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IV. Perpetrators and Victims

The phenomenon of enforced disappearances that has haunted Sri Lanka since the 1980s has now returned. With the resumption of major military operations between government forces and the LTTE, a new wave of enforced disappearances and abductions engulfed the country in 2006-2007. With the end of the ceasefire, it is likely to accelerate.

While the exact number of “disappearances” perpetrated over the last two years remains unknown, data from local organizations and the UN Working Group, as well as information collected by Human Rights Watch, suggests that the problem has reached crisis proportions.

In 2006 the UN Working Group transmitted more cases of “disappearances” as urgent appeals to the Sri Lankan government than to any other country in the world. At the conclusion of its session in March 2007, the UN Working Group again expressed “deep concern that the majority of new urgent action cases are regarding alleged disappearances in Sri Lanka.”⁸⁶

Judging by various figures on “disappearances” released by government and nongovernmental sources, more than 1,500 people have been reported missing from December 2005 through December 2007, and the majority of them are still unaccounted for.

On June 28, 2007, the chairman of the Presidential Commission on abductions, disappearances, and killings, Judge Tillekeratne, told the media that 2,020 abductions and “disappearances” were reported to his commission between September 14, 2006, and February 25, 2007 (1,713 cases of “disappearances” and 307 abductions). According to Tillekeratne, 1,134 persons were later “found alive and reunited with their famlies,” but the fate of the rest remains unknown.⁸⁷

Although Judge Tillekeratne presented the figures as proof that the majority of the “disappeared” had returned to their homes, it shows in fact that at least 886 people “disappeared” without a trace in less than 12 months.

The national Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka does not publicize its data on cases submitted to its review. According to credible sources interviewed by Human Rights Watch, as well as press reports, the commission recorded about 1,000 cases in 2006 and over 300 cases in the first four months of 2007.⁸⁸ The commission refused to provide any data in response to Human Rights Watch’s letter of inquiry.⁸⁹

On October 31, 2007, a credible Sri Lankan NGO, the Law and Society Trust, in collaboration with four local partners, including the Civil Monitoring Commission⁹⁰ and the Free Media Movement, submitted the details of 540 alleged “disappearances” perpetrated between January and August 2007 to the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (CoI).⁹¹

While “disappearances” have occurred all over the country, certain regions have been particularly affected.

The majority of cases are reported from the Jaffna peninsula—according to HRC figures published in the media, at least 835 persons were “disappeared” or abducted there between December 2005 and May 2007.⁹² A respected Sri Lankan group, University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), reported in December 2007 that out of 948 individuals reported missing in Jaffna from December 2005 to October 2007, 684 remain unaccounted for.⁹³

Since late 2006, “disappearances” and abductions have also become a widespread practice in Colombo, as well as in the districts of Mannar, Batticaloa, Ampara, and Vavuniya. Out of 540 cases submitted to the CoI by the Law and Society Trust, 271 were from Jaffna, 78 from Colombo, 40 from Mannar, 39 from Batticaloa, 15 from Ampara, and 14 from Vavuniya.⁹⁴

Since its formation in November 2006, the Civil Monitoring Commission (CMC) has recorded details of dozens of cases of “disappearances” and abductions in Colombo, at the same time acknowledging that this reflects only a fraction of the total.⁹⁵

Human Rights Watch’s research in Sri Lanka in February, March, and June 2007, examined in detail 99 cases out of the hundreds of people believed to have been “disappeared” or abducted in 2006 and 2007. These include cases from Colombo, Jaffna, Vavuniya, Mannar, Tricomalee, and Batticaloa.

While the government claims that the number of “disappearances” and abductions has dropped dramatically since June 2007, available evidence shows a high number of new “disappearances.”

In August 2007, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated it had received reports on 34 abductions in three weeks,⁹⁶ and the HRC recorded 21 “disappearances” in Jaffna alone.⁹⁷ Weekly reports published by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) suggest that in September and October 2007 abductions in the east continued almost on a daily basis, and, for example, in the week of December 3 – December 9, 2007, 22 abductions were reported to the SLMM in the east.⁹⁸ The Law and Society Trust report also shows that the number of reported “disappearances,” which had been gradually decreasing in April-July 2007, rose sharply again in August.⁹⁹

Perpetrators

“Disappearances” by their nature are abuses perpetrated with the very intention of evading responsibility. In conflicts throughout the world the perpetrators often try to conceal their identity and ensure that there are no direct witnesses. This makes establishing accountability challenging and allows the parties to a conflict to blame the abuses on each other. Sri Lanka is no exception in this respect.

The Sri Lankan government routinely denies the responsibility of its security forces for “disappearances” and dismisses the allegations of eyewitnesses as unreliable because they cannot point indubitably to the identity of the perpetrators. In a number of cases documented by Human Rights Watch and others, eyewitnesses were unable to clearly identify the perpetrators, describing them as a “group of armed men” arriving in a “white van,” on motorcycles, or on foot.¹⁰⁰

However, in the majority of cases documented, there is sufficient evidence to suggest the involvement or complicity of the Sri Lankan security forces—army, navy, or police—in the “disappearances.”

Witnesses in some cases also pointed to members of pro-government non-state armed groups, acting either in conjunction with the security forces or independently, as the perpetrators. These are Tamil groups that are in conflict with the LTTE—and whose members have frequently been targets of LTTE attack—specifically the Karuna group in the east and Colombo, and the EPDP in the northern Jaffna peninsula.

In its first submission to the CoI in August 2007, the Law and Society Trust noted that out of the 396 cases of alleged “disappearances,” 352 were perpetrated by “government agents,” and in 44 cases the perpetrators were unknown.¹⁰¹

Undoubtedly, the LTTE is also responsible for “disappearances” and abductions. The numbers are comparatively low, however, in part because “disappearance” is not a prime tactic of the LTTE and in part because cases may be underreported due to the fear instilled in victim’s families and eyewitnesses.

Sri Lankan armed forces

In the absence of a significant external defense mission throughout Sri Lanka’s modern history, the armed forces have primarily focused on internal security and counter-insurgency warfare.

During the country’s internal conflicts, the government has frequently applied laws conferring additional powers on the armed forces. Since 2001, successive Sri Lankan presidents have invoked the powers under section 12 of the Public Security Ordinance (PSO), allowing them to heavily rely on the armed forces “when public security is endangered and the President is of the opinion that the police are inadequate to maintain public order.”¹⁰²

The powers granted to the military under the PSO are limited to standard search and arrest procedures; dispersal of unlawful assemblies; seizure and removal of offensive weapons and substances from unauthorized persons in public places; seizure and removal of guns and explosives (when written authority is granted by the president or an authorized person). Section 12 also specifically prohibits the armed forces from exercising powers under Chapter XI of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, such as investigating crimes and bringing suspects before magistrates.

The 2005 Emergency Regulations, however, go far beyond the PSO; Regulation 52 confers broad policing powers onto officers of the armed forces, when so authorized by the respective commander.¹⁰³ Under Regulation 68, members of the armed forces, when authorized by the respective commander, can question any person in custody, and hold him in the custody of the authorized member of the armed forces for a period not exceeding seven days at a time for the purpose of questioning, or for any matter connected to such questioning.¹⁰⁴

Commenting on the regulations granting broad policing powers to the armed forces, a prominent Sri Lankan lawyer noted that this is “an exercise fraught with danger” as the military forces “lack the proper training, experience and investigative skills to engage in such an exercise, and considering the nature of the training they undergo and the experiences of the battlefield, their psychological make-up may not be conducive to the conducting of an effective investigation within the confines of the law.”¹⁰⁵

The involvement of the army and navy in “disappearances” is particularly evident in the Jaffna peninsula. ¹⁰⁶ Historically, much of the heaviest fighting between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces has occurred on the peninsula, evident in the war-torn appearance of its major town, Jaffna. The peninsula is dotted with a number of Sri Lankan military bases—land, naval, and air—whose presence often is a factor in “disappearance” cases. In 21 out of 37 cases of “disappearances” documented by Human Rights Watch in Jaffna, evidence strongly suggests that the perpetrators were members of the armed forces. In some cases, individuals “disappeared” after being detained during large-scale cordon-and-search operations. In such cases, family members knew exactly to which military camps their relatives were taken, and sometimes even wrote down the license plate numbers of the military vehicles that took them away.

For example, in one of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, two women witnessed the arrests of their husbands on December 8, 2006, after the men came to retrieve their IDs seized during cordon-and-search operations by the military in Navindil. The women managed to write down the license plate numbers of the vehicles that took their husbands away (40041-14 and 40032-14) and later saw the vehicles at the Point Pedro military camp where they went looking for their husbands. Despite these details, the military denied ever arresting the men and at the time of writing their fate remains unknown.¹⁰⁷

In other cases, the families’ suspicion of the military involvement in “disappearances” was reinforced by subsequent inquiries in army camps. For example, after 26-year-old Thavaruban Kanapathipillai and 30-year-old Shangar Santhivarseharam went missing on August 16, 2006, on the way to Kachai in eastern Jaffna district, their families made inquiries with the Kodikamam military camp located near their place of residence. While the military denied having detained the men, the relatives saw Kanapathipillai’s bicycle—that the two men rode on the day of their “disappearance”—parked near the camp, in the area controlled by the military. The camp commander eventually returned the bicycle to the relatives, yet denied having any knowledge of the men’s fate.¹⁰⁸

In a number of cases in Jaffna, victims of “disappearances” were taken away by large groups of armed men from houses located in the immediate proximity of military checkpoints, sentry posts, or other military positions. While the witnesses could not positively identify the perpetrators, they had a well-grounded suspicion that the military was either directly involved or was complicit in such “disappearances.” These incidents usually occurred during curfew hours in areas of government control, and, according to witnesses, it is inconceivable that large groups of armed men could move around freely and pass through checkpoints without endorsement from the military.

Sri Lankan police

The blurring of the mandates of the military and police forces through extraordinary laws also has a corrosive effect on Sri Lankan police forces.¹⁰⁹

The militarization of the Sri Lankan police dates back to the 1970s, when insurgents targeted many police stations, and the government realized the “need to train and equip the police for duties over and above normal police functions.”¹¹⁰ In 1983 the government formed a Special Task Force (STF) within the police as a paramilitary unit specializing in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations.¹¹¹

Heavily involved in the fighting against the LTTE, the Special Task Force over the years became notorious for its human rights violations, including “disappearances” and extrajudicial killings. The Sri Lankan Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons in the Northern and Eastern Provinces concluded in 1997 that the STF was the arresting agency in 5 percent of 1,219 reported cases of “disappearances” in the Batticaloa district in North Eastern province between 1988 and 1996.¹¹² The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions also reported that individuals allegedly died “while in the custody of the Special Task Force of Sri Lanka in Colombo.”¹¹³ Despite well-documented allegations of abuse, STF members have managed to avoid accountability for their actions and continue to function with impunity.¹¹⁴

In addition to the STF, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), which is responsible for routine police operations, is also implicated in abuses, including the spree of abductions and “disappearances” in Colombo in 2006-2007. In a number of cases documented by Human Rights Watch, eyewitnesses said that their relatives had been taken away by uniformed policemen who introduced themselves as representatives of the CID, and even produced relevant IDs. In some cases, they told the families that their relatives were needed for questioning, yet failed to inform them where they were being taken or to produce an arrest receipt as required by law. When the families later tried to inquire with the police, police denied any knowledge of the persons’ whereabouts.

In an illustrative case, on February 1, 2007, four men who identified themselves as police, two of them in uniform, came to the house of 22-year-old Suresh Palanisamy in Colombo 13 (sections of the capital are identified by number). The police said they needed Palanisamy at the Eheliyagoda police station in relation to a complaint and took him away. Palanisamy’s father, informed by his daughter-in-law, immediately rushed to the police station, but the police denied ever bringing Palanisamy there. The family went to other police stations and filed a complaint with the HRC, but, at this writing, has received no further information about Palanisamy’s fate or whereabouts.¹¹⁵

Police involvement in abductions was also confirmed in an unexpected admission made by police inspector general Victor Perera in March 2007. Perera announced that police had arrested a “large number” of police officers, as well as members of armed forces, on charges of abduction and extortion, although he never provided any details.¹¹⁶ Attempts by Human Rights Watch to learn more from the police regarding this assertion have proved fruitless. In response to Human Rights Watch’s inquiry, national police responded on January 2, 2008, that “since 2004 a total number of 31 Police officers have been arrested for violations of Human Rights.”¹¹⁷ His letter did not specify how many of these officers have been arrested since the resumption of hostilities in 2006; what were the specific charges against the officers; and the current status of their cases.

Pro-government armed groups 

Human Rights Watch obtained significant evidence of the involvement of pro-government Tamil armed groups in enforced disappearances, acting either on their own or alongside the Sri Lankan security forces. Implicated were the Karuna group, operating mostly in the east and in Colombo, and the EPDP in the Jaffna peninsula in the north.

Both groups closely cooperate with Sri Lankan security forces. The Sri Lankan security forces are primarily Sinhalese and as a result have few native Tamil speakers. Both the military and police use EPDP and Karuna cadres—who are native Tamil speakers—to identify and often apprehend suspected LTTE members or supporters.

In a number of cases documented by Human Rights Watch, witnesses described the perpetrators as a joint group of Tamil and Sinhala speakers, or mentioned the presence of at least one native Tamil speaker whom the soldiers used to identify the individuals apprehended. When not identified, these may have been local residents acting independently as government informants. In several cases, families also said that they were first visited and questioned by the military, and then, usually several hours later, a group of Tamil-speaking armed men came to their house and took their relatives away.

On other occasions, the Karuna group or EPDP seemed to be acting on their own—seeking to settle scores with the LTTE or abducting persons for ransom—with security forces turning a blind eye to their activities.

Reports by local media and human rights groups describe the two groups’ involvement in “disappearances” and killings, and their close cooperation with the security forces. A November 2006 report by the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) detailed a number of murder cases perpetrated by “hybrid killer groups” that were “made up of elements from intelligence divisions of the various arms of the security forces (especially Army and Navy) together with Tamils who serve the security forces in their individual capacity or from groups such as the EPDP and Karuna faction.”¹¹⁸ In a comprehensive “Overview of the Enforced Disappearances Phenomenon,” journalist D.B.S. Jeyaraj noted that the actual abductions are generally done by the Karuna or EPDP group, “while some top ‘security’ guy is usually at hand to help out if something goes wrong.”¹¹⁹

Karuna group

Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan (a.k.a. Colonel Karuna) was the senior LTTE military commander for the eastern districts until he split from the LTTE with his forces in March 2004. The LTTE largely destroyed his group in fighting in April 2004, but he continued to control several hundred armed supporters opposed to the LTTE until he lost a power struggle to commander Pillaiyan and his leadership position in the group by September 2007.¹²⁰ Through cooperation with Sri Lankan security forces the Karuna group has exerted de facto authority over parts of the eastern districts of Ampara, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa, and extended its operations in the northern Vavuniya district.

Previous reports by Human Rights Watch have extensively documented the group’s involvement in human rights abuses, particularly large-scale recruitment of child soldiers and the government’s complicity in these violations.¹²¹ Despite international criticism and the government’s repeated pledges to investigate and address the violations, in late 2006 and 2007 Karuna cadres were still responsible for continued forced child recruitment and abductions and murders of suspected LTTE supporters.

In the east, Karuna cadres were operating in close tandem with the security forces—primarily the army, navy, and STF. Examples of such cooperation are cited in previous reports by Human Rights Watch and by Sri Lankan human rights groups. For example, the August 2007 report of the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) described a spree of abductions in Thiriyai, a village about 25 miles north of Trincomalee, in October 2006, after a checkpoint jointly manned by the navy and the Karuna group was set up there.¹²²

In Colombo and other districts the Karuna group also engaged in kidnappings of wealthy Tamil businessmen, what journalists dubbed “an industry” of raising money through kidnappings for ransom.¹²³ The International Crisis Group noted that the government’s “reliance on paramilitaries to fight the government’s war, while refusing to pay them for it, has blurred the lines between political and criminal violence. What may have started out as an attempt to establish an extra layer of militant taxation or undermine LTTE taxation networks, has descended into increasing lawlessness and insecurity for all minority businessmen.”¹²⁴

An October 2007 media article on the situation in the east suggested that the Karuna group has taken “effective control of wide swaths of the east, employing many of the same rackets they ran when they were Tigers, but now with the tacit support of a government.” The article cited a Muslim community leader saying, “Earlier they operated from jungles with fear. Now they are in the open with government license.”¹²⁵

Human Rights Watch interviewed several persons who had been released after paying a ransom or who had to flee after receiving threats allegedly from the Karuna group, as well as relatives of people who “disappeared” after being taken away.

For example, after men in a white van abducted 29-year-old Sakthivadivel Rajkumar on October 23, 2006, in Vavyniya, his family received a phone call from the kidnappers. A person who said he was from the Karuna group requested a ransom for Rajkumar’s release. After the family deposited the money into the specified banking account, the caller, who introduced himself as “Robert,” informed the family that Rajkumar had been injured during torture, and that he would be released upon recovery. Yet at the time of this writing, he still had not returned home.¹²⁶

Rajkumar’s relatives also told Human Rights Watch that the caller threatened them not to report the abduction to any authorities.”¹²⁷

Most of the family members of victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they feared reporting the abductions to the authorities, referring to the Karuna group’s close affiliation with the security forces. A lawyer from Vavuniya, who had to flee the town with his wife after the Karuna group started demanding money from them, said, “We are afraid to go to the police. The police are attached to this. If we file a case in court the Karuna group will throw a grenade at my house.”¹²⁸

A Colombo businessman who was released after paying a ransom said that his kidnappers, who spoke Tamil with a particular Batticaloa accent (where most Karuna group members originate), moved easily through checkpoints as they were taking him away. According to the man, the kidnappers warned him not to report the abduction to anyone. “They said, ‘Do not convey this information to anyone: the media, the police, or human rights groups,’” the man told Human Rights Watch. “’We have connections at each organization, so we will not allow you to live.’”¹²⁹

While the witnesses were able to provide specific details—including names, cell phone numbers, and bank accounts numbers—that could allow the identification of the perpetrators, the government continues to turn a blind eye to crimes allegedly perpetrated by the Karuna group, and to deny the complicity of its security forces. In its July 2007 response to Human Rights Watch’s letter of inquiry, the government provided no information on the status of the government’s highly publicized investigation into abductions by the Karuna group, stating that it “has no complicity with the Karuna group in any allegations of child recruitment or abduction.”¹³⁰

In response to a follow-up inquiry sent by Human Rights Watch in November 2008, the national police reiterated government denials of state complicity in the abductions perpetrated by the Karuna group and added that “no complaints have been received by the Sri Lankan Police implicating Karuna group in abduction of boys.”¹³¹ At the same time, a note from the National Police Commission attached to the deputy inspector general’s response, mentions the Karuna group (along with the army, “unidentified men,” and “paramilitary elements”) as one of the alleged perpetrators of “several” cases of abductions and “disappearances” reported to the commission.¹³²

Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP)

In the Jaffna peninsula, the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) has been in active alliance with the military against the LTTE. This is in part a reaction to the LTTE’s intensification of killings of EPDP members and supporters following the EPDP’s disarmament under the ceasefire agreement in 2002. Accounts obtained by Human Rights Watch as well as reports by local human rights groups point to the involvement of EPDP cadres in a number of abuses, including enforced disappearances.

The EPDP has a long history in northern Sri Lanka. It was formed in 1987, with most of its leadership and members previously involved in the Tamil armed struggle in the north and east.¹³³ After the party entered into mainstream politics, it officially renounced violence, yet until the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement continued to maintain a military wing.¹³⁴

Over the past decade, the EPDP has been a political option, alongside several other small parties, for citizens who wish to vote for a Tamil political party other than the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance. Its leaders have been elected repeatedly to the parliament and have held cabinet posts.¹³⁵ The party maintains a significant presence in Jaffna district.¹³⁶

In the early years of the Sri Lankan Tamil armed struggle for independence, the EPDP fought alongside other Tamil groups, including the LTTE. After the LTTE began to systematically eliminate or absorb the other Tamil groups, the EPDP became one of the LTTE’s most determined rivals.¹³⁷ The government actively allied with the EPDP and other Tamil groups opposed to the LTTE, and armed them.¹³⁸

The EPDP criticized the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, in which only the government and the LTTE were allowed to participate, and specifically the provision that required “Tamil paramilitary groups”—but not the LTTE—to disarm, because it placed them at risk of LTTE attack.¹³⁹ According to knowledgeable sources, the party leadership in large measure “cooperated in the process” of disarmament, as the EPDP claimed, and was compelled to rely on the police and military to guard party offices. However, individual members did continue to maintain weapons.¹⁴⁰

While the LTTE had long targeted EPDP leadership and members, its attacks on the EPDP intensified after the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement, as the LTTE expanded and strengthened its presence and influence on the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE not only sharply curtailed EPDP political activities in Jaffna,¹⁴¹ but also committed numerous killings of the party’s members and supporters. The EPDP website contains a list of 48 party activists killed and abducted since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement in February 2002.¹⁴² While this information is hard to verify, Human Rights Watch and others have reported on LTTE attacks on members of EPDP members and other Tamil political parties during the ceasefire.¹⁴³

The situation changed in 2006, as Sri Lankan government forces reestablished their presence in Jaffna town and some other parts of the peninsula. The EPDP then began to support the government in its anti-LTTE operations, as well as to initiate its own attacks against suspected LTTE cadres, supporters, and former EPDP loyalists who switched their allegiance to the LTTE.

While the EPDP has denied having armed cadres and conducting security operations, several independent observers have concluded otherwise. For example, after a mission to Sri Lanka in late 2005, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, mentioned in his report the “continuing operation of armed EPDP cadres in the islands off the Jaffna peninsula.”¹⁴⁴ Amnesty International stated that it had received “credible reports” of the involvement of EPDP armed cadres alongside Sri Lanka navy personnel in the killings of 18 civilians on northern Kayts Island on May 13-14, 2006. Local groups and media also believed that EPDP cadres alongside the Sri Lankan navy were responsible for the killings.¹⁴⁵

Reports by credible local human rights groups referred to specific incidents of attacks by armed EPDP cadres—for example, a May 2006 attack on the office of the pro-LTTE newspaper, Uthayan, which left two staff members dead and three injured.¹⁴⁶

In at least two “disappearance” cases documented by Human Rights Watch in Jaffna, the families strongly believed that the perpetrators were members of the EPDP—based on their accents, appearance, and vehicles leaving in the direction of EPDP camps.

The family of 25-year-old Thiyagarajah Saran said that on February 20, 2007, a group of men they believed to be from the military and the EPDP took him away from his residence in East Puttur, a village 13 kilometers from Jaffna town. The relatives said that some of the perpetrators spoke Sinhala, and some were native Tamil speakers. They all wore military pants and T-shirts and were armed with AK-47 assault rifles and pistols. As the perpetrators were leaving the house, the family said, part of the group left in the direction of the Puttur army camp, while others moved in the direction of the Achchuveli EPDP camp.¹⁴⁷

A number of other witnesses also referred to EPDP “camps” in Jaffna as places where they went to search for their missing relatives. At a meeting with Human Rights Watch in April 2007, EPDP leader Douglas Devananda said that the EPDP does not have any “camps,” just “offices,” one of which is indeed located in Achchuveli.¹⁴⁸

The EPDP leadership is undoubtedly aware of the allegations against its cadres. A number of witnesses told Human Rights Watch that they approached EPDP offices while searching for their “disappeared” relatives and tried to inquire within EPDP camps. A relative of Sivasothy Sivaramanan, a man who “disappeared” after he had been taken away by a group of armed men, some of whom spoke Sinhala and some spoke Tamil, said that he met with Douglas Devananda three times. Each time, the EPDP leader promised to find his son, yet the young man remains missing to date.¹⁴⁹

In August 2007, in Jaffna, Devananda met with the families of the “disappeared” who, according to the EPDP website, “expressed their tales of woes and broke down out of grief in front of the Minister.” Devananda reportedly told the families that such matters cannot be “settled at an instance” and asked for time, and then communicated with President Mahinda Rajapaksa about his meeting with the families.¹⁵⁰

In a meeting with Human Rights Watch, Devananda dismissed allegations of the EPDP’s involvement in abductions and blamed them exclusively on the army and the LTTE. He noted, however, that he has only “98 percent control over his people”—suggesting, apparently, that the 2 percent he says he does not have control of, may be responsible for violations outside of his knowledge.¹⁵¹

In response to Human Rights Watch’s letter of inquiry, the EPDP insisted that its members never participate in joint operations with the army or police, do not collaborate with any agencies “in arresting or detaining any person,” and do not bear arms.¹⁵² The party also said that whenever their representatives receive complaints regarding abductions or disappearances from the families, they approach relevant authorities in order to establish the whereabouts of the missing individuals and to ensure their release. In the letter, the EPDP mentioned that during a visit to Jaffna in August 2007, the party representatives managed to trace three missing persons—however, the letter did not provide any details and did not specify whether the party has any information on the identity of the perpetrators in these or other cases reported to its offices.¹⁵³

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Both during the ceasefire and since the resumption of hostilities, the LTTE has continued to be responsible for massive human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. The group has carried out landmine attacks targeting civilians, murdered Tamils deemed political opponents or suspected of cooperating with government forces, prevented civilians from fleeing areas of active fighting, interfered with the delivery of humanitarian aid, and forcibly recruited people, including many children, into its ranks. In the areas under its control in Sri Lanka’s north and east, the LTTE represses the rights to free expression, association, assembly, and movement.

Human Rights Watch has long documented abuses by the LTTE, particularly the systematic recruitment and use of child soldiers, the targeted killings of political opponents, and abusive fundraising tactics abroad.¹⁵⁴

Despite claims of the Sri Lankan government to the contrary, “disappearances” do not appear to be a tactic widely used by the LTTE. In order to achieve the maximum deterrent effect on the population in areas under its control, the LTTE much more commonly publicly executes its victims, or publicly displays the bodies following executions.¹⁵⁵

At the same time, the LTTE is clearly responsible for abductions for the purposes of forced recruitment. Media reports suggest that since June 2006, the LTTE intensified its conscription efforts, recruiting as many as 10,000 people in eight months. Although the recruitment efforts are broadly unpopular in LTTE controlled areas, it is difficult to know how many of these individuals, ages 17 to 35, were taken against their will. However, in some cases where people tried to go into hiding to avoid recruitment, the LTTE took other family members, often children, to pressure them into joining the ranks.¹⁵⁶

Most of the abductions for recruitment took place in Kilinochchi and Mullaitheevu districts—territories controlled by the LTTE—although the LTTE has also reached Mannar, Vavuniya, and certain areas in Jaffna. According to media reports, LTTE cadres who possess detailed information about households in the territories under their control start by pressuring men and women to join. However, according to one informed journalist, “if unsuccessful at daytime the Tigers return at night” to take the recalcitrant recruits away by force.¹⁵⁷

In February 2007, a Sri Lankan Tamil residing in Canada made a rare public appeal for international assistance to release his niece abducted by the LTTE in Kilinochchi. The man stated that on February 9, 2007, LTTE cadres came looking for his 23-year-old niece, Thenuga, in order to recruit her for military training. The young woman, however, had gone into hiding before they arrived. After they realized that Thenuga was missing, the LTTE men demanded that her older sister, 27-year-old Pathmaseeli Kanagarajah, join them. When the woman refused, they dragged her out of the house, kicking the relatives who tried to prevent the abduction aside, and took her away.¹⁵⁸

In a case documented by Human Rights Watch, the families believed that their relatives had been taken away by the LTTE. Three young men—21-year-old Padmanathan Rajendran, his 18-year-old brother Sureshkumar Rajendran, and 21-year-old Nishanthan Tharmakulasingam—went missing on September 28, 2006, in Irupalai, Jaffna district after going to a sports field. While there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged abduction, the families said that they suspect the LTTE as no army or other security forces were present in the area, while the LTTE was known to have a strong presence there. Had the sons voluntarily joined the LTTE, that message would likely have been conveyed to their families.

The abduction might have been retaliatory, because, according to the families, the Rajendran brothers used to be “friends” with the military, spoke good Sinhala, and used to tell people in the village that they would be able to help them out should they have any problems with the military. The families said that other villagers also believed the three men were abducted by the LTTE because of presumed connections to the military, yet everybody was too scared to share any specific information with the families.¹⁵⁹

Human Rights Watch believes that the actual number of “disappearances” and abductions perpetrated by the LTTE may be significantly underreported as many relatives may choose not to relate such cases to the authorities or human rights groups, fearing retaliation or considering such efforts to be of no avail.

However, repeated statements by the Sri Lankan government blaming the upsurge in new “disappearances” exclusively on the LTTE and “criminal gangs” are not credible or convincing. In hundreds of well-documented cases, eyewitness accounts compellingly point to the responsibility of the Sri Lankan army, navy, or police, or pro-government armed groups. In other cases circumstantial evidence suggests military involvement—the victims were taken away by large groups of men during curfew hours, often in the immediate proximity of government checkpoints or other military installations. It would be hard for the government to explain how in such instances the LTTE could have been the perpetrator.

Victims

The vast majority of victims of the “disappearances” and abductions have been young Tamil men, although some Sinhalese and Muslims have also been targeted. Statistics presented by the Civil Monitoring Commission, Free Media Movement, and Law and Society Trust suggest that of the cases where the ethnicity of the victim was known (85.3 percent of all documented cases), approximately 80 percent of the “disappearance” victims were Tamils, 1.8 percent were Sinhalese, and 3.5 percent Muslims.¹⁶⁰ Men represented 98 percent of all missing persons.¹⁶¹ Most but not all of the reported “disappeared” were young—according to Law and Society Trust, 60 percent of the victims were 30 years old or younger.¹⁶²

Some of the victims, especially in Jaffna, were clearly targeted because of their alleged affiliation with or support for the LTTE. The cases documented by Human Rights Watch indicate that this “affiliation” seems to be vaguely defined and could include anything from receiving training in the LTTE camps years earlier (something that many Tamils were forced to do in the territories within the LTTE’s reach), to running a small shop where LTTE cadres might have entered as customers.

For example, the relatives of 28-year-old Sivasooriyakumar Tharmaratnambelieved that his “disappearance” on November 17, 2006, might have been linked to the opening of a small shop shortly before then. The shop, which sold car parts, was located inside the military’s high security zone. The family thought that since Tharmaratnamused to spend a lot of time outside of the shop, the army might have suspected him of being an LTTE spy observing the military positions.¹⁶³

A father of another “disappeared” man told Human Rights Watch that he believed the army abducted his son because the army might have suspected that he had close connections to the LTTE. The family used to run a tea shop in Urumpirai, north of Jaffna town, which served lunch to local people, of whom any could have been LTTE members. According to the father, when he went to inquire about his son’s fate at a nearby checkpoint, the soldiers there told him casually, “Oh, that’s because you were feeding the LTTE.”¹⁶⁴

Security forces reportedly identify many of their targets by examining video and photographic materials from the ceasefire period, when many people openly participated in LTTE-organized demonstrations and parades in the north.¹⁶⁵ In the north and east, a significant number of victims of abductions and “disappearances” are students. Since the LTTE recruits children for its forces in various capacities,¹⁶⁶ security forces are particularly likely to target students as suspected LTTE supporters.

One Sri Lankan NGO provided Human Rights Watch with a detailed report on student abductions in the north and east, listing dozens of alleged cases that occurred from December 2005 to May 2007. The report includes copies and English translations of “death threat” flyers that unknown persons distributed at the University of Jaffna, a site under the control of the security forces.

The true source of the flyers is unknown but they contribute to an atmosphere of fear at the university. One of the flyers states that 323 students and university staff from different faculties “were acting closely with Tiger terrorists” and received arms training from the LTTE. The flyer adds that they have identified these students and employees as “punishable criminals” and were “awaiting proper opportunity to punish all of them.”¹⁶⁷

The NGO report also contains detailed complaints from family members of abducted students received by the NGO and filed with the Human Rights Commission. One such complaint was submitted by the relatives of 18-year-old Yasotharan Suntharaliningam, a Jaffna Hindu College student. The relatives said that at midnight on May 4, 2007, during the local curfew, a group of armed men on motorbikes, some of whom were wearing army uniforms and some wearing civilian clothes, abducted Suntharaliningam from his house in Kokuvil, Jaffna. According to the complaint, the house is located 100 meters away from an army sentry post.

Acting on the complaint, the Human Rights Commission in the Jaffna region inquired with the commander at Palaly military camp in Jaffna and the assistant superintendent of police, and forwarded the complaint to the HRC in Colombo. At the time of this writing the whereabouts of the student remains unknown.¹⁶⁸

Other discernible categories of persons subjected to “disappearance” include religious leaders, humanitarian workers, and journalists. In a joint submission to the UN Human Rights Council in September 2007, a coalition of Sri Lankan NGOs drew special attention to the patterns of killings and enforced disappearances of religious leaders and attacks on places of worship. ¹⁶⁹

Among the most highly publicized “disappearance” cases in Jaffna is that of Reverend Fr. Thiruchchelvan Nihal Jim Brown, a parish priest in the village of Allaipiddy on Kayts Island. He was known to have helped many civilians move from Allaipiddy to the town of Kayts during fighting in the area between Sri Lankan Navy forces and the LTTE in 2006. The priest went missing with another man, Wenceslaus Vinces Vimalathas, on August 20, 2006. The two men left Allaipiddy in the early afternoon for the nearby village of Mandaithivu, but the Sri Lankan military did not allow them to enter. On the way back to Allaipiddy they were stopped at a navy checkpoint, and they have not been seen since then.¹⁷⁰

The navy denied having detained the men, and the investigation into the “disappearance” has so far produced no results.

In August 2007, a year after Fr. Jim Brown’s “disappearance,” the Christian Alliance for Social Action and the Law and Society Trust addressed President Mahinda Rajapaksa with an open letter expressing deep regret and concern that “for a whole year, domestic human rights protection mechanisms, including the Commission of Inquiry… have failed to find out what happened to Fr. Jim Brown and Mr. Vimalathas and prosecute those accountable.”¹⁷¹

In a case documented by Human Rights Watch, eight people “disappeared” on May 6, 2006, from a Hindu temple in Kodikamam where they were spending a night for holiday celebrations. The families of the men said that the military was conducting a search operation in the village that night, and that they heard gunshots and saw army vehicles approaching the temple. When the families were able to get to the temple in the morning they found the men’s sleeping mats, one of their ID cards, and blood stains on the floor, as well as bullet cartridges. The families reported the case to the Kodikamam police, SLMM, the HRC, and the ICRC, and inquired at the Varani military camp, yet to date the fate of the men remains unknown.¹⁷²

On September 6, 2007, a Hong Kong-based NGO, the Asian Human Rights Commission, published a list of 57 humanitarian workers allegedly killed or “disappeared” since the beginning of the year. Among the 14 “disappeared” were persons working for the HALO Trust, the Danish Demining Group, the Methodist Community Organization for Refugees (UMCOR), the Sri Lankan Red Cross Society, and the pro-LTTE Tamil Rehabilitation Organization.¹⁷³

One of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch concerns 37-year-old Charles Caston Raveendran, an employee of the HALO Trust, a de-mining organization. According to his family, on the night of November 15, 2006, a group of eight heavily armed men broke into the family’s house on Old Park Road in Jaffna. The men arrived in a white van and a jeep, were wearing civilian clothes and bandanas, and spoke a mixture of Tamil and Sinhala.

Pushing the other family members into one of the rooms, the intruders searched the house, took Raveendran’s documents, cell phone, watch, and work boots, and took him away with his hands tied. The family and the HALO Trust filed a complaint with the police and raised the matter with the SLMM, the HRC, and the ICRC. So far they have not been able to locate Raveendran.¹⁷⁴

The Free Media Movement reported continuing harassment and attacks on journalists and media workers throughout Sri Lanka. The Law and Society Trust submission to the Presidential Commission of Inquiry detailed the cases of five media workers abducted or “disappeared” in 2007.¹⁷⁵

In Colombo and to a lesser extent in other districts, many victims have been business owners. These abductions, usually followed by ransom demands, have been widely reported in the Sri Lankan media.¹⁷⁶ The nongovernmental CMC reported that in late 2006 and early 2007, 78 Tamil businessmen were abducted from Colombo. According to the CMC, 12 of them have been murdered, five released after paying large ransoms, and 51 are still missing.¹⁷⁷

Journalists and members of the CMC believe that the actual number of abducted businessmen is much higher, as many families and victims themselves choose not to report the cases, believing that acting on their own will bring the safe return of their relative or fearing that reporting the case will make matters worse.

Initially business owners victimized in the abductions were predominantly Tamil, but in 2007 Muslim businessmen were also targeted. According to media reports, in May 2007 more than a dozen Muslim businessmen were abducted. Some were released after paying ransoms ranging from 30 to 100 million SLR (US$ 300,000-1,000,000).¹⁷⁸

These abductions have created an atmosphere of fear and panic among the Tamil and Muslim business communities. Many families had to sell their businesses to be able to pay the requested ransom, or decided to sell them after securing release to avoid being victimized in the future. Others have reportedly fled abroad.¹⁷⁹