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IV. Background²

On May 13, 2005, Uzbek government forces killed hundreds of unarmed people who participated in a demonstration in Andijan, in eastern Uzbekistan.

The Uprising and Massacre

In the early hours of May 13, gunmen attacked government buildings, killed security officials, broke into the city prison, took over the local government building (hokimiat), and took hostages. The trigger for the attacks was the trial of 23 respected local businessmen for religious extremism--charges against them were widely perceived as unfair and in previous weeks had provoked sporadic protests.

Toward dawn, the instigators, many of them armed, began to prepare for a large protest in a public square, in front of the regional government building, and mobilized people to attend. By mid-morning, as word spread, the protest grew into the thousands, as people came of their own will and vented their grievances about poverty and government repression. When government forces sealed off the square and started shooting indiscriminately, the protesters fled; with them were some of the instigators. Hundreds of them were ambushed by government forces and were gunned down without warning. While a small number of those fleeing were armed, government forces made no apparent effort to spare the lives of the overwhelming majority who were not. This stunning use of excessive force was documented by the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations.

Pressure on Refugees to Return to Uzbekistan

Roughly five hundred people fled Andijan on May 13 and made their way to neighboring Kyrgyzstan. The group received refuge in tent camps set up along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and administered by the Kyrgyz Department of Migration Services.

The Uzbek authorities aggressively pursued the return of refugees who had fled the country following May 13. Beginning in early June 2005, it used threats, coercion, promises of fair treatment, and unscrupulous propaganda to pressure families of refugees who had sought refuge in Kyrgyzstan to bring their relatives back to Andijan. Officials often threatened serious repercussions for family members if they failed to convince their relatives in Kyrgyzstan to return. In some cases, Uzbek government proxies themselves entered the camp and attempted to remove refugees or interfered with family meetings.³

The danger of forced return from Kyrgyzstan was so great that in late July 2005 the UNHCR evacuated the refugees from Kyrgyzstan to Romania, where they could be better protected.

The Uzbek government has worked jointly with the security forces of neighboring countries to secure the forcible return refugees and asylum seekers, often in blatant disregard of international law prohibiting such action; in several other cases, asylum seekers have simply vanished and later been found in custody in Uzbekistan. In the past three years, several dozen individuals have been forcibly returned⁴ and scores of others live in constant fear of being returned to Uzbekistan, where they face a serious risk of torture and other abuse.

No Accountability for Killings of Unarmed People

To this day, and despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, government authorities deny responsibility for the killings of unarmed protesters in Andijan, blaming them instead on Islamic extremists who were intent on overthrowing the government and creating an Islamic state in the Fergana valley. The government characterized the killings in Andijan as “terrorist acts” and put the death toll at 187, the majority of them “bandits,” “terrorists,” and the government agents they supposedly killed. It acknowledges approximately 60 civilian deaths, and attributes all of them to the gunmen and not to fire by government forces.⁵ The government has specifically stated that the gunmen were the ones responsible for the slaughter of civilians retreating from the main square where the protest had been held.⁶

Three years later, no one has been held accountable for these killings. The government of Uzbekistan has extensively investigated and convicted hundreds of people in connection with the armed uprising and the mass protest.⁷  But it has made no attempt to clarify the circumstances surrounding the massacre or to provide information regarding the specific units responsible for the killings or who gave the orders to fire. It has adamantly rejected repeated calls for an independent international inquiry into the Andijan events. Instead, in late 2006 and early 2007 the Uzbek government agreed to engage with the EU in “Andijan experts meetings” that examined the armed uprising that preceded the massacre, but not the killings themselves.⁸ At these meetings the Uzbek government deflected any further criticism for its refusal to agree to an independent inquiry. The EU, for its part, made a public statement that the experts’ meeting was an important opportunity for dialogue but not a substitute for such an inquiry.

In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, the Uzbek government also made unprecedented efforts to suppress and manipulate the truth about the May 13 events. Foreign journalists were forcibly ejected from Andijan, and had their notes and equipment confiscated. Local law enforcement and mahalla (neighborhood) committee members went door to door warning residents not to speak with journalists or foreigners or to discuss the events of May 13.

The authorities detained and tortured or otherwise ill-treated hundreds of participants in and witnesses to the demonstration. In autumn 2005 the Uzbek authorities began a series of trials related to the Andijan events. Between September 2005 and July 2006 at least 303 people were convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms in 22 trials—including one trial of Andijan Interior Ministry employees and another involving Andijan prison staff and soldiers. Some of the people tried were convicted of terrorism, the courts finding that the defendants had been plotting to set up an Islamic caliphate in Uzbekistan. With the exception of the first trial, held in the Supreme Court between September and November 2005, all trials were closed to the public.

The government portrayed the trials as a means of holding accountable those responsible for the uprising and protests in Andijan, but, as noted above, did nothing to answer the outstanding questions about the scale of—and responsibility for—the excessive use of lethal force by law enforcement.

Crackdown on Civil Society

The Uzbek government also engaged in a fierce crackdown on individuals and organizations who sought to establish and expose the truth about the Andijan events. Dozens of human rights defenders, political activists, and independent journalists were either detained by the authorities or were forced to flee the country because they feared for their security. The authorities also blocked the activities of local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Between May 2007 and February 2008, eight human rights activists were released from prison or amnestied. But at this writing, the Uzbek government continues to hold at least 12 human rights defenders in prison on politically motivated charges. All of the currently imprisoned defenders were arrested and prosecuted during the post-Andijan crackdown.

International Response

With the notable exception of Russia and China, the initial response by international organizations and third-party governments to the Andijan massacre was strong and unified condemnation. The United Nations, the European Union, the United States government, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the NATO Council all called for an independent international inquiry into the events and for accountability for those government officials found responsible. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued strongly critical reports based on extensive interviews in Kyrgyzstan with eyewitnesses to the massacre.⁹ These reports corroborated the findings of Human Rights Watch and other NGOs that there was overwhelming evidence of Uzbek government responsibility for the killings.

After this initial show of unity, however, it soon became evident that key actors, in particular the United States and the European Union, lacked a common strategy toward Uzbekistan, resulting in a failure to ensure that the Uzbek government’s persistent defiance of the international community’s calls were met by an effective, coordinated response. Thus the hard-hitting reports by the OSCE/ODIHR and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights never received the political backing and sustained follow up they so clearly warranted. The UN’s highest human rights body, the Human Rights Council, considered the situation in Uzbekistan on two separate occasions in 2006, only to decide to lift its scrutiny of the country altogether.

Only the European Union, six months after the massacre, mustered the political courage to impose concrete political consequences in the form of targeted sanctions, which were adopted by EU foreign ministers in October 2005. The sanctions consisted of an EU-wide visa ban on 12 high-ranking Uzbek officials the European Union considered “directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijan,” an embargo on arms exports to Uzbekistan, and partial suspension of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the framework that regulates the EU’s relationship with Uzbekistan—marking the first time in the institution’s history that it had partially suspended a PCA with another country over human rights concerns.

Since their initial instatement, however, the European Union has incrementally weakened the sanctions despite the Uzbek government’s failure to heed EU human rights demands, first by lifting the partial suspension of the PCA in November 2006, and then again in May 2007, when it took the names of four officials off the visa ban list even though the Uzbek government had not conducted impartial and credible investigations into the Andijan massacre or held the perpetrators to account. In October 2007, while extending the sanctions for another 12 months, the EU suspended the bulk of the sanctions regime—the visa ban—for a period of six months and listed a set of concrete benchmarks that the Uzbek government had to undertake, including the release of imprisoned human rights defenders.  The EU justified the move as a constructive gesture aimed at encouraging the Uzbek government to undertake the necessary human rights reforms. On April 29, 2008, the EU suspended the visa ban for another six months, until October 2008, when the sanctions regime is scheduled to expire unless it is again extended. While the EU announced that it would conduct a mid-term evaluation of Uzbekistan’s human rights record in three months, it squandered significant leverage by failing to ensure that the further suspension was accompanied by an automatic reinstatement clause should the Uzbek government continue to defy EU calls for human rights progress.

This shifting EU policy reflects a deep split among EU member states as to whether to maintain sanctions against Uzbekistan, with some arguing that the sanctions have not proved effective and should therefore be dropped, and others adopting a more principled position that the sanctions should be maintained until the Uzbek government has met the EU’s benchmarks.

Another factor contributing to a weaker EU commitment to the sanctions has been its parallel pursuit of a comprehensive strategy for Central Asia, encompassing all five Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan. The strategy, adopted in June 2007, envisages a range of ambitious goals for deepening EU engagement in energy, security, and other policy areas in Central Asia. It also seeks to promote human rights and the rule of law, chiefly through technical assistance and structured human rights dialogues the EU wants to establish with each of the Central Asian states.

Against the backdrop of this broader EU agenda, the sanctions on Uzbekistan have come to be perceived as a “thorn” in the relationship and an impediment to constructive engagement. Thus, while acknowledging that the human rights situation in Uzbekistan remains atrocious, EU officials increasingly refer to the human rights dialogue as the appropriate forum through which these concerns can be addressed, ignoring years of accumulated experience showing that some of the most important human rights steps the Uzbek government has taken were in response to international pressure.

Despite the shifts in its approach, the EU nevertheless stands out as a leader in the international arena when it comes to promoting human rights improvements in Uzbekistan. By contrast, the United States’ performance in this respect has been particularly disappointing. Not only did it fail to adopt sanctions similar to those imposed by the EU, but it also stopped short of articulating any clear policy more broadly vis-a-vis the Uzbek government.¹⁰

A significant opportunity for reversing this disappointing record was created by the adoption in the US Congress in December 2007 of legislation setting out specific human rights benchmarks the Uzbek government would have to fulfill, or risk facing sanctions. The sanctions, which mirror those of the EU, would take the form of a visa ban, to be imposed after six months should Tashkent fail to deliver on the benchmarks. The significance of this legislation should be seen in the process it creates for ensuring that the Uzbek government’s rights record at long last comes up for close, public scrutiny in Washington, DC.

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