive devices has also been reported.⁷

The demining organization HALO Trust noted in March 2000 that "incidents of current mine laying...are increasingly rare."⁸

There have been previous allegations of Abkhazian military groups or partisans laying mines in Georgia,⁹ but Landmine Monitor is unaware of any allegations in 1999 or 2000.

The UN Security Council has repeatedly adopted resolutions in which it "*condemns* the activities by armed groups, including the continued laying of mines, which endanger the civilian population, impede the work of the humanitarian organizations and seriously

⁴ Information provided to the AbCBL by HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine-Action Center, Sukhum, Abkhazia, May 2000; also, HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, pp. 40-46.

⁵ Report of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Abkhazia, April 2000. LM has information on specific incidents available upon request.

⁶ Information provided by UN sources to LM/HRW by email, July 2000. Also, information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia to the AbCBL.

⁷ Report of the Ministry of Interior, April 2000.

⁸ HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 26.

⁹ 1999 Landmine Monitor interview with M. Rapava, Head of Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia.

delay the normalization of the situation in the Galii region, and *deplores* the lack of serious efforts made by the parties to bring an end to those activities...¹⁰

It has been reported that engineering units of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense as a part of the CIS Peacekeeping Forces use antipersonnel landmines in the security zone between Abkhazia and Georgia in accordance with their mandate for protection of dislocation posts, strategic infrastructure sites and control posts.¹¹

Landmine Problem

After concluding their nationwide survey, HALO Trust, a British non-governmental demining organization, and the Abkhazia Mine Action Center in March 2000 estimated that there are 18,366,000 square meters of potentially mine-threatened land in Abkhazia.¹² About 7% of this land is considered Priority 1 (land next to human habitation, pressure for use of land is great), about 23% is Priority 2 (land close to human habitation, cleared land likely to be used), about 22% is Priority 3 (land not close to human habitation, cleared land may be used), and about 48% is Priority 4 (land not close to human habitation, cleared land is unlikely to be used).¹³

In January 1999, the Government of Abkhazia estimated that there were between 30,000-35,000 landmines scattered in approximately 500 mined locations throughout Abkhazia.¹⁴ HALO Trust had estimated in 1998 that there were close to 50,000 landmines in Abkhazia but further clearance work and extensive survey has now led them to conclude that the maximum number of mines in Abkhazia was never more than 15,000.¹⁵

The mine threat is restricted to four regions in Abkhazia: Sukhum, Gulripsh, Ochamchira and Gali. The worst affected areas are the banks of the Gumista and Ingur Rivers which formed the front lines at the beginning and end of the war, and along the M-27 highway between Gali and Sukhum where there were movements of troops and supplies and where the pre-war population was ethnically mixed. HALO survey teams found no evidence of mines northwest of the Gumista River.¹⁶ According to the UN, landmines are estimated to affect at least 2,000 hectares of arable farmland, as well as schools, hospitals, and administrative buildings in the Ochamchira region.¹⁷

¹⁰ UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1225, 28 January 1999. See also, UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1187, 30 July 1998; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1150, 30 January 1998; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1124, 31 July 1997; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1096, 30 January 1997; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1065, 12 July 1996.

¹¹ LM Monitor 1999 report on Russian Federation.

¹² HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 22. Also, HALO Trust assessment report, dated 11 April 2000, provided to AbCBL in Sukhum, Abkhazia.

¹³ HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 22.

¹⁴ Statement on the Situation with Landmines in Abkhazia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, No. 11, 22 January 1999.

¹⁵ United Nations Development Program, "United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia," March 1998. Email from Richard Boulter, Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

¹⁶ HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 24.

¹⁷ UNDP, *Needs Assessment Mission*, March 1998

From its survey information, HALO has noted that in general: (1) Barrier minefields were used extensively on the banks of the Gumista and Ingur rivers to hamper full-scale military assaults. The Gumista River had over 5,000 mines laid on its banks. Mines are frequently washed downriver. HALO plans to clear this area by the end of the year 2000. (2) Defensive minefields were laid around military encampments, bridges and along access roads adjacent to M-27, to deny freedom of movement to opposition forces. Currently, HALO is only marking the positions of these minefields. (3) In the Ochamchira region, village people laid mines at the boundaries of their villages to protect against adjacent ethnically different communities.¹⁸

Use of landmines has affected the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, as people are afraid of going to potentially mined areas.¹⁹

Mine Action Coordination and Funding

In January 1999, in cooperation with Abkhazian authorities, HALO Trust established the Abkhazian Mine Action Center (AMAC) to supervise and coordinate mine action in the territory of Abkhazia. Recognized by the UN as a coordinating body for all mine action in Abkhazia, AMAC maintains a database of all information related to mines within Abkhazia, including the collation, translation and duplication of all wartime maps. These maps can be superimposed over existing ordnance survey maps to highlight danger areas; this information is all computerized. All mapping work is the responsibility of Abkhazian personnel.

AMAC is funded through HALO Trust by the governments of the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Finland and the private foundations Pro Victimis and Anti-Landmyn Stichtung.²⁰

Survey and Assessment

Starting in 1999, survey and mine-marking teams were deployed to carry out an in depth survey of the extent of the mine/UXO problem in Abkhazia. In March 2000, HALO and AMAC reported the results of that survey.²¹ HALO noted that "AMAC has proven in a remarkably short time to be an international model for a successful fully integrated Mine Action Center. One of the first specific tasks that AMAC set itself was to locate and map each and every minefield in the territory. This report is the fulfillment of that task. Researched, compiled and written by local staff with a minimum of expatriate involvement it represents the establishment of a truly indigenous capacity."²²

¹⁸ HALO Trust assessment report, 11 April 2000; HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, pp. 24-26.

¹⁹ UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1287, 31 January 2000 welcomed the establishment of a new mechanism between Georgia and Abkhazia on 18-19 January 2000 for joint investigation of violations of the cease-fire of 1994 and the preparation of a new protocol on return of refugees to the Galii region, which is one of the seriously mined areas of the region.

²⁰ Information provided by HALO Trust to the AbCBL, 25 January 2000. Also, HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," p. 4.

²¹ HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 11.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 2. Preface by Simon Conway, HALO Trust.

Mine Clearance

HALO Trust and the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CIS CPKF) are conducting demining operations in Abkhazia. HALO Trust started demining operations in 1997 with two demining platoons and now has five twenty-one man manual mine clearance teams working in Abkhazia; two teams are based in Gali and three in Sukhum. As of 1 May 2000, 460,077 square meters of land had been cleared, and 2,448 antipersonnel mines, 93 antitank mines, and 1,795 UXOs destroyed.²³

HALO has applied to the U.S. government for support for an additional three teams to operate in Ochamchira. HALO will employ 385 local staff and four expatriates in 2000. Manual teams concentrate on agricultural land and on sites where mechanical access is difficult. The manual mine clearance teams are all managed by local staff. HALO Trust has four Volvo vehicles, based in Sukhum, to support manual mine clearance.²⁴

The mine action priorities of HALO Trust and AMAC are as follows: 1. Return or resettlement of refugees and IDPs; 2. Agricultural land; 3. Infrastructure - schools, bridges, water, power and sewerage, road projects. There are some mountain areas where demining is not yet planned due to difficult mountain terrain, dense vegetation and lack of financial resources.

HALO, in cooperation with AMAC, maintains the reconstruction and development of cleared areas. The arable land that was cleared along the Gumista River is back in use by its previous private owners. Though this happens only in limited areas, the psychological effect is great. The industrial sites cleared by HALO Trust are not returning to production because of the lack of investment in small businesses and because supplies and equipment were looted during the war.

Since 1994, the special engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense as a part of the CIS CPKF has been demining in Abkhazia. Roads, land and infrastructure in Abkhazia and the south bank of the Ingur River have been surveyed and demined by the Russians. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, some 23,000 explosive devices have been cleared since 1994.²⁵ HALO Trust states that Russian engineers "have undertaken limited clearance of items in Abkhazia," particularly in Gumista minefields. HALO notes that "some mines were missed and HALO had to re-clear some areas." HALO states that currently Russian engineers only deal with "increasingly rare" incidents of new use, and check the stretch of M27 between Gali town and Inguri bridge "several times each day."²⁶

²³ Information provided by HALO Trust to the AbCBL, May 2000. Locations, start and finish dates, and purpose of clearance are all available to the interested reader. The March survey report (p. 6) indicated 415,158 square meters of land cleared, and 2,310 AP mines, 83 AT mines, and 1,770 UXOs destroyed.

²⁴ "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 32.

²⁵ A. Nizhalovsky, Deputy-Commander of the Engineering Forces, Russian Ministry of Defense: presentation at the IPPNW-ICBL Landmine Conference, Moscow, 27 May 1998.

²⁶ HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 26.

Mine Awareness

Since its establishment at the beginning of 1999, the Abkhazia Mine Action Center has been running a mine awareness program in Abkhazia. The program is aimed at schoolchildren in mine-affected communities and is seen as an intrinsic part of survey and assessment.²⁷ The ICRC has supported AMAC and HALO in this effort. Mine awareness teams operate in Sukhum and Gali. The Sukhum-based team covers Ochamchira, Gulripsh, Gagra, and Gudauta; the Gali team also works in western Georgia. In addition to regular presentations to schools the teams also talk to NGOs, factory groups, ICRC, and to the various offices of the UN.

Mine Awareness presentations have been given to 3,078 recipients in Abkhazia and Western Georgia. The mine awareness teams have distributed 4,000 schoolbooks with a mine awareness message to schools. In 2000, plans call for providing every school child in Abkhazia with similar books. Posters with mine awareness messages have been printed and distributed nationally. Traffic billboards explaining the significance of minefield marking signs have been erected in the city of Sukhum. The mines awareness program is entirely Abkhazian managed.

Landmine Casualties

There is no systematic data collection on mine victims in Abkhazia; thus information is sketchy at best. The local NGO "Rehabilitation Center-AIS" is monitoring the problem and is creating a database of mine victims. At the end of April 2000, they had interviewed 153 amputees. The Center estimates that there are approximately 550-650 mine victims, with the number increasing each year. This NGO believes the information collected by the government misrepresents the actual number of victims.²⁸ The Ministry of the Interior reported twenty-four landmine and UXO incidents from January 1999 to May 2000, in which there were thirty-three casualties – fourteen people killed and nineteen wounded.²⁹

Survivor Assistance

The ICRC, in cooperation with the Ministry of Health Care of Abkhazia, runs an orthopedic workshop for the disabled, many of whom are landmine victims. According to the Abkhazian Social Security Foundation in 1998, there were some 490 amputees in Abkhazia³⁰ and by February 2000, some 450 of them had used the ICRC orthopedic workshop for free prostheses. There is little available in terms of rehabilitation services in Abkhazia. While medical personnel have the expertise to treat victims, at the

²⁷ "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 14.

²⁸ "Rehabilitation Center – AIS" database, May 2000.

²⁹ Report of the Ministry of the Interior, April 2000. HALO however states that "almost all of those injured by mines in Abkhazia have been victims of anti-tank mines, many of them serving military, to the best of our knowledge there were only seven civilians injured by anti-personnel mines in Abkhazia in the period stated." Email from Richard Boulter, Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

³⁰ Interview with the head of the "Foundation for Medical Insurance," Center for Humanitarian Programs, August 1998.

Republican Hospital in Sukhum adequate resources and equipment to treat landmine injuries are generally not available.³¹

CHECHNYA

Key developments since March 1999: The renewed conflict since September 1999 has seen extensive use of mines by Russian and Chechen forces. In April 2000, the Russian military revealed plans to deploy mines along the southern Chechen border with Georgia. In December 1999, mine clearance operations by HALO Trust were suspended. Mine awareness activities also ground to a halt, but by late spring 2000 had begun again. Many hundreds of new mine victims have already been identified.

Background

In September 1991, Chechnya proclaimed independence from Russia, and adopted the full name Chechen Republic Ichkeria. On 11 December 1994, the Russian Federation sent troops into the Chechen Republic where mines were used extensively in the fighting by both sides. In August 1996, the Khasav-Yurt peace agreements were signed; and a decision on the Chechen Republic Ichkeria's status was delayed till 1 January 2001.

Relations remained tense, however, and deteriorated to the point of Russia sending troops into Dagestan in August 1999 and then into Chechnya in September. Russian troops first secured the northern section of the country, occupied the Chechen capital of Grozny, then began pursuit of rebels in mountainous areas in southern Chechnya. The war, replete with massive violations of human rights and laws of war including widespread use of mines, continues as *Landmine Monitor 2000* goes to print. (See also Landmine Monitor country report on Russia.)

Mine Ban Policy

Chechnya is not an internationally recognized sovereign state, and therefore cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty. In 1998 then Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ilias Akhmadov expressed support for the Mine Ban Treaty and said that the Chechen Republic Ichkeria would be ready to sign immediately.¹ With the resumption of the war in 1999, the Chechen position on a mine ban has reversed.

One Chechen parliamentarian noted that "any questions pertaining to the antipersonnel mine ban, which may be put by a sovereign state in peacetime to the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, are unacceptable at the present time."² Another government official said, "The question of banning the use of antipersonnel mines, which we put to some field commanders...caused unconcealed indignation. We considered it senseless to make further inquiries pertaining to this theme. The main conclusion made by our

³¹ UNDP, "Needs Assessment Mission," March 1998.

¹ Interview with Ilias Akhmadov, Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 December 1998.

² Interview with Mr. A. Idigov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, Paris, December 1999.

representatives is that mines will not be discarded from general military strategy by either the Russian Army or the Chechen detachments.”³

Production

It is unclear if, or how much, landmine production capability was located in Chechnya before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is believed that there had been no domestic production of mines in Chechnya although some plants have produced military materiel.⁴ An engineer of the “Krasny Molot” plant said that Chechnya has never manufactured its own mines and does not produce them at the present time.⁵ He considered that making improvised explosive devices was not production, as they could not be made in large numbers.

Transfer

Chechnya has not made an official declaration regarding its position on the export or import of AP mines, but it is not known to have exported mines. The landmines in Chechnya were brought in during Soviet times. During the first war, it appears that Chechens obtained antipersonnel mines from Russian soldiers and officers, and mines also came from the Trans-Caucasus, delivered by groups on horseback across the mountains.

A Chechen military officer has said that all mines are remainders of stockpiles of the Armed Forces of the USSR or mines left by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation after the first war. He said the only method of receiving AP mines is through contacts with representatives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.⁶

On 13 January 2000, on a trip to the U.S., Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ilias Akhmadov stated that Chechens were being provided “arms, ammunition, including explosives...by Russia.” Earlier that month, Georgian intelligence services had captured a Russian military vehicle near the Russian military base in Vaziani, Georgia, attempting to transport weapons to Chechen militaries.⁷ The SSM (State Security Ministry) of Georgia reported that the evidence of the trafficking would be submitted by Georgia's Procurator's Office to Russia's Procurator's Office. Vladimir Andreev, Commander of the Russian Military forces in Transcaucasus, responded that Georgia's SSM had forged a film depicting the illegal trafficking of weapons from Vaziani.⁸

One Russian report stated that among other things Chechens used “serial landmines of Western manufacturing.”⁹

³ Interviews with Kh. Israpilov, Commander-in Chief, Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, Grozny, 2-3 January 2000.

⁴ 1999 interviews with former chief technologist of Electropribor plant Mr. A.Z. Satuev, laboratory assistant at Anisimov plant Mr. T. Larsaev, and former engineer at Krasny Molot plant Mr. T. Akhmetkhanov.

⁵ Interview with Mr. M. Isaev, engineer at “Krasny Molot” plant, Grozny, December 1999.

⁶ Interview with Col. M. Arsaliev, engineering service, Chechen military, May 1999.

⁷ *Chechenskaya Pravda*, (Chechen newspaper), 2 January 2000.

⁸ “Prime News,” *ORT* (television daily news, *ORT*, *RTR*, *NTV* transmit to the entire territory of the former Soviet Union), Tbilisi, 10 February 2000.

⁹ “Segodnya” (news program), *NTV* Russian national television, 11pm, 6 March 2000.

Chechen forces are known to have links with Islamist militant movements in the region and may also be obtaining military supplies, including landmines, from these support networks.¹⁰

Stockpiling

It is not possible to get accurate information on the quantity of mines in Chechen stockpiles, but they consist mostly of Soviet-produced PMN and OZM mines. According to Mr. M. Arsaliev, the chief deminer of the Chechen Republic, the pre-war arsenal stored in the Chechen Republic consisted mainly of PMN, OMZ-72, MON-50, MON-90, and MON-100 antipersonnel mines, and TM-62 antitank mines.¹¹ During the fighting, stocks of AP mines, along with other weapons, were moved to secret camps and bases in mountain regions, especially in southern Chechnya.¹² A military official noted that the disproportion of fighting forces in Chechnya makes stockpile destruction impossible; mines will only be destroyed in the “natural” way.¹³

Use

Both sides used mines in the 1994-96 Chechen conflict.¹⁴ (See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for details). While some estimates of mines laid in the first war were over one million, surveys by the British demining organization HALO Trust found fewer mines than in other parts of the Caucasus. However, the perceived threat, based on accidents across the territory, resulted in large tracts of agricultural land not being used.¹⁵

In the lull between the wars, there were allegations of continued use of landmines. In May 1997, HALO Trust said it had seen new minefields laid by Russian Interior Ministry forces along Chechnya’s borders with Ingushetia and Dagestan.¹⁶ Mines were also used by various armed groups and armed robbers.

With the renewed fighting, first in Dagestan in August 1999 and then moving into Chechnya, where it continues as this edition goes to print, mines have been used in

¹⁰ There are clear links between Chechen fighters and Afghan war veterans, as well as Dagestani Islamists.

¹¹ 1999 interview with Mr. M. Arsaliev, chief deminer of the Chechen Republic.

¹² M. Khambiev, Minister of Defense, Ichkeria television, October 1999.

¹³ Interview with Kh. Khachukaev, field commander, Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, Grozny, 24 December 1999.

¹⁴ Mines used by Russians have included OZM-72, MON-50, PMN-2 and PFM-1S, as well as remote-controlled VKPM-1, BKPM-2, remote controlled UMP-3. Interview with General Kuznetsov (ret.), Commander of the Russian Engineer troops from 1986-1999, by General Mehov (ret.), Russian Humanitarian Mine Action Center/RAVUNPM, Moscow, April 2000; IPPNW-Russia, Materials of the First International Conference on AP Mines in Russia-CIS, 27-28 May 1998, Moscow, 1998, p. 30. Chechens mainly used PMN, PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-100, MON-200 and often grenades with hand-made trip-wires. *Landmines: Outlook from Russia*, IPPNW-Russia interim report, 1999; also various TV news interviews with Russian soldiers who participated in Combat in Chechnya, ORT, NTV, RTR.

¹⁵ Richard Boulter, “Knights in Armored Vehicles – the Halo Trust in the Caucasus,” *JMU Journal*, #4.1, at website: <http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/hdic/journal/4.1/halo.htm>. Site visited 6 June 2000.

¹⁶ Carlotta Gall, “Land Mines, Chechnya’s Hidden Killers,” *Moscow Times*, 21 May 1997.

significant numbers by all armed fighters. Chechens have made unverifiable claims that Russia has used between 200,000-300,000 mines since the fighting broke out.¹⁷

Russian officials admit to the large-scale use of mines throughout the operations. A government official, describing their use in Dagestan wrote, "The use of antipersonnel landmines there was nothing less but a 'dire necessity.' In Dagestan we had to do everything possible not only to safeguard the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, but first and foremost to protect the civilian population from international terrorists.... The Russian Federation uses antipersonnel landmines only for the purposes of defense and in the first place to deter terrorists, drug smugglers and other potential illegal trespassers who wish to penetrate into our territory."¹⁸

Russian troops have used hand-laid mines, air- and artillery-scattered mines, as well as remotely controlled devices. The main objectives of the initial stages of the operation were the creation of "security zones," and a "sanitary corridor." The military has said that at that point, only MVZ mines were used to protect check-points, outposts and temporary positions, and that the mines were removed whenever the units changed position.¹⁹ They also said that the minefields were mapped and the "security zones" were marked.²⁰ As operations expanded, so did the use of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Hand-laid mines included OZM-72, and MON-50/90/100 mines.²¹

The Russians also have widely used scatterable mines, mostly dropped from aircraft, to cut off potential withdrawal routes from Dagestan, against guerrillas in the mountainous areas of Chechnya, and to cut off both weapons supply and guerrilla reinforcement along the Russian-Georgian border. In December 1999, a Georgian officer noted that such operations had been going on for two months, and he stated that on one day alone, Russian aircraft scattered mines along a 20 kilometer stretch in the Chechen border area. He noted that it is very difficult to precisely locate air-scattered mines.²² The most commonly used mine has been the PFM-1S, which is equipped with a self-destruct mechanism.²³ Artillery-delivered mines have also been used, notably in the mining of the estuary of the River Sunzha and in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu.²⁴ Civilians returning to their homes have on occasion been injured by booby-traps left behind by Russian forces.

¹⁷ "Chechens Say Russians Laid 300,000 Mines," *Kavkaz-Tsentri News Agency* (Internet), 5 June 2000.

¹⁸ Letter to ICBL from Mr. Alexander V. Zmeevski, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, New York, 22 October 1999, as a follow up to a meeting at the Russian Mission on 5 October 1999.

¹⁹ Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Russian Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 16 December 1999.

²² Lieutenant-General Nickolaishvili Guram Georgevich, "Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future Without Landmines," Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.

²³ *Ibid.* Also, ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999. Col Bobkov said only self-destructing PFMs were used, not older non-self-destructing ones.

²⁴ Interview with a colonel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, RTR television, March 2000. In the interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by artillery.

The Chechens have used mainly PMN, PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-100, MON-200, improvised explosive devices, grenades with trip-wires and to a wide extent booby traps.²⁵ A Russian military officer said that 90% of the mines were Russian-made, left over from the breakup of the USSR; he also stated that the Chechens used Italian-made mines.²⁶ While Russian forces have used mostly AP mines, Chechens have used mainly antitank mines. According to one report, "The Chechen rebels use landmines of a wide range types and modifications, including serial landmines of Western manufacturing, as well as a wide spectrum of improvised explosives and even devices which to a great extent complicates mine clearance." Chechen fighters have used mines to retard the advance of Russian troops, as well as to complicate rebuilding of communication infrastructure, and along railroads, electrical supply lines and other such sites.²⁷ By the summer of 2000, it was reported that, "Quite well equipped until recently, [the rebels] are now experiencing difficulties...in the supply of standard-issue munitions. Home-made explosive devices are therefore in use."²⁸

In a radio interview, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov noted that the decision to use mines is taken by junior commanders, in both Chechen and Russian force, and that the use of antipersonnel mines and antitank mines will only increase with the beginning of the partisan war.²⁹ Another report indicates that for the Russians, in many cases, decisions to use mines were made at individual command and/or small reconnaissance team and patrol level.³⁰

Much of the Chechen capital of Grozny has been laid to waste in the fighting.³¹ Mines have been used extensively in the city and have taken their toll on combatants and civilians alike. In one of the most notorious incidents in the fighting for Grozny, on 31 January 2000, a column of some 2-3,000 rebels evacuating from Grozny traveled through a large minefield on the outskirts of the capitol suffering heavy casualties.³² Russians officials claimed they lured the guerrillas into a trap by pretending to accept a bribe in

²⁵ *Landmines: Outlook from Russia*, IPPNW-Russia interim report, 1999; also various TV news reports by *ORT*, *NTV*, *RTR* among others, interviews with Russian soldiers and officers participating in combat actions in Chechnya, on the route between Rostov-Baku, 18 March 2000.

²⁶ ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999.

²⁷ "Railway Connection with Chechnya Will Soon Resume," *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye* (weekly) 26 November – 3 December 1999; "The Federal Center is Fully Determined," *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye*, 10-16 December 1999; "What is Grozny like after the Thunder?" *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 11 February 2000.

²⁸ "Mine Clearance Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya," "Vesti" newscast, *RTR* Moscow Russian TV, 5 July 2000, in *FBIS*.

²⁹ Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, interview to Radio Svoboda, March 2000.

³⁰ "Night Patrol of 'Fittermice,'" *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January 2000.

³¹ Daniel Williams, "Russians Declare Victory, Raise Flag Over Grozny," *Washington Post*, 7 February 2000. Regarding the level of destruction in the city, the article reported that "Gen. Gennady Troshev, one of Russia's top commanders, toured the city today and said he had trouble finding intact buildings to use as command posts. After more than five months of bombing and shelling, 'the city is ruined,' he said."

³² "Chechen Rebels Lured into Minefield," *Segodnya* (newscast), Moscow NTV, 3 February 2000; Daniel Williams, "Grozny Nearly in Russian Forces' Grasp: Chechen Rebels Head South After Taking Heavy Losses in Escape from Capital," *Washington Post*, 4 February 2000, p. A. 26.

exchange for safe passage out of Grozny. “Frankly, we did not expect bandits, especially the key figures, to swallow the bait,” said Gen. Vladimir Shamanov.³³

In one account of the incident, a Chechen fighter said, “I saw dreadful things during fighting in Grozny, but that massacre was beyond comparison. We had to walk on our dead comrades” to avoid stepping on unexploded mines.³⁴ Several hundred fighters were killed or wounded, including rebel commanders such as the Mayor of Grozny, Lecha Dudayev, who was killed by a mine.³⁵ One doctor in the nearby village of Alkhan-Kala said that in two days, he amputated limbs on sixty-seven mine victims, including rebel commander Shamil Basayev, who lost his right foot.³⁶

Shortly after the incident, the Russian military closed Grozny to returning civilians. On Russia’s NTV television, Col. Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, a top Russian commander, said, “As long as the city isn’t cleared of all mines and shells, and there is a threat of buildings collapsing, civilians are being banned from entering.” He added, “Under civilian disguise, militants are trying to return to pick up their wounded.”³⁷

On 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the city had been “completely cleared of mines.” They did, however, note that the “city is still unsafe,” charging continued mine use by Chechen fighters.³⁸ In May 2000, Russian authorities began using mines again to protect factories and power plants in Chechen’s capital, Grozny. The Russian-appointed mayor of the city, Supyan Mokchayev reported that such mining was necessary to stop “a plague of looting by their own [Russian] troops.”³⁹

Since evacuating the capitol Grozny in early February, Chechen forces have resorted to guerilla tactics, mounting dozens of ambushes on Russian forces throughout Chechen territory. Usually, the ambushes are initiated by the use of concealed antitank mines that demobilize vehicles in the Russian convoy, followed by brief ground engagement by Chechen fighters. Such attacks have inflicted hundreds of Russian casualties and continue unabated.⁴⁰

In April 2000, it was reported that the “military leadership and border services of Russia and Georgia have adopted the decision to mine several stretches of the border” in

³³ Lyoma Turpalov, “Minefield massacre bleeds rebels; Russia says it was a trap,” *Associated Press Newswires*, (Alkhan-Kala, Russia), 4 February 2000.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May 2000. He estimated 300 wounded, including 50 civilians who fled Grozny with the fighters, plus many killed. See also, Andrew Kramer, “Doctor becomes enemy of all after treating both Russians and Chechens,” *AP*, 18 February 2000; Alvi Zakriyev, “Doctor Hassan Baiyev: life-saving Chechen surgeon,” *AFP*, 19 February 2000; Dave Montgomery, “Brutal attacks reported in Chechnya: Accounts surfacing about executions, other atrocities by Russian troops,” *The Dallas Morning News*, 27 February 2000.

³⁷ “Russia Blocks Civilians From Returning Home to Grozny,” (*AP*, Nazran, Russia), *Washington Post*, 15 February 2000, p. A.19.

³⁸ Olga Allenova, “‘Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” *Moscow Kommersant* (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p. 1.

³⁹ Giles Whittel, “Grozny is Mined to Stop Troops Looting,” *London Times*, 13 May 2000.

⁴⁰ See for example, “Russian army column attacked near Grozny: reports,” *AFP* (Moscow), 29 July 2000.

order to stop the flow of men and materiel between Georgia and Chechnya. Russian military spokesmen would not “disclose precisely” the type of mines to be used, noting only that over twenty mountain passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80 kilometer-long stretch of the border near the southern Chechen Argun Gorge.⁴¹ There has been speculation that the mining would be similar to that used in Afghanistan, where individual stretches of border were mined by sappers and in inaccessible areas, air-scattered by helicopter. The report also noted that when mines are air-scattered it is difficult to determine the exact location of the minefields, which endangers the movement of one’s own troops.⁴² The Georgian Department for the Protection of the State Border, for its part, has stated officially it is “considering the possibility of mining the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border.”⁴³

Landmine Problem

With the renewed fighting, it is impossible to get accurate information about mined areas, but given that very limited mine clearance took place after the 1994-96 war, the current situation can only be worse – and the fighting continues. (For details of the mine problem as a result of the 1994-96 fighting, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 844.)

In addition to the mining of Grozny, air-scatterable mines have been used against guerrilla strongholds in the mountains. Forest ranges adjacent to villages and towns have also been mined, as have been the “administrative borders” of Chechnya, along the banks of the Terek River,⁴⁴ the estuary of the River Sunzha and in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu.⁴⁵

During May 2000, the Chechen NGO, “Refugees Against Landmines,” began interviewing Chechen refugees in the Panki Canyon of Akmeta district in Georgia about their knowledge of the landmine problem in Chechnya and mine victims. Responses about areas mined included the following:⁴⁶

- male from village on 1 May: fields near Samashky village and the nearby forests and roads;
- male from Urus-Martan on 6 May: arable land of Sovkhoz “Gorets” of Urus-Martan district by Russian forces;

⁴¹ Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,” *Moscow Kommersant* (daily newspaper), 12 April 2000; “Federalists to Mine 80Km of Chechnya-Georgia Border, *AVN*, 11 April 2000.

⁴² Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,” 12 April 2000.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Interviews with employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ingushetia in Chechnya, February 2000.

⁴⁵ Interview with a colonel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, RTR television, March 2000. In the interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by artillery.

⁴⁶ “Refugees Against Landmines” hope to complete interviews of 1,000 refugees. Interviewing was begun on 1 May and by mid-June, approximately 100 refugees had been interviewed. The NGO noted the difficult circumstances in attempting to interview about the ongoing war. Complete information from interviewees is available.

- male from Urus-Martan on 6 May: arable land from Urus-Martan to Tangi-Chu; cattle pasture between Urus-Martan to Gekhi, near the highway to Baku – it was all mined in December 1999 and the minefields are not marked;
- 2 males from Urus-Martan on 6 & 7 May: sowing lands between Urus-Martan and Tangi-Chu are mined by Russian forces;
- male on 6 May: arable lands and fields in Naur district, and the bridge over the Terek river mined by Russian soldiers;
- male on 6 May: almost all civil and administrative buildings in Grozny.

Many refugees noted that minefields from the 1994-96 war had not been cleared. As one said, “After the first war, half of Chechnya was mined and still there are places not cleared yet... we shall see after the war.”

In July 2000, a Russian television interview with a Russian sapper noted the following: “In innumerable areas in Chechnya, no man has set foot for several years now. It is dangerous to walk in woods, which have been mined by both our forces and the rebels. Since no minefields have been mapped, not even sappers take the risk. Civilians are blown up and farm animals killed by mines controlled by tripwires. The lofts and cellars of Grozny ruins are no less of a danger.”⁴⁷

A Chechen doctor who operated on numerous mine victims said that no single town or district is without mines, and that even after the war, for ten or twenty years, mines will still be killing people. “There is no need to continue the war,” he said, “even if troops leave now half the population will die.” He believed that mine use in the second war was ten times greater than the first, and he said that neither side bothered with signs, marking or fencing.⁴⁸

Mine Action Funding

Even before the renewed war, international funding for demining had been almost nonexistent. There were no funds in the Chechen Republic budget for humanitarian demining. According to an agreement between Chechnya and the Russian Federation, financing of demining programs was to be carried out by Russia, but because of the financial crisis the program had not been implemented.

Mine Clearance

HALO Trust conducted a mine assessment mission in January 1997 and proposed a demining project in cooperation with the Chechen army.⁴⁹ For most of 1998 and 1999, HALO carried out programs in Chechnya. By the time of the 1999 Russian invasion, HALO had trained both manual and mechanical clearance teams. Operations were based in southwestern Chechnya. HALO was preparing to hand over management to Chechen personnel when the fighting began again. Operations were suspended in December 1999.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ “Mine Clearance Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” “Vesti” newscast, *RTR Moscow Russian TV*, 5 July 2000, in *FBIS*.

⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May 2000.

⁴⁹ “Landmines in the former Soviet Union,” p. 10.

⁵⁰ Richard Boulter, “Knights in Armored Vehicles.”

In February 2000, Russian military called upon the residents of Avtury to turn over arms and ammunition, and on behalf of the command of the Internal Forces of the Russian Federation in Chechnya promised "to clear the infested mined lands by the beginning of the planting season..."⁵¹ In this vicinity about 1,500 hectares of land are infested with landmines and UXOs and have been unable to be farmed since the 1994-96 fighting.

On 3 April 2000, the Russian Military News Agency reported that "160 hectares of land has been cleared of mines and prepared for ploughing in the Pravoberezhny district. Sappers have surveyed 653 hectares of land in the Urus-Martan district."⁵²

Russian military stated, "During only the first week after gaining control over Grozny, the Russian sappers found in this half-destroyed city more than 3,000 landmines among other explosive devices, UXOs and ammunition – the result of surveying hardly one-third of the city. Due to this, the military command took the decision to suspend until special order entry to the city for civilians and journalists."⁵³ By late February there were reportedly 500 sappers working in Grozny.⁵⁴ On 24 April 2000, Russia declared the city "completely cleared of mines," stating that "[o]ver 177,000 explosive devices and rounds of ammunition were rendered harmless."⁵⁵

Mine Awareness

Prior to renewed fighting in 1999, the ICRC and Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN - a British NGO) had carried out mine awareness activities.⁵⁶ Just as the fighting has made clearance operations impossible, no mine awareness activities could be conducted. One Chechen NGO was formulating plans for mine awareness activities with refugees in Georgia, Ingushetya and Azerbaijan, but due to lack of resources and logistical constraints at that time, the project essentially remained a plan for the future. In early 2000, a very bleak picture of the situation was described:

The entire work carried out by our organization to inform the population of the danger of antipersonnel mines has been reduced since the beginning of the war. At the present time it is impossible to move about on the territory of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria and even if one reached any populated locality, having paid for this at every check-post, one would find out that it is a ghost town. It will be very difficult to work on problems of antipersonnel mines until the end of the military operations.... Our office in the city of Grozny, which contained video and photo materials, booklets, placards, warning boards and other things and equipment, has been completely

⁵¹ "Spring in Avtury," *Krashaya Zvezda* (Ministry of Defence of RF's national daily), 7 February 2000.

⁵² "Ploughland Cleared of Mines, Rebels Detained in Chechnya," *AVN* (Russian Military News Agency), 3 April 2000.

⁵³ Colonel-General Viktor Kazantsev, Commander of the United Groupment of Federal Forces in the North Caucasus, "Zdes I Seychas," *ORT* television program, 15 February 2000.

⁵⁴ "When the Thunderstorm Passed Grozny," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 25 February 2000.

⁵⁵ Olga Allenova, "'Mine Warfare' Seen Continuing in Grozny," *Moscow Kommersant* (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.1.

⁵⁶ NPA, "Fact Finding Mission Report, Chechnya," Annexes A-3 and A-15.

destroyed... Neither Russian nor Chechen military men inform the population about mined territories, moreover this information is kept secret.⁵⁷

Representatives from UNHCR reported that the agency plans to carry out mine awareness activities in Ingushetia/Chechnya and that the Danish Refugee Council also plans a project to target teachers and schools in Ingushetia.⁵⁸

By early summer 2000, mine awareness work in Chechnya is increasing. Movement around the territory is still dangerous and payment at Russian checkpoints still a necessity to reach communities; but it is possible to begin some work. A Chechen youth group, Laman Az (Voice of the Mountains), the Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development, the Chechen Human Rights Investigation Bureau, and the Danish Refugee Council are now actively involved in mine awareness activities. UNICEF now has funds to support such programs.⁵⁹

Landmine Casualties

With the end of the first war in 1996, there were an estimated 600 to 800 civilian landmine casualties in Chechnya, about half of whom are children.⁶⁰ Immediately after the war, the number of casualties from mines appeared to increase as people returned to their homes. Laman Az reported that during this time period, there were fifty-seven landmine casualties in the Nozhai-Yurtovsky region, forty-five landmine casualties in the Achoi-Martanovsky region, and thirty landmine casualties in the Urus-Martanovsky region.⁶¹

By the outbreak of the war in 1999, there were approximately 3,500 people registered by the Ministry of Public Health in the Chechen Republic as needing artificial limbs. Of those, Chechen Health Ministry officials estimate up to 20 percent were mine victims.⁶²

One NGO had begun to compile information on mine victims, working through the Chechen Ministry of Health. In the spring and summer of 1999, it had compiled a list of names and addresses of 1,800 people injured by mines and were planning on cross-checking the information. When work had to stop with the outbreak of war, northern regions of Naursky, Shelkovsky, and Nadterochny had not yet been covered.⁶³

⁵⁷ Maia Chovkhalova, Centre for Peacemaking & Community Development (NGO based in Moscow that works in Chechnya), draft report for *Landmine Monitor 2000*.

⁵⁸ Email memo to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch, from Jon Hoisaeter, Protection Officer, North-Caucasus, UNHCR, 4 April 2000.

⁵⁹ Email from Chris Hunter, Centre for Peacemaking & Community Development, 11 July 2000.

⁶⁰ Roman Gashaev, Chairman of the "Laman Az," Voice of the Mountains Public Organization. Presented at *New Steps for a Mine-Free Future*, Report on the First International Conference on Landmines in Russia and the CIS, IPPNW-ICBL, Moscow, 27-28 May 1998.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² 1999 Landmine Monitor interview.

⁶³ Chris Hunter, Centre for Peacemaking & Community Development, draft report for *Landmine Monitor 2000*.

Officials indicated that the number of injured Chechen refugees in the republic of Ingushetia since the beginning of the conflict in August 1999 is 347, including 88 children, 89 women and 210 men. The number of persons that need prostheses is 300, twenty-five of them critically.⁶⁴

The “Kids of the Chechen War” program of the Children’s Foundation reported on 250 injured children from Chechnya who applied for medical assistance; seventy of them are amputees requiring prosthetic aid.⁶⁵ No Ministry of the Russian government or of the official temporary Chechen administration was able to provide any information on civilian victims of the current war.

During May 2000, the Chechen NGO “Refugees Against Landmines” began interviewing Chechen refugees in the Panki Canyon of Akmeta district in Georgia about their knowledge of the landmine problem in Chechnya and mine victims.⁶⁶ A female from Urus-Martan on 6 May reported that her brother Ibragin was killed on 14 April 2000 and her nephew, age 13, lost his eyes to a landmine. She also said, “A girl ran from some men and got killed in a nearby village on a landmine. These men laughed when they heard the explosion. She was 20-years-old.” A woman, speaking about the casualties of the Chechen wars, said, “How can we name all of them? There were a lot who lost their legs and got killed due to these mines.”

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Chechnya has historically been one of the poorest of the Soviet republics. The health care system was inadequate before the 1994-96 war and even then ill equipped to handle war victims. Two-thirds of hospitals and clinics were destroyed in that war and those that remained at the new outbreak of fighting were running at around 30% of their original capacity. If the medical system was in a crisis state with the first war, now it is impossible to assess what remains. Currently it is reported that the only place where a person who has been wounded by antipersonnel mines can receive assistance is Ingushetia.

KOSOVO

Key developments since March 1999: Both FRY and KLA forces used mines in the fighting that ended on 9 June 1999. NATO forces dropped cluster bombs in the March-June bombing campaign. Since June 1999, extensive mine action programs have been

⁶⁴ Interviews with Minister of Public Health Kambulat Uzhakhov, Deputy-Minister of Labor and Social Security Khalifa Zurova and Ministry of Education via Suleiman Arselgov, Chair of the Council of Eldest and Chair of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights of the republic of Ingushetia, February 2000. Data received from doctors in hospitals in Ingushetia indicate more than 220 people lost limbs from August 1999 to March 2000.

⁶⁵ Lubov Krzhizhanovskaya, Director, Children Foundation Program “Kids of Chechen War.” Research groups of the Foundation unofficially estimate the number of cases approaches 1,000.

⁶⁶ “Refugees Against Landmines” hopes to complete interviews of 1,000 refugees. Interviewing was begun on 1 May and by mid-June, approximately 100 refugees had been interviewed. The NGO noted the difficult circumstances in attempting to interview about the ongoing war. Complete information from interviewees is available.

carried out. As of 1 July 2000, sixteen commercial and nongovernmental organizations are engaged in mine clearance. Approximately 8 million square meters of land have been cleared, including 4,173 AP mines, 4,175 AT mines, 4,591 cluster bomblets, and 9,412 other UXO. As of 31 May 2000, 463 villages in high and medium impact areas have been provided mine awareness education; eleven organizations are engaged in mine awareness programs. From June 1999 to 31 May 2000, there were a total of 492 mine/UXO victims identified in Kosovo.

Background

With the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992, Kosovo became the southernmost province of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The FRY has been heavily dominated by its Serbian majority, while the majority population in Kosovo is ethnic Albanian. International pressure as a result of escalating conflict between the FRY armed forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and increasingly repressive measures against civilians in Kosovo led to negotiations in Rambouillet, France in February-March 1999. As these talks broke down, Serbian forces began "ethnic cleansing," forcing more than 800,000 Kosovars to flee to Albania and Macedonia.¹ With the stated objective of halting this process, on 24 March NATO launched a bombing campaign against the FRY and Serbian forces in Kosovo, which lasted seventy-eight days. In the course of this conflict, large areas of Kosovo have been contaminated with mines and UXO.

In the agreement between the FRY and NATO on 9 June 1999, all FRY forces were withdrawn from the province and responsibility for the province's security was transferred to KFOR. As a province of FRY, Kosovo lacked the administrative apparatus of government. To provide an interim administration, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 created the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The ultimate status of the province remains undecided.

Mine Use by Yugoslav Forces

The FRY has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. (See report on Yugoslavia.) Historically the SFRY was a major producer of mines, and it is estimated that the FRY inherited stockpiles of several million mines in 1992. Many were used in the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992-1995, but it is likely that large stocks remained at the start of the conflict.

Several Yugoslav armed forces were operating in Kosovo before and during the NATO air campaign. The Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslovenska, or VJ) and Special Police forces operated in tandem with Serbian paramilitary forces under the control of the Serbian Interior Ministry known by the acronym MUP (Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova).

The Yugoslav Army laid extensive barrier minefields along its southern border. These minefields account for 75-80% of the mines laid in Kosovo. The majority are

¹ Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 2000* (Human Rights Watch: New York, December 1999), pp. 314-316.

situated in remote border regions; many of them are marked.² The VJ also laid unmarked minefields around defensive positions in a wide variety of locations.³ On occasion, Yugoslav forces also used booby-traps to target civilians.

The MUP Special Police and paramilitary forces laid many AP mines in and around civilian population centers. Evidence of such “nuisance mining” was found in Sicevo in Pec district, and most frequently in central Kosovo in Cacic, Donje Obrinje, Glogovac, Potart and Ujmir in Pristina district, and in Lubizba in Prizren district. “[M]any villages are afflicted with random mines laid with the sole aim of causing civilian casualties and thereby discouraging the return of refugees... are causing significant casualties and are denying access to farm land. This situation is most prevalent in villages formerly occupied by the MUP.”⁴

Yugoslav forces are reported to have used PMA-1/1A, PMA-2, PMA-3, and PMR-2A mines. PMA-1/1A mines have been found in many places, such as around the village of Veliki Krystac in the Prizren district. The PMA-2 was discovered on the forested paths of Trstenik near Pristina and in the Djakova area, and the PMA-3 in Kotradic in Pec district. Many PMR-2A mines have been found on the outskirts of Donja Dubnica in the northern Mitrovica district.⁵

Mine Use by the KLA

In June 1999, KLA leaders said that if the KLA were in a position to do so, it would sign the Mine Ban Treaty.⁶ KLA use of mines in the preceding months casts doubt on such a statement. It is unknown where the KLA obtained its mines, although there had been unsubstantiated allegations that they obtained weapons from Albania.⁷

The KLA officially ceased to exist in September 1999 and stocks of weapons and ammunition, including mines, were handed over to KFOR before that date under the terms of an agreement for their demilitarization.⁸ The agreement provided a timetable for the KLA to disarm itself, and contained specific provisions concerning landmines and related weaponry in which the KLA agreed not to place any more mines (section 10b), to mark their minefields and booby traps by 25 June (section 14a), to establish secure weapons storage sites by 28 June to be registered with and verified by KFOR (section 23a), and to store in the registered weapons storage sites all prohibited weapons, including landmines within thirty days or before 20 September (section 23f1).

But it is very likely that mines of all types continue to be held by individuals and by unofficial Kosovar Albanian and Serbian groups. The number of mines handed over to

² Consolidated Minefield Survey Results: Kosovo, the HALO Trust, Pristina, 14 August 1999.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p.8.

⁶ Meeting with representatives of the military and political sides of the KLA, and ICBL Ambassador Jody Williams and then-Canadian Landmine Ambassador Jill Sinclair, Pristina, Kosovo, 30 June 1999.

⁷ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 829.

⁸ The Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UCK [KLA] was signed on 21 June 1999 by KFOR Commander Lt. Gen. Mike Jackson and KLA Commander-in-Chief, Hashim Thaci.

KFOR is classified and it is not possible to make any accurate estimates of that number. In June 2000 two large caches of weapons and ammunition, including several hundred mines, were discovered in central Kosovo, in the village of Klecka near a former KLA headquarters. The KLA denied responsibility.⁹

KLA officials including its chief mine clearance officer, Col. Bardhyl Tahiri, claimed that it never used AP mines during the conflict.¹⁰ According to the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center (KMACC), KLA forces did use AP mines sporadically during the war, mainly nuisance mining, particularly on routes travelled by VJ forces.¹¹ They also laid minefields around their defensive positions, but to a significantly lesser degree than the VJ, having smaller material resources, less freedom of movement and being engaged in a more fluid form of warfare. The HALO Trust found variations of PMR fragmentation mines around the perimeter of a KLA safe house in the village of Krajkovo in Pristina district.¹²

The KLA predominantly used antitank mines.¹³ Colonel Tahiri said that the KLA used antitank mines either captured or recovered from the VJ as well as AT mines improvised from components including explosive charges removed from Yugoslav AP mines. Most of the mines laid by the KLA were not properly recorded and the deaths of the combatants who laid them effectively erased any knowledge of their location.

According to UN sources, in the first weeks after KFOR entered Kosovo, the KLA systematically collected military ordnance for possible future use. In particular, the removal of stake mines from mixed stake and blast minefields resulted in the creation of some blast mine fields without any form of visible identification.

In the year since KFOR entered Kosovo in June 1999 there have continued to be reported and confirmed incidents of new mine use, particularly antitank mine use, by unknown persons, targeting the remaining Serbian population.¹⁴ On 2 June 2000 near Preoce about seven kilometers west of Pristina, two people were killed and three injured in a mine explosion. On 15 June 2000 near Lepina two people were killed. KFOR now checks many roads and tracks each day.¹⁵ On 22 March 2000 KFOR personnel

⁹ "Peacekeepers Seize Kosovo Weapons Cache," *Reuters* and *New York Times*, 18 June 2000; "Kosovo Rebel Commander Denies Hiding Weapons," *Baltimore Sun*, 19 June 2000; "KFOR Finds Largest Weapons Cache Yet," *European Stars and Stripes*, 20 June 2000, p. 6.

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with the Col. Tahiri, KLA headquarters, Pristina, 1 September 1999; Human Rights Watch interview with Col. Tahiri, Salihu Veseli, Chief of Demilitarization, and Commandant Remi, KLA headquarters, Pristina, 4 September 1999.

¹¹ Report (untitled), Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center, UNMIK, August 1999.

¹² Consolidated Minefield Survey, HALO Trust, 24 August 1999, p. 50.

¹³ KLA officers provided KMACC officials with some information about their use of antitank mines during the conflict and their clearance of antipersonnel mines after the war. The information was incomplete and made only a marginal contribution to the international community's knowledge about the extent of battle debris left behind from the war. Human Rights Watch interviews with Lt. Col. John Flanagan, Program Manager, KMACC, 1 September 1999, and with Col. Bardhyl Tahiri, KLA chief mine clearance officer with KMACC, 1 and 3 September 1999.

¹⁴ Email from KMACC, 30 June 2000; Danica Kirka, "Two Serbs Killed, 3 Injured in Land Mine Explosion," Associated Press, 2 June 2000; Threat Factsheet No. 5, KMACC, (undated).

¹⁵ Email to Landmine Monitor/Kosovo from KMACC, 30 June 2000; Danica Kirka, "Two Serbs Killed, 3 Injured in Land Mine Explosion", *Associated Press*, 2 June 2000.

discovered a device constructed from twenty-seven antitank mines on a road bridge north of Mitrovica, shortly after a railway bridge nearby had been destroyed by an explosion.¹⁶ On 29 July 2000, NATO recovered a large cache of weapons, including 80 mines.¹⁷

NATO Cluster Bomb Use

During the bombing campaign, the U.S. dropped 1,100 cluster bombs of the type CBU-87/B, each containing 202 BLU-97/B bomblets and the UK dropped 500 RBL/755 cluster bombs, each containing 147 BL-755 bomblets.¹⁸ Thus, a combined total of 295,700 bomblets were dropped by NATO. Estimates of the “dud rate” of cluster bombs, that is, the percentage that fail to explode on contact as intended and thus become de facto antipersonnel mines, run from a conservative 5% to as high as 30%. Human Rights Watch has criticized NATO for use of cluster bombs in populated areas and reported that NATO cluster bomb use can be confirmed in seven incidents resulting in civilian casualties (another five are possible but unconfirmed); some ninety to 150 civilians died during the conflict from use of these weapons.¹⁹

Landmine Problem

Kosovo was littered with tens of thousands of antipersonnel landmines, mostly laid by FRY forces. Although it has been reported that some 500,000 mines were laid, KMACC has told Landmine Monitor that the actual number is likely to be around 50,000.²⁰ About eighty percent of the landmines are concentrated near the southern border, while nuisance mines are concentrated in the interior of the province. Additionally, it is estimated that 10-30,000 unexploded cluster bomblets and other UXO were to be found in the province at the end of the conflict.²¹ Through its concerted efforts the international community quickly gained a remarkably full picture of the extent and variety of the mine/UXO problem in Kosovo, although data continues to be added. This initial information was gained from several sources.

On 13 June, the UK-based HALO Trust began a ten-week long minefield survey, in coordination with the KMACC in Pristina, which was completed in August 1999. The HALO report positively identified 252 areas with mines or unexploded ordnance (many

¹⁶ *Threat Factsheet No. 5*, KMACC, (undated).

¹⁷ Eric B. Pilgrim, “KFOR Seizes Illegal Arsenal,” *European Stars and Stripes*, 1 August 2000, p. 2.

¹⁸ See, Human Rights Watch, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,” February 2000. See also, HRW, “Cluster Bombs: Memorandum for CCW Delegates,” 16 December 1999, and HRW, “Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia,” May 1999.

¹⁹ HRW, “Civilian Deaths,” p. 2.

²⁰ Email from Lt. Col. John Flanagan, Program Manager, KMACC, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August 2000. Landmine Monitor is grateful to John Flanagan for providing comments on the draft Landmine Monitor report.

²¹ KMACC has estimated that there are up to 30,000 unexploded bomblets in Kosovo. The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000. Human Rights Watch noted a conservative estimate of 5% would mean 15,000 unexploded bomblets from cluster munitions. See footnote 16. Others give failure rates of ten percent or more. See Rae McGrath, “Cluster Bombs: The Military Effectiveness and Impact on Civilians of Cluster Munitions,” UK Working Group on Landmines, August 2000. The HALO Trust estimated 10,000 UXO. Consolidated Minefield Survey Results, 14 August 1999, p. 3.

areas containing multiple minefields), 684 villages which were found to be free of war debris, as well as 269 villages where it was uncertain (due to lack of information) whether or not they were affected.²²

A second source was the hundreds of maps of known minefields that the VJ began to provide to KFOR on 19 June 1999, as required under the agreement ending the war.²³ The first maps handed over identified 425 distinct minefields, but NATO engineers working under KFOR soon concluded that although at least eighty percent of the records coincided with their own ground observations, many of the maps and other information lacked sufficient detail to be useful. KFOR asked the VJ to revise the maps, and on 5 August, records marking 616 minefields were provided; one minefield was a duplicate, leaving the net total number of minefields identified by the VJ as 615. This has since been amended to 620.²⁴

This second set of more comprehensive records showed sixty of the original 425 minefields in different locations,²⁵ and KMACC found gaps in many areas especially in heavily mined areas in the south of the province near Macedonia and Albania; the quality of the maps was highly variable.²⁶ Nevertheless, this information suggested that the great majority of mines were concentrated in the south near the borders with Macedonia and Albania. An unknown number of mines were buried on the Albanian side of the border. (See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000-Albania*).²⁷

Another source of less complete and reliable information were KLA officers indicating locations where they had used landmines during the conflict. Colonel Tahiri reported that the KLA did not have maps of its mines, but had cleared all the mines that it had used.²⁸ He also said the KLA has provided KMACC with complete information about its clearance activities, yet the KMACC program manager said that the KLA had reported only a few of their mine clearance activities to his office,²⁹ and KFOR officials said that the KLA had registered relatively few mines with them.³⁰

A fourth source was the mapping coordinates for the areas attacked with cluster bombs by NATO during the conflict; although initially reluctant to provide "classified information," after international pressure the data was given to KMACC. The records

²² Consolidated Minefield Survey Results, the HALO Trust, Pristina, 14 August 1999.

²³ Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999, p. 4.

²⁴ Email from Lt. Col. John Flanagan, Program Manager, KMACC, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August 2000.

²⁵ Human Rights Watch interviews with KMACC and KFOR officials in Pristina, 23-27 August 1999.

²⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Chris Clark, Operations Officer, KMACC, 26 August 1999.

²⁷ Human Rights Watch interviews with KMACC and KFOR officials in Pristina, 23-27 August 1999; HALO Trust Senior Survey Officer quoted in: "Profiles, Eastern Europe & the Caucasus: Kosovo," *Journal of Mine Action*, 1, 4.1 (Spring issue), p. 80.

²⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with Col. Tahiri, KLA, Pristina, 1 September 1999.

²⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with the Lt. Col. Flanagan, KMACC, Pristina, 1 September 1999.

³⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with KFOR officers, Pristina, from 24 August to 3 September 1999.

indicated 333 separate targeted areas.³¹ The final ongoing source of information has been reports being filed daily with KMACC by KFOR forces, nongovernmental organizations, commercial contractors and others operating under U.N. auspices in Kosovo.

Mine Action Funding

Funding for mine action in Kosovo has been a mixture of direct funding to NGOs and commercial companies and the establishment of a UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for Kosovo. As of 31 May 2000, approximately \$6.83 million had been contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Kosovo, and an additional \$600,000 pledged. Contributions are outlined in the table below.³²

³¹ Al J. Venter, "The Prom 1: Waiting on the Ground for Deminers in Kosovo," *Journal of Mine Action*, 1.4.1 (Spring issue) 2000, pp. 12-16.

³² Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A.

Table 1. Contributions to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Kosovo as of 31 May 2000

Date Funds Received	Donor	Amount (US\$)
15-Nov-99	Australia	266,910
12-Apr-00	Australia	47,744
19-Aug-99	Belgium	79,321
20-Aug-99	Belgium	185,112
22-Sep-99	Canada	47,500.00
11-Feb-00	Canada	346,265
30-Jul-99	Denmark	211,996
01-Nov-99	European Union	2,525,520
24-Dec-99	European Union	1,015,500
24-Aug-99	France	325,2035
21-Jul-99	Luxembourg	126,186
10-Dec-99	Netherlands	798,375
30-Jun-99	Norway	199,980
25-Apr-00	San Marino	15,000
29-Feb-00	Spain	185,000
19-Jul-99	Switzerland	152,129
30-Jun-99	United Kingdom	300,000
Subtotal		6,827,745

Funds Pledged		
12-Aug-99	European Union	600,000
Subtotal		600,000

Total Funds		7,427,745
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In addition to these financial contributions, in-kind donations of personnel have been provided by Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Equipment donations have been provided by Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The following organizations carrying out mine action programs in Kosovo have been funded in 1999-2000:

Table 2. Funding of mine action organizations 1999-2000³³

Organization	Funding (governmental unless stated otherwise).
BACTEC International Ltd.	U.K. Department for International Development (DFID). Operating in MNB (N), MNB (C) and MNB (E). MNB = MultiNational Brigade area
Danish Church Aid / Action by Churches Together (DCA/ACT)	Denmark. Operating in MNB (W).
Defence Systems Ltd.	U.K. DFID. Senior partner in MNB (S).
EMERCOM (Russia)	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.
European Landmine Solutions Ltd. (ELS)	UK DFID. Operating in MNB (W) and MNB (S).
HALO Trust	U.K. DFID, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, the Netherlands, International Trust Fund (ITF) using funds from United States, Germany and Czech Republic, bilateral agreements with AAR of Japan and Pro Victimis. Operating in MNB (W). Senior Partner in MNB (C).
Handicap International	Operating in MNB (W). Senior Partner for Djakove Municipality.
HELP (Germany)	Germany through the ITF (with matching US funds).
International Demining Alliance of Canada Inc.	Canada
INTERSOS	Italy and ECHO. Operating in MNB (W).
Mines Advisory Group	Manual teams funded by World Vision and ECHO. Flail funded by U.K. DFID. Senior Partner MNB (N).
MineTech	MACC core assets funded using EU contributions to VTF and donation by Belgium. Senior Partner MNB (E).
Mine Clear International Ltd	Funded using EU contributions to VTF. MACC core assets operating Province-wide.
Norwegian People's Aid	Norway. Flails donated by Finland. Senior Partner MNB (W).
RONCO	U.S. Operating in MNB (E).
Swiss Federation for Demining	Working in support of ICRC Safer Village Program.

Mine Action Coordination and Planning

UNMIK was mandated to "establish, as soon as possible, a Mine Action Center to deal with the threat posed to the returnees and internally displaced persons by landmines and unexploded ordnance."³⁴ Accordingly, the United Nations Mine Action Service established a Mine Action Coordination Center (KMACC) in Pristina, which became operational on 17 June 1999, five days after the entry of KFOR into the province.³⁵

³³ Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A. MNB is MultiNational Brigade area.

³⁴ UN Security Council Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Resolution 1244 (1999).

³⁵ Report (untitled), Kosovo Mine Action Co-ordination Center, UNMIK, August 1999; responsibility for KMACC was assigned to the office of the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, responsible for Humanitarian Affairs. This office forms the first pillar of the

Mine action in Kosovo is based on lessons learned in other mine-affected areas, including Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to John Flanagan, the Program Manager of KMACC, “[W]e are not reinventing the wheel. The lessons have been hard learned over time and we cannot ignore them.”³⁶

There are three fundamental aspects of the Mine Action Program (MAP) in Kosovo. From its inception, KMACC has concentrated on coordination and the setting and enforcement of standards, without attempting to engage directly in clearance operations. It has not opened regional offices but has appointed implementing agencies as “senior partners” in each of the MultiNational Brigade (MNB) areas. Second, there is a realistic and structured mine action plan for containing the landmine/UXO problem and then scaling down international assistance and handing the program over to the local implementing agency, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Whether or not this happens on time or without problems remains to be seen, but donors, the UN and international NGOs have a clear timetable on which to plan. Third, compared with previous mine action programs, KMACC activities are effectively integrated into the overall reconstruction plan for Kosovo.

Mine action planning for Kosovo is based on the premise that the problem can be brought under control through a three-year program. In order to achieve this, the program has been divided into three distinct phases, the first two of which have been completed.³⁷

- *Preliminary Phase:* key activities in Kosovo included mine awareness training to refugees in camps before they returned to the mine-affected area, rapid assessment of the mine/UXO threat, establishment of a Mine Action Coordination Center in Pristina as the focal point for humanitarian mine action activities, and establishment of a victim surveillance system. This phase is now complete.
- *Emergency Phase:* key activities included mined area verification/survey; Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tasks; battle area clearance; mine/UXO clearance of houses, key installations, essential infrastructure and mined areas; building local capacity; ongoing mine awareness; and development of victim assistance capacities. This phase was completed on 31 December 1999.
- *Consolidation Phase:* the transition from Emergency to Consolidation Phase activities in Kosovo involved the development of an integrated plan for mine action. The plan builds upon the foundation created during the Emergency Phase, particularly with regard to the local capacity developed over this period by NGOs. The objectives of this third phase include the systematic clearance of mines, reduction in casualties through effective mine awareness, rehabilitation and reintegration assistance to mine victims, and development of

UNMIK structure, the other three being Civil Administration (UN), Institutional Building (OSCE) and Reconstruction (EU).

³⁶ Email from KMACC, 30 June 2000.

³⁷ UNMIK Mine Action Programme, Operational Plan for Consolidation Phase, Mine/UXO Clearance, KMACC, 13 December 1999.

institutional arrangements upon which the medium to long-term requirements for mine action will be based.

The plan will also integrate the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) into the Mine Action Program, as the indigenous organization tasked to assist with mine/UXO clearance. Reliance on international assistance will decrease in a controlled manner as part of a deliberate exit strategy, including reduction in the number of local deminers as mined areas become cleared. This is necessary to ensure that there is a phased reintegration of personnel into employment outside mine action.

In order to achieve the objective of clearing all high priority areas in 2000, emphasis is placed on the integration of manual teams, mechanical assets and Explosive Detection Dog (EDD) teams, which greatly increases the efficiency of clearance operations. This integrated approach will lead to a significant amount of land being returned to productive use without the necessity for full-scale manual clearance operations. Level 2 survey activities are being developed to pinpoint the exact location of the mined areas, prior to beginning clearance activities at a particular site. The MACC philosophy for Quality Control is to systematically inspect each clearance site at various stages of the process. The combination of these checks will constitute a comprehensive evaluation of the standards to which activities have been completed. KMACC has contracted the services of an independent QC capacity for this purpose.

Having entered the Consolidation Phase at the start of 2000, the mine action objectives for this year are the clearance of all high priority mined or dangerous areas, clearance of all cluster munition sites, the reduction of casualties through effective mine awareness and support to the existing prosthetic and rehabilitation capacities in addition to psychosocial and vocational training activities. For these aims to be attained, KMACC made several assumptions, that current levels of support would continue with additional assets as required, and that weather would permit a full work season. Two other assumptions were that there is no significant increase in reported dangerous/mined areas, and that all cluster strike areas can be rapidly surveyed and marked. KFOR units have been assigned responsibility for this latter task.

The success so far of the operation in Kosovo has brought within sight the broader humanitarian objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty. The KMACC stated, "Finally, in Kosovo, there is the possibility of fulfilling the requirements of the Ottawa Treaty, even though the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a signatory. By reinforcing the success that has been achieved to date, this situation could be realised in a period of three years. This would be a tremendous achievement both symbolically and physically, and the international community could be justifiably proud of this result. Conversely, any reduction in effort at this point could mean that this period is measured in decades, not years."³⁸

Survey and Prioritization

As noted above, on 13 June 1999, the UK-based HALO Trust began a ten-week long minefield survey, in coordination with KMACC in Pristina, which was completed in August 1999. The HALO Trust level 1 survey was designed to locate battle debris that

³⁸ The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, Public Information document, Kosovo Mine Action Co-ordination Center, 15 June 2000, p. 7.

posed an immediate risk to the civilian population. Based on interviews with repatriated refugees and other residents, and assessments by HALO experts in vehicles and on foot, the survey focused on affected or potentially affected areas in and around populated villages and towns. Six teams covered every accessible village over a ten-week period beginning on 13 June, four days after the end of the war. They later provided 1,205 survey reports of specifically affected areas to KMACC. The HALO report positively identified 252 areas with mines or unexploded ordnance (many areas containing multiple minefields), 684 villages which were found to be free of war debris, as well as 269 villages where it was uncertain (due to lack of information) whether or not they were affected.³⁹

The core tool facilitating coordination and task prioritization is the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), a mine action management package developed for the UN by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining in collaboration with UN Mine Action Service. The system has been used operationally for the first time in Kosovo. It is made up of a database that holds mine/UXO information and a Geographic Information System to display and map data, which can be produced on a scale of 1:50,000.

The survey information provided by the HALO Trust was the first data entered into IMSMA, and gave an initial indication of the location and scale of contamination. The Survey Action Center (SAC) was then contracted to tailor a specific software solution to combine data from a wide variety of sources⁴⁰ and the initial HALO assessment. A socio-economic impact index was created and information aggregated at the district level for the 320 districts of Kosovo. Classification of dangerous areas and district remains flexible enough to absorb reconstruction priorities as they are created.

The methodology has proven to be statistically highly accurate. According to KMACC, "As a result of the Survey, each district within the Province has been categorised as having a High, Moderate, Low or Nil impact as the result of mine/UXO contamination. Furthermore, each individual mined or dangerous area can be characterised in the same way, based on its effect on agricultural development, proximity to habitation or lines of communication, and impact on activities such as firewood collection. Based on these criteria, 760 out of a total 1,926 recorded dangerous areas have been classified as having a high impact. This degree of analysis enables a clear definition of priorities for clearance, as well as identifying where other activities such as mine awareness must be placed as a minimum activity..."⁴¹

Mine/UXO Clearance

As of July 2000, there are sixteen international commercial and nongovernmental organizations engaged in mine and UXO clearance. Although KFOR has made some preparations for the return of the VJ to clear mines as required by the Military Technical

³⁹ Consolidated Minefield Survey Results: Kosovo, the HALO Trust, Pristina, 14 August 1999.

⁴⁰ Sources of data include: UNMIK, UNHCR, FAO, WFP, IMG, WHO, ICRC.

⁴¹ The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000, p. 5.

Agreement, the decision to implement this rests with Commander KFOR based on his assessment of the security situation. The VJ has not returned as yet because of security risks.

Table 3. Organizations engaged in mine and UXO clearance in Kosovo, July 2000⁴²

Organization	Capacity
BACTEC International Ltd.	Four CBU clearance teams and two EOD teams.
Danish Church Aid / Action by Churches Together (DCA/ACT)	84 manual mine clearance personnel; access to Hydrema Flail (Danish Battalion KFOR)
Defence Systems Ltd.	Four manual clearance teams and two ready response teams.
EMERCOM (Russia)	Twenty deminers and two Explosive Detecting Dog (EDD) teams (four dogs total).
European Landmine Solutions Ltd. (ELS)	Six CBU clearance teams, and three EOD teams.
HALO Trust	Two hundred mine clearance personnel, three CBU clearance teams, four Case rollers and a crusher.
Handicap International	Two manual teams and one EDD team (two dogs).
HELP (Germany)	Two manual clearance teams.
International Demining Alliance of Canada Inc.	Two manual clearance teams. One mini-flail (Bozena). One EDD team (two dogs). One EOD team.
INTERSOS	One Manual Team and two EOD teams.
Mines Advisory Group	One mine action team, Minecat flail, one Minecat support team of 7 deminers.
Mine Tech	Two manual teams and four EDD teams (MACC core assets). Two manual teams and two EDD teams (UNHCR)
Mine Clear International Ltd	One Armtrac heavy flail and one Bozena mini-flail
Norwegian People's Aid	Four manual mine clearance teams. Two Sisu flails as MACC assets.
RONCO	Five CBU clearance teams
Swiss Federation for Demining	Three rapid response teams

In Kosovo, the use of dogs, machines and manual deminers as a system has been implemented from the start. Building on lessons learned in Bosnia, the requirement for

⁴² Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A. Amendments to MAG section provided in email from Tim Carstairs, Communications Manager, MAG to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

deminers to be cross-trained as far as possible in demining, EOD and house clearance was also accepted. The integration of a Quality Control (QC) regime into every stage of the demining process is novel and the result of lessons from other operations. The QC process begins with the accreditation of organizations and covers all activities to the point where an area is declared cleared.

As of 1 July 2000, almost eight million square meters of land had been cleared and/or verified, including more than 16,000 houses and 776 schools. Some 4,173 AP mines were destroyed, along with 4,591 cluster bomb units, 9,412 other types of UXO, and 4,175 AT mines.⁴³

Mine/UXO Awareness

As with mine survey and clearance, mine awareness is coordinated through KMACC. After a chaotic start with too many NGOs trying to implement mine awareness programs with no experience and no attempt at coordination, KMACC together with UNICEF have been able to coordinate and rationalise the system.

Mine awareness programs can be designed to target specific groups. As analysis of mine victim data shows that males between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five are the most at-risk group of the population, an awareness campaign targeting this group is currently being implemented. A child orientated awareness program is being implemented to cover the gap until mine awareness education becomes part of the school curriculum in November 2000. This activity will be launched in conjunction with the ongoing Safer Village projects and safe play area-marking schemes. The Safer Village concept examines the specific needs of a village and tries to provide alternatives to risk-taking behavior. This may mean the provision of firewood in winter until forests where wood has traditionally been collected are cleared on mines. The Child-to-Child program focuses on the child as a trainer of other children, and on parents in the home using traditional games and activities to reinforce mine awareness messages over a longer period of time. An additional benefit has been children using information gained in this program to report mines and UXO in the locality to village adults and KFOR personnel.

There are eleven organizations currently carrying out mine awareness programs in Kosovo, as outlined in the table below. Additional mine awareness capacity is expected from HMD Response using U.S. government funding through the International Trust Fund.

⁴³ The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000, p. 3.

Table 4. Organizations currently implementing mine awareness programs⁴⁴

Organization	Capacity	Remarks
CARITAS		Senior Partner in MNB (S)
HALO Trust	Two mine awareness teams	Bilateral agreement with AAR Japan. Operating in MNB (W).
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Safer Village Community mine awareness teams.	Active in all but four of the twenty-nine municipalities
Islamic Relief Worldwide	Imam and Child to Child Programs	Funded using EU contribution to VTF.
KFOR	Teams from Sweden, Finland and France accredited by the MACC to conduct mine awareness.	
Mines Advisory Group	Seven teams	4 Child to child training. 3 Community-based mine awareness. MNB (N, E, S)
Mines Awareness Trust	Two teams	Operating in MNB (W). Child to Child and Train the Trainer programs.
MineTech	Community-based mine awareness teams	Operating in support of MineTech Clearance operations.
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)	Two mine awareness teams	Operating in MNB (W) in support of NPA clearance operations. Funded using EU contribution to VTF.
Save the Children		School Curriculum development funded by UNICEF.
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAFA)	Youth Program	Funded by MACC using EU contribution to VTF.

Note: MNB refers to MultiNational Brigade

Some 1,973 villages have been classified as being in low, medium and high impact areas. As of 31 May 2000, 209 villages of the 425 in the high impact areas (49%) had been reached with mine awareness programs. Of the 537 villages in the medium impact areas, 47%, or 254, had been involved in mine awareness activities.⁴⁵ Mine awareness efforts by activity are described in the table below.

⁴⁴ Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A. Amendments to MAG section provided in email from Tim Carstairs, Communications Manager, MAG to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Table 5. Mine awareness by activity as of 31 May 2000⁴⁶

Activities	Child to Child	Community	Direct	Imam	Youth	Total Activities
Total	141	445	311	20	45	962
High impact	47	164	102	3	18	334
Medium impact	55	155	122	10	15	357

Note: This table describes the number of villages that are either in a Medium or High Impact area and does not include figures for villages located in Low Impact areas.

Mine/UXO Casualties

In the five months after the end of the war on 9 June 1999, 800,000 refugees returned to Kosovo.⁴⁷ During this period there were many mine casualties, despite the fact that mine awareness programs had been carried out in refugee camps before their return. From 7-14 July 1999, the World Health Organization (WHO) conducted an assessment of the number of people injured or killed by mines and UXO in the four weeks following the end of the conflict, based on data from Kosovo's six hospitals and the KMACC database. It estimated that in the four weeks following 13 June 1999, 150 people were maimed or killed by mines and UXO: "[T]his corresponds to a monthly incidence rate of 10 per 100,00 population (an annualised rate of 120 per 100,000). Seventy-one per cent of the survivors are younger than twenty-four.... Nineteen per cent of the seventy-five patients interviewed were injured during demining efforts by the Kosovo Liberation Army. In some areas 35% and 42% of hospital beds in the surgical and orthopaedic wards are occupied by survivors of explosions of mines or unexploded ordnance."⁴⁸ WHO commented that this rate far exceeds that found in many other countries affected by mines.⁴⁹

Between June 1999 and 31 May 2000, there have been more than 492 people involved in mine/UXO incidents. Of these, ninety-eight have died and the remainder have sustained injuries ranging from traumatic loss of limbs to minor wounds. Following the decline of casualties over winter, the rate of casualties has risen recently to approximately fifteen per month.⁵⁰ The resources currently available to deal with the immediate and follow-up specialized treatment for mine victims are inadequate. Unexploded cluster munitions appear to pose the greatest threat, particularly to children.

⁴⁶ The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000 p., 4.

⁴⁷ Kosovo: Emergency Bulletin 21, Save the Children, November 1999, p. 1; for details of casualties in Yugoslav minefields over the Albanian border see report on Albania in Landmine Monitor Report 2000.

⁴⁸ E. G. Krug and A. Gjini, "Number of Land Mine Victims in Kosovo in High," *British Medical Journal*, 14 August 1999, p. 450.

⁴⁹ WHO Finds Heavy Toll from Land Mines in Kosovo, Press Release, World Health Organization, 15 July 1999.

⁵⁰ The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000, p. 4.

As of June 2000, about 80 children (0–18 years) had been killed or injured by these UXO compared to about 60 child victims from antipersonnel mines.⁵¹

Since 1 June 1999, the overall victim rate is 15.4 per 100,000 population, and mortality rate is 4.9 per 100,000 population. Based on mortality data from 1994, mine/UXO injuries represent the fourteenth leading cause of death in Kosovo. There is one death for every five mine/UXO victims injured.⁵²

There have been ten casualties among mine clearance personnel up to July 2000. Five incidents involved traumatic amputations of the lower leg through mine blast, two involved blast injuries to one foot (with minor, non-permanent damage to the foot), two involved blast injuries from close proximity to mine/UXO detonations (both non-permanent injuries) and one involved minor damage (non-permanent injury) to the hand.⁵³ Numerous casualties to KFOR personnel have also been reported in the press.⁵⁴

Survivor Assistance

In Kosovo, the lead agency for victim assistance is the World Health Organization which, with the ICRC and a number of NGO partners such as Handicap International and the Mother Theresa Society, are developing the means to provide comprehensive medical and rehabilitation care to mine victims. However, this will take some time, as much of the public health system and services had deteriorated in recent years and will require considerable effort to be upgraded. By February 2000 Handicap International had registered 482 amputees (of which, seventy-three percent were adult men, sixteen percent adult women, eleven percent children).⁵⁵ Not all of these are mine victims. There is one prosthetics center in Kosovo, in Pristina. In addition, the International Trust Fund of Slovenia has provided rehabilitation assistance to a number of mine victims.⁵⁶

⁵¹ UNMIK MACC, extrapolated from IMSMA database, June 2000; original data from the ICRC.

⁵² UNMIK MACC, extrapolated from IMSMA database by Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, June 2000; original data from ICRC.

⁵³ Email from Lt. Col. Flanagan, KMACC, 12 July 2000.

⁵⁴ "German Soldiers Wounded in Kosovo Minefield," *Reuters*, 23 September 1999; "One Peacekeeper Killed, Five injured in Kosovo," *Associated Press*, 23 September 1999; "US Soldier Killed in Mine Explosion in Kosovo," *FBIS*, 16 December 1999; "Soldiers Injured in Kosovo Landmine Blast," *Financial Times*, 30 December 1999.

⁵⁵ Activity Report on the Activities of the National Orthoprosthetic Workshop, August 1999–February 2000, Handicap International, Pristina, undated; Synthesis Report of Operation, Handicap International, Pristina, January 2000, p. 6.

⁵⁶ Email from John Flanagan, KMACC, to Landmine Monitor, 1 August 2000.

Table 6. Organizations with current victim assistance programs⁵⁷

Organization	Capacity	Remarks
Handicap International	Prosthetic and rehabilitation support.	
ICRC	Victim surveillance system	In conjunction with WHO and MACC
VVAF	Victim assistance outreach program	Funded by EU contribution to VTF.
WHO	Victim assistance point of contact	

NAGORNY-KARABAKH

Key developments since March 1999: In March 2000, the Nagorny-Karabakh Minister of Agriculture said that thirty percent of the territory's most productive agricultural lands are not being used because of the danger of mines. HALO Trust, which had carried out mine clearance in Nagorny-Karabakh in 1995-96, resumed operations in January 2000.

Background

Nagorny-Karabakh is an autonomous region of western Azerbaijan, but the majority of the inhabitants are Armenian. In 1988, the region voted to secede and join Armenia, which led to armed conflict from 1988-1994 involving forces from all three armies. In the midst of the conflict, the region proclaimed itself the Nagorny-Karabakh Republic (NKR) on 2 September 1991, and declared independence on 6 January 1992. Armenian forces occupied 20% of Azerbaijan territory. The UN Security Council adopted four resolutions in 1993, calling for the withdrawal of Armenian occupying forces from Azeri territories and reiterating the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with Nagorny-Karabakh as an integral part.¹ These resolutions have not been implemented. In May 1994 Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a cease-fire agreement; however, negotiations for a final peace agreement are still going on under the auspices of the OSCE.

Mine Ban Policy

There have been no public comments regarding landmines by officials of Nagorny-Karabakh. The Nagorny-Karabakh military has told the Landmine Monitor researcher that mines are viewed as useful weapons in numerous tactical military tasks and that as long as the war lasts, mines are necessary. The military recognizes that mines kill both enemy and friend.²

⁵⁷ Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A.

¹ UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/822, 30 April 1993; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/853, 29 July 1993; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/874, 14 October 1993; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/884, 12 November 1993.

² Discussions with soldiers and members of the special mine clearing regiment, including Lt.-Colonel Anatoly Galayan, Commander of the mine-clearing regiment, NKR Ministry of Defense, late 1999 and early 2000.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Nagorny-Karabakh is not known to have produced mines. Stocks now held are of former Soviet production, but types and numbers are unknown. The most commonly used mines during the conflict were Soviet PMN-2 and OZM-72, as well as Soviet MON mines and Italian TS-50.³ During the armed conflict, the fighting parties used antipersonnel mines extensively, in areas claimed by Nagorny-Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Armenia, though the heaviest concentration of mines by far is in Nagorny-Karabakh.

Landmine Problem

The region of Nagorny-Karabakh is considered to be one of the most heavily mined regions of the former Soviet Union. The Nagorny-Karabakh Minister of Agriculture Mr. Armo Tsaturian, said that thirty percent of the territory's agricultural lands are not being used because of the danger of mines. He pointed out that these lands are the most productive areas in the valleys and foothills. The Minister also reported that eight hectares of vineyards are also inaccessible because of the mines.⁴ Approximately 15,000 hectares of land, roads and forests must be surveyed for future mine action.⁵ Nearly five thousand hectares of these territories are arable lands.

The United Nations and the U.S. had estimated the number of mines in Nagorny-Karabakh at 100,000, but after its 1998 assessment mission, the UN Mine Action Service concluded that the mine problem was not nearly as bad as original estimates portrayed.⁶

Mine Action

In 1995-96, the British demining NGO HALO Trust carried out mine clearance in Nagorny-Karabakh and cleared more than 2,000 mines and 9,000 items of UXO from 883,000 square metres of land. In addition, HALO trained local specialists. In January 2000, HALO resumed operations in Nagorny-Karabakh and aims to support the existing mine clearance capacity, provide specialist training and to establish a mines action centre to coordinate the clearance work with the needs of the development community.

In 1993, Nagorny-Karabakh created a Working Group on Mine Problems (WGMP), under the Special Governmental Commission, whose task was to collect information on the landmine problem. In 1999-2000, headed by a special representative of the Prime Minister, its activities were expanded to include coordination among the various relevant ministries dealing with the various aspects of the mine problem, including mine clearance, minefield marking and mapping, mine awareness activities, and provision of basic medical aid courses.

Ministry of Defense engineer regiments deal with mine clearance while Emergency Services Department teams are responsible for the clearance of UXO. They inform the WGMP of their activities, except when the information is classified. With HALO

³ UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission," 5 November 1998, p. 8.

⁴ *Azat Artsakh* (Karabakh newspaper), 4 April 2000.

⁵ Program of the NKR Special Governmental Commission, presented at the 8 June 2000 meeting of the WGMP.

⁶ UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," 5 November 1998.

support, the Emergency Services Department cleared over 1,000 UXO in the first three months of 2000, compared to 37 items of UXO destroyed in the whole of 1999.

Mine Awareness

The International Committee of the Red Cross office in Stepanakert initiated mine action programs in May 1994. The programs seek to educate the public, and in particular children, about the danger of mines. ICRC cooperates with the Ministry of Education and Science, as well as with the WGMP. The ICRC and the government created a map indicating the dangerous zones in the territory, which has been distributed among the village communities. Recently the WGMP and the ICRC prepared a notebook for schoolchildren which illustrates types of mines and UXO. Some 46,000 copies of this notebook will be distributed for free among schoolchildren. The WGMP has also prepared several mine awareness videos and posters, and special radio and television programs are continuously broadcast throughout Nagorny-Karabakh.

Landmine Casualties and Victim Assistance

The Nagorny-Karabakh Ministry of Health reports that between June 1993 and May 1999 the number of victims of explosions, including mines, was 687 of whom 180 died and 507 were injured.⁷ Among the victims the children are gradually outnumbering the adults.

At a session of the WGMP in June 2000, the following statistics were presented: in 1995, there were eighty-two mine incidents; in 1996, sixty-four; in 1997, there were twenty-five incidents; in 1998, sixteen; and in 1999, thirty. According to the WGMP, twenty-eight of the victims in 1999 were male. As of June 2000, there have been twelve incidents, with five deaths and seven injuries.⁸

An orthopedic hospital was established in 1994.

⁷ Annual report of the NKR Ministry of Health, 1999.

⁸ Meeting of the Working Group on Mine Problems, 8 June 2000.

MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA

STATES PARTIES

JORDAN

Key developments since March 1999: The treaty entered into force for Jordan on 1 May 1999. Jordan began its antipersonnel mine destruction program in September 1999 and has destroyed 20,552 antipersonnel mines (22% of its stockpile). Jordan is establishing a National Demining Committee. A nationwide mine awareness campaign has been carried out in 1999 and 2000. The Landmine Survivors Network opened a branch in Amman in April 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Jordan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 August 1998 and ratified on 13 November 1998. The treaty entered into force for Jordan on 1 May 1999. Jordan's Law of Explosive Materials (1953) currently serves as the legal mechanism to enforce the treaty. It regulates all use, production, trading, and storage of explosives; the use of explosives for unlawful or terrorist acts is punishable with death.¹ It is not known if the Jordanian Cabinet intends to pass new legislation to implement the treaty.

Jordan participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 and served as the Vice President of the conference. In the opening ceremony, Her Majesty Queen Noor sent a message to the participants and urged all countries that have not signed the treaty to do so. Queen Noor also called upon state parties to assume their moral and legal obligations in assisting those who have been maimed or injured by landmines.²

Jordan has been an active participant in the treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. It submitted its Article 7 report to the UN on 9 August 1999 covering the time period from 1 May 1999 to 1 September 1999. Jordan voted for the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Jordan is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons having ratified Protocol I (nondetectable fragments) and Protocol III (incendiaries) on 19 September 1995. Jordan is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Use

According to the Commander of the Royal Engineer Corps, Jordan has never produced antipersonnel mines and the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) have not emplaced them since 1973.³ There is no evidence that Jordan has exported antipersonnel mines.

¹ Jordan Article 7 Report, submitted 9 August 1999.

² "Maputo Declaration seeks 'Zero Victims' under Ottawa Landmine Ban Treaty," *The Jordan Times Daily*, 10 May 1999.

³ Interview with Brigadier General Naser Majali, Commander of the Royal Corps of Engineers, Amman, Jordan, 25 January 2000.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Jordan has declared a stockpile of 93,342 antipersonnel mines consisting of: 84,677 M14 (U.S.); 5,771 M18/M18A1 (U.S.); 413 M35 (Belgium); 268 No. 6 (UK); 1,000 OZM-72 (Soviet); 980 VS-50 with M14 detonator (Italy); 5 VS-59 (Italy); 51 “wooden” [Lot Number 10-24-58] (Syria); 4 “blasting” (Italian); 2 No. 5 (UK); and 171 other items.⁴

The Royal Corps of Engineers will retain 1,000 AP mines of this stockpile for research/development and training purposes including 800 M14, 100 M35, and 100 M18/M18A1 Claymore mines.⁵

On 6 September 1999, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) began destroying their stockpile by burning 4,552 M14s at the Military Academy Training School east of Al Zarqa District.⁶ Another 8,000 AP mines were destroyed on 5 December 1999 and 8,000 more were destroyed on 10 May 2000.⁷ This brings the total number destroyed to 20,552. Destruction of the stockpile is accomplished by open burning and open detonation. Media and others are invited to witness the destruction. The cost of destruction is about \$1 per mine.⁸ The safety measures observed during the destruction are described in the Article 7 Report.⁹

According to the schedule included in Jordan’s Article 7 report, the destruction of the stockpile will be accomplished by April 2003.¹⁰ However, in May 2000, a Jordanian military officer said that “we will minimize the period by maximizing the amount of mines we will destroy each time, so we will complete the destruction of our stockpile by the end of year 2001.”¹¹

Landmine Problem

Jordan has declared that the following areas contain antipersonnel mines: 66,610 M14s in the “northern area” (Syrian border); 30,312 M14, M35, and No. 6 mines in the “northwestern area;” 10,629 M14, M35, and No. 6 mines in the “central area;” 2,538 M14s in the “southern area;” 65,530 No. 10 and M35 mines in “Israeli minefields.” Additionally an unknown number of No. 10 and M35 mines are emplaced in the “military southern area.”¹²

⁴ Jordan Article 7 Report.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Noura Wazani, “Jordan Destroys 4,500 Anti-Personnel Mines,” *The Arab Daily*, 7 September 1999, p.2.

⁷ “Jordan Destroys Another 8,000 Anti-personnel Mines” AFP (Amman, Jordan) 5 December 1999; *Al Rai Daily* # 10837, 11 May 2000, p. 8; *Al Dostour Daily* # 11767, 11 May 2000, p. 3.

⁸ Statement by Brigadier General Al-Dwari to the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 22 May 2000. He confirmed the 20,552 figure. According to the plan described in the Article 7 report, all mines destroyed thus far are M14s.

⁹ Jordan Article 7 Report.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Statement by Brigadier General Al-Dwari to the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 22 May 2000.

¹² Jordan Article 7 Report.

In the north the problem of landmines is still significant, most notably in Irbid and Balqa, and to a lesser extent in Mafrak. Nearly all of Jordan's landmine accidents in recent years occurred in these governorates.

According to a United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) assessment conducted in 1999, there are 354 minefields that were planted by the JAF (110 antipersonnel, 83 antitank, and 161 mixed AP-AT) in both the Jordan River Valley and on the northern border with Syria. The minefields in the Jordan River Valley are in the northwest region. One minefield is toward the northern end of the Valley, near Lake Tiberias, and another is near the northern banks of the Dead Sea. According to UNMAS, the JAF claims to know the location of the minefields, as they possess the maps, and the types and numbers of mines deployed. Jordan indicates that 138 minefields planted by the Israeli Armed Forces (ninety-nine AP, thirty-four AT and five "fragmentary") are located in the southwest region of the country in the Araba Valley and contain an estimated 73,853 AP and AT landmines.¹³

All minefields in Jordan are marked and fenced with short bars connected with a single layer of wires from the opposite side of the border, and long bars connected with three layers of wires from the other sides. Signs with the legend "Beware Mines" to alert civilians not to approach the area are supposed to be in place. JAF personnel apparently protect all minefields in Jordan.¹⁴

Mine Action Funding

Nations that have supported Jordan's demining program include Canada, Norway, the UK, and the U.S.¹⁵ The UK donated two Aardvark minesweeping vehicles to the JAF on 27 November 1999. The U.S. sponsored a meeting in November 1999 of potential donor countries (UK, Japan, and Canada) to discuss equipment requirements and other assistance for the Jordanian demining effort.

Jordan received \$2.64 million in demining assistance from the U.S. in fiscal year 1999 and it is estimated that the U.S. will provide an additional \$2.141 million in fiscal year 2000.¹⁶ In 1999-2000, US-provided training and equipment to the Royal Engineer Corps included: a one-year loan of two Enhanced Tele-operated Ordnance Disposal Systems (ETODS)¹⁷; funding for the procurement of helmets, face shields, protective clothing, special antimine boots, navigation equipment (GPS), six complete computer systems (scanners, digital and video cameras, high-end printers), one ruggedized laptop computer for field use, probes, VMH2 mine detectors, complete minefield marking kits, medical training kits, and ordnance recognition training aids;¹⁸ a seven week course by 25

¹³ UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Jordan," 7 June 1999, p. 6. The mission was carried out from 23-30 January 1999.

¹⁴ Jordan Article 7 Report.

¹⁵ Interview with General Majali, 25 January 2000.

¹⁶ "Demining Program Financing History" provided by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, 5 May 2000.

¹⁷ "Queen Noor honored for LM Campaign," *Jordan Times Daily*, 5 June 1999.

¹⁸ "New Demining Robot Gets Down to Business in the Jordan Valley," *The Arab Daily*, 27 April 1999. Also interviews and information from U.S. military personnel gathered by Landmine Monitor/Jordan in Amman, Jordan, February 2000.

U.S. military personnel on the use of new protective equipment, training about mine clearance technology and UN recognized minefield-marking techniques for 172 Jordanian engineers at the Royal Engineer Academy between October and December 1999;¹⁹ U.S. personnel also introduced a new mechanical minefield marking and clearance technique and began collaborating with the British Aardvark technicians to develop a training and clearance plan.²⁰

Survey and Assessment

UNMAS conducted a survey mission in Jordan from 23-30 January 1999 at the request of the Jordanian Government. UNMAS noted that according to military sources, since 1948 nearly 300,000 landmines had been planted in 492 minefields, covering over 15,000 acres of land.²¹ According to one report, the minefields contain a ratio of two-thirds AP mines to one-third AT mines.²²

Mine Clearance

The Royal Engineer Corps conducts all demining operations, and in 1999 and 2000 these continued in border regions. Factors impacting mine clearance operations include high temperature, heavy vegetation, and seasonal flooding. According to General Majali, "The JAF has, since 1993, been able to clear approximately 81,000 mines, of all types, from an estimated number of 300,000."²³ A joint operation in 1995 between the JAF and the Israeli Armed Forces cleared portions of the Wadi Araba area in the south of the country.²⁴

The Baptism site visited by Pope John Paul II in March 2000 is an example to how cleared areas can reflect very positively on Jordan. The site and its access paths had been mined but are now fully cleared and constitute an agriculturally productive area qualified to host Christian pilgrims.²⁵ The site was opened to the public shortly before the Pope's visit.

Planning of Mine Action

On 1 March 2000 the King announced that Jordan would establish a civilian-led demining organization that would include a National Demining Committee.²⁶ Prior to this change, "the planning of mine clearance [wa]s composed of three phases, based on geographical, economical, and community safety planning, which have been discussed

¹⁹ Descriptive Summaries of Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Programs provided to Landmine Monitor/U.S. by Demining Policy Officers from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, 10 May 2000.

²⁰ Interview with U.S. military personnel, Amman, Jordan, February 2000.

²¹ UNMAS Joint Assessment Mission Report, 7 June 1999, p. 6.

²² *Al Dostour Daily*, 7 September 1999.

²³ Interview with Gen. Naser Majali, 25 January 2000.

²⁴ U.S. Central Command, "Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," 13 July 1999.

...," 13 July 1999.

²⁵ "U.K. grants JAF 2 Minesweeping Vehicles," *Jordan Times Daily*, 28 November 1999.

²⁶ U.S. Central Command, "Humanitarian Demining Country Plan...," 13 July 1999.

with the concerned ministries to determine priorities” under the leadership of the military.²⁷

The National Demining Committee will meet quarterly and consists of representatives from government ministries to insure that the program is implemented according to national policies and priorities. The committee will also conduct negotiations with the international donor community.²⁸

Mine Awareness Education.

His Royal Highness Prince Ra’d Bin Zeid has stated that he is willing to “act as a catalyst” and assist with mine awareness education.²⁹ The Hashemite Society for Soldiers with Special Needs, also headed by Prince Ra’d, has indicated its willingness to work with the UN in developing special mine awareness strategies, disseminating this information through its network, and gathering data on civilian casualties of mine accidents.³⁰

The ICRC, Jordan Red Crescent, Royal Engineer Corps, and other non-governmental organizations have supported a nationwide mine awareness campaign over the past year. Two Jordan Red Crescent members attended a mine awareness workshop in Yemen in November 1999 and received training on how to initiate child-to-child mine awareness programs. In 2000, with the cooperation of Rädä Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) a program for creating “awareness units” in mine-affected areas will begin with the training of twenty-five children as part of a larger child-to-child awareness program.

Landmine Casualties

The civilian part of the Jordanian health system does not register landmine accidents, and Jordanian hospitals either do not classify mine victims or have begun to do so only in recent years. According to military figures, Jordan has had a total of 452 landmine victims from 1968 through 1999, 62% of which were military personnel.³¹ The majority of the rest of the victims are farmers. Apparently most mine related incidents occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Israeli–Palestinian conflict escalated in Jordan. Incidents again rose in the early 1990s due to heavy rains and floods that shifted landmines from their originally marked areas and mapped fields into unrecorded areas.³²

The frequency of landmine incidents is much higher in the northern region of Jordan than in the south. In the southern governorates of Aqaba, Tafila, and Kerak, the number of landmine victims is very small due to the fact that the minefields in these regions are located in a very sparsely populated desert area. Nearly all of Jordan’s landmine accidents in recent years occurred in the northern governorates of Irbid and Balqa, and to a lesser extent Mafrak.

²⁷ Interview with Gen. Naser Majali, 25 January 2000.

²⁸ U.S. Central Command, “Humanitarian Demining Country Plan...,” 13 July 1999.

²⁹ UNMAS Joint Assessment Mission Report, 7 June 1999.

³⁰ Interview with His Royal Highness Prince Ra’d, Amman, 28 January 2000.

³¹ Interview with Gen. Naser Majali, 25 January 2000.

³² UNMAS, p. 10.

Four mine accidents have been reported in the Jordanian press in the past year:³³

- A 21-year-old farmer was killed in the Al Mafrak district in June 1999.
- An 8-year-old boy was killed while playing with his friends in Zarqa City in July 1999.
- Two men were injured after their tractor hit an antitank mine in Jordan Valley in October 1999.
- Mr. Radwan Al Wawi, a 40-year-old man, lost both hands on 21 April 2000. The accident occurred in the Al-Kafrain Dam area, which is the same area on 26 April 1999, the U.S. Ambassador to Jordan, William Burns, joined the previous Joint Chief of Staff Abdul Hafeth Kaabneh, for a demonstration of the Enhanced Tele-Operated Ordnance Disposal System (ETODS).

Provision of Assistance

The government health care system and providers for landmine victims have remained unchanged since the publishing of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.

The Holy Land Institute for the Deaf, located in Salt City, west of Amman, offered to help those who through landmine incidents have lost all or part of their hearing. The Institute will perform assessments and diagnoses free of charge, but will be in need of financial assistance when it comes to medical intervention or the provision of hearing aids. Also in 1999, the ICRC delegation in Jordan sent five landmine victims to make new prosthetics at the workshop in Damascus, Syria.

Disability Policy and Practice

A law for the "Welfare of Disabled Persons" was adopted by the Jordanian Parliament in April 1993, which represented a significant measure of formalization of disability rights in Jordan. Among other things this law entitles the disabled to health care, education, vocational training, rehabilitation, employment, sports, and participation in decision making. With a network of 326 health centers, 274 secondary health centers, 316 maternal child health centers, 42 comprehensive health centers, and 203 dental clinics, this goal has more or less been achieved.³⁴

Unfortunately, most health centers cannot offer more advanced services to mine victims. Health centers usually refer patients with need of prosthetic care and rehabilitation to the main hospitals in the governorates. For the prosthetic device itself, and for maintenance and training, patients are referred to the more advanced regional hospitals in the regional centers. Also, as the number of Jordanian amputees grows (including victims of landmines as well as victims of car accidents and diabetic amputees), public institutions that render services to amputees are over-run and lack equipment.³⁵

The Landmine Survivors Network opened a branch in Amman in April 1999. According to its founder Jerry White, "LSN is completing an overview of the prosthetic

³³ All incident data from: *Al Arab Yom Daily*, 9 July 1999; *Al Arab Yom Daily*, 19 June 1999; *Hawadeth Al Sa'a Weekly* # 272, 3 May 2000, p. 19; *Sheehan Weekly* # 811, 6 May 2000.

³⁴ Jordanian Ministry of Health, *Annual Report 1996-97*, 1997.

³⁵ Dana Charkasi, "Army Investigates," *Jordan Times Daily*, 10 October 1999.

and rehabilitation centers in the country.” He added that this list would be published soon as the first national rehabilitation services directory.³⁶

QATAR

Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Qatar on 1 April 1999. Landmine Monitor has discovered that the United States has antipersonnel mines stockpiled in Qatar, and has plans to add to that stockpile.

Mine Ban Policy

Qatar signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 October 1998. The treaty entered into force for Qatar on 1 April 1999. It is not known if Qatar has enacted national legislation implementing the treaty. Qatar was one of the 139 countries to vote in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 December 1999.

Qatar did not attend the First Meeting of States Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. Qatar did not participate in any of the treaty’s intersessional meetings in 1999 and 2000. Qatar has not submitted its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency measures to the UN Secretary General, which was due by 27 September 1999. Qatari diplomats offered no explanation for this inaction.¹

Qatar is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but did attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in December 1999 in Geneva. Qatar is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Stockpile, Transfer, and Use

Qatar is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The Qatari Armed Forces are not known have ever imported, stockpiled, or used AP mines. Qatari military engineers do train for tactical demining operations but this is conducted in France, Jordan, and the United Kingdom.² No Qatari soldiers suffered mine injuries during the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.³

Landmine Monitor has discovered that the United States is stockpiling 216 ADAM projectiles containing 7,776 antipersonnel mines at the Al Karana area in Doha, Qatar as part of U.S. Army Pre-Positioned Stocks Five (APS-5).⁴

³⁶ “Landmine Survivors Network Opens Branch in Jordan,” *Jordan Times Daily*, 14 April 1999.

¹ Interview with Minister Khalifa Ahmed Al-Sowaidi, Chargé D’Affaires and Brigadier General Hamad A. Hinz Al-Marri, Military Attaché, Embassy of the State of Qatar to the U.S., Washington, DC, 16 February 2000.

² Interview with Minister Al-Sowaidi and Brigadier General Al-Marri, 16 February 2000.

³ Ibid.

⁴ U.S. Army Operations Support Command, Solicitation DAAA09-99-R-0118: “Maintenance and Supply/Service for Army Pre-Positioned Stocks (APS-5) Equipment in Doha, Qatar,” 21 January 2000. Exhibit N, Technical Exhibit #11 of this solicitation titled “Ammunition in Qatar”

Additionally, based on U.S. Air Force plans for its war reserve ammunition stockpiles in the Persian Gulf region, U.S. Gator antipersonnel mines, as well as Claymore mines, may be introduced and stockpiled at the Al Udeid area in Qatar in the near future. U.S. Air Force documents indicate that the Al Udeid storage facility will eventually contain 142 CBU-89 Gator mine systems, each with twenty-two antipersonnel mines, and 141 M18/M18A1 Claymore mines.⁵

Qatari diplomats stated that the “mine issue has not been discussed between Qatar and the USA.”⁶ It is not known if the government of Qatar regards the U.S. equipment stored on its territory as being under Qatari jurisdiction and control. It is also not known if any bilateral arrangement exists between Qatar and the U.S. such as a basing agreement or status of forces agreement. The equipment is stored on territory that is leased by the U.S.⁷ It is also not known if Qatari nationals are involved in the operation or maintenance of the storage facilities hosting the U.S. equipment as employees of joint venture companies formed with the U.S. company that won the Air Force contract, DynCorp Technical Services of Fort Worth, Texas.

Mine Action

Qatar is not mine-affected. Qatar donated \$200,000 to the (Slovenia) International Trust Fund for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1999.⁸ It is not known if there have been additional donations or any in-kind contributions for mine action.

TUNISIA

Key developments since March 1999: Tunisia ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 9 July 1999 and it entered into force for Tunisia on 1 January 2000. Tunisia reportedly began destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in July 1999.

Tunisia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and officially deposited its instrument of ratification on 9 July 1999. At the UN in November 1999, the representative of Tunisia stated that the treaty “attested to the will of the international community to end the suffering of so many.”¹ On 1 December 1999 Tunisia joined 138

shows the presence of 72 M691 ADAM projectiles (forty-eight hour self-destruct time) and 189 M731 ADAM projectiles (four hour self-destruct time). Each ADAM projectile contains thirty-six antipersonnel mines.

⁵ U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, Solicitation F44650-99-R0007: “Operation, Maintenance, and Support of Pre-Positioned War Reserve Materiel in Southwest Asia” 9 August 1999. Section E, Appendix 1, Enclosure 5 of this solicitation shows the planned on-hand balances of munitions stored at the Al Udeid facility to include 142 CBU-89 Gator units (with a total of 3,124 AP mines) and 141 M18/M18A1 Claymore mines.

⁶ Interview with Minister Al-Sowaidi and Brigadier General Al-Marri, 16 February 2000.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Letter to Landmine Monitor from Ambassador Saad Mohamed Al-Kobaisi, Qatari Ambassador to the U.S., 9 September 1999.

¹ Representative of Tunisia, First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 18 October 1999, GA/DIS/3147.

other nations in voting in favor of UN General Assembly resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Tunisia did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) held in Maputo in May 1999. It attended the two Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Technologies for Mine Action meetings in Geneva in December 1999 and May 2000, but none of the other SCE meetings. The treaty entered into force for Tunisia on 1 January 2000. The deadline for Tunisia's Article 7 report was 28 June 2000 but it has not provided it to the UN.

Tunisia is a party to CCW, but has not ratified Amended Protocol II. Tunisia attended the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in December 1999 in Geneva. Tunisia became a member of the Conference on Disarmament in 1999.

Tunisia is not known to have produced or exported landmines. In the past, Tunisia imported landmines from Italy, France, Yugoslavia, and Great Britain.² Details on its stockpile will be available once Tunisia publishes its Article 7 report. On 6 July 1999, the Tunisian Army began the destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile.³ The types and numbers of mines destroyed are not available.

No comprehensive assessment of the landmine problem in Tunisia has been conducted to date. It is known, however, that there is residual landmine and UXO contamination in Tunisia from World War II. In a September 1999 letter to the ICBL, a Tunisian diplomat stated that the Tunisian Army "has destroyed 1,000 mines which have been lying on national territory since the Second World War." He added, "Over ten years, the Army has discovered and destroyed approximately 6,000 explosive devices scattered over the whole of the Tunisian territory."⁴

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 stated that the Tunisian Army had begun marking zones likely to contain mines, that the army was developing an educational program focusing on the landmine problem in northern Tunisia, and that the Arab Institute For Human Rights, an NGO based in Tunis, planned to train instructors for a mine awareness program.⁵ It is not known if there has been any progress in these activities.

YEMEN

Key developments since March 1999: The Level One Survey, the first comprehensive survey of its kind to be conducted in any landmine-affected country in the world, began in January 2000. The Mine Clearance Unit of the National Demining Program conducted its first operation and handed over the cleared field to villagers in December 1999. Yemen began destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in February 2000. An additional 20,000 AP mines were found after submission of its Article 7 report. Yemen

² Osservatorio sul commercio delle armi, IRES, Toscana, 12 March 1997.

³ "Tunisia Begins Destruction of Antipersonnel Landmines," *Tunisia Online*, 6 July 1999.

⁴ Letter to ICBL from Tarek Ben Youssef, Councilor to the Tunisian Ambassador to Canada, 13 September 1999.

⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 874.

has served as the co-chair of the Standing Committee of Experts on Technologies for Mine Action. The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Yemen on 1 March 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Yemen signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 1 September 1998. It entered into force for Yemen on 1 March 1999. There is no domestic law implementing the treaty. A Yemeni official told Landmine Monitor that if a request is made to the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs about such a law, he has committed to put it forward to the Minister of Justice.¹

Yemen submitted its first Article 7 report in November 1999. Yemen was four months late with its report because a helicopter crash claimed the lives of several high ranking officers from the Ministry of Defense who had collected information for the report.²

Yemen participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 with a delegation headed by Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, Dr. Mutahar Al Saidi. Yemen was named co-chair of the Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Technologies for Mine Action and participated in the nearly all of the intersessional meetings in Geneva.

Yemen voted for the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had on similar resolutions in the past. Yemen is a state party to the original Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but has not ratified Amended Protocol II. An official has said that ratifying the amended protocol would “diminish” the role of the Mine Ban Treaty, which is much more comprehensive.³ Yemen took part in the Amended Protocol II conference in Geneva in December 1999.

Minister Al Saidi welcomed the ICBL’s establishment of its Resource Center in Sana’a.⁴ The Yemeni National Demining Committee, with the support of Rädä Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) and the Yemen Mine Awareness Association (YMAA), translated the Landmine Monitor 1999 country report on Yemen into Arabic and distributed 2,000 copies nationally and regionally.

Production, Transfer, and Use

According to the government, Yemen has never manufactured or exported AP mines.⁵ For many years Yemen imported landmines from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Italy.⁶ There are no reports of new landmine use in Yemen. The last reported use of mines was in 1994. Mine use was a feature of the numerous

¹ Interview with Rashida Al Hamdani, Secretary of the National Demining Committee, Sana’a, 12 February 2000.

² Interview with Mansour El-Azzi, the Executive Officer and General Coordinator of the National Mine Action Program, Sana’a, 22 November 1999.

³ Interview with Rashida Al Hamdani, National Demining Committee, 10 April 2000.

⁴ Interview with Dalma Foeldes, coordinator of the ICBL resource center in Sana’a, January 2000.

⁵ Interview with Colonel Al Sheibani, Director of the Technical Unit of the National Demining Center, Sana’a, 23 January 1999.

⁶ UNMAS, “Joint Assessment Mission Report: Yemen,” 21 September 1998.

internal conflicts in Yemen. Egypt also used mines in Yemen during its intervention in the Royalist-Republican war. Yemen is not currently involved in any armed internal or external conflict and has no non-state actors operating in the country.⁷

Stockpiling and Destruction

In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, covering the period 4 December 1997 to 30 November 1999, Yemen stated that there were 59,000 antipersonnel mines stockpiled, including POM-2 (44,500), PP-Mi-Sr-2 (11,000), PMN (2,000), and PMD-6 (1,500).⁸ Since the submission of that report, the military has “discovered” about 20,000 more antipersonnel mines. The exact number, types, and locations of these newly discovered mines have not been confirmed.⁹ The locations of stockpiled mines were not contained in the Article 7 report, but Landmine Monitor has been told that 42,000 POMZ-2 and POMZ mines are kept in stores in Aden, specifically at Ras Abas and Dar Saad.¹⁰

Yemen retains a stockpile of 4,000 AP mines for demining training purposes. This stockpile consists of 1,000 of each of the following types: PP-Mi-Sr-2, PMD-6, POM-2, and PMN. The mines are retained by the Military Engineering Department and will be located at five different military training camps.¹¹

Yemen began the destruction of its AP mine stockpile on 14 February 2000, when 5,050 PMD-6 and PP-Mi-Sr-2 were destroyed at two separate places. The first destruction was arranged as an international celebration near the Jaolah minefield (B-12) with fifty PMD-6 detonated by the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and Head of the National Demining Committee, Dr. Mutahar Al Saidi. The second destruction of 5,000 PP-Mi-Sr-2 took place at Al Whed outside Little Aden where the majority of stockpile destruction will occur. Mines are destroyed by open detonation in consultation with the Yemen Environmental Protection Council and according to the UN’s international standards for disposal of unexploded ordnance. The cost has not been estimated yet, but a non-confirmed figure of \$15,000-20,000 has been mentioned.¹² Yemen has not received any assistance from other governments for stockpile destruction costs, but has indicated that it can destroy its entire stockpile within a year if a donor country would fund it.¹³

⁷ Interview with Rashida Al Hamdani, National Demining Committee, 25 April 2000.

⁸ Yemen’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, submitted 30 November 1999. Although the designation POM-2 is used in the report, this mine is usually referred to as the POMZ-2.

⁹ Interview with General Al Dhahab, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Ministry of Defense, Sana’a, 19 February 2000.

¹⁰ Interview with Fadhle Mohammed Obaid Garama, Head of the Mine Clearance Department at the Regional Mine Action Center in Aden, Aden, 29 November 1999.

¹¹ Interview with General Al Dhahab, 19 February 2000.

¹² Interview with Phil Lewis, Chief Technical Advisor for the National Mine Action Program, Sana’a 19 February 2000.

¹³ Ibid.; Interview with General Al Dhahab, 19 February 2000.

The Landmine Problem

Yemen's Article 7 report designated 889 places as mine-affected. As of February 2000, 1,207 mine-affected communities in 274 districts in 18 of 19 governorates had been identified. Most of the minefields in Yemen are located either in agriculture and grazing areas, close to water sources, or close to electricity sources in such places as Aden, Abyan and Lahej. There are minefields in populated areas in Al Dhala, Ibb, Aden, Lahej, and Hadhramout (often on the roadsides) and in desert areas in Shabwa and Hadhramout.¹⁴ Only the Al Mahweet governorate has been declared mine-free. Fences and warning signs are missing around many of the minefields known by the military. Funds from the U.S. will cover the cost of some of the fences and signs that will be put up.¹⁵

Survey and Assessment

UNMAS selected Yemen as the first mine-affected country to have the Level One Survey "Landmine Impact General Survey" (Level One Survey) with the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).¹⁶ Canada is funding the survey with \$1.1 million and Japan has donated \$450,000. The total budget for the survey is \$1.8 million.

Three offices have been set up in Sana'a, Aden, and Mukalla. National staff have been recruited; twenty-eight personnel have been trained as supervisors/editors and three as data processors. The first training of field supervisors/editors was conducted 4-21 September 1999.¹⁷

The first test of the survey questionnaire was conducted 25-29 September 1999 in twenty-seven villages in fourteen governorates. The questionnaire, which had been translated into Arabic, worked well in general, but a retraining of the supervisors was needed to reinforce their skills.¹⁸ The second test was conducted in special districts in the governorates of Sana'a, Ibb, Aden, Abyan and Hadramouth between 3 November and 2 December 1999. Twenty-two field supervisors/editors were involved and a total of eighty-five communities were surveyed.¹⁹ The training of field survey enumerators was conducted in Aden between 6-30 November 1999.

The survey started after Ramadan in January 2000, simultaneously in fourteen governorates. After an announcement on television and radio regarding the Level One Survey, over sixty new mine suspected communities responded.²⁰ It is estimated that the survey will be finished by July 2000. After all the village level data has been collated and reviewed, a Survey Certification Committee will review the survey methodology and

¹⁴ Interview with Colonel Al Sheibani, Technical Unit of the National Demining Center, 22 November 1999.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Qadeem Tariq, MCPA, "Global Landmine Impact General Survey, Republic of Yemen," November 1999, p. 5.

¹⁷ Interview with Qadeem Tariq, MCPA team leader, 22 November 1999.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Interview with Qadeem Tariq, 26 January 2000.

²⁰ Interview with Qadeem Tariq and Justin Brady, the UN Level One Survey Quality Assurance Monitor, Sana'a, 17 February 2000.

data collected before the aggregated results are released to the public.²¹ The results of the survey will be available at the National Mine Action Center.²²

Mine Action Funding

The government of Yemen spent an estimated \$1.7 million in 1999 to support its National Mine Action Program, including salaries, allowances, health care, and transportation for the approximately 400 national staff involved, as well as barracks for the deminers, the training facility in Dar Saad in Aden, and the building where the National Mine Action Center in Sana'a is located.²³ The Yemen government's expenditures are budgeted at \$3,250,000 for the period 10 May 1999 to 30 April 2001 in the United Nations Development Program's Project Document regarding support to the National Mine Action Program.

Yemeni businessmen have provided in-kind contributions for printing of mine awareness education material, provision of medical treatments, food and water tanks for the deminers in the field. This contribution is estimated to \$10,000.²⁴ Members of the Yemen Mine Awareness Association have voluntarily provided in-kind contribution regarding mine awareness education.

Yemen has received (or will receive based upon commitments made to date) nearly \$7.3 million from international donors for the national mine action program for the period October 1998 to September 2000. The National Demining Committee asks all donors who want to contribute to Yemen's Mine Action Program to go through the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and conclude an agreement before starting activities. This procedure is in place to make sure that actions are performed according to the international UN standards and guidelines and to avoid duplication and unnecessary costs.²⁵ The UNDP has taken on the role of coordinating the funds from international donors.²⁶

U.S. funds are partly channeled through the Ministry of Defense while the Ministry of Finance handles UN and other bilateral assistance. Prior to dispersal, the Ministry of Finance first needs approval from the National Demining Committee and the signature of its head, the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs. This has led to a delay due to the fact that the national demining budget is outside the normal state procedures because the national mine action program was formed with a resolution by the Prime Minister and not as a ministerial decree.²⁷

²¹ Ibid.

²² Qadeem Tariq, "Global Landmine Impact General Survey, Republic of Yemen," November 1999, p. 7.

²³ Interview with Phil Lewis, National Mine Action Program, 22 November 1999.

²⁴ Interview with Colonel Al Sheibani, Technical Unit of the National Demining Center, 22 November 1999.

²⁵ Interview with Rashida Al Hamdani, National Demining Committee, 23 November 1999.

²⁶ Interview with Mr. Mutahar Al Huthi, officer in charge of the UNDP Mine Action Program, Sana'a, 24 November 1999.

²⁷ Interview with Colonel Al Sheibani, Technical Unit of the National Demining Center, 22 November 1999.

International Contributions to Yemen's Mine Action Program				
Source	Amount (in US\$)	Recipient	Purpose	Duration
UNDP Yemen ²⁸	500,000	National Mine Action Program	Technical assistance	6/99-6/01
British Council to Victim Assistance ²⁹	48,300	Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA)	Victims assistance programs	1999
Canada ³⁰	67,746	ADRA	Protective equipment for deminers	In-kind
Canada ³¹	250,000	ADRA	Victims assistance programs	2000-2001
Canadian CIDA ³²	114,067	ADRA	Victims assistance programs	1999
Canadian Voluntary Trust Fund ³³	1,100,000	UNMAS (MCPA)	Level One Survey	7/99-7/00
Germany ³⁴	100,000	National Mine Action Program	Assignment of an advisor to national mine action center	In-kind
Japan (through UNDP) ³⁵	500,000	National Mine Action Program	Mine awareness education and mine victim assistance	2000
Japan ³⁶	450,000	UNMAS (MCPA)	Level One Survey	2000
Norway (through UNDP) ³⁷	278,000	National Mine Action Program	Technical assistance	2000

²⁸ Interview with Al Huthi, UNDP Mine Action Program, Sana'a, 24 November 1999.

²⁹ Interview with Sheryl McWilliams, Director for the ADRA Victim Assistance Project in Yemen, Sana'a, 17 February 2000.

³⁰ Interview with Colonel Al Sheibani, Technical Unit of the National Demining Center, 23 November 1999.

³¹ Interview with Nicolas Drouin, Program Officer at the Mine Action Unit, CIDA, Geneva, 30 March 2000.

³² Interview with Sheryl McWilliams, ADRA, 17 February 2000.

³³ Interview with Mr. Al Huthi, 24 November 1999.

³⁴ UNDP, "Project Document for Support to the Yemen National Mine Action Program," p. 1.

³⁵ Interview with Phil Lewis, National Mine Action Program, 25 January 2000.

³⁶ Interview with Rashida Al Hamdani, 10 April 2000.

International Contributions to Yemen's Mine Action Program				
<i>Source</i>	<i>Amount (in US\$)</i>	<i>Recipient</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Duration</i>
Norway ³⁸	31,000	Yemen Mine Awareness Association	Mine awareness projects and advocacy	2000-2001
Rádda Barnen, (Save the Children Sweden) ³⁹	6,100	Yemen Mine Awareness Association, National Mine Action Center	Mine awareness education and advocacy	1999
Rádda Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) ⁴⁰	25,000	Yemen Mine Awareness Association, National Mine Action Center, ICBL Resource Center	Mine awareness education and advocacy	2000
Switzerland	100,000	National Mine Action Program	Assignment of an advisor to national mine action center	2000
U.S. ⁴¹	3,806,000	National Mine Action Program	Program assistance (see text)	10/98-8/00
Total	7,348,313			

³⁷ Interview with Leif Trana, Second Secretary at the Norwegian Embassy in Riyadh, Sana'a, 4 December 1999.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Interview with Abdul Karim Ahmed, Head of the Rádda Barnen suboffice in Aden, Aden, 14 February 2000.

⁴⁰ Interview with Trygve Nelke, Regional Representative for Rádda Barnen, the Middle East Program, Beirut, 23 February 2000.

⁴¹ UNDP, "Project Document for Support to the Yemen National Mine Action Program," p.1.

Assistance from the U.S. has been used for establishing the national and regional Mine Action Centers and training their staff in Sana'a and Aden. Apart from the training equipment for the mine clearance program, funds from the U.S. have been used to buy uniforms, tents, books, kitchens, sixty mine detectors, explosives, seventeen vehicles, computers, renovation of offices and the training facility, and renting of apartments and an office.⁴² During 1999 around forty-five trainers from the U.S. have alternatively, in short assignments, been training the Mine Action Centers' staff. Additionally, the U.S. has donated \$290,000 to UNDP's cost-sharing fund for the National Mine Action Program.⁴³

Mine Clearance

A unit of the Engineering Department of the Ministry Defense and a separate body, the Mine Clearance Unit of the Regional Mine Action Center, undertake mine clearance in Yemen. The deminers from the Engineering Department work on an on-call basis and are hampered by outdated equipment and techniques.⁴⁴ The Mine Clearance Unit consists of two companies (a total of 180 staff), trained and equipped by the U.S. These deminers are seconded from the military to the National Demining Program.⁴⁵ A third company of deminers is scheduled to be trained in April 2000 and two more companies in 2001.

The first operation by the Mine Clearance Unit occurred in June 1999 at minefield C6 outside Aden. The Ministry of Defense has cleared this field twice before but there were still mines left. UXO and four antitank mines were found and destroyed in situ.⁴⁶ The cleared field, which will be used for grazing, was handed over to the villagers at a small celebration ceremony in early December 1999.

The National Demining Committee has designated the governorate of Aden and the Lahej corridor as the focus of its initial clearance effort. This area has been divided into four zones and will begin with twenty-one minefields in Zone B.⁴⁷ Field A1, in the Al Habil area, where the Yemen Mine Awareness Association (YMAA) and Radda Barnen have had one of their community based mine awareness education pilot projects, has been chosen on a special request from the President to be one of the very first new areas to be cleared. This will constitute a complete mine action operation in this location, starting with mine awareness education, followed by a victim survey, a Level Two Survey, and mine clearance.

A problem regarding allowances for the demining staff in the field has been reported. Most of the deminers in the Mine Clearance Unit of the National Demining Program originally came from the Engineering Department of the Ministry of Defense.

⁴² Interview with Major Elzie, outgoing head of the U.S. assistance team to Yemen's Mine Action Program, Sana'a, 25 November 1999.

⁴³ Interview with Mr. Al Huthi, 24 November 1999.

⁴⁴ Interview with General Al Dhahab, 19 February 2000.

⁴⁵ Interview with Major Elzie, 26 November 1999.

⁴⁶ Landmine Monitor Researcher's field visit to the C6 minefield accompanied by Aysha Saed, Program Officer and Chair of the Yemen Mine Awareness Association, Shafika Saed and Agmal, members of the Yemen Mine Awareness Association, 4 October 1999.

⁴⁷ Interview with Major Elzie, 26 November 1999.

Since this secondment, they have not received special field allowances. The National Demining Committee does not have funding at the moment for this purpose nor for any life insurance. International donors are not willing to pay salaries or allowances to government employees. There is a hope however that an agreement can be reached between the Ministry of Defense and the National Demining Committee to solve the matter.⁴⁸ As a step forward an agreement was reached in March 2000 between UNMAS, UNDP, and the National Demining Committee stating that the deminers will be given free meals (funded by the UNDP) when they are in the field.⁴⁹

Coordination of Mine Action

The Yemeni National Mine Action Program was established on 17 June 1998. It is the overall policy and decision-making body concerning all mine action in Yemen and is headed by the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs. Other members include the Director of the Military Engineering Department, the Deputy Minister of Public Health, the Deputy Minister of Social Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Interior, the Deputy Minister of Information, the Deputy Minister of Education, the Director of Work and Administration at the Prime Minister's Office, a representative from the Ministry of Planning, a representative from the Environment Protection Council, and a representative from the Yemen Mine Awareness Association. There is also a corresponding Regional Demining Committee, chaired by the Governor of Aden. The composition of the committees reflects an understanding that humanitarian demining involves the civil society and all concerned ministries and not only the Ministry of Defense.

Different advisory groups, such as the Victim Assistance Advisory Group and the Mine Awareness Education Advisory Group, have been formed. They meet once a month to coordinate the work between the different donors, NGOs, the staff at the National Mine Action Program, specially appointed coordinators from some ministries and the Yemen Mine Awareness Association. Donors, together with staff from the National Demining Committee, have formed a group called "Friends of Demining."⁵⁰ Special working groups have also regularly met within the Victims/Survivors Assistance and Mine Awareness Education Advisory Groups, to draw up plans for future mutual work.

All major decisions regarding mine action are taken by the National Demining Committee on advice from the national and international staff in the National Mine Action Program. The National Mine Action Center (also called NTEU, National Technical Executive Unit) in Sana'a and the Regional Mine Action Center (RTEU, Regional Technical Executive Unit) in Aden are the operating units for the National Mine Action Program.

The National Demining Committee has delegated to the National Technical Executive Unit the responsibility for planning different strategies and mine action policies. The National Demining Committee decides on these plans and the Mine Action

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Interview with Mr. Ian Mansfield, Mine Action Team Leader, UNDP head office in New York, Geneva, 28 March 2000.

⁵⁰ Interview with Phil Lewis, Mine Action Program, Sana'a, 24 November 1999.

Centers implement them together with their different partners like national and international agencies, communities and concerned ministries.⁵¹

Mine Awareness Education

The mine awareness education national staff at the National Mine Action Program, in coordination with the Mine Awareness Education Advisory Group, has responsibility for producing national guidelines conforming to UN standards, a strategy paper and a work plan for 2000. The YMAA and Rädä Barnen are members of the Mine Awareness Education Advisory Group and Rädä Barnen has been appointed the lead agency among the international donors for Mine Awareness Education.

The Ministry of Information has promised to regularly broadcast on television and radio, and to publish in the newspapers, mine action progress in Yemen, international landmine issues, accidents caused by mines or UXOs, and mine survivors' plight and achievements.⁵² A television program was produced detailing Yemen's stand on the Mine Ban Treaty and mine action activities and was broadcast in December 1999 and March 2000 on anniversary dates of the treaty.

The Mine Awareness Department (staff of six) at the Regional Mine Action Center in Aden concentrates on raising awareness of different target groups living in the villages close to the minefields and to supporting the work of the deminers. The department has reached around 6,000 persons as of February 2000.

The YMAA and the Mine Awareness Education Department are designing new posters on mines and UXO in different parts of Yemen at the Regional Mine Action Center in Aden. A team with staff from the RMAC and members of YMAA has started community-based mine awareness education projects in the villages around minefield B12 in the Jaolah area.⁵³

The YMAA has been granted \$31,000 for community-based mine awareness education and for advocacy work around the Mine Ban Treaty. This funding will go toward producing new mine awareness education material, especially for children, and a quarterly newsletter. The YMAA together with Rädä Barnen continued community-based mine awareness education projects in Al Habil (Lahej governorate), Masabeen and Imran (Aden governorate) and Al Kood (Abyan governorate). Four schools and 2,904 school children in Al Kood, Al Habeel, Masabeen, and Imran have received training using the child-to-child approach. Four teams of educators are active in the villages. An evaluation of the project has been carried out in March 2000, but is still not compiled in a report.⁵⁴

A regional Mine Awareness Education workshop organized by Rädä Barnen was held in Aden between 27 November and 3 December 1999. Participants from Sudan, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen took part in the weeklong workshop.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Interview with Rashida Al Hamdani, National Demining Committee, 10 April 2000.

⁵² National Mine Awareness Education Advisory Group meeting, Speech by Deputy Minister of Information, Sana'a, 28 October 1999.

⁵³ Interview with Aysha Saed, Program Officer Rädä Barnen and Chair of the Yemen Mine Awareness Association, Aden, 15 February 2000.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Landmine Casualties

There are still no accurate records of mine victims. The Level One Survey will provide nationwide information, but it will only record information on victims that have had landmine accidents during the past year.

The results of a mine/UXO survivor survey carried out by the YMAA and Radda Barnen together with community members in Al Habil, Masabeen, Imran, and in Al Kood were released in 1999.⁵⁶ The survey showed that herding and playing are the most commonly performed activities resulting in landmine accidents, and the most common victim is the male child.⁵⁷

The Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA) completed a landmine accident survivor survey in three districts: Hais, Jabal Ras, and Al Khokha. The survey was extended to a fourth bordering area, Shameer in the Tazeh governorate. In the survey, 1,326 people with disabilities were identified, including 51 mine victims. Most of the mine victims were middle aged and in great need of financial resources. Most victims that lost limbs did not have any prosthetic device or artificial limb.⁵⁸

The only known records kept of mine injuries in 1999 are with the communities in the four pilot areas in which the Yemen Mine Awareness Association and Radda Barnen have supported community-based mine awareness education. Key people in the villages have been supplied with record books, in which they have been asked to register all mine/UXO casualties that have occurred in the area. Al Habel registered a mine accident in August 1999 when a mine explosion injured two shepherd boys.

Survivor Assistance

In general, health facilities in Yemen are inadequate in most regions, and only the main cities have hospitals. There have, however, been several recent developments in the provision of assistance.

In October 1999 a Rehabilitation Department was established within the Ministry of Public Health, in part to analyze the needs of people with disabilities and to coordinate at the national level.

The Victim Assistance Advisory Group has representatives from the Ministries of Public Health, Social Affairs and Education, as well as Radda Barnen, Handicap International, Movimondo and ADRA, together with national and international staff from the National Mine Action Program. The advisory group has agreed to translate the ICBL's "Guidelines for the Care and Rehabilitation of Survivors" into Arabic, and to add a special page on Yemeni conditions. The UNDP and Radda Barnen are funding this guide, and it will be widely distributed to all mine-affected areas of the country.

In January 2000 Handicap International (HI) began training staff at a new rehabilitation center in Aden together with the Ministries of Health and Social Affairs. This center is meant to serve landmine survivors and others in need of orthopedic devices

⁵⁶ For details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p 867.

⁵⁷ Yemen Mine Awareness Association and Radda Barnen, "Landmine UXO Survivor Survey within Three Governorates in the Republic of Yemen," December 1998.

⁵⁸ ADRA, "Report from a Survey on Landmine Accident-Survivors in Al Hodeida Governorate," 1999; Interview with Sheryl McWilliams, ADRA, 17 February 2000.

from the governorates of Aden, Abyan, Shabwa, Lahej, and Dhale. The building and the equipment is provided by GAVTT (General Authority for Vocational and Technical Training, which is funded by the World Bank and Germany), and HI receives funding from ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Office) as well.

ADRA has started a project that assists mine survivors, which is funded by the Canadian government and the British Council.⁵⁹ It has also signed an agreement with the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs, the Minister of Health and the National Demining Committee to support a community-based rehabilitation (CBR) program for adults. This program is located in the same mine-affected areas in which Radda Barnen is supporting the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs community-based rehabilitation program for children.⁶⁰

A team of Italian doctors has begun training Yemeni surgeons on mine victim operations in Al Thowra hospital in Taz, that will also serve as the national referral hospital for mine victims.

For two weeks in September 1999 a four-person U.S. medical team specializing in eye injuries was brought in for consultation and training of staff at the Regional Mine Action Center and Aden Hospital. Mine victims with eye injuries were brought in for check-ups and treatments. A total of 150 mine victims were examined, thirty-eight of whom were treated, including eight surgical operations.⁶¹

Disability Policy and Practice

The Yemeni government has not segregated mine victims from other people with disabilities. Apparently there exists a firm belief among the decision-makers and donors to the Yemeni National Mine Action Program that health service structures for mine victims should not be separated from the already existing structures for people with disabilities. However, there is a serious intention to improve the structures already in place.⁶²

The draft for the Care and Rehabilitation of the Disabled Act that was mentioned in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* is still being reviewed by the Parliament.

⁵⁹ Interview with Sheryl McWilliams, ADRA, 17 February 2000.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Interview with Jane Brouillette, Radda Barnen, 17 February 2000.

⁶² Interview with Jane Brouillette, 22 November 1999.

SIGNATORIES**ALGERIA****Mine Ban Policy**

Algeria signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and called for “immediate and resolute action from all governments.”¹ Algeria has yet to ratify the treaty despite President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s assurances that “Algeria will be diligent in completing the ratification process of the Convention and guaranteeing its implementation, adapting, if so needed, its legislation.”² The ratification process appears to still be at the first stage of consideration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before it is sent to the Council of Ministers, National Assembly, and then to the Council of the Nation.³

Algeria attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. The Algerian Ambassador to Mozambique stated that given the effects of landmines on its war-torn nation, Algeria is firmly committed to banning these weapons. He said that a National Algerian Committee Against Antipersonnel Landmines had been established, in conjunction with the Chief of Government, to develop a program against AP mines, focusing primarily on the socio-economic reintegration of mine victims and enhancing cooperation in the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴

Algeria has not participated in any of the ban treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. Algeria voted in favor of the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

Algeria is not party to Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not spoken on the mine issue.

Use, Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Algeria is not believed to have either produced or exported AP mines. In the past, Algeria has imported mines and explosives from Italy, France, Yugoslavia, UK, and China.⁵ It is believed that Algeria’s security forces have a stockpile of mines but its size and composition is not known.

There are continuing reports of mine incidents in Algeria, but it is not possible to discern whether these reports reflect new use of AP mines or explosions of previously

¹ Mr. Lahcène Moussaoui, Delegate Minister for Cooperation and Maghreb Affairs, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.

² President Abdelaziz Bouteflika message to Handicap International, published in *El Moudjehed* newspaper, 7 October 1999.

³ Interview with Mr. Rezag-Bara, President of the National Observatorium for Human Rights of Algeria, 3 July 2000.

⁴ Statement of the Delegation of Algeria to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 4 May 1999.

⁵ Information from Osservatorio Sul Commercio delle Arme, Italy.

laid mines.⁶ There are indications, however, of continued use of homemade mines (improvised explosive devices) and possibly conventional mines by the insurgent GIA (Groupe Islamiste Arme) forces. In early 2000 French television (Canal+) showed footage of use of improvised explosive devices by the GIA in the Mitidja plain (northern central area of the country). According to Mr. Rezag-Bar, President of the National Observatory for Human Rights of Algeria, mine accidents are happening in the areas that have previously been in the hands of rebel groups. He said it is likely these are caused by improvised explosive devices serving as landmines.⁷ On 18 June 2000, an Algerian soldier was killed when he stepped on an antipersonnel mine in the Zbarbar Mountains.⁸

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Algeria has a landmine problem but no comprehensive assessment has ever been undertaken to quantify it. German and Italian troops laid mines in the Northern Coastal regions during WWII and French troops laid mines in the border regions of neighboring Tunisia and Morocco until 1962, mainly along the electrified "Challe et Morice" Line. The density of the French minefields is reported to be one landmine per meter.⁹

According to the Algerian government, there are approximately 1.3 million mines in place, including 913,000 in the eastern frontier and 4,200 in the western frontier.¹⁰ According to one source, approximately twenty types of mines were laid during the liberation war (i.e. before 1962).¹¹

There has been little new information regarding mine casualties, or mine action activities in Algeria in the past year. Algeria made a request for humanitarian demining assistance from the United States on 6 December 1999. The U.S. government is currently reviewing the request.¹²

The government claims to have undertaken mine clearance and awareness activities, but details are not publicly available. In addition to Army deminers who clear border areas, the National Security Police are also reported to have a team of Explosive Ordnance Disposal experts to deal with mines and improvised explosive devices in urban areas.¹³

⁶ For example, two shepherds were killed and two wounded in a landmine explosion on 1 June 1999 near Sidi Bel Abbes, 440 kilometers southwest of Algiers in "Algeria's Four-Year Reign of Violence Claims 5,000," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (Algiers), 03 June 1999.

⁷ Interview with Mr. Rezag-Bara, President of the National Observatory for Human Rights of Algeria, (ONDH) 3 July 2000.

⁸ "Four dead, 15 injured in Latest Algerian Islamist Rebel Attacks," *EFE* (Spain) via COMTEX, Algiers, 19 June 2000.

⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 872.

¹⁰ Le réseau d'échanges multidisciplinaires pour l'environnement et le développement (Multidisciplinary Network for Environment and Development), Algeria, Regional conference on the dangers of landmines in the Arab countries, 11-12 February 1999.

¹¹ Interview with M. Ali Halimi, president of the National Association for the Protection of Environment and Fight against Pollution (APEP), Algiers, 3 July 2000.

¹² U.S. Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet : Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining, 9 December 1999.

¹³ Interview with Dr. Djamel Ould Abbès, Minister of Solidarity, Algiers, 3 July 2000.

Algerian officials, including the Minister of Solidarity, confirm mine accidents have occurred in the Mitidja region, around Algier (Blida), in the area of Mascara, Saïda, Relizane, and Kabilie, but no information regarding the number and location of mine incidents is available due to the lack of an adequate data-collection system.¹⁴ One source estimates that there have been 3,600 victims in the region of Tebessa since 1962.¹⁵

¹⁴ Interview with Dr. Djamel Ould Abbès, Minister of Solidarity, Algiers, 3 July 2000; also interview with Pr. J.L. Grangaud, Director for Prevention and Sanitary Education, Ministry of Health, Algiers, 4 July 2000.

¹⁵ Interview with M. Ali Halimi, APEP, Algiers, 3 July 2000.

NON-SIGNATORIES

BAHRAIN

Key developments since March 1999: Landmine Monitor has discovered that the U.S. Air Force plans to stockpile antipersonnel mines in Bahrain.

Bahrain has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, nor is it a party to the CCW. At the UN General Assembly in October 1998, the Bahrain representative stated that Bahrain supported a landmine ban and endorsed the Ottawa Convention.¹ Officials have not spoken on the issue in the UN in 1999 or 2000, nor have they given any indication why they have not acceded to the treaty. On 1 December 1999 Bahrain joined 138 other nations in voting in favor of UNGA resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty.

Bahrain is not believed to have produced or exported landmines. There is no information on whether it has a stockpile of AP mines.

However, the U.S. may be stockpiling antipersonnel mines at a location near Manama in the near future. According to U.S. Air Force plans for its war reserve ammunition stockpiles in the Persian Gulf region, U.S. Gator antipersonnel mines, as well as Claymore mines, may be introduced and stockpiled in Bahrain. U.S. Air Force documents indicate that ammunition storage facilities in Bahrain will eventually contain 142 CBU-89 Gator mine systems (each containing twenty-two antipersonnel mines) and 141 M18/M18A1 Claymore mines.²

Bahrain is not believed to be mine-affected. Bahrain has not contributed any funds to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance or other mine action programs.

EGYPT

Key developments since March 1999: In February 2000 Egypt suspended mine clearance operations, citing lack of funding. Also in February 2000, UNMAS conducted an assessment mission in Egypt. Egypt told the UN that it does not produce or export antipersonnel mines. In April 2000, Egypt formed a national committee for mine clearance. The Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines was held in Cairo in April 2000. The Landmines Struggle Center recorded thirty-seven landmine/UXO victims in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

Egypt has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Speaking at the UN, an Egyptian representative stated that the treaty “did not take into consideration the legitimate right of

¹ UN General Assembly First Committee, Press Release GA/DIS/3116, 20 October 1998.

² U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Section E, Appendix 1, Enclosure 5 of Solicitation Number F44650-99-R0007 “Operation, Maintenance, And Support of Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel in Southwest Asia” shows the planned on-hand balances of munitions stored at facilities.

States for self-defense, including the use of landmines in certain conditions.”¹ Egypt has objected to the treaty because it does not provide a legally binding obligation on states to remove mines they laid in other states. Egypt also believes that AP mines play an important role in self-defense, protection of borders, defense from terrorist attacks, and in deterring drug smuggling. Egypt states that alternatives to landmines must be in place before consideration of a ban; moreover, it believes that at present alternatives are restricted to those states with advanced military capabilities, thus creating an imbalance in the security requirements of states.²

Egypt was one of twenty countries to abstain on the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 December 1999. It had abstained on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. Egypt’s opposition to the Mine Ban Treaty surfaced again when it blocked pro-treaty wording contained in the final declaration of the Africa-Europe Summit held in Cairo, 3-4 April 2000. Egypt insisted on the removal of a recommendation for states to join the Mine Ban Treaty and introduced weaker language urging efforts within the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), though it is not a state party.³ A German official told Landmine Monitor, “Germany, like other EU member states, regrets very much the Egyptian stance of denying any form of open dialogue on the subject.”⁴

The Egypt’s anti-Mine Ban Treaty position continued at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines held at the Arab League Headquarters in Cairo 9-11 April 2000. Egypt was successful in insuring that the conference recommendations did not include mention of the Mine Ban Treaty but did include endorsement of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the appropriate forum to negotiate a comprehensive approach to the landmine problem. Members of the ICBL attending this conference were concerned that the views of pro-treaty mine-affected Arab countries like Yemen and regional NGOs in attendance were not recognized in the concluding statement. In a press report of this event, an unnamed Egyptian Foreign Ministry official stated that government had played no part in organizing the conference.⁵

¹ Statement of UN Ambassador Ahmed Aboulgheit as an explanation of vote at UN General Assembly First Committee meeting, New York, 8 November 1999.

² These positions have been expressed frequently. Interview with Alla Issa, Director of Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 8 April 2000. Interview with Soliman Awaad, Deputy Assistant Minister, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, March 2000. Interview with UN Ambassador Ahmed Aboulgheit, New York, 5 October 1999. “Explanation of Vote by the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Resolution on Anti-Personal Landmines, delivered by Ambassador Dr Mahmoud Karem,” 6 November 1998, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Document, November 1998.

³ “Cairo Declaration, Africa-Europe Summit,” under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000, paragraphs 76-80. Egyptian officials argue that this strengthened the declaration by making an explicit reference to mine clearance and the duty of those states responsible for laying mines to assist in their removal. Interview with Alla Issa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 8 April 2000.

⁴ Letter to Landmine Monitor from the German Embassy in Cairo, 11 April 2000. A diplomat from the UK expressed similar views during a 10 April 2000 interview at the UK Embassy in Cairo.

⁵ “Egypt Under Fire Over Anti-Personnel Mine Policy,” *Reuters*, 11 April 2000.

Egypt did not participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. Egypt attended one of the ban treaty intersessional meetings on Technologies for Mine Action in May 2000 in Geneva.

Egypt is not a state party to the CCW, but participated as an observer in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in December 1999 in Geneva. Egypt links Protocol II ratification with progress on wider regional disarmament and peace agreements. Egypt claims that minefields in its eastern region comply with the marking and mapping requirements contained in Protocol II, but the mines in the Western Desert would not.⁶ In its report on a February 2000 assessment mission to Egypt, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) noted that “minefield marking procedures are limited in terms of warning signs and fencing, particularly in the Western Desert. Safe paths and cleared/suspected areas were not marked effectively in the areas observed.”⁷ The UNMAS team was not provided information regarding minefields on Egypt’s borders during the mission.⁸

Production and Transfer

Egypt has in the past been a significant producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines.⁹ Since 1997, Egyptian officials have on several occasions, in public fora and in meetings with ban campaigners, maintained that Egypt no longer produces or exports antipersonnel mines. An Egyptian official said to Landmine Monitor in April 2000, “Egypt does not produce nor export antipersonnel landmines.”¹⁰ A UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) assessment mission to Egypt in February 2000 was told, “Egypt does not export or produce [AP mines], a position supported by the Minister of Military Production who stated that exportation ceased in 1984, while production had ceased in 1988.”¹¹ Despite repeated requests, however, there is no official written policy statement by Egypt declaring that AP mine production and export has ceased.

At the IDEX99 defense fair in the United Arab Emirates, a marketing brochure from the state-run Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries listed several types of mines for sale, including T/78 and T/79 antipersonnel mines. The T/78 and T/79 plastic blast mines were offered in boxes of 100 and 60 respectively.¹² While marketing brochures are not evidence of new production or continued transfer, advertising mines at an international defense fair would appear to represent intention to export the weapon.

⁶ Interview with Alla Issa, Director of Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2000.

⁷ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 23.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁹ For details on past production and export, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 877-879. The most recent evidence of export dates to 1992-1993.

¹⁰ Interview with Alla Issa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2000.

¹¹ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 21.

¹² The brochure listing AP mines was obtained by an attendee at IDEX 99 held at the Abu Dhabi International Exhibition Center, United Arab Emirates, 14-18 March 1999.

Stockpiling

Egypt is assumed to have a large stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but details are not available. An Egyptian official stated that any such information was classified for reasons of military security.¹³

Use

Egypt repeatedly argues that it needs to use mines to defend its borders and to protect against terrorists, smugglers, and other criminal activity. It is unclear, however, if Egypt is actively engaged in mine laying. UNMAS notes, "Unconfirmed reports indicate that landmines have been laid in some other border areas as a result of security concerns and efforts to stop smuggling and other illegal activities."¹⁴ Egyptian officials stress that all mines laid by Egypt for these purposes met international obligations laid down under the CCW. It is not possible to verify this fact or ascertain the exact location of any newly mined areas. Such information remains classified for reasons of state security.¹⁵

The Landmine Problem

While Egypt is sometimes described as seriously affected by landmines and UXO, the most seriously affected areas are sparsely populated. However, development plans and expansion of infrastructure will bring the population and tourists into greater proximity to mined areas.¹⁶ The government has claimed that at least 23 million mines have been laid in Egypt, 17.3 to 19.7 million mines in the western region and 5.1 million mines in the eastern region.¹⁷ These numbers are based on statistical extrapolations of previous clearance efforts conducted by the Egyptian Army between 1983 and 1999.¹⁸

Antipersonnel mines believed to be in the Western Desert include German S-type bounding fragmentation mines and British Mk.2 mines. Antitank mines are thought to include German Riegelmine 43, Tellermine 35, Tellermine 42 and Tellermine 43 mines, Italian B-2 and V-3 mines, and British Mk.5 and Mk.7 mines.¹⁹ UNMAS states, "The level of marking and signposting of minefields and mine suspected areas is extremely limited in the Western Desert area."²⁰

Mines deployed in the Eastern Region include the Russian PMN blast AP mine, the Czech PP-Mi-Sr bounding AP mine, and the Egyptian M/71 AT mine.²¹ UNMAS notes

¹³ Interview with Alla Issa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2000.

¹⁴ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt," July 2000, p. 9.

¹⁵ Interview with Alla Issa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2000.

¹⁶ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt," July 2000, p. 3.

¹⁷ Statement made by General Ahmed Hazem to the National Security Committee of the Egyptian parliament, 5 April 1999.

¹⁸ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt," July 2000, p. 10.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

²¹ UN Country report on Egypt; U.S. Central Command, "U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001)," 13 July 1999; UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt," July 2000, p. 11.

that the PMN is the “leading cause of mine accidents.”²² According to UNMAS, “For the minefields in the Eastern Region laid by the Egyptian armed forces and the Israeli military, reliable minefield records and maps are available. Marking and fencing of the minefields in the Eastern Region, while more visible than in the Western Desert region, is still limited or often in need of repair.”²³

The huge numbers of mines quoted by Egyptian officials are believed to be inaccurate and greatly exaggerated. A British Ministry of Defense document states that “we consider that the totals - such as the 30 million - cited in the press or in other reports on the mines problem in Egypt are considerable over-estimates.”²⁴ Officials from Germany have said, “Documents of the German Afrikakorps and likewise documents of the British 8th Army Division lead to the conclusion that about 1.5 to 2 million landmines are to be found in the Western Desert of Egypt.”²⁵

The most likely explanation for the disparity in numbers is that when the Egyptian government cites a figure such as 23 million, it is apparently referring to all unexploded ordnance (UXO), not just landmines. An Egyptian military official recently stated at an international meeting that only 20% of explosive devices removed by the Egyptian Army from the Western Desert were mines.²⁶ The Egyptian government told the UNMAS assessment mission that 25% of the “landmines” in the Western Desert are actual landmines.²⁷ These percentages are reinforced by photographic and statistical data showing large numbers of UXO removed from the Western Desert.²⁸ Thus, using the percentages and total numbers provided by Egyptian officials, there would be 3.5 to 5 million landmines in the Western Desert. The number of antipersonnel mines, as opposed to antitank mines, would obviously be much lower.

Survey and Assessment

UNMAS conducted an assessment mission to Egypt between 9-23 February 2000 and published its findings in July 2000. It does not appear that the Egyptian government has conducted a national level survey of the landmine and UXO problem. UNMAS recommends that a combined Level I/Level II Landmine Impact Survey be conducted in the Western desert region.²⁹ UNMAS notes that a Level I Impact Survey “is not considered appropriate for information collection in the Western Desert region due to the limited population and lack of accurate records relating to the mine/UXO problem.”³⁰

²² UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 11.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Information supplied by the UK Ministry of Defense correspondence between Harry Cohen MP and Dr John Reid MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, 31 March 1998.

²⁵ Letter to Landmine Monitor from the German Embassy in Cairo, 11 April 2000.

²⁶ Statement made during interview with Colonel Dr. Abdel-Hamid Mostafa, Ministry of Defense Egypt. Colonel Dr. Mostafa also cited this percentage in his presentation to the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo, 9-11 April 2000.

²⁷ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, pp. 11-12.

²⁸ Interviews with and presentation made by Colonel Mostafa, 9-11 April 2000.

²⁹ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 27.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 24.

According to UNMAS, “the vast majority of existing records relating to minefield activities had been provided to the Egyptian Government.”³¹

Mine Action Funding

Egypt has asked for large-scale international financial support to help clear its mines. Egypt has also been critical of the slow response of international donors to offer significant help, especially former Allied and Axis states. One source has stated that the Egyptian government has asked western countries responsible for mines laid at El Alaman to contribute at least \$142 million for demining activities.³² Moreover, in an interview with the *Al-Ahram Weekly* newspaper, Major General Ahamed Hazem, commander of the engineering corps, stated that “Egypt needs approximately \$250 million to remove the 21.9 million mines that are still buried on its territory.”³³ UNMAS noted, “The ongoing statement of a need for \$250 million to overcome the problem, without clearer indications of costing breakdowns has also had an effect of alienating some potential donors.”³⁴ There is no direct UN coordination for mine action funding in Egypt.³⁵

The UK government has provided some assistance to Egypt for mine clearance. In 1996, the Department for International Development (DFID) provided \$850,000 for the purchase of mine clearance equipment and in 1998 a further \$166,000 was provided.³⁶ The UK has also, upon the request of the Egyptian government, provided all available maps and historical records, as well as technical documents on mine clearance and military doctrine to help identify the location and nature of UK deployed mines.³⁷ Royal Engineer experts from the Ministry of Defense have conducted visits in 1981, 1984 and 1994 to offer technical advice and assistance. All relevant historical records were also made available to the UNMAS mission and the UK Army Historical Branch is currently in the process of putting all relevant information onto CD-ROM.³⁸ The UK government admits that historical records on this issue are extremely patchy.

When asked whether the UK would give substantial new funds to mine clearance efforts in the future, the view expressed was that it was unlikely that the UK would wish to provide additional financial assistance on the basis of an Egyptian estimate for the removal of mines. That said, however, it was felt that funds could be available for mine awareness and victim assistance, but that Egypt had not presented any proposals in this area.³⁹

³¹ Ibid., p. 11.

³² U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001),” 13 July 1999.

³³ Amira Ibrahim, “Deadly Legacy,” *Al-Ahram* weekly, Issue No. 444, 26 August-1 September 1999.

³⁴ UNMAS, “Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt,” July 2000, p. 17.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ “Demining: UK assistance provided to Egypt”, UK Embassy, Cairo, 15 February 2000.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Interviews with UK officials, Cairo, April 2000.

³⁹ Interview with officials from the UK Embassy in Cairo, April 10, 2000.

The German government has similarly provided maps and historical records, initially in 1982. In 1998, Germany sent mine experts to Egypt for technical assistance and donated 110 Foerter Minex 2 mine detectors, with an estimated value of \$411,000.⁴⁰ In 1994, Italy provided training for twenty Egyptian deminers.⁴¹

Egypt has received \$1.432 million in U.S. demining assistance to date. Egypt requested U.S. assistance to supplement its national demining efforts in 1997 and was accepted into the U.S. program on 2 September 1998. The U.S. government body that makes demining policy has limited the amount of U.S. funds available to Egypt in light of the \$1.3 billion in military aid Egypt receives from the U.S. each year. There is an apparent reluctance on the part of the Egyptians to support its own demining effort with this form of assistance.⁴²

Coordination of Mine Action

The Egyptian government determines priorities and coordinates all planning for demining. Current priorities are agrarian, industrial, petroleum and tourist projects.⁴³ However, UNMAS states, "The linking of mine clearance tasks to with development projects or other activities was not systematised, often resulting in limited coordination in handover of cleared land to follow-on project staff."⁴⁴ Most mine clearance by the Army is accomplished when the national government funds a development project related to the economy. Other factors influencing whether or not demining is accomplished include the nature of the agreement between the government and the landowner and the anticipated total cost of the demining. UNMAS notes, "Current coordination efforts see various concerned ministries and other entities liaising bilaterally with the Ministry of Defense to address needs for mine clearance."⁴⁵

On 3 April 2000 Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Ebaed issued Decision 750/2000 to form a national committee for mine clearance. Membership in this committee includes fourteen ministries and three regional governorates and three NGOs. Two of these NGOs had not existed prior to this decision and the third does not presently work in the mine action area. The Minister of Planning and International Cooperation heads the committee. Not included in the committee were four mine-affected governorates (Port Saaid, Ismailia, Elseuz, and Red Sea) and the only NGO engaged in mine action in Egypt (Landmines Struggle Center). The mandate of the committee is solely mine clearance.

Egypt does not appear to have developed an integrated humanitarian mine action strategy. Observers have noted that Egypt has not benefited from the recent experiences of the mine clearance community, which has stressed the need to develop mine clearance as a comprehensive strategy involving clearance, mine awareness and victim assistance.

⁴⁰ Information provided the German Embassy, Cairo, April 2000.

⁴¹ "Egypt's mine problem in the Western Desert," paper by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense circulated at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo 9-11 April 2000.

⁴² U.S. Central Command, "U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001)," 13 July 1999.

⁴³ Statement by representative of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to UNMAS assessment mission, Cairo, 12 February 2000.

⁴⁴ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt," July 2000, p. 21.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

A symptom of this may be manifest in Egypt's perception that expensive high technology detection equipment will greatly assist mine clearance operations in the Western Desert and elsewhere.⁴⁶

Mine Clearance

With increasing population pressures along the Nile valley, the Egyptian government stresses the need to develop infrastructure and agriculture in mine-affected areas west of Alexandria. As a result, the government has prioritized four areas of mine clearance, which it hopes to complete by 2002. Depending on greater international donor assistance, a more ambitious target of 2005 has been set to remove all mines from its territory.⁴⁷ These four areas include the cities of Burj Al-Arab and Nubariah, a new road linking Alexandria and Matrouh, agricultural areas alongside Tira't Al-Hamam, Alamain, Ras Al-Hikma, Fouka and Sidi Barani areas, and the development of tourism west of Alexandria, especially in Marsa Matrouh and Ras Al Hikma.⁴⁸

The primary responsibility for mine clearance rests with the Engineering Corps of the Egyptian Army. Approximately 480 army troops are trained in mine clearance, most of whom are deployed in the Western Desert.⁴⁹ The Army uses a combination of manual and mechanical demining methods. UNMAS assessed the Army's clearance capabilities as "well-trained and professional...but by the admission of the Egyptian Government, it is not however capable of clearing the entire landmine problem facing Egypt."⁵⁰

Commercial companies, mainly petroleum services companies, also engage in demining employing mostly retired military personnel. These companies are registered and working in demining with the permission of the Army and work on the petroleum and tourist projects using only manual methods with Fisher 65 and Fisher Plus mine detectors.

In February 2000, the Army Engineering Corps announced that its demining operations would be stopped because of insufficient funds.⁵¹ Up to 1981, the Egyptian government reports that 11 million mines and UXO were cleared. Between then and 1999, an additional 1.2 million were cleared, 800,000 in the west and 400,000 in the east.⁵² Clearance efforts have suffered from financial constraints and have resulted in

⁴⁶ Regional and international participants engaged in integrated mine action at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, April 2000, highlighted the limitations of high technology in mine clearance.

⁴⁷ "U.S. Combs the World for Deadly Mines," *Tampa Tribune*, 19 March 2000.

⁴⁸ "Egypt's mine problem in the Western Desert," conference paper by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense circulated at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo 9-11 April 2000.

⁴⁹ U.S. Central Command, "U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Country Plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt (FY 2000 & 2001)," 13 July 1999; interview with Colin King, April 2000.

⁵⁰ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt," July 2000, p. 3.

⁵¹ Declaration by General Ahmed Hazem to the UNMAS assessment mission, Cairo, 12 February 2000.

⁵² Statement by General Ahmed Hazem to the National Security Committee of the Egyptian parliament, 5 April 1999.

periodic suspensions of activity. For example, the Army did not demine between 1991-1998.⁵³

Mine Awareness

According to UNMAS, "Mine awareness education is undertaken by the military for its Army mine clearance personnel.... Mine awareness education appears extremely limited for the civilian population both in mine affected areas and elsewhere."⁵⁴ Egyptian officials have noted that the mines issue is routinely highlighted in the national media.⁵⁵ However, there does not appear to be a government strategy to promote mine awareness, particularly in remote areas or to particularly vulnerable sections of the population, such as the nomadic Bedouin tribes. There is also a shortage of warning signs and fencing in known mined areas.

Landmine Casualties

According to information provided by the Egyptian Army in April 2000, there have been 8,313 landmine victims in Egypt, mostly civilians.

Mine Victims	Injuries	Fatalities	Total:
Military	3018	278	3296
Civilian	4599	418	5017
Total:	7617	696	8313 ⁵⁶

The government could not provide information concerning how the statistics on landmine victims are recorded, their types of injuries, or the locations of the incidents. UNMAS notes this is an aspect of the "absence of a coordinated system of data collection."⁵⁷ These figures are essentially the same as those given by the Egyptian government to the UN in 1998 for the years 1945-1996.⁵⁸

Many incidents are likely to go unreported, especially amongst nomadic Bedouin tribes in the Western desert, as well as in the areas where mines have been deployed to protect against drug cultivation and smuggling.

According to a survey conducted by the Cairo-based Landmines Struggle Center (LSC), the number of mine and UXO victims in 1998 was thirty-three and in 1999 was

⁵³ Interview with Alla Issa, Foreign Ministry, Cairo, 8 April 2000.

⁵⁴ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt," July 2000, p. 18.

⁵⁵ Interview with Alla Issa, Cairo, 8 April 2000.

⁵⁶ Figures provided by Egyptian government, April 2000. Identical statistics were included in the statement of the Egyptian representative to the Regional Conference on the Menace of Mines, Beirut, 10 February 1999. However, statistics provided to UNMAS in February 2000 indicate 6 fewer fatalities and 6 fewer injuries. UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt," July 2000, p. 12.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ambassador Dr Mahmoud Karem, "Explanation of Vote by the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Resolution on Anti-Personal Landmines," Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Document, November 1998.

Thirty-seven.⁵⁹ In 1998, thirteen people were killed and twenty wounded, including eight children killed and nine wounded. Sixteen people had accidents in the Eastern area, nine in the Western area, five in Behera governorate, and three in Aswan governorate. Two military deminers were wounded during demining operations in the new port of El Aien-El Sokhna in the East region.

In 1999, fourteen people were killed and twenty-three wounded, including four children killed and six children wounded. Twenty-two had accidents in the Eastern area, six in the Western area, four in Giza governorate, three in Menya governorate, one in Daqahlyia governorate, and one in Sharqya governorate.

Between 1 January 2000 and 29 February 2000 the Landmine Struggle Center recorded three deaths and one injury due to mines in Elamar village, Ismailia governorate.

Victim Assistance

Emergency equipment and ambulances are scarce in the mine-affected areas. The medical care available at local clinics and hospitals is not sufficient for the trauma of mine incidents. According to UNMAS, "There is an uneven distribution of health services throughout the country, although the services that are available are to a large extent maintained free to the general public."⁶⁰ Additionally, UNMAS notes, "Within the civilian community medical resources for mine injuries did not appear to be as complete throughout the mine affected areas as those for military personnel."⁶¹ The State provides medical treatment and artificial limbs to mine victims, but most of the assistance offered is geared towards the treatment of military personnel. For example, the Alagouza military hospital provides artificial limbs and more long-term rehabilitation for servicemen and veterans injured by mines. The only other rehabilitation center for disabled people in Egypt is the Veterans Association, another military organization. Military hospitals will provide some civilian victims with treatment, but they have to contribute up to 50% towards the cost of their treatment.⁶²

Law 39/1975 (Executive Roll Number 59/1979) states that disabled should receive free medical care, and provides a structure for the care and rehabilitation of disabled people. However, limited financial resources hamper implementation of its provisions. The Ministry of Social Affairs rarely provides pensions to the disabled; recently some landmine victims have been compensated with approximately \$45-80. There are no rehabilitation programs existing for mine victims. There is no national body representing the interests of disabled people or mine victims in Egypt.

⁵⁹ All subsequent data in this section is from a survey by the Landmines Struggle Center (Cairo) covering the period of 1 January 1998 to 1 January 2000 in the two main mined areas in Egypt and other governorates next to those areas. This NGO receives news about mine or UXO incidents from media, hospitals, and other local sources. Staff then visits the accident area, interviews the victim or the victim's family, visits the hospital treating the victim, interviews witnesses and notes other indicators such as warning signs, education, rehabilitation and social care.

⁶⁰ UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission Report: Arab Republic of Egypt," July 2000, p. 8.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁶² Information obtained at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo, 9-11 April 2000.

IRAN

Key developments since March 1999: The first known conference on the landmine problem in Iran was held in Tehran on 15-16 February 2000, organized by the non-governmental High Center of Research and Informatics.

Mine Ban Policy

Iran has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. As reasons, the government has cited its special geographical situation and stated that a prohibition on antipersonnel mines should not prejudice a state's legitimate right of self-defense.¹ Officials also cite a lack of viable alternatives to defend Iran's borders.² Included in almost every statement made by Iranian officials on the mine issue is a plea for the transfer of mine clearance technology and international cooperation. Iranian officials have not made any public statements regarding the mine ban issue in 1999 or 2000.

Iran was one of twenty nations to abstain on the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 December 1999, as it had on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998. Iranian diplomats offered no explanation of these votes at the UN. Iran did not participate in major diplomatic meetings on landmines in 1999 or 2000. Iran is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Iran is a member of the Conference on Disarmament and in 1998 urged others to negotiate prohibitions on landmines within its framework.³

Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use

Iran has produced antipersonnel mines. This includes the YM-I (a copy of the Italian TS-50) and the Mk. 4 (similar to the Egyptian T/78 and Israeli No. 4) mines.⁴ It is not known whether Iran is currently producing antipersonnel mines, but it has no policy or formal restrictions against production.

No information is available concerning types, quantities, or location of Iran's AP mine stockpile. Between 1969 and 1979, Iran imported more than 2.5 million AP mines from the U.S. of the M2, M14, M16/M16A1 varieties.

Iran declared a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines in 1997, but it is not known if this moratorium is still in effect.⁵ Four types of Iranian mines have been found in Afghanistan. Additionally, Human Rights Watch reported in 1998 that Iranian Mk. 4 AP mines have been found in the Ugandan border region of Sudan.

There have been no reports concerning the use of antipersonnel mines by Iran recently.

¹ Statement by S.M.H. Adeli, Ambassador to Canada, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.

² Statement by Ambassador Sirous Nasser, Head of Delegation to the CCW Review Conference, Vienna, 27 September 1995.

³ Statement by Ambassador Mehdi Danesh Yazdi, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN, 17 November 1998.

⁴ Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, 1999-2000, online update, 18 November 1999.

⁵ Statement by Ambassador Mehdi Danesh Yazdi to the UN, 17 November 1998.

The Landmine Problem

Government officials claim that during the Iran-Iraq War, over 16 million landmines were planted in Iran covering over 4 million hectares. The number of mines Iran has emplaced on its own borders for security purposes or to deter narcotics trafficking is not known. It is not known if a nationwide survey on mine and UXO contamination has been conducted by the government.

Mine Action

Responsibility for mine action rests with the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Military Services, Mostazafan and Janbazan Foundation (MJF), Emam Emdad Committee, and the United Nations. Apparently the activities of these organizations are not well coordinated. According to the Ministry of the Interior's 5-year plan, a budget of \$183 million has been estimated to demine 2,796,000 hectares in 1,911 different areas.⁶

A UNDP mine action program for western Iran is currently on-hold pending Iranian Government approval and funding. Apparently, the reason for the delay is not related to mine action, but rather budgetary.⁷

Mine Clearance

Separate organizations in Iran may undertake mine clearance activities. For example, the Armed Forces General Headquarters has demined several areas of the western border region. Estimates of mines and "explosive devices" removed have ranged from 200,000 in 1996 to 6.2 million in 1998.

To date, with the cooperation of the Ministry of the Interior, 104,000 hectares have been demined and the demining of an additional 2,900,000 hectares is currently under consideration.⁸

The military has apparently marked mine-affected areas. Demining in Iran is accomplished manually and also by mechanical methods. Iran has indigenously produced a mechanical clearance vehicle named the Taftan-1. This unmanned, remotely operated vehicle is reported to be able to withstand the impact of mines weighing up to 10 kilograms.⁹

Mine Awareness

Apparently, there are currently no mine awareness programs in Iran. However, the "First International Conference on Land Mine Victim Assistance during Peace Period" was held in Tehran on 15-16 February 2000. It was organized by the High Center of Research and Informatics (HCRI), which is affiliated with the Mostazafan and Janbazan Foundation, with the cooperation of the Trauma Care Foundation (Norway) and World Health Organization. Different organizations, ministries, members of the Armed Forces

⁶ Budget figure converted at official rates; Iranian Ministry of the Interior, 5 Year Plan, April 2000.

⁷ UNDP, "Mine Action Updates Country and Global Programmes," 17 November 1999.

⁸ Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the Khatamolanbia Military Demining Department, April, 2000.

⁹ "Iran Says Will Produce Own Mine-Clearing Vehicle," *Reuters*, 28 July 1999.

as well as some local landmine injured people participated in the conference. This was the first known conference about the landmine problem in Iran and may in the future lead to increased mine awareness and victim assistance efforts in Iran.

Landmine Casualties

The exact number of people who have been killed or injured by AP mines in Iran is not available. However, in January 2000 a survey was conducted in Eylam, a western province of Iran, by HCRI with the purpose of preparing a statistical evaluation of civilian mine victims. According to this survey, Eylam, with the population of about 500,000, and having the longest common border with Iraq (about 250 km) has the most infected landmine areas in comparison with other western provinces. Mehran, Dehloran and Moosian are the most infected areas/towns in this province. The majority of fatalities were people under the age of twenty (ninety-eight deaths). Another group at high risk is shepherds whose lifestyle makes them extremely vulnerable. The following table shows the range of landmine casualties during the past 10 years in Eylam province:¹⁰

Year	Deaths	Injuries
1989	25	24
1990	40	61
1991	57	68
1992	31	84
1993	23	55
1994	32	69
1995	49	82
1996	63	72
1997	28	62
1998	33	77
1999	13	34
Total	394	688

Victim Assistance

Little is known about programs in Iran to care for landmine victims and raise awareness of landmines. HCRI is planning to undertake a pilot study of the assistance and awareness programs for victims and affected communities, especially in Eylam province. HCRI (Mostazafan and Janbazan Foundation) has presented a project on mine victim assistance to the Iranian Ministry of Health and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁰ HCRI Survey of Mine Victims in Eylam Province. The data for 1999 is only through October.

IRAQ

Key developments since March 1999: The United Nations expressed concern in mid-2000 about incidences of freshly laid mines being found in previously cleared minefields in Northern Iraq. It did not identify the mine user.

Iraq has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, nor is it a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Iraq became a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1996, and in 1997 the Iraqi Ambassador to the UN urged the CD to launch negotiations on a global landmine ban.¹ However, the Iraqi government is not known to have made any public statements with regard to a mine ban since 1997. Iraq has not been eligible to vote on the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions because of failure to pay dues.

Iraq is both a producer and an exporter of antipersonnel mines. It remains the only known mine exporter in the world that has not instituted an export ban or moratorium, or at least made a policy declaration of no current export. Though Iraq deployed enormous quantities of mines in Kuwait and Iraqi Kurdistan, the vast majority of mines used were imported.

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency has identified AP mines from the following countries as having been used by Iraq in Iraqi Kurdistan, in Kuwait, on the borders with Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia, or found in Iraqi stocks: Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the former Soviet Union and the U.S.²

A United Nations report in June 2000 noted that the UN Office for Project Services “remains concerned about the incidences of freshly laid mines being found in previously cleared minefields.”³ The report does not identify the user of mines, though it is likely the PKK (see Northern Iraq Landmine Monitor report).

Iraq is severely mine-affected as a consequence of the Gulf War, the Iran-Iraq War, and two decades of internal conflict. According to the U.S. State Department, the government before 1991 primarily planted landmines in northern Iraq. Apparently many of the mines were laid during the Iran-Iraq War, and the army failed to clear them before it abandoned the area. Landmines are also a problem along the Iraq-Iran border throughout central and southern Iraq.⁴

Mine awareness and mine clearance programs appear to be underway only in Iraqi Kurdistan, with both the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) as well as the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) being active in this region (see separate report on Iraqi Kurdistan). In December 1998 the Iraqi government declared this mine-clearing

¹ Stephanie Nebhay, “Iraq Calls on Middle East States to Reveal Arms,” *Reuters*, 14 August 1997.

² Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 104.

³ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1281 (1999), S/2000/520, 1 June 2000, p. 13. The report addresses distribution of humanitarian supplies throughout Iraq.

⁴ U.S. Department of State, *1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, 25 February 2000, online edition, Section 1 (g).

activity in northern Iraq to be subversive.⁵ It stated that the clearance was being performed without Baghdad's permission, and that it violated Security Council resolutions on the need to "respect Iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty."⁶

Care for landmine survivors is minimal. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) developed an orthopedic program that was initiated in Iraq in 1993. Decentralized prosthetic/orthotic centers were created in Basra, Mosul and Najef in collaboration with the ministry of Health and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.⁷

ISRAEL

Key developments since March 1999: In May 2000, Israel withdrew from south Lebanon, where both Israeli forces and armed non-state actors have used mines extensively. In May 1999, Israel extended its export moratorium for three years. In November 1999 the State Comptroller's Office released an important report on landmines that concluded, among other things, that 350 Israeli antipersonnel minefields were no longer vital to security.

Mine Ban Policy

Israel has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In November 1999 Israel's representative to the UN stated that Israel "reserved the right to use landmines to protect its citizens."¹ Israeli diplomats cite its geographic circumstances, the constant threat of hostilities, and the necessity to protect its armed forces and citizens as factors underlying Israel's policy.

Israel was one of twelve observer delegations at the First Meeting of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. At this event, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs further articulated Israel's view:

The State of Israel whole-heartedly supports the ultimate goal of this Convention.... It is also actively seeking to forge a new reality with its neighbors...that would render the need for such devices, and the pain and suffering they cause, obsolete.... Israel supports a gradual process in which each state will begin doing its part to reduce the indiscriminate use of landmines, toward the eventual goal of a total ban. We believe the best way to achieve this lies along the path we have already set with our neighbors: Working within the framework of regional cooperation. We believe that the first step should be the elimination of the production of APLs [antipersonnel landmines] to be followed by finding

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ "Iraq Objects To Demining Groups in Kurdish North," Fox News Online, 29 December 1998.

⁷ ICRC, "ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Program in Iraq, 1994 - 1997."

¹ Statement of Nimrod Barkran, Representative of Israel at UN General Assembly First Committee, UN Press Release GA/DIS/3162, 8 November 1999.

appropriate replacements for landmines and then, later on, when security circumstances allow, a total ban on the use of APLs.²

Israel abstained on the vote on the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had on similar resolutions in the past.

Israel attended four of the ban treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings -- on Mine Clearance and Victim Assistance in September 1999, and on Mine Action Technologies and Stockpile Destruction in December 1999, all held in Geneva.

Between March and September 1998, the State Comptroller's Office conducted an audit of the Israel Defense Forces policies on mine laying, and issued a detailed report in 1999.³ The report reflects the seriousness with which Israel addresses the landmine issue, a commendable degree of transparency, and a willingness to examine critically a wide range of military institutions and practices related to landmines.

Israel is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines. Israeli officials said in May 1999, in December 1999 and again in May 2000 that Israel was in the final stages of approval for accession to Amended Protocol II.⁴ Israel has already said that Israeli use of mines "remains strictly within the constraints set by the amended Protocol II of the CCW."⁵ Israel attended the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 1999 in Geneva, but did not make a statement to the plenary. In a meeting with members of the ICBL at that time, an Israeli official said that Israel had some concerns about the provisions of Article 5, Paragraph 2 (b) of the amended protocol.⁶ This provision prohibits the use of non-self-destructing AP mines unless "such weapons are cleared before the area is abandoned, unless the area is turned over to the forces of another State which accepts responsibility for the maintenance of the protections required by this article and the subsequent clearance of those weapons."

Israel's full compliance with Protocol II is called into question by the findings of the 1999 audit by the State Comptroller's Office. The State Comptroller's report notes that "the protocol has not been inserted into [IDF] orders and has not been published by the IDF in Hebrew." The report also details inadequate marking and monitoring measures taken by Israel in the Occupied Territories and Golan Heights.⁷

² Statement by Mr. Giora Becher, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the FMSP of the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, May 1999. Hereafter cited as "Becher Statement at FMSP, May 1999."

³ State Comptroller's Report No. 50 A, for the Year 1999, "Mine Laying in the Israel Defense Forces," (Published in Hebrew and translated unofficially) Israel government printing office, Jerusalem. Hereafter cited as "State Comptroller's Report, 1999."

⁴ For May 1999: Becher Statement at FMSP. For December 1999: ICBL meeting with members of Israeli delegation to Conference on Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999. For May 2000: Interview with Israeli official, May 2000.

⁵ Becher Statement at FMSP, May 1999.

⁶ ICBL meeting with members of Israeli delegation to Conference on Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose, Human Rights Watch.

⁷ State Comptroller's Report, 1999.

Israel is a member of the Conference on Disarmament and supports the idea of negotiations on a global export ban at that venue.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Israel has produced and exported AP mines in the past.⁸ Since December 1997, Israel has frequently stated that it “does not” produce antipersonnel mines.⁹ Israel is the only non-signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty that has declared a halt to AP mine production since the beginning of the Ottawa Process in 1996. It is unknown when production stopped, and it is unclear if a formal moratorium or ban is in place. An Israeli official told the ICBL in December 1999 that Israel does not rule out production of AP mines in the future if the situation requires it.¹⁰

In 1994, Israel instituted a three-year unilateral moratorium on the export of AP mines. The moratorium was renewed for three years in 1996, and was renewed again for three years in May 1999.¹¹ The size and composition of Israel’s current AP mine stockpile are not known. One Israeli official has said the current stockpile is adequate for responding to a crisis.¹² Although Israel has said it will need to have alternatives in place before it can give up AP mines, it apparently does not have an active program seeking alternatives.¹³

Use

Israel has employed antipersonnel mines along its borders, near military camps and training areas, and near sensitive areas like water pump stations and electric power facilities. As the peace process evolved in the region, some minefields have been transferred as part of territory returned to Lebanese, Jordanian, and Egyptian control.

Both Israel and non-state actors, notably Hezbollah, have used antipersonnel mines in south Lebanon. When Israel withdrew from the occupied zone in late May 2000, it gave the UN detailed maps delineating the Israeli-planted minefields in south Lebanon.¹⁴ Some reports indicate that the IDF and its ally, the South Lebanon Army, used antipersonnel mines in southern Lebanon in anticipation of the withdrawal. This is supported by a number of mine incidents in areas of southern Lebanon that had not been known to be mine-affected. For example, on 16 January 2000 a mine in the Kfarhouna

⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 889 for details.

⁹ The first known public announcement was the Statement of the Israel Delegation, Ottawa Forum for Mine Action, December 1997, document 1.12.97/17119. See also Becher Statement at FMSP, May 1999.

¹⁰ ICBL meeting with members of Israeli delegation to Conference on Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

¹¹ Becher Statement at FMSP, May 1999.

¹² ICBL meeting with members of Israeli delegation to Conference on Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ The UN Mine Action Service told Landmine Monitor that the IDF handed over four maps and four files with details on areas mined by Israel in south Lebanon. Email from Hemi Morete, UNMAS, to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, 14 July 2000. See also, “Israel Hands Over Landmine Field Maps to UNIFIL,” Jerusalem Voice of Israel (state-funded radio) in Hebrew, 1300 GMT, 31 May 2000; “UN Experts to Meet Lebanese Army over Landmines in South,” *Agence-France Presse*, 31 May 2000.

area in Jezzine Cadaa, a village from which Israeli forces recently withdrew, killed two persons.¹⁵

The United Nations Mine Action Service conducted an emergency assessment mission to southern Lebanon from 26 May-1 June 2000. It reported that “many of the 80+ positions evacuated by the IDF and the de-facto forces (DDF) are suspected to be contaminated by nuisance minefields and booby traps.... Most minefields and dangerous areas remain unfenced and unmarked.”¹⁶ One report stated that UN peacekeepers estimated that Israel and the SLA left 70,000 antipersonnel mines “in and around their abandoned compounds” in southern Lebanon.¹⁷ A 21 June 2000 news account said that, according to United Nations experts, there are about 130,000 mines and other explosive devices scattered over the area formerly occupied by Israel.¹⁸

In December 1999 an Israeli official stated that Hezbollah had continued to use mines and improvised explosive devices regularly during the year. He noted that Israel would give consideration to both sides refraining from use of mines, but that the other side refuses.¹⁹

The Landmine Problem

The U.S. State Department has estimated that there are 260,000 mines in Israel.²⁰ The mines are mostly along the borders with Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and territories captured in the 1967 war (i.e. West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights). Aside from mines emplaced by the IDF, this figure includes mines laid prior to the establishment of Israel by the British and during subsequent conflicts by Jordan and Syria.²¹

In 1999, the Israeli State Comptroller's Office published an audit of mine use policies and practices. The audit states that there are 350 antipersonnel minefields emplaced by the IDF and other belligerent parties that are no longer “vital to the security of the state.” This includes minefields within the state of Israel proper, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Additionally, the State Comptroller noted that an unspecified number of minefields in the Jordan Valley and the Arava are “also no longer vital.”²²

According to an IDF General Staff order titled “Laying and Removal of Mines,” any minefield and any area that is mined or suspected of being mined shall be fenced off and posted with warning signs. The IDF is required to check the fencing and sign posting of the minefields and the areas suspected of being mined at least once a year, in some

¹⁵ Lebanese daily newspapers on 17, 18, and 19 January 2000: *ANNAHAR*, *Al-Safir*, *L'orient le Jour*, *Daily Star*.

¹⁶ UNMAS, “The Landmine/UXO Problem in South Lebanon: Preliminary UNMAS Assessment Report,” 6 June 2000.

¹⁷ Henry McDonald, “Seeds of Death Litter Lebanon's Liberated Fields,” *The Observer*, 18 June 2000.

¹⁸ *Agence-France Presse*, Sidon, Lebanon, 21 June 2000.

¹⁹ ICBL meeting with members of Israeli delegation to Conference on Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

²⁰ U.S. Department of State, “Hidden Killers,” September 1998, p. A-1.

²¹ State Comptroller's Report, 1999.

²² *Ibid.*

instances every six months.²³ The State Comptroller's audit found that some minefields are not properly marked or fenced and are not inspected within the prescribed time. This finding includes minefields in Israel proper, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and areas controlled by Israel in the Golan Heights. For example:²⁴

- Eight minefields and areas suspected of being mined on and at the foot of the Golan Heights (old Syrian mines) were not fenced off. Six of the above areas are in the Jordan Park area.
- In fifty-nine of the seventy-six of the minefields examined, no external inspection was conducted within six months after the previous inspection, as required. In thirty-six minefields, no such inspection was performed in the course of the year.
- The cumulative perimeter of the areas suspected of being mined within the Southern Command region was about 350 kilometers; in view of the limitations in resources and order of battle, the required fencing and sign posting of the areas suspected of being mined was impossible to carry out.
- Data supplied by the Israel Defense Forces show that between January 1997 and May 1998, nine cases of mine explosions occurred as the result of malfunctions caused by failure to obey or to comply with rules. In two of those cases, humans were injured.

In July 1998, the Israel Defense Forces Department of Field Security considered the issue of unmarked minefields and concluded that "minefields [that] constitute part of an obstacle laid by our forces on the front lines...there is no possibility of marking them on civilian maps. Regarding minefields that were laid by enemy forces...there is no impediment to marking them on the maps. Regarding minefields located in the vicinity of sensitive sites, such as electrical power stations, water pumps and the like, there is no impediment to marking them on the maps."²⁵

Part of the State Comptroller's report remains classified but the part of the report publicly released included recommendations for operational, doctrinal, and logistical procedural adjustments.²⁶ These recommendations are in the process of being examined by the Israeli military.

Mine Action

In January 1999, the division of Finances, Equipment, and Property in the Israeli Ministry of Defense stated that it was examining the possibility of IDF evacuating unnecessary minefields, as well as adjacent areas suspected of being mined. To advance the process, the State Comptroller recommended the appointment of an inter-ministerial committee to examine all aspects of the subject, and to guide government policy.²⁷ There are four companies registered with the government as providers of mine clearance services.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ All examples Ibid.

²⁵ Currently, this is only accepted in "principle." Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

Israel's demining capabilities are quite significant. Indigenously developed mine clearing equipment includes: AP mine safety shoes; a lightweight in-stride mine extractor for surface munitions clearance; a teleoperation kit to convert a vehicle into a remotely controlled unit; a track-width mine plow; an on-board anti-magnetic mine actuating device; a highly mobile rear-engine four wheeled all terrain vehicle; ground penetrating radar; and, a twin roller bank system coupled to a heavy-tracked tractor.²⁸

In addition, Israel's Technion (Israel Institute of Technology) is in the process of developing: a tree and shrub clearing shredder; a mini-flail; a lightweight flail mounted on a small remote-operated tractor; a self-powered heavy flail; a standard deep-rooter; and a soil combine-sifter-crusher.²⁹

In 1997, Israel and Jordan carried out a combined project of clearing minefields along their shared border. Israel is currently involved in a multilateral humanitarian mine clearance project with Jordan and has offered the Jordanian engineering corps additional mine clearing equipment and safety gear.³⁰ In addition, Israel has offered to fund a mine victims rehabilitation program and is willing to provide technical training assistance for its medical staff.³¹ Four Jordanian landmine victims, three adults and a child, have undergone extensive treatment and rehabilitation at Israel's Beit Levenstein and Schneider's Children's Hospital.³²

Since 1996, Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been engaged in mine clearance and mine awareness operations in Angola. An Israeli NGO, Aid Without Borders, conducts mine awareness education programs in Angola under the auspices of UNICEF. Aid Without Borders has also been active in Kosovo where it taught mine awareness to children in conjunction with the British Mines Advisory Group.³³

Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also operates a joint landmine assistance program with Canada in Guatemala. Canada's sphere of responsibility in the program includes both physical and psychological rehabilitation, while Israel is involved with the economic rehabilitation of mine victims. This economic rehabilitation consists of encouraging and teaching landmine survivors to establish and successfully run independent micro-enterprises or other small businesses.³⁴

Weapons and explosives are part of daily life in Israel. During "special terrorism awareness" sessions, Israeli school children are shown detailed pictorial images of

²⁸ Most of the equipment was evaluated or used by the IDF, U.S. Army during "Desert Storm" and by the Canadian and Swedish armies. Stated by the Israel Delegation, *Israeli Capabilities in Demining and Rehabilitation of Victims*, Ottawa Forum for Mine Action, December 1997.

²⁹ Israel Delegation, *Israeli Capabilities in Demining and Rehabilitation of Victims*, Ottawa Forum for Mine Action, December 1997.

³⁰ Interviews with Israeli officials, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, May and June 2000.

³¹ Interview with Israeli government official, June 2000.

³² Interview with Professor Chaim Ring, Deputy Director of Lowenstein Rehabilitation Center, Beit Levenstein Hospital, Rannana, 24 May 2000.

³³ Interview with Erez T. Yanuv, Founder of Aid Without Borders, Jerusalem, 1 June 2000.

³⁴ Interview with Benny Abileah, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 1 June 2000.

various landmines and are taught to avoid them.³⁵ In addition, all military graduates in Israel possess considerable awareness of mines as a result of their army service.

Landmine Casualties

Civilians have fallen casualty to landmines in the Golan Heights, West Bank, and other areas (see separate reports on Golan and Palestine). A detailed statistical record of landmine casualties is currently unavailable, as victims of landmines are treated under the general category of "Victims of Hostile Activities." Therefore, there is no specific statistical category reserved for landmine casualties. However, the 1999 State Comptroller's Report noted that "between January 1997 and May 1998, nine cases of mine explosions occurred as the result of malfunctions caused by failure to obey or to comply with rules.... [Consequently,] there was one death and seven injuries."³⁶

Although official detailed statistics on mine incidents are sparse, the Israeli media occasionally reports on mine casualties suffered by soldiers. For example, on 5 June 2000, the media reported that an Israeli soldier was severely wounded while clearing minefields along the Israeli-Lebanese border.³⁷

Survivor Assistance³⁸

In April 1999, Israel hosted an international workshop on the rehabilitation of landmine victims.³⁹ Israel's comprehensive Bituach Leumi, or National Insurance Service, completely covers the cost of treatment for victims of landmines. Victims of landmines in Israel (whether citizens, tourists, students, or anyone who has entered the country legally⁴⁰) are included in the Health Services clause of "Victims of Hostile Activities," and as such, are provided extensive treatment. This treatment includes an initial evaluation, subsequent operations, and extensive orthopedic rehabilitation. Patients are provided with psychological therapy and counseling, as well as occupational, speech, and physical therapy. They also receive an appropriate prosthetic device, or devices.

Israel also provides extensive vocational training and outpatient treatment. The Ministry of Work and Social Welfare, the National Health Insurance Institute, and the General Sick Fund (Israel's largest HMO) jointly run vocational schools for landmine victims. After an initial assessment by the vocational school, the patient selects a course of interest, and upon successful completion of a final exam, receives a professional degree. Israel's comprehensive rehabilitative vocational facilities enable the landmine victim to return to the workplace, providing him or her with a sense of success and inclusion in society.

³⁵ Interview with Professor Chaim Ring, Deputy Director of Lowenstein Rehabilitation Center, Beit Levenstein Hospital, Rannana, 24 May 2000.

³⁶ State Comptroller's Report, 1999.

³⁷ David Rudge, "Soldier Wounded in Mine-Clearing Accident," *Jerusalem Post*, 6 June 2000.

³⁸ The majority of information for this section is from an interview with Professor Chaim Ring, Deputy Director of Lowenstein Rehabilitation Center, Beit Levenstein Hospital, Rannana, 24 May 2000.

³⁹ Becher Statement at FMSP, May 1999.

⁴⁰ Bituach Leumi website, http://www.btl.gov.il/English/eng_index.asp.

Additional benefits to landmine survivors include a monthly pension, and the ability to purchase a car without tax. If the patient is unable or does not wish to drive, a transportation stipend can be provided. Israel also has parking spaces reserved for handicapped people, and most new buildings have elevators and ramps for handicapped and disabled people.

Medical centers that are involved in the treatment of civilian landmine victims and survivors are: Beit Levenstein in Rannana, Tel Hashomer in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, Tel Aviv University Medical Center, and Schneider's Children's Hospital in Petach Tikvah.

Soldiers wounded by landmines are provided with the same comprehensive rehabilitative treatment as civilians, with two exceptions: injured soldiers receive treatment from army medical teams instead of civilian doctors, and receive a higher monthly pension.⁴¹

KUWAIT

Key developments since March 1999: Landmines are still being found in Kuwait in both coastal and desert areas, and mine clearance operations are ongoing. In 1999 the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research established the "Kuwait Environmental Information System" that records and plots the locations of mines and UXO recovered. Previously unknown, it appears Kuwait has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines numbering more than 45,000. The United States also apparently stockpiles antipersonnel mines in Kuwait.

Mine Ban Policy

Kuwait has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty nor has the government provided any reason for not joining the treaty. In October 1999, the Kuwaiti representative at the UN First Committee stated that antipersonnel mines were of "great concern, and the international community needed to look into the best means for their elimination."¹ Kuwait, as in the past, voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 December 1999. Kuwait is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but it did attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in December 1999 in Geneva. Kuwait is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Use, Stockpiling

It is not believed that Kuwait has produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It is not known if Kuwait has imported or used antipersonnel mines.

Citing the United Nations database, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* reported that Kuwait had said it did not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.² However, based on

⁴¹ "Department of Rehabilitation," State of Israel Ministry of Defense official publication, Tel Aviv, April 1996.

¹ Statement of Hisham al-Ghanim, General Debate of the First Committee, GA/DIS/3142, 13 October 1999.

² *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 891.

information obtained from the Kuwait Ministry of Defense, it appears that Kuwait has collected and stored at least 45,845 antipersonnel mines cleared during the demining operations conducted after the Gulf War.³ This represents 4.3% of the total number of antipersonnel mines removed in Kuwait. In addition to the AP mines, 48,742 antitank mines were retained.⁴ According to a study conducted by the Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, "During mine clearing operations, the working teams destroyed the damaged mines which were hazardous to manipulate. The usable ones were collected in order to be stored."⁵

It is not known if these mines were subsequently destroyed or retained by Kuwait for unspecified purposes. The majority of the antipersonnel mines retained and stored by Kuwait came from the northeast part of the country that was cleared by Pakistani deminers, and from the Kuwait City-Ahmadi sector cleared by Kuwaiti deminers.⁶ The types of AP mines retained and stored are unknown.

According to information dated 1997, the United States stockpiles 696 MOPMS and 8,200 Volcano antipersonnel mines as part of pre-positioned U.S. Army equipment stored in Kuwait.⁷

The Landmine Problem

Landmines are still being found in Kuwait in coastal and desert areas, including rough vegetated sandy plains, sabkhas, active drainage basins, and oil contaminated patches.⁸ Emergency teams are still clearing mines in several areas.⁹

During the 1990-1991 Iraqi occupation and subsequent liberation of Kuwait, almost 97.8% of the land area of Kuwait became mine or UXO affected. The most heavily mined areas were the northern coast of Kuwait Bay (610 mines per square kilometer) and the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border (917 mines per square kilometer).

As of 3 April 1999, a total of 1,646,916 landmines had been recovered from the coastal and desert areas of Kuwait, including 1,078,961 antipersonnel mines and 567,955 antitank mines.¹⁰ The statewide density of the recovered landmines was approximately 92 mines per square kilometer and a ratio of 1.1 mines per person.

³ Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, *Landmines and the Destruction of the Environment of Kuwait* (ISBN 99906-32-20-0), Kuwait, 1999, p. 37 (Table 7). Data was as of 22 January 1997.

⁴ *Landmines and the Destruction of the Environment of Kuwait*, p. 40 (Table 9).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 37 (Figure 13).

⁷ Information provided to Human Rights Watch by U.S. government sources, March 1999.

⁸ Interviews with officers of the Kuwaiti Army, July 1999.

⁹ Information provided by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense to the Center for Research and Studies, May 2000.

¹⁰ Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense "Ammunition and Explosives Disposal Report," 1999.

Survey and Assessment¹¹

The Kuwait Ministry of Defense conducted an in-depth assessment and survey for the extent of the mine and UXO problem in Kuwait in 1991 and subdivided the country into eight sectors for subsequent clearance.

In 1998, the Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait prepared a complete set of maps showing the geographic extent and density of the various types of landmines. Mapping was based on information obtained during demining operations. In 1999 the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research established the “Kuwait Environmental Information System” that records and plots the locations of mines and UXO recovered.¹²

Mine Action Funding

Immediately after the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991, the government of Kuwait planned for an integrated mine and UXO clearance program. Its duration was twenty-four months and cost approximately \$728 million. The government of Kuwait financed the entire program.

Kuwait has not contributed funds toward international mine action programs due to budgetary limitations and infrastructure rebuilding costs.

Coordination of Mine Action

A national mine clearance plan was established by the Ministry of Defence in 1991. Priority was given to populated areas, transportation nodes, infrastructure, oil fields, and recreation facilities. The national plan consisted of the three phases. The military and contractors continue in the on-going third phase to complete pending operations and carry out new tasks requested by the government and private authorities, as well as quality control.

The Engineering Corps (Ministry of Defense) and the Ministry of the Interior are responsible for the coordination of mine action operations. The latter body deals with mines and UXO in populated areas, while the former deals with these explosives in desert areas (unpopulated). The two bodies receive notices from the public and governmental organizations on the existence of mines and UXO. The Fire and Safety department of the Kuwait Oil Company is responsible for the coordination of mine clearance in company areas and has direct contact with the Engineering Corps.

Mine Clearance

Contracts have been signed with the Bangladeshi military, an American consulting company, and local companies to conduct on-going clearance in nearly half of Kuwaiti territory (8,035 square kilometers) over the next five years. From 16 June 1997 to 12

¹¹ For a detailed examination of the mine and UXO problem in Kuwait, see *Landmines and the Destruction of the Environment of Kuwait* (ISBN 99906-32-20-0) by the Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 1999.

¹² Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, “Kuwait Environmental Information System, Phase II, Interim report No 4,” 1999.

December 1998 approximately 380 mines were recovered from desert areas in Kuwait. From 12 December 1998 to 3 April 1999, twenty-two mines were cleared.¹³

The Engineering Corps is currently clearing seismic survey tracks for the Kuwait Oil Company, as well as electricity and oil line tracks, according to the requests received by the Kuwaiti Army.¹⁴ Two Bangladeshi battalions are engaged in mine clearance under the supervision of the Engineering Corps.

Mine Awareness

Mine awareness activities are on-going in Kuwait. In May 2000, the Kuwait Red Crescent arranged an exhibition on the hazards of antipersonnel mines.

As part of the integrated mine action effort, the government established a mine awareness program that produced maps, posters, pamphlets and media programs on the distribution, types, and hazards of mines and UXO. The Ministry of Defence issued a 160-page guide for deminers that included the specifications, mechanism of operation and safety measures of landmines and ammunition found in Kuwait. The book covers cluster bombs (eight types), antipersonnel mines (VS50, PMN, Type 72, SB33, P40, VS.T), antitank mines (P2, MARK3, VS1.6, VS2.2, Type 72), mortars (fifteen types), artillery ammunition (twelve types), tank ammunition (six types), grenades (twelve types), RPG and missiles (six types).¹⁵ Another similar twenty-eight-page guide was distributed to the public with the warning "report all suspected strange objects."¹⁶

The Kuwait Red Crescent Society arranged, in 1997, an exhibition with the theme landmines should be stopped and included several pavilions displaying the effects of landmines. Additionally, Kuwait Red Crescent Society issued a 40-page booklet that discusses international law and the landmines in Kuwait entitled "Landmines Must be Stopped" in English, French and Arabic.

Landmine Casualties

The government conducted a countrywide survey of the number of people killed and injured by mines and UXO between 1991 to 1993.¹⁷ A total of 429 persons were wounded and twenty killed by mines and UXO. Regarding children under 16 years, 5 were killed and 149 were wounded. For adults, 15 were killed (all men) and 280 were wounded (18 women and 262 men). 51 victims had limbs amputated.¹⁸ All victims have received prosthetic devices. The mine incidents took place in both urban and desert areas.

The number and nationalities of deminers killed or injured between 1991 and 3 April 1999 during clearance operations in Kuwait is presented in the following table.¹⁹

¹³ Information provided by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense to the Center for Research and Studies, May 2000.

¹⁴ Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, *Landmines and the Destruction of the Environment of Kuwait*, 1999, p. 120.

¹⁵ Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, "Unexploded Ammunition in Kuwait, a Pocket Book for the Personnel of the Clearance Operations of the Remains of War," undated.

¹⁶ Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, "War Remains," undated.

¹⁷ Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning, Statistics and Information Sector, Edition 34, 1997.

¹⁸ Kuwaiti Ministry of Health, "Statistics of Casualties of Landmines," 1993.

¹⁹ Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, reports on landmine and ammunition clearance, 1999

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Injured</i>	<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Total</i>
Kuwaiti	8	4	12
American	11	1	12
British	8	3	11
French	7	1	8
Egyptian	37	29	66
Bangladeshi	28	13	41
Pakistani	32	9	41
Turkish	0	0	0
Total	131	60	191

Victim Assistance

For landmine and UXO victims medical and rehabilitative services are generally free except for some items like wheelchairs that are partially paid for by victims. Health care and medical treatment are sponsored by the government of Kuwait and disabled persons receive pensions. The medical expenditure incurred by the state to treat traumatic injuries caused by a mine or UXO accident, from initial visit to the emergency room through psysiotherapy, totals \$17,331.²⁰

The Ministry of Health with the cooperation of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour constitute a national level coordination body focused on disability issues. For disabled persons in Kuwait facilities and services are available. These involve rehabilitation centers, manufacturing of orthopaedic devices and appliances, physiotherapy, prosthetic technicians, occupational therapists, psychologists, and vocational rehabilitation programs. Kuwait Red Crescent Society provides services for disabled persons and landmine victims in the whole country. There are no specific disability laws or decrees in Kuwait.

LEBANON

Key developments since March 1999: Israel's withdrawal from its occupied zone in South Lebanon in May 2000 revealed a high level of contamination in the area, and greatly increased risk to civilians. The Landmines Resource Center documented fifty mine casualties nationwide in 1999; media reports indicated twenty casualties in one month just in South Lebanon following the withdrawal. Both Israeli forces and non-state actors used mines in South Lebanon in this reporting period.

Mine Ban Policy

Lebanon has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Prime Minister told Landmine Monitor in January 2000 that Lebanon supports the treaty's goals.¹ In June

²⁰ Kuwaiti Public Authority for Assessment of Compensation for Damage Resulting from Iraqi Aggression, 1996. Converted at 1996 exchange rates.

¹ Interview with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Salim Hoss, 16 January 2000.

1997 the Foreign Ministry said, "Lebanon will sign the treaty whenever Israel withdraws."² In December 1998 the Foreign Ministry said, "Lebanon did not sign the Treaty due to the Israeli occupation of West Bakaa and South Lebanon."³ According to the report of a United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) assessment mission conducted in February 1999, "The Government of Lebanon has indicated its intention to sign both Landmine Conventions as soon as [UN General Assembly] Resolution 425 is successfully implemented and the Government of Israel signs the same Conventions."⁴ There has been no policy statement from the Lebanese government on the Mine Ban Treaty since Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon in late May 2000.

Lebanon became the first country to vote against a pro-ban resolution at the UN General Assembly when on 1 December 1999 it voted against UNGA Resolution 54/54B, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁵ Lebanon had voted yes on similar resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. Lebanese diplomats made no explanation of the vote. No clarifying comments could be obtained from the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Lebanon did not participate in any of diplomatic meetings regarding landmines in 1999 or 2000. Lebanon is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Although the government has not confirmed it, Lebanon is not thought to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The Lebanese Army is believed to have a stockpile of AP mines, but its size and composition are not known.

Since 1975, forces reported to have used landmines in Lebanon include the Lebanese Army, local militia groups, the Syrian Army, various armed Palestinian groups, Israel Defense Forces, and the South Lebanon Army.⁶ In 1999 and 2000 the only known use of antipersonnel mines in Lebanon was in occupied South Lebanon by Israel and armed non-state actors, likely Hezbollah. An Israeli official claimed that Hezbollah used mines regularly in South Lebanon in 1999,⁷ but a key spokesman affiliated with Hezbollah stated in March 2000 that they generally do not classify themselves as landmine users.⁸

² Letter from Thafer Al Hassan, General Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, read to the Brussels International Conference for the Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines, 24-27 June 1997.

³ Letter from Thafer Al Hassan, General Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, to Landmine Monitor, Beirut, 18 December 1998.

⁴ UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Lebanon, 7 June 1999. The two conventions are the Mine Ban Treaty and Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. The UNGA resolution calls for Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon.

⁵ From 1996-1998, ten to twenty countries abstained on pro-ban UNGA votes, but none voted against.

⁶ James Trevelyan, "Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Problem in Lebanon," February 2000.

⁷ ICBL meeting with Amnon Efrat, Minister-Counsellor, Israeli Mission to the UN, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

⁸ Interview conducted in South Lebanon, March 2000.

Landmine Problem

Estimates of the number of mines and minefields in Lebanon vary greatly. The Lebanese Army claims that there are more than 150,000 landmines in 518 minefields in the following areas:⁹

- eighteen minefields or suspected minefields in the Beirut area including Ras El Nabeh, Ras El Nabeh Cemeteries, Mathaf Olivetti, Sahat Al Abd, Syoufi Garden, and Sharshabouh District.
- Forty-seven minefields or suspected minefields near the Baabda area including the Faculty of Sciences of Lebanon University, Kfarshima, Salima, Arbaniyya, Zandouka, Shwet, Araya, Ras El Harf, and Ain El Remmeneh.
- Thirty-eight minefields or suspected minefields around Northern Metn including Wadi Jamajem, Ain Teffaha, Sannin, Sin El Fil, Shalouhi, Saloumi, Zaghrein, Kossaybeh, Shamoun Buildings, Ayroun, and Dawwar.
- Fifty-eight minefields or suspected minefields near Chouf including Deir El Kamar, Barouk Ceders, Ikleem Al Kharroub, KfarMatta, Ain Ksour, Ain Zhalta, Ain El Hawtr, Mtoullah, Bakkifa, Hasrout, and Shourit.
- One hundred-fifteen minefields or suspected minefields in the Aley area including Souk El Gharb, Kayfoun, Aytat, Maaroufieh, Aley Ras El Jabal, Bmakkin, Ain Ksour, Binnay, Abey, Baysour, Btater, and Ain Drafeil.
- Thirty-three minefields or suspected minefields near Kesserwan including Ouyoun El Siman, Geita, Sakiat El Meftiey, Klayaat, Deir Afs, and Bakaata.
- Sixty-five minefields or suspected minefields in the Jbeil area including Jouroud Al Akoura, Barbara, the Old Tripoli Road, Bejjeh, Shmout, Fghal, and Afka.
- Ten minefields or suspected minefields near Koura including Zghorta Matawleh, Shanata, Wata Fares, Kateh Fares, and Majdal.
- Seventy-eight minefields or suspected minefields near Batroun including Shabteen, Sourat, Harbouna, Zan, Toula, Douk, Dahr Abi Yaghi, Tannourine, Sghar, Masrah, Artez, Niha, Koura, and Bekhaaz.
- Fifteen minefields or suspected minefields near Bsharry including Mazraat Bani Assaf, Mnazraat Bani Saab, and Metrit.
- One minefield at the Klayat Airbase in Akkar.
- Five minefields or suspected minefields near Saida including Tanbourit, Barti, Zeghedraya, Kfarhatta, Maghdoushi, and Jabal Hemedeh.
- Six minefields or suspected minefields near Jezzine (before the withdrawal) in Mrah Hbas, Ain El Mir, and Wadi Maksabi.
- Three minefields or suspected minefields near Nabatieh including Wadi Jhannam and the Nabatieh Fortress.

⁹ All data (as of 16 November 1999) was presented by Lebanese Army officers at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo, 9-11 April 2000. 300 minefields are confirmed, 218 are suspected to be contaminated. In addition, 303 minefields have already been cleared.

- Thirteen minefields or suspected minefields West Bekaa including Falouj, Bireh, Kilya, Zallaya, Maydoun, Ain Tina, Rawda, Yohmor, and Kamed El Lawz.
- One minefield at the Baalbeck Fortress.
- Six minefields or suspected minefields near Rashayya including Yanta, Jabal Mzaybleh, Bakka, and Jabal Al Dawaweer.
- Six minefields or suspected minefields in the Hasbayya area including Dallafa, Fakha, Mazraat Ain Al Hajal, Shebaa, and Al Kakour.

The above Lebanese Army figures contrast with information provided by the Lebanese government to an UNMAS assessment mission in February 1999: 743 minefields with approximately 3,183 AT mines and 24,271 AP mines, as of December 1998. Of these 471 minefields and suspected areas were treated. According to sources, 208 treated/cleared mine fields still remain suspected areas of being unsafe.¹⁰

The U.S. Department of State has estimated the number of mines in Lebanon from 8,795 to 35,000.¹¹

None of the above numbers of mines and minefields include the formerly occupied zone in South Lebanon from which Israel withdrew in late May 2000. UNMAS has noted, "While the information on the landmine and UXO problem in South Lebanon remain very incomplete, both the data collected during the past twenty-two years by UNIFIL, and the first maps released by Israel, suggest a high level of contamination."¹² UNMAS states that many of the more than eighty bases and positions evacuated by the IDF and its allied militia in South Lebanon are suspected to be contaminated by nuisance minefields and booby-traps. Other areas with high concentrations of mines include the former border and zone of confrontation. UNMAS reports that most minefields in South Lebanon are unmarked and unfenced.¹³ While Israel is not known to have removed mines that it laid prior to its withdrawal, it has provided the UN with maps and other details needed for clearance.¹⁴

A 21 June 2000 news account said that, according to United Nations experts, there are about 130,000 mines and other explosive devices scattered over the area formerly occupied by Israel.¹⁵

Mine Action Funding

Lebanon has received funds from Canada, Britain, France, and the U.S. for mine action programs. U.S. military personnel have conducted training programs in Lebanon

¹⁰ UNMAS Joint Assessment Mission Report: Lebanon, 7 June 1999.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*, 1998, p. A-2.

¹² UNMAS, "The Landmine/UXO Problem in South Lebanon: Preliminary UNMAS Assessment Report," 6 June 2000.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ UNMAS told Landmine Monitor that the IDF handed over 4 maps and 4 files with details on areas mined by Israel in South Lebanon. Email from Hemi Morete, UNMAS, to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, 14 July 2000. See also, "Israel Hands Over Landmine Field Maps to UNIFIL," Jerusalem Voice of Israel (state-funded radio) in Hebrew, 1300 GMT, 31 May 2000; "UN Experts to Meet Lebanese Army over Landmines in South," *Agence-France Presse*, 31 May 2000.

¹⁵ *Agence-France Presse*, Sidon, Lebanon, 21 June 2000.

and twenty-two Lebanese military personnel have attended a one-time advanced humanitarian demining course in the U.S. The \$1.65 million in U.S. funds for 2000-2001 will be used to train personnel, finance equipment purchases, and sustain on-going programs to remove mines throughout Lebanon.¹⁶ In response to the Israeli withdrawal, the UK pledged \$120,000 for the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for emergency mine awareness activities in Lebanon to be implemented by UNICEF.¹⁷ Italy announced on 25 May 2000 the donation of five Minex 2FD mine detectors to the Lebanese Army.¹⁸

Mine Clearance

The Lebanese Army is responsible for all mine clearance in the country. The National Demining Office is staffed entirely by military personnel. The Army reports that it has cleared 303 minefields and that 4,000 AT mines, 20,000 AP mines, and 40,000 UXO have been destroyed.¹⁹ The report of the UNMAS assessment mission in February 1999 states that 471 minefields and suspected areas were treated, and 2,383 AT mines, 23,693 AP mines and a large number of UXO were removed between 13 October 1990 and 1 December 1998 by the Engineer Regiment.²⁰

The Army states that it does not have sufficient resources for clearance, and that the technical skills of its deminers are not fully compatible with international humanitarian standards because they are based upon military methods. The Army also claims that mechanical mine clearance methods are not viable due to difficult terrain, but that mine-detecting dogs may be suitable.²¹ According to the UN, the Lebanese Army has about 200 trained deminers operating throughout Lebanon, but not yet in the South. The UN says the deminers are poorly equipped, with no mechanical means and only a handful of modern mine detectors.²²

Following the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, UNMAS reported that the UNIFIL mine clearance capacity will be strengthened through a Ukrainian contribution of up to forty personnel. UNMAS describes UNIFIL's mine marking and clearance capacities as "extremely limited," consisting of one Polish platoon to support UNIFIL operations and respond to emergency requests from local populations.²³

¹⁶ U.S. Department of State "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001—Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs," 15 March 2000; SOLIC Information Paper.

¹⁷ UNMAS Update as of 15 June 2000, Mines, UXO, and mine action in South Lebanon, received by email.

¹⁸ "Rome to Donate Land Mine Sweepers to Lebanon," *ANSA*, Rome, 1127 GMT, 25 May 2000.

¹⁹ Information provided by National Demining Office of the Lebanese Army, 1 April 2000, and used in presentations by Lebanese Army officers at the Arab Regional Seminar on Landmines, Cairo, 9-11 April 2000.

²⁰ UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Lebanon," 7 June 1999.

²¹ James Trevelyan, "Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Problem in Lebanon," February 2000.

²² UNMAS, "The Landmine/UXO Problem in South Lebanon," 6 June 2000.

²³ UNMAS Update as of 15 June 2000, Mines, UXO, and mine action in Southern Lebanon, received by email.

Mine Awareness²⁴

The withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon has highlighted the critical need for mine awareness education in these areas. Press reports recount instances of returning civilians entering former military areas, pulling off roads to park, and removing Israeli minefield marking signs.²⁵ Organizations conducting mine awareness in Lebanon immediately began emergency programs in South Lebanon that included the distribution of pamphlets, leaflets, posters and media broadcasts.

A Mine Awareness Committee was established in 1999 at the Landmines Resource Center of the Faculty of Health Sciences of the University of Balamand with the support of the World Rehabilitation Fund. The purpose of this committee is to structure and conduct mine awareness activities in Lebanon and to serve as an advisory body.

The first mine awareness education training workshop took place on 15-16 June 1999. This workshop allowed the Mine Awareness Committee to develop a mine awareness kit and guidelines on how to promote the dissemination of information on the landmine problem. In August 1999, two camps on mine awareness were organized by NGOs (one in Bekaa and one in Mount Lebanon) to disseminate information to youth and organizations working with disabled people. In November 1999, Rädä Barnen (Save the Children/Sweden) supported the participation of five Lebanese NGOs in a mine awareness workshop conducted in Yemen on the child-to-child approach.

On 3 March 2000, the World Rehabilitation Fund organized a workshop to encourage the media to join the mine awareness campaign. One of the local stations, Sawt El Shaab, produced and broadcast a documentary on the landmine problem in collaboration with the Landmines Resource Center. The program was presented to the UNDP Media Program and won a prize during the competition run by UNDP on sustainable development.

From 25-26 March 2000 a mine awareness training workshop for twenty-five scout leaders from different regions of Lebanon took place to train them on disseminating information and to train their own troops. Between 16-19 April 2000 Rädä Barnen conducted a child-to-child mine awareness workshop in South Lebanon. From 25-26 April 2000 another training workshop was conducted for girl scouts in north Lebanon.

A work plan to conduct a series of mine awareness sessions in schools primarily in South Lebanon has been developed and approved by the Landmines Resource Center, the Mine Awareness Committee, the World Rehabilitation Fund, the National Demining Office, and the Ministry of Education. As of May, more than 120 community mine awareness sessions had taken place in different regions of Lebanon in 2000.

UNICEF and UNESCO have also joined the mine awareness campaign in South Lebanon. From 6-9 June 2000 the Landmine Awareness Committee conducted training sessions for teachers in South Lebanon.

²⁴ Information in this section comes from the Landmines Resource Center and the World Rehabilitation Fund landmines' project unless otherwise indicated.

²⁵ Samar Kanafani, "NGOs Race to alert South to Peril of Mines," *The Daily Star Online*, 1 June 2000.

Landmine Casualties

The departure of the Israeli troops has made it apparent that South Lebanon is contaminated with landmines as well as unexploded ordnance.²⁶ Due to the withdrawal, heavily mined areas have been opened up to Lebanese civilians, resulting in a number of landmine related accidents. Only a few hours after the Israelis left, a 15-year-old boy lost his leg after stepping on a mine.²⁷ On the same day a 10-year-old boy lost a foot and two men each lost a leg.²⁸ According to Agence France-Presse, in the first four weeks following the Israeli pullout, five civilians were killed, including two infants, and fifteen injured by landmines.²⁹ Prior to the withdrawal UNIFIL had reported two mine incidents in its area of operations in South Lebanon between 16 July 1999 and 15 January 2000. One civilian was injured near Bayt Lif on 25 October 1999 and another civilian lost a limb on 20 December 1999 after stepping on an AP mine near Qabrikha.³⁰

The Landmines Resource Center has estimated there to be more than 1,500 landmine survivors in Lebanon, as well as approximately 1,000 deaths due to mines. On 31 December 1999, the Landmines Resource Center completed its data collection process of the nationwide door-to-door survey of landmine victims initiated in August 1998. This effort was designed to gain detailed understanding of the profile of victims and survivors, the nature and location of injuries and related needs. A database of survivors and casualties was created and a geographic information system is currently being developed.

The preliminary findings of the survey note that in 1999, fifty casualties were reported, while sixty incidents were registered, pointing to damage to livestock. By the end of April 2000, fifteen cases additional were reported. The survey gave the following geographic distribution of landmine survivors in Lebanon: 33% were located in the South and in Nabatieh, 31% in Mount Lebanon, 21% in Bekaa, 12% in the North and 3% in Beirut. The survey results showed that 56% of the survivors were harmed by an AP mine, 37% by UXO and 7% by "strange" objects. 36% of the survivors were injured while engaged in their daily agricultural activity. 90% of the survivors were males. The average age was thirty-two years. The survey found that injuries caused by landmines are occurring at an average rate of one per week.³¹

The Lebanese Army provided the UNMAS assessment mission with the following data on the number of victims affected by mine explosions in Lebanon between 1997 and 1999.³²

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Kamel Jaber, "Lebanese Suffer the Legacy of Israeli Land Mines," *Reuters*, 29 May 2000.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ *Agence-France Presse*, Sidon, Lebanon, 21 June 2000.

³⁰ "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission Interim Force in Lebanon," S/2000/28, 17 January 2000, p. 2.

³¹ Based on a preliminary analysis of the survey data by the Landmines Resource Center at the Faculty of Health Sciences of the University of Balamand.

³² UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Lebanon," 7 June 1999.

YEAR	Civilians		Military	
	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Injured</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Injured</i>
1990	12	15	-	8
1991	36	78	5	34
1992	11	41	3	14
1993	23	33	-	12
1994	23	32	2	10
1995	16	15	1	5
1996	6	18	1	1
1997	7	17	-	1
Total	134	249	12	85

Survivor Assistance

No major changes have occurred concerning victim assistance since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, except for the planning of an income-generating program for victims in the Jezzine area (South Lebanon) by the World Rehabilitation Fund that will begin in 2000.

Medical care for landmine victims is provided through the Lebanese health system. In 2000 there is a shortage in the budget of the Ministry of Health, which is why medical services for landmine victims have become very expensive. Programs to assist survivors, families of victims and mine-affected communities are scarce. Programs addressing the psychological needs of survivors are practically non-existent. Furthermore there is limited awareness among victims of available assistance and rehabilitation programs, particularly in rural areas.

LIBYA

Key developments since March 1999: Libya abstained on the UNGA vote in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, but attended the First Meeting of States Parties and several intersessional meetings.

Mine Ban Policy

Libya has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Libya was one of twenty countries to abstain on the vote for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. As explanation, a Libyan representative stated that Libya “opposed the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of landmines, but viewed the Ottawa Convention as only a first step.”¹

A Libyan delegation attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 as an observer. Libya said this was a very important meeting which “marked a new stage in international demining efforts.”² Libya attended the ban treaty Intersessional

¹ Explanation of vote by Libyan Representative, UNGA First Committee, UN Press Release GA/DIS/3162, 8 November 1999.

² Statement by the Libyan Delegation to the UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting Agenda Item 35: Assistance in Mine Action, New York, 18 November 1999.

Standing Committee of Experts meetings on General Status of the Convention in January 2000, Mine Clearance in March 2000, and Stockpile Destruction in May 2000.

Libya argues that the treaty is flawed because it does not require states that laid mines to clear them, nor that these states provide compensation and technical assistance for mine clearance and victim assistance. Libya regards its primary mine problem as dating back to World War II where the former Allied and Axis forces laid thousands of antipersonnel and antitank mines during various battles in the deserts of North Africa.

Libya has not signed the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Libya is not known to have produced or exported AP mines. Libya has imported mines from the former Soviet Union, including the POMZ-2 and the POMZ-2M AP fragmentation mines.³ The size and composition of Libya's AP mine stockpile is not known.

Libya is believed to have deployed antipersonnel mines during its border conflict with Egypt in 1977 and also during its border conflict with Chad between 1977-1987. Libya is also believed to have deployed mines for protection of strategically and economically important locations within Libya.⁴

Landmine Problem

Libya suffers from heavy mine and UXO contamination as a result of the North African campaign of World War II. In addition to the deserts, there are minefields close to ports and urban areas, such as the towns of Tubruk and Benghazi.⁵ There are also mines on the borders with Egypt and Chad, although the exact locations or numbers of mines is not known. Mines believed to be left over from World War II hostilities include:⁶

Germany:	Riegalmine 43, Tellermine 35, Tellermine 42 and Tellermine 43 AT mines and S-Type bounding fragmentation AP mines.
Italy:	B-2 and B-3 AT mines and B-5 AP mine
France:	Model 36 AT mine
United Kingdom:	Mk.5 and Mk.7 AT mines and Mk.2 AP mines

The exact number of mines currently in Libya is unknown. A lack of comprehensive historical records and maps of mined areas during World War II have prevented accurate assessment. Interestingly, however, Libyan officials have cited a much lower number of mines than their Egyptian counterparts. Libyan officials estimate

³ Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, Third Edition 1998-99, Jane's Information Group, p. 603.

⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for more details on this.

⁵ Interviews with Dr. A.H. Ammar, May 2000.

⁶ The White Book, "Some Examples of the Damages Caused by the Belligerents of the World War II to the People of the Jamahiriya," Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Researchers wish to thank Dr. A. H. Ammar for this material.

that former Allied and Axis forces left behind 5 to 19 million mines and UXO during the entire North Africa campaign.⁷ Of this total, the Libyan government estimates that there are 1.5 to 3 million mines on its territory. The table below provides partial details:⁸

Location of mines	Estimated Number	Area (square meters)
Tobruk	8,430	12,240
Al-Mechili to Darna	7,636	15,624
Darna	7,529	26,620
Al-Mechili to Abiar	32,579	60,038
Tmimi	3,907	9,748
Benghazi	9,912	20,751
Benghazi to Ghemines	552	1,104
Agedabia	87,033	91,511
Aggheila	1,743	30,148
Marsa Brega	1,978	3,956
Gialo	336	627
Marada	5,441	3,060
Total	167,076	275,472

Libya appears not to classify all explosive devices deployed on its territory as mines, which suggests that these figures are estimated totals for mines only (including antitank). Photographs provided to researchers of mine clearance work in Libya suggest that the majority of explosive devices removed are categories of UXO rather than mines (including artillery shells, bombs and grenades).⁹

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance in Libya is undertaken by the explosives division of the police force, which also trains local people in demining techniques. There are also some private companies involved in mine clearance, whose work is linked to oil, gas, and mineral exploration. It is not known if any comprehensive records are available as to the number of mines removed or the area of land cleared in Libya.

Libya has noted that a lack of accurate maps and historical records has made mine clearance particularly hazardous and difficult.¹⁰ In 1998, Italy, largely due to its colonial connection, signed an agreement with Libya to provide access to Italian historical

⁷ Statement by the Libyan Delegation to the UN General Assembly, New York, 18 November 1999.

⁸ "The White Book, Some Examples of the Damages Caused by the Belligerents of the World War II to the People of the Jamahiriya," Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

⁹ Photographs provided by Dr. A. H. Ammar.

¹⁰ Statement by the Libyan Delegation to the UN General Assembly; New York, 18 November 1999.

records, provide technical assistance and training for Libyan deminers, as well as support for mine casualties (see below for more details).¹¹

Due to Libya's political isolation from many Western countries, the UK and Germany have not as yet provided Libya with access to historical records from the Second World War. The records and maps that do exist are known to be extremely patchy.¹² With the recent improvement in diplomatic and political relationships, Libya hopes that the UK and Germany will provide access to this information as well as offering technical assistance for mine clearance in the near future.

Mine Awareness, Mine Casualties, and Victim Assistance

The Libyan government has stated that it provides mine awareness and training programs to warn people of the dangers of mines, although no further information is known.¹³ It is believed that these training programs include the training of civilians in mine clearance techniques.¹⁴

All mine incidents in Libya must be reported to the police,¹⁵ but it is doubtful that accurate records exist for the numbers of mine-related incidents and mine victims in Libya. Some data on mine victims is collected, although this appears not to be done on a countrywide basis. For example, in the mine-affected municipality of Tobruk, the Libyan Historical Studies Center, a state-funded research institute, maintains detailed case study records of all mine incidents that have occurred in the area since the 1970s.¹⁶

Figures regarding mine casualties that are available from various sources show a fairly wide degree of variance. Figures provided to the UN suggest that from 1940 to 1975 there were 5,670 mine-related deaths and at least 4,935 mine-related injuries.¹⁷ The Libyan Police have stated that from 1940 to 1995 there were 6,749 mine-related deaths and 5,096 injuries.¹⁸ A statement provided by the Libyan government to the UN General Assembly in November 1999 cites a figure of 4,000 mine-related deaths.¹⁹

Although there are no specific mine-related victim assistance measures, all injuries are treated by the state and medical care is free. Moreover, Italy has agreed to provide several types of assistance, including the construction of a mine injury hospital, cooperation between the Italian Red Cross and the Libyan Red Crescent, and the treatment of victims in Italy where necessary (including the provision of artificial limbs for amputees).²⁰

¹¹ This declaration was signed by the Foreign Ministers of Libya and Italy in Rome on 7 April 1998.

¹² See Egypt country report for more details.

¹³ Statement by the Libyan Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, 18 November 1999.

¹⁴ Interviews with Dr. A. H. Ammar, May 2000.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/libyannar.htm>

¹⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 900-901.

¹⁹ Statement by the Libyan Delegation to the UN General Assembly, 18 November 1999.

²⁰ Joint Declaration between Italy and Libya, Rome, 7 April 1998.

MOROCCO

Mine Ban Policy

Morocco has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It was one of twenty countries to abstain on the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. Morocco explained its abstention by saying that “it could not become a signatory for the time being, due to security issues in its southern province.”¹

Morocco was one of just twelve non-signatories that attended (as an observer) the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. At the FMSP, a Moroccan representative stated that he did not entirely agree with having Morocco included among the “bad countries.”² In a statement to the plenary, the Moroccan representative said, “My country is only deferring signature of the convention, and this is due to the conditions linked to the security of our southern provinces and to the achievement of our territorial integrity.... We should also be precise that this circumstantial situation will disappear on its own when the integrity of my country will not any more be the object of threats or controversies.... We hope that this situation will resolve in the future months.”³ Similarly, in a response to a Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Morocco stated that it would accede to the treaty when conditions are right.⁴

Morocco has sent representatives from its permanent mission based in Geneva to nearly all meetings of the Intersessional Standing Committees of Experts.

Morocco is not a party to either the original or revised landmine protocols of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but Morocco attended, as an observer, the December 1999 First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II. According to Morocco’s UN Ambassador in Geneva, in May 2000 the Moroccan parliament approved Amended Protocol II, and ratification should occur soon; the necessary documents are being processed in Rabat.⁵

Morocco is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In its response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Morocco said it encourages introduction of the mine issue in the CD, and believes this is the best forum to insure the widest ban on mine transfers. However, in an interview, a Moroccan diplomat has said that it is not necessary to rush to the disarmament conference on a mine transfer ban in order to assuage the conscience of those who do not wish to sign the Mine Ban Treaty.⁶

¹ Statement by Moroccan Representative to the UN First Committee, Press Release GA/DIS/3162, 8 November 1999.

² Interview with Mr. Omar Zniber, Head, United Nations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Maputo, March 1999.

³ Statement by Moroccan Representative to the FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999. Unofficial translation by Landmine Monitor.

⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ambassador Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi, Permanent Representative of Morocco in Geneva, received by facsimile, 23 June 2000.

⁵ Meeting with Ambassador Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi, Geneva, 31 May 2000.

⁶ Ibid.

Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use

Morocco is not known to have ever produced or exported AP mines. Morocco has recently stated that it does not import or export antipersonnel mines.⁷ According to an arms monitoring group in France, Morocco has not imported any AP mines since 1978.⁸ The size and composition of Morocco's current AP mine stockpile is not known but is considered by Moroccan officials as highly sensitive.⁹ There is no new information regarding the use on antipersonnel mines by Morocco in the past year.

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Morocco is not considered to be mine-affected except for the territory it controls in Western Sahara. The situation in the Western Sahara is covered in a separate Landmine Monitor entry; see also *Landmine Monitor 1999* for details on the mine problem in Morocco and Western Sahara.

The Moroccan Army possesses a mine clearance capability and has conducted some clearance operations in Western Sahara. The Moroccan military has signed an accord with the UN Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for mine clearance in Moroccan zones.¹⁰ According to a MINURSO officer, roughly 60% of the Moroccan-controlled area has been cleared, and about 20% of the Polisario-controlled area.¹¹

The most recent report of the UN Secretary General states that "during the period of 13 May 2000 to 3 July 2000, 278 mines and unexploded ordnance were marked and 124 destroyed on the Moroccan side while 488 were marked and 177 destroyed on the Frente Polisario side."¹² Between 6 December and 22 May 2000, both sides in cooperation with MINURSO conducted twenty-eight disposal operations for UXO and ammunition.¹³ These operations have not been carried out without danger, as eleven soldiers in the international MINURSO contingent have died in mine or UXO incidents over the course of its presence in the area.¹⁴

Morocco states that to its knowledge there are no Moroccan civilian mine victims.¹⁵

⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 23 June 2000; Statement to the FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* for more on past imports.

⁹ Interview with Ambassador Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi, Geneva, 31 May 2000.

¹⁰ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 23 June 2000.

¹¹ Interviews with MINURSO officers, Laayoune, 20-21 June 2000.

¹² "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara," S/2000/683, 12 July 2000, pp. 3-4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 3; "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara," S/2000/131, 17 February 2000, p. 3.

¹⁴ Interviews with MINURSO officers, Laayoune, 20-21 June 2000.

¹⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 23 June 2000.

OMAN

Key developments since March 1999: Landmine Monitor has discovered that the United States may be stockpiling antipersonnel mines at storage facilities in Seeb, Thumrait, and Masirah in the near future. The U.S. has provisionally agreed to provide humanitarian demining training to Oman.

Oman has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. At the treaty signing conference in Ottawa a representative stated that “the Sultanate of Oman shares wholeheartedly in the aims of the campaign for a total global ban...I also reaffirm that my Government is currently considering joining you as signatories to the Convention as soon as possible.”¹ However, in 1999 and 2000 officials have not spoken on the issue in international fora, nor have they given any indication why they have not joined the treaty. On 1 December 1999 Oman joined 138 other nations in voting in favor of UNGA resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Oman is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but it did attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in December 1999 in Geneva. Oman is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Oman is not believed to produce antipersonnel mines and it is not known whether Oman stockpiles them. According to Ambassador Mohammed Bin Murdas Al Quahtani, Omani ambassador to Yemen, “Oman does not have a landmine problem, nor does it export landmines.”²

Landmine Monitor has discovered that the United States may be stockpiling antipersonnel mines at storage facilities in Seeb, Thumrait, and Masirah in the near future. According to U.S. Air Force plans for its war reserve ammunition stockpiles in the Persian Gulf region, U.S. Gator antipersonnel mines and Claymore mines may be introduced and stockpiled in Oman. U.S. Air Force documents indicate that ammunition storage sites at each of these facilities in Oman will eventually contain 142 CBU-89 Gator mine systems, each containing twenty-two antipersonnel mines, and 141 M18/M18A1 Claymore mines.³ That would constitute a total U.S. stockpile of 9,372 Gator antipersonnel mines and 423 Claymore mines in Oman.

Some remote border areas such as Dhofar Province in Oman are thought to be mine-affected.⁴ The United States provisionally approved Oman's request for humanitarian demining training assistance on 9 December 1999. Oman may receive a total of \$2.2 million in humanitarian demining assistance between 2000 and 2001. A survey will be conducted sometime in 2000 to establish the training and equipment requirements needed to bring Oman's current demining units up to international

¹ Sultanate of Oman's speech at the Signing Ceremony for the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 2-4 December, 1997, Ottawa, Canada.

² Interview with Ambassador Mohammed Bin Murdas Al Quahtani, Omani Ambassador to Yemen, 28 February 2000.

³ U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Section E, Appendix 1, Enclosure 5 of Solicitation Number F44650-99-R0007 “Operation, Maintenance, And Support of Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel in Southwest Asia” shows the planned on-hand balances of munitions stored at facilities.

⁴ <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country.oman.htm>.

standards. U.S. training of Omani deminers is scheduled to occur in February 2001. It is also possible that the U.S. will provide a mine-detecting dog capability.⁵

SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor does not know of any public statements by the government regarding its position on the treaty or the ban. Saudi Arabia voted for the pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996 and 1997, but was absent during the votes in 1998 and 1999. Saudi Arabia is not a party to the CCW nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Saudi Arabia is not known to have ever produced or exported AP mines, but has imported them from the U.S. and perhaps other nations.¹ In 1995 it was reported that the UK sold to Saudi Arabia an unspecified number of JP-233 air-delivered airfield attack weapons that contain HB-876 area denial antipersonnel mines.² However, it appears that after considerable pressure in the UK, at least some of these weapons have been exchanged for other bombs.³

The size and composition of Saudi Arabia's current AP mine stockpile is unknown. It is not known if Saudi forces have ever employed antipersonnel mines. The Saudi armed forces have mine clearance vehicles for use in wartime countermine operations, including the Aardvark Joint Services Flail Unit and Pearson Pathfinder marker system, both supplied by UK companies.⁴

Though little is known, the United States maintains a stockpile of 2,255 CBU-89 Gator air-delivered mine dispensing bombs that contain a total of 49,610 antipersonnel mines in Saudi Arabia.⁵ The U.S. used 1,314 Gator units, containing a total of 27,445 AP mines, during the 1990-1991 conflict in the Kuwaiti theater of operations.⁶

Saudi Arabia is not believed to be mine-affected, though there may be areas with UXO contamination. Several UK companies have conducted UXO clearance operations at unspecified locations in the country. These companies include BACTEC International Limited and Royal Ordnance Explosive Ordnance Disposal.⁷

⁵ Descriptive summaries of U.S. Department of Defense demining programs provided by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, 10 May 2000.

¹ For more details, see *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 907.

² Peter Beaumont, "Major Accused of Deception on Mine Sales," *The Observer*, 9 July 1995.

³ The UK provided \$24-27 million to destroy these weapons and replace them with 100 Paveway 3 bombs. Hansard, 15 March 1999, Col. 506. Jane's Air Launched Weapons, Issue 33, August 1999.

⁴ Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, on-line update, 18 November 1999.

⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 333.

⁶ Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War, Volume IV: The Gulf War*, p. 477 citing data extracted from Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report*, p. 103. According to this source, the Air Force used 1,105 CBU-89 Gators, the Navy used 148 CBU-78 Gators and the Marine Corps used 61 CBU-78 Gators. CBU-89 contain 22 AP mines and CBU-78 contain 15 AP mines.

⁷ Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, on-line update, 18 November 1999.

Saudi Arabia has contributed \$50,000 to the UN Voluntary Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.

SYRIA

Key developments since March 1999: Syrian engineers cleared mines in the Golan Heights under UN Disengagement Observer Force supervision between November 1999 and May 2000. Although it was previously believed that Syria had not produced mines, Jordan has declared possession of Syrian-made mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Syria has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty and justifies its stance by stating that antipersonnel mines are important weapons of defense. Syria has claimed that landmines are vital to its defense against Israel. Syrian officials have noted that a “just and comprehensive peace in the region may put an end to many problems and sufferings and create a mine-free region.”¹ It is not known if mine issues are being addressed as Syria and Israel engage in peace talks.

Syria has not made any public statements about its landmine policy, or participated in any diplomatic meetings on landmines, in 1999 or 2000. Syria abstained on the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 December 1999, as it had in previous years on similar resolutions. Syria is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpile, and Use

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 stated, “Syria is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel landmines.” However, in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report, Jordan declared possessing fifty-one wooden antipersonnel mines of Syrian origin.² The lot number of the mines was reported as 10-24-58. This would seem to indicate at least past production on Syria’s part. It is not known how these mines came into Jordan’s possession, but this fact also calls into question whether Syria has ever exported AP mines. Syria is thought to have a large stockpile of antipersonnel mines but the numbers, origins and types of mines are not known.

Syrian forces used both antipersonnel and antitank mines in the Golan Heights during the 1973 war with Israel and during the 1982 conflict in Lebanon.³ It is not known whether Syrian troops currently in Lebanon possess or use mines. In July 2000, a senior Israeli officer expressed concern about Syria spreading more mines near the border with Israel.⁴

¹ Interviews with Syrian Foreign Ministry officials, Damascus, February and 2 April 2000.

² Jordan’s Article 7 Report, Form B, submitted to the UN on 9 August 1999.

³ Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War, Volume 1: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 69 and p. 183.

⁴ “IDF concerned why Syria built 3 empty villages on border,” *Ha’aretz* (Hebrew edition), 3 July 2000.

Landmine Problem

The Golan Heights contain both minefields and UXO from prior conflicts (see report on the Golan for more details of the situation in Israeli-controlled areas). The degree to which other areas of Syria are mined is not clear. At least one of Syria's neighbors, Jordan, deployed nearly 67,000 AP mines along its border with Syria in 1971.⁵ It has also been reported that Turkey's border with Syria is mined.⁶

Syria has not publicly refuted the U.S. Department of State report that states, "Syria may have AP and AT mines deployed in highly restricted areas along its borders where military troops are located and claims that it has no landmine or UXO problem."⁷ The report estimates that there may be 100,000 mines in Syria.⁸

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

Syrian engineers cleared mines in the Golan Heights under UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) supervision between November 1999 and May 2000.⁹ Engineers from the Russian Armed Forces are reported to have conducted demining operations in Syria but the scope and location of their operations is not known.¹⁰

Some mine awareness activities have been conducted in Syria in the past year. The Syrian Red Crescent Society in Damascus has participated in activities to create awareness of the landmine problem as well as of methods to assist victims of landmines. On 25 March 2000 an art exhibition organized by the Syrian artist Asem Al Wali opened in Damascus. The themed exhibit included pictures and drawings of Syrian landmine victims.¹¹

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Civilians, military personnel, and international peacekeeping forces from UNDOF have suffered casualties from mines in areas of the Golan Heights controlled by Israel and Syria, as well as in the zone of separation. A landmine injured a Syrian shepherd on 6 April 1999. A landmine injured two children in the zone of separation on 14 April 1999.¹² Another Syrian shepherd was injured in the Golan on 12 September 1999.¹³

There is no distinct mechanism in Syria for the provision of assistance to landmine survivors. Basic health and social services in Syria are provided free of charge by the government and most landmine survivors have access to emergency medical care, physical rehabilitation, amputation surgery, post-operative care, prosthetic devices, wheelchairs and special education. There is, however, a need for self-supporting projects

⁵ Jordan's Article 7 Report, Form C, submitted on 9 August 1999.

⁶ "Turkey Hindered by Own Landmines on Syrian Border," Reuters, 6 December 1996.

⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*, 1998, p. A-3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. A-2.

⁹ UNDOF Report to the UN Secretary General, S/2000/459, 22 May 2000, p. 1.

¹⁰ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 813.

¹¹ The exhibition was conducted in Al Assad Library and opened by the Minister of Defense on 25 March 2000.

¹² UNDOF Report to the UN Secretary General, S/1999/575, 18 May 1999, p. 1.

¹³ UNDOF Report to the UN Secretary General, S/1999/1175, 15 November 1999, p. 1.

that assist people with disabilities, including landmine victims. There are several NGOs located in Damascus involved in the assistance of people with disabilities.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, nor is it a party to the CCW. However, at the UN General Assembly on 12 October 1999, UAE representative Mohammad Samhan stated that his country supported the international community's efforts to ban antipersonnel landmines and give humanitarian support to victims.¹ On 1 December 1999 the UAE joined 138 other nations in voting in favor of UNGA resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty.

The United Arab Emirates is not believed to be a landmine producer or exporter and there are no known stockpiles of antipersonnel mines on its territory.

The United Arab Emirates is not mine-affected. In 1999, in support of an agriculture project, the UAE funded the demining of the South Alameen and El Hammam channels in Egypt. The demining was done by the Egyptian Army according to the agreement with the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture.

The UAE has not contributed any funds to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.

¹ UN General Assembly First Committee, Press Release GA/DIS/3141, 12 October 1999.

OTHER**GOLAN HEIGHTS****Background**

Located on the Israeli-Syrian border, the Golan has been an area of conflict ever since the establishment of Israel in 1948. During the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel occupied most of this area, displacing many of the occupants to Syria. Israel annexed the Golan in 1981. Today, most of the 16,000 Golanis hold Israeli identity cards instead of passports, and thus do not enjoy full citizen's rights. Around 15,000 Israelis have moved into settlements there. In the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan is being discussed.

Landmine Problem

In Israel, the Occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan there are numerous minefields, although the exact locations, numbers, and types of mines are not publicly known. The Israeli State Comptroller's Report indicates that for 350 minefields, there is clearly no longer a security need.¹ Some of these minefields originate from the period of the British Mandate. Some were laid by Jordan, Syria or Egypt prior to the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan. In addition, Israel planted landmines along borders, military areas, and settlements in the occupied areas, as well as electricity and water stations and pipelines.² These minefields continue to be a big obstacle to the civil use and development of the land and its resources. The situation is especially severe for the Golani people whose livelihood depends on growing crops and grazing cattle. Thus there are numerous requests for mine clearance from civil bodies like the Agricultural Ministry, the Israeli Land Administration and the Israeli water company, Makorot.³

A major danger in the Golan is the fact that many minefields are not marked or fenced and are thus easily entered by mistake.⁴ There are several areas fenced off covering several kilometers of land, and there are also fenced off minefields near schools and even in the back yards of some Golani residents. However, in many instances, there are no warnings or protections for civilians at all.

For example, in Ein Al-Hamreh there are still several areas with mines that are not fenced off. It was here that an Israeli soldier was killed by a mine in 1990; in another incident two victims were injured and one killed. Furthermore, the area between Ein Al-Hamreh and Al-Mansurah (approximately one hundred square kilometers) is mined, but much of it is not marked; this is a known grazing area. Minefields also surround the village of Majdal Shams.

According to al-Haq, a Palestinian human rights organization with ECOSOC consultative status at the UN, the Israeli Army used to confiscate land for the purpose of

¹ Conclusion from the Israeli State Comptroller's Report No. 50 A, for the Year 1999, "Mine Laying in the Israel Defense Forces," (Published in Hebrew and translated unofficially) Israel Government Printing Office, Jerusalem. Hereafter cited as "State Comptroller's Report, 1999."

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Documented during field visits by al-Haq, 1999-2000.

planting mines, and offered compensations to the landowners far below the actual value.⁵ Israel justified this in the name of military needs. Some other areas are declared closed to civilians by military order, as they are mined or suspected of being mined, either by the Israeli army or by the Syrians before 1967.⁶

Residents avoid some areas out of fear that they could contain mines. Landmines planted directly next to houses, schools, and streets impose restrictions on the freedom of movement. The situation is worsened by the fact that, since the Golan is a mountainous area, rain and natural earth movements cause mines to move from their original places and slide into areas that are believed to be safe, sometimes even into the back yards of houses.

In addition to agriculture, tourism is an important source of income for many Israeli settlers in the Golan, as the mountainous area is ideal for hiking and skiing. But tourism, too, is restricted as a result of mines. Some attractive areas are closed to civilians, while others are open but still dangerous due to the insufficient marking of existing minefields. Tourists hiking in the Golan are at risk of entering a minefield unintentionally.

Israeli mining near electrical stations, water stations, and water pipes poses dangers for the workers, and leads to difficulties in maintaining and extending these stations.

Protection of Civilians

Israel as a party to Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons has a duty to protect the civilian population from the effects of mines it has laid, including marking and monitoring known mined areas.⁷

Al-Haq argues that Israel also has a legal obligation to provide protections for civilians in the Golan from landmines emplaced by other belligerents. The Fourth Geneva Convention provides for the protection of the civilian population, individually and collectively, who find themselves in the hands of a belligerent State or occupying Power of which they are not nationals “at any given moment and in any manner whatsoever” (Art. 4) and in “all cases of partial or total occupation” (Art 2).⁸ While Israel has argued that these provisions are not applicable in the Golan because an Arab country was not sovereign, al-Haq disagrees, noting that the Fourth Geneva Convention was intended to protect the right of people who find themselves “in the hands of a Party to the conflict or occupying Power of which they are not nationals” (Art. 4), irrespective of the competing claims to sovereignty over the territory.⁹ It does not exclusively refer to territory whose “legal sovereign” has been displaced by the occupant and the term “territory” in the

⁵ Documented by al-Haq fieldwork and May 1999 questionnaires.

⁶ State Comptroller’s Report, 1999.

⁷ See CCW Protocol II (1980), Article 4, paragraph 2 (b) and Article 7, paragraphs 2 and 3.

⁸ Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, TIAS No. 3365, 75 UNTS 287. See Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 22 (J. Pictet Ed. 1958); G. Von Glahn, *The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation* 281, 283 (1957); UK War Office, *The Law of War on Land: Being Part III of the Manual of Military Law* 140 (1958); and M. Greenspan, *The Modern Law of Land Warfare* 216-17, 224-27 (1959).

⁹ Roberts, “The Applicability of Human Rights During Military Occupation,” 13 *Rev. Int’l Study* 39 (1987).

Convention is not restricted to territory where the displaced government has the formal title as the “legitimate sovereign.”

Mine and UXO Casualties

Al-Haq has done a survey of mine casualties in the Golan, but there has not been comprehensive research on mine victims within the Golan. The Israeli State Comptroller's Report covers mine incidents in Israel based on military data for the period of December 1997 to May 1998 and reports one incident in which a “member of the minority” was killed in southern Golan while entering a known minefield together with another person.¹⁰

Four other incidents are included in the State Comptroller Report involving Israeli soldiers and employees of Makorot. Further information about mine victims that are not from the Arab Golani community (Israeli soldiers and civil employees, local Israeli civilians, tourists, and soldiers of the international peacekeeping forces in the Golan) is not known.

Al-Haq collected information about sixty-six Arab Golani landmine and UXO victims since the beginning of the Occupation in 1967, of whom sixteen died and fifty were injured.¹¹ It was not possible in all cases to find out what if the explosion was caused by a mine or by UXO. Al-Haq's data indicates that among the fifty people who survived, forty-three were under the age of eighteen. Eight of the sixteen fatally wounded were under the age of eighteen. One victim lost both eyes and both legs. One victim lost both eyes and both arms. One victim lost one eye, one leg and both hands. One victim lost one eye, one leg and one hand. Six victims lost at least an eye. Six victims lost at least one leg. Sixteen victims lost one hand. Eighteen people suffered from burns and fragments entering their body.¹²

The last known human accident with mines occurred in November 1999, when teenagers brought a landmine they found outside their village to a local sports club, where it exploded and injured three of them slightly and one seriously in the foot.¹³

Research has revealed that of the sixteen incidents in which Golanis were killed by mines or UXO, seven happened while the victims were grazing cattle, two on agricultural roads and one on agricultural land. The Israeli State Comptroller's Report mentions that evidence of agricultural activity were discovered in nineteen minefields in the Golan.¹⁴ This has occurred even though these areas have been officially declared closed for civilians.¹⁵

In addition to civilian casualties, there are also frequent incidents of cattle being killed by mine blasts, thus resulting in serious economic loss. For example, Shepherd

¹⁰ State Comptroller's Report, 1999.

¹¹ Based on data from questionnaires collected by al-Haq, May 1999.

¹² Data obtained from al-Haq fieldworker in the Golan Heights. Information is based on affidavits and questionnaires from May 1999.

¹³ Al-Haq Affidavit #3 2000, Amir Abu-Jabel's father.

¹⁴ State Comptroller's Report, 1999.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Najeeb Tareeba estimates that since 1967 he has lost more than fifty cattle due to landmines. The most recent explosion killed one of his livestock in February 2000.¹⁶

The survey indicated a high risk for Golani children, especially small children, who are more likely to suffer serious or even fatal injuries than adults. Four-year-old Amir Abu-Jabel was killed by a landmine in 1989 while playing in the yard of his house.¹⁷ It appears that rain probably swept the mine to the area from a nearby minefield. Golani Arab children are at an even higher risk because they are traditionally responsible for grazing cattle and helping with the harvest.

Of particular interest to al-Haq was landmine victim Saleh Abu-Arrar. Saleh is a victim who discussed at length the trials of being a child landmine victim. With his strong passion for life, Saleh has overcome near blindness and the loss of his limbs to become a successful accountant in the Golan. Saleh went into great detail on how he was victimized and what he felt like immediately afterwards. He described to al-Haq field workers what it was like the morning after the accident as he lay in the hospital bed. He talked about waking up and asking his brother to scratch his right leg. His brother scratched his left. After requesting for his brother again to scratch his right leg, once again he scratched his left one. At that time Saleh's brother told him that he had lost his right leg. When Saleh arrived home from the hospital he remembers people from the community walking by him thinking that he could not hear them saying, "Saleh would have been better off dead than to have survived and be handicapped forever." Realizing he would never be "normal" Saleh stopped feeling sorry for himself and is now quite a success story for all landmine survivors.¹⁸

Mine Awareness and Victim Assistance

Currently, there are no governmental or local programs to teach Golani citizens about the dangers of mines. Research in the Arab Golani community shows first aid for mine and UXO victims was delivered by the IDF in twenty-two cases and by civilians in the others, one of them being an Israeli settler.¹⁹ If the victim lies in a minefield or an area suspected to contain more mines, the IDF has to bring a vehicle through to the victim. Al-Haq has documentation of one instance in which a second mine exploded under a military vehicle trying to reach a mine victim and killed an Israeli soldier.²⁰

The closest hospital to the Golan is in Safed, more than 100 kilometers from the Golani villages. In the Golan itself there is only a small emergency clinic. Thus the special medical help needed for serious mine injuries is not available quickly enough in the Golan to be of effective assistance. In the Golan there are no governmental or local rehabilitation facilities for mine victims.

At the time of the accidents many Golani families were either unaware of their rights or afraid to deal with Israeli authorities and institutions.²¹ Thus many of them never tried to get any compensation or to make use of the facilities and benefits provided by the state of Israel to handicapped victims. Even if victims or their families tried to get

¹⁶ Al-Haq Affidavit #4, 15 February 2000, Najeeb Saleh Taraba.

¹⁷ Al-Haq Affidavit #3 2000, Amir Abu-Jabel's father.

¹⁸ Al-Haq Affidavit #1, 14 February 2000, Saleh Salman Youssef Abu-Arrar.

¹⁹ Al-Haq Questionnaire, May 1999.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

compensation, Israel is generally unwilling to acknowledge any responsibility for mine accidents involving civilians and thus generally do not pay compensation.²² In fact, nineteen mine victims who had to be treated in a hospital after a mine or UXO explosion were subsequently investigated by the police on the circumstances of the accident.²³

NORTHERN IRAQ (IRAQI KURDISTAN)

Key developments since March 1999: As of May 2000, the UN reports nearly 3.1 square kilometers of land cleared and returned to productive use, impacting forty-nine villages. The survey program has conducted a socio-economic impact survey of 95% of the villages in the three northern governorates. Supplies and funds valued at about \$8 million were provided for mine action from April-October 1999. The UN in mid-2000 expressed concern about incidences of freshly laid mines being found in previously cleared minefields.

Mine Ban Treaty

The region of northern Iraq has been autonomous from Baghdad since the 1991 Gulf War. Northern Iraq is under the nominative political leadership of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), an entity comprised primarily by the two major Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). There is no formal diplomatic recognition of the KRG, the KDP, or PUK.

As regional, informally recognized entities, neither the KRG nor the major parties have signed the Mine Ban Treaty. However, the leadership in northern Iraq has maintained a long-standing opposition to the employment of landmines due to the debilitating effect they have had in the region. Leaders of both the KDP and PUK, in similarly worded letters to the UN Secretary General, have committed to ensuring that the principles and obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty are realized. The letter from Masoud Barzani, President of the KDP, was dated 3 October 1999 and the letter from Jalal Talabani, PUK General Secretary, was dated 26 January 2000.

Mr. Jalal Talabani, General Secretary of the PUK, told Landmine Monitor that the KRG, "were it to be allowed, would have no hesitation in ratifying the [Mine Ban] treaty unconditionally."¹ He said the PUK has foresworn the use of landmines, but also notes that some mines remain in place "given our precarious situation, and our vulnerability to attack. We do not use them for offensive purposes, for we have none." Mr. Talabani stated that the PUK does not "in any way, shape, or form stockpile landmines."² Dilshad Miran, the London representative of the KDP told Landmine Monitor last year, "We are totally against landmines in all their forms."³

²² Finding based on analysis of al-Haq Questionnaire, May 1999.

²³ The results of these investigations are not known to al-Haq because most of the interviewees did not know the final outcome.

¹ Interview with Mr. Jalal Talabani, General Secretary, PUK, 25 June 2000.

² Ibid.

³ Landmine Monitor 1999 interview, 9 January 1999.

Recent Use

There is credible evidence that landmines were used in northern Iraq during past periods of factional fighting, but there is no evidence of recent use of antipersonnel mines by the KDP or PUK. However, it appears that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) continues to use antipersonnel mines in northern Iraq.

Since 1991 there has been sporadic fighting in the region that has involved the KDP, PUK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Iraqi military, and the Turkish military. The PKK maintains operational bases in northern Iraq from which it has in the past launched cross-border operations into Turkey, resulting in incursions by Turkish military forces.⁴ KDP and Turkish forces are often allied in operations against the PKK.⁵ This situation has generated frequent accusations of landmine use by the PKK. On 17 July 1999, the Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan radio claimed that the PKK emplaced landmines in July along roads in the Chaman border area. A local man was reported injured by one of these mines.⁶ The Turkish General Staff reports that between 1994 and present nearly 15,000 landmines have been seized from PKK bases, primarily located in northern Iraq.⁷

A United Nations report in June 2000 noted that the UN Office for Project Services "remains concerned about the incidences of freshly laid mines being found in previously cleared minefields."⁸ The report does not identify the user of mines.

Landmine Problem

Northern Iraq remains one of the more heavily mined areas in the world. Huge numbers of mines were employed in the region by the Iraqi Army in 1980-88 during the Iran-Iraq War.⁹ According to surveys conducted by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the British NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG), more than 470 square kilometers of land is mined in the region, affecting approximately 1,500 villages in the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Mines have been placed in locations that affect roads, power lines, agricultural land, former Iraqi military barracks, and villages vacated and destroyed by Iraqi forces during the Anfal Campaigns of the late 1980s.¹⁰

Landmines take their heaviest toll on rural people, farmers, herders, those gathering firewood, and children.¹¹ Internally displaced Kurds are unable to return to villages destroyed during the Anfal Campaigns, thus hampering resettlement and reconstruction.

⁴ "Iraq condemns Turkish attack," BBC News, 6 December 1999.

⁵ "Turkey continues anti-Kurdish raid in N. Iraq," BBC News, 8 December 1997.

⁶ News Archive, *Stratford-Iraq*, 17 July 1999, <http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/news/an990717.htm>.

⁷ "Almost All the Land Mines Used by the PKK Are Italian," *Milan Il Giornale* in Italian, 1 July 1999, p. 10.

⁸ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1281 (1999), S/2000/520, 1 June 2000, p. 13. The report addresses distribution of humanitarian supplies throughout Iraq.

⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*, 1998, p. 97.

¹⁰ Norwegian People's Aid, "Mine Action Proposal 2000," p. 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

No Iraqi records of minefields are available to the Mine Action Program (MAP) in northern Iraq. MAP reports a total of more than 3,200 mined areas in the region,¹² with the greatest concentration of mines along the Iran-Iraq border, specifically in the districts of Penjwin, Sharbazher and Qaladiza.¹³ Other mined areas include former Iraqi military installations, destroyed villages, grazing/agricultural areas, and roads.¹⁴ However, the primary impact of landmines in northern Iraq is upon villages currently inhabited, or those de-populated during Anfal.

Mine Action Coordination

The General Directorate for Mine Clearing, affiliated with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Cooperation of the KRG, is the primary local authority office charged with humanitarian mine action activities in northern Iraq. The KRG, KDP and PUK work closely with UN organizations and local and international NGOs. Current initiatives include exploring avenues of promoting capacity building within the KRG administration so that, with time, all responsibility for such programs can be handed over to KRG partners.

Since late August 1997 the United Nations Office for Project Services has managed and executed the Mine Action Program in northern Iraq under UN Security Council Resolution 986 Food for Oil Program. The MAP mission is to conduct landmine/UXO surveys, marking and clearance using manual, explosive detecting dog (EDD) and mechanical methods. The MAP also supports a network of medical facilities for treatment and rehabilitation of victims, and provides mine awareness training to UN staff in northern Iraq.¹⁵

The MAP is one of the largest employers in northern Iraq. Staff includes 1,230 local and forty-eight expatriates. Through grants and other forms of cooperation with local partners, MAP supports the employment of an additional 666 local humanitarian staff. UNOPS estimates the impact of MAP upon the local economy is between \$600,000 and \$800,000 per month through salaries and local materiel procurement.¹⁶

Mines Advisory Group has been operating continuously in northern Iraq since 1992, longer than any other international humanitarian mine action organization. MAG has conducted mine awareness, clearance, marking, survey, and explosive ordnance disposal operations.¹⁷

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) began operating in northern Iraq in 1995 in Suleymaniyah Governorate. During 1999 NPA mine action capacity in northern Iraq was comprised of one explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team and two demining teams.¹⁸

¹² UNOPS, "Executive Summary, UNOPS Mine Action Program in Northern Iraq," June 2000.

¹³ Norwegian People's Aid, "Mine Action Proposal 2000," p. 7.

¹⁴ UNOPS, "Executive Summary, UNOPS Mine Action Program in Northern Iraq," June 2000.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Mines Advisory Group, "Activities Summary, 1st January 1993 – 31st January 2000."

¹⁸ Norwegian People's Aid, "Mine Action Proposal 2000," p. 4.

Numerous local NGOs are active in the mine action arena in northern Iraq. The table below provides an overview of these organizations¹⁹:

Organization	Primary Mission	Began	Donors
Solidarity	Landmine Clearance	1996	Swedish International Development Agency, Kurdish expatriate community
Kurdish Mine Removal Society (KMRS)	Landmine Clearance	1991	Private donors inside northern Iraq and in Sweden
Kurdish Humanitarian Mine Clearance Organization (KHMCO)	Landmine Clearance, not yet operational	1999	Local authorities
Kurdish Life Support (KLA)	Victim Assistance, Survey	1991	KLA UK, European Community Humanitarian Organization (ECHO), SCR 986, UN HABITAT, UNICEF

Mine Action Funding

Primary funding for UNOPS mine action in northern Iraq is provided by the UN Oil for Food Program. Established by UNSC Resolution 986 as “a temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people,” the Security Council has continued the program in 180-day periods. The program began in 1997, and Phase VI ended on 20 November 1999.²⁰

As of 31 October 1999, supplies and funds for the mine clearance program valued at \$18.5 million had arrived in the three northern governorates since the start of the program, of which \$16 million had been utilized or distributed.²¹ Approximately \$8 million of those totals was provided and utilized in the period from April-October 1999.²²

NPA received approximately \$1 million in funding for programs in northern Iraq from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Affairs.²³

Funding for Handicap International/Belgium (HI) victim assistance programs in northern Iraq comes primarily from UNOPS and UNICEF. In 1999 HI received \$185,000 from UNOPS, as well as \$53,000 from Belgium’s Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale (General Directorate for the International Cooperation, DGCI) and \$40,000 from the Netherlands’ Stichting Vluchteling. A total of \$529,000 has been requested for programs during 2000.

¹⁹ Correspondence from Mr. Sayed Aqa, Field Director, Survey Action Center, February 2000.

²⁰ United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, “Oil for Food – The Basic Facts,” June 2000.

²¹ United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, “180 Day Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council (Phase VI),” paragraph 107.

²² Ibid. Also, UN Office of the Iraq Programme, “180 Day Report requested by SCR 1210 (S/1999/573) (Phase V),” paragraph 104.

²³ Correspondence from Norwegian People’s Aid, June 2000.

MAG, like many other NGOs, is unable to access funding under Resolution 986. MAG's sources of funding include SIDA, DFID, Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, Stichting Vluchteling, Anti-Landmijn Stichting, and SCIAF. In part due to the political situation, funding is increasingly unsure.

Surveys and Assessment

As of May 2000 UNOPS reports that an extensive database of mined areas has been developed for northern Iraq. The goal of this database is to facilitate more efficient planning, prioritization and allocation of resources. The survey program has trained local socio-economic impact surveyors, and has conducted a socio-economic impact survey of 95% of the villages in the three northern governorates. Results of the survey indicate more than 3,200 mined areas, covering approximately 491 square kilometers of land needed for resettlement or agricultural use, or the development of basic infrastructure including electricity, water and reconstruction. A database has been established to record information pertaining to mined areas and mine incidents. This database is available to local authorities, UN agencies, and NGOs. The UNOPS MAP has trained and deployed twenty-four landmine/UXO socio-economic impact survey teams, and eight Level Two Survey teams.²⁴

MAG set up and ran an in-country survey, community-based data gathering and database from 1992. This has become the DCU (Data Co-ordination Unit) which has records of over 3,700 minefield reconnaissance/surveys for over 750 of the most heavily mine- and UXO-contaminated areas. This information was opened to NPA when it arrived in 1996 and to UNOPS in 1997 which set up its own data recording system. MAG's data has been complemented as teams region-wide have completed surveys, demarcation and clearance programs. Since the early days, MAG has been operating survey and demarcation teams to help identify suspect areas and make available more land for farming through 'area reduction.' Between 1992 and 1996, MAG conducted what was probably the largest minefield marking program in the world: MAG has so far demarcated 1,150 minefields covering some 110 million square metres.²⁵

Mine Clearance

The UNOPS MAP in northern Iraq conducts the Level Two (Technical) Survey, area reduction, marking, and clearance. The MAP has identified twenty-five types of landmines in the region, with Valmarra 69 bounding and VS 50 antipersonnel mines the most common.²⁶

Primary contractors supporting MAP are European Landmine Solutions (ELS) and Mechem. ELS operations in northern Iraq began in January 1998. ELS is working to develop and expand indigenous capacity for long term mine clearance. By early 1999 ELS had recruited, trained and deployed survey and demining teams, together with

²⁴ UNOPS, "Executive Summary, UNOPS Mine Action Program in Northern Iraq," June 2000.

²⁵ Information provided via email by Tim Carstairs, Communications Director, MAG, 27 July 2000.

²⁶ Ibid.

section and team leaders and medical support staff, and had integrated explosive detection dogs into the operations. The company now manages a program with over 800 local and 18 international staff members.²⁷

Mechem, a South African demining firm, is providing explosive detecting dog support to the MAP. Mechem began operations in 1998 with six dogs, and currently employs twenty-four dogs and twelve handlers. The primary duties of Mechem include support to Level Two survey teams and quality assurance of areas cleared by ELS. Mechem is also training local dog/handler teams. The first locally-trained teams are expected to become operational in August 2000.²⁸

MAP mine clearance teams are currently working in twenty-five minefields, having returned twenty-four to productive use. Selection of minefields to be cleared is done in close cooperation with local authorities and other humanitarian sectors to ensure proper prioritization. Priorities for clearance are: land needed for resettlement; settled land producing high numbers of victims; agricultural land; areas necessary for basic needs, such as water and fuel; land needed for reconstruction and infrastructure development.²⁹

As of May 2000 the MAP reports 3,088,215 square meters of land cleared and returned to productive use. A total of 1,905,973 square meters of land have been technically surveyed and prepared for follow-on clearance operations. MAP reports that 2,367 landmines and 5,137 pieces of UXO were destroyed. Forty-nine villages with a combined population of approximately 2,600 have been positively impacted by these clearance efforts.³⁰

The MAP has trained 596 local deminers who are currently working in fifteen clearance teams. Twenty explosive detecting dogs and handler counterparts have been trained, with forty additional teams expected to complete training by August 2000.³¹

MAG has been conducting mine clearance operations since early 1993. MAG currently employs over 600 local staff and has built capacity to such a degree that expatriate supervision is now at a very limited level. MAG operates 17 Mine Action Teams across the region. These Mine Action Teams are multi-skilled and highly mobile and flexible, they can be split into sub-teams where necessary to work small urgent tasks, or built together to conduct larger clearance work. In 1999, 18 minefields were cleared; 1,191,081 square meters were declared safe; nearly 5,000 mines were destroyed. Since 1992, MAG has declared safe over 4 million square meters of land from mines and UXO.³²

NPA reports that during 1999 a total 552 antipersonnel mines and 65 UXO were removed and destroyed by manual demining effort. 171,845 sq.meters of land including that of area reduction (73,318) cleared. Seven priority minefields were cleared and handed over to the local population in the target area. As part of explosive ordnance disposal efforts, 20,211 UXO, 216 antipersonnel mines, and two antitank mines were

²⁷ European Landmine Solutions, <http://www.landmine-solutions.com/operations.htm>.

²⁸ Correspondence from Mr. Sayed Aqa, Field Director, Survey Action Center, February 2000.

²⁹ UNOPS, "Executive Summary, UNOPS Mine Action Program in Northern Iraq," June 2000.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Information provided via email by Tim Carstairs, Communications Director, MAG, 27 July 2000.

removed and destroyed. 2,753,796 square meters of land cleared through battle area clearance. The work covered 45 villages in the area.³³

Regarding PUK capabilities to enact mine action themselves, Mr. Talabani stated, "We simply do not have the capacity, in terms of manpower or expertise, to undertake this ourselves." But he noted that the PUK assists the UN organizations and international mine action NGOs in planning and implementing programs. Mr. Talabani also decried the inability to import state-of-the-art mine clearance technology and machinery. He said, "The fact that the international community fails to act to counter the restrictions upon our access to effective and safe mine-clearing technology is an international shame."³⁴

Mine Awareness Education

Most known mined areas in the region are marked either by signs or by strips of wire placed along the mine-affected area.³⁵ The UNOPS MAP provides mine awareness training for UN staff in northern Iraq.

MAG is the primary provider of mine awareness training to the population of northern Iraq. MAG pioneered and continues in northern Iraq the 'Child to Child' approach as applied to mine awareness, involving children passing on mine awareness messages to their peers. MAG also operates 8 Education/Teacher Training Teams which are achieving the integration of mine awareness into the Education Departments' school curriculum. 2,500 primary school teachers have so far been trained to pass on the message. School instructors and supervisors have also been trained. MAG also runs five Religious Representative Teams which work with the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs and over 500 local Mullahs to bring mine risk education to those adult male populations at risk from mines. A further Farsi-speaking team runs mine awareness around Hajihomorán where Kurdish refugees continue to repatriate from Iran - their children have never been to their homelands and are specially at risk.³⁶

MAG has worked with UNICEF and local officials to produce a mine awareness book for schools to help children identify landmines and teach them how to avoid them.³⁷ During 1999, MAG mine awareness teams provided training and visits as shown below:³⁸

³³ Norwegian People's Aid, "Mine Action Proposal 2000," p. 7 with additional information provided by NPA via email on 31 July 2000.

³⁴ Interview with Mr. Jalal Talabani, General Secretary, PUK, 25 June 2000.

³⁵ Gilles Paris, "The Sanctuary Of Iraqi Kurdistan," *Le Monde*, 19 December 1998.

³⁶ Information provided via email by Tim Carstairs, Communications Director, MAG, 27 July 2000.

³⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*, 1998, p. 97.

³⁸ Mines Advisory Group, "Activities Summary, 1st January 1993–31st January 2000."

SITE TYPE	Number Visited
Collective Villages/Nomadic Group (Mine Awareness Teams)	255
Schools, Institutes, Returnees, Refugees (Mine Awareness Teams)	120
Villages and Schools (Education Teams)	15
Mosques (Religious Representative Teams)	609
Monitoring Visits (Religious Representative Teams)	305
Commune Workshops (Religious Representative Teams)	82
Training Departments (Religious Representative Teams)	19
Schools, Departments, Institutes (Teacher Training Teams)	39
Follow-up Visits to Schools (Teacher Training Teams)	649
Teacher/Supervisor Workshops (Teacher Training Teams)	223

Victim Assistance

According to data provided by the UNOPS MAP socio-economic survey, a total of 9,289 victims have been injured or killed by landmines in northern Iraq since 1980. MAP provides assistance to established prosthetics centers and victim workshops, and assists in the establishment of new assistance facilities. Through twelve first aid posts, MAP supports regional trauma centers that are the first stop for landmine victims following injury.³⁹

According to PUK General Secretary Talabani, "The local hospitals have developed capabilities and expertise to deal with the problem, but I emphasize that this remains limited, relative to the scale and urgency of the problem we face in the region."⁴⁰ Limited ability to import necessary medical equipment and medicines, as well as lack of access by Kurdish doctors to international medical developments, are great obstacles to development of indigenous victim assistance capacity.

HI is providing orthopedic support to war victims in Suleymaniyah and Halabja. The purpose of the program is to enhance and expand the quality and coverage of existing ortho-prosthetic and physiotherapeutic services for disabled people. HI has been active in Suleymaniyah since 1991 in response to the large number of amputees identified there, primarily victims of numerous landmine incidents along the Iranian border. Because of ongoing conflict, and lack of access to prosthetic centers in Baghdad, these victims did not have access to proper care.⁴¹

HI has identified the need for wider rehabilitation services, and development of orthotics production and advocacy/social rehabilitation of the disabled are current priorities. The Ministry of Public Health in Suleymaniyah, the Rozh Society for Disabled People and the Handicapped Union (local NGOs) are favored partners for development of holistic approaches to rehabilitation of the disabled in the regions.⁴²

The first HI orthopedic workshop was the Vincent Orthopedic Workshop located in Suleymaniyah in facilities provided by the local health department. Opened in 1991, this

³⁹ UNOPS, "Executive Summary, UNOPS Mine Action Program in Northern Iraq," June 2000.

⁴⁰ Interview with Mr. Jalal Talabani, General Secretary, PUK, 25 June 2000.

⁴¹ Correspondence from Handicap International, Belgium, June 2000.

⁴² Ibid.

workshop produces below-knee and above-knee prostheses, as well as some ortho-prostheses. It also produces crutches, walking aids and orthotics. Since 1991, more than 3,900 prostheses and 900 orthotics have been delivered, and more than 4,000 devices have been repaired or inspected. More than 2,000 pairs of crutches have been produced and delivered.⁴³

The second workshop supported by HI is the Halabja Prosthetic Limb Center located in the town of Halabja near the Iranian border. The workshop produces below-knee and above-knee permanent prostheses, as well as some orthotics. Since re-opening in March 1998, with funding assistance from UNOIP, more than 350 disabled persons have received long-term care through orthopedic activities at this workshop. This funding also supported renovation of the facility, purchase of equipment and training for staff.⁴⁴

PALESTINE

Key developments since March 1999: The Palestinian Authority expressed its desire to join the Mine Ban Treaty. No humanitarian mine clearance was undertaken, or planned. There continue to be civilian casualties. Defense of Children International/Palestine Section launched a mine awareness campaign.

Mine Ban Policy

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has not developed into a sovereign state. The PA does not have the international legal status to sign or ratify international treaties, including the Mine Ban Treaty. The PA was one of twelve observer delegations to the First Meeting of State Parties to the treaty in Mozambique in May 1999. In a statement to the plenary, the PA representative expressed its desire “to put an end to the danger of antipersonnel mines,” and asked states “to help make the Middle East free of mines.”¹ In April 2000, the PA stated its strong support for and desire to join the Mine Ban Treaty.²

According to one source, the issue of mines and unexploded ordnance in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) “has not been addressed in any of the agreements negotiated between Israel and the PNA.”³ This apparent lack of discussion would seemingly indicate that the issue is not a priority for either the Palestinian Authority or the Israeli government. Colonel Nizar Ammar, Head of Planning and Studies in the Palestinian General Security said, “Authority officials have not given enough attention to

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹ Statement of the Palestinian observing delegation to the FMSP, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

² Letter from the Office of the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Gaza, 27 April 2000.

³ Fihmi Shahin, “Yesterday's War Harvests More Victim's Today,” *Haquq al-Nas* (People's Rights magazine), LAW, the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, August 1999, No. 30, p. 13.

this issue.”⁴ Palestinian Legislative Council member Hatem Abdel Qader said, “To be silent only because we are afraid that the negotiations will fail or will not take U.S. to where we want to go is unacceptable on the part of the Palestinian leadership.”⁵

Landmine Monitor has been unable to obtain information on possible use, stockpiling, trade or production of antipersonnel mines by Palestinian armed forces.

The Landmine Problem

After decades of war and on-going military occupation, Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories have been left with thousands of antipersonnel mines, antitank mines, and unexploded ordnance (UXO) on their lands. Until now, international attention and awareness regarding the problem of landmines and UXOs in the OPT has been minimal to non-existent.

The number of landmines planted in the OPT is not known. There are no precise and comprehensive statistics available from any source. According to Israeli and Palestinian military experts, the majority of the landmines planted in the OPT are U.S., British, or Israeli-made mines. Most of these were laid by British, Jordanian, and Israeli forces.

After 1967, the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted in the emplacement of more minefields along the new borders and around dozens of military bases and training areas. In 1997 and 1998 Defence for Children International/Palestine Section (DCI/PS) carried out a survey, identifying 334 mine and UXO incidents.⁶ DCI/PS reports that the West Bank areas that experience the most frequent landmine and UXO explosion incidents are Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya and Nablus. Most of the explosions occur in the rural areas of “Zone C” (62.1%), then in “Zone B” (20.5%), and then in “Zone A” (17.4%). In Zones B and C, the majority of the explosions occur in the border areas and near Israeli military training bases, and also in areas adjacent to Israeli settlements. 40% of the explosions resulted from landmines, 39% were UXO explosions, and in 21% of the cases the explosive device was not identified.

Israel has officially declared the locations of sixteen minefields. These declared minefields are located as follows: Jenin District (five minefields), Tulkarem District (one minefield), Qalqilya District (two minefields), Bethlehem District (three minefields), Ramallah and Jerusalem Districts (three minefields), Hebron District (two minefields).⁷ However, Palestinian military experts believe that there are a large number of other undisclosed minefields located in the first defense lines between Jordan and the West

⁴ Hadeel Wahdan, “Landmines, the Hidden Terror,” *The Palestine Report*, 22 September 1999.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Defense of Children International/Palestine Section, *Report on the Field Study on the Victims of Landmines and Remnants of the Israeli Army in the West Bank during the period from June 1967 to February 1998: The First Report* (Jerusalem: DCI/PS, 1998), p.7. Hereinafter, DCI/PS Report 1967-1998.

⁷ DCI/PS, *The Problem of Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance and Munitions Remnants in the Palestinian Territories: A Seminar Report*, 25-26 March 1998 (DCI/PS: 1998), p. 14. Hereafter cited as ‘DCI/PS Seminar.’

Bank, in the second defense lines in the Jordan Valley and in other strategic areas leading to the central areas of the West Bank.

Israel has acknowledged that some of the minefields in the occupied territories have no strategic value from a military point of view.⁸ According to Major Fathi Saeed, of the Operational Section of the Palestinian National Security Forces, Jenin Area, “Most of the minefields in the West Bank are located in the depth of the West Bank, where no one is threatening Israel’s security.”⁹

Survey and Assessment

The PA has yet to initiate preparations for demining Palestinian areas. No detailed assessment or survey has been made to determine the extent of the mine and UXO problem in Palestine. Even the National Security Forces have no clear idea about the scope of the problem in the OPT. They do not have maps or records of minefields. They obtain their information from the Israeli side.

Mine Clearance

No mine clearance has been done by the PA in the OPT. In Zones B and C, the PA does not have the authority to clear mines. In Zone A, where the PA does have jurisdiction, they have failed to do so due to a variety of reasons, namely, lack of financial and technical means, equipment and trained personnel. Indeed, the ability of the PA to clear landmines and UXO is limited. Major Saeed said, “As Palestinian National Forces we have the human resources to do the clearance, but these resources need training, and we are in need of technical resources.”¹⁰

The Israeli government has undertaken only limited mine clearance in the OPT. Israel has declared that it has cleared two minefields since its occupation of the West Bank: Alnabi- Elias and Yaabad. However, a mine explosion in the Yaabad field killed a Palestinian on 15 July 1996. Israel replied to an inquiry from the Yaabad Municipality by stating that “the minefield is very old. It has existed since the Jordanian period. We detected and removed the mines that we discovered. We cannot guarantee its emptiness because the detecting instruments cannot discover the mines if they are old. A heavy bulldozer crossed the minefield and exploded the mines. We hope you will notify us if anything is discovered.”¹¹

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has stated, “The IDF takes every measure required, including the issuing of orders, putting up fences and signs in the areas, and providing information to local residents in order to prevent the recurrence of these [mine and UXO] incidents.”¹² The statement also said that such measures “are implemented in

⁸ Conclusion from the Israeli State Comptroller's Report No. 50 A, for the Year 1999, “Mine Laying in the Israel Defense Forces,” (Published in Hebrew and translated unofficially) Israel government printing office, Jerusalem.

⁹ Interview with Major Fathi Saeed, National Security Forces-Operational Section, Jenin, 19 October 1999.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Letter from the IDF to the Yaabad municipality, 29 July 1996.

¹² B’Tselem, *Incidents of Death and Injury Resulting from Exploding Munition Remnants* (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, July 1995), p. 13.

the Judea and Samaria region, and that the fire practice areas in Judea and Samaria are marked and bordered according to standing army regulations.”¹³

According to DCI/PS, twelve minefields are not properly marked or fenced. Other fences are in need of repair, and signs (often in Hebrew and English only, not Arabic) in need of replacement.

Mine Awareness

Defense of Children International/Palestine Section in 1999 launched a mine awareness campaign, particularly in areas close to minefields and military training bases. DCI/PS has secured support for its mine awareness education programs from a variety of international organizations, including Norwegian People's Aid, Rädä Barner and Handicap International. It intends to launch a pilot program in the Jenin area of the northern West Bank, a region which is highly affected by mines and UXO.

DCI/PS conducted two sessions to train volunteers from the local community as mine educators. The first was held in the Jenin area, and included 27 volunteer participants. The second was located in the Tobas area, where 20 volunteers participated. After completing the training sessions, the volunteers conducted numerous lectures and workshops to raise the awareness of the problem of landmines and UXO within their communities.

A coordination committee (Mine Action Committee) representing organizations that participated in the project was created to plan, follow-up, and evaluate the activities. This committee is comprised of representatives from DCI/PS, National Security Forces, Palestinian Red Crescent and the YMCA. In addition, as a part of the awareness campaign a collection of printed materials was issued, including a poster indicating the dangers of landmines and UXOs.

On the local level, the PA (specifically the Palestinian National Security Forces and the Ministry of Education) has cooperated with the DCI/PS mine awareness program. The PA's participation has been instrumental in developing the educational programs necessary to inform the Palestinian community about the dangers of landmines and UXOs.

Landmine Casualties

According to the 1998 study carried out by DCI/PS, every year, dozens of casualties occur as a result of mines and UXO. The documented cases indicate that approximately 34% of the victims are Palestinian children.¹⁴ Not only do children often consider the mines and UXO to be curious objects, but many incidents occur in areas used for grazing flocks, work often undertaken by children.

It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of Palestinian victims, as there has been no concerted effort to document casualties. According to Fadi Abu Sido, Head of Armament Prohibition and Regional Security in the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “Injuries and casualties have been happening since 1967,

¹³ Ibid., p. 13. Note: “Judea and Samaria” are the terms the Israeli government uses to refer to the West Bank.

¹⁴ DCI/PS Report 1967-1998, p. 7.

while work on this issue did not start before 1994, that is after the advent of the Palestinian Authority."¹⁵

DCI/PS believes that since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967, there have been more than 2,500 landmine and UXO victims. Some of the findings of the DCI/PS survey, based upon a random sample of 334 incidents that have occurred since 1967 are that of the total 464 casualties: 144 were killed (31%) and 320 were injured (69%); 34% were children under eighteen years of age; 46% were from families who work in agriculture; 93% are males from low-income families with minimal education. DCI/PS found that 18% of the victims have taken legal actions against the Israeli government in order to receive compensation for their loss. According to one account, there have been several instances following a mine/UXO accident of the IDF interrogating or harassing either the survivor or family members.¹⁶

Survivor Assistance

No special rehabilitation assistance is provided to landmine victims in the OPT, but there are numerous rehabilitation centers to deal with the disabled from all aspects, including medical, psychological, and vocational. Still, most survivors receive their medical treatment in Israeli hospitals, either because the Israeli hospitals have strong experience in dealing with these injuries or because Palestinians were transferred to Israeli hospitals to have their treatment before the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.

There are two major health care providers for landmine victims in the OPT, the government hospitals and the private hospitals. These two types of hospitals are spread all over the Palestinian territories, with at least one hospital in every Palestinian governorate. Still, the situation for Palestinian survivors is very bad. For instance, a year after the explosion wounding 16-year-old Burhan Shkeir, he had not received any help or financial support. His father explained: "In order for the (Palestinian) Ministry of Health to agree to treat him for free, it has to get a paper from the Ministry of Social Affairs. And for the latter to complete all its legal procedures, we need a lot of time and patience."¹⁷

According to the Director of the General Union of Palestinian Disabled, "No special disability laws are available to landmine victims."¹⁸ But during the last year, the General Union of Disabled Palestinians, Rights Representative and Advocacy Body in coordination with the Central National Committee of Rehabilitation, and the Rehabilitation Institutions Coordinating Body in Palestine, succeeded in passing a special law, "People with Disabilities Rights Law," in the Palestinian Legislative Council. This law, which was Law Number 4 for the year, was published in the official newspaper and entered into force on 10 October 1999. Currently, there is no national body representing

¹⁵ Hadeel Wahdan, "Landmines, the Hidden Terror," *The Palestine Report*, 22 September 1999.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Interview with Ziad 'Amr, Ramallah, 3 January 2000.

the disabled, but there are attempts to formulate the National Council for Disability, which would represent the disabled, NGOs and the government.

WESTERN SAHARA

Key developments since March 1999: The major mine awareness program run by Norwegian People's Aid ended in May 2000. There are no humanitarian mine clearance programs underway. There were reportedly forty-two mine accidents from November 1999 to March 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front (Frente Polisario, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro). The Polisario's Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic is not universally recognized and has no official representation in the UN. Therefore it was unable to sign the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Polisario representatives have stated on a number of occasions, including in March and April 2000, that the Saharawi government would sign and ratify the treaty, if eligible to do so.¹ At the same time, officials continue to speak of a possible need for the weapon. According to Mr. Dah Bendir, who is responsible for Polisario Mine Engineering, "Due to the actual situation of uncertainty, we cannot make a commitment to destroying all the mines we have, because we may go back to war tomorrow morning. But it's our will to do so when the conflict is finally resolved."²

The non-governmental Saharawi Campaign to Ban Mines (SCABAM) was established in early 2000.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

The Polisario is not known to produce or export mines. It has imported mines from Algeria and perhaps other nations. It has also acquired mines by lifting them from the Moroccan defensive walls. Polisario acknowledges having a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but will not disclose the number and types of mines.³ Polisario is not known to have used antipersonnel mines in 1999 or 2000.

Landmine Problem⁴

Western Sahara is heavily mine-affected. After years of colonial and post-colonial conflict, mines and UXO litter the landscape. Moroccan and Polisario forces fought intermittently from 1975 to 1991, when a cease-fire went into effect and a UN peacekeeping force, MINURSO, was deployed to the region. The cease-fire resulted in a

¹ Statement by Sinniya Ahmed at the NGO-sponsored "Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban" conference, Geneva, 24-25 March 2000; interview with Mr. Mohamed Haddad, liaison between Polisario and MINURSO, Rabouni, Algeria, 10 April 2000.

² Interview with Polisario Mine Engineer Mr. Dah Bendir, Rabouni, Algeria, 9 April 2000.

³ Ibid.

⁴ For a more detailed description of the landmine problem, see *Landmine Monitor Report* 1999, pp. 921-924.

territory that is divided between the Polisario and Morocco by defensive walls, known as berms (earthen walls of about three meters in height). Both sides have fortified these walls with mines

Estimates of the number of mines in Western Sahara range from 200,000 to 10,000,000.⁵ Thirty-five different types of AP mines and twenty-one different types of AT mines from twelve states have been confirmed by MINURSO to exist in the territory.⁶

The most mine-affected area in Western Sahara is thought to extend up to ten kilometers to the east of the berms. The location of UXO, which are distributed throughout the entire territory, is unknown. The desert conditions of sand, wind and occasional heavy rain make mine shifting a constant phenomenon.

Survey and Mine Clearance

Some clearance has been conducted by militaries from both sides, though it only totals a small percentage of the problem. A Swedish Demining Unit operated for several months in 1998. Polisario and MINURSO have cooperated in identifying and marking danger areas along MINURSO patrol routes. A UN report on the Western Sahara in January 1999 recommended a pilot demining project, but there does not appear to have been any follow-up on this.⁷ The Global Landmine Survey sent an exploratory mission to the Western Sahara to look at the feasibility of a Level One Survey, but no further action has occurred.⁸

The Polisario liaison with MINURSO told Landmine Monitor about an agreement reached between Polisario and the UN "related to the destruction of mines in the area and since then we have been destroying all types of mines and UXO that we have found in our region."⁹ According to Fadli Mohamed Ahmed, a Saharawi officer who represented the Polisario in an international landmines conference held in October 1999 in Catalunya, Spain, the Polisario have cooperated with the UN by presenting maps of minefields and suspected areas.¹⁰

The most recent report of the UN Secretary General states that "during the period 13 May 2000 to 3 July 2000, 278 mines and unexploded ordnance were marked and 124 destroyed on the Moroccan side while 488 were marked and 177 destroyed on the Frente

⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis," 1998, p. A-2.

⁶ MINURSO, "Western Sahara: Updated Mine Situation," February 1998. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 922, for details.

⁷ "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara," 28 January 1999.

⁸ Global Landmine Survey, information sheet, undated.

⁹ Interview with Mr. Mohamed Haddad, liaison between Polisario and MINURSO, Rabouni, Algeria, 10 April 2000.

¹⁰ Interview with Polisario officer Fadli Mohamed, Rabouni, Algeria, 28 April 2000.

Polisario side.”¹¹ Between 6 December and 22 May 2000, both sides in cooperation with MINURSO conducted 28 disposal operations for UXO and ammunition.¹²

Mine Awareness

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a mine awareness program from April 1998 until May 2000, educating about 90,000 Saharawi refugees. NPA had a mine awareness team in each of the main refugee camps (Smara, Aaiun, Auserd, and Dajla), as well as in a smaller camp based at a women’s training school. It also conducted mine awareness through the media, such as radio programs.

Landmine Casualties

The Saharawi Campaign to Ban Mines believes that since November 1999, the number of mine accidents in Western Sahara has increased, noting that about forty-two accidents occurred between November 1999 and March 2000. SCABAM attributes this to the fact that the northern part of the country experienced heavy rainfall, leading to more movement throughout the region, and resulting in an increase in mine/UXO accidents.

Survivor Assistance

Mine victim access to emergency services, especially in remote areas, is limited to military medical facilities. In preparation for repatriation, the Saharawi government, supported by Spanish NGOs and aid committees for the Saharawi people, began the construction of two hospitals in Western Sahara. However, these hospitals lack staffing and basic equipment for medical assistance. All the seriously wounded patients have to be taken to the National Hospital located in Rabouni. Many mine accident victims do not receive assistance until two or three days after the accident occurs. Other victims die on their way to medical treatment, as in some cases the closest health facility can be up to forty hours away.

SCABAM has begun a survey of landmine survivors, and identified about 360 amputees living in the four main Saharawi refugee camps, near Tindouf, Algeria. The majority of these amputees lacked prosthetics, while others had been using the same prosthetic device for ten years or more. SCABAM is seeking funding for a mine victim support project to provide prosthetics to the amputees.

¹¹ “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara,” S/2000/683, 12 July 2000, pp. 3-4.

¹² “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara,” S/2000/461, 22 May 2000, p. 3; “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara,” S/2000/131, 17 February 2000, p. 3.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), formally launched in 1992 by a handful of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), is presently made up of over 1,400 organizations in 90 countries worldwide. It is an unprecedented coalition bringing together human rights, humanitarian mine action, children's, peace, disability, veterans, medical, development, arms control, religious, environmental and women's groups who work locally, nationally, regionally and internationally to achieve its goals. Since its inception, the ICBL has remained focused on its call for a ban on the use, production, trade and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines (APMs), and for increased resources for mine clearance and victim assistance.

The ICBL is coordinated by a committee of fourteen member organizations, working with a Coordinator, Government Relations Liaison, Resource Center Director and Webmaster. During the past year the ICBL Resource Center moved from Oslo, Norway to Sana'a, Yemen. The center serves campaigns and the public by providing documents, photographs, exhibition materials and other resources and support services to facilitate campaign activities. Over the past year, the ICBL's website, www.icbl.org, has been regularly and substantially updated by a small web team led by Webmaster, Kjell Knudsen. The ICBL's General Meeting—a bi-annual meeting composed of representatives of national campaigns, international organizations and individuals to strategize on how best to further the campaign's goals—was held last year in Maputo in May 1999 after the First Meeting of States Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. A report of the ICBL's activities at both the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo and its Second General Meeting was produced and distributed.

ICBL General Meeting in Maputo, Mozambique

At the General Meeting representatives of the ICBL's member organizations and country campaigns made major decisions on the ICBL's strategic direction and activities over the coming year in particular, and over the next five years to the first Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004. The campaign recommitted itself to ensuring that the words of the treaty are indeed turned into action. While acknowledging that one of the campaign's objectives had been met with the rapid entry into force of the treaty, the campaign agreed that sustained, aggressive efforts would continue for universalization—convincing recalcitrant nations to accede to the treaty—and to ensure effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

To further those goals, and to develop new and innovative ways to maintain and build momentum around the Mine Ban Treaty, the General Meeting in Maputo set priorities that included:

- Universalization of the ban treaty, redoubling efforts on the previously targeted states of the former Soviet Union and the Middle East/North Africa and adding as a key target the United States, in addition to its continued, unrelenting pressure on all non-signatories to accede to the treaty;

- Implementation of the ban treaty, focusing on some key issues of concern including: how to respond to violations of the ban treaty, pressing for clarity on the issue of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, joint operations where non-signatories use mines, and continued stockpiling and transit of non-signatory mines in signatory nations;
- Promoting increased funding for sustainable and appropriate mine action programs;
- Promoting increased funding for comprehensive victim assistance programs and greater involvement of mine victims and mine-affected communities in the planning and implementation of such programs;
- Continuing to explore ways to encourage non-state actors to commit to the banning of AP mines;
- Identifying and advocating on moral, legal, and environmental issues relating to landmines and the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty; and
- Committing to ICBL participation in the intersessional work program established in Maputo at the First Meeting of States Parties aligning the ICBL Working Groups with the five Intersessional Standing Committees of Experts (SCEs).

Four permanent working groups and one ad hoc working group of the ICBL lead these efforts to address the various aspects of the humanitarian landmines crisis. They are the Treaty Working Group, the Working Group on Victim Assistance, the Mine Action Working Group, and the Non-State Actors Working Group, as well as the ad-hoc Ethics and Justice Working Group. Part of the agenda of the General Meeting was dedicated to the development of working group action plans.

Campaign Activities

Since *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, both regional and thematic conferences have been held to continue to build public awareness and further various aspects of the ban movement. Regional conferences, either held by ICBL members or where ICBL members participated, took place in Azerbaijan, Belarus (on stockpile destruction), Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Malaysia and Slovenia. National seminars or workshops were held in India, Iran, Japan, Nepal, Nigeria, and the U.S. As for thematic conferences, members of the ICBL held a follow-up conference in Germany to continue to develop the Bad Honnef concept of mine action and development, while others held a conference in Switzerland to engage non-state actors in the landmine ban. New campaigners in countries including Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Chile, Iran, Nigeria, Poland, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Syria, and Togo have begun activities, as has a new group, Refugees Against Landmines, among Chechen refugees in Georgia; new work is also being carried out in Nagorno-Karabakh. Two meetings of Landmine Monitor researchers also provided opportunities for ICBL sessions to introduce new researchers to the ICBL, hone advocacy skills and further strategize regionally and thematically.

The second anniversary of the opening for signature of the Mine Ban Treaty galvanized campaigners into action worldwide. On 3 December 1999, which appropriately coincides with the International Day for Disabled Persons, activities were held around the globe, from theater and basketball games between disabled teams in Angola, to exhibits in South Korea and special hockey matches in the US. Similarly the first anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on 1 March 2000 further spurred action worldwide. A concerted Ratification Campaign included a coordinated letter-writing campaign with other partners, embassy visits, and various activities and media events in thirty-three countries around the world.

Additionally, ICBL members undertook a number of advocacy and awareness-building missions, including to Kosovo, Korea, United Arab Emirates, and Belgium (for the European Council and Parliament). The ICBL sent letters to heads of state and engaged in other advocacy activities on the occasions of international events such as the Francophone summit in Moncton, New Brunswick; the UN General Assembly in New York; the Special Summit of the European Council on the establishment of an area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Finland; the Helsinki Summit of the European Union; the Organization of American States Summit; the Organization of African Unity Summit; the Inter-Parliamentary Union; and the Assembly of African Francophone Parliamentarians. Letters to heads of state were also sent on the occasions of the 3 December and 1 March anniversaries urging governments to accede to or ratify the treaty, destroy their stocks, submit their transparency report as required under Article 7, and increase funding for mine action and victim assistance. Letters were also sent prior to the two meetings of the Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention highlighting issues of concern to the ICBL in preparation for the meetings.

The ICBL also issued regular Action Alerts. One such alert related to an incident in which a state-owned Romanian company, Romtehnica, offered AP mines for sale at an arms fair in the United Kingdom, and another to an incident in which state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories offered AP mines for sale to a British journalist posing as a company representative. Another alert called for efforts to stop funding for a new U.S. mine system containing both antipersonnel and antitank mines (RADAM). An Action Alert was also issued at the prospect of Russia mining its border (in Chechnya) with Georgia; a letter was sent as well to President Putin. There were several Ratification Campaign Action Alerts circulated, prior to 1 March 2000 and again in June 2000, in anticipation of the Second Meeting of States Parties to be held in September.

The ICBL and the Intersessional Work of the Mine Ban Treaty

During its General Meeting the Campaign committed to significant ICBL participation in the intersessional work program established in Maputo at the First Meeting of States Parties. ICBL Working Groups take the lead in liaising with the five Intersessional Standing Committees of Experts (SCEs). The intersessional work program strives to consolidate and concentrate global mine action efforts, without duplicating existing efforts, and to highlight the role of the Mine Ban Treaty as a comprehensive framework for mine action. The five SCEs seek to facilitate the implementation of

provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty. The SCE process is conducted with input, recommendations, and action points resulting from NGO-IO-government collaboration.

The five Standing Committees of Experts (SCEs) on Victim Assistance, Socio-economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness; Mine Clearance; Stockpile Destruction; Technologies for Mine Action; and the General Status and Operation of the Convention each met two times in the “intersessional” period between the FMSP and the upcoming meeting in September. Action points for the various SCEs have been identified and work on them is ongoing.

At the SCE Meetings on General Status and Operation of the Convention the ICBL, through the leadership of its Treaty Working Group, highlighted five issues of concern which were discussed during the two meetings: antivehicle mines with antihandling devices (definitions), mines retained for training and development, the need for comprehensive Article 7 reporting, the obligation of national implementation measures, and foreign stockpiles and transit of mines and joint operations with non-signatory states in which AP mines could be used.

At the SCE meetings on Technologies and Mine Clearance, the ICBL Mine Action Working Group, as well as its member mine clearance organizations, made concrete and informative interventions on the five thematic topics discussed by the SCE, including: “Standards and Criteria,” “Measures of Impact and Benefit,” “Planning and Prioritization,” “Coordination,” and “Building National Capacity.”

The ICBL Victim Assistance Working Group, as well as its member organizations, made concrete and informative presentations and interventions during the SCE on issues discussed in the five “Network Groups” and an additional group on mine awareness established at the September SCE meeting. These groups include: mine awareness (ICBL and ICRC), victim assistance draft reporting forms (Handicap International and ICBL), victim assistance guidelines (Mexico and Nicaragua), victim assistance portfolio (ICBL), data collection (GICHD), and donor coordination (Sweden).

The intersessional work is an important mechanism to measure progress made in the full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and the ICBL has reaffirmed its commitment to full participation in this process.

TREATY WORKING GROUP

While the entire ICBL coalition works to promote ratification, universalization, effective implementation, and strengthening of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, members of the Treaty Working Group (TWG) are tasked with taking the lead in developing and implementing the ICBL’s strategies and actions related to the treaty. The TWG also deals with other mine-oriented international bodies and instruments, such as CCW Protocol II, as well as with national laws and measures. It is chaired by Human Rights Watch.

In 1999, a Treaty section was established on the ICBL’s website where ICBL activities relating to the Mine Ban Treaty are housed. The Working Group’s electronic discussion group (egroup), established in July 1999, has some forty-five individual subscribers from ICBL member organizations.

The twenty-four ICBL members of the Working Group include nearly all the members of the ICBL Coordination Committee, three former members of the Coordination Committee (medico international, Mines Advisory Group and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation), national campaigns such as the Australia Network of the ICBL, German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines, and the U.K. Working Group on Landmines, and individual NGOs such as the Quaker UN Office (Geneva) and Mennonite Central Committee. ICBL Ambassador Jody Williams, Coordinator Liz Bernstein and Government Relations Liaison Susan Walker are also very actively involved.

Actions Taken

Ratification: Following the 1 March 1999 entry into force of the treaty, the Treaty Working Group members continued to press for *all* signatories to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty. The TWG monitors the ratification process, coordinates advocacy efforts with key governments and international organizations, such as the ICRC and UNICEF, and sends out through the ban movement network its "Ratification Updates."

Universalization: The TWG and the Campaign overall continue work to bring those who remain outside the treaty on board. Targets for particular action identified at the ICBL's Second General Meeting in Maputo are the states of the former Soviet Union, countries in the Middle East, and the United States. As the ICBL works to build new campaigns and strengthen existing ones, the TWG works closely with these campaigns on issues related to the treaty, helping to guide the NGOs as they press and/or work with their governments on issues related to the treaty. Members of the TWG have been centrally involved in regional landmine conferences in Croatia, Nigeria, Egypt, Georgia and Slovenia. Members of the TWG have visited target countries to press for these countries to sign the treaty. Members of the TWG have spoken on multiple occasions at regional and international bodies, such as the United Nations both in New York and Geneva, the European Community and the Organization of American States.

Implementation and Monitoring: The TWG works closely with national campaigns and other ban partners on the implementation and monitoring of the Mine Ban Treaty. The TWG monitors the progress by States Parties in submitting Article 7 reports, and sends out through the ban movement network regular "Reporting Updates." The chair of the TWG also serves as the coordination point of the Landmine Monitor. The process of gathering data for Landmine Monitor has also served to reinforce the work of the TWG and the ICBL; persistent inquiries from researchers have helped convince governments to ratify and to better implement the treaty, especially in terms of submission of Article 7 transparency reports.

First Meeting of States Parties: Nearly all TWG members participated in the FMSP in Maputo in May 1999. Along with the release of the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, this presented great opportunities for educating and encouraging governments on issues of concern. The TWG chair served as the Head of the ICBL delegation to the FMSP and delivered the ICBL statement to the Plenary. TWG members made interventions in other working sessions of the FMSP, and also participated in several press conferences and media events.

Intersessional Work: The TWG chair was tasked with organizing the ICBL's participation in two intersessional groups, the SCE on Stockpile Destruction and the SCE on General Status and Operation of the Convention. The ICBL was able to play a prominent role in these SCEs through (1) providing relevant information to enhance the work of the SCEs, (2) by clearly stating NGO positions and concerns, and (3) by making specific recommendations that the SCEs could carry out. All ICBL suggestions on the overall intersessional process were adopted.

General Status: The TWG chair worked with SCE co-chairs Canada and South Africa, to expand the agenda of this SCE's meetings from examination of Articles 6 (international assistance for mine action/victim assistance) and Article 7 (reporting matters) to include discussion of a other key issues of concern to the ICBL. Prior to both SCE meetings, the TWG in conjunction with the ICBL Coordinator sent letters to all States Parties and signatories highlighting these issues with the aim of spurring the governments to seriously prepare for discussion at the SCE. These issues included antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, mines retained for training/development, comprehensive Article 7 reporting, national implementation measures, foreign stockpiles and transit, and joint operations with non-signatory states where AP mines could be used. At the two SCE meetings, a TWG representative gave a presentation on each issue. TWG members distributed fact sheets on antivehicle mines, Article 7 reporting and on non-state actors.

Stockpile Destruction: The TWG chair closely worked with SCE chair Hungary to develop the agenda for this SCE's meetings. The TWG chair also served as the chair of the final work sessions of each SCE meeting, tasked with identifying "the way forward." This was the first instance of an NGO chairing an intersessional meeting. A "Landmine Monitor Fact Sheet, Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and their Destruction" was distributed at the first meeting of the SCE in December 1999 and an update of the Fact Sheet to the second meeting in May 2000. Largely as a result of TWG interventions, a number of governments have reduced or eliminated altogether the number of AP mines they intend to keep for training.

United Nations General Assembly: In October 1999, the TWG chair prepared, in cooperation with other members, a paper entitled "UNGA Landmine Resolutions: Yes on Mine Ban Treaty, No on Mine Transfers" in response to two draft resolutions that were in circulation. The ICBL paper was key to government support for pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA Resolution 54/54B, as well as the withdrawal of the second resolution, which supported a transfer ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament.

Convention on Conventional Weapons: In December 1999, about a dozen NGOs from the TWG/ICBL, in a delegation led by the TWG chair, attended the open sessions of the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva. The chair of the TWG delivered a statement to the plenary which pointed out the weaknesses of the Protocol and stressed that it was not an acceptable option to the MBT. The ICBL took advantage of the Conference to organize bilateral meetings with a number of non-signatories (Belarus, India, Israel, Finland, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey and U.S.) and gave a number of press briefings on the eve of the opening of the meeting, as well as various briefings for Conference delegates and the press during the course of the meetings.

Conference on Disarmament: Although no ICBL members participate or lobby directly at the Conference on Disarmament meetings in Geneva, the TWG monitors the CD's continued lack of progress to reach agreement on beginning negotiations on an AP mine transfer ban. The ICBL strongly opposes any effort to negotiate a transfer ban, or any other mine-related measure, in the CD. The chair of the TWG, in cooperation with other members, has written a position paper on Landmines and the CD, which is available upon request.

MINE ACTION WORKING GROUP

The ICBL Mine Action Working Group was formed in February 1998 to serve as the focal point for addressing issues related to mine action, with a particular focus on the work in the field. The core members of the group have been project-implementation organizations, such as Handicap International (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Mines Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), and medico international, as well as the German Initiative to Ban Landmines. In addition to this core, there is wider participation from a number of other organizations either involved or interested in the issue. The MAWG is a loose structure, where the main basis of communication is by e-mail, but members of the group also meet for discussions within the context of various international mine action meetings.

The goals of the MAWG are to promote the ICBL call for more resources for mine action programs, to ensure meaningful NGO participation in all relevant political and decision-making processes that define the parameters for mine action, and to promote an understanding and general acceptance of integrated mine action, as formulated in the "Bad Honnef Guidelines." Overall, the MAWG collaborates with other working groups of the ICBL to promote full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Activities

First Meeting of States Parties: The MAWG presented a written statement at the beginning of the meeting, outlining key points that the international community had to address in order to solve the crisis of landmines:

- The need for more and better information on the impact of landmines on peoples and communities in order to set true and clear priorities of the work.
- To make use of the knowledge and competence of the NGO mine action community.
- To recognize the mine action agencies' need for longer funding cycles in order to increase effectiveness and efficiency of mine action programs.
- To create funding mechanisms and procedures that enable the agencies to focus on the work on the ground, not on extensive bureaucracy.
- To focus research and development efforts on methods that are relevant to the situation on the ground, aimed at improving the speed, safety and efficiency of existing mine clearance methods.

The MAWG also presented the Bad Honnef framework for integrated humanitarian mine action to the plenary of the FMSP.

ICBL General Meeting: During the ICBL General Meeting, MAWG members facilitated workshops on mine action with participants at the general meeting. A key issue in the discussions was the need to ensure that mine awareness was given sufficient emphasis in the mine action discussions. Partly as a result of these discussions, a subgroup addressing mine awareness issues was established later in 1999.

Mine Awareness Subgroup: Since its creation the group has been working on the following issues: Preparation for and participation in the ISCE on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness; production of a short video presentation on mine awareness, in collaboration with ICRC; and preparation of a draft recommendation paper for the SCE.

The subgroup has also been actively involved in follow-up on a Warner Brothers' and U.S. State Department initiative to use animated characters/comics as mine awareness learning tools, sending out State Department questionnaires and collecting the answers on the initiative. It has also followed-up on the UNMAS/UNICEF Superman field test in Kosovo. The ICBL, because of concerns from member organizations about the use of the Superman comic, was invited to participate in a field test in Kosovo, but so late that participation was virtually impossible. The subgroup sent a letter to UNMAS/UNICEF regarding the process.

Intersessional Work: Members of the MAWG have participated actively in the ICBL delegations to the meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts that carry out the intersessional work related to the treaty. MAWG members have been particularly active, in the SCEs related to mine action: Mine Clearance; Technology; and Mine Awareness, which is integrated into the SCE on Victim Assistance, as well as participating in the SCE on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

The main goal of the MAWG has been to ensure that realities of mine action work in the field are reflected in global mine action policies developed by the international community. It also seeks to assist the State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty to achieve the goals as outlined in the obligations of the treaty. Throughout the intersessional work, it has promoted the views of the ICBL and its members concerning mine action programs, technology, and mine awareness, as formulated in the revised Bad Honnef Guidelines for humanitarian mine action.

The following issues have been raised in particular: funding for mine action programs in countries/areas that are not parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; the problem of various political, legal and bureaucratic obstacles to undertaking mine action programs in mine affected areas; the need for comprehensive surveys on impact of landmines; the need to use mine awareness methods and tools that are relevant to the field situation; the need to promote and coordinate technology initiatives that are relevant to the reality in the field, as well as emphasizing the need for overall and effective coordination of mine action efforts. In addition to these issues, the MAWG has forwarded the view that State Parties should refrain from retaining live APMs for training or research, as permitted under Article 3, as well as raising the concern about antivehicle mines with antihandling devices. In the intersessional process, the MAWG has enjoyed a fruitful cooperation with the chairs of the various committees.

Interaction with donors: The MAWG participated in the December 1999 meeting of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), an informal group of donor countries that meets regularly in New York. At this meeting, MAWG presented the mine action agencies' views on cooperation with donors, their analysis of the mine action situation, as well as the mine action NGOs' views on policies and priorities for funding. This was the second time that MAWG participated in a MASG meeting, and the exercise was encouraging.

Survey Action Center: Although not a direct MAWG initiative or project, the SAC is probably the most active arena for cooperative efforts between the mine action NGOs. All members of the MAWG are actively represented in the Survey Working Group, which meets regularly to advise the SAC on matters of Global Landmine Impact Survey policy and implementation. The Survey Working Group and SAC also provide a venue for fruitful contact between the NGOs and UNMAS and the Geneva International Center. The MAWG continues its call for support of the Global Impact Survey, and stresses the need to put the results to use.

Other activities: Members of MAWG have been closely involved in the revision process of the UN standards for humanitarian mine action, and in the UNDP initiative on undertaking socio-economic analysis of the impact of mine action.

Communication: The MAWG has established two email subscription lists to facilitate discussion on mine action, the icblmineaction@egroups.com and the mineawarenessdiscussion@egroups.com. The MAWG also has a designated page on the ICBL website, where relevant statements and documents can be found.

Sayed Aqa of MCPA has been chair of the MAWG during this period. HI and NPA have served as co-chairs. The Mine Awareness subgroup has been chaired by Anne Capelle of HI (Belgium).

WORKING GROUP ON VICTIM ASSISTANCE

The WGVA was formed at the ICBL General Meeting of February 1998 to strengthen the Victim Assistance pillar of the campaign, and to serve as a resource to the ICBL, and others, on victim assistance issues. As Article 6, Section 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires states parties to "provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration of mine victims," the WGVA vigorously presses states to abide as seriously by that obligation as they do others in the Mine Ban Treaty.

From nine original member organizations, the WGVA has grown to include more than forty NGOs and country campaigns. Members share a commitment to increase the level and quality of the local, national, and international response to the situation of landmine victims worldwide. Landmine Survivors Network has facilitated the group's activities since its formation.

Key definitions

The work of the WGVA is based upon a definition of "landmine victim" that includes individuals who have been directly hit by a landmine explosion, their families, and communities. Mine victims include those who have, either individually or

collectively, suffered physical, emotional and psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to the use of landmines.¹

Following this three-tiered definition of landmine victim, the concept of victim assistance also involves multiple layers. On the level of individual survivors, victim assistance includes interventions to provide for the care and rehabilitation, and the social and economic integration of landmine victims. The provision of prostheses is a critically important element of assistance to these individuals, but is not the only type of intervention needed to ensure their full rehabilitation and reintegration. Other components of comprehensive victim assistance are: emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation treatment, psychological and social support, employment and economic integration programs. Efforts to enact legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities including landmine victims, disability awareness activities, and providing support to associations of landmine victims or persons with disabilities are also forms of victim assistance. In addition, victim assistance may include programs to ensure that socio-economic needs of affected communities are met in the broader contexts of repatriation, rehabilitation, and development strategies.

Goal areas

The goals of the WGVA have evolved somewhat since their formulation in 1998. They include:

1. To secure increased levels of funding for victim assistance programs;
2. To promote a broad range of activities to meet the needs of landmine survivors;
3. To promote inclusion of landmine survivors in decision-making, planning, and implementation of programs and activities that concern them;
4. To advocate for the rights of landmine survivors; and
5. To facilitate information sharing about victim assistance among all relevant actors.

Activities

Participation in Intersessional Work: In September 1999, the WGVA began to shift its focus from internal activities to involvement in the intersessional work of the SCEs. In the first round of meetings, the WGVA coordinated a slate of eleven speakers and organized a number of further interventions from the floor. It also produced a "Sample Portfolio of Victim Assistance Programs" to encourage the development of a Global Portfolio of Victim Assistance as an SCE project.

Action points from the first SCE meeting on Victim Assistance were so numerous that for purposes of organization, the work was sub-divided into five on-going "Network Groups." The WGVA facilitates two of these groups, Victim Assistance Reporting and Portfolio of Victim Assistance Programs. We also produced recommendations papers on each of the five topics, and participated, although minimally, in the other three groups. The groups include:

- Portfolio of Victim Assistance Programs: facilitated by WGVA
- Victim Assistance Reporting: facilitated by WGVA/HI

¹ ICBL Guidelines for the Care and Rehabilitation of Survivors.

- Strategic Use of Guidelines: The WGVA encourages wide distribution and use of all existing guidelines
- Donor Coordination: The WGVA urges donors to support a range of activities through a range of partners/implementers in a range of countries
- Information and Data Collection: We promote the principle of data collection without harm to individual survivors

Development of the Portfolio of Victim Assistance Programs: As of March 2000, the Portfolio had forty-eight one-page program descriptions representing a range of victim assistance activities in twenty-one countries and seventeen organizations. By September 2000, in time for the Second Meeting of States Parties, the Portfolio will have at least doubled the number of entries. The following are excerpts from the introduction to the March 2000 version of the Portfolio, which explains both its purposes and its limitations:

The purposes of the Portfolio are:

- To raise awareness among governments, donors, and program implementers on the range of activities that constitute victim assistance.
- To promote transparency among all actors in victim assistance.
- To highlight needs that have not been addressed due to lack of resources.
- To facilitate contact and information sharing among actors in victim assistance.

These limits of the Portfolio are important to clarify:

- Programs included in the Portfolio have not been judged or evaluated by the SCE-VA. Users are advised to make their own inquiries and judgments of the programs.
- The present edition is far from complete. Entries will be added on a continuous basis; active solicitation of entries from local NGOs and government programs is ongoing.
- The Portfolio is not a substitute for in-depth investigation into a country's national priorities and plans. It is merely a tool to use in the early stages of a full needs assessment.
- The SCE-VA supports the principle that national level assessments, long-term strategic planning, and government ownership of issues are crucial for the development of sustainable responses to the problems created by landmines. Programs included in the Portfolio do not necessarily contribute to the operationalization of this principle.

NON-STATE ACTORS WORKING GROUP

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines made the ad hoc working group on Non-State Actors (NSAs), originally formed in 1997 on the initiative of the Colombian, Philippine, and South African country campaigns, into a full working group in at its General Meeting in May 1999. The objective of the working group is to develop a

complementary process to engage armed opposition groups in all aspects of the humanitarian solution to the landmine crisis, including an unconditional ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines, and obtaining the cooperation of NSAs in integrated mine action.

The Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines and Mines Action Canada have co-chaired the working group since May 1999. As of May 2000, the membership had expanded to include: the Afghan Campaign, Australian Network, members of the Colombian Campaign, Indian Campaign, Irish Campaign-Pax Christi, Italian Campaign, Kenya Coalition, Mines Action Canada, Nepal Campaign, Pakistan Campaign, Palestine Campaign, Philippine Campaign, South African Campaign, Swiss Campaign, Thai Campaign, the UK Working Group on Landmines, and the Zimbabwe Campaign.

The NSA Working Group is committed to an impartial application of the principles of international humanitarian law. The working group believes in engaging NSAs through dialogue and education, appealing to appropriate legal and normative points of reference and to political self-interest, and, as necessary, pressure. The working group stresses the importance of consultation with the communities affected and of careful attention to the impact of landmine work on initiatives aimed at establishing a just and lasting peace.

Overview of NSAs and Landmines

The majority of contemporary wars involve one or more armed groups operating autonomously from officially recognized governments. A recent survey indicated that there are over 190 non-state armed groups with a basic command structure and a capacity to plan armed operations, active in over 60 countries around the world.¹ According to information in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, landmines were used by NSAs in forty-four countries during the 1990s.²

In the majority of situations in which there are reasonably certain reports that landmines are in use, NSAs are involved, either as users (and sometimes producers) or targets of landmines. Landmine Monitor 2000 research identifies likely use of antipersonnel mines by approximately thirty NSAs in at least eighteen conflicts in 1999 and 2000, including in Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Chechnya, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia/Abkhazia, India/Pakistan (Kashmir), South Lebanon, Nepal, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey/Northern Iraq, Uganda, Yugoslavia/Kosovo (see country reports). The report identifies likely use by eleven governments in eleven conflicts.

This demonstrates the necessity of engaging non-state groups as well as states in a solution to the landmine crisis. Aware of the impact of mines on their constituents, or, more recently, of the global movement to eliminate landmines, some NSAs have issued public statements about their use of landmines and their willingness to support mine action activities in areas under their control. As with states, the public positions taken by

¹ Martin Rupiya, "One Man's Terrorist is Another's Liberator," March 2000, citing Non-State Actor Database, "Non State Armed Actors: Region and Country Survey." Updated survey, from April 2000, available from nsadba@international-alert.org.

² ICBL NSA Working Group, "The use of landmines by non-state actors," Information Paper prepared for the January 2000 meeting of the SCE on General Status and Operation of the Convention.

NSAs vary in their level of understanding and acceptance of the humanitarian principles impelling the ban movement, and in their implementation. Some such public statements were listed in the *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*.³ Updated information about the landmine policies of various NSAs can be found on the NSA working group website and in the documentation of the March 2000 conference on landmines and non-state actors (see below), or obtained directly from the NSA database.⁴

One of the most encouraging NSA statements on landmines made recently was issued by the RPA-ABB, a Maoist group operating in the Philippines. Their statement of March 2000 admits past error, renounces future use and production of antipersonnel mines and concludes, "Fighting for genuine peace, social justice, political liberty, and a safe and clean environment are all in the service of the human race. Destroying the world and sacrificing innocent lives with the use of anti-personnel mines does not serve this purpose."

Customary international humanitarian law, which is taken to apply to non-state as well as state actors, offers a common global framework in which such unilateral statements can be evaluated. IHL states that, "In any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited." Three general principles are relevant to landmines: prohibitions on weapons whose harm is disproportionate to their military objectives, weapons which are inherently indiscriminate, and weapons whose use violates "the public conscience."⁵ The ICBL believes that these principles require non-state actors to adopt a complete ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines.

In the end, however, international humanitarian principles are only practically relevant if NSAs accept them; the process of convincing NSAs and their publics of their relevance and of the importance of implementing a total ban is primary. Ultimate progress in this area is measured not in terms of the public positions taken by NSAs, important as these can be as reference points, but in terms of their implementation of an effective ban, together with progress on mine clearance and victim assistance in areas under NSA control. This is the work in which several NSA Working Group members have been engaged over the past year.

Activities of the Working Group and its Members since March 1999

During the past year, the members of the NSA Working Group have participated in a number of initiatives, including: a South Asia regional workshop on landmines hosted by the ICRC in Sri Lanka in August 1999; a workshop on Non-State Actors hosted by the Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva in December 1999; the Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the

³ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp 943-944.

⁴ NSA WG website is www.icbl.org/wg/nsa; NSA database (housed at International Alert in London) can be reached at nsadba@international-alert.org.

⁵ Two background papers on the international legal framework for NSAs and landmines, "The Ottawa Treaty and Non-State Actors" and "The International Criminal Court and Rebel Groups," have been prepared for the Working Group by Sol Santos of the Philippine Campaign and can be obtained from the NSA database.

Convention in January 2000; and the Wilton Park conference on Engaging Non-State Actors in Humanitarian Principles in March 2000 in the UK.

One of the chief efforts of members of the working group over the past year was a conference, "Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban," held in March 2000 in Geneva. The conference brought together over one hundred representatives of governments, NGOs, NSAs and international organizations to discuss issues around NSAs and landmines. A summary report and conference proceedings are available from the NSA Working Group.

Drawing on the findings of the conference, the working group has begun developing a framework for approaching NSAs. The Working Group also developed public communication material, including an introductory brochure and a website, in order to increase public understanding of its objectives, work and progress.

Immediately following the March conference, several members of the working group launched the "Geneva Call," a new international NGO based in Geneva that will promote humanitarian principles to NSAs and serve as a mechanism to hold NSAs accountable for their unilateral declarations banning antipersonnel mines and other humanitarian norms articulated in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.

The Non-State Actor Database independently housed at International Alert in London has continued to provide information to the Working Group, developing its files on NSAs and in April 2000, producing an updated global survey of NSAs, categorized by region and country, that have been, are, or are potential mine users. The Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines has contributed valuable research in the field of international law as it applies to NSA use of landmines.

Research and outreach have continued at the field level. The Thai Campaign developed an outreach plan and information kit for NSAs operating in *Burma*. The Thai Campaign's systematic approach to NSAs in Burma, combining transparency of objectives with confidentiality, has begun to pay off in terms of some groups questioning their continued use of landmines. The Australian network met earlier with Karen and Karenni groups on the Thai-Burma border and has raised the issue with representatives of the military regime. The Philippine Campaign briefed leaders of the Karen National Union and the National Council of the Union of Burma on the landmine issue and discussed the possibility of a future workshop on the issue.

Members of the working group have conducted consultations in January 2000 with *Sri Lanka* experts on strategies to involve both the government and LTTE in a ban; have entered into dialogue with NSAs in the *Philippines*; have met with Xanana Gusmao and a very supportive Jose Ramos Horta of *East Timor* to encourage East Timor to make a statement on landmines; and have conducted research on NSAs operating in *Nepal*.

The Indian Campaign organized two regional landmine seminars in Jammu and Kashmir in July and August 1999. Both representatives of NSAs and Indian military officers took part in these meetings. In February 2000, a regional workshop was held in Southern India and Naxalites were invited to attend. A landmine seminar and photo exhibit were held at the beginning of March 2000 in North East *India* and representatives of NSAs operating in the region were again invited to attend.

The Pakistan Campaign (PCBL) is promoting awareness in the tribal belt of *Pakistan*. PCBL has held several meetings with local administration and government

officials in which it has communicated its concerns on the use of landmines in those areas. It has held meetings with local elders and religious scholars.

Members of the working group have also visited *Yugoslavia/Kosovo* in July 1999 to discuss a mine ban with the now disbanded KLA/UCK; conducted talks with the Polisario in the *Western Sahara* in March 1999; initiated communication with NSAs in *Guatemala, Mexico and Colombia*. The Zimbabwe campaign has conducted local and regional research in *Southern Africa*.

ETHICS AND JUSTICE WORKING GROUP REPORT

The "Ethics and Justice Working Group" (EJWG) was established at the General Meeting in Maputo in May 1999 as an ad-hoc working group.¹ It currently consists of twenty-four members and is co-chaired by Alejandro Bendana of the Nicaraguan Campaign and Nicoletta Dentico, coordinator of the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines.

Various issues have been debated in the group, including the question of the cultural appropriateness of DC Comics' "Superman" as a mine awareness instrument; research over the environmental impact of landmines; and, reparation and compensation to landmine victims. Several of its members met in Berlin in June 1999 and contributed to the reviewing process of the Bad Honnef Guidelines.

Activities

The Superman Mine Awareness Comic: The Superman mine awareness comic is a highly visible tool endorsed by celebrities who, along with the UNICEF logo, give the publication much credibility. The EJWG triggered discussion about its cultural appropriateness, as seen from the perspective of campaigns in many countries of the South and some in the East.² The main objection to the Superman mine awareness project is its impact on the everyday reality and cultural context of the mine-affected communities. Some believe it can undermine local development of mine awareness education; mine awareness tools are more effective and empowering when developed with the involvement of the affected communities themselves. Regular discussions have been carried out between the Ethics and Justice and the Mine Action Working Groups on this issue. The EJWG and MAWG drafted an ICBL letter sent to UNICEF in May 2000 formally requesting that UNICEF "openly address the cultural and technical concerns raised."

The EJWG is (1) continuing to gather information on the impact of the Superman comics in mine awareness programs, to provide interested parties with background information and comments from NGOs and experts directly involved in fieldwork; (2) preparing a letter to circulate among ICBL campaigns to foster action at the domestic

¹ It is the revived and renamed version of a previous working group on legal and moral responsibility formed in Frankfurt in February 1998.

² Following a period of consultations and correspondence among ICBL members, including specialists in mine awareness, technical and cultural objections were raised by campaigns and NGOs particularly in Mozambique, Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Philippines, Bosnia, Kosovo, Nicaragua and Colombia.

level with their UNICEF counterparts; and (3) promoting the idea of UNICEF studies on the impact of the Superman comic as a mine awareness tool.

*The “Polluter Pays” principle:*³ The EJWG seeks to focus consistent attention on the issue, particularly as the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty compels governments to a renewed humanitarian commitment, as they focus on national guidelines for mine action. A recommended and accepted criterion for mine action should be that of avoiding “double dipping” situations, where those involved in production and export of landmines also profit from demining.

The working group is stimulating investigations that *product liability* and actions based on the *polluter pays principle* may be two possible legal avenues whereby affected populations might be able to claim their clearance rights, as well as their compensation rights. The EJWG has been coordinating with the VAWG, and with the ICRC, to identify the best approach from the point of view of the victims, and possible areas for action. Contacts have been made with individuals and legal groups in Italy, U.S., Canada and Switzerland.

The EJWG will coordinate these individual efforts with a seminar in Brescia, the former cradle of mine production in Italy, to develop a legal basis of a “polluter pays” concept in relation to landmine use and production and create an international pool of legal experts willing to pursue legal possibilities in relation to the responsibility of landmine producers and user vis-a-vis civilian populations.

Landmines and Environment: Landmines have been called a toxic pollutant of global proportion, yet not much has been done to research their environmental consequences. Toward this end, the Sub-Committee on Environmental Aspects (SCEA) of the EJWG was created in May 1999, and it is working with a number of national campaigns and organizations affiliated with the ICBL on the issue.⁴ The SCEA seeks to continue efforts on the analysis of overall environmental aspects of the landmine crisis and environmental norms as expressed in Article 7 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. States are obligated to destroy stockpiled and planted landmines, and in either process, environmental standards may or may not be observed. A compilation of the information on Environmental Standards provided by States under Article 7 is being analyzed, with particular reference to the need for an international environmental standard for destruction of stockpiles. Research on the environmental impact of landmines was carried out for Landmine Monitor 2000. The SCEA has actively participated in various international conferences studying the relations between armed conflict, sustainable development and conservation strategies.

³ The first “Call” of the ICBL included a broad call urging states that had contributed to the proliferation of landmines to commit financially for their eradication; members of the ICBL, now particularly in the EJWG, have focused more specifically on the “polluter pays” principle, with a mind to how it was applied in the environmental movement.

⁴ From May 1999, Mr. Claudio Torres Nachón of the SCEA has conducted research on the environmental aspects of landmines. Some of the sub-committee’s main findings and other research papers can be found in a dedicated web page hosted by the Centro de Derecho Ambiental e Integración Económica del Sur—DASSUR, at: <http://members.xoom.com/dassur/envir.html>.

The Definition of AP Mines: One of the objectives of the EJWG is to stimulate analysis of a definition of AP mines that more fully encompasses its impact on the victim. Several members of the EJWG have focussed on the impact-oriented definition of AP mine in the review process of the Bad Honnef guidelines on mine action. After the NATO bombing in Kosovo,⁵ the EJWG began discussions about the feasibility of including cluster bombs in the ICBL ban call. The issue was raised at the ICBL Coordination Committee meeting in September 1999, where it was decided that the sole focus of the ICBL would remain the ban of AP mines, but that national campaigns and/or member organizations could individually look at ways of addressing the issue of cluster bombs.⁶

The EJWG also calls upon organizations to work on the issue of antihandling devices on antivehicle mines, and to develop sustained debate on a review of the definition of AP mines contained in the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ethical reflections on compliance of the Mine Ban Treaty: After the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, many sought sound ethical thinking regarding compliance. When this working group was still called that of "legal and moral responsibility," JRS AsiaPacific-Cambodia had already begun some work regarding the ethical arguments for compliance with the treaty (which is nearing completion). The EJWG wants to further develop such arguments. Contacts have been made by Misereor and the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines, the focal points for this EJWG subcommittee, with various Buddhist groups and with the Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace. The religious groups so far involved have expressed their interest in joining efforts to stimulate some discussion on ethical themes vis-a-vis landmines and the Mine Ban Treaty.

⁵ Kosovo has demonstrated again what is already known from past experiences in Laos and in Iraq: that the long-term effect of unexploded cluster munitions (duds) on civilian populations is comparable to that of AP mines.

⁶ Technical contributions on cluster bombs have been carried out by Human Rights Watch, as well as the ICRC, and another is about to be released by the UK Working Group on Landmines.

APPENDICES

The entities contributing to the appendices of this report do not necessarily endorse the rest of the Landmine Monitor Report and they are in no way responsible for other material contained in this report. Likewise, Landmine Monitor does not necessarily endorse, nor does it take responsibility for the accuracy of, material included in the appendices.

GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA*Mine Action Funding***Benchmark (1) : Australian financial contribution to humanitarian mine action programs*****Government Contributions***

The Australian Government, through its international development agency AusAID, has contributed, spent or committed around \$A80.5 million to humanitarian mine action since 1996.

This represents over three quarters of the total ten-year commitment by Australia of A\$100 million to the year 2005. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, signed the Ottawa Treaty on 3 December 1997. Funding periods vary, with some allocations specific for times and projects/countries, and others part of core contributions to multilateral organisations over a number of years. New funds allocated since July 1999 are \$A12.5 million (US\$8 million). Of these new funds, \$A5.4 million was allocated to new mine action projects in Cambodia, Angola and Afghanistan.

Recipients include Mine Action Centres in Cambodia (CMAC) and Mozambique (UNDP ADP), UN agencies (UNMAS and UNDP), the ICRC and a range of NGOs. In addition, the Australian Defence Force receives reimbursement from aid funds for technical assistance to the UNDP ADP in Mozambique.

AusAID has made disaggregation of the details of funding available, and the development of a policy framework for expenditure is nearing completion. (*ref: AusAID/ICBL meeting to discuss and review documents on 15/3/00*). Funding is directed - roughly in descending order of magnitude - to: core grants (CMAC, UNDP ADP and UNMAS), mine clearance (NGOs and UNDP), integrated programs (including surveys), mine victims, equipment and technical assistance (including seminars and conferences) and lastly to mine awareness. It should be noted core grant contributions cut across all aspects of humanitarian mine action and is difficult to separate the categories.

There is a clear geographic priority for funding, with the bulk of funding allocated for projects/action in Australia's immediate region, particularly Cambodia and Laos. Significant support has also provided to countries outside of the region, in descending order: Mozambique, Angola, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. Some funds will soon be available for Thailand.

The Government has also committed A\$700,000 including \$200,000 from sales tax revenue from the Elton John CD "Candle in the Wind" in memory of Princess Diana to its community participation initiative "*Destroy a Minefield*". \$400,000 of these funds will be used to match A\$1 from the Government for every A\$2 raised by the community for a mine clearance in Cambodia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer launched the scheme in November 1999.

Non-Government Organisations

In addition to being the recipients of Government funding for mine action, NGOs in Australia also provide a significant contribution to mine action work. This includes

specific projects, particularly in the areas of mine awareness and victim assistance or through landmine sensitivity in integrated development programs. Details of projects and funds are not available.

Commercial Organisations

One Australian company, *Minelab*, has donated a small amount of equipment for use in humanitarian mine clearance. It is envisaged that Australian businesses and corporations will make contributions to mine clearance under the *Destroy-A-Minefield scheme*.

Benchmark (2): Policy criteria/strategy governing allocations

AusAID is in the process of finalising the Government's humanitarian mine action strategy. Consultation with NGOs, interested individuals (including members of the Australian Network of ICBL and commercial deminers), multilateral organisations, and Australian diplomatic posts took place between September –November 1999. The first round of consultations took place in September to assess priorities for the (then) remaining A\$47 million pledged by Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer for mine action activities between 1996 -2005. (*ref: email invitation to NGOs from John Munro, Director, Humanitarian and Emergencies Section, AusAID, August 1999*).

At these meetings, comments were tabled from a number of Australian diplomatic posts in mine-affected countries. Those attending also proffered a range of suggestions regarding regional priorities, approaches and the need for a strategic approach that included clear evaluation criteria, quality assurance, advocacy of the universalisation of the Ottawa Treaty and annual consultations. Many of the suggestions have been integrated into recent funding decisions.

Accountability for outcomes varies depending on the funding channel. For NGOs it is detailed within the scope of services of each project and in the general AusAID accreditation requirements for NGOs. There are also guidelines for NGOs when writing proposals, submitting progress reports and acquitting funds.

Australia provides funding for multilateral organisations such as UNMAS and UNDP often in the form of core contributions. Australia sees UNMAS as the focal point for mine-related issues and activities with the UN system and supports its role of coordinating the UN response to mine action. Australia supports UNDP in its role as carrying responsibility for coordinating mine action in individual mine affected countries. Australian contributions are paid into the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance which is administered in accordance with the UN financial regulations and rules. The Australian Government holds these organisations responsible for the overall transparency of their budgets by actively participating in the governing bodies and other fora of these agencies.

AusAID has developed a "Multilateral Assessment Framework" to assist with the monitoring and assessment of multilateral agencies.

AusAID's Humanitarian and Emergencies Section coordinates all demining policy and programming within the Australian aid program. This includes contributions to mine action programs globally, in particular through NGOs, as well as contributions to UN agencies. AusAID's country program managers for Cambodia, Mozambique and Sri

Lanka are responsible for the management and monitoring of bilateral funds allocated to mine action in those countries.

Benchmark (3): In Kind Contributions

A proportion of Australian mine action funding includes in kind contributions, either in personnel costs or equipment. AusAID and the Australian Department of Defence are currently finalising a joint agreement to provide two Australian Defence Force technical advisers to the UNDP ADP in Mozambique for the next two years (2000-01).

Funding to governments and mine action centres can include equipment as well as personnel. Funding has been provided in the form of meeting costs and travel for the Australian Network of the ICBL to attend the meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts in Geneva. The Coordinator of the Australian Network, Sister Patricia Pak Poy, has been an official member of the Australian delegation at these meetings.

Benchmark (4): Funding Received by Australia

AusAID is unaware of any other funds received from outside Australia.

GOVERNMENT OF BELGIUM

The international community has reacted with determination to the humanitarian and socio-economic catastrophe brought about by the use of anti-personnel mines. The fair co-operation between the civil society and the State has led to the Convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines and to its success. The results reaped show the necessity of further co-operation in order to enforce the treaty globally and to ban the anti-personnel mines out of the world.

The continued action of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, with the creation of the Landmine Monitor – once the Convention was signed – is in this context highly valued as a useful instrument to review the implementation of the Convention. The 1999 Landmine Monitor Annual Report is an impressive achievement and an endeavour worth to be pursued. It is therefore a pleasure to positively answer the invitation for submission of a paper on the activities of the Government of Belgium on anti-personnel mines to be included as an appendix in the 2000 Report. Belgium is one of the countries that has supported this initiative from the beginning onwards and welcomed the organisation of the Landmine Monitor Researchers' Meeting in Brussels from 31 January till 2 February.

Belgium has largely contributed to the setting up of the Convention and has been part of the international movement that led a group of States on 3 and 4 October 1996 in Ottawa to launch a process, intended to set up a complete ban on anti-personnel mines on the short term. Belgium has pursued its action and has shown its commitment by organising the International Conference of Brussels for a Global Ban on Anti-personnel Mines in June 1997. This conference paved the way for the Diplomatic Conference at Oslo and the signing of the Convention in December 1997 in Ottawa. Belgium enjoyed in this respect the support of a large national consensus, so that we have also been the first country in the world to include a total ban on anti-personnel mines in our national legislation by the 1995 Law as amended in 1996.

For the future, Belgium considers three priorities, namely broadening the universalisation of the Convention, monitoring its implementation and giving assistance to countries in the fulfilment of their national obligations under the Convention.

Fortunately, to help us with this task, besides the mechanism laid down in the Convention, additional instruments have been set up, such as the intersessional mechanism, created by the first Meeting of States Parties, in May 1999 in Maputo (Mozambique) and the Landmine Monitor. Within the framework of the intersessional mechanism Belgium is conscious of the high responsibilities it will have to shoulder, together with Zimbabwe, from September 2000 on and for a whole year, as they will be co-chairing the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention in Geneva. Belgium intends to perform this task as a true custodian of the Convention while working further towards the goal of the final elimination of anti-personnel mines. For this, it will rely on the co-operation of everybody, the States, the international organisations and the citizens.

The process of universalisation is a success. The accession of so many States in such an unbelievably short time can but be interpreted in one way: an international standard has been set that can no longer be ignored or circumvented. But there is still much to do in order to gain universal acceptance. Obtaining complete universalisation is

one of the objectives vigorously pursued in Belgium's foreign policy. There are difficult situations for which allowances have to be made. A country in the midst of a conflict will have more difficulties to take the step than a country which does not have to face problems on its territory. However there are still several countries which have not yet taken the step although there appears to be no reason for not going ahead. Belgium appeals to those countries to accede to the Convention.

Obviously, it is not enough to sign and ratify the Convention. The point is that the Convention should be implemented and the world effectively freed from this weapon. Great vigilance is also required because the Convention has been drawn up in an ambitious spirit as to the 10-year deadline set for demining and the 4-year deadline set for the destruction of anti-personnel mines. Belgium has destroyed its whole stock of anti-personnel mines in September 1997 and has only retained a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques. This is permitted under article 3 of the Convention. Belgium invites in this context the acceding states to provide the UNSG with the yearly report on their national implementation measures as foreseen under article 7 of the Convention.

Clearing the world of anti-personnel mines is not an easy task. In 1999, Belgium contributed 127 million BEF or – at the current exchange rate – 3,190.007 million USD to international assistance to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Landmine Monitor of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and particularly to Handicap International. Specific support went among others to mine clearance operations in Kosovo and to the continuation of specific programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cambodia and Laos. Belgium also gave assistance to Mozambique and supported specific scientific research projects for the development of new mine clearance technologies. These measures will be continued in observance of the principles. More attention will go to Africa.

Belgium will continue its efforts to achieve the goals of the Convention and will do so in co-operation with other States, international organisations and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

Canada is proud of the accomplishments made over the past year, in partnership with other members of the mine action community, in moving towards universalization and implementation of the Ottawa Convention. Since its entry-into-force on 1 March 1999, an additional 23 states have ratified or acceded to the Convention. It is likely that when the Landmine Monitor Report 2000 is released, over 100 states will have made the formal commitment to join the global ban on anti-personnel mines. As these numbers increase, progress in mine action continues. We have witnessed the worldwide production and transfer of AP mines grind to a halt. Mines are being pulled from the ground at a faster rate than they are being planted. Casualty rates are on the decline. And the needs of landmine victims and their families are beginning to be met through the work of dedicated governments, organizations, and individuals working in the health, aid, and development sectors.

Canada has contributed CDN\$25 million since 1998 to support mine action in every region of the world. In that time, Canadian funding and expertise have gone to support mine clearance operations in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Yemen, Moldova, and every mine affected country in the Balkans. Canada has supported mine awareness programs in Angola, Iraq, Laos, Sudan, and Colombia and provided assistance to mine victims in some of the world's most war-ravaged countries, including Azerbaijan, El Salvador, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone.

Canadian mine action initiatives have worked to ensure that the borders between former adversaries become mine free. Canadian-funded initiatives have helped numerous communities to develop indigenous mine action capacities. Some of the most innovative and urgently needed developments in mine action technologies have come from Canadian financing, and from the talents of individual Canadians. And Canada has demonstrated a willingness and an ability to respond quickly to mine-related emergencies. In 1999, Canada provided funding to Nicaragua through the OAS to support the clearance of uprooted mines in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. This year, when devastating floods hit Mozambique, disrupting mine clearance activities in that country, Canada became the first country to respond to the United Nations' appeal for assistance. Canada contributed CDN\$500,000 to assess the crisis and to raise awareness of the new landmine dangers associated with the flooding.

In all, Canada has supported over 100 mine action projects in more than 30 countries since 1998 and has contributed to more than 50 multilateral, regional, and thematic initiatives over the same period.¹ With a continuing commitment from the Government of Canada to support mine action globally through the CDN\$100 million Canadian Landmine Fund, Canada will remain a world leader in providing financial and technical support to mine-affected countries.

Canada is particularly encouraged by the success of the Ottawa Convention's intersessional program over the past year. This program has channelled the work of the donor community, mine-affected states, and other interested parties through the work of

¹ For a complete listing of Canada's contributions to mine action, please see the United Nations Mine Action Service on-line database, *Mine Action Investments*, at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine

five committees to tackle issues related to the implementation of the Convention. Some of the successes of the first intersessional program include the following:

- *The Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) on Mine Clearance* identified over 50 action items and covered – in detail – important issues such as international standards for mine clearance and the development of indigenous demining capacities.
- *The SCE on Victim Assistance* put into action the Convention’s tradition of inclusiveness, partnership, dialogue, openness, and practical cooperation through the establishment of “Network Groups” which afforded a leading role to NGOs and international organizations such as the World Health Organization in administering victim assistance.
- *The SCE on Stockpile Destruction* succeeded in engaging States Parties on matters related to the obligation to destroy all stockpiled AP mines within four years of entry-into-force – an obligation that had received very little attention prior to discussions held in the intersessional environment.
- *The SCE on Mine Action Technologies* facilitated an all-important dialogue between end users and the people who develop technologies.
- *The SCE on the General Status and Operation of the Convention* addressed issues of compliance with the Convention’s transparency measures, the implementation of national laws in accordance with the Convention, and the retention of limited numbers of mines for training purposes.

Canada has long recognized that, although mine action is a relatively new area, there is a need to demonstrate that initiatives undertaken as part of mine action are achieving results valued by the mine action community – particularly the results expected by individuals and communities affected by landmines. As such, Canada has developed a system of measurement for mine action, focussed on six areas:

- improving mine action information and planning;
- clearing mined land;
- delivering mine awareness education and reducing casualties;
- meeting the needs of landmine victims;
- ending the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of AP mines, and;
- sustaining mine action efforts.

The progress measurement system developed by Canada incorporates the exhaustive research carried out by the Landmine Monitor initiative and, upon integration with further research and data sets, presents a comprehensive assessment of progress based on a series of measurement indicators. The results will give the mine action community a clearer understanding of the state of mine action on a country-by-country basis and will afford donor governments, NGOs, and international organizations the opportunity to see where effective mine action is lacking, what forms of delivery are

working best, where course corrections may be necessary, and where successes can be reinforced through the application of increased mine action efforts.

Landmine Monitor has played an important role in this regard by providing the mine action community with an important and expanding data set. The Landmine Monitor initiative has also established itself as a world leader in drawing attention to violations of the new international norm surrounding the Ottawa Convention. It was Landmine Monitor – at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention – that exposed AP mine use in Angola and the possible use of mines by 10 other governments and several non-state actors. In addition, it was thanks to the global reach of the Landmine Monitor initiative that reports of mine use in Chechnya and Kashmir were brought to the world's attention. The Government of Canada has every confidence that Landmine Monitor will continue to hold governments accountable for their actions and continually make them mindful of their obligations.

For these reasons, Canada has been proud to be a leading contributor to the Landmine Monitor initiative, donating a total of CDN\$900,000 over the period 1998 to 2001. Canada values Landmine Monitor as both a partner and an integral element of an international monitoring system – a system that measures progress in mine action, provides transparency, and facilitates implementation of the Ottawa Convention. As part of this system, Landmine Monitor provides the mine action community with important inputs through which lessons can be learned, progress evaluated, and new courses of action taken.

Canada continues to believe that the terror of anti-personnel mines can be overcome in years, not decades – as long as we maintain our collective commitment to address the problem. Landmine Monitor is deeply involved in this commitment. The value of its contribution of information, knowledge, and insight cannot be overstated. The Government of Canada applauds the efforts of the Landmine Monitor core group, the organizers and researchers involved in this project, and the numerous donors to this initiative for their continued partnership.

GOVERNMENT OF DENMARK

List of Abbreviations:

ADP	Accelerated Demining Programme
AFSC:	American Friends Service Committee
CMAC:	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
DanChurchAid:	Folkekirkens Nødhjælp
DDG	Danish De-Mining Group (Danish Refugee Council, Caritas DK, ASF Danish Peopleaid)
DHA:	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN Secretariat)
DKKM:	The Danish Committee for Human Rights of the Kurds
EUAM:	EU Administration in Mostar
ICBL:	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC:	International Committee of the Red Cross
IHB:	International Humanitarian Service
IPPNW:	International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
NPA:	Norwegian People's Aid
OAS	Orgaizations of American States
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF:	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA:	United Nations Office for Coordination of Afghanistan
UNTAC:	United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia

Danish Support to Humanitarian Mine Action (Updated 29.05.00)

Disbursed (1996)		All Amounts in DKK	
Organization	Recipient Country	Activity Description	MFA Total Dept. Amount
DHA	International	Secondment of Expert in Mine Clearance. Activity continues in 1997.	278,294
ICBL	International	Conference activities.	29,805
DHA	International	Study on the Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities.	438,788
DHA/Danida	International	International Conference on Mine Clearance Technology in Denmark 1996.	4,000,000
DHA	International	Follow-up Seminar on The International Conference on Mine Clearance Technology addressing International Standards.	209,055
DanChurchAid	Angola/Zaire	Mines Advisory Group: Mine Action Teams and Mine Awareness Programmes.	3,468,000
EUAM	Bos/Herz.	Mine Awareness Campaign in Mostar.	774,330
ICRC	Cambodia	Surgical hospital for victims of mine injuries.	5,000,000
ICRC	International	Information campaign and activities for victims of landmines in Angola, Afghanistan and Cambodia.	5,000,000
IFRC	Angola	Reconstruction of former Health Service, including assistance to mine victims and mine awareness work	2,000,000
DKKM & NPH	Iraq	Mine clearance in northern Iraq	1,359,000
UNDP	Cambodia	Trust Fund for Capacity Building in Demining (CMAC).	13,000,000
DHA	Bos/Herz.	Mine Action Center in Sarajevo: Mine Clearance Activities.	11,469,000
DHA	International	UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance to Mine Clear.	5,000,000
1996 in total			52,026,272

(Source: Annual Reports of Danida and internal statistics from the files of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs/S.3)

Danish Support to Humanitarian Mine Action (Updated 29.05.00)

All Amounts in DKK

Organization	Recipient Country	Activity Description	MFA Dept.	Total Amount
ICRC	International	Special 1997 appeal for Support for Mine Victims	S.3	4,000,000
Norwegian People's Aid	Mozambique	Mine Clearance Programme	S.7	5,000,000
UNDP	Cambodia	Trust Fund for Capacity Building in Demining (CMAC)	S.3	6,000,000
DHA/DPKO	International	UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance to Mine Clearance	S.3	4,500,000
DanChurchAid	Cambodia	Mine Clearance	S.3	5,000,000
UNOCHA	Afghanistan	Mine Clearance	S.3	4,000,000
DanChurchAid	Angola	Mine Clearance Programme with Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in Angola.	S.3	2,500,000
DHA	South Africa	Mine Clearance Conference in South Africa	S.3	478,275
DanChurchAid	Chechnia	Programme for Mine Clearance in Chechnia. (Total budget 9.3 Mio. DKK).	S.3	5,000,000
IPPNW	International	The Danish Contribution to IPPNW's project concerning Mine Clearance	S.3	2,100,000
		1997 in total		38,578,275

(Source: Annual Reports of Danida and internal statistics from the files of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs/S.3)

Danish Support to Humanitarian Mine Action (Updated 29.05.00)

All Amounts in DKK

Disbursed (1998)	Recipient Country	Activity Description	MFA Dept.	Total Amount
	Angola	Mine Clearance	S.3	13,500,000
NPA				
DDG	Afghanistan	Mine Clearance	S.3	7,000,000
UNOCHA	Afghanistan	Mine Clearance	S.3	5,000,000
ICRC	Cambodia	Mine Education	S.3	1,000,000
DanChurchAid	Angola	Mine Clearance in Moxico-province	S.3	3,000,000
UNDP	Somalia	Mine Clearance	S.3	1,000,000
DanChurchAid	Chechnia	Programme for Mine Clearance in Chechnia. (2. instalment of 9.3 Mio. DKK).	S.3	2,000,000
DDG	Somalia	Mine Clearance	S.3	4,000,000
UNDP	Laos	Bomb Clearance Programme and Information Campaign (total grant 1997-1998)	S.6	2,700,000
OHR / DEMEX	Bosnia- Her	Total grant (1997-1998)	StN.2	112,250
Norwegian People's Aid	Mozambique	Mine Clearance Programme	S.7	5,000,000
1998 in total				44,312,250

(Source: Annual Reports of Danida and internal statistics from the files of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs/S.3)

Danish Support to Humanitarian Mine Action (Updated 29.05.00)

All Amounts in DKK

Disbursed (1999)	Recipient Country	Activity Description	MFA Dept.	Total Amount
	Angola	Training Program and Information Campaign in Toco north of Lubango	S.3	4,000,000
NPA	Kosovo	Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action in Kosovo	S.3	1,500,000
UNMAS	Angola	Information campaign ect.	S.3	5,000,000
DFH	Afghanistan	Mine clearance program ect.	S.3	2,500,000
UNOCHA	Kosovo	Mine Education (total grant 1999-2000: 17,4 mil.)	S.3	11,900,000
DanChurchAid	Mozambique	Mine clearance program ect.	S.7	5,000,000
Norwegian People's Aid	Mozambique	Mine clearance program ect.	S.7	14,500,000
ADP/UNDP	Vietnam	Bomb and Mine Clearance in Quang Tri Province (total grant 1998-1999)	S.6	7,100,000
MAG	Bosnia- Her	Identification of areas in Brcko where mine clearance is needed (Total grant 98-99)	StN.2	460,000
OHR / DEMEX	Bosnia- Her	Mine clearance in Brcko (total grant 1998-1999)	StN.2	1,720,000
DEMEX	Bosnia- Her	Trust fund for demining (Total grant 1998-1999)	StN.2	700,000
Slovenian Trust Fund (Demining activities).	Somalia	Mine Clearance Program (MIKA)	S.7	540,000
Danish Demining Group				
		1999 in total		54,920,000

(Source: Annual Reports of Danida and internal statistics from the files of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs/S.3)

Danish Support to Humanitarian Mine Action (Updated 29.05.00)

All Amounts in DKK

Disbursed (2000)

Organization	Recipient Country	Activity Description	Dept. MFA	Total Amount
UNMAS	Mozambique	Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action in Mozambique	S.3	1,000,000
DFH /ASF	Chechnia	Mine awareness etc.	S.3	300,000
IPPNW	General	Support to mine campaigns	S.3	1,000,000
ICBL	International	Aid to ICBL's Landmine Monitor Initiative.	S.3	350,000
DanChurchAid	Kosovo	Mine clearance program ect. (2. instalment of total grant 1999: 17,4 mil.)	S.3	5,500,000
DanChurchAid	Kosovo	Mine clearance program ect.	S.3	7,000,000
DanChurchAid	Chechnia	Programme for Mine Clearance in Chechnia. (3. instalment of 9.3 Mil).	S.3	2,300,000
UNDP	Laos	Bomb Clearance Program (total grant 1998-2000)	S.6	19,500,000
Nicaraguan Government	Nicaragua	Mine Clearance Program (total grant 1998-2000)	S.5	8,000,000
OAS	Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica	Mine Clearance Program (total grant 1998-2000)	S.5	15,000,000
IND/UNOPS	Mozambique	Technical Assistance to National Demining Institute	S.7	2,972,700
Dandec	General	Grant to education in mine clearance	S.3	2,000,000
2000 (May) in total				64,922,700

Granted but not allocated (2000)

UNDP/CMAC	Cambodia	Mine Clearance Programme (Total grant 1998-2000)	S.6	5,000,000
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(Source: Annual Reports of Danida and internal statistics from the files of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs/S.3)

GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

There are some 110 million anti-personnel land mines buried in 68 countries, in particular post-conflict areas such as Cambodia, Bosnia, and Mozambique. These mines cause horrific injuries to ordinary citizens not only during war but after fighting has finished. This is a humanitarian problem that greatly hinders post-war recovery and development.

In June 1997, the Government of Japan signed the Protocol II as amended of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Conventional Weapons). In December 1997, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Keizo Obuchi, attended the signing ceremony for the Ottawa Treaty and signed it. In September 1998, the Government of Japan ratified the Treaty and established the treaty-implementation law called the "Law on the Prohibition of the Manufacture of Anti-personnel Mines and the Regulation of the Possession of Anti-personnel Mines"

At the signing of the Ottawa Treaty, late Prime Minister Obuchi proposed the "Zero Victims Program" and stressed the importance of taking a comprehensive approach to the problem by implementing a universal and effective ban on anti-personnel mines and strengthening assistance for demining and victims. In this conflict, he announced a pledge of assistance of 10 billion yen for the five years from 1998.

In addition, simultaneously, the Government of Japan decided that the export of machinery and materials required for humanitarian demining activities would be an exception to the three principles of weapons exports which strictly prohibit weapons exports.

At the First Meeting of State Parties to the Ottawa Treaty held in Maputo, Mozambique on May 1999, Mr. Takemi, the then parliamentary State Secretary for Foreign Affairs who attended the meeting as the Japanese representative, stressed the need for; 1) the universal application of the Treaty; 2) the signing of the Protocol II to CCW as amended and moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mine by countries which are considered unlikely to sign the Treaty in the near future; and 3) early commencement of negotiations for a treaty that bans the international transfer of anti-personnel mines at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. He also explained Japan's intention to implement demining and provide assistance for victims based on the three principles of ownership, partnership, and human security and announced specific aid packages for Thailand, Chad, and Nicaragua. His statement was warmly welcomed.

At this same Meeting, it was agreed that countries would implement joint activities during the intersessional period until the Second Meeting in September 2000. The Government of Japan was elected as rapporteur for the Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance established as part of these joint activities. Japan will become a co-chairman at the Second Meeting.

With regard to the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, one of the main obligations in the Ottawa Treaty, the Government of Japan will complete destruction of the approximately one million land mines which it holds by the end of February 2003 in full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

To secure transparency and to obtain the understanding of its citizens, the Government of Japan conducted public demonstration of the destruction work together, with a briefing meeting. The demonstration was attended by around 200 people including the then Prime Minister, Mr. Obuchi, Minister for Defense, the General of the Ground Defense Force, government officials, local citizen representatives, local leaders, and people from the NGO and media. It increased public understanding of how the Government of Japan would handle the destruction work.

After the Ottawa Treaty came into force, in view of the importance of obtaining its universal acceptance, the Government of Japan urged, in cooperation with Canada, non-ratifiers to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible and participate in the First Meeting of State Parties. Since then, the Government of Japan has been taking opportunities of international conferences and bilateral talks to call upon the non-ratifiers to accede to the Treaty and will continue to do so.

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME**Introduction**

The indiscriminate laying of landmines has created a long term development problem in many countries across the globe. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has a growing role in supporting Governments of mine affected countries and local communities to address this problem.

The United Nations Policy on Mine Action¹ confirms the need for a fully integrated response to the problems caused by landmines and UXO, incorporating mine awareness and risk reduction education; minefield survey, mapping, marking and clearance; victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration; and advocacy to stigmatize the use of landmines and support a total ban on antipersonnel landmines. The policy outlines the roles and responsibilities of each of the relevant UN Agencies, coordinated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).

UNDP is responsible *“for addressing the socio-economic consequences of landmine contamination and for supporting national/local capacity building to ensure the elimination of the obstacle they pose to the resumption of normal economic activity, reconstruction and development. When applicable, UNDP will have normal responsibility for the development of integrated, sustainable national/local mine action programmes.....”*

Development of national/local capacity

UNDP's role is not to engage in actual mine clearance itself, but to assist Governments to develop long term capacity to manage, prioritize and coordinate their Mine Action Programme. UNDP, with its network of offices in 137 countries and its multi-sectoral approach to development, is able to provide appropriate support and training for the establishment of integrated national mine action programmes. In addition, it has a small specialist team based at its headquarters office in New York, which provides assistance in areas such as capacity building, technical advice, training, resource mobilisation and advocacy for a fully integrated approach to mine action. The team provides direct support to UNDP's regional bureaux and country offices, who in turn assist national governments.

UNDP is responsible for supporting mine action capacity building projects in various stages of development the following countries:

¹ “Mine Action and Effective Coordination,: The United Nations Policy” endorsed by the Secretary General in September 1998.

Existing Programmes	Pilot Programmes	Initial Planning
Angola	Guinea Bissau	Albania
Azerbaijan	Sri Lanka ²	Lebanon
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Iran ³	Jordan
Cambodia		Thailand
Chad		
Lao PDR		
Mozambique		
Somalia		
Yemen		

As of May 2000

The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has been contracted to provide project services for many of these programmes. Further information on the specific details of these programmes is contained in the country information sections of this report.

UNDP's support to host Governments is aimed at developing an appropriate, sustainable response to the problems of landmines which contaminate their country. Typically, this response will include:

- The development of a national legislative framework which will set out how mine action activities should be conducted. If the country has signed or ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, the legislation will also address its obligations in respect of the Convention. This framework will also normally identify which Ministries and other organisations will participate in defining the national mine action policy.
- The establishment of a national mine action centre which will be responsible for preparation of the national mine action plan, consulting on a working level with key ministries and other organisations to ensure that the plan addresses established priorities. The national mine action centre would normally also be responsible for the development of the national standards, quality assurance, the national mine action data-base, tasking/contracting of implementing partners and training.
- The implementation of an information management system. UNDP, in close cooperation with UNMAS and the Geneva International Centre for

² Project suspended in early May 2000 due to increased fighting in the Jaffna area.

³ Project suspended at end March 2000.

Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), is working with national mine action programmes to introduce the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). In the past year, UNDP coordinated the participation of Information Managers and Technical Advisers from the national mine action programmes in Chad, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Laos, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Yemen in training on the system.

- The development and implementation of a resource mobilisation strategy and plan.
- The provision of assistance with training and capacity building. UNDP provides technical advisers to support and provide on-the-job training for key staff of national mine action centres. In addition, in 1999, UNDP undertook a study which assessed the training needs of management staff and proposed options to address them. The Government of the United Kingdom is now funding UNDP's follow-on project, implemented by Cranfield University in the UK, to develop training packages for executive, senior and middle managers. The Senior Manager's pilot course will be trialed at Cranfield University in August-September 2000. After a post-course review of the materials, the training packages will be distributed for delivery in country, through local colleges, specialist trainers, or by project technical advisers. Similar strategies will be adopted with the training for executive and middle managers.

Addressing Socio-Economic issues

Socio-Economic Impact Study

In order to assist mine action programmes set priorities, and to assist in reporting the impact of their work, UNDP has commissioned GICHD to conduct a study into the assessment of the socio-economic impact of mine action. The study report and guidelines are intended to be a clear and straightforward operational tool for programme planners who will look at how human, social, economic and environmental indicators have been used in mine action. The study will also address how mine action as a whole is integrated within emergency and development initiatives. The findings will help the programme planner to set more meaningful programme objectives, and thereby to identify clear targets by which both the efficiency and the effectiveness of mine action can be judged. The study entails a review of the literature on mine action, including programme planning and evaluation in both the humanitarian and development fields. This will be supplemented by country case studies to document differences in how agencies cope with mine and UXO contamination in three situations: (1) immediate reaction to a complex emergency (Kosovo); (2) transition from humanitarian to development assistance (Mozambique); and (3) "normal development" (Laos).

Socio-Economic Reintegration of Landmine Victims

The World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF) has been engaged to conduct a project for UNDP looking at the socio-economic reintegration of landmine victims. This project, which is being implemented in Cambodia, Laos, Lebanon and Mozambique, has developed a "prototype" of mechanisms and services which should be in place to support the socio-economic re-integration of landmine victims. It is also developing pilot projects to demonstrate approaches which can bring about this goal, as well as seeking funding for further initiatives in these countries. In the first year of this project, WRF have worked in Cambodia and Laos, analysing the legislative and organisational frameworks as well as services being provided in country. In addition, they have conducted an initial visit to Lebanon to introduce the project and agree on the approach to its implementation in the country. Links are being established between WRF and the Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) to ensure that there is proper coordination between this project and the LSN project for the Landmine Survivors Rehabilitation Database.

Other activities***Resource mobilisation***

UNDP assists governments and others involved in the national mine action response to carry out their own resource mobilisation efforts. This can be through the provision of advice, assisting with the establishment and management of Trust Funds, establishing cost-sharing agreements, facilitating in-kind contributions, and participating in round table meetings, consultative groups and similar mechanisms. UNDP also submits information on the country programmes and their resource needs to the UN Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, contributing to a coordinated UN approach to resource mobilisation for mine action.

In 1999, UNDP contributed approximately US\$ 6 million of its own resources for mine action activities. These seed funds succeeded in raising a further US\$ 30 million in cost sharing or contributions to UNDP Trust funds. In addition, UNDP works in close cooperation with the National Mine Action Programmes that it supports to coordinate resource mobilisation for the total programme. It is estimated that, in 1999, a total of over US\$ 50 million was contributed by host governments and donors for mine action programmes in these countries. Recently, UNDP has worked closely with the Government of Mozambique and their National Demining Institute (IND) to develop its strategy and resource mobilisation plan to respond the effect of the major flooding on the landmine situation. UNDP has also worked to ensure continuing support for the Cambodian Mine Action Centre as it responds to the need for management change.

The United Nations Association of the United States (UNA-USA) continues to be an active partner raising resources for mine clearance through the "Adopt-A-Minefield" campaign. By the end of April 2000, over US\$1.5 million had been pledged, of which almost US\$.1.3 million had been received by UNA-USA. The Mine Action Programmes in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia and Mozambique are currently participating in this programme. It is hoped that one or two additional Mine Action Centres will be able to join the programme this year.

Coordination

The headquarters-based Mine Action Team coordinates with UNMAS, other UN partners, the World Bank, non-government organisations and donors, and represents UNDP at international meetings as appropriate, and ensures that information is shared with colleagues as necessary. UNDP is also represented on focus groups, the survey certification committee and other inter-agency groups.

Information

In 1999, UNDP produced the following promotional material:

- *Post Crisis Recovery and Landmines*, a twenty-four page booklet which describes the ways in which UNDP's support to mine action programmes assists the countries in their recovery process, with particular reference to its socio-economic impact.
- *Capacity Building for Sustainable Mine Action*: a tri-fold brochure describing UNDP's role in capacity building for mine action.

In addition, the internet site < <http://www.undp.org/erd/mineaction/> > which provides information on UNDP's mine action policy and programmes is regularly updated.

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF)

In keeping with its role as the UN focal point for mine awareness education, UNICEF continues to provide the international community with appropriate guidance for mine awareness programmes. Liaising closely with concerned partners and in collaboration with WHO and the ICRC, UNICEF continues to assist, wherever possible, with comprehensive rehabilitation for mine survivors and continues to advocate for the promotion of a total ban on anti-personnel landmines and the universalisation of the Ottawa Convention.

UNICEF is currently undertaking mine action programmes in 17 countries world-wide and seeks to utilise the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as the framework for developing a 'rights based approach' to programming. Programmes supported by the agency are based on sustainable, long-term local capacity building initiatives. In dealing with the problem of landmines, UNICEF continues to integrate all mine-related issues into its regular programming. This is especially the case in the areas of advocacy, mine awareness education, and somewhat with victim assistance.

Advocacy

UNICEF, together with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and International Committee of the Red Cross has been working towards the universalisation

of the Ottawa Convention. In order to strengthen and renew these efforts, UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy recently sent letters to the Heads of State of all signatories to the Ottawa Convention, urging them to ratify the Convention as soon as possible. As a follow-up, additional efforts will be re-initiated through UNICEF's regional and country offices and updated ratification kits are being provided to support them in their efforts.

In addition, UNICEF has been supporting ICBL's Goodwill Ambassador in South-East Asia, to raise awareness of the Ottawa Convention. In 2000-2001, UNICEF and the ICBL will co-host senior level Regional Conferences advocating against the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of mines and urging further ratifications.

UNICEF has participated in all relevant meetings including the First Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention and its Standing Committee of Experts, the Annual Meeting of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and the ICBL's Landmine Monitor Meeting.

Mine Awareness Education

Together with the ICBL, UN and the ICRC, UNICEF was instrumental in developing the *International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Education*, which was launched at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Treaty in Mozambique, in May 1999. These Guidelines serve to guide the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all UN mine awareness programmes.

Following the publication of the *International Guidelines*, UNICEF was tasked by the United Nations to develop *International Training Modules on Mine Awareness Education*. In 1999, two international workshops were held on the subject and two modules have been created, one to serve Programme Managers and the other Mine Awareness Facilitators. Field testing of the training modules was undertaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in April 2000. Participants included UNICEF, UN, Red Cross and NGO staff working in CEE/CIS countries on mine awareness education. The modules will be revised based on the findings from the field tests and will be launched at the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Treaty in September 2000.

In March, 2000, at the Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness, the international community called upon UNICEF to take the lead in developing *International Guidelines for the Monitoring and Evaluation of Mine Awareness Programmes*. These guidelines will ensure that Programme Managers will undertake monitoring and evaluation of their mine awareness programmes. In developing these *International Guidelines* expertise will be sought from UN agencies, mine action centres, and operational NGOs and International Organisations, and an opportunity given to all partners to provide input to, and comment on the *Guidelines* as they are being developed. A first meeting will take place in the fall of 2000. Consequently, a first draft of the *Guidelines* will be circulated for initial review, which will be followed by a large-scale technical consultation in early 2001.

UNICEF has also been mandated to develop *International Standards for Landmine and UXO Awareness Programmes* and will initiate this process during 2000. Moreover, UNICEF will contribute regional inputs to a global baseline review and inventory of mine awareness training/learning materials, of best practices and of technical

partner/agency expertise. Further, UNICEF will increase the capacity of its Regional Offices to develop and undertake programmes in the area of mine action.

UNICEF has participated in all the UNMAS-lead Inter-Agency Assessment Missions to mine-affected countries, and in cooperation with its NGO partners, has prepared and developed additional mine awareness programmes based on these assessments.

UNICEF will work closely with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to develop modalities of cooperation in data gathering and data dissemination for planning its mine awareness and victim assistance strategies.

Victim Assistance

UNICEF will continue to cooperate closely with its UN and NGO partners to support the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of mine survivors and their reintegration within the communities. UNICEF continues to provide support for the development of low-cost, locally produced prosthetics, orthotics and other assistive devices. Additionally, economic and social rehabilitation for the disabled is still being undertaken through psychosocial counselling, referrals to prosthetic workshops, physiotherapy, community-based rehabilitation, vocational training, and the provision of grants or loans to start up small businesses. This programme also ensures that disabled children go to school and encourages the creation of self-help groups of disabled persons. In collaboration with the appropriate Ministries of Health, UNICEF continues to support the construction of Rural Health Centres in selected areas.

UNICEF together with the WHO, ICRC, Swiss Government and relevant NGOs has been working towards the development of a Public Health Approach to dealing with mine victim assistance. This approach avoids programmes that narrowly target a specific group thereby creating a “privileged class” of disabled, but instead focuses on improving the quality and availability of health services in the specialities and the geographic areas most likely to impact upon those affected by conflict. Additionally, this approach is encompassed within the chapeau of a child-rights framework.

Currently, specific programmes for victim assistance have been established in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Cambodia, Guatemala, Macedonia and Mozambique. UNICEF is looking into the possibility of establishing new programmes in Uganda and Lao PDR. In 1999, UNICEF’s newly created Guatemala programme also undertook Workshops/Seminars on Prosthetic Post-Surgical Treatment, the development of Health Information Systems on Disability, and on consensus building to review five Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) Training Guides in the country.

UNICEF, together with ICBL, UNDP and other relevant partners, is also developing child-focussed Guidelines for reintegration of survivors of mines with special emphasis on psychosocial trauma counselling, life skills training etc.

In cooperation with the WHO, GICHD and other partners, UNICEF will refine the data collection system targeting child survivors of mine accidents.

Regionally, UNICEF will undertake a baseline review and qualitative assessment of rehabilitation services and programmes as the basis for identifying best practices gaps and potential UNICEF partnerships.

UNICEF Country Programmes

UNICEF plans to undertake a range of activities in 2000 in the following 17 countries:

Albania

As a follow up to the National Mine Awareness Campaign launched during the Kosovo emergency, UNICEF continues its role as lead agency for mine awareness in Albania with further sensitisation of public opinion and policy-makers on landmine/UXO/weapons-related dangers. A needs assessment survey and evaluation will be carried out through the Albanian Youth Council network and partner NGOs to determine a national strategy for the year 2000, including the impact and sustainability of interventions. Mine/weapons awareness will be incorporated into the school curriculum after undertaking a training of trainers and testing in pilot schools. Technical support will be provided to the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) and marking signs delivered for the remarking of minefields. In the area of Mine Victims Assistance, UNICEF will promote the Mine Victims' Association and the social reintegration of mine victims, and will support workshops producing walking aids for mine victims. UNICEF will continue to promote and closely monitor the implementation of the Ottawa Convention, recently ratified by the Albanian Parliament.

Angola

In Angola, UNICEF and its partner organisations have carried out a number of effective programs in 1999. All of these share the underlying goal of building sustainable community capacity and the capability to live safely with the presence of mines. Mine awareness messages have been communicated through provincial theatre groups using locally appropriate communications techniques such as poster, puppet shows, traditional song, dance and plays. These campaigns have reached approximately 400,000 people. Training seminars in mine awareness techniques were conducted for about 1,120 teachers who have incorporated the messages into daily lessons, further reaffirming mine awareness strategies. Over 55,500 students have already been sensitised to the dangers of mines. Moreover, the Teacher Emergency Packages (TEP) programme which distributes pedagogical materials to teachers active in non-formal education settings continues to be supported. UNICEF has also provided support for a number of advocacy efforts in Angola including the observance of the second anniversary of Ottawa Convention, a theatre night, sport activities for disabled people, and a children's festival called "Song against Landmines". In collaboration with CIET International, an evaluation of UNICEF's mine awareness programmes is currently being completed.

In 2000, UNICEF will continue to enhance the level of community-based mine awareness, especially among vulnerable groups. In order to reach displaced communities with maximum effect, UNICEF will support project activities centred around IDP communities and host populations in Huambo, Kuito, Huila and Bengo. Working through four local NGOs, UNICEF will continue to deliver mines awareness messages at the community level. Further, the agency will assist in training teachers in mine awareness, to reinforce messages through the Angolan school system and the Teacher Emergency Package. An evaluation of UNICEF's current pilot project in the primary schools will

also be undertaken. UNICEF will continue to support the production of a quarterly mine bulletin by INAROE.

Over the next year, UNICEF Angola intends to direct its energy toward what it believes will be the most effective areas of social benefit. Recognising the probability of operating in an insecure environment, project orientation will seek to build upon current concrete successes. Other areas of continuing and growing emphasis will be mine awareness activities toward community behavioural modification; the development and maintenance of a mine incident surveillance system; continuation of mine advocacy through workshops and local popular media; and increasing the capacity for INAROE and provincial delegations.

Azerbaijan

UNICEF will initiate a Mine Awareness Programme in Azerbaijan, training teachers and health personnel in mine awareness education. In addition, training materials for teachers and students will be developed and included within the formal school curricula, utilising both child-to-child and child-to-mother techniques. The local population will also be provided mine awareness through public education materials such as posters, pamphlets, brochures and TV spots. An integrated approach will be developed within the mine awareness system where IDP movement and feedback will be obtained to provide information to the Azerbaijan National Strategic Corporate Plan for Mine Action. The database of mine victims will be analysed for trends and problems. UNICEF will also participate in a needs assessment mission in the year 2000.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

UNICEF will continue to develop mine awareness education kits for training teachers and educators and undertake monitoring and evaluation of UN and NGO activities. Mine awareness training programmes through football clubs will be organised in order to disseminate mine awareness information after coaching sessions and school competitions with drawings, essays, poems around the theme of mine awareness. The use of theatre, radio and TV will augment programmes and technical support for implementation of mine awareness education.

Cambodia

In 1999, over 2,000 children with disability benefited from socio-economic reintegration and community based rehabilitation. Approximately 3,000 persons, 80% women and children, received a mobility device. Child-centred mine awareness programmes will continue to be undertaken in 2000 in cooperation with the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) and activities such as surveys, permanent marking, awareness and selective limited clearance will be undertaken with community participation. In the course of the year mine awareness for children will progressively be transferred to the Ministry of Education for school activities. UNICEF will continue to support the CMAC Integrated Database and the CRC Mine Incident Database to collect comprehensive information on mine incidents and to improve the planning, monitoring and evaluation of mine action activities. Prosthetics, orthotics and other assistive devices will be provided in support of programmes in

cooperation with Handicap International (HI), Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) and the Ministry of Health. A joint initiative of the Disability Action Council and the Ministry of Education will continue to promote access to education for children with disabilities. UNICEF, with its partners will continue to lobby for the implementation of the Ottawa Treaty.

Chad

UNICEF will participate in a needs assessment mission to Chad and will assist with drafting a national mine awareness communication strategy for the country.

Colombia

UNICEF and the Colombian Red Cross have undertaken mine awareness education over the past three years in the country. Mine signs have been posted in minefields in 15 municipalities; approximately 1,000 young brigade members were trained; mine awareness materials were disseminated to 200 primary and secondary schools in Colombia. In 1999, UNICEF in partnership with the Ministry of Communications, the Scouts Association of Colombia and the Dream Foundation of the Kiwanis Club initiated a new project including Education, Prevention and Social Integration of Victims of Accidents caused by Antipersonnel Mines. Activities included the education of children, training of scouts, training on production and broadcast of radio programmes, and the preparation of a video documentary for T.V. Furthermore, the preparation of a national census of the mine-affected population was initiated. In 2000, educational materials, such as posters, pamphlets, flyers, TV spots and radio programmes will be prepared, adapted and distributed, and child-to-child and child-to-mother methods will be utilised in the schools.

Croatia

UNICEF will continue to develop appropriate mine awareness materials targeting the most vulnerable sections of the population in order to alter risk-taking behaviour. Mine awareness and teacher training will continue in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, the Police Academy, the Ministry of the Interior and national NGOs.

Ethiopia

In 1999, UNICEF undertook a needs assessment mission to Ethiopia and based on the findings of the mission developed an interim mine awareness education strategy for the country. Together with Rehabilitation and Development Organisation (RaDO), UNICEF undertook a training of trainers ("ToT") for 30 local community leaders. In 2000, UNICEF with its local partners, will train affected communities in the production and dissemination of mine awareness messages.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)

UNICEF played a lead role in coordinating efforts and providing mine awareness education for Kosovar refugees in Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. The agency developed a mine awareness strategy for the returning refugees which included developing a Teacher's Manual and undertaking a "ToT" for teachers in the refugee camps, working with local NGOs and Red Cross Societies to assist those living with host families, training and supporting mobile mine awareness theatre groups, developing 6

public service announcements and 2 TV spots for regular broadcast, and disseminating over 1 million posters and leaflets throughout the refugee camps and at border crossings. UNICEF will continue to raise awareness amongst all sectors of society about the dangers of mines/UXO. UNICEF will support a mass media and information campaign that will be conducted using TV, radio, posters and newspapers. Mine/UXO awareness will be incorporated into the school curriculum, using child-centred techniques, and teachers will be trained in use of the curriculum. UNICEF will ensure coordination and standardisation of all mine/UXO awareness activities through close cooperation with UNMIK/UNMACC and technical awareness guidance will be provided to organisations working in Kosovo. UNICEF will also support child mine victims in Kosovo.

Guatemala

UNICEF continues to support victims assistance projects being undertaken by the NGO Physicians Against Landmines (PALM). Specialised courses were undertaken on Prosthetic Post Surgical Treatment, and in coordination with PAHO, 35 professionals were trained in Health Information Systems. Additionally, a consensus building workshop to review 5 Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) training guidelines was carried out, and a CBR study developed in Esquintla.

In 2000, a survey and the development of a national database and registry of rehabilitation resources will be initiated in Guatemala. Training will be provided in prosthetics/orthotics, occupational and physical therapy, psychosocial counselling and rehabilitative equipment will be provided for mine victims. Community-based education, information and communication programmes will also be developed.

Laos

UNICEF will undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the mine/UXO awareness programme and will adapt the programme based on its findings. UNICEF will continue community awareness with particular focus on extending messages to children and ethnic minority groups in areas not previously reached by community awareness. An increase is planned in the technical capacity at field level with emphasis on support for material development, production, and assistance to strengthen community awareness management. In addition, on-the-job training is planned. The capacity of UXO LAO will be strengthened and monitoring and evaluation components will be further refined.

Mozambique

Under the coordination of the National Demining Institute, UNICEF will continue to support the implementation of the National Demining Institute's data gathering system for mine accidents. School teachers, social and health workers will be trained on mine awareness education and mine awareness activities will be undertaken in schools and communities. Assistance will continue to be provided for physical and psychosocial rehabilitation through orthopaedic workshops and trauma counselling, in addition to training of school teachers, social and health workers in mine awareness education. Monitoring and evaluation of local and community level mine awareness programmes will be on-going.

Nicaragua

Mine awareness training activities reached a total of 5,473 persons and prevention workshops were carried out in the most affected areas. Coordination with the Nicaraguan Army's prevention team was consolidated and children and adolescents were trained to undertake outreach activities. UNICEF continues to supervise and monitor the mine awareness programme.

In 2000, UNICEF will continue to develop mine awareness materials and child broadcasters will be trained in coordination with the Nicaraguan Red Cross. Local programme coordinators will be trained in mine awareness education. Community-based solutions will be formulated following discussions with 600 communities.

Panama

To protect people living near former military shooting ranges, UNICEF will direct a program of UXO awareness education to different target groups through community-based interventions using networks of public and social institutions. Information will be disseminated through the different media to strengthen implementation and increase national social awareness. Mechanisms for marking dangerous areas and reporting the presence of UXO to the relevant authorities will also be developed.

Somalia

Mine awareness training will be undertaken through local schools, women's groups and NGOs. Reporting systems on mine accidents will be strengthened and the development of appropriate communication tools such as toys, puppets, games, posters, videos, etc will be supported. UNICEF will undertake a 'training of trainers' on mine risk education and provide technical assistance to local authorities and NGOs on the design and implementation of survey instruments.

Sri Lanka

UNICEF will train government and NGO officials as mine awareness trainers. In partnership with government departments at national, regional and local levels and UN agencies, UNICEF will monitor mine incident data in the affected areas and conduct training and awareness activities in schools and communities. Prostheses and economic assistance will be provided to mine victims.

Sudan

UNICEF will coordinate mines awareness activities in OLS-Southern Sector areas of operation and support the mines awareness teams of Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL). The management capacity of OSIL, Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association and Relief Association of South Sudan will be strengthened and the mines awareness capacity of indigenous Sudanese organisations, including counterparts and NGOs will be further developed. A "Training of Trainers" (ToT) will be undertaken in Future Search methodology and mines awareness activities conducted through the Future Search network of children and youth. Mine awareness messages will be prepared and incorporated into the existing delivery systems of education, health, water and sanitation services. Through appropriate partnerships, UNICEF will plan to provide mine-awareness education to approximately 500,000 residents and internally displaced as well

as 350,000 refugees residing in neighbouring countries. A comprehensive survey to collect information on landmines will be conducted.

UNITED NATIONS MINE ACTION SERVICE

Landmines constitute one of the many serious problems facing the world as we enter the twenty-first century, afflicting nearly one-third of the world's countries, restricting the potential of national development efforts, and impairing the realisation of true human security within infested regions. The terrible impact of anti-personnel landmines has since been recognised, however, and this recognition has provided the stimulus for successful action on the part of the international community, and for the development of crucial links between the United Nations and civil society.

In recognition of the multi-disciplinary nature of mine action and of the requirement for enhanced coordination, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was established in 1997 to serve as UN focal point for landmine-related issues and activities. The nature of this role requires UNMAS to play a central part in all aspects of what is a holistic activity and, as such, necessitates a proactive and focused response in terms of both policy formulation and implementation, as well as in the reporting of findings and activities to the broader community.

Policy development and coordination

In its capacity as focal point, UNMAS is responsible for ongoing policy development and coordination with regard to United Nations mine action activities. In 1998, in collaboration with ten UN departments, agencies, and other concerned UN entities, UNMAS prepared a comprehensive document entitled *Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Policy* in order to provide appropriate guidance for UN activities worldwide. Within the context of this document, UNMAS has continued to further develop the principles of UN mine action through the preparation of additional guidelines, such as those published in 1999 pertaining to UN support to Government mine action programmes involving collaborative arrangements with the military. These policies are being further supplemented through the ongoing production of other complementary clarifying documents such as a five-year strategy paper.

In order to facilitate the ongoing coordination of UN mine action, both internally within the UN system and externally between the UN system and non-UN partners, two mechanisms have been established to maximise the focus of the international and UNMAS response. The Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action and the Steering Committee on Mine Action were both created to further this goal, and have achieved tangible results by providing opportunities for consultation and the exchange of ideas. These bodies are chaired at the senior management level by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, and at the working level by the Chief of UNMAS, with meetings taking place on a regular basis to best ensure effective communication. There is also a close working relationship between UNMAS and the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), a collaboration of major mine action donors which

meets monthly to develop funding strategies and enhance international interaction with UN landmine-related activities. A reinforced MASG, including donor representatives from national capitals, also occurs on an annual basis with UNMAS providing updates and briefings on current and pressing issues.

As a result of the First Meeting of the States Parties (FMSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999, a programme of Inter-Sessional Work was established to enhance coordination of the five key elements of mine action that had been identified. UNMAS actively participates in this process, attending meetings of the resulting Standing Committees of Experts and providing technical briefings and other input as needed. This is seen as an ongoing responsibility throughout the FMSP process, with anticipated requirements being to provide expert advice both on implementation issues and their relationship with policy development.

Additional conference activities also occur throughout the year, including a UN meeting of mine action programme directors and advisors organised by UNMAS and held annually in Geneva with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). This meeting provides a key coordination opportunity by gathering key mine action practitioners in one location for effective and in-depth consultations. This facilitates better information sharing, comparison of techniques, lessons learned analysis, and news of innovations at the management level, as well as an opportunity for direct feedback between field personnel and those staff providing support at the headquarters level.

Commitment to these and other fora provides regular opportunities for reporting and coordination at many levels, ensuring a flow of information and varied input into the development of United Nations strategies and policies at the working and management level. UNMAS sees this as an ongoing and proactive activity, enabling a focused response to identified needs within the mine action community as well as in the development of future strategies and plans for effective implementation.

Assessment and monitoring of the landmine threat

One of UNMAS' main responsibilities is to assess and monitor the global landmine threat, with a view to identifying needs and developing appropriate responses in a systematic manner. Towards this end, 1998 saw five inter-agency and multi-sectoral assessment missions conducted in Azerbaijan, Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen. In 1999, six additional missions were conducted to Kosovo, Lebanon, Jordan, Ecuador, Peru, Zimbabwe and Namibia. So far in 2000, assessment missions have been conducted in Egypt, Nicaragua, Zambia and Belarus, and additional missions remain under consideration. The aim of these missions is to define the scope and nature of the landmine / UXO problem in the affected countries, identify constraints and opportunities relating to the development of mine action initiative, and make recommendations for a comprehensive response, including institutional arrangements for the coordination and implementation of mine action activities. Technical missions have also been conducted on a more limited scale in support of new and ongoing operations, with visits in 1998 to Sudan, Iraq, and Guinea-Bissau, to Kosovo, Nicaragua, and Honduras in 1999, and to Sierra Leone and Mozambique after floods there in 2000.

Completed assessment reports are widely distributed among governments, non-governmental organisations, and other agencies and entities, as well as publicly via

electronic media, to enable a better understanding of the landmine situation within the broader community. In this manner, potential donors and the wider concerned community at all levels are kept informed as to the scope of the problem and the particular needs created within affected countries, ensuring more focused funding and support.

The implementation of Level 1 impact surveys is often a natural follow-up to assessment missions, designed not only to identify the general location of mined or suspected mined areas but also to measure the humanitarian and socio-economic impact of landmine contamination. Such surveys focus on collecting information for clearance activities and for mine awareness and victim assistance programmes in support of a complete national response. The determination of priorities as a result of this process allows activities and resources to be concentrated on the areas of greatest need, in line with the UN policy of developing a comprehensive profile of the landmine problem at a global level.

Towards this end, in 1999 Level 1 impact surveys were initiated in Yemen, Mozambique and Chad, with a limited survey also being conducted in Kosovo in response to the humanitarian crisis in that province. Further impact surveys are projected for Thailand and Lebanon in the near future and in cooperation with the Survey Action Centre, and in Cambodia with the support of the Government of Canada. Funding is being provided by donor countries and the United Nations Foundation for International Peace (UNFIP).

Programme initiation and programme support

Since the initiation of the first humanitarian mine action programmes in 1988, UN field activities in support of emergency situations, peace-keeping operations and longer term, integrated mine action programmes have developed considerably. While direct responsibility for the latter rests primarily with UNDP, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) coordinates activities in Afghanistan, while the Iraq "Oil-for-Food" Programme does so in Iraq. In this context, UNMAS is tasked with ensuring global coordination of all activities and assisting in the establishment of programmes in a growing number of situations. For all of these activities, UNMAS remains involved in an advisory and monitoring capacity, acting as the repository for central reporting and providing oversight of elements such as standards and quality assurance.

At the country and regional level, UNMAS has maintained its role in terms of coordination and integration, as well as implementation where required, to ensure the global oversight of UN mine action. Within Croatia, UNMAS continues to be directly responsible for the mine action programme, with the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) acting as implementing partner. It is planned to transfer this responsibility to UNDP this year, in conformity with the agreed principles of the UN mine action policy for development of indigenous capacities. Concurrently, humanitarian emergencies in areas like south Sudan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Abkhazia require careful monitoring and contingency planning.

In Kosovo, UNMAS has demonstrated the transition undertaken from policy formulation to implementation, playing an early and key role in support of the

humanitarian operations launched there in 1999. A Mine Action Coordination Centre was established at the commencement of relief operations, with personnel deployed directly from the UNMAS Headquarters to provide a start-up team and ensure a coordinated and integrated response with UNOPS acting as the implementing agency. The MACC has since exercised responsibility for the planning and coordination of all mine / UXO-related activities, information management aspects, the development of technical and safety standards, quality assurance, and resource mobilisation for all entities active in the region, including providing co-ordinating support to KFOR forces. These tasks have been carried out in close co-operation with those international, non-governmental and commercial organisations in country, enabling all to function successfully within a coordinated work plan developed by the MACC.

UNMAS also continues to support mine action in the context of peace-keeping operations as these requirements arise and forces are deployed, while also maintaining a contingency planning role for any future crises. This has seen support being dispatched to Sierra Leone and the coordination of assistance within Tajikistan, while potential operations within central and sub-Saharan Africa and within eastern Europe also remain under constant consideration. Assistance for flood-related mine action within Mozambique has also been facilitated with UNMAS support in 2000, as a result of the impact of heavy flooding in many contaminated areas around the country. The inherently short notice and unknown scope of such operations, however, continue to place pressing demands on the limited resources available for such activities.

Additional planning commitments are also maintained for activities in Western Sahara, where approximately 100 demining specialists were originally deployed between May and November 1998 to verify and clear MINURSO deployment sites and prepare the repatriation of refugees. As the political process there stalled, however, the mine action force was subsequently reduced to an information cell. This cell continues to collect and disseminate mine-related information, and coordinate EOD and mine clearance operations conducted by Moroccan and Polisario forces. The UN peace-keeping presence in Lebanon and Kuwait (UNIFIL and UNIKOM) also pose similar planning difficulties, with EOD and clearance teams needing to be available in support of the deployment of peace-keeping troops.

Information management

Given the scope of the landmine problem, the wide spectrum of factors needing to be taken into consideration and the number of actors involved, the development of an appropriate information management system has been a priority for UNMAS. It has been apparent that such a system will greatly support and enhance monitoring, planning and programme implementation throughout all mine action activities, and will serve the needs not only of the United Nations but also of other partners by providing a better picture of the worldwide landmine threat. The initiative to create this Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) has been facilitated through an agreement between UNMAS and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

Initial steps in the development of the IMSMA field module have been completed and the module has been successfully deployed in Kosovo and Yemen, providing a theatre-wide tool for the collection, maintenance and dissemination of data on landmines and their impact. UNMAS is also providing ongoing support to the provision of training

courses to IMSMA users, while actively demonstrating and advocating the use of this system to selected organisations, national governments and other mine action partners. The IMSMA field module is being made available to new and existing mine action programmes, with a view to providing a benchmark system for the consolidation and use of landmine data in affected countries throughout the world.

The development of the complementary IMSMA headquarters module is also underway, incorporating both information processing and dissemination modules, with additional tools such as the recently-developed Database of Mine Action Investments also being included. The adoption of such a modular approach in the development of the IMSMA system means that the product can be maintained as a living and developing asset to the mine action community, with scope for improvement and adjustment as the situation requires. In the same manner, valuable secondary benefits are also making themselves apparent in the development of enhanced headquarters databases and country profiling systems, resulting in improved information processing mechanisms within the Mine Action Service.

In addition to these projects, UNMAS is also in the process of re-developing its World Wide Web presence in order to better serve the wider mine action community and provide a clearer and more user-friendly interface with the growing number of electronic media users. This will provide enhanced opportunities for consciousness-raising and advocacy efforts, while also providing better information to all levels of the international community. In such a manner, information relating to UN mine action activities can be made accessible to a larger, more diverse population.

Quality management and technology

UNMAS has remained committed to the development, maintenance and promotion of technical and safety standards for mine action, expanding the scope and coverage of available literature in order to ensure that coherent and clear reference sources are available for guidance. These standards provide a benchmark for future UN supported mine action operations, while also being openly available to other users to ensure a clear understanding of internationally accepted procedures and standards on all relevant issues.

Key among these efforts is the review of the International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations, which were produced originally in 1997 as a result of working group consultations in Denmark the previous year. This review process, conducted every two years, will see expert user-focus groups providing input into a re-drafting of the document, reflecting new technologies, experience gained and ongoing developments in the field. Commitment to such a process will ensure that this effort remains current and applicable to clearance operations both now and in the future.

To complement activities related to the development of standards, UNMAS is also devising a policy framework for the overall standards and guidelines process in order to ensure a coordinated and coherent direction for the numerous projects underway. These include activities relating to clearance, surveys, use of dogs, mechanical equipment, mine awareness, victim assistance and social reintegration, as well as quality management. This document, to be created in active consultation with all concerned partners and entities, is intended to augment related policy documents and provide a further link between policy formulation and implementation.

In this context, the training of personnel is also considered to be an essential component of overall quality management. In a 1997 study, the United Nations observed that "middle and senior level management skills are one of the biggest challenges facing training programmes, and are central to the task of developing an indigenous mine action capacity." In collaboration with UNMAS, UNDP subsequently conducted an assessment of the training needs of national and local mine action managers in January 1999, with workshops being developed to target appropriate participants.

With regard to mine action-related technology, there is growing acceptance that a more universal application of existing equipment could enable activities to be conducted more effectively, efficiently, and with less risk. UNMAS has been called upon to take an important role in this regard through the collection and dissemination of appropriate information and the development of applicable standards, where required and practical. With the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), UNMAS has drafted International Guidelines for the Procurement of Mine action Equipment, with results being discussed with all partners concerned. Future UNMAS directed projects, implemented through the GICHD, will compliment this work and provide a more coordinated approach to the ongoing development of new technology while also ensuring that items currently in existence are assessed and utilised appropriately.

Advocacy and consciousness-raising

Advocacy and consciousness-raising activities are integral parts of the international effort to rid the world of landmines. In the past two years, UNMAS has taken a lead role in support of a global ban on landmines and in the development of materials that stigmatise the use of these weapons. More than 250,000 consciousness-raising materials, including posters, bookmarks, books, videos and stickers with anti-landmine messages, in addition to the quarterly United Nations *Landmines Magazine*, have reached up to 50,000 institutions, decision-makers and concerned individuals worldwide.

UNMAS has also developed minefield simulators and significant travelling exhibitions as extremely effective awareness-raising tools, especially in countries with little or no experience with landmine contamination. These items, initially created for a conference in Tokyo in 1997, have since travelled throughout the world, to London, Glasgow, Athens, Geneva, Vienna and New York. An improved simulator is also under development, as well as a mine action CD-ROM to be used as both an instrument of advocacy and a teaching tool. Grants are also being provided to selected mine action programmes to develop public service announcements for national broadcast.

UNMAS staff is also repeatedly called upon to support public conferences, media occasions and educational activities throughout the world. These occasions provide a key opportunity to interact with a broad and attentive audience, to spread awareness of the issue and generate local grass roots interest in achieving a solution.

UNMAS sees this role continuing and expanding through the use of developing media and the global reach of current technology, while also remaining committed to nurturing lower level development of consciousness raising activities. Close partnership with the larger UN body has also offered opportunities to expand this capacity through a number of joint high profile fora.

Resource mobilisation

The vast majority of UN mine action activities are funded from voluntary donor contributions, making resource mobilisation instrumental to the success of these endeavours. As UN focal point, UNMAS coordinates these resource mobilisation efforts and manages the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, which acts as the central funding mechanism for many UN projects. Each year a consolidated *Portfolio of Mine-related Projects* is prepared to support this process, providing brief descriptions and budget requirements for all UN mine action programmes and projects, including those implemented by UNDP, UNOPS, UNICEF and other UN agencies or programmes. UNMAS also actively liaises with the donor community through a variety of regular and *ad hoc* meetings and consultations to discuss priorities and funding gaps and to ensure continued support of projects.

The Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) was established in 1994 to support the overall coordination of UN mine action, to finance the initiation of new mine action projects and activities, and to bridge funding gaps in ongoing programmes. Contributions received in the VTF amounted to \$300,000 in 1994, \$16.3 million in 1995, \$11.6 million in 1996, \$8.1 million in 1997, \$11.1 million in 1998, \$11.9 million in 1999, and \$4.09 million in the first four months of 2000. Support has been provided by forty-two donor governments and the European Union, with disbursements being applied to programmes in nineteen severely affected countries.

Reporting on the use of these funds has remained a key issue for all concerned parties to ensure the required level of transparency and to instil confidence in UN funding mechanisms. This has been achieved through the publication and distribution of regular updates and feedback on funds usage, particularly in mission areas, which saw eighteen reports issued in 1999 to seven countries, and an anticipated coverage of approximately sixty other contributions in 2000.

Continued coordination

Even as lives continue to be saved and valuable assets returned to productive use through the elimination of landmines, the success of mine action endeavours remains dependant on the political commitment of the parties involved, on the overall security situation, and on the effective co-operation of all other parties willing to provide assistance. In its capacity as UN focal point for mine action, UNMAS stands ready to facilitate and support all international efforts in this regard.

Annex: List of United Nations Resources Relating To Mine Action

Internet Sites

- [United Nations Mine Action Service \(UNMAS\)](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine>

General Assembly Resolutions

- Assistance in mine action. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the 84th plenary meeting on 17 December 1999, A/RES/54/191.

- Assistance in mine action. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the 60th plenary meeting on 17 November 1998. A/RES/53/26.
- Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the 79th plenary meeting on 4 December 1998. A/RES/53/81.
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the 79th plenary meeting on 4 December 1998. A/RES/53/77[N].

Reports of the UN Secretary-General

- Assistance in mine action. Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at the 54th session on 6 October 1999. A/54/445.
- Assistance in mine clearance. Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at the 53rd session on 14 October 1998. A/53/496.
- Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at the 53rd session on 16 June 1998. A/53/159.
- An international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines. Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at the 52nd session on 6 August 1997. A/52/268 + Add.1.

Policy, International Standards and Guidelines

- International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Education. United Nations, 1999.
- United Nations and the Use of the Militaries. United Nations, 1999.
- Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Policy. United Nations, 1998.
- International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations. United Nations, 1998.

Study Reports

- Study Report, the Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997.
- Anti-Personnel Land-Mines. A Scourge on Children. UNICEF, 1994.
- Burundi. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. August 1998.
- Ethiopia. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. June 1998.
- Jordan. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. May 1999.
- Lebanon. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. May 1999.
- North-West Somalia. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. June 1998.
- Azerbaijan. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. November 1998.
- Yemen. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. September 1998.

- Ecuador. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. November 1999.
- Peru. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. December 1999.
- Sierra Leone. Technical Assessment Mission Report. February 2000.
- Zimbabwe. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. February 2000.
- Namibia. Inter-agency Assessment Mission Report. March 2000.

Newsletter

- Landmines. Demining News from the United Nations. Magazine. Vol. 1.1 January 1996, Vol. 1.2 April 1996, Vol. 1.3 July 1996, Vol. 2.1 January 1997, Vol. 2.2 May 1997, Vol. 2.3 October 1997, Vol. 2.4 December 1997, Vol. 3.1 April 1998, Volume 3.2 Fourth Quarter 1998, A Special Issue April 1999.

Miscellaneous

- Portfolio of Mine-related Projects. United Nations. April 1999.
- UN Terminology Bulletin 349, Humanitarian Demining, 1997.

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR PROJECT SERVICES**Introduction**

Long after combat ends, landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to maim and kill, preventing people from safely returning to their homes, tilling their fields, collecting water, as well as preventing governments from reconstructing powerlines and industrial infrastructure. Mine action is an integrated approach to addressing the mine problem and consists of a range of activities that create a safer environment for people to resume a normal and productive life.

In 15 of the world's most heavily mined countries, UNOPS acts on behalf of its major clients (the United Nations Mine Action Service – UNMAS, the United Nations Development Programme – UNDP, and the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme – UNOIP), providing the project management services necessary to deal with immediate urgent needs and to help develop national capacity to resolve the problem over the long term, combining the flexibility and innovation of a private sector firm with the principles and objectives of the United Nations.

UNOPS Project Management Services for Mine Action

UNOPS has been designated as a principal provider for mine action project services within the United Nations system. The UNOPS Mine Action Unit, established in early 1998, is directly responsible for all UNOPS involvement in mine action, including the execution of nearly all of the UN mine action support projects. The MAU includes specialized project management, technical and legal expertise, as well as appropriate support for fielding personnel and procurement of supplies. This unique combination of skills enables UNOPS to efficiently provide mine action project management services tailored to our clients needs. UNOPS acts in many ways:

Behind the scenes: Before mine action begins, UNOPS brings together the elements required to set up a mine action programme, including international expertise, specialized equipment, complex agreements with donor governments for the provision of "in-kind" personnel, as well as necessary management and administrative support. One of the key successes of UNOPS in 1999 was the timely establishment of the UNMIK Mine Action Coordination Center in Pristina, Kosovo, which ensured that the multitude of resources which converged on Kosovo in the summer of 1999 could be applied in a coordinated and effective manner.

In the country: Depending on the scope of the project, UNOPS specialized project personnel advise officials of the national mine action authority or directly coordinate the work of all actors, launch nationwide mine surveys and work with the responsible authorities to set priorities to meet local needs.

In the minefields: UNOPS contracts the world's leading demining companies and NGOs through competitive bidding, and ensures that they follow the international standards for humanitarian mine clearance. As areas are cleared, certification is provided to let civilians know it's safe to move back home.

In the community: UNOPS supports networks of prosthetic and rehabilitation centres, mine-awareness campaigns, and training programmes to lessen the risk of living in mine affected areas and to teach new skills to those who have lost limbs and livelihoods.

When requested to do so, UNOPS will:

- orchestrate the many resources required to start up and carry out effective mine action;
- identify and recruit international and national expertise in mine action;
- rapidly procure and deploy demining and other equipment to the field;
- conduct tenders and draft contracts and agreements to suit any country;
- provide technical backstopping on all aspects of mine action;
- ensure exchange of experience and best practices among programmes;
- prepare grant agreements for support to victim assistance; and
- train nationals and develop local institutions to ensure sustainability.

Through the provision of mine action services, UNOPS has been able to assist UNMAS, UNDP, OIP and national governments in the:

- establishment of national mine action centres and development of national mine action plans and policies covering standards and quality assurance for survey, clearance, accreditation, and victim assistance;
- establishment of mine action information systems for priority setting, tasking and reporting;
- launching of mine survey and clearance operations through the use of manual, mine detection dogs and mechanical systems in mine-affected areas; and

- strengthening of medical treatment, rehabilitation and vocational services for mine victims.

UNOPS Clients / Programmes

UNOPS has been entrusted to manage mine action projects for various UN agencies since the early 1990s. The Mine Action Unit delivers a range of management and procurement services valued at about \$25 million in 1999 and expected to reach \$35 million in the year 2000.

UNOPS' major clients include UNMAS, UNDP and the UNOIP. UNOPS' involvement varies, depending on the country and the project. Sometimes funders of mine action call on UNOPS to assume full operational responsibility for an entire programme (e.g., Kosovo and N. Iraq). At other times, UNOPS is given responsibility for all UN support to a national programme; whereas in some cases UNOPS may be hired to manage only a single component, such as hiring international technical expertise in mine action. The programmes, listed below, are described in more detail in the country update sections of this Report.

UNMAS is the focal point for mine action within the UN system, as designated by the UN Secretary-General, and is responsible for coordinating all mine-related work funded by eleven UN departments and agencies, and for launching emergency mine action activities such as in Kosovo, or when natural disasters severely impact on a country's mine problem as in the floods in Central America and Mozambique. Over the past few years, UNOPS has worked with UNMAS by providing the programme management services necessary to implement programmes in Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mozambique, Nicaragua, the Sudan and Yemen and on global projects such as the Landmine Survivors Directory and the Land Mine Safety Handbook.

UNDP is generally responsible for mine action projects in stable development contexts, which generally focus on strengthening national institutional capacity to enable mine-affected countries to manage mine action programmes on their own over the long-term. UNOPS provides project management services necessary to support implementation of UNDP programmes in Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Yemen and the UNA-USA "Adopt-a Minefield" programme.

The UN Office of the Iraq Programme manages the "Oil for Food Programme" established under Security Council Resolution 986. Since 1997, UNOPS has managed the integrated mine action programme in Northern Iraq on behalf of the UNOIP. Under this programme over 600 deminers have been trained and deployed, with the majority of teams now operating under local supervision, a mine action information database has been established with a Level One Survey conducted in 85% of the territory, over 2.5 square kilometers of mine fields cleared and an equal area marked for clearance, a network of emergency medical and prosthetics centers established and supported, and special efforts have been taken to develop a full range of local capabilities, including an indigenous mine detection dog programme, development and production of local mini-flail systems, and development of local mine action NGOs.

Other UNOPS Activities

UNOPS is actively involved in the efforts of the United Nations and the mine action community to develop the information, tools, and infrastructure to increase the effectiveness of mine action, and is an active member of the Interagency Coordination Group on Mine Action chaired by UNMAS. In addition to the provision of project management services for the specific country programmes referred above, UNOPS executes other projects for UNMAS, including the Landmine Safety Handbook and Training Programme, and the Landmine Survivors' Directory, and quality assurance of the Level One Survey process. UNOPS participates in the development of international standards for mine action – particularly those for demining – as well as in the discussion of the specification and use of appropriate indicators for priority setting to increase the impact and efficiency of mine action activities. UNOPS seeks to ensure that international and national staff involved in the daily management and support to programmes take part in all such discussions. UNOPS actively encourages exchange of information among programmes and learning from best practices, and has developed startup kits including model documents and guidelines that enable the new programmes with which it is involved to benefit from the experience accumulating in the field.

UNOPS Mine Action Unit

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WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION*Victim Assistance: Who Contribution To Intersessional Process***Introduction**

The signing of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction* in December 1997 catalysed the creation of a political momentum around the issue of landmines.

This created an opportunity to promote the public health approach to victim assistance, starting with assistance to mine victims. The small percentage of victims due to landmines however (0.3% of the disease burden), as compared with other causes of injury and trauma (such as violence and road traffic accidents) made it imperative to shift from a focus on mine victims to a more comprehensive victim assistance approach that does not discriminate between different sources of injury and trauma.

WHO, in conjunction with the ICRC, stimulated the endorsement of a concerted public health strategy regarding mine victim assistance within the international agenda. The *Joint ICRC-WHO Strategy for the Prevention, Care and Rehabilitation of Victims of Landmines* emphasised the need to carry out an integrated, non-discriminatory approach to victim assistance and provided the framework for policymaking and programming. The framework allows policymakers to design a comprehensive national plan of action that incorporates victims of all types of trauma, identifies priorities, and presents a holistic plan that emphasises existing strengths and overcomes gaps and duplications.

Victim assistance emphasises capacity-building for the implementation of sustainable support to victims. It promotes a new humanitarian vision that focuses on long-term action and effective, transparent partnership, based on the needs of victims, and the co-ordination of all relevant actors and programmes.

Locally appropriate victim assistance, through the promotion of violence prevention, psychosocial rehabilitation and social reintegration, represents a first step in the community healing process. A comprehensive understanding of the factors that lead to violence and the availability of resources victims can access to manage the health, social and environmental consequences provides an opportunity for social reintegration and elaboration of the trauma in a healthy manner. The community can thus prevent the resurgence of violent attitudes and behaviour, and start working towards a peace-building process.

Progress achieved in the field of victim assistance needs to be consolidated and expanded within a broader human security context. The promotion of human security offers a framework to plan and implement interventions for the improvement of community security, and to approach non-intentional injuries, suicide, violence and crime from a health promotion and prevention perspective. Such an approach recognises that many security issues share the same risk factors, such as drugs, alcohol abuse and small arms, and it is advantageous to consider such risks in a global manner to promote the efficacy and efficiency of interventions. Furthermore, a same organisation, such as a municipality, is concerned by an ensemble of security concerns. It thus becomes more efficient to approach such an institution with a comprehensive issue of security rather than with piecemeal concerns. A global vision of human security allows for a shared understanding between different disciplines and sectors, and contributes to the development of global initiatives that aim to not only reduce a distinct concern, but also aims to promote the deeper issue of population security.

WHO/PVI proposes to build a network of expertise at the national level, composed of community actors, NGOs, academicians from the university, and the government and thus facilitate the development of culturally appropriate, sustainable approaches to victim assistance within a human security framework. Local experience, supplemented by lessons learned from other humanitarian contexts, can contribute to the design of appropriate training initiatives for all sectors concerned.

The following provides an overview of the translation of victim assistance into country action:

From Ottawa to Maputo

The signing of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction* in December 1997 catalysed the creation of a political momentum around the issue of landmines. WHO, in conjunction with the ICRC, stimulated the endorsement of a concerted public health strategy regarding mine victim assistance within the international agenda:

The Treaty Signing Conference in Ottawa on December 1997 represented the first official WHO involvement in the landmine arena.

Immediate steps were taken following the Conference at the WHO political and technical levels. WHO developed, in consultation with the ICRC, a Plan of action on a concerted public health response to anti-personnel mines.

As a follow-up to these consultations, a WHO resolution (EB 101.R23) "Concerted public health action on anti-personnel mines" was approved by the Executive Board at its 101st session and later endorsed at the Fifty-first World Health Assembly (Resolution WHA 51.8) on May 1998.

WHO and the ICRC collaborated to outline key principles in mine victim assistance. The *Joint ICRC-WHO Strategy for the Prevention, Care and Rehabilitation of Victims of Landmines* emphasised the need to carry out an integrated, non-discriminatory approach to victim assistance and provided the framework for policymaking and programming.

Following discussions with the Swiss Representatives at a donor meeting on demining and victim assistance in Ottawa on March 1998, the Swiss government, based on the ICRC-WHO Strategy and with the technical assistance of the WHO, the ICRC and UNICEF, elaborated the *Bern Manifesto*, which emphasised equity in access to services, sustainability, and country ownership.

The WHO Interregional Workshop on Landmine Victim Assistance at Kampala strongly endorsed the principles included in the Bern Manifesto and in the ICRC-WHO Strategy. The workshop brought the Ottawa Process to affected states, to the people and to the health sector, as it provided the opportunity for representatives from the Ministries of Health and the WHO Country Offices of the States present to work together with members of ICRC; UNICEF, ICBL¹ and Handicap International in the elaboration of a framework on mine victim assistance. The meeting paved the way for national health policy aiming at victim assistance through capacity-building and strengthening of the health sector.

In this way, the "bottom-up process" was initiated, giving voice to the countries and providing them with the means and tools to manage country needs and thus further ensure sustainability.

In view of the venue of the First Conference of State Parties to the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*, further steps were taken by WHO/HQ, jointly with the Swiss and the Mozambican governments, to translate into action the principles elaborated in Kampala. Following several meetings in Maputo with Ministries concerned as well as with representatives of donor countries and NGOs, they developed a Strategic Framework for Planning Integrated Mine Victim Assistance Programmes, and demonstrated its applicability through the elaboration of a national Mozambican plan of action on victim assistance.

The presentation of the Strategic Framework by Switzerland at the Conference, and the incorporation of the principle of integrated public health action into the Maputo Declaration constituted a key step in the progress towards its adoption at a national level and towards national ownership that would ensure long-term sustainability of action.

¹ International Campaign to Ban Landmines, a coalition of non-governmental organizations involved in the monitoring process of the mine ban treaty.

Intersessional Process: From Maputo To Geneva 2000

Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Re-integration and Mine Awareness

Five expert committees were established as part of the intersessional process from Maputo to the September 2000 Geneva Meeting of State Parties. The Standing Committee of Experts focusing on landmine victim assistance holds Switzerland and Mexico as chairs and Japan and Nicaragua as rapporteurs. The committee offers a potential mechanism to maintain transparency of donor contributions and international development projects.

The venue is used to monitor the implementation of the Convention at the country level and to allow government, multilateral and non-governmental actors to co-ordinate action for the promotion of national victim assistance programming and policymaking. The participants aim to establish a basis for the development of a portfolio of collaborative, sustainable country plans that could be presented at the Second Meeting of State Parties to the Convention.

A regional approach has been adopted, whereby one country represents each region: Nicaragua, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Government representatives and non-governmental counterparts at the country level present the status of country plans and outlined the key areas requiring technical and financial assistance from donors and technical agencies.

Consolidation of achievements on victim assistance

Following the collaboration established with the African and American regions, and the first meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts, the WHO aims to present a portfolio of consolidated achievements based on the ICRC/WHO policy agenda to the Second Meeting of State Parties at Geneva in September 2000. The Second Meeting of State Parties represents a key arena to present coherent, comprehensive country victim assistance plans to donors. Countries have the opportunity to discuss their plans and co-ordinate, with the technical assistance of agencies such as WHO, a series of donor countries around their plan of action.

Towards this goal, a regional process has been initiated:

- *African Region:* Three countries as reference programmes: Burundi, Mozambique and Uganda. The Mozambican government has fully endorsed the plan already.
- *Region of the Americas:* Nicaragua and additional Central American countries are in the process of being selected.
- *Asia and the Western Pacific Regions:* Collaboration with WPRO/SEARO should commence. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Sri Lanka are the countries considered.
- *Eastern European Region:* Bosnia and Kosovo have been selected to receive intensified support for the elaboration of strategic plans

WHO Country-based Process

AFRO: The African Region

Operationalisation of the Post-Maputo Agenda, Harare, May 1999

On the occasion of a Maputo follow-up PVI/AFRO meeting in Harare in May 1997, Dr. Samba, Regional Director for the WHO Regional Office for Africa, established a Regional Working Group to elaborate a concerted public health response to landmine victim assistance for the African region. This group worked closely with the WHO/PVI/HQ to identify 3 countries for intensified assistance according to the following criteria: magnitude of the problem, commitment at the highest government level, security, an ongoing program, and English, French or Portuguese speaking (in order to facilitate the expertise and documentation in the 3 languages of the Regional Office). The three countries (Mozambique, Uganda, Burundi) were selected from those participating in the Kampala Process, thus providing a continuum from the elaboration of principles regarding victim assistance to the planning and implementation of country-level action.

HQ/AFRO Country Planning Meeting: Harare, August 1999

Within the purview of translating established principles of mine victims assistance into action, a Technical PVI/AFRO Meeting was organised at Harare on August 16-18, 1999 to further the agenda within the African region. The meeting aimed to support an integrated public health approach to landmine victim assistance in Mozambique, Burundi and Uganda through the elaboration of country plans of action and the mobilisation of technical, financial and political resources.

It was decided to present a regional, country-based approach at the Standing Committee of Experts of the Ottawa Process, that would reflect country needs and allow donors to visualise opportunities to become involved in the victim assistance process. The desire was noted to replicate the Harare process in other regions and promote the presentation of plans for each region within the intersessional arena.

A tool was presented to promote country-level coherency in action and to allow countries to present a comprehensive plan to potential donors, particularly through the intersessional process.

AMRO/PAHO: The Region of the Americas

PAHO began to implement in January 1999 a tripartite agreement with the governments of Canada and Mexico to collaborate with the Central American countries to achieve an integral approach for the rehabilitation of landmine survivors.

A joint planning process was initiated between WHO headquarters and PAHO to launch co-ordinated victim assistance in the Central American region. The preliminary planning involved four countries: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. A first formal planning meeting with Nicaragua will take place in March 2000 to develop a national plan of action. The victim assistance programming process in Central America will be accompanied by a WHO headquarters-PAHO consultation on public health and human security.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The reinforcement of the contribution of the European Union.

The European Union has made a comprehensive response to the APL challenges through the Community, CFSP and the Parliament and policies in the field of development co-operation, rehabilitation and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and research. The Council of Ministers has been actively engaged on the APL issue since 1995 through joint actions and resolutions; diplomatic demarches and dialogue with third countries; activity in international fora such as the United Nations; active participation in the Ottawa process; and through practical action.

All fifteen member states of the Union attended the Ottawa Conference from 2-4 December 1997, and 14 of them signed the Convention. The European Union supported mine action also through various institutions, in particular the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance (UNVTF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As regards CFSP funds, the Council has taken decisions since 1995 to contribute a total of some 21.6 MECU reserved for CFSP action to a range of mine actions carried out by leading international organisations. The European Union is thus the largest single contributor to both the United Nations and the ICRC for funds related to Mine actions.

Since 1995, the European Parliament has been strongly committed to the APL issue and has acted as a consistent advocate of the total ban through successive resolutions and questions. Most recently, the European Parliament resolution on APL of 18 December 1997, in addition to encouraging wider adherence to the Convention and its early ratification, also called for more effective co-ordination of international efforts in mine clearance and in the rehabilitation of victims.

The greater part of the European Union contribution comes from Community resources which are controlled and managed by the European Commission. Over the past eight years, European Community support for mine action has exceeded EUR 180 million. On 14 March 2000, the European Commission approved a Communication to the European Parliament and the Council as well as a draft Regulation on an ACTION AGAINST ANTI PERSONNEL LANDMINES: REINFORCING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Reasons behind the decision to revamp the Anti-Landmines strategy and process are multi-fold; they concern the need to take stock of the experiences and lessons learned until now on the field and indirectly, the need to approach the problem with an overall strategy and under all the facets required by the criteria for Humanitarian and Civil Demining, the need to introduce explicit links between de-mining and safety and security objectives, to reinforce Community's mine actions, to ensure complementarity and consistency between Community policies and those of Member States, to reinforce overall efficiency as required by the obligations under Ottawa Convention and thus to remove the scourge of landmines within the next 10 to 15 years at the latest. A reinforced budgetary line will progressively lead to a level of quantity and quality of commitments such as to keep up with and exceed Community's past records.

The European Union has intervened in all corners of the world, it has supported action by national authorities, international organisations, and not least NGOs. It has

contributed to de-mining and mine destruction as well as to victim assistance and research into new de-mining technology. But until now, we have not had a coherent overall approach to our mine action.

To take full advantage of the diversity of our instruments and funding mechanisms, we must make sure that we have a framework in which we can formulate the necessary horizontal guidelines and priorities in order to ensure effectiveness and consistency in what we do. The funding of mine action from the geographic programmes and their budget lines will continue. Mine clearance and other forms of mine action are often a preliminary step to any sensible development programme.

Therefore they should form part of national or regional reconstruction and rehabilitation plans. The new regulation and the special budget line will support and complement the geographic line by providing the overall policy framework and functioning as a general reserve and a source for funding for international programmes. The re-sources available for European Community mine actions should remain at least at the same level in real terms as we have achieved over the last few years, that is about EUR 30 million a year. European member states contributions will add to this amount as much thus bringing the total average to at least 60 m € per year.

Regular programmes for mine clearance and destruction under our new policy should principally benefit countries which have subscribed to the Ottawa Convention. But we must also be ready to provide exceptional assistance to mine victims at their homes or when they have been displaced, even when they have the misfortune to find themselves in a non-signatory country. The entry into force of the Ottawa Convention a year ago provided us with a forceful new instrument and a set of ambitious targets for the years to come. We have signed up to the objective of eliminating all landmines worldwide in ten to fifteen years. That will require determination, consistency and perseverance. With the funding and co-ordinating mechanism under the new regulation and communication, we are well placed to take on that challenge.

European Community Mine Actions 1999						
COUNTRY	COMM. SERVICE	AGENCY	PERIOD	AMOUNT (€)	BUDGET LINE	ESSENCE OF THE PROJECT
Cambodia	ECHO	Halo Trust	20-06-99 31-03-00	700,000	KHM/210	Mine clearance
Kosovo	ECHO	INTERSOS	17-01-00 31-03-00	360,000	TPS/214	Urgent humanitarian de-mining in Kosovo
Kosovo	ECHO	HANDICAP- FRA/LYON	9-12-99 31-01-00	240,000	TPS/214	Emergency EOD team deployment to Kosovo
Kosovo	ECHO	MAG-UK	26-11-99 31-03-00	350,000	TPS/214	Emergency humanitarian demining in Kosovo
Kosovo	ECHO	HANDICAP - FRA/LYON	23-11-99 30-07-00	460,000	TPS/214	Kosovo mine action programme, Djakovica district
Kosovo	DG RELEX			3,000,000	OBNOVA	Institution Building Support to MACC
BiH	DG RELEX			4,000,000	OBNOVA	De-mining programme
Kosovo	DG RELEX			1,000,000	OBNOVA	Emergency support to MACC
Afghanistan	DG RELEX	UNOCHA		3,800,000	AFG (B7-3020)	Mine Action
Angola		INTERSOS		300,120		Orthopaedic rehabilitation centre and social reinsertion of victims (Italian co-financing)
Angola		INTERSOS		700,000		Training of a demining brigade and demining activities (Italian co-financing)
Angola		CARE		646,308	B7-6610	CAMRI II
Angola		Halo Trust		1,200,000	B7-6610	Mine clearance on the planalto
Mozambique		Min For Foreign Affairs of MOZ		71,775	B7-6610	Contribution to the Maputo Conference on MAP
Croatia				424,197	CFSP	Council decisions 1998/627/PESC and 1998/628/PESC

European Community Mine Actions 1999						
COUNTRY	COMM. SERVICE	AGENCY	PERIOD	AMOUNT (€)	BUDGET LINE	ESSENCE OF THE PROJECT
R&D	JRC			1,650,000	ESPRIT	Development of vehicle-based multisensor detection prototype
	JRC			2,874,500	ESPRIT	Development of hand-held multisensor detection prototype
	JRC			1,027,000	ESPRIT	Development of light weight radar system
	JRC			1,925,000	ESPRIT	Prototyping and field validation of hand-held multisensor detection system
	JRC			1,073,595	ESPRIT	Development of neutron-based prototype to verify presence of buried mines
	JRC			ca. 3,700,000	JRC	Civilian de-mining
	JRC			ca. 1,300,000	JRC	Information systems on civilian de-mining
	TOTAL				€ 30,352,215	

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Report of the OAS Mine Action Program

Given the importance of an integrated and comprehensive response to the crisis caused by antipersonnel mines, as well as the need to provide real and lasting support to those who face ongoing risk, a new program area called "Mine Action" (AICMA) was created in the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy in 1998. This area is the focal point for the General Secretariat on this issue and covers the following topics, among others: (a) mine risk awareness education for the civilian population; (b) support for minefield surveying, mapping, marking, and clearance; (c) victim assistance, including physical and psychological rehabilitation and the socioeconomic reintegration of cleared zones; (d) support for a total ban on antipersonnel mines; and (e) establishment of databases on activities directed against antipersonnel mines.

In fulfillment of the aforementioned mandate, a description of the activities conducted by AICMA in this area is provided below. Between March 1999 and May 2000, periodic reports were provided to the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the OAS Permanent Council on the work done and on the use of the funds allocated.

Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA)

The Assistance Program for Demining in Central America was created by the Organization of American States in 1991, at the request of the Central American countries affected by antipersonnel mines, with the technical support of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). The distinctive feature of PADCA, which is integrated into the new AICMA program, is that it is largely a humanitarian project, since it seeks to restore safe conditions and the confidence of citizens, to reduce the threat and danger posed by explosive devices and antipersonnel mines, and to restore the use of the lands dedicated to agriculture and livestock in the affected zones. Furthermore, it is a multilateral program since a number Member States and Permanent Observer participate as donor and funding governments, along with other governments and various organizations such as the OAS and the IADB.

Between March 1999 and May 2000, the Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA), has continued to strengthen the canine component of the program. To this date, the number of dogs assigned to the program has been doubled: twelve in Nicaragua, four in Honduras, and four in Costa Rica. The use of dogs represents significant progress from the standpoint of time and technical support resources.

The passage of Hurricane Mitch over Central America dramatically changed and exacerbated the already-existing mine problem in the area (particularly in Honduras and Nicaragua), moving an undetermined number of mines and explosive devices from their original location, altering the information on mined areas, causing significant damage to the infrastructure, and increasing the number of suspicious areas.

In this regard, AICMA, in coordination with the national authorities of both Honduras and Nicaragua, implemented an emergency plan in both countries. As part of this plan, all demining units and equipment were made available to these governments.

Joint work was conducted with the Government of Nicaragua in the clearance and certification of major roadways, primarily the bridges of Paso Real, Jícaro, Montecristo, Naranjita, Tapacales, Inalí, Río Pire, Pueblo Nuevo, and El Tular, along the Juigalpa-El Rama main highway. A total of 26 bridges were cleared and certified, and all the demining units in Nicaragua participated in these operations (400 men).

In Honduras, clearance and certification operations were conducted in the areas surrounding the De Guasaule international bridge in Choluteca Department.

Furthermore, using funds received from the Canadian Government, the equipment lost in Honduras and Nicaragua as a result of the devastation by Hurricane Mitch was replaced.

The progress made in each PADCA-recipient country can be summarized as follows:

Costa Rica

The generous contributions of the Governments of the United States and Costa Rica and the international community in general covered the cost of rental of a medical evacuation helicopter in Costa Rica. Demining in that country has been plagued by delays due to the absence of a proper helicopter that is used exclusively for operations.

At the moment, module VII operations are being carried out in the areas of Cutriz, Pocosol, and Las Tiricias, in Alajuela Province, on the northern border with Nicaragua. Demining and the removal of explosive devices have been carried out with the ongoing assistance of two international supervisors, forty-one sapper soldiers, and the support of canine techniques.

The Mine Risk Awareness Education Campaign for the Civilian Population has continued in the areas of Crucitas, Jocote, Las Tiricias, San Isidro, Pocosol, Medio Queso, and La Guaría, in Alajuela province. A number of educational talks were given at the schools visited by the personnel belonging to the program, at which an explanation was provided to students of the most common types of mines, as well the measures that need to be taken by the population if this type of device is found. Educational and informational material was also distributed.

Taking advantage of technical skills and the specialized personnel assigned to the program for evacuation and medical safety operations, a medical camp was set up in the los Chiles area, with the assistance of the Costa Rican Social Security Office. At this camp, care was provided not only to sapper soldiers, but also to the population living close to mined areas.

Guatemala

In keeping with the National Plan for Demining and the destruction of Unexploded Ordnance, operations aimed at identifying and destroying explosive devices in the area of Ixcán, Quiché Department were wrapped up, and because of this, demined lands were handed over for the first time by the local authorities to the community in January 2000.

At the moment, tracking and detection work in the area of the Ixil triangle is being carried out, which includes four municipalities in Quiché Department and covers 30 of the 129 suspicious zones included in the National Demining Plan.

Operations continue with the assistance, in particular, of the Association of Volunteer Firefighters, the Army Corps of Engineers, former combatants, and international supervisors of the IADB.

Honduras

It is important to underscore the fact that antipersonnel mines have been cleared in the eastern area of Honduras, with these activities being concluded under module VII and covering the San Andrés de Bocay sector, in the municipality of Olancho Department. At the moment, the activities are being conducted in the southern zone of the country in the municipality of San Marcos de Colón in Choluteca Department, where 10 suspicious zones have been identified.

At the same time, assistance has been provided with the following activities:

Clearance operations in a suspicious area in Naco, a municipality of Cortés Department in the northern region of Honduras. Work has continued on the “Mine Risk Awareness Education for the Civilian Population” campaign among the populations close to the zones of operation.

Nicaragua

Using funds provided by the Government of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, a new operations front composed of 100 sapper soldiers will be established. It will be located in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) of the Republic of Nicaragua. At the moment, the sapper soldiers who will belong to the new platoons are being trained. It should be emphasized that they will supplement the other two fronts that are supported by the international community, through the OAS, in the areas of Ocotal and Juigalpa.

At the moment, module IV operations, in Operations Front No. 3, located in Juigalpa, and module VIII operations, in Operations Front No. 4, in the Ocotal area, are being carried out.

Furthermore, at the request of ENEL (the Nicaraguan Electricity Company), the certification and handing over of demined high-tension towers in the territories of Chontales and Matagalpa have begun, in order to begin maintenance of transmission lines.

During the course of the 1999, the Mine Clearance Assistance Mission in Central America (MARMINCA) was transferred from Honduras to Nicaragua.

Also, the “Program for Care to Victims of Mines and UXO,” which has existed in Nicaragua since 1997, was continued and will be strengthened in the year 2000, with the assistance of the Government of Sweden, in order to ensure monitoring of the rehabilitation services provided under the program.

Peru and Ecuador

With a joint note of March 18, 1999, the Governments of Ecuador and Peru, through their Permanent Missions to the Organization of American States, asked the Organization to establish a specific fund to support demining related to the demarcation of the border between Ecuador and Peru, using the funds provided by Canada for that purpose.

In this regard, the Organization started activities in this area with the establishment of a specific fund for the "Program for Demining Assistance in Ecuador/Peru," (PADEP), using a contribution from the Canadian Government of CAN\$300,000 (USD\$198,800.45) in April 1999. This contribution, which was divided equally, has been used exclusively for the purchase of equipment and materials for activities to support humanitarian demining associated with the demarcation of the border between Ecuador and Peru.

The U.S. Department of State invited the OAS to participate in a multi-disciplinary mission to Ecuador and Peru. This mission was conducted August 16-20, 1999, in order to evaluate the antipersonnel land mine situation in the border region of the two countries.

As a result of this mission, and based on the requests of both countries for the assistance of the OAS in humanitarian demining activities, the Organization submitted working documents for consideration by both governments containing a proposal to provide coordinated international assistance with the efforts of both countries in integrated action against antipersonnel mines in their respective territories.

A number of additional activities conducted within the framework of AICMA are indicated below:

The management of funds, along with the donor community, was continued in order to obtain resources for the purchase of the appropriate equipment needed, and, as appropriate, the very careful checking and repair of existing equipment in order to guarantee the safety of the persons involved in demining activities and the immediate evacuation of victims in the event of an accident.

As stipulated in the Ottawa Convention and in the National Plan for the Destruction of Stockpiled Mines in Nicaragua, 30,000 antipersonnel mines have been destroyed in the country on four different occasions.

In that regard, and in order to begin the destruction of stocks of mines in Honduras, AICMA organized an advisory and assistance mission to that country for the destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, sponsored by the Canadian Government.

With regard to the Rehabilitation Program for Victims of Antipersonnel Mines, a Framework Agreement was signed between the International Rehabilitation Center and the OAS n of America for the implementation of a Plan of Action to develop and prepare new technologies, educational material, and physical and labor-related employment programs for persons affected by antipersonnel mines and explosive devices in Central America.

Furthermore, during the course of the year, there was close coordination with the Pan American Health Organization with the aim of working cooperatively on activities related to assistance, rehabilitation, and integration of victims of mines, and on awareness education of the population on the danger of these devices. Also, contact was established with the Trust for the Americas in order to conduct joint work with the private, public, and academic sectors, and the different civil society institutions in the Hemisphere, with a view to promoting initiatives beneficial to mine victims.

In order to start a seed fund aimed at providing urgent medical assistance overseas to mine victims who cannot be treated in their countries, AICMA made arrangements, together with the Women of the Americas Foundation of Washington, to obtain funds

from the cultural activity organized by this foundation annually, which, by means of a unanimous decision, contributed 80% of funds collected.

During the course of the year, AICMA has held various meetings with UNMAS (United Nations Mine Action Service) regarding the establishment of a database on integrated action against antipersonnel mines. This system has been developed by the Swiss Government for the benefit of the international community. AICMA hopes to implement it around the middle of this year.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

The contribution of this paper does not necessarily imply the association of the ICRC with views or statements made in other chapters of Landmine Monitor.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is pleased to have been invited to contribute to the second edition of Landmine Monitor. The inaugural edition proved itself to be an invaluable tool to all those involved in the landmine issue. The Landmine Monitor has established itself as an important reference point for research on the world-wide landmine problem and the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel mines (Ottawa treaty). It will surely continue to be an essential resource in the future work in these areas.

Introduction

Nineteen ninety-nine was a remarkable year in the effort to eliminate anti-personnel mines. The entry into force of the Ottawa treaty on 1 March 1999 and the first meeting of States Parties were unprecedented events. Never before had a multilateral arms-related agreement become international law so quickly and rarely do States Parties come together immediately after entry into force to begin collectively discussing and examining a convention's universalization and implementation. The creation of Standing Committees of Experts (SCE's) to continue work on implementation between annual meetings of States Parties also reflected the international community's commitment to act expeditiously in the clearing of land, the destruction of stockpiles and the provision of assistance to mine victims.

Perhaps even more importantly, 1999 also saw tangible results in terms of lives and limbs saved. Some mine-affected countries have witnessed a decrease in the number of mine casualties. Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, have seen the number of accidents decline significantly in recent years. While a variety of factors may have contributed to this welcome development, concerted mine action in both countries has certainly made an important contribution.

Yet, 1999 also reminded the world of the realities of mine contamination and the difficulties facing many mine-affected countries. The floods of Mozambique wiped out years of dedicated mine clearance by national and international agencies. Fresh or continued use of mines in some conflicts brought new reports of death, injury and suffering. These actualities are the most powerful reminders of the work which remains to be done and the need for all actors to continue their efforts to universalize the Ottawa treaty and make its obligations a world-wide reality on the ground.

Throughout 1999, the ICRC continued its work to promote universal adherence to, and implementation of, the Ottawa treaty. Through its operations in lands affected by armed conflict, the ICRC also brought relief to mine victims and mine-affected communities. This annex provides an update of the institution's work in each of these areas. It also highlights some issues which remain a concern to the institution and other actors involved in the landmine issue.

Humanitarian diplomacy: promoting universalization and implementation

The historic entry into force of the Ottawa treaty was accompanied by a rapid succession of ratifications. During 1999, an impressive 32 States became party to the treaty. Thus, by year's end, a total of 139 States -- over two thirds of the countries in the world -- were bound to a prohibition on anti-personnel mines through their signature or ratification of the treaty. This was a clear indication that ending the use of anti-personnel mines had become the international norm.

These developments brought a corresponding change to the work of encouraging adherence to and implementation of the treaty. Instead of convening large international conferences, most efforts began to focus on promoting ratification in specific regions or countries. Less emphasis was placed on why a comprehensive ban was necessary and the discussion turned to the implications of the treaty and the nuts and bolts of implementation. Today, even States which are unable to adhere at this time recognize the need for drastic action to limit the effects of anti-personnel mines and foresee their eventual elimination.

For its part, the ICRC organized two meetings in 1999 in regions where ratifications have been slow in coming. The first meeting took place in Wadduwa, Sri Lanka in August, where, for the first time ever, representatives of the ministries of defence and foreign affairs of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka gathered to discuss the landmine issue. Participants recognized the importance of a ban on anti-personnel mines and their eventual elimination. Participants also identified measures, short of ratifying the Ottawa treaty, which could nonetheless further the region along this path.

A meeting was also held in Nyeri, Kenya in October for Kenyan military and foreign affairs officials. As Kenya is a signatory to the Ottawa treaty this meeting focussed primarily on implementation issues. The military, legislative and administrative implications of adherence were discussed in detail. This meeting was convened at the request of the Attorney-General of Kenya in an effort to facilitate the passing of national legislation which would enable the country to deposit its instrument of ratification in the near future.

ICRC representatives also participated in meetings organized by governments and other organizations in the following locations:

- Mexico City, Mexico, organized by the Mexican and Canadian governments and the Organization of American States;
- Tunis, Tunisia, organized by the *Institut Arabes des droits de l'homme*;
- Beirut, Lebanon, organized by the National Demining Office of the Lebanese army and the Landmines Resource Centre of Balamand University;
- Zagreb, Croatia, organized by the Croatian government, the Croatian Mine Action Centre and the Croatian Red Cross Society;
- Lagos, Nigeria, organized by the Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace Advocacy
- Tbilissi, Georgia, organized by the Georgian Campaign to Ban Landmines and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

In addition to providing expertise to these meetings, the ICRC also supplied documentation and videos. Its Ottawa treaty exhibition was also frequently used by conference organizers. In 1999, a third exhibition was launched to promote understanding of the treaty in Arabic speaking countries. The exhibition is currently on tour in the Middle East and North Africa.

Nineteen ninety-nine also saw the release of "The Ottawa treaty: towards a world free of anti-personnel mines". This information video provides an overview of the content and implementation of the treaty for the general public and others aware of the landmine issue. It has been produced in seven languages and has been widely distributed.

Mine Awareness

The ICRC also continued its efforts to prevent mine accidents through its mine/UXO awareness programs. Already established community-based programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the region of Nagorny-Karabakh continue to conduct training, organise mine awareness events and find ways to make affected villages safer for residents. In early 2000, the ICRC mine awareness program in Azerbaijan was transferred to the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action.

In 1999 new mine awareness programs were started in Albania and the region of Kosovo. A short summary of these programs is provided below.

Albania

The ICRC has worked closely with the Albanian Red Cross to alert the population about the dangers of weapons since 1997. These efforts were in response to the widespread availability of arms brought about by the civil unrest of that year. As a result of the conflict in Kosovo, however, a formal mine/UXO awareness program was launched in Albania due to the presence of mines and unexploded cluster bomb submunitions along the northern border of the country. As an initial response, leaflets and posters were printed and distributed in communities near the affected areas. Later, information was passed through Albanian Red Cross volunteers in Kukes and other villages in the region. Today, fifteen volunteers and one co-ordinator from the Albanian Red Cross have been trained by the ICRC and conduct mine awareness.

The mine/UXO awareness program in Albania also helps facilitate the physical rehabilitation of those who have been injured by these weapons. Through mine awareness volunteers, victims are informed about the availability of prostheses from a clinic in Tirana. The ICRC provides raw material to the clinic and victims are provided prostheses and fitting free of charge. The ICRC ensures the transportation and accommodation for patients during their stay.

Kosovo

In response to the conflict in Kosovo, a mine awareness information campaign was initially launched in the Macedonian and Albanian refugee camps in May 1999. With the return of large numbers of refugees following the end of the fighting in June, the ICRC launched a full mine/UXO awareness program throughout the region.

Similar to programs it operates elsewhere, ICRC mine awareness in Kosovo is community based. Twelve locally recruited mine awareness officers have been trained to visit localities which are believed to be mine/UXO-affected, collect preliminary data on

the problem, teach local volunteers how to conduct training and work with residents to make the village safer. By the end of March 2000, ICRC mine awareness officers had visited 350 mine/UXO-affected villages. These visits will continue until all such villages have been assessed. Follow-up visits and support for community volunteers are ongoing and will continue for as long as the mine/UXO threat exists.

Through its experience in conducting mine awareness in a number of countries, the ICRC has learned that mine awareness officers are an important interface between a community and the mine/UXO clearance organisations. In Kosovo, data on the local mine/UXO problem is collected with the help of the community. Data and requests for clearance and marking are then passed on to UNMAC and mine clearance organizations through the ICRC. This allows the organizations to prioritise the marking and clearing of land according to the community's needs.

In order to ensure that the affected communities receive timely responses to their requests, and thus see concrete results for their efforts, the ICRC has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Swiss Federation for Mine Clearance (FSD). Under this agreement, FSD clearance teams respond to urgent demands for clearance or marking forwarded to it by the ICRC. The clearance teams then work with the communities to develop a plan to address the problem. This close collaboration in the field allows mine-affected communities to be directly involved in the technical response to the mine/UXO problem in their village. If a request can not be addressed, FSD provides explanation directly to the community.

Data collection

An important aspect of ICRC mine awareness programs is the collection of data about mine incidents. In addition to providing information about the location of mined areas, this data is also necessary to understand the impact of mines on local communities and mine victims in order to better respond to their needs. The most comprehensive ICRC data collection program is in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the ICRC has been gathering and analyzing data since 1995. As at 31 March 2000, the ICRC had recorded 4313 people killed or injured by mines or UXO. Detailed tables based on ICRC statistics are found in the Landmine Monitor country report for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Overall, the number of mine accidents in that country has steadily declined since 1996 and this trend continued through 1999.

The ICRC also collects data in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Information in Kosovo is collected in support of the ICRC mine awareness program and forwarded to the UN Mine Action Center In Kosovo. The ICRC is one of the primary contributors of data to the UNMAC and its IMSMA database.

Below is a brief summary of some of the data collected by the ICRC in Kosovo through 31 December 1999. As at that date, the ICRC had registered a total of 208 victims of mines, cluster bomb submunitions or other UXO. The ICRC plans to publish a report examining the socio-economic impact of these weapons in greater detail in August 2000.

1. Injury by type of device

Device	Number of incidents	Percentage of Total
AP mine	65	31.71
AV mine	13	6.34
Cluster subm.	60	29.27
Other UXO	21	10.24
Booby trap	10	4.88
Other	9	4.39
Unknown	27	13.17
Total	205	100.00

2. Incident by month

Month	Number of Incidents	Percentage of Total
Feb.	4	1.94
March	6	2.91
April	6	2.91
May	11	5.34
June	52	25.24
July	40	19.42
August	20	9.71
Sept.	27	13.11
Oct.	23	11.17
Nov.	9	4.37
Dec.	8	3.88
Total	206	100.00

3. Incident by gender

Sex	Number of incidents	Percentage of total
Female	9	4.64
Male	181	93.30
Unknown	4	2.06
Total	194	100.00

In 1998, the ICRC started data collection of mine/UXO casualties in Afghanistan. Presently, the ICRC is supporting UN co-ordinated surveying, demining and mine awareness through the sharing of data. This helps identify locations affected by mines

and/or UXO and minefields which have not yet been surveyed. This assists in the planning and prioritizing of mine clearance and mine awareness programmes.

Data is collected in 11 different provinces. The primary sources of data are ICRC supported hospitals, clinics and first aid posts as well some selected clinics run by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. Information on approximately 2,000 mine incidents has been recorded as at 28 February 2000.

Mine Victim assistance

Providing aid and assistance to victims of war is one of the primary activities of the ICRC. The ICRC often provides medical and surgical assistance during and immediately following armed conflicts. Currently, the institution supports medical facilities in 22 countries.⁵³ In many cases these are the principal facilities in these areas treating mine victims and other war wounded. The doctors and nurses are trained to deal with war wounded and able to meet the specific surgical and medical needs of mine victims.

The construction and fitting of prostheses remain an important part of the assistance ICRC provides directly to mine victims. During 1999, the ICRC opened 7 new rehabilitation clinics bringing the total number of ICRC projects to 29 operating in 14 countries. New clinics were opened in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Sudan. Each project provides rehabilitation services free of charge to war wounded, a majority of which are often mine victims, and other people in need. Such services include new prostheses or orthoses, fitting, training and, in some cases, transport and accommodation during his or her stay.

In 1999 the ICRC produced record number of prostheses. In total, 14,383 prostheses were manufactured and of these 8,896, or approximately 62%, were for mine victims (see table below). This proportion has remained fairly constant over the last 3 years yet percentages between projects can vary significantly. In 1998, 6,996 (58%) of the 11,977 prostheses produced were for mine victims. In 1997, 7,201 (63%) of 11,354 prostheses were for people who lost limbs due to mines. Clinics in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Iraq produced the largest percentage of prostheses for mine injured. In these clinics the proportion of prostheses for mine victims in relation to those made for other patients was 72% (3929 out of 4565), 80% (1625 out of 2016), 95% (1481 out of 1553) and 55% (1945 out of 3518) respectively. Such numbers are not surprising given that these are among the most heavily mine-affected countries in the world.

⁵³The countries are: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya (for those injured in Sudan), Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Russia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia. ¹ I especially thank Damien Donnelly-Cole, David Hawk and Becky

**ICRC PROSTHETIC/ORTHOTIC PROGRAMMES
STATISTICS FOR 1999**

Countries	Newly Registered Amputees Fitted With Prostheses	Number Of Prostheses Manufactured	Number Of Prostheses Manufactured For Mine Victims	Newly Registered Patients Fitted With Orthoses	Number Of Orthoses Manufactured	Pairs Of Crutches Manufactured	Wheelchairs Manufactured
AFGHANISTAN	2,124	4,565	3,292	3,463	5,519	9,016	855
ANGOLA	830	2,016	1,625	21	30	1,921	0
AZERBAIDJAN	184	442	34	75	109	769	0
CAMBODIA	703	1,553	1,481	288	362	4,710	0
GEORGIA	234	623	137	229	393	401	0
IRAQ	2,692	3,518	1,945	1,916	2,878	1,743	0
KENYA	142	390	87	123	153	727	0
R.D. CONGO	239	250	18	3	3	85	0
RWANDA**	31	37	7	172	236	368	0
SRI LANKA	141	141	86	16	19	0	35
SUDAN	250	531	97	110	169	332	0
TADJIKISTAN	188	200	32	0	0	247	0
UGANDA	106	117	55	22	38	0	0
TOTAL	7,864	14,383	8,896	6,438	9,909	20,319	890

***from January to May 99, then withdrawn Swill Red Cross*

In addition to the 29 programs it runs today, the ICRC continues to assist physical rehabilitation projects formerly operated by it, but which have now been handed over to local organizations, government ministries, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies or non-governmental organizations. Resources for this assistance comes from the ICRC-administered Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD). During 1999, 58 projects in 33 countries received assistance from the fund and produced a total of 7,085 prostheses. These projects assisted all those in need of their services, including mine victims.

Issues related to treaty implementation

In the first edition of Landmine Monitor the ICRC expressed its concern about anti-vehicle mines with sensitive anti-handling devices and sensitive fusing mechanisms. Briefly restated, the concern was that as States began to eliminate anti-personnel mines from their arsenals they would increase their reliance on anti-vehicle mines, particularly those equipped with anti-handling devices. In the opinion of the ICRC, the use of anti-vehicle mines with anti-handling devices is permitted by the Ottawa treaty so long as the anti-handling device does not activate by innocent or inadvertent contact. Similarly, anti-vehicle mines which can be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person are prohibited as they fall under the definition of an anti-personnel mine found in Article 2 of the treaty. The ICRC has produced an information paper explaining this position in more detail.

The ICRC remains concerned about these issues and believes that States must examine anti-vehicle mines they currently possess, or any that they may develop or procure in the future, in light of the definitions contained in the Ottawa treaty. Only through such an examination can a potentially new humanitarian problem be averted. The ICRC will continue to work with States and participants in the Standing Committee of Experts on the Status and Implementation of the Convention to address these issues.

GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

General

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was formally established on 28 April 1998 as an international foundation in accordance with Swiss law. The Centre aims to be an independent and impartial centre of excellence within the international network of Mine Action activities, and it is supported by the Governments of Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Republic and Canton of Geneva.

The Centre's budget totals CHF 6.7 million for the year 2000, of which Switzerland covers over CHF 4 million as major contributor.

Mandate

The Centre aims to promote co-operation in the field of Mine Action

- by assisting the United Nations – especially UNMAS as focal point for Mine Action within the UN system – by providing services for their Mine Action related activities;
- by contributing to the formulation and development of coherent strategies and procedures in Mine Action world-wide;
- by providing specific operational support and assistance for ongoing Mine Action activities;
- by supporting the implementation of the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer on Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction” (Mine Ban Convention, MBC) in co-operation with the States Parties to the MBC; and
- by supporting the implementation and further development of the humanitarian mine action elements of the “Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects” (CCW) in co-operation with States Parties to the Convention and the Protocol.

The Centre consists of 18 staff members, including five “in-kind contributions” seconded by the Governments of France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In total, eight different nationalities are currently represented in the Centre.

Activities Between March 1999 and May 2000***Mine Action Strategies and Procedures***

During the reporting period, the Centre continued to carry out studies in three main areas: socio-economic, operational analysis, and technology and standards. These studies aim to provide practical guidance and support to the Mine Action projects and programmes in the field and may be summarised as follows:

- The Socio-economic Indicator Study, requested by UNDP and UNMAS, will provide indicators of socio-economic impact and value, to help programme managers on the assessment of such criteria. The study should be completed in autumn 2000.
- The Dog Study, carried out on behalf of UNMAS, will lead to the framing of UN standards for the accreditation, training, evaluation and use of mine detecting dogs. First results will be available in summer 2000, the final paper will be submitted in autumn 2001.

- The Operational Needs Study, carried out on behalf of UNMAS, aims to review the equipment needs of Mine Action agencies on a world-wide basis. A major part of the analytical work has been sub-contracted to Cranfield University, and the final results will be available in summer 2000.
- The Balkans Project is carried out on behalf of the European Commission on Mine Action capabilities in the Balkans and will be completed in summer 2000.
- The International Standards Project aims to review and update the International Standards for Mine Action on behalf of UNMAS. A final draft report is due to be sent to the UN in July 2000, and the study faces completion in autumn 2000.

Operational Support and Assistance

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is developed in co-operation with UNMAS and is based on two modules:

- The “Field Module” provides a ready-to-use tool for Mine Action Centres, at national and regional level, to cover their data collection and information management needs;
- The “Headquarter Module” refines and collates the raw data from the field and provides the UN with improved capabilities for decision-making related to Mine Action. A pilot version was presented to UNMAS in April 2000.

The Field Module was first installed to Kosovo in June 1999. To cope with the specific needs of a war/post-war situation, the module was subsequently adapted to meet the requirements of the International Security Force (KFOR).

To date, the Field Module is in use in Kosovo, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Chad and Estonia. In addition, three Central Training Courses took place in Geneva and on-site training was provided to Kosovo, Yemen, Chad, Estonia and to the U.S. Army Engineer School. It is actually planned to install the Field Module in more than 20 countries. The WHO as well as other organisations involved in Mine Action are in the process of studying or adapting IMSMA for their use as well.

Assessment Mission, Deployments and Consultancy

Staff members of the Centre participated in UN Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia and Egypt. In addition, three staff members were deployed to assist the UN in establishing the Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (UNMACC) in Kosovo between June and August 1999. This engagement enabled UN to accelerate the setting-up of Mine Action structures in a very crucial phase. Finally, one staff member was deployed to Cambodia as Technical Advisor to a mechanical demining project in

Cambodia between March and May 2000, and consultant work was carried out for the Croatian MAC, for the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the German Government and for the ICRC.

UNMAS Geneva Conference

The third UNMAS Geneva Conference took place between 20 and 22 March and was highlighted by the keynote speech of Her Majesty, Queen Noor of Jordan. Representatives of over twenty mine-affected countries, of UN agencies, NGOs and observers attended this conference. This increasing number of participants may show the importance and the need for such a forum in the framework of Mine Action. Beside the focus on information exchange and interchange, the key issue of this year's conference was "integration" in relation to the planning, manner and conduct of Mine Action activities in their various forms, and this topic was successfully approached from an interactive standpoint.

Mine Ban Convention

The Centre provided the necessary organisation and venue for meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts (SCE) within the framework of the Mine Ban Convention (MBC) process. The aim of this Intersessional Work is to enable the States Parties to advance Mine Action efforts and measure achievements. Therefore, each SCE has been tasked to set up recommendations and report to the Second Meeting of States Parties, which will take place in Geneva between 11 and 15 September 2000.

The SCE meetings brought together representatives of States Parties, non-States Parties, of international organisations, NGOs and various experts who have addressed key issues of the MBC in order to ensure its effective implementation.

The Centre has also provided technical input to the SCEs in the areas of Mine Clearance, Victim Assistance, Stockpile Destruction and Technology. Some of the input has been in the form of presentations of progress with existing work. In other areas, staff members of the Centre have provided input for inter-meeting consultations, specialist papers and the provision of technical advice.

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SURVEY ACTION CENTER

Global Landmine Survey

Landmines destroy life and limb and inhibit national development long after the smoke of battle has cleared. After ten years of international humanitarian mine action, the mine action community has learned that the terror can be controlled in a relatively short period of time. The International Treaty to Ban Landmines and the 2010 Initiative both project success within the next decade. Success is possible if the international community improves its capacity to prioritize scarce resources of personnel, time and money.

Within the next two years, the Global Landmine Survey will produce high quality survey data on the socio-economic impact of landmines. This survey, conducted by visiting all the mine-affected communities within a country, will provide the foundation for a wide range of subsequent mine action activities. Executed to a common international standard and certified by the United Nations Mine Action Service, the survey will:

- Allow donors to rationally proportion funds to places of greatest human need as defined by impact on communities;
- Permit national authorities to develop national plans focusing on regions and areas of greatest impact; and
- Give implementers data that will provide success indicators for mine action programs.

Who Are We?

In a unique cooperative effort, the NGO community, in collaboration with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), has established the Survey Working Group. The Survey Working Group will monitor standards and facilitate the international coordination of resources and expert personnel for the completion of the Global Landmine Survey in the most mine-affected countries. The following are the members of the Survey Working Group:

Association to Aid Refugees	Japan
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	Switzerland
Handicap International	Belgium/France
Landmine Survivors Network	U.S.
Medico International	Germany
Mines Advisory Group	United Kingdom
Mine Clearance Planning Agency	Afghanistan
Norwegian People's Aid	Norway
UN Mine Action Service	United Nations
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation	U.S.

The Survey Working Group has designated Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) to manage and serve as fiscal agent for the Survey Action Center (SAC) in the coordination and resource mobilization of the Global Landmine Survey program.

Funding (as at 2000/03/01)

The Global Landmine Survey process is funded through a variety of channels. To date, the following funds have been pledged:

United Nations Foundation [1:3 challenge match]	US \$ 4,000,000
US State Department	US \$ 3,700,000
Canada – CIDA & DFAIT Foundations	US \$ 3,000,000
[Rockefeller, J & C MacArthur, Compton]	US \$ 500,000
United Kingdom – DFID	US \$ 480,000
Japan	US \$ 450,000
Norway – MFA	US \$ 380,000
VVAF	US \$ 300,000
Germany	US \$ 100,000
World Bank	US \$ 20,000

Current Operations

Yemen

Contributions from the governments of Canada, Japan, Germany and the U.S. have been provided to support a survey in Yemen. UNOPS is the executing agency with SAC implementation contracted to the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA). The survey commenced in July 1999 and is progressing ahead of schedule with completion planned for July 2000. Yemen has used preliminary survey data to comply with Article Seven reporting requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Yemen survey is already producing some surprises. As the survey progresses, assumptions by the international community and national authorities are being revised – in other words the survey is doing its job by clarifying what we know about the magnitude and severity of the problem. Two examples:

1. Unknown problems on the doorstep

Government and NGO representatives informed the survey team that there were no mine affected communities in the province of Sana'a where the national capital is located. Using sampling techniques in the survey protocol to test for "false negatives" the survey team found and confirmed by direct observation 47 mine impacted communities in the province.

2. Less accuracy, but more mines

As the preliminary table below indicates reports from national sources that included government, NGO and international organizations indicated 400 suspected mined communities. After a visit to each suspected site the number reduced to roughly 200 confirmed. While collecting information at the local level 1,000 additional communities were added to the suspect list. As of May 2000, survey teams had visited over 750 of these new suspects and of these 500 communities are confirmed to be affected. The accuracy rate is, therefore 66%. Making a rough projection, this would mean that 660 communities will prove to have a mine problem. Added to the 200 already confirmed this would lead to a national projection of 860 mined impacted communities in Yemen. This is already more than twice the original assumption of 400.

LEVEL	INITIAL REPORT	CONFIRMED	ACCURACY
National	400	200 [real]	50%
Local	1000 additional	500 confirmed [160 projected confirmed]	66% [of 750 visited]
Total			860

Mozambique

The Canadian International Demining Center (CIDC) is surveying in Mozambique with a direct and bilateral Canadian government (CIDA) contribution. The survey is conducted according to Survey Working Group standards and SAC has appointed a quality assurance monitor with funding from the U.S. Department of State. Training of local staff is completed.

Chad

With support from the U.S. Department of State, the UN Foundation, and the United Kingdom SAC contracted Handicap International- France to begin operations in

early November 1999. Work is progressing well. Local staff are trained and the survey instrument has been tested.

Thailand

With funding from the MacArthur Foundation, SAC conducted an advance survey mission with UNMAS participation and produced a country survey plan. SAC contracted Norwegian People's Aid as the implementing partner and funding for the survey has been secured from the UK, Norway and the U.S. Survey operations has commenced in early May 2000.

Kosovo

A SAC technical expert has worked within the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center (UNMACC) to bring together disparate survey materials within the Level One Impact Survey module of IMSMA. The work has been completed. UNMACC and other aid agencies already use the product of SAC's work. The European Commission through UNMAS and UNOPS funded the project. Advance mission to Kosovo was funded by the United States.

Countries Under Consideration For Future Operations

Somaliland [NW Somalia]

With funding from the U.S. Department of State, SAC subcontracted the HALO Trust to conduct an advance survey mission to Somaliland. Conditions at that time was determined to be unfavorable for execution of a survey. However, the situation is being monitored and the possibility exists to survey Somaliland in 2000.

Lebanon

With funding from HMD Response International [UK] and the U.S. State Department, SAC and HMD Response International [UK] have sent advance teams to Lebanon and produced a country survey plan. With funding from the European Commission, HMD Response, with SAC as technical advisor, is planning to commence survey operations in summer 2000.

Western Sahara

The Norwegian People's Aid and Medico International have sent an exploratory mission to Western Sahara.

Angola

Norwegian People's Aid conducted an extensive socio-economic survey of Angola prior to the establishment of the current Level One Impact Survey standards. NPA and SAC are working together to consider ways to "retrofit" the existing data into the current IMSMA Level One Impact Survey module

Cambodia

Canada is providing direct and bilateral funding to a Canadian organization for the survey according to Survey Working Group standards. Operations began in April 2000. The survey is conducted according to Survey Working Group standards.

Afghanistan

The Mine Clearance Planning Agency has done extensive survey work in Afghanistan. SAC has undertaken an advance survey mission to Afghanistan to work out a plan to assess current practices and possibly to “retrofit” existing data into Level One Impact Survey module.

Ethiopia & Eritrea

It is planned to conduct an advance survey mission to study the need and feasibility for a Level One Impact Survey in this region once conditions permit.

Northern Iraq

SAC is coordinating with UNMAS and UNOPS to explore possibilities for survey here.

Sac Capabilities

- *Technical Advisory Team* – A specialized SAC team of internationally recognized experts in social science, survey, cartography, and statistics is available to assist surveys and to help with later analysis.
- *Survey Information* – The SAC information department will support national surveys with map data sets and related information.
- *Data Base* – In accordance with the Survey Working Group principles the SAC and UNMAS have developed the field questionnaire to support collection of the Level One Impact survey data. In cooperation with the Geneva International Center, this data set has been integrated into the UN Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The field module is available for national surveys.
- *WorldWideWeb Site* – The Global Landmine Survey will maintain a web site allowing access to survey information referenced geographically

The Survey Process

A Level One Impact Survey is conducted in different phases. These phases and their component activities are presented in a general chronological order, which corresponds to the task/sub-task matrix of the UN Certification Guidelines for Level One Impact Survey. A number of activities (or tasks) will occur within each phase, although in some cases a given task may continue throughout two or more phases. This general process may be modified as required by the particular conditions encountered in any given country, particularly if that country has a pre-existing mine action program.

PHASE 1: PLANNING, Preparation and Office Establishment**UN Assessment Mission**

A UN Assessment Mission is an expected precursor to Humanitarian Mine Action intervention for Mine/UXO affected countries. The assessment mission will examine first the “need” for mine action and the “utility” of mine action within a country’s existing institutional mechanisms. This mission will explicitly call for the execution of a Level One Impact Survey when it is justified. An assessment mission report calling for the conduct of a survey is the first step in the process.

Advance Survey Mission

UNMAS formally requests that the Survey Action Center to mobilize an Advance Survey Mission to the identified mine affected country. In addition to confirming the “need” and “utility” for a survey, this mission will also examine the “feasibility” for the actual execution of the survey.

The purpose of an Advance Survey Mission is to develop the contacts and information required to plan for the actual survey. In some cases information may suggest that a survey is not appropriate and activities will stop, or be delayed.

Operational Set up and Establishment of Country Presence

Upon the approval and funding of the impact survey, an operational base(s) will be prepared to support the survey team, complete with temporary offices and a communications system.

An open and transparent recruitment and selection process is to be undertaken to attract and retain competent local & international staff. Final selection of staff is the responsibility of the implementing survey team with due consideration of the National host.

Collection of Expert Opinion

The survey team should begin the systematic collection of informed opinion of national “experts” familiar with the mine contamination problem. This should be done by using a standardized interview format and should involve a broad cross-section of agencies, and individuals representing diverse interests and regions.

Our, experience proves that best results come from provincial capital and district visits by survey staff to gather information on names and location of affected communities.

Sounding Board Meeting

The global survey instrument and methodology will be discussed with local stakeholders including relevant government bodies, NGO’s involved in mine action activities, and experienced national survey experts and social scientists to ensure that it meets local requirements and cultural sensitivities..

PHASE 2: PROJECT expansion and survey instrument Refinement**Training**

Based on the selection process and the level of academic and professional skills of the survey staff recruited, a training programme is to be developed. The aim of the training programme is to teach survey-related skills and knowledge to reinforce the survey process.

Conduct Pre- and Pilot Tests

Following the survey training stage, a pre-test of the survey instrument itself is to be conducted to determine its utility and cultural acceptability. Likewise a pilot test is to be conducted of the entire survey process to analyze management, logistics and administrative systems and planning assumptions.

Sampling for False Negatives

The refined survey process is to be used to develop methodologies for conducting a sampling to check for false negative in the areas not reported to be min affected. This will be used to a measure of confidence regarding survey findings.

Revise Operational Plan

Prior to actually conducting the survey, information gained during the testing exercises is to be used to revise and update the final operations plan.

PHASE 3: DATA Collection, Processing and Verification**Administer and Manage Level One Impact Mine /UXO Survey**

The conduct of the Level One Impact Survey is to take place under contractual agreements and in close collaboration with National authorities. An independent Quality Assurance Monitor will evaluate the survey. The survey is to be conducted in accordance with SWG and UN policies.

Community Group Interviews

The field supervisors would visit mine affected areas prior to the survey teams and make overall arrangements for communities to be surveyed. The teams will conduct a group interview of the key informants within a community. The questionnaire will be administered to register the information of the group. The group interview will be conducted based on participatory approaches.

Visual Verification of Mined Areas

Reported mined areas will be visually verified from a safe area. Strict procedures are in place to ensure that enumerators do not take un-necessary risks. Visual verification will not only improve the quality of the data but will also provide relevant data for subsequent technical (Level II) survey as well.

Supervision and Field Editing

Field operations will be regularly monitored and supervised by trained local supervisors, and international staff. All data will be checked and edited by a full time data editor, as close to the field as possible, prior they are sent for entry into the computer.

Quality Assurance Monitoring

Survey quality is assured by an independent UN Quality Assurance Monitor (QAM) who records and documents survey progress in accordance with the UNMAS Certification Guidelines.

The QAM's reports will also serve as an instrument for certification of the survey results.

PHASE 4: Data Analysis, Presentation and Hand-Over**Data Analysis**

The objective analysis of data collected during the survey is vital to ensure acceptance of the survey results. The analysis of facts collected in quantitative study and impact weighting that is applied must be transparent, logical and understandable. The analysis of data must meet the informational needs of the National Authorities.

Handover

As part of completing the survey, the Survey team is to present it's preliminary findings, maps and data to National authorities and other stakeholders in the country. This will be done not only to share the knowledge gained, but to illicit comments and input prior to publishing the final report and releasing data on the world-wide web.

Trained staff and equipment will also be handed over to the national mine action authorities.

Reports

The Survey Team is to produce a Final Report as a product for the National Authorities in order to allow them to continue the Mine Action process. This report is to focus on an objective presentation and analysis of the data gathered in the survey.

New Definition

By focusing on community impact rather than the absolute number of landmines in the ground, the Global Landmine Survey process provides the Mine Action community with new tools with which to prioritize work and to measure progress.

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CONVERTING LANDMINE FACTORIES TO CIVILIAN PRODUCTION

**Prepared by C. David Crenna
Director, Rebuild International
in conjunction with H. John Harker, Robert Marcille
and Goran Kapetanovic**

Over the past dozen years, numbers of countries and facilities producing antipersonnel landmines (APMs) have declined dramatically, from 54 to 16 or fewer around the world. Recently, this trend has been a direct result of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Mine Ban Treaty. Decisions to end landmine production have necessitated action either to close or to convert manufacturing plants, as well as to address community economic, social, and environmental impacts of ending production. The fate of people and facilities engaged in such deadly work has been a low priority for mine ban advocates in the past.

Rebuild International, a consortium of Canadian companies and non-governmental organizations, advocates more attention and resources to defence conversion in the future, both as a direct intervention to inhibit renewed production and promote demining, and as an *additional inducement for reluctant countries to sign the Treaty*. Remaining producers are going to be much tougher to address than those of the past. While landmine production is not a huge generator of employment nor of export-based profits, our field research indicates that terminating production can loom very large in specific smaller communities affected, as well as leaving a costly environmental legacy. As well, APMs are cheaper and easier to transport and to sell in arms bazaars than are many other weapons systems, so risks of reentry into production and/or evading export bans are real in some countries.

Quite a number of major producers have already signed the *Convention*, and among these there have been actions to close plants, to phase out APM production lines, and/or to convert plants. From our research there appeared to be very few success stories to date in the field of conversion, due to a lack of focused external assistance. Generally those with the fewest resources and least ability to create alternative employment have had the most problems organizing this process as well.

In a number of countries, APMs are just one among a whole "family" of weapons systems and technologies the production of which is distorting development priorities and contributing in many cases to repression. Defence conversion is an integral part of ending a culture of violence and stimulating positive, peace-oriented development. Technically, converting landmine production facilities is a relatively easy place to begin wider military conversion programs. It is an opportunity to build on success in forming new ventures. Especially in current and former command economies, is that many landmine producers are already engaged in some civilian production, and can more readily shift resources and management attention to this avenue for future earnings, compared to other defence-oriented production.

At the same time, APM production plants may be difficult to market as targets for foreign or domestic investment because of their former occupation. They are often laced with toxic substances, and may be mined themselves to prevent intrusion. They may be

located away from convenient infrastructure and services that would attract investors, especially if overall economic conditions are risky as they are in most countries of the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and parts of Eurasia. In brief, in most countries outside Western Europe and North America, conversion is unlikely to be successful without targeted development assessment and investment, coupled with risk management regimes.

For further information on landmine plant conversion and on Rebuild International, please contact:

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ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY

By Claudio Torres-Nachón, Center for Environmental Law and Economic Integration of the South-DASSUR, dassurct@prodigy.net.mx

The international landmine crisis should be understood as an ancillary element of the current international environmental crisis. There is a strong need for a global environmental impact assessment of landmines. Be it for assessing its impact on wildlife or to evaluate atmospheric emissions by destruction of stockpile, environmental impact assessments are essential to advance in humanitarian demining in Africa and elsewhere as a pre-requisite for redevelopment after war.

The impact of landmines goes further than the killing and maiming of civilians and military well after conflicts are over. Landmines affect many components of the global biosphere. Among the many problems attached to the use of landmines are those related to its impact on the natural environment and its components. Landmines have killed and maimed large numbers of specimens of wildlife and domestic species worldwide. Landmines set in motion a series of events leading to environmental degradation in the forms of soil degradation, deforestation, pollution of water resources with heavy metals and possibly altering entire species' populations by degrading habitats and altering food chains. Additionally, landmines are usually placed near hospitals or sanitation facilities, impacting the ability to preserve human health. In certain cases there is a repetitive geographical coincidence between mine-affected zones and biodiversity hotspots. By degrading habitats, impacting population species, altering food's chain, and placing additional pressure over natural resources, landmines pose a considerable risk to pristine ecosystems throughout the world. Landmine-poaching presents the ultimate distortion of this insidious weapon. It is used as a simple and effective mechanism for killing wildlife. Environmental impacts may occur while demining is taking place or by destruction of stockpile as well.

In general terms, environmental impacts of APMs can roughly be categorized as direct or indirect. 1) Direct Impacts Of Landmines On The Environment: By direct environmental impact we refer to those effects, alterations and disruptions caused to the

natural environment and/or its components at the moment and specific location of the blast of a landmine; 2) Indirect Impacts Of Landmines On The Environment: Indirect environmental impact of landmines are those effects, alterations and disruptions that may take place at differentiated spatial and temporal scheme from an original location or explosion of a landmine.

From a temporal spectrum indirect impacts may be continuous and/or delayed at a short, medium or long term. By continuous impacts we refer to those landmine related physico-chemical effects which degrade, pollute or transform in any ecologically sensitive perspective those environmental elements interacting with the device, i.e. Decomposition or corrosion of the landmine's case, may produce a prolonged leaking of toxic heavy metals typically present in a landmine, as mercury and lead. Delayed impacts are those negatively affecting the environment and its components at a later time in a single, recognizable event, i.e. Certain methods of mine clearance may produce such impacts.

Short term effects generally include the physical destruction of close range vegetation and killing/injuring of wildlife. Medium term impacts may include a deterioration on soil composition preventing cultivation lands to return to levels of agricultural production prior to a landmine explosion. Long term impacts include the persistence and bioaccumulation of certain toxic substances freed into the site of the blast as mercury and lead, both present on most landmines. It is open to discussion how to classify impacts which are specially difficult to assess and quantify. A probable influence into global warming by depletion and enhanced human pressure over natural carbon dioxide sinks as forest presents an enormous task for scientists. As entire populations may not be able to return to their villages or cultivation lands, in occasion they are forced to find new land to settle. To better comprehend the issue, let us remember some basic principles of environmentalism: first, nature knows best; second, everything must go somewhere; and third, but not last, everything is connected to everything else. Therefore, even if such impact on global warming happens to be minimal, it should be properly addressed as an innovative way to reflex on the nature and ends of armed conflict.

The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty makes two explicit references to environmental issues: Article 5(4)(c) states that "States Parties may request an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such landmines to a Meeting of States Parties. Such request of deadlines extensions shall contain the humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of the extension". By such reference to environmental implications, the strategic importance of environmental issues is underlined in the international humanitarian strategy to universally ban and destroy landmines. On the other hand, such provisions opens up a possibility for fraudulent States to use the environment to escape from their immediate obligations of destruction within the established 10 years period of planted landmines on territories under its jurisdiction or control as stated in Article 5(1) of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. In short, environmental issues may represent both a positive or a negative tool for the effective implementation of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and the global eradication of landmines. Nevertheless, such environmental allegations may be valid and legitimate as to request an extension on the compliance with the general obligation above mentioned. As such, it is an indispensable,

delicate and urgent task to develop and establish a Working Group on Environmental Aspects of the Landmine Crisis and the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty to compile, evaluate, classify, and analyze information related to past, present, and potential impacts of the landmine crisis on the environment for the territories of States Parties and Non-Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, since ecosystems, rivers, underground waters, marine currents, species and all other elements of the environment recognize no political borders and legal situations of transboundary pollution may occur, directly or indirectly caused by the international landmine crisis.

Our first and overall policy recommendation resides on the need for a global environmental impact assessment of landmines, Africa being the first region to assess. Be it for assessing its impact on wildlife or to evaluate atmospheric emissions by destruction of stockpile, environmental impact assessments are essential to advance in humanitarian demining in Africa and elsewhere as a pre-requisite for redevelopment after war.

Second, specific attention should be paid to the advances of the Study on the Use of Socio-Economic Analysis in Planning and Evaluating Mine Action Programmes undertaken by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. As it is to include environmental indicators, environmentalists should try to participate at every level possible in the development and follow-up of such study as it will serve as a cornerstone for humanitarian demining policy makers in the aftermath of the Second Meeting of the State Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty to be held in Geneva on September 2000.

Third, multilateral, environmental and humanitarian demining organizations should work together with countries Party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty towards the development and ultimate establishment of a Minimum Environmental Standard (MES) for the destruction of antipersonnel landmines. A first step should be the detailed sharing of specific environmental measuring and mitigation techniques used during destruction of stockpile and planted landmines between technologically advanced and developing or less developed countries.

Fourth, in countries where the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty has not been signed or ratified, it may prove effective to follow a strategy consisting on distributing this and other publications on environmental impacts of landmines to national environmental organizations in order to get them on board for advocacy goals for signature, ratification and/or effective implementation of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. By doing so, environmental organizations may become part of national campaigns and use their influence to advance in the goal of universal ban of landmines.

INJURIES THAT OCCUR IN HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

By Andy Smith

Most of the author's recent research has been dedicated to devising practical improvements for deminers. To this end, the author pioneered visor production in Africa under a charitable Technology Transfer programme in 1997, added body armour aprons to that work in 1998, and completed a programme to prove and establish African production of improved protective equipment and safer hand tools in June 2000. In order

to remain genuinely independent, the author takes no profit from the exploitation of his practical designs. The following paper draws on information derived from my field research in demining over the past six years, and from the incident data in the AVS Database of Demining Incident Victims (DDIV). The DDIV resulted from work I carried out in 1998 and 1999 for the US DoD as part of their CECOM NVESD Humanitarian Demining research initiative. It covers demining incidents that occurred in Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Kosovo, Cambodia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Laos, and Zimbabwe.

The threat to deminers at work

Opinions of risk vary, but the detail in the DDIV allows a relatively objective assessment by providing a record of the activities and the mines that have constituted the greatest risk in the past. For example, it has been said that there is a greater risk when demining in areas with minimum metal AP blast mines than in areas where the mines are easier to detect. This commonsense view is not confirmed by the evidence. In the vast majority of demining “missed-mine” incidents, the mine was a PMN, PMN-2 or PPM-2, all of which have a large metal content.

Very simply, in terms of mines causing deaths in demining, bounding (jumping) fragmentation mines head the list, followed by AP blast mines, then larger mines, IEDs and UXO. Bounding fragmentation mines are only a very small proportion of the mines found in any theatre and cause a hugely disproportionate number of fatalities at close range. Blast mines are by far the most common mines found in any theatre (excluding Laos). Incidents with blast mines are rarely fatal, and when they are, the incident unusually involved handling a device, stepping on a device while squatting over it, or falling onto a device. Incidents with AT mines are rare, but have invariably killed the deminer initiating the mine.

Areas of the body at risk

In the DDIV, injuries are classed as either Severe or Minor. Injuries likely to be life threatening, to require surgery or to result in permanent disability are rated as Severe. All others are rated as Minor. This distinction is for convenience and is not intended to reflect on the discomfort and/or hardship associated with the injury.

For the whole database (covering all device types), the following injuries occur:

	<i>Severe</i>	<i>Minor</i>
Eye	60	37
Face	19	100
Head	17	16
Neck	5	23
Head & neck = 101 severe injuries		

	<i>Severe</i>	<i>Minor</i>	<i>Amputation</i>
Hand	34	84	8
Arm	25	66	13

Finger	-	-	26
Upper limb = 106 severe injuries			

	<i>Severe</i>	<i>Minor</i>	<i>Amputation</i>
Leg	40	94	63
Foot	17	10	9
Toes	-	-	1
Lower limb = 130 severe injuries			

	<i>Severe</i>	<i>Minor</i>
Body	13	36
Chest	18	37
Genital	11	5
Trunk = 42 severe injuries		

The difference between the threat to the head and upper limbs is that between 101 and 106, which is not significant. The jump to 130 for the lower limb injury may be significant, and illustrates that the Missed-mine risk is real and generally results in a severe injury. The large drop to 40 for trunk/body injury is also significant, illustrating clearly that the main torso is not at threat to the same degree as the limbs and the head.

The single most frequent area of severely disabling injury is to the eyesight of deminers, which can be lost when no other significant injury occurs.

Activity at time of risk

The most common activity at the time of an incident is "excavation". An "excavation incident" occurs while a deminer is investigating a detector reading or digging in a suspect area with a prodder, trowel, bayonet, pick, hoe or shovel. Severe injuries usually occur when the tool is very short or breaks up in the blast. Where the tool is well designed and the deminer's face is protected, severe injuries do not occur.

Excavation often has to take place in hard ground. Sometimes water is used to soften the surface, but the quantities needed to make a real difference on most soils are rarely available and the water often only serves to keep the dust down. Since excavation must be done, the risk of detonating a particular sensitive or tilted device is often considered to be unavoidable.

But if some excavation incidents are unavoidable, some excavation techniques are particularly dangerous, such as using a pick or a shovel. These are not "approved" tools but the fact that they were used indicates a supervisory lapse. All deminers are, after all, supposedly supervised and appropriate supervision could have prevented these incidents.

Some excavation tools increase the severity of injury when an incident occurs. When a short AK bayonet is used to chip away at hard ground, the user's hand is so close to any detonation that he has a high risk of severe injury. In some cases, the tool itself breaks up and the blade or shards of the handle hit the deminer. When they hit him in the face, they can kill. The deminer does not choose his tools. The organization that issues

him with tooling so inappropriate that it exacerbates injury in an unavoidable incident is at fault.

The next most common activity is treading on a "Missed-mine". A missed-mine incident occurs when a victim initiates a device that he or other members of the survey or demining group failed to locate during their normal work and which consequently was in an area that the demining group considered safe. Most professionals in the industry agree that a missed-mine indicates a lapse in the system: either the deminers did not apply the system properly (so were poorly supervised) or the clearance system itself was inadequate. The professionals' view is supported by the evidence in the DDIV which indicates that most missed-mine incidents involved mines that were readily detectable with the detectors used – if in good working order.

The next most common activity is "handling". A "handling incident" occurs when the victim was holding the device immediately prior to the detonation whether this was for examination, disarming or another purpose. Many groups reject render-safe procedures and destroy all finds in-situ. This is the UN view, but not one held by all. A few groups routinely disarm, using a "pulling" technique first to ensure that the device has not been booby-trapped. One commercial group finding mines in very large numbers (300 a day) uses a new technique to pick-up the mines remotely and place them together for destruction in pits. This saves them a good deal of time and the cost of multiple demolition charges.

The next most common incident is classed as "victim inattention" – or "out-to-lunch". A "victim inattention" incident occurs when the victim behaves in a manner that is apparently thoughtless, such as stepping outside the cleared area, or not looking where he was going. In some cases, the victim was a supervisor and this may be taken to imply poor selection or training. In some cases the supervisor should have noticed that the victim was sick (in one case "drunk") and prevented his working.

This paper is too short to provide detailed argument of some of the issues under discussion. I suggest readers refer to the DDIV itself and make their own informed judgment on any contentious issue. The DDIV is available on CD. Contact avs@landmines.demon.co.uk

**THE LANDMINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATES
PARTIES TO THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY**

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There are more than 300,000 landmine survivors worldwide, and that to rehabilitate these survivors, it will cost more than \$3 billion over the next ten years.² In article 6 paragraph 3, the Mine Ban Treaty requires States Parties to support mine victim assistance in order to reintegrate landmine survivors into society.³ This brief chapter examines state legal obligations to mine victim assistance and argues that all States Parties can undertake a range of victim assistance activities and initiatives. It concludes that State support of landmine victim assistance is a rapidly emerging international customary law.

With the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty in March 1999, the social and economic integration of landmine survivors became part of international treaty law. The Treaty is especially noteworthy because it is the first arms control and disarmament treaty that incorporates language to support victims of that weapon. In the treaty's preamble, State Parties express their wish "to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic rehabilitation of mine victims." To achieve this goal, the treaty's article six, paragraph three clearly obligates signatory states to support victim assistance. It commits state parties to victim assistance obligations by stating that "[e]ach State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs." Based on these provisions, the treaty "implies a responsibility of the international community to support victim assistance programs in mine-affected countries with limited resources"⁴ This means that States Parties can ask or be asked for survivor assistance. Specifically, article 6, paragraph 7(e) grants states the right to request other States Parties to assist victims.

While "shall" in Article 6 paragraph 3 can perhaps be read as less "obliging" than the "undertakes to" language used elsewhere in the treaty for non-use, stockpile destruction, etc., the treaty language for assistance provision is less absolute. The qualifying treaty language about assistance differs from the time-qualifying language for de-mining.⁵ Stockpile destruction and de-mining is to be progressively realized over

¹ I especially thank Damien Donnelly-Cole, David Hawk and Becky Jordan of the Landmine Survivors Network for their helpful comments. I have also benefited from the comments on an earlier version of this chapter by Lou Maresca of the International Committee for the Red Cross.

² *Landmine Monitor: Executive Summary 1999*, p. 22.

³ States Parties are those states that have either signed and ratified or acceded to the Treaty. States that have not signed the Treaty cannot ratify it. They become States Parties by acceding to it. Accession has the same effect as ratification and States that accede are full States Parties.

⁴ *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 24.

⁵ Article 4, Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines will be destroyed "as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State

time. Put otherwise, the demining and stockpile destruction obligation can be read as being written in a harder way than is victim assistance. However, this may be due to more readily quantifiable demining information available and the dearth of detailed victim assistance information at the time of the treaty signing. Moreover, putting time limits on victim assistance is difficult since the rehabilitative process last a lifetime and discrimination against the disabled continues even in the most advanced legalistic and economically developed states.

This chapter's claim is that all state parties, irrespective of poverty, wealth or level of economic development, can provide for mine victim assistance. Specifically, if States Parties understand the definition and spirit of victim assistance they would better understand that they are in a position to provide victim assistance. This issue is briefly discussed below:

While the treaty's article 6, paragraph 3 calls for State Parties to "provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness *programs*" (italics mine). This assistance does not necessarily have to be delivered through programs. Victim assistance can take place through programs *and* policy. The definition of victim assistance is comprehensive and is not restricted to the provision of medical treatment for initial traumatic injuries sustained from landmine explosions and the provision of prosthetics. Victim assistance also includes the provision of ongoing treatment to aid in the physical therapy, mental and emotional rehabilitation of survivors and their families. Landmine survivors themselves have defined victim assistance as "emergency and medical care; access to prosthetics, wheelchairs and other assistive devices; social and economical reintegration; psychological and peer support; accident prevention programs; and legal and advisory services."⁶ These activities can take the form of continued rehabilitative care, the provision of psychological and social counseling, vocational training, and broader public advocacy for disability rights and judicial reform aimed at removing barriers to persons with disabilities in an effort to achieve integration into society. For example, if a state does not have the financial resources to provide direct victim assistance, it can contribute through policy changes to help the survivors become more fully integrated into society's economic and social realms.

Described below are three specific policy examples of victim assistance, whose implementation did not require "programming."

Legislation and Public Awareness

State Parties can enact and enforce national legislation to promote effective treatment, care and protection for all disabled citizens, including landmine survivors. The legislation should ensure that disabled populations have legal protection against discrimination, and assurance of an acceptable level of care and access to services.

Party." Article 5, Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas, stating "each State Party undertakes to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas "as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party."

⁶ Jerry White and Ken Rutherford, "The Role of the Landmine Survivors Network," in Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 103-104.

Moreover, landmine survivors should be given access to a formal statutory complaint mechanism to address the concerns and protect their interests. Lastly, each State Party can accept responsibility for raising public awareness of the needs of its disabled citizenry and to counter the stigmatization of persons with disabilities. This type of policy implementation can include community education measures, such as a campaign to publicize the abilities of the disabled and the availability of rehabilitative and social services.

Physical and Rehabilitation Access

States Parties can also provide victim assistance by providing increased physical access to persons with disabilities. This can take the form of elimination of physical obstacles to mobility, ensuring access to buildings and public places, availability of first aid, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, employment opportunities, education and training, religious practice, sports and recreation, safe land and tenure of land, and information and communication about available services. States can also set affirmative action policies designed to encourage the education, recruitment, and hiring of landmine victims and persons with disabilities.

Establish a National Council on Disability Issues

States Parties can set up a National Council on Disability Issues, which would include landmine victims. Cambodia has done this (although before the advent of the Treaty) by creating the Cambodian Disability Action Council, a joint government, international organization, and NGO body that is mandated to oversee all aspects of programs and policies relating to persons with disabilities.

In sum, *all* states can provide victim assistance, particularly when assistance is explicitly defined to include social re-integration, a lot of which does not require much financial assistance but can be accomplished by legislation, policy, exhortation and/or example. Therefore, in reality and not just theoretically, each state can provide some form of assistance to mine victims.

This chapter's assertion is that all states, even the poorest, can assist landmine victims within their territory and jurisdiction, not only those states in a position so to do, as treaty law puts it. There is a range of activities that states, even those with low GNP, can undertake to support victim assistance. This chapter describes less well known ways states can assist survivors, such as policy changes to allow for increased physical access, better legislation and awareness for disability rights. It hopes to help convince decision-makers of the existence of state responsibility generally and demonstrate that any proposed actions flow naturally from the Mine Ban Treaty.

PRODUCER LIABILITY

By Tara Ashtakala

There is a general principle of law which dictates that whoever harms another is liable for that harm. Now that the Ottawa Land Mines Treaty has entered into force, the efforts of the ban movement are now largely concentrating on mine clearance and victim assistance. Increased funding will be needed as long as people continue to be injured by existing mine emplacements. One viable solution to this funding problem is holding those who produce land mines financially liable for the destruction caused by their products. This report examined such remedies available under the rules of both international and private law.

Those who suffer indirect injury from land mines use, such as being deprived of the use of agricultural land, may have recourse to the rules of international environmental law. For example, the “polluter pays” principle could be used by the mine-affected State to obligate the producers of the land mines used on its territory to pay for measures to restore the environment, including arable land, to an acceptable state. International human rights law also offers potential relief: a case which litigated basic rights of access to drinking water and of freedom of movement within one’s country may serve as a useful model for those denied access to water wells or other sources by strategic mine emplacement.

The private law route to seeking compensation for land mine injury sees these pernicious weapons as defective products for which their manufacturers are now directly accountable to the third-party victim. Some older class-action suits in the US against pharmaceutical or chemical makers serve as useful model for a possible land mines injury lawsuit. For example, using Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, in most cases where a victim who would be unable to identify which particular mine caused his particular injury, each mine in a mine field would thus be presumed to be 100% responsible for injury to the plaintiff.

In principle, civilians injured by mines that are made with no disarming mechanism could sue the manufacturer for an omission in the product’s design; those injured by mines that are supposed to self-destruct, but fail to do so, could claim a defect in manufacture of the product. The US Supreme Court, however, recently upheld a defence protecting companies, contracted by the government to make mines fitting government specifications, from suits based on defects in design. Therefore, it seems currently that a products liability suit in the US could be brought only regarding injury caused by mines that fail to self-destruct as required.

A more promising prospect for victims may be found in the recent lawsuits launched by US states and municipalities against the maker of cigarettes and handguns, products that, like land mines, kill indiscriminately. When a large number of States attorneys joined together to pursue the tobacco manufacturers for reimbursement of the billions of dollars spent by the States on treating tobacco-related illness in State-paid Medicaid patients, the tobacco companies decided to settle out of court for a multi-year, multi-billion-dollar payment. Such a protracted and sizeable award given up by intimidated land mines manufacturers would go along way in fighting the problems

caused by at least pre-Ottawa Treaty mine emplacements. Similar suits against the powerful handgun industry by US cities claimed, *inter alia*, that manufacturers, permitted an illegal black market to supply guns into the wrong hands. However, the scope of a similar claim against land mine makers may be reduced in the US by recent legislation.

The mere threat of such lawsuits, the public scrutiny they attract to manufacturers and the generous settlements they have extracted from powerful industries offer the best hope, in this author's opinion, for success in an analogous products liability suit against land mine producers.

THE UNITED NATIONS' ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING THE COMPLIANCE ASPECTS OF THE OTTAWA CONVENTION

By Angela Woodward

Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), London¹

Introduction

The Ottawa Convention seeks to encourage compliance through mutual transparency and co-operation, rather than through an intrusive and adversarial verification mechanism of the type established by other disarmament treaties.² The treaty does not have a standing secretariat or other standing compliance body. As the treaty's Depositary, it was the United Nations which was given a central role in facilitating the gathering and exchange of information about states parties' compliance, as well as in pursuing questions related to possible non-compliance. Article 7 of the treaty requires states parties to submit declarations to the UN Secretary-General detailing their compliance efforts under nine categories; the UN is in turn responsible for disseminating such information to all states parties. Article 8 of the treaty contains mechanisms for clarifying compliance which also rely on the assistance of the UN. This paper will detail the mandated role of the UN in facilitating compliance with the Ottawa Convention and examine the effectiveness in this role to date.

¹ This is the second report prepared for Landmine Monitor by VERTIC. The first, on national ratification and implementation legislation was published in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World* as 'Landmines in International Law: Ratification and National Implementation', pp. 1037-1046. A longer version was published by VERTIC as Joe McGrath and David Robertson, 'Monitoring the Landmine Convention: Ratification and National Implementation Legislation', *VERTIC Research Report* no. 5, September 1999. See www.vertic.org for details.

² For example the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements required by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons allow for regular on-site inspections. The Ottawa Convention is, however, a hybrid humanitarian/disarmament treaty. For a detailed analysis of the verification provisions of the Ottawa Convention see Trevor Findlay, 'Verification of the Ottawa Convention: Workable Hybrid or Fatal Compromise?', *Disarmament Forum*, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva, no. 4, 1999.

The role of the United Nations in Regard to Article 7

Pursuant to Article 7, each state party must submit to the UN Secretary-General reports detailing their activities pursuant to the treaty.³ Each state party is required to update its initial report no later than 30 April each year. The United Nations is responsible for collating the information and transmitting it to the states parties.

Procedural aspects of implementing Article 7

The treaty does not stipulate the form or method of transmission of Article 7 reports to the UN, nor does it stipulate how the UN should transmit these to states parties.

The First Meeting of States Parties, held in Mozambique in May 1999, adopted standard forms for states parties reporting under Article 7.⁴ The meeting also recommended that states submit their reports electronically to the UN in order to expedite their receipt and dissemination. Reports may be submitted in any of the six authentic languages of the Convention.⁵ They are to be entered into the database in the languages in which they are submitted.⁶

The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA), the Department responsible to the UN Secretary-General for handling his responsibilities under the Ottawa Convention, created an 'Article 7 Transparency Measures' database to receive and organise the information received.⁷ The UNDDA chose to display the Article 7 reports on the database in full (by state party) and also under each category being reported (by state party). The database is accessible not just to states parties but also to the general public on the UN website,⁸ following a decision at the First Meeting of States Parties to facilitate its use by other states and organisations involved in mine action activities.⁹

Effectiveness of Article 7 implementation

As of 3 May 2000, forty-three states parties had submitted Article 7 reports.¹⁰ At that time thirty-eight were late in submitting their reports.¹¹ The remaining states parties

³ Items that shall be reported on are detailed in Article 7(1)(a)-(i) Ottawa Convention.

⁴ APLC/MSP.1/1999/1 p. 6. The standard reporting forms are contained in APLC/MSP.1/1999/1 Annex II.

⁵ Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish (Article 22 Ottawa Convention).

⁶ APLC/MSP.1/1999/1, Annex III, p. 25.

⁷ The UN is also prepared to receive 'hard copy' reports from states parties not 'in a position to use electronic communication means...'; APLC/MSP.1/1999/1, Annex III. p. 25.

⁸ <http://domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf>.

⁹ APLC/MSP.1/1999/1, Annex III, p. 25.

¹⁰ States parties that had submitted reports under Article 7 were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, France, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niue, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

¹¹ States parties that were late in submitting reports under Article 7(1) were: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chad, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Iceland, Jamaica, Lesotho, Malawi,

were not yet required to submit them since 180 days had not yet elapsed since the treaty entered into force for them.

Among the states that have responded, most are from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) at the UN. The states late in reporting are all mine-affected and/or developing countries. These states have been encouraged to submit their overdue reports by other states parties and many pro-convention organisations. The UNDDA does not see itself as having a role in requesting the submission of overdue reports.¹²

To date reports have been submitted in Arabic, English, French and Spanish.¹³ There is no funding available at this stage to translate documents into all official languages of the Convention.¹⁴ However, it was recommended at the First Meeting of States Parties that states parties submit their report in more than one of the official languages, so that such reports may be added to the UN database.¹⁵ While the UNDDA is prepared to include such additional documents,¹⁶ multiple language versions provided by states parties have not to date been posted on the database.¹⁷

The standard forms were designed to elicit only the information that states parties are legally required to submit under Article 7. A 'supplementary information' category was included on each form to allow those states that wished to do so to provide further information.¹⁸ While this is entirely in line with the openness that the treaty promotes, few states have chosen to use the opportunity. It has been proposed to include an additional form to allow for further supplementary, voluntary reporting, with particular emphasis on Article 6 obligations.¹⁹

As to the requirement for states to submit annual reports by each April, it has not been decided whether this should involve a new report being submitted or simply amendments to the previous report, thereby creating a 'rolling text'. As of 3 May 2000, 12

Mali, Mauritius, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Solomon Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda and Venezuela.

¹² The UNDDA did, however, present a report listing the due date of Article 7 reports to the Second Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention (Geneva, 29-30 May 2000); APLC/MSP.2/2000/L. . This report will be continuously updated for submission to the Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, September 2000.

¹³ As of 3 May 2000, only Belgium and Canada had submitted in more than one language.

¹⁴ The First Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention (Geneva, 10-11 January 2000) recommended that a summary document relating to the Article 7 reports be translated into all six authentic languages for presentation to the Second Meeting of States Parties to be held in Geneva in September 2000. Article 7 reports will be provided at that meeting in the language of submission to the UN.

¹⁵ First Meeting of States Parties document APLC/MSP.1/1991/1, p. 26.

¹⁶ VERTIC interview with Carolyn Cooper and Tamara Malinova, UNDDA, New York, 14 January 2000.

¹⁷ As of 30 June 2000.

¹⁸ Form F 'Status of programs for destruction of APMS' does not contain a supplementary information category. Form I 'Measures to provide warning to the population' seeks solely a narrative response.

¹⁹ A decision on the inclusion of 'Form J' ('Other relevant matters') will be made at the Second Meeting of States Parties. Form J was proposed by Canada, at the Standing Committee of Experts meeting on the Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 29-30 May 2000.

states parties had submitted their annual reports under Article 7(2).²⁰ The Second Meeting of States Parties needs to specify whether or not it is satisfied with the manner of reporting and whether or not future reports should be submitted in a different form.²¹ The UNDDA does not envisage changing the structure of the database presentation until it receives such clarification.²²

Despite the fact that states parties are encouraged to submit their reports electronically, only 30% of reports submitted to date have been electronic.²³ This increases the work of the UNDDA in entering the information and inevitably delays its availability on the database. Bilateral and multilateral assistance needs to be coordinated and regularised to ensure that all states have access to the necessary technology. Some states parties may still mistrust the authenticity of the reports on an electronic database, since these reports do not have the standard diplomatic attestations of printed official documents. The UNDDA is attempting to encourage confidence among states parties by reproducing the information exactly as received. Future development of the database may allow states parties to input their own information.²⁴

While the database is fulfilling the letter of the UN's mandate to transmit Article 7 information to all states parties, its effectiveness from the states parties' perspectives will be learned at the Second Meeting of States Parties. The cost-effectiveness and accessibility of electronic means were factors in the decision to promote the use of an electronic database over traditional hard copy document circulation. However, the technology required for states to *access* the database effectively is more advanced than is required to *submit* documents electronically.²⁵

It has been suggested that the Article 7 database might be integrated into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) at the behest of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). There would clearly be political, financial and technical issues to be considered in any potential integration. The official status of the Article 7 reports would need to be maintained on any database outside the UN.

²⁰ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico and Switzerland Thailand and the United Kingdom. There is no consistency between states parties reports on the time period that the Article 7(2) reports cover; many overlap with the reports submitted under Article 7(1). If states parties submit their Article 7(2) reports on time, by 30 April each year, the workload of the UNDDA will increase dramatically at this time.

²¹ VERTIC interview with Carolyn Cooper and Tamara Malinova, UNDDA, New York, 14 January 2000.

²² VERTIC interview with Carolyn Cooper and Tamara Malinova, UNDDA, New York, 14 January 2000.

²³ Carolyn Cooper, UNDDA, verbal report to the Second Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts meeting on the Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 29-30 May 2000. These electronic reports were transmitted either by email, or on computer disk.

²⁴ States involved in funding mine action are encouraged to input their own information on the Mine Action Investments database overseen by UNMAS.

²⁵ The receiving computer must have its internet browser set to support advanced internet applications. In particular, applets and the internet language 'Java'. A high-speed modem is also advisable given the large size of some of the reports. Reports containing maps, photos or other graphic images, and reports submitted in Arabic, take longer to download than text-only reports.

Integration of the database into IMSMA would necessitate further development and implementation of both database systems.²⁶ Moreover, IMSMA is not yet being widely used by states parties for its existing purposes.

The Second Meeting of States Parties should discuss the issue of the costs of implementing Articles 7 and 8 by the UN. Article 14 states that costs will be borne by states parties.²⁷ However, the cost of developing and implementing the Article 7 database was not factored into the initial scale of assessment.²⁸ The UN has simply absorbed the cost of the necessary technology and human resources,²⁹ despite the fact that its own budget is under severe pressure. Funding for Articles 7 and 8 implementation cannot continue to be sourced from general UNDDA funds, as these are assessed from all UN member states, including non-states parties to the Ottawa Convention. Yet the UN has reportedly not sought extra resources from states parties in fulfilling its obligations under Article 7, even though some states parties may have been prepared to assist unilaterally had they been aware of funding problems. Funding for future maintenance and development of the database needs to be addressed by states parties. They may wish to consider funding a dedicated UNDDA staff member who would be responsible solely for collating and disseminating Article 7 reports.

Problems in State Reporting

The existence of a standard form for reporting has not resulted in standardised reports being submitted by all states parties. Some states are experiencing difficulty acquiring and determining the necessary information to include in their reports. Resource and personnel shortages, lack of clarity as to the submission procedure, combined with competing reporting requirements of many other treaties can delay the compilation and submission of reports. Some information required, such as the location of areas that are mined or suspected of being mined, simply has never been accurately determined in some states before. Information held by militaries concerning numbers and types of anti-personnel mines owned, possessed, stockpiled or destroyed is not always available to those compiling the report. This may be due to several factors, including bureaucratic ineptness or secrecy. The culture of secrecy that often surrounds landmine capabilities needs to be addressed: the Convention was intended to usher in a new mode of transparency and openness in landmine disarmament that needs to be recognised by all involved with the treaty. As many states are obliged to report on mine action under various multilateral agreements, it would be helpful in those states parties which have not already done so, to appoint a specific person or section within an appropriate government ministry to be responsible for compiling and submitting the necessary information, as is required, for instance, under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

²⁶ The GICHD contracted the development of IMSMA to the Centre for Security Policy at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland. The UNDDA 'Article 7 Transparency Measures' database was developed in-house at the UN.

²⁷ Article 14(2) Ottawa Convention.

²⁸ VERTIC interview with Carolyn Cooper and Tamara Malinova, UNDDA, New York, 14 January 2000.

²⁹ VERTIC interview with Carolyn Cooper and Tamara Malinova, UNDDA, New York, 14 January 2000.

Assistance in reporting

Some states require technical assistance in carrying out their obligations under the Convention, including the obligation to report. Any request made to the UN for assistance is directed to UNMAS, which is responsible within the UN system for coordinating the provision of assistance to all mine-affected countries. However UNMAS' responsibility for assisting states in the preparation of Article 7 reports is unclear. Article 7 reporting is viewed by UNMAS as an issue for the UNDDA.³⁰ If a request for assistance with Article 7 reporting is made by a Mine Action Centre, UNMAS may send a technical expert to the state to assist in the collection of information, for example by liaising with government ministries; this has not happened to date.³¹ Requests for assistance may also be made to the GICHD, although, unlike the UN, they have no treaty-mandated role in implementing the Convention.³² Some states parties are prepared to offer assistance to others in compiling reports when requested to do so. It is heartening that the Second Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention³³ encouraged the development of guidelines for completing Article 7 reports.³⁴

The Role of the UN under Article 8

Article 8 details fact-finding procedures to be followed if a state party requests clarification of compliance by another state party. Should this article ever be invoked, the UN may be called on to facilitate exchanges of information between states parties; exercise its good offices; convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider a question relating to compliance; or facilitate a fact-finding mission. The UN is required, in the meantime, to maintain a list of experts who may be called on to conduct fact-finding missions and to communicate this list to all states parties.

As in the case of Article 7, the UN's role in implementing Article 8 has also required some clarification of procedures which were not made clear in the treaty itself. The Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention has agreed that the list of experts for fact-finding missions should only be

³⁰ VERTIC interview with Stéphane Vigié, Policy Advisor, UNMAS, New York, 19 January 2000. The UNDDA is not mandated to assist states parties in compiling and transmitting Article 7 reports, and in any event, does not currently have the resources to be able to do so.

³¹ VERTIC interview with Stéphane Vigié, Policy Advisor, UNMAS, New York, 19 January 2000.

³² In practice, the GICHD has aided those states parties who have requested assistance with Article 7 reporting.

³³ This is one of five Intersessional working groups whose establishment was recommended by the First Meeting of States Parties held in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. The meetings have been hosted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The first meeting of this Standing Committee was held in Geneva, 10-11 January 2000. The other Intersessional Working Groups focus on mine clearance; victim assistance, socio-economic reintegration and mine awareness; stockpile destruction; and technologies for mine action. Further information about these working groups is available on the GICHD website: www.gichd.ch.

³⁴ *Draft Report of the Second Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention*, Geneva, 29-30 May 2000, p. 3.

transmitted to states parties.³⁵ The Committee recommended that this Article be operationalized shortly ‘in order to have all structures and the necessary methodology in place for a smooth execution whenever needed’.³⁶

The UNDDA requested all fifty-five states parties as of April 1999 to submit the names of experts to be included on this list. As of 3 May 2000 only twelve states have made such submissions.³⁷

It is essential to have the necessary infrastructure in place to facilitate any requests for clarification or fact-finding missions which may be instituted, if only as a continuing reminder that such missions are possible. Canada’s draft recommendations³⁸ in this regard are a useful starting point, and it has been agreed that they will be discussed at the Second Meeting of States Parties. These will focus on, *inter alia*, the standards of evidence to be used for initiating “requests for clarification”; encouraging states parties to submit lists of experts; procedures for ensuring an efficient and speedy deployment of any fact-finding missions; and issues related to the costs of any Special Meeting of States Parties under Article 8 and of fact-finding missions.

It is important to recognise that ‘quiet diplomacy’ is also at work in ensuring compliance with this convention. If a state party suspected of acting against the treaty is persuaded to come into compliance through demarches by another state party, then a more positive result may be achieved than by using the Article 8 process. The politicisation of the issue and creation of an adversarial situation is thus avoided. Whether this will be achieved in all suspected cases of non-compliance would depend very much on the relationships between the relevant states parties.

Conclusion

Implementation of the compliance mechanisms in the Ottawa Convention has begun during this first year of reporting. Refinements and improvements can now be made to achieve a system that is generally acceptable to states parties.

Effective monitoring of compliance requires states to submit their Article 7 reports to the UN in a proper and timely manner. Assistance to states parties that are having difficulty in obtaining, collating or submitting the required information to the UN may need to be formalised so that effective remedies can be instituted in these cases.

The UN’s Article 7 Transparency Measures database is currently a useful tool in monitoring compliance, but its effectiveness should be enhanced. The assessed contributions of states parties should be sufficient to cover such improvements. If not, governments should consider making voluntary contributions for this purpose. The amounts required are tiny compared to the costs of implementing the treaty generally and

³⁵ *Draft Report of the First Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention*, Geneva, 10-11 January 2000, p. 3.

³⁶ *Draft Report of the First Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention*, Geneva, 10-11 January 2000, p. 3.

³⁷ Email from Carolyn Cooper, UNDDA, 11 May 2000.

³⁸ *Draft Recommendations with Respect to the Implementation of Article 8 of the Mine Ban Convention*, presented to the Second Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts meeting on the Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 29-30 May 2000 (contained in that meeting’s Reference Documents at 6.1). These recommendations were accepted by the Standing Committee of Experts.

compared to the compliance costs for other treaties. In the absence of a standing secretariat for the Ottawa Convention, the UN needs the support of all states parties to fulfil the tasks the treaty has ascribed to it.

ANTIVEHICLE MINES WITH ANTIPERSONNEL EFFECTS

**Summary of a report by Thomas Küchenmeister
German Initiative to Ban Landmines
Full text download: www.landmine.de**

It is a widespread misunderstanding that only antipersonnel mines (APM) are responsible for the humanitarian disaster caused by landmines. Also anti vehicle mines (AVM) mines pose a considerable threat to the civilian population, and claim many victims as the tragic reality shows. Respectable estimates assume that between 15- 20 % of all laid mines are believed to be antivehicle.

Especially AVMs equipped with antihandling devices (AHD), tilt rod fuzes or magnetic fuzes, trip- or breakwires pose a significant threat to civilians. Due to the sensitiveness of these fuze technologies, they can cause a mine explosion from an unintentional act. Individual people are basically threatened by such mines when they move (either with or without a vehicle!) over/past/close to such mines. Therefore most existing AVMs act like antipersonnel mines.

Their explosive force makes their impacts all the more devastating and usually fatal for several victims. AVMs are laid together with APMs to increase their destructive power yet further. Buildings, railway lines, roads and other infrastructures are often blocked with AT/AV mines. Often AVM incidents result in a number of death and injured people travelling with trucks or pick-ups on mined roadways. But even a step on certain AVM can cause their detonation. Ignoring these facts means ignoring hundreds of death and injured civilians year by year.

As is generally known, the Ottawa Convention tries to impose a total ban on antipersonnel mines yet at the same time denies that anti-vehicle mines and anti-handling devices are, or were, ever part of the problem. But according to the Ottawa Treaty *definitions* antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that explode from an unintentional innocent act are considered antipersonnel mines and therefore prohibited. The *diplomatic history* from Oslo clearly shows that this was the understanding of the negotiators.

As it was feared the ban on APM wakes extensive further technological development of AVMs. Already in the beginning 90ties military requirements called for the integration of AP effects (e.g. anti-handling devices) into existing AT/AV systems in view of a future mine ban. This development continues up to now and includes the development of sensor fuzed “smart” mines.

Despite the often heard military argumentation that modern sensor fuzed “smart” AVMs do not pose a threat to civilians, producer of modern area defence AVMs confirm a lot of existing technical problems with a reliable target discrimination. It is known that

even a smart off route mine can fire its warhead on to a passing animal or a person under specific circumstances (weather and soil conditions).

Therefore AVMs as well as bomblet ammunitions and (mine)submunitions are being more and more targeted by NGOs or ICRC for potential inclusion into future arms control legislation. Meanwhile many see this as a logical extension of the APM ban.

Furthermore the report points out that certain AVM types are suspected to violate both, the CCW 2 Protocol and the Ottawa-Treaty. NGOs have urged all Ottawa and CCW-2 member states to clarify the consistency of their antivehicle mines with these treaties and asked them to report all existing AT/AV mine stockpiles to the UN General Secretary within their article 7 reports.

In the light of the current landmine warfare praxis and the landmine technology developments the German Initiative to Ban Landmines calls for a ban on all types of mines with antipersonnel effects and points to a considerable and rising number of ICBL member organizations sharing this position.

CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The Bombs That Keep On Killing

By Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe¹

On May 8, 1999 a NATO cluster bomb strike aimed at the Nis, Serbia airport went astray, resulting in at least 14 immediate deaths and between 28 and 70 injuries. Police reported finding at least 20 unexploded bomblets in the area of the strikes. One man who was injured in this attack, 72 year-old Vladimir Jovanovic, died some 11 months later on April 4, 2000, when he was working in his yard with a shovel. His shovel accidentally hit a buried cluster bomb which blew up and killed him.

With each war, there is a growing number of victims, many of them children and other civilians, who suffer injury or death from cluster munitions. Mr. Jovanovic had the misfortune of experiencing the characteristics which make cluster bombs so prone to cause indiscriminate injury and death: the difficulty in targeting such wide area munitions in civilian areas, and their high dud rate which converts them into *de facto* landmines after the battle is over.

There are persistent and predictable patterns resulting from cluster munitions use, now demonstrable over a 30+ year period from the Indochina War until the present. Cluster bombs are wide area munitions, difficult to use safely in civilian areas. Cluster bombs are small, and very difficult to track, map, or find. With dud rates ranging from an estimated 2% to over 30%, they create large, unmapped minefields in areas where people live or will return to live. Many of the submunitions bury themselves, gradually

¹ This article summarizes a more extensive report entitled *Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Global Report on Cluster Bomb Production and Use*, July 2000. Access the full report at: <http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/report/index.htm> The full report focuses on cluster bomb production and use by the United States, Russia, and Sudan. Additional country studies will be added periodically. Titus Peachey is a Staff Associate for Peace Education with Mennonite Central Committee in Akron, Pennsylvania. Virgil Wiebe is an Advocacy Fellow at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C.

coming to the surface over time, or as a result of agricultural activity. Cluster munitions are sensitive to the touch even when they do not function as designed. Children find them almost irresistible, and often play with them even after they have been warned of the danger. Cluster munitions continue to maim and kill long after a war has ended.

Despite these predictable effects, there are no international conventions which explicitly restrict or ban the use of cluster munitions. However, in recent years, government leaders restricted or halted the use of cluster munitions during several times of conflict, because of concerns about their indiscriminate effects.

In the context of the Campaign to Ban Landmines, the issue of cluster munitions has surfaced frequently, due to the similarity in effect between landmines and cluster munitions. While the Ottawa Treaty uses a design-based definition for landmines which likely excludes cluster munitions from the Treaty's provisions, the wars in Kosova/Serbia and Chechnya have once again placed cluster munitions squarely on the arms control agenda.

Cluster munitions have been employed worldwide, used by state and non-state actors in places as diverse as the Afghanistan, Angola, Chechnya, Croatia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq, Kashmir, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Vietnam.

Contractors from around the globe produce cluster bombs, multiple rocket launcher systems, submunitions, and their components. A non-exclusive list includes manufacturers in Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, France, India, Israel, Italy, Germany, North Korea, Poland, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Cluster bombs kill indiscriminately in two ways: (1) "geographically," because they are wide area munitions which are difficult to target, and thus are likely to kill and injure civilian and soldier alike, especially in civilian areas, and (2) "temporally," because their high dud rates guarantee the creation of de facto landmine fields, and thus go on killing for decades after the battle is over.

The lethality of cluster bombs is so high, that even when used "properly" against combatants, they arguably violate the international prohibition against weapons that cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. Increasing international criticism on cluster bomb use makes it incumbent upon the international community to act now. Cluster bomb use must be stopped while the nations of the world consider restrictions and bans on the use of these indiscriminate and inhumane weapons.

**MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES FROM A DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED
POINT OF VIEW**
"THE BAD HONNEF FRAMEWORK"

The "Bad Honnef" Guidelines were elaborated and adopted at the First International Conference of Experts in Bad Honnef, 23-24 June 1997. They were reconfirmed and adopted at the ICBL's NGO Forum on Landmines in September 1997.

The Guidelines were renewed and revised at the Second International Conference of Experts (Bad Honnef II) in Berlin-Kladow from 21-23 June 1999.

An abbreviated version of the full Guidelines follows. To obtain the full version, please go to <http://www.landmine.de> or contact: German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Markus Haake, Rykestr. 13, 10405 Berlin, Germany, Phone +49 30 421 36 86, Fax +49 30 428 01 688, Email: gibl.haake@t-online.de

The Guidelines are also available in Arabic, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish, Russian and Chinese.

Guidelines for Development-oriented Mine Action Programmes

Basic Principles

1. The needs and aspirations of people affected by mines are the starting point for mine action programmes. Mine action programmes must be environmentally specific; they must be compatible, in form and content, with the conditions in individual countries.
2. As much as any human being, mine affected people and communities have the right to shape their own lives and to participate in political and economic decision making which concerns their interests. The implementation of the humanitarian action in a spirit of solidarity designed to promote autonomy rather than creating new dependencies is crucial.
3. Mine action programmes must be part of integrated response. They have to support peace-building including reconstruction and development of the community and aim at enhancing the socio-economic and cultural infrastructure. Empowerment of the community to carry out all aspects of mine action programmes by providing the proper training, equipment, standard and supervision is the ultimate goal.
4. Social indicators that will determine the progress and success of a mine action programme should be defined in advance in consultation with the affected community and donors. Each programme should have well-defined goals, to be reviewed continuously.
5. Mine action programmes should be designed on the basis of objective data obtained through accurate socio-economic taking into account indicators and factors particular to the cultural environment. There is a need to review and revise programme objectives in consultation with the community and donors as the programme evolves.
6. The complex situation of societal destruction after war requires a coherent and simultaneous approach for all of the following elements of mine action programs:
 - a. insertion in a national and local peace-building and development framework;
 - b. community and victim/survivor participation;
 - c. mine awareness and accident/incident prevention; mine surveying, marking and mine clearance
 - d. effective emergency response capacities to accidents (emergency first aid);
 - e. physical and psychological rehabilitation of mine victims;
 - f. political, social, and economic reintegration of mine victims, families and their communities,
 - g. empowerment of local communities, and

- h. political advocacy and support for the programmes.
7. Mine action programmes should reflect the impact of landmines on the environment and wildlife providing appropriate support.

**Participation and co-operation –
Integrated mine action programmes based on community participation**

Awareness building, Surveying, Marking and Demining:

8. It is essential that clearing mines and other explosive debris (UXO) is accompanied by information, education, and training, taking into account the specific cultural environment of each mine affected community. The population should be made aware of the dangers and consequences of mines in ways that are appropriate to the age, gender and social group of those being trained.
9. Surveying and marking of mine infested areas, as well as the actual demining process, including the destruction of mines and UXO, must take place in close co-operation with the affected population and all relevant authorities and organisations.
10. The guidelines (8) and (9) should be carried out by fully skilled and equipped local specialists trained by qualified trainers and planned and implemented in an integrated and co-ordinated manner.

Emergency first aid and physical rehabilitation

11. Access to prompt medical attention and the availability of surgical care is imperative. Local paramedics and physicians should be trained to competently provide emergency first aid, ambulance care and longer-term treatment to victims of mine explosions.
12. Prostheses and wheelchairs or other aids for the victims must be provided through the development of local production capacities. The highest possible quality standards, adapted to local circumstances, should be reached.
13. Physiotherapeutic and other rehabilitative measures should be carried out with an emphasis on the training of local specialists.
14. In order to guarantee continued success of the medical measures, the affected communities should be supported in their efforts to provide medical support and follow-up care for people with disabilities.

Socio-economic, cultural and psychological rehabilitation

15. Personal suffering and rupture of the social fabric must be countered by
 - a. offering appropriate accompaniment, educational and vocational training and/or other income generating possibilities for economic reintegration;

- b. providing psycho-social care for the disabled and their kin (with the care tailored to the cultural traditions), helping to generate community capacities in this regard;
 - c. supporting healing cultural activities (such as sports, cinema, theatre, dance, newspaper, etc), as the realm of social integration, with a balanced participation of disabled and non-disabled;
 - d. supporting local organisations and particularly the efforts of the affected people to organise themselves.
16. Mine action programmes must address peace-building, reconciliation and needs of mine affected communities. This means for example to guarantee access to education and justice systems as well as creation of citizen security. Access to water, rural credit schemes, village roads, provision of primary health care should also be ensured, in order to sustain livelihoods.
 17. Efforts at psychosocial rehabilitation should be accompanied by basic and further training of local monitors (social workers, health workers, teachers, and other community monitors).
 18. Mine victims and landless people must be given priority in the allocation of demined land.

Institution building, co-operation and synergy

19. To correspond as best as possible with the needs and aspirations of affected communities, local institutions implementing individual parts of mine action programmes should be supported both in establishing themselves as well as in their work (capacity enhancement).
20. Close co-operation between organisations is required in planning and implementing mine action programmes, mobilising different organisational competencies. A practical division of labour and responsibility in different aspects of projects contributes to an integrated and participatory approach.
21. Since no single organisation or international institution has the overall knowledge and competence to fulfil all elements of the integrated and comprehensive approach close co-operation between national and local authorities and organisations which take responsibility for a specific component of the mine action programme is crucial.
22. Co-operation between institutions of the North and the South (North-South-co-operation) as well as between institution from the South (South-South-co-operation) should be supported to build mutual confidence. An improved and mutual transfer of organising ability and other competencies is therefore required. Exchanges of community based experiences should be encouraged.
23. Non-local workers need to be sensitised in local culture and language in recognition of the demandingly holistic approach. They are a guest in a foreign country, and working for the benefit of that country. They should contribute to insuring sustainability.
24. The creation of local campaigns for the banning of landmines should be supported, for instance in helping to bring about an awareness of a collectively suffered injustice, or in averting the possible renewed use of mines.

**Coherence and sustainability –
Mine action programmes as part of peace-building, reconstruction and development
programmes**

General requirements

25. Mine action programmes are part of national reconstruction and development programmes guided by the goal to create a community empowerment, social confidence and a development-oriented civil society.
26. Mine action programmes are part of peace building programmes. Beyond victim assistance, they should take into consideration the need for fully reintegrating refugees, displaced persons, and demobilised soldiers. There should be no discrimination of ex-soldiers, particularly of victims of mine accidents and other war disabled.
27. The participation of diverse social groups in mine action promotes both the sustainability of programmes and national reconciliation. The success of reconciliation, particularly among war victims, is an indicator of progress.
28. Efforts on the part of the victims (and their dependants) to establish a reparation fund, and financial aid such as pensions, should be supported. States are required to draw up and implement appropriate legislation regarding war victim and disabled rights, including the rights of veterans.
29. Mine action programmes require the creation of national data management systems including archives, mine related records, Geographical Information Systems, and national-wide databanks. Data should not only cover planted and stockpiled mines but also victims, internally displaced, demobilised soldiers. Comprehensive data collection and transparency with free access for all participants needs to be assured.

The role of NGOs and community based organisations in implementation and monitoring

30. NGOs and community based organisations welcome the steps taken so far on the path towards prohibiting mines, especially the Ottawa Convention for the prohibition of anti-personnel mines. However, they regard the results achieved to date as a first step that has to be followed by further steps:
 - extending the prohibition to include all mines and weapons covered by the effect-oriented definition;
 - ensuring transparency of information on research into mines and weapons similar to mines and on the sale, transfer or export of mines;
 - verifying the destruction of all mines;
 - ensuring transparency in funding the research, development and procurement of new mines and mines delivery systems;
 - rededicating funds allocated to the research and development of new mine technologies to mine action programmes.
31. NGOs and community based organisations support the universalisation of the Ottawa convention and beyond this the comprehensive banning of landmines and weapons with similar effect. Relevant work by local, regional and national campaigns towards an overall ban should be supported.

32. NGOs and community based organisations should demand international and national standards for the main elements of mine action programmes, such as demining and the rehabilitation of victims. NGOs and community based organisations should be part of the relevant negotiations on these and should bring their influence to bear.
33. National control mechanisms such as legislation should include NGOs and community based organisations in verifying compliance with these standards.
34. NGOs and community based organisations should monitor the overall impact of mine action programmes put into practice, in order to ensure compliance with the holistic approach.

**Solidarity and financing –
Promotion of autonomy instead of creation of new dependencies**

General principles

35. The NGOs and community based organisations demand that governments or warring parties, who developed, produced, exported and/or used landmines, accept their responsibility for the eradication of mines and addressing the impact of mines.
36. Comprehensive, integrated, participatory mine action programmes should become the norm for development policy in mine-affected societies. Plain demining cannot be the only goal of developmental or humanitarian considerations in the face of the pervasive destruction wrought on these societies. It is important that civil institutions are involved in all aspects of demining and mine action. The NGOs and community based organisations will strive continuously for this.
37. For the provision of additional funds, the principle that the polluter pays should be considered: companies that have profited from the development, production and sale of mines, could pay into a reparation fund.

Standards for the allocation of funds

38. Resources for mine action programmes should be allocated according to humanitarian considerations and according to these guidelines. If commissions are given to commercial enterprises, profits must not go into weapons production or into activities that are counter to these guidelines.
39. The comprehensive, integrated approach of mine action programmes demands a long term planning perspective, which needs to be considered when providing funds. Funding decisions should be made as close to the field as possible. Funds should be released rapidly to ensure programme coherence and timely implementation. Donors should practice direct funding to implementing organisations and take greater and closer responsibility for programme monitoring.
40. Funding allocation decisions must be based on the needs and aspirations of mine victims and their communities. These decisions should involve mine action protagonists at all stages of the allocation process. Vested interests of the donor or recipient countries should not play a decisive role.
41. While NGOs and community based organisations accept appropriate research into new mine clearance technologies based on end-user requirements and existing

- technologies, the ratio of funding should be balanced in favour of community-based mine action programmes. New mine clearance technology should reflect local capacities and be locally manageable.
42. Donors should be fully transparent about the funds allocated to mine action. The purpose of the grants should be specifically designated in different categories: these should include mine clearance, research and development of new mine clearance and detection technology, and mine victim assistance. This will clarify whether humanitarian funds are being used to fund non-humanitarian work, and/or commercial and military research and development.
 43. NGOs and community based organisations encourage mine-affected countries themselves to create, in full transparency, their own mine action budgets commensurate with the extent of the landmine problem. Such budgets should include corresponding decreases in military spending for mine technology.
 44. Development, commercial and other investments in mine-affected countries should include appropriate mine-action elements in project planning, budgeting and implementation. In particular, all mine clearance organisations and commercial investments in affected areas should privilege local capacity-building.

Changes and improvement of these guidelines

45. Changes to these guidelines will make use of experts representing the diverse elements of integrated mine action programmes.

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Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 76

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/54/563)]

54/54. General and complete disarmament**B****IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL
MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 53/77 N of 4 December 1998,

Reaffirming its determination to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, which kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do the utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to facing the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do the utmost in ensuring assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration, of mine victims,

Welcoming the entry into force on 1 March 1999 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,³

Recalling the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention, held at Maputo from 3 to 7 May 1999, and the reaffirmation made in the Maputo Declaration 4 of a commitment to the total eradication of anti-personnel mines,

Noting with satisfaction the addition of new States signatories to the Convention, the rapid ratification by many signatories, and the accession to the Convention by other States, bringing the total number of States that have signed to one hundred and thirty-three, and that eighty-nine States have ratified or acceded to the Convention in the two years since it was opened for signature,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to the Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization,

Noting with regret that anti-personnel mines continue to be used in conflicts around the world, causing human suffering and impeding post-conflict development,

1. *Invites* all States that have not signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction⁴ to accede it without delay;

2. *Urges* all States that have signed but not ratified the Convention to ratify it without delay;

3. *Stresses* the importance of the full and effective implementation of, and compliance with, the Convention;

4. *Urges* all States parties to provide the Secretary-General with complete and timely information, as required in article 7 of the Convention in order to promote transparency and compliance with the Convention;

5. *Invites* all States that have not ratified the Convention or acceded to it to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to make global mine action efforts more effective;

6. *Renews its call upon* all States and other relevant parties to work together to promote, support and advance the care, rehabilitation and social and economic

³ See CD/1478.

⁴ APLC/MSP.1/1999/1, part II.

reintegration of mine victims, mine awareness programmes, and the removal of anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world and the assurance of their destruction;

7. *Invites and encourages* all interested States, the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to participate in the programme of inter-sessional work established at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in accordance with article 11, paragraph 2, of the Convention, to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the Second Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention at Geneva, from 11 to 15 September 2000, and, on behalf of States parties and according to article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention, to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to attend the Meeting as observers;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fifth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

*69th plenary meeting
1 December 1999*

18 September 1997

**CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING,
PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND
ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

Preamble

The States Parties,

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
 - a) To use anti-personnel mines;
 - b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
 - c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article 2

Definitions

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

Article 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5*Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas*

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
 - a) The duration of the proposed extension;
 - b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension,
 - (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
 - (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
 - (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party
 - c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
 - d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

Article 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.
2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.
6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
 - a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
 - b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
 - c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
 - d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
 - e) Assistance to mine victims;
 - f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

Article 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
 - a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
 - b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
 - c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
 - d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

- e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
 - f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
 - g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
 - h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
 - i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.
 3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

Article 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall

be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and

decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.
11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.
12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.
13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:
- a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
 - b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
 - c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.
16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.
17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.
18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.
19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.
20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

Article 9*National implementation measures*

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 10*Settlement of disputes*

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

Article 11*Meetings of the States Parties*

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 - a) The operation and status of this Convention;
 - b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
 - c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
 - d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
 - e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
 - f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this

Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
 - a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
 - b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
 - c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
 - d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be

convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

Article 15*Signature*

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

Article 16*Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession*

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 17*Entry into force*

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 18*Provisional application*

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

Article 19
Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 20
Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

Article 21
Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 22
Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.