publications

Gaps in Legal Protection for Children

Repatriation Procedures Lack Clarity

The repatriation of an unaccompanied child is an administrative procedure that involves central and regional administrations, and the office of the public prosecutor, which is under direct instruction from the prosecutor general and independent from central and regional administrations.21

Spanish law considers all unaccompanied migrant children to be in need of protection, and thus entitled to state guardianship (tutela).22 Regional child protection services act as children’s guardians and provide a care placement, usually in a residential center, for the child.23  They also act as children’s legal representatives during a repatriation procedure and may propose to the central government that a child be repatriated.24 The decision to repatriate a child, however, is taken by the central government, either upon proposal from child protection services, or upon its own initiative, and following a report from child protection services.25 Central government representatives have to hear the child and decide about the child’s repatriation in accordance with the child’s best interests.26 They also contact diplomatic representations of the child’s country to process travel documents and to trace the child’s family.27 The office of the public prosecutor is charged with overseeing this process to ensure that repatriations comply with the law and the administration has to communicate to the prosecutor its decisions on whether a child will be repatriated.28

Spanish law generally reflects several binding international norms and standards around children’s rights, including that the child’s best interests trump any other consideration and that children must be heard in all administrative or judicial proceedings.29 Under the country’s immigration regulations, a child can only be repatriated if the repatriation does not put the child at risk or danger and if a child is reunited with the family or receives adequate care from protection services in the country of origin.30

However, procedures for repatriating an unaccompanied child are not regulated in more detail. For example, the law fails to specify how the hearing with the child should be conducted, or who should be present. There are no formal criteria for assessing a child’s best interests. There are no instructions as to what and who must gather information before making a repatriation decision. There are no definitions of the risks and dangers that need to be verified before returning a child, nor is it defined who is in charge of doing so. The role of public prosecutors during the procedure is left vague (see section below). As a result, government entities contradict one another as to what their responsibility is during the procedure, they repeatedly fail to fulfill their legal obligations, for example by not hearing the child during the procedure and by not submitting individualized reports, which contributes to a lack of legal protection for children (see Andalusia case study below).

The Committee on the Rights of the Child, the body that oversees the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, specifies that “the ultimate aim in addressing the fate of unaccompanied or separated children is to identify a durable solution,” and that “the search for a durable solution commences with analyzing the possibility of family reunification.”31 The committee adds, however, that further separation of a child from his or her family may be necessary for the child’s best interest and that a decision to repatriate must be weighed against other forms of durable solutions such as remaining in the host country or transfer to a third country.32 

Family reunification in the country of origin should not be pursued where there is a “reasonable risk” that such return would lead to the violation of a child’s fundamental human rights. Such a determination of risks includes, among other things, the availability of care arrangements, the child’s level of integration in the host country, and the duration of absence from the home country, as well as socioeconomic conditions upon return.

National Courts Repeatedly Annul Illegal Repatriations

National courts in Spain have repeatedly halted repatriation decisions made by the administration and ruled that these decisions violated procedural obligations and children’s rights. National courts, however, only review a fraction of all children’s repatriation cases and, thus, are not effective substitutes for fair procedures in initial hearings. However, that national courts have taken such strong measures in the few cases that they do hear is additional evidence that the repatriation system is flawed. Moreover, in at least two instances identified by the Spanish Ombudsman, Spanish authorities disregarded judicial suspensions of repatriations and repatriated unaccompanied children.33

Within the past two years, courts have suspended and in many cases subsequently annulled the repatriation of at least 24 unaccompanied children to Morocco.34 Several cases have been upheld at the appeals level35 and one case was pending before Spain’s constitutional court as of September 2008. In all cases, the court suspended or annulled repatriations ordered by central government representatives and approved by public prosecutors who found them in conformity with the law. Grounds for the suspensions and annulations included both procedural and substantive grounds, including that the administration decided to repatriate without hearing the child and without taking into consideration the possible consequences after the child’s return,36 and that repatriation would violate a child’s best interests and right to legal representation.37

These cases are atypical in that lawyers independently challenged repatriation decisions on behalf of unaccompanied children. Most children in repatriation proceedings do not have access to a lawyer, and even in the national court cases the Spanish administration repeatedly tried to block lawyers from representing children, challenging children’s right to be represented on the grounds that they lack the legal capacity to appoint lawyers.38 While most of these cases were argued before Madrid courts where lawyers have organized themselves to take up repatriation cases on a pro bono basis, in most parts of the country, no such organization exists.

Absence of Independent Representation

In practice, unaccompanied children are left without independent representation during a repatriation procedure which prevents them from challenging a repatriation decision, as required under international law. Child protection services—children’s only legal representatives—can and frequently do recommend repatriations. However, Human Rights Watch found that such proposals are made without any assessment of the child’s best interests or information about possible risks for the child after return. That child protection services represent children in a procedure that they initiate, without adequate information, for the purpose of removing the child from Spain constitutes a conflict of interest (see the Andalusia case study below).39 Even if a child expresses the wish not to return to the country of origin during the procedure, no judge necessarily reviews the decision made by the administration. The child remains represented by the child protection services, without the legal capacity to initiate such a review. As such, unaccompanied children are unable to challenge repatriation decisions, and in comparison to adult migrants who receive free legal assistance from bar associations during deportation procedures, they are worse-off.40  

The public prosecutor has the power and the impartiality to challenge a repatriation decision on behalf of the child. However, the prosecutor is not required by law to meet face-to-face with the child during the repatriation procedure, and a child is not given an opportunity to communicate real concerns to the prosecutor. Furthermore, the prosecutor is only instructed that he or she “may verify” whether the repatriation is in the child’s best interest.41 In practice, prosecutors repeatedly failed to ensure that repatriation decisions were compliant with the law. At least two dozen repatriation cases that were successfully challenged by independent lawyers before court had all been approved by public prosecutors, but were found to violate procedural obligations or children’s rights subsequently by courts (see section above about national court decisions).

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) grants migrants the right to submit reasons against an expulsion decision, to have his or her case reviewed by the competent authority, and to be represented for that purpose before that authority.42  The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) grants any person the right to an effective remedy whose rights and freedoms are violated under the Convention’s provisions.43 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), specified that states also have an obligation to guarantee an effective remedy against the risk of rights violations44 and that the “the remedy required by Article 13 must be ‘effective’ in practice as well as in law.”45

The Committee on the Rights of the Child stipulates that “individuals or agencies whose interests could potentially be in conflict with those of the child’s should not be eligible for guardianship,” as such an arrangement fails to secure proper representation of the child. In addition, the Committee has stated that children in administrative or judicial proceedings should be provided with a legal representative in addition to a guardian.46 Spanish repatriation procedure fall short of this recommendation given that child protection services are in a potential conflict of interest with the child they represent; furthermore, they remain the child’s only representative in a repatriation proceeding.

An additional binding legal obligation on Spain is the principle of non-refoulement under the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which prohibits Spain to return a person to a place where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.47 The obligation of non-refoulement is further enshrined in the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Both treaties prohibit Spain to return a person to a place where he or she is subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.48  The ECtHR, in interpreting this provision, has held that persons must not be returned if they face a real risk of ill-treatment.49

State parties furthermore have positive obligations under Article 3 of the ECHR. They need to take requisite measures and precautions against torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. In the case of Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, which involved the deportation of a 5-year old Congolese girl, the ECtHR concluded that a child’s deportation amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment including on the grounds that Belgian authorities “did not seek to ensure that she [the child] would be properly looked after or have regard to the real situation she was likely to encounter on her return to her country of origin.”50 In Nsona v. The Netherlands, which also involved the forced removal of an unaccompanied child, the court explained State parties’ responsibility under Article 3 of the ECHR as follows:

The responsibility under Article 3 in cases of this kind lies in the act of exposing an individual to the risk of ill-treatment, the existence of the risk must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting States at the time of the expulsion.51




21 Organic law 8/2000 of December 22, article 35, and Royal Decree 2393/2004, article 92.

22 Spanish Civil Code, art. 172.3.

23 Ibid, Royal Decree 2393/2004, article 92.

24 Spanish Civil Code, arts. 172, 222.4.

25 Royal Decree 2393/2004, article 92(4).

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., Circular 2/2006, Attorney General (Fiscal General del Estado), 2006, p. 133.

29 Organic law 1/1996 of January 15, arts.2, 9, 11(2); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted November 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force September 2, 1990, ratified by Spain on December 6, 1990, arts.3, 12(2). Under article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration in all administrative and judicial proceedings, including repatriation decisions.

30 Royal Decree 2393/2004, art. 92(4).

31 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, paras.79-90.

32 Ibid.

33 See: Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo),Annual Report 2007 (Informe anual 2007), www.defensordelpueblo.es/InformesAnuales/informe2007.pdf (accessed September 19, 2008), p. 488.

34 These decisions are on file with Human Rights Watch. The most recent case on file with Human Rights Watch at the time of writing dated from June 6, 2008.

35 For example, High court of Madrid (tribunal superior de Madrid), chamber of administrative litigation (sala de lo contencioso administrativo), ruling 767 (sentencia 767), appeal number (apelación numero): 148-2007, April, 26, 2007.

36 For example, litigation/administrative court (Juzgado contencioso/administrativo) No.4, Madrid, proceeding (procedimiento) PA 32/07, of January 19, 2007; litigation/administrative court (Juzgado contencioso/administrativo) No.11, Madrid, abbreviated proceeding (procedimiento abreviado) 35/2007, of January 18, 2007; litigation/administrative court (Juzgado contencioso/administrativo) No.12, Madrid, sole identification number (número de identificación único): 28079 3 0074792/2006, of November 22, 2006.

37 For example, litigation/administrative court (Juzgado contencioso/administrativo) No.15, Madrid, sole identification number (número de identificación único): 28079 3 0074793/2006, of November 22, 2006; litigation/administrative court (Juzgado contencioso/administrativo) No.15, Madrid, sole identification number (número de identificación único): 28079 3 0070166/2006, of April 27, 2007. One judge concluded that the child’s representation by protection services during a repatriation procedure constituted a conflict of interest and that the child must be given independent representation. See: litigation/administrative court (Juzgado contencioso/administrativo) No.24, Madrid, sole identification number (número de identificación único): 28079 3 0015827/2008, of June 6, 2008.

38 For example, litigation/administrative court (Juzgado contencioso/administrativo) No.15, Madrid, sole identification number (número de identificación único): 28079 3 0015687/2007, of March 4, 2008; litigation/administrative court (Juzgado contencioso/administrativo) No.14, Madrid, general registry (registro general) 359/06, of September 25, 2006.

39 Furthermore, heads of child protection services in autonomous communities are appointed and can be removed by political parties in power. As such they may become subject to political influence.

40 Organic Law 8/2000, of December 22, article 22(1); Royal Decree 2393/2004, article 156(a).

41 See Prosecutor General’s instruction 6/2004; and Spanish Civil Code, art. 174.

42 “An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority,” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976, ratified by Spain on April 27, 1977, art.13.

Spanish law considers all unaccompanied migrant children to be in need of protection, and thus entitled to state guardianship (tutela); by law, children under state guardianship are legal residents. Spanish Civil Code, art. 172.1; Organic Law 4/2000, modified by Organic Law 8/2000, art. 35(4).

43 “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity,” ECHR, art.13.

44 “Secondly, even if the risk of error is in practice negligible… it should be noted that the requirement of Article 13, and of the other provisions of the Convention, take the form of a guarantee and not of a mere statement of intent or a practical arrangement.” Conka v. Belgium, (Application no. 51564/99), Judgment of 5 May  2002, available at www.echr.coe.int, para. 83.

45 Z and others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 29392/95, Judgment of 10 May 2001, available at www.echr.coe.int, para 108.

46 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No.6, paras.21, 33.

47 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into force April 22, 1954, ratified by Spain on August 14, 1978, art.33. These obligations are reflected in Spanish law 9/1994, dated May 19, of the amendment of law 5/1984, dated March 26, on the right to asylum and refugee status, arts. 2(1), 12.

48 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture), adopted December 10, 1984, G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987, ratified by Spain on October 21, 1987, art.3; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force September 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on September 21, 1970, December 20, 1971, January 1, 1990, and November 1, 1998, respectively, ratified by Spain on October 4, 1979, art.3.

49 Saadi v. Italy, (Application no. 37201/06), Judgment of February 28, 2008, available at www.echr.coe.int, para. 142.

50 Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, (Application no. 13178/03), Judgment of October 12, 2006, available at www.echr.coe.int, para 68.

51 Nsona v. The Netherlands, (23366/94), Judgment of June 26 and October 26 1996; 63/1995/569/655, available at www.echr.coe.int, para 92(c).