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Role of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

Both in the run-up to and during the fighting, UNMIS in Abyei lacked the ability to carry out two key aspects of its mandate: monitoring implementation of the CPA, and protecting civilians.

Under Security Council Resolution 1590, UNMIS is mandated to support the implementation of the CPA, largely through the monitoring and verification of the Ceasefire Agreement and other elements of the CPA, for which purposes the parties should provide free movement for UNMIS throughout Sudan.⁵⁶

However, both Khartoum and GOSS have repeatedly imposed restrictions on the movement of UNMIS. In March 2006 the SAF notified UNMIS that a number of towns in areas north of Abyei, including Al Fula, Muglad and Meiram, were to be excluded from monitoring and verification.⁵⁷ These areas are within the boundary proposed by the Abyei Boundary Commission – but that the NCP argues that these areas do not fall within the accepted boundaries of Abyei, and therefore are not UNMIS does not have the mandate to monitor there.⁵⁸ In September 2006 SPLA representatives informed UNMIS and the SAF that it would be imposing restrictions on movement of UNMIS monitors south of Abyei.⁵⁹ Although these restrictions were briefly lifted in December 2007⁶⁰ and again in April 2008⁶¹, this was only temporary and only in relation to limited areas. As a result UNMIS was unable to fully investigate allegations of troop build up and other violations north of Abyei. When SAF and the SPLA police clashed in Dukra on May 13^th, lack of information and contacts in that area hampered UNMIS’ ability to respond effectively.⁶²  

Resolution 1590 also mandates UNMIS to take action to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, providing that:

UNMIS is authorized to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities… and, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.⁶³

The protection mandate is made explicitly subject to UNMIS capabilities within a given area, and of course decisions regarding the deployment of UNMIS military capabilities are critical in determining its ability to protect civilians. Despite increasing awareness, particularly since October 2007, that Abyei was a potential flashpoint for new conflict,⁶⁴ the unit there was designed with a view to carrying out monitoring activities rather than protection of civilians.⁶⁵ The force of some 200 soldiers then in Abyei was inadequate, both in terms of manpower and equipment, either to prevent the fighting or to intervene once fighting had begun on May 14.⁶⁶ UNMIS evacuated humanitarian staff on the evening of May 14, and was able to provide assistance to civilians who came to the base seeking protection. When they were told by SPLM representatives of some civilians still trapped in Abyei two weeks after the fighting, UNMIS were able to collect them from their homes and bring them back to the UNMIS compound.⁶⁷ However, for most of the four weeks following the fighting they were unable to deter ongoing violations such as continuing looting by SAF soldiers and government-supported militia, and for the most part remained bunkered in their compound.⁶⁸

As the UN Secretary General reported to the Security Council in January 2008, a strategic assessment of UNMIS had indicated the need for a review of the strength of its military component.⁶⁹ That same report acknowledged that Abyei was the most crucial challenge facing the parties, due to the ongoing presence of forces from both sides in that area. In April 2008, the Secretary General called for UNMIS to develop an integrated strategy for civilian protection and conflict management, with border area flashpoints being the first priority.⁷⁰ Despite this, when the fighting broke out in Abyei the UNMIS force was insufficient to meet the challenges of this predictably volatile and politically critical conflagration. As of July 8, the military capabilities assessment had yet to take place, and is now planned for late July.⁷¹

Some civilians who had fled the fighting in Abyei told Human Rights Watch they had lost confidence in the ability of UN peacekeepers to provide protection for civilians. Community leaders told Human Rights Watch they had made complaints to UNMIS, particularly regarding the build up and behavior of SAF Brigade 31, but UNMIS had failed to resolve them.⁷²

One man who had been working with an international NGO in the centre of Abyei told Human Rights Watch: “UNMIS was very weak and could not stop anything. It had big guns outside the compound, but the men were all inside.”⁷³

Following a request by the UN Security Council on June 24, 2008, UNMIS sent an assessment team on July 4 to investigate the ‘the role played by UNMIS in relation to the violence.’ ⁷⁴ As of July 18 UNMIS has yet to report on its findings or on any investigation on human rights violations carried out by the parties during the attacks.

The CJMC (Ceasefire Joint Military Committee)⁷⁵ has begun carrying out an investigation into the fighting as specified in the Roadmap. However, this investigation will focus on military activities and breaches of the CPA, rather than human rights violations and is carried out jointly by representatives of the SPLM and NCP, as well as UNMIS staff.

None of these ongoing investigations focuses on human rights and humanitarian law violations. The United Nations should task human rights monitors to carry out an in-depth investigation into human rights and other violations carried out during the fighting and to report publicly on the findings.⁷⁶ The central government and the GOSS should cooperate fully with such an investigation, and take all necessary steps to ensure accountability for the perpetrators and compensation for the victims.

The Security Council on June 24 also requested that UNMIS “robustly deploy, as appropriate, peacekeeping personnel in and around Abyei to help reduce tensions and prevent escalation of conflict in support of implementation of the CPA,”⁷⁷ however by July 18 UNMIS had yet to deploy significant additional troops to Abyei.⁷⁸