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Executive Summary

Kosovo’s declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, sparked a dangerous chain of events in Serbia. Nationalist anger about losing a province considered to be a cradle of Serbian culture and religion found an outlet in public demonstrations, and in some cases violence, including attacks on western embassies and businesses. During a February 21, 2008 rally in Belgrade, several hundred individuals broke loose from the otherwise peaceful crowd, attacking police and journalists.

The attacks on embassies and rioting in Belgrade were widely covered by national and international media. What largely escaped attention, however, were acts of harassment and intimidation against ethnic Albanians that took place across Serbia, but particularly in the province of Vojvodina, in the days that followed. In February and March 2008, the police registered 221 incidents relating to the protests over Kosovo, including those with no ethnic motivation, of which 190 took place in Vojvodina. Predominantly affecting Albanian-owned businesses and homes, many involved criminal damage—the smashing of windows and attempted arson, the spraying of hate graffiti, intimidating protests in front of homes and businesses, and in one case an organized boycott of an Albanian-owned business and the distribution of inflammatory leaflets. Some incidents took place during or immediately after public protests, and others occurred over subsequent days, sometimes repeatedly, the vast majority after dark.

This kind of violence against minorities is not new in Serbia. Ethnic Albanians have been particularly vulnerable, particularly when developments in Kosovo inflame tension. They were targeted, for example, in 1999 during the NATO bombing campaign. A wave of violence which included attacks on minority-owned businesses and on mosques took place between late 2003 and 2005, reaching a peak in March 2004 as nationalist sentiment reacted to anti-Serbian and anti-Roma riots in Kosovo.

In the context of long-standing political and ethnic conflict in the Balkans, even low-level violence, if not curbed, has the potential to escalate dangerously. In 2005 Human Rights Watch reported on the wave of violence against minorities in late 2003 and early 2004, describing a weak government reaction that failed to take the phenomenon seriously. The police made little effort to protect vulnerable locations associated with minorities, and failed to aggressively prosecute perpetrators of attacks—failing to identify perpetrators of the great majority of incidents reported. Calling for change, the report pointed out that Serbian criminal law did not encompass so-called hate crimes.   

Official reaction to events in February 2008 demonstrated that not much has changed in the intervening years. Indeed, in one important respect—the prosecution of the perpetrators of attacks—the authorities appear to have become more complacent.

On the positive side, in many instances police officers deployed to protect minority-owned property once it had been attacked, providing a deterrent physical presence for several days. On the other hand, based on the experience of ultra-nationalist reaction to events in Kosovo in previous years, attacks on minority, especially Albanian, homes and businesses were entirely foreseeable—yet the police did not take preemptive action to protect property before attacks took place.  

During demonstrations the police largely failed to intervene as ultra-nationalists threw stones at property, even when the police were physically present. The police have argued that during and following demonstrations, when officers were outnumbered by angry protesters, intervening robustly to protect property alone was not always feasible.

However, even if the police are given the benefit of doubt on this issue, Human Rights Watch is concerned that in most cases they appear to have done little to identify or vigorously pursue perpetrators of attacks—even in situations where police officers were themselves witnesses, or where other eye-witnesses or CCTV footage were available.

According to information obtained by Human Rights Watch from the police, of the 221 officially registered Kosovo-related incidents (including those, such as the criminal damage caused during protests in Belgrade, that lacked an ethnic dimension), 10 people were convicted and fined for misdemeanors. We did not obtain comprehensive statistics on prosecutions in the criminal courts, despite contacting the Chief Prosecutor of Serbia, and prosecutors across Vojvodina region. Through these officials, however, we learned of only one active case against a named perpetrator (a minor). A handful of other cases had been discontinued for lack of evidence, or were opened against “unknown perpetrators.”

None of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch in this report resulted in criminal charges or misdemeanor proceedings against named perpetrators. In some of the cases we documented, there were formal criminal investigations against “unknown perpetrators.” 

The information received from Human Rights Watch from Serbian authorities was often incomplete, making it difficult to accurately and fully assess the official response of the police and justice system, both in the cases documented in the report, as well as in general. But what is clear is that few incidents (whether ethnic-related or otherwise) resulted in misdemeanor charges, let alone criminal prosecution.

Victims of attacks were often keen to point out to Human Rights Watch that attacks on their property by ultra-nationalists were not representative of the attitudes of the local population as a whole. According to Albanian business-owners, the majority of citizens continued to frequent their shops after Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Some independent Serbian journalists were proactive in investigating and condemning the violence. President Boris Tadic, Serbia’s Ombudsman, and the then-Director of the Serbian National Office of Human and Minority Rights, were robust in their condemnation.

However, the messages of other state organs and government leaders were more ambiguous. The state-owned media was silent about violent incidents against minority-owned businesses. Then Minister of Infrastructure Velimir Ilic initially appeared to justify the violent protests in Belgrade and at border posts with Kosovo, before, a few days later, apparently back-tracking, calling for the arrest of “those who embarrassed Serbia.” Then Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica delivered a patriotic and nationalist speech to protestors in Belgrade, but later stated that “violence and destruction most directly harm the fight for state and national interest.”

While eventually ostensibly rejecting violence, the apparent emphasis of these leaders on the negative practical consequences for Serbian interests rather than on the principle that violence was an illegitimate form of protest was widely perceived as creating a permissive atmosphere for attacks by ultra-nationalists. With one or two principled exceptions, such as the mayor of Sombor, municipal authorities appear not to have responded at all.

Four years after a wave of anti-minority violence, Serbia’s response to violence against minorities in February 2008 was again inadequate and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the authorities still do not take attacks on minorities and their property sufficiently seriously. While police protection has improved, there was a lack of preemptive action. There remains a lack of vigor on the part of the police to find the evidence needed to bring those responsible to justice, and send the clearest signal that such attacks are unacceptable. Serbia has still to introduce criminal legislation that would allow for the imposition of greater sentences for ethnically aggravated forms of offences. 

Human Rights Watch is also concerned by the apparent lack of communication between the police and prosecutors and the victims and wider communities. Such communication is essential to assure that victims are able to assert their rights, including their rights to compensation for damages “on the occasion of” public protests, and possibly to deter further attacks.

Serbia’s new government, which took office in July 2008, took a welcome first step to give more prominence to minority rights on the day it was formed, by establishing a new Ministry of Human and Minority Rights to replace the Serbian National Office of Human and Minority Rights.  However, despite the upgrading of the agency responsible for minority rights, the government has yet to take concrete steps to address the long-standing weaknesses identified in this report.

The government must demonstrate a stronger commitment to investigate and prosecute ethnically motivated crimes, condemn violence, and act to protect minorities and their property from attack. The authorities must also assist victims obtain the protections and remedies to which the law entitles them, including for civil claims against perpetrators.

Until the authorities cooperate adequately to prevent, investigate, and, where appropriate, prosecute the attacks on minorities such as those described in this report, minorities in Serbia will remain hostages of societal tensions, feeling threatened, intimidated and unwelcome. The persistence of such vulnerability is detrimental not only to minorities, but also to Serbian society as a whole. If Serbia is serious about moving closer to Europe, it is crucial for the authorities and the society as a whole to create conditions for the peaceful and dignified coexistence of all of Serbia’s citizens.

Methodology

Human Rights Watch returned to Serbia in April 2008 to document the violence targeting ethnic Albanians the autonomous Serbian province of Vojvodina and central Serbia in the wake of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The areas were identified on basis of the available (but limited) Serbian media coverage, which indicated the locations of the attacks on the Albanian and other minority-owned businesses. We visited nine cities and interviewed 24 property owners, their family members and employees of affected businesses.¹

Victims of attacks were identified through press articles, which mentioned the names of businesses, and in some cases through local journalists, community activists and non-governmental organizations. The majority of the interviews were conducted in Serbian. In most cases, there were very few ethnic Albanians living in the towns and cities we visited.

Interviews with victims, NGO and other civil society representatives and reports in the local media suggest that the majority of the other ethnic Albanian business owners in these locations were also attacked. Human Rights did not follow up on every case in the areas we visited, due to time constraints. The information we received on the other cases from victims, NGO and other civil society representatives and reports in the local media suggest that the cases documented in this report are representative of those that occurred in the areas we visited in terms of their nature and the police and justice system response.

Between May and September 2008 victims were re-contacted either in writing or by phone to assess progress. Follow up victim interviews were conducted in either Serbian or Albanian.

The majority of victims interviewed were ethnic Albanians originally from Kosovo or Macedonia. In all areas where victims were interviewed, they constituted a small percentage of the overall population (less than 1%).  A few other victims attacked were of Gorani origin. Goranis are Slavic speaking Muslims originating from the Gora area in Southern Kosovo. One victim was of Turkish ethnicity (the majority of whom in the Balkan context come from the Prizren area of Kosovo).

The other minorities present in the areas Human Rights Watch visited were Hungarians, Croats and Bunjevci (ethnic Croats originating from Dalmatia and Western Herzegovina), Roma (who are both Serbian and Romani speakers), Vlachs (who are Latinized Romance language speakers), and Yugoslavs, i.e. people who identified themselves in the 1991 census as not belonging to any particular ethnicity. None of these groups were victims of the attacks discussed in this report.

Human Rights Watch also interviewed five national government officials, including the head of Serbia’s Uniformed Police Directorate, four local civil society activists, and four journalists. We allowed the police and justice system time to investigate, indict and prosecute the perpetrators before contacting them over the period June-September 2008.  Initially we wrote to nine misdemeanor judges and nine district prosecutors responsible for all the locations covered in the report. We received written responses from six prosecutors (four of them responded indirectly through the chief prosecutor, who compiled their responses and forwarded to Human Rights Watch). Human Rights Watch followed up with the remaining prosecutors and all the misdemeanor judges (due to their lack of written response) by telephone, receiving information orally.

Human Rights Watch again contacted the head of the Uniformed Police Directorate on August 11, 2008, asking for the information about the progress on the cases, as well as clarification on the police response (the letter is attached in Annex 1 of this report). The police acknowledged receipt by fax on August 12, 2008.  We faxed an additional letter on August 18, 2008, enquiring about the current status of police reform. Receipt was acknowledged orally on August 25, 2008. We received responses to both letters on September 16, 2008 (attached in Annex 3 and 4).

The final reply to our requests for information did not contain information about specific cases and incidents. The response to the first letter emphasized that the police force did its utmost to protect the minorities in the aftermath of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, including during the protests. The response to the second letter described current activities aimed at fostering closer collaboration between the police and the communities in Vojvodina and elsewhere, as well as activities aimed at enhancing ethnic diversity in the police corps.

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